The Concept of Intentional Action

Joshua Knobe has run a series of experiments that suggest that our intuitions about whether or not an action was intentional may be influenced by whether or not the effects of the action were harmful/bad. Here’s a brief summary of one of those studies. In a case where an exec sought to max company profits [...]

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Gettier in Real Life

I like to make note of real life Gettier cases. Yesterday I was in one.

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Foundational Semantics

Here’s an argument that the semantic content of some term is directly referential. It’s designed to mirror the regress argument for foundationalism in epistemology.

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Independent Study on Experimental Philosophy

I’m directing an independent study this summer on Experimental Philosophy. We’re starting with the new reader by Knobe and Nichols. I’ll probably be posting about some of it soon. So far we’re through the manifesto and the section on cross-cultural differences. We spent most of our time talking about “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”

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A Road to Skepticism

I’ve been on a David Lewis kick recently. Here’s more. David Lewis considers two different epistemic objections to Lewisian Modal Realism (hereafter LMR). The first argues that modal realism is incompatible with modal knowledge. The second is that modal realism is incompatible with knowledge about the external world. I want to talk about the second [...]

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Modal Realism and Drowning Children

UPDATE: I think Mike Almeida is right. The response I lay out won’t work. Suppose you have the option of saving a drowning child. Further suppose that Lewisian Modal Realism is true. Here are your options. SAVE THE CHILD You save the child. However, consider what is true about the pluriverse if you save the [...]

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Evidence of Unreliability

I like evidentialism. (EJ) S is justified in believing P iff P is best supported by S’s total evidence. I also like phenomenal conservatism. (PC) If it seems to S that P and S has no defeaters for P, then S is justified believing P. I take it that seemings (absent defeaters) are a kind [...]

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Epistemic Bootstrapping - Philosopher’s Digest

My first review for Philosopher’s Digest was posted today. Here’s the link. It’s on Jonathan Vogel’s paper “Epistemic Bootstrapping” in The Journal of Philosophy (September 2008)

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The General, the Intention Pill, and The Doctrine of Double Effect

There are a few things I don’t quite understand about the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). I think most of them boil down to my own confusion about when it’s true of a person that they intend to bring about some effect. In this post, I simply want to present a case. I’m not sure [...]

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David Lewis on The Number of Functional Roles

In On the Plurality of Worlds David Lewis resists an objection to his view by appealing to functionalism. The problem is roughly that for any number of worlds you suppose are in the pluriverse, you’ll be committed to the absurd thesis that there are more worlds than there really are. Here is the argument.

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