Knowledge Denials and Belief
As I noted, we’re back from our vacation, but I want to quickly post a worry about Subject Sensitive Invariantism before I crash.
Filed under: epistemology, philosophy by Andrew Cullison
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Intuitions About Truth vs. Intuitions About Appropriateness
In the last post, I presented an objection to one of the main motivations for Subject Sensitive Invariantism (here). There is an obvious difference between the Guard Dog and Contractor cases on the one hand and Stanley’s cases on the other.
Filed under: epistemology, philosophy, philosophy of language by Andrew Cullison
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Subject Sensitive Invariantism About Dogs and Contractors
Consider the following two cases Guard Dog Case Bob’s mom is worried about burglars. She tells him she needs a dog (but not that it’s to scare away burglars). Bob goes out and gets her a tea cup poodle. She laughs at him and says, “You don’t understand. I’m worried about burglars. That’s not a [...]
Filed under: epistemology, philosophy, philosophy of language by Andrew Cullison
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Where I Was Going with All That Linguistic Inappropriateness
So let’s talk about where I was headed with those last three posts on linguistic appropriateness. We had four cases of assertion. I’ll give a quick summary of each with links to the original post.
Filed under: epistemology, philosophy, philosophy of language by Andrew Cullison
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Linguistic Appropriateness: Another Case
Confession time. I don’t have a good grasp as to what linguistic appropriateness is. But in so far as I do, I’m starting to get interested in cases where it seems intuitive that the person has done something linguistically inappropriate. In the long run, I’m interested in how the cases might inform some debates in [...]
Filed under: epistemology, philosophy, philosophy of language by Andrew Cullison
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Knowledge and Linguistic Appropriateness: Part Two
In this previous post, I briefly outlined how epistemologists sometimes take linguistic appropriateness into account. Let’s grant the judgements about appropriateness in George’s case from that post. In this post, let’s consider some more cases.
Filed under: epistemology, philosophy, philosophy of language by Andrew Cullison
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Knowledge and Linguistic Appropriateness
In this post, I want to illustrate a methodological assumption that is sometimes made in epistemology.The idea is that facts about the linguistic appropriateness/inappropriateness of an assertion can count as evidence for or against an epistemic theory Here’s an example as to how someone might make use of this assumption.
Filed under: epistemology, philosophy, philosophy of language by Andrew Cullison
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Gettier in Real Life
I like to make note of real life Gettier cases. Yesterday I was in one.
Filed under: epistemology, philosophy by Andrew Cullison
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Foundational Semantics
Here’s an argument that the semantic content of some term is directly referential. It’s designed to mirror the regress argument for foundationalism in epistemology.
Filed under: Uncategorized, epistemology, philosophy, philosophy of language by Andrew Cullison
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A Road to Skepticism
I’ve been on a David Lewis kick recently. Here’s more. David Lewis considers two different epistemic objections to Lewisian Modal Realism (hereafter LMR). The first argues that modal realism is incompatible with modal knowledge. The second is that modal realism is incompatible with knowledge about the external world. I want to talk about the second [...]
Filed under: epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy by Andrew Cullison
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