I was reading some of the literature on qualia recently, and I was struck by the use of the term qualia freak. Qualia Freak is a label for someone who endorses the view that phenomenal experiences cannot be individuated by what they represent. Qualia freaks believe that experiences must be individuated by some intrinsic feature of that experience.
That’s a pretty funny label, but it’s also pretty clearly an attempt to poke fun at or tease proponents of such a view. So I’m trying to come up with labels for theories in philosophy that are abusive. Perhaps the term abusive is a bit harsh, but you get the idea. Perhaps we should call these labels teasing labels. Basically, I’m looking for labels that seem like they are introduced with a partial intention to tease proponents of the view.
Here are some that I can come up with.
Dogmatist
Someone who endorses a Chisholmian-esque epistemic principle like “If it appears to S that P (and S has no defeaters), then S is justified in believing P”
Ostrich Nominalism
A version of nominalism about properties that doesn’t address questions that many think motivate postulating the existence of abstract universals (e.g. questions about what grounds similarity relations)
Magical Realism
This is a realist view about possible worlds that denies that possible worlds are ersatz linguistic entities and denies that they are concrete worlds like our own.
Qualia Freaks
People who think that phenomenal experiences are individuated by some intrinsic feature of the experience.
Non-serious Presentism
Non-serious presentists defend against the cross-temporal relations objection to presentism by holding that you can stand in relations to things that don’t exist.
I have some thoughts about what unifies this phenomenon in contemporary philosophy, but before I go into details - I’m curious about how wide spread this is.
It’s time for a bleg: Can you add to this list? Can you come up with more popular, well-known labels for philosophical theories that seem to be introduced with a (perhaps very small) intent to mock or tease.
Filed under: epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy by Andrew Cullison
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