At the beginning of each semester, I teach all of my students about basic argument structure and vocabulary (e.g. valid, invalid, sound, and unsound) and get them used to the idea of seeing arguments laid out in numbered-premise form. I’ve started using Google Presentations as a cool way to let them self-diagnose. I’ve created two presentation ...
I was invited to write a critical review of Jennifer Lackey’s book Learning from Words. I just submitted a draft to Philosophical Books for review, but I still welcome comments/feedback. In short, despite the fact that I disagree with Lackey on a number of issues, I think this book is excellent. Here’s a link to the ...
I’ve posted the penultimate version of my paper “A Defense of the No Minimum Response to the Problem of Evil,” on my research page. It’s forthcoming in Religious Studies. You can also grab it here if you’re interested. It’s a short one, only three pages. ...
Here’s the line-up for that Companion to Epistemology I’ve been working on. 1. Some Puzzles About Methodology in Epistemology (Andrew Cullison) 2. What is Knowledge? (Earl Conee) 3. Foundationalism (Daniel Howard-Snyder) 4. Coherentism (Jonathan Kvanvig) 5. Infinitism (Peter Klein) 6. Evidentialism (Richard Feldman) 7. Reliabilism (Sandford Goldberg) 8. Proper Functionalism (Alvin Plantinga and Kenneth Boyce) 9. Skepticism and Justification (Richard Fumerton) 10. Contextualism and Interest-Relative ...
It’s been awhile since my last blog entry. We hit the end of the semester crunch, and then I went out of town. I’m now back doing work, and posts will resume. Two cool things happened in that break. I had two papers accepted for publication! The first is a paper on the problem of evil called ...
I’m giving a talk this afternoon as part of SUNY Fredonia’s Spring Symposium in Arts and Humanities. The title of the symposium is “The Human Response to Adversity.” The title of my talk is “Natural Disasters and the Existence of God”. I’m posting my presentation slides here, so the audience (and anyone else) can view them ...
I was reading some of the literature on qualia recently, and I was struck by the use of the term qualia freak. Qualia Freak is a label for someone who endorses the view that phenomenal experiences cannot be individuated by what they represent. Qualia freaks believe that experiences must be individuated by some intrinsic feature ...
My paper, “Two Solutions to the Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” just came out in American Philosophical Quarterly today. I just received my copy of the issue in the mail. Here’s a link to the issue on their website. If you don’t have access to APQ, here’s a link to the penultimate draft. ...
I’m giving a talk at Northwestern today called “Descriptivism Meets Gettier” as part of their Epistemology Brown Bag Lecture Series. I’ll post a draft of the paper later (I’ll likely want to make changes after the talk), but here’s the basic idea. I think Descriptivism (about semantic content) is committed to certain speakers having knowledge in ...
Part of Williamson’s case against the possibility of analyzing knowledge involves rejecting three candidate arguments for the thesis that belief is conceptually prior to knowledge. These all come up in the introduction of Knowledge and Its Limits.1 Here is my best attempt to extract these arguments. The labels are my own. The Argument from Non-reflexive Entailment Knowledge ...