When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge - Accepted for Publication!

Woot! I just heard from Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. They just accepted a paper I co-authored with Neil Feit titled “When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge”. Here’s the abstract. I’ll post a penultimate version of the paper when I can. ABSTRACT Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground [...]

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An Open Access Epistemology Journal!

Some of you may already be aware of Logos and Episteme - a new, open-access epistemology journal. I think this is exciting, and I really hope it sticks. So far things are looking great. They have an impressive advisory board including Ernest Sosa, Alvin Goldman, Susan Haack, Duncan Prichard, and Jonathan Kvanvig. You can check [...]

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Critical Review of Lackey’s “Learning from Words”

I was invited to write a critical review of Jennifer Lackey’s book Learning from Words. I just submitted a draft to Philosophical Books for review, but I still welcome comments/feedback. In short, despite the fact that I disagree with Lackey on a number of issues, I think this book is excellent. Here’s a link to [...]

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Companion to Epistemology Line-up

Here’s the line-up for that Companion to Epistemology I’ve been working on. 1. Some Puzzles About Methodology in Epistemology (Andrew Cullison) 2. What is Knowledge? (Earl Conee) 3. Foundationalism (Daniel Howard-Snyder) 4. Coherentism (Jonathan Kvanvig) 5. Infinitism (Peter Klein) 6. Evidentialism (Richard Feldman) 7. Reliabilism (Sandford Goldberg) 8. Proper Functionalism (Alvin Plantinga and Kenneth Boyce) [...]

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Two Papers Accepted for Publication

It’s been awhile since my last blog entry. We hit the end of the semester crunch, and then I went out of town. I’m now back doing work, and posts will resume. Two cool things happened in that break. I had two papers accepted for publication! The first is a paper on the problem of [...]

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Abusive/Teasing Labels in Philosophy

I was reading some of the literature on qualia recently, and I was struck by the use of the term qualia freak. Qualia Freak is a label for someone who endorses the view that phenomenal experiences cannot be individuated by what they represent. Qualia freaks believe that experiences must be individuated by some intrinsic feature [...]

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Descriptivism Meets Gettier Talk at Northwestern

I’m giving a talk at Northwestern today called “Descriptivism Meets Gettier” as part of their Epistemology Brown Bag Lecture Series. I’ll post a draft of the paper later (I’ll likely want to make changes after the talk), but here’s the basic idea. I think Descriptivism (about semantic content) is committed to certain speakers having knowledge [...]

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Three Arguments That Belief is Conceptually Prior to Knowledge

Part of Williamson’s case against the possibility of analyzing knowledge involves rejecting three candidate arguments for the thesis that belief is conceptually prior to knowledge. These all come up in the introduction of Knowledge and Its Limits.1 Here is my best attempt to extract these arguments. The labels are my own. The Argument from Non-reflexive [...]

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Chris Tucker Research Talk is Now Online

I just posted Chris Tucker’s research talk – “What Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism” This was a great talk. You should check it out.

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Williamson’s Caring Argument Against Analyzing Knowledge

Williamson thinks that the fact that we have yet to come up with a suitable analysis of knowledge post-Gettier, among other things, should push us to accept that there is no analysis of knowledge. He thinks that we should treat knowledge as an unanalyzable primitive. Here’s something I find puzzling, he argues that we should [...]

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