Regarding:
“But at no point are experimental philosophers (or at least the most of experimental philosophers) advocating for the abandonment of conceptual analysis. Generally, they are only advocating the use of experimental methods to compliment conceptual analysis.”

Where do you think someone like Stich fits into this? He strikes me as one of the philosophers that’s really spear-heading this movement, and much of what he writes doesn’t seem to have the conciliatory, harmonious compromise you suggest.

For example, here is a link to a paper on his website - it’s the most recent paper a back and forth between him and Sosa
http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/Publications/Papers/REPLY%20%20to%20%20SOSA%20-%20web.doc

That said - Stich is not Knobe or Nichols - so it’s not fair to pin his views on them.

Philosophers, as conceptual analyst, many times make claims about what some given person would surely say about a given scenario. However, experimental philosophers see these type of claims as being empirically testable claims (which they clearly are). As an empirical claim, the experimentalist simply prefers to test these claims rather than simply stipulate that the claims are true.

Experimental philosophers are generally also interested in exploring what sorts of mechanisms produce some given intuition and what sorts of individual difference factors, if any, may be able to systematically account for intuition variations.

Identifying the mechanisms, traits, and processes involved in intuition production and intuition variation seem to have obvious potential benefits for identifying the reliability of certain intuitions (via the reliability of the mechanisms).

But at no point are experimental philosophers (or at least the most of experimental philosophers) advocating for the abandonment of conceptual analysis. Generally, they are only advocating the use of experimental methods to compliment conceptual analysis.

I think more directly to your claimed principles that the experimentalist is committed to, I think it may be more accurate (though far from perfectly so) to restate them as follows:

1. Intuitions that come from sources S are unreliable and tend not to reliably yield knowledge because they are unreliable.
2. Intuitions that have been empirically confirmed to come from sources S should be suspect.
(Let S be whatever sources the experimental philosophers take to be suspect)

That post was very informative. Correct me if I’m wrong, but it looks like Schwitzgebel would go with Joshua’s first interpretation of the the first passage above.

I think I like your first interpretation best.

Regarding the second interpretation, I suspect they do think their position is rational, and I suspect that they are offering what they think is a good motivation for their position (even for them).

Regarding the third interpretation, that’s certainly a possibility - I would have liked to see (even perhaps in a footnote where to go in the reader to find it).

Back the first interpretation - this is what I thought they might have in mind - but then it’s interesting to note that experimental philosophy isn’t the radical shake-up movement that some of the really enthusiastic experimentalists trumpet. In fact, it’s something I’d probably be on board with.

But, suppose that they do accept the core commitment that you’ve suggested they may be touting. One might take this passage as an ad hominem. Perhaps they are trying to elicit in you whatever it is that you take to be an intuition in support of their position. They might then say that insofar as you believe that intuitions are a decent source of justification, you should accept their position.

Finally, perhaps they think they do have the empirical support for the reliability of the intuitions that generate their beliefs. They are just not presenting that empirical support in the first few pages of their new reader.

But if that’s the case, then I agree with you completely. If you’re being uncharitable, someone needs to straighten two people out now.