SUNY-Fredonia's own, Neil Feit, has a book coming out this summer.

OUP has a description - plus some nice blurbs from Andy Egan and John Perry on their website. I'm pasting all of that below.

Description

Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions-things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of beliefs about the self. These are beliefs that we express by means of a first-person pronoun. Feit maintains-following David Lewis, Roderick Chisholm, and others-that in general, the contents of our beliefs are properties. Unlike propositions, properties lack absolute truth values that do not vary with time, place, or person.

Belief about the Self offers a sustained defense of the Property Theory of Content, according to which the content of every cognitive attitude is a property rather than a proposition. The theory is supported with an array of new arguments, defended from various objections, and applied to some important problems and puzzles in the philosophy of mind.

Reviews

"Feit's discussion of the arguments for and against the property theory of content is philosophically sophisticated, generous, and fair-minded, and he finds some extremely interesting applications for his version of the property theory."
--Andy Egan, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan

"Belief about the Self is an important contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, and useful for the broader field of cognitive science."
--John Perry, Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University

Here's one standard way to formulate the skeptical paradox.

1. I know that I have hands.
2. I don't know I'm not a brain-in-a-vat.
3. If I don't know that I'm not a brain-in-a-vat, then I don't know that I have hands.
   

These three sentences cannot all be true, and yet each one seems plausible. Here are the standard replies.

The Standard Replies

Option One: Skepticism
We deny (1.)

Option Two: Dogmatist
We deny (2.)

Option Three: Closure Hater
Most people think that knowledge is closed under entailment. If we deny that, we're in a position to deny (3.)

Option Four: Contextualist
Utterances of (1.) and (2.) are never true in the same context. Which of the two we deny will depend on the context in which the sentences are uttered.

All of these responses treat the knowledge relation (or relations if you're a contextualist) as binary relations between a person and proposition.

Enter Contrastivism
Contrastivism holds that knowledge ascriptions do not express a binary relation. Knowledge ascriptions express a ternary relation between a person, a proposition, and a second contrast proposition. (see Contrastive Knowledge.)

I won't get into the details of the constrastivist resolution of the paradox just yet, I'm more interested in a passage from Schaffer criticizing the skeptic and dogmatist.

I object to skepticism and dogmatism on two parallel counts. First, the denials of [1] and [2] strike me as absurd. At least, some explanation is needed of their plausibility. Second, skepticism and dogmatism collapse distinctions. Suppose that Student, Assistant, and Professor are visiting the zebras at the zoo. Student is remarkably ignorant, and can’t even discern a zebra from a mule; Assistant can discern a zebra from a mule by its stripes, but cannot discern a zebra from a cleverly pained mule; Professor can discern a zebra even from a cleverly painted mule by anatomical features that no mere paint job can disguise. The skeptic confuses Student with Assistant, denying that either knows that the beast is a zebra, since neither can eliminate the painted mule hypothesis. The dogmatist confuses Assistant with Professor, maintaining that both know that the beast is a zebra, since both can eliminate the unpainted mule hypothesis. Both skepticism and dogmatism thereby distort partial knowledge. [emphasis added]

I'm interested in the last few sentences. My money is on dogmatism, so maybe I'm missing something rather simple here. Why can't the dogmatist capture intuitions about partial knowledge in the following way?

A. The student doesn't know it's a zebra
B. The assistant knows it's a zebra, but the degree of justification (or warrant) is moderate.
C. The professor knows it's a zebra, and the degree of justification (or warrant) is really high.

The basic idea is that I would not need contrastivism to capture any intuitions that someone like Schaffer has about partial knowledge - all I would need is that justification (or warrant) comes in degrees. Am I overlooking something here?

In a previous post I presented an argument from Jubien aimed at direct reference theory that relied on mereological essentialism. Here is the post. Below is the argument again so you don't have to click away.



Michael Jubien's Argument Against Direct Reference

1. If Direct Reference theory is true, then 'Venus' in 'Venus could have had different parts' contributes a physical object to the proposition expressed and nothing more.
   
   
2. If 'Venus' in 'Venus could have had different parts' contributes a physical object to the proposition expressed and nothing more, then the sentence 'Venus could have had different parts' expresses a falsehood.
   
   
3. The sentence 'Venus could have had different parts' does not express a falsehood.
   
   
4. Therefore, it's not true that 'Venus' in 'Venus could have had different parts' contributes a physical object to the proposition expressed and nothing more.
   
   
5. Therefore, Direct Reference theory is not true.

I've been thinking about this all week. The comments from the previous post noted two very plausible ways to go. Give up on mereological essentialism, and reject (2). I'm inclined to give up on mereological essentialism too, but I must confess I have my moments where I wake up groggy and ask myself - why should I reject that view again?

The other option suggested was to give up on (3). If you're a mereological essentialist, why not stick to those guns and say that Venus couldn't have had different parts?

Let's pursue this option of rejecting (3) a little further. I think if you're a mereological essentialist, you're going to have a tough time finding a plausible semantic theory that allows you to keep (3).

Jubien takes it for granted that his descriptivism would allow us to keep (3). But consider the sentence.

(V) Venus could have had different parts.

It seems that Jubien's version of descriptivism entails that (V) is synonymous with (V*)

(V*) There is an X such that X has the property being-Venus and X could have had different parts.

(V*) is false if you're a mereological essentialist. If you're a mereological essentialist and a standard descriptivist then you'd have to say that (V) doesn't express a truth. It seems like Jubien would have to reject (3) in his own argument. Or make it more clear how his version of descriptivism when combined with mereological essentialism doesn't entail that (V) is false.

This seems like a very quick and hasty objection to direct reference theory from Michael Jubien, but it's interesting. Direct Reference Theory recall is the thesis that the meaning of a name is the thing to which it refers (and nothing more).

From the present perspective [direct reference] cannot be right. It is an indisputable modal fact that (the planet) Venus could have had some different parts. If the name 'Venus' simply contributed a physical object to the claims expressed with the help of that name, it would follow that some physical object could have had different parts. But we have apparently just seen that no physical object could have different parts. And all we needed to see it was a seemingly innocent and naturalistic conception of physical stuff. The falsity of direct reference theory is a very important consequence of these seemingly innocent and straightforward metaphysical considerations. (Michael Jubien. 2007. "Analyzing Modality" in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3: pp. 116-117)

Wow. So some kind of mereological essentialism leads to the denial of Millianism? Let's grant Jubien the consequences of his thought experiment and assume that no physical object could have different parts. I may lay that out in a future post soon, but for now I'll leave it as homework.

Michael Jubien's Argument Against Direct Reference

1. If Direct Reference theory is true, then 'Venus' in 'Venus could have had different parts' contributes a physical object to the proposition expressed and nothing more.
   
   
2. If 'Venus' in 'Venus could have had different parts' contributes a physical object to the proposition expressed and nothing more, then the sentence 'Venus could have had different parts' expresses a falsehood.
   
   
3. The sentence 'Venus could have had different parts' does not express a falsehood.
   
   
4. Therefore, it's not true that 'Venus' in 'Venus could have had different parts' contributes a physical object to the proposition expressed and nothing more.
   
   
5. Therefore, Direct Reference theory is not true.
   

That's my summary of the argument. Let me know if you think I'm being uncharitable. I've got a lot to say about this argument. This may involve laying out Jubien's thought experiment that alleges to show that physical objects could not have had different parts. This will all have to wait. I have to get to school.

You've gotta love it when a car commercial picks up on the semantic/pragmatic confusion that sometimes goes with the logical connective 'and'...

I've been writing about Weak Substantivalism. Here are the two previous posts.

1. Two Kinds of Substantivalism
2. They Are There: Some Consequences for Weak Substantivalism

In the second post, I promised to post about some more counter-intuitive consequences of weak substantivalism. Here they are.

More Counter-Intuitive Consequences for Weak Substantivalism
Suppose we have an Andy-shaped bag of turnips. Suppose I pick out the region of space that it occupies with the word 'there' - Now consider proposition (C).

(C) I could have been there.

(C) seems true. If Weak Substantivalism is true, then (C) is committed to the claim that I could have been a bag of turnips - which is false.

If you think it is metaphysically possible for me to have been a bag of turnips (which it's not), we can press this point a bit more. Suppose I'm trying to make a point to the class about Weak Substantivalism, and I bring an Andy-Shaped Bag of Turnips to class to talk about the view. I can't decide where to stand. I'm about to stand to the left, but at the last minute decide to stand more toward the right. I place Andy-shaped bag of turnips in the spot where I was going to stand. Then an anvil drops from the ceiling and crushes the turnips. I say, "Whew, I'm glad I wasn't there. I almost was there." Consider (D)

(D) I was almost there

If Weak Substantivalism is true, then (D) says that I was almost a bag of turnips. That's definitely false. However, (D) is definitely true.

Note: All of this is on the assumption that weak substantivalists will collapse the location relation to the identity relation - In the comments to my previous post, I noted that weak substantivalists could collapse the location relation to the part-whole relation. However, I think many of the counter-intuitive consequences will remain.

A few days ago I laid out three views about the nature of space-time. Here's a quick summary of those views. For those of you who read the last post, you can probably skip down to the section titled "They are There"

Relationalism - Space is not real. Talk about space is reducible to talk about objects.

Strong Substantivalism
Space is a real, genuine entity. Objects that occupy space are real. Regions of space are distinct from the objects that occupy them.

Weak Substantivalism
Space is a real, genuine entity. And material objects JUST ARE regions of space.

In my last post, I briefly mentioned some counter-intuitive consequences for Weak Substantivalism, and I promised to offer more. Here are some more.

They are There
The pronoun ‘they’ is an indexical that when used in a particular context can pick out a group of objects. The pronoun ‘there’ is an indexical that when used in a particular context can pick out a region of space (and I assume a scattered region).

Suppose I use ‘they’ in a particular context to pick out Alex, Bobbi, Sam, and Jackson. Suppose I then use ‘there’ to pick out the region of space that I think they occupy. Here are some odd consequences of Weak Substantivalism.

First: My use of ‘they’ and ‘there’ are synonymous. That alone is a little odd.

Second: 'They are watching' is synonymous with 'There are watching'

Now of course this assumes some kind of direct reference theory meaning and compositionality of meaning. Those seem like OK assumptions to me, but suppose you're not convinced that these consequences are problematic. You might reject my linguistic assumptions, or (if you accept the assumptions) employ a Ways-Millian strategy.

If you are not worried about the above consequences, we can generate some consequences that may still seem problematic to you. I assume that, according to Weak Substantivalism, location relations would collapse into identity relations. Assuming that's true, consider the following proposition.

(B) They are there

It seems that if Weak Substantivalism is true, then (B) is an identity claim. It sure doesn't seem like an identity claim. Furthermore, assuming identity is necessary - (B) would be necessary. It certainly doesn't seem like a necessary truth. I've got some more counter-intuitive consequences for Weak Substantivalism. Stay tuned.

[Update: Here are some more counter-intuitive consequences for Weak Substantivalism]

This is pretty half-baked, but consider the following proposition:

(1) January 9, 2008 is present.

I think it is a vague matter whether or not this is true. Imagine the minutes are slowly ticking away on January 8. It's 11:59. As the time passes, January 9 will be determinately present, but exactly when that happens seems to be a vague matter.

This, however, will lend some support to A-Theory (and either presentism or some version of the moving spotlight view in the ontology of time). For imagine if B-Theory is true. If B-Theory is true, then 'present' functions like an indexical, and (1) really expresses something like the following proposition.

(1*) October 4, 2006 is October 4, 2006.

(1*) is not vague. At least many philosophers are inclined to accept that identity statements are not vague, and whatever motivates us to accept that should motivate us to accept that (1*) is not vague.

So, it's time for the puzzle. First, a quick recap.

1. Ways-Millianism (Part One)
I explained how Millianism responds to Frege Puzzles using ways of believing.

2. Ways-Millianism (Part Two)
I explained how this strategy can be extended (and has already been extended) to respond to a variety of philosophical problems and puzzles.

Now for the puzzle...
The strategy in Part One and Part Two all have the following unifying feature. The diagnosis of the problem involves pointing out that we are confused in some way because we run the argument using two different ways of thinking about one and the same thing. Those different ways are embedded in the same propositional attitude verb. This is how we get confused, says the Millian.

Basically, I'm worried that this strategy if it can be adopted in Part One and Part Two, can be extended to undermine any counterexample to any conceptual analysis in philosophy!

Here's the idea. The following is the basic structure for any conceptual analysis and counterexample.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++


The Basic Structure for ANY CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS and COUNTEREXAMPLE

Schema for Analysis of Alpha in terms of Beta
X is an alpha iff X is a beta

Counterexample
I tell you a story where it is intuitive that something, call it Bob, is an alpha but not a beta.


++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Extreme Ways Millian Extension
The Ways Millian extension of the strategy from part one and part two would go like this...

"In your thought experiment you're thinking about one and the same thing using to different ways or modes of presentation. We can see this more clearly when you flesh out what your real evidence for non-identity is. Your real evidence is...

(A) It is intuitive that Bob is an alpha
(B) It is not intuitive that Bob is a beta

But look, you're just embedding your uses of 'alpha' and 'beta' inside the propositional attitude verb intuitive-that. There's your mistake," says the Extreme Ways-Millian.

The Options
1. Give up on Ways-Millianism.
2. Draw some distinction between permissible and impermissible uses of the strategy.
3. Accept Way-Millianism and the extension of the stragey - i.e., bye-bye conceptual analysis.

My money is on (2), and I think I have a way to draw the line. I'm currently hashing that out, though. I might post it a little later.

If anyone has any thoughts, comments are open.

In Ways-Millianism: A Puzzle (Part One), I explained how ways of believing can be employed to respond to Frege Puzzles. In this post, I'll explain how this strategy gives us a nice tool for our philosopher's toolkit. However, adding that tool introduces what appears to me to be a serious puzzle. I'll discuss that puzzle in the next post.

Recalling the Ways Millian Strategy
Recall (C) and (D) from the first post.

(C) Sarah believes that Mark Twain wrote Huck Finn
(D) Sarah believes that Samuel Clemens wrote Huck Finn

Once you're on board with the Millian strategy of explaining our intuitions that (C) and (D) could differ in truth value by appeal to ways of thinking about one and the same thing under different ways of believing or modes of presentation - you've got a nice tool to add to your philosopher's toolkit. Here are some examples.

Ethical Naturalism
It has been suggested that The Open Question Argument against ethical naturalism is a kind of Frege Puzzle. Your intuitions about the following:

(E) X is good, but is X pleasant?
(F) X is good, but is X good?

We find it intuitive that (E) and (F) are different questions. So, 'good' must not mean pleasant. Good-ness must not equal pleasant-ness. Since you could do this for any natural property, good-ness (if it exists) must be a non-natural property.

Enter Ways - Your intutions about (E) and (F) can be explained by appeal to ways. You simply have two different ways of thinking about one and the same thing.

Materialism about the Mind
Here's a simplistic argument that the mental states are not identical to brain states. Imagine Little Johnny feels hungry. An identity theorist about the mind will hold that the state of being-hungry is identical to some brain state B. Call the state of being-hungry H and the brain state B.

(G) Little Johnny knows about H
(H) Little Johnny does not know about B

So, by Leibniz Law H does not equal B. Problem for the identity theorist.

Enter Ways - Johnny does know about B, he just knows about it using the H-way of thinking about it. He has two ways of thinking about one and the same thing.

Philosophy of Time
I won't go into the details here, but Ted Sider appeals to the idea that you can think about the same fact under two different propositional guises in Four-Dimensionalism. This is how he responds to the Thank-Goodness-That's-Over argument against eternalism.

Upgrading the Philosopher's Toolkit
My main point in this post is that once you've adopted the Ways-Millian metaphysics of belief, you can start using it to respond to a bunch of philosophical problems and puzzles. It's a wonderful little tool to add to your philosopher's toolkit. There are more examples of this, but these three are good enough now.

But, this leads to a puzzle. Stay tuned...

I want to discuss a puzzle for a view called Ways-Millianism. I'll do it in two parts. In this post I'm going to briefly present a Frege Puzzle for Millianism and the Ways-Millianism response. The puzzle I want to discuss relies on understanding how the Ways-Millian responds to Frege Puzzles.

If you're already familiar with this stuff, then you might want to just wait for the next post.

Frege Puzzles and Ways-Millianism

Millianism is the view that the semantic content of a proper name is its referent. This view faces certain problems that are called Frege Puzzles. Consider the following two sentences:

(A) Mark Twain is the author of Huckleberry Finn.
(B) Samuel Clemens is the author of Huckleberry Finn.

If Millianism is correct, then (A) and (B) express the same proposition. That seems problematic. It seems obvious that (A) and (B) do not express the same proposition.

While it might be easy to resist the intuition that simple sentences like (A) and (B) do not express the same proposition, the problem seems worse when we consider sentences, like the following, that contain propositional attitude verbs.

(C) Sarah believes that Mark Twain is the author of Huckleberry Finn.
(D) Sarah believes that Samuel Clemens is the author of Huckleberry Finn.

While one might simply insist that (A) and (B) express the same proposition, it seems that (C) and (D) clearly express different propositions. Surely, (C) and (D) could differ in truth value. If (C) and (D) could differ in truth value, then they do not express the same proposition. If (C) and (D) do not express the same proposition, then neither do (A) and (B). Millians have a problem.

A nice way to solve this problem is to invoke ways of believing. The solution takes belief to be a mediated relation. The belief relation is still a relation between a person and a proposition; however, persons believe propositions via some way of believing. A person believes a proposition in virtue of standing in some psychological relation to some third thing.

One theory of what ways are holds that ways are sentence-like mental representations. According to this theory, people believe propositions in virtue of standing in some relation to these representations. Let’s call this relation that a person bears to the sentence-like mental representation the accepting relation. So a person believes a proposition P by accepting a sentence-like mental representation that semantically expresses P.

Call the combination of this metaphysics of belief with Millianism, Ways-Millianism. Ways-Millianism can explain why we have the intuition that (C) and (D) could differ in truth value. Consider Sarah again. She could believe Mark Twain is the author of Huckleberry Finn by accepting the mentalese sentence ‘Mark Twain is the author of Huckleberry Finn.' However, she could fail to accept the mental sentence ‘Samuel Clemens is the author of Huckleberry Finn.’ We could say that Sarah believes Mark Twain is the author of Huckleberry Finn---in the Twain Way, but fails to believe Mark Twain is the author of Huckleberry Finn--- in the Clemens Way. Since Sarah could believe the same proposition in one way and fail to believe it in another way, it is easy to see how we might have the intuition that (C) and (D) could differ in truth value. We imagine Sarah accepting a sentence like ‘Mark Twain is the author of Huckleberry Finn’, so we think (C) could be true. However, we think that she could accept that sentence while also accepting the denial of the sentence ‘Samuel Clemens is the author of Huckleberry Finn’, so we think that (D) could be false. However, we are simply mistaken. (C) and (D) do not differ in truth value, but it is easy to see why we might think they could.

Stay tuned for the puzzle...