#Created by Kbib version 0.6.1 #Last modified: Sun Jun 8 00:23:07 2008 @article{Coleman2008, author = {Coleman, Mary Clayton}, title = {Directions of fit and the humean theory of motivation}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {1}, pages = {127--139}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701676393}, abstract = {According to the Humean theory of motivation, a person can only be motivated to act by a desire together with a relevantly related belief. More specifically, a person can only be motivated to {\"I}• by a desire to {\"I}ˆ together with a belief that {\"I}•-ing is a means to or a way of {\"I}ˆ-ing. In recent writings, Michael Smith gives what has become a very influential argument in favour of the Humean claim that desire is a necessary part of motivation, and a great deal has been written about Smith's defence of this Humean claim. However, no one has yet identified the fundamental weakness of his defence. The fundamental weakness is that there is no single conception of directions of fit that does all the work Smith needs it to do throughout the various stages of his defence.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hieronymi2008, author = {Hieronymi, Pamela}, title = {The reasons of trust}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {2}, pages = {213--236}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400801886496}, abstract = {I argue to a conclusion I find at once surprising and intuitive: although many considerations show trust useful, valuable, important, or required, these are not the reasons for which one trusts a particular person to do a particular thing. The reasons for which one trusts a particular person on a particular occasion concern, not the value, importance, or necessity of trust itself, but rather the trustworthiness of the person in question in the matter at hand. In fact, I will suggest that the degree to which you trust a particular person to do a particular thing will vary inversely with the degree to which you must rely, for the motivation or justification of your trusting response, on reasons that concern the importance, or value, or necessity of having such a response.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{McGeer2008, author = {McGeer, Victoria}, title = {Trust, hope and empowerment}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {2}, pages = {237--254}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400801886413}, abstract = {Philosophers and social scientists have focussed a great deal of attention on our human capacity to trust, but relatively little on the capacity to hope. This is a significant oversight, as hope and trust are importantly interconnected. This paper argues that, even though trust can and does feed our hopes, it is our empowering capacity to hope that significantly underwrites{\^a}€”and makes rational{\^a}€”our capacity to trust.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Nagel2008, author = {Nagel, Jennifer}, title = {Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {2}, pages = {279--294}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400801886397}, abstract = {Why do our intuitive knowledge ascriptions shift when a subject's practical interests are mentioned? Many efforts to answer this question have focused on empirical linguistic evidence for context sensitivity in knowledge claims, but the empirical psychology of belief formation and attribution also merits attention. The present paper examines a major psychological factor (called {\^a}€˜need-for-closure{\^a}€™) relevant to ascriptions involving practical interests. Need-for-closure plays an important role in determining whether one has a settled belief; it also influences the accuracy of one's cognition. Given these effects, it is a mistake to assume that high- and low-stakes subjects provided with the same initial evidence are perceived to enjoy belief formation that is the same as far as truth-conducive factors are concerned. This mistaken assumption has underpinned contextualist and interest-relative invariantist treatments of cases in which contrasting knowledge ascriptions are elicited by descriptions of subjects with the same initial information and different stakes. The paper argues that intellectualist invariantism can easily accommodate such cases.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Lyons2008, author = {Lyons, Jack C.}, title = {Evidence, experience, and externalism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {99999}, number = {1}, pages = {1--19}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400801886363}, abstract = {The Sellarsian dilemma is a famous argument that attempts to show that nondoxastic experiential states cannot confer justification on basic beliefs. The usual conclusion of the Sellarsian dilemma is a coherentist epistemology, and the usual response to the dilemma is to find it quite unconvincing. By distinguishing between two importantly different justification relations (evidential and nonevidential), I hope to show that the Sellarsian dilemma, or something like it, does offer a powerful argument against standard nondoxastic foundationalist theories. But this reconceived version of the argument does not support coherentism. Instead, I use it to argue for a strongly externalist epistemology.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hare2008, author = {Hare, Caspar}, title = {A Puzzle about Other-directed Time-bias}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {2}, pages = {269--277}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400801886348}, abstract = {Should we be time-biased on behalf of other people? {\^a}€˜Sometimes yes, sometimes no{\^a}€™{\^a}€”it is tempting to answer. But this is not right. On pain of irrationality, we cannot be too selective about when we are time-biased on behalf of other people.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Paseau2008, author = {Paseau, Alexander}, title = {Motivating Reductionism about Sets}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {2}, pages = {295--307}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400801886454}, abstract = {The paper raises some difficulties for the typical motivations behind set reductionism, the view that sets are reducible to entities identified independently of set theory.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Yagisawa2008, author = {Yagisawa, Takashi}, title = {Modal Realism with Modal Tense}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {2}, pages = {309--327}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400801886470}, abstract = {Modal realists should fashion their theory by postulating and taking seriously the modal equivalent of tense, or modal tense. This will give them a uniform way to respond to five different objections, one each by Skyrms, Quine, and Peacocke, and two by van Inwagen, and suggest a non-Lewisian path to modal realism.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Lackey2008, author = {Lackey, Jennifer}, title = {What Luck is Not}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {2}, pages = {255--267}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400801886207}, abstract = {In this paper, I critically examine the two dominant views of the concept of luck in the current literature: lack of control accounts and modal accounts. In particular, I argue that the conditions proposed by such views{\^a}€”that is, a lack of control and the absence of counterfactual robustness{\^a}€”are neither necessary nor sufficient for an event's being lucky. Hence, I conclude that the two main accounts in the current literature both fail to capture what is distinctive of, and central to, the concept of luck.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cohen2008, author = {Cohen, Jonathan}, title = {Colour constancy as counterfactual}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {1}, pages = {61--92}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701846566}, abstract = {


There is nothing in this World constant but Inconstancy.

[Swift 1711: 258]



In this paper I argue that two standard characterizations of colour constancy are inadequate to the phenomenon. This inadequacy matters, since, I contend, philosophical appeals to colour constancy as a way of motivating illumination-independent conceptions of colour turn crucially on the shortcomings of these characterizations. After critically reviewing the standard characterizations, I provide a novel counterfactualist understanding of colour constancy, argue that it avoids difficulties of its traditional rivals, and defend it from objections. Finally, I show why, on this improved understanding, colour constancy does not have the philosophical consequences that have been claimed for it in the literature.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{H2008, author = {Handfield, Toby}, title = {Humean dispositionalism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {1}, pages = {113--126}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701846608}, abstract = {Humean metaphysics is characterized by a rejection of necessary connections between distinct existences. Dispositionalists claim that there are basic causal powers. The existence of such properties is widely held to be incompatible with the Humean rejection of necessary connections. In this paper I present a novel theory of causal powers that vindicates the dispositionalist claim that causal powers are basic, without embracing brute necessary connections. The key assumptions of the theory are that there are natural types of causal processes, and that manifestations of powers are identified with certain kinds of causal processes. From these assumptions, the modal features of powers are explained in terms of internal relations between powers themselves and the process-types in which powers are manifested.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Demir2008, author = {Demir, Hilmi}, title = {Counterfactuals vs. conditional probabilities: A critical analysis of the counterfactual theory of information}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {1}, pages = {45--60}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701846541}, abstract = {Cohen and Meskin 2006 recently offered a counterfactual theory of information to replace the standard probabilistic theory of information. They claim that the counterfactual theory fares better than the standard account on three grounds: first, it provides a better framework for explaining information flow properties; second, it requires a less expensive ontology; and third, because it does not refer to doxastic states of the information-receiving organism, it provides an objective basis. In this paper, I show that none of these is really an advantage. Moreover, the counterfactual theory fails to satisfy one of the basic properties of information flow, namely the Conjunction principle. Thus, I conclude, there is no reason to give up the standard probabilistic theory for the counterfactual theory of information.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{DeRose2008, author = {DeRose, Keith}, title = {Gradable adjectives: A defence of pluralism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {1}, pages = {141--160}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701846624}, abstract = {This paper attacks the Implicit Reference Class Theory of gradable adjectives and proposes instead a {\^a}€˜pluralist{\^a}€™ approach to the semantics of those terms, according to which they can be governed by a variety of different types of standards, one, but only one, of which is the group-indexed standards utilized by the Implicit Reference Class Theory.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cullity2008, author = {Cullity, Garrett}, title = {Public goods and fairness}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {1}, pages = {1--21}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701846491}, abstract = {To what extent can we as a community legitimately require individuals to contribute to producing public goods? Most of us think that, at least sometimes, refusing to pay for a public good that you have enjoyed can involve a kind of {\^a}€˜free riding{\^a}€™ that makes it wrong. But what is less clear is under exactly which circumstances this is wrong. To work out the answer to that, we need to know why it is wrong. I argue that when free riding is wrong, the reason is that it is unfair. That is not itself a very controversial claim. But spelling out why it is unfair allows us to see just which forms of free riding are wrong. Moreover, it supplies a basis from which some more controversial conclusions can be defended. Even if a public good is one that you have been given without asking for it or seeking it out, it can still be wrong not to be prepared to pay for it. It can be wrong not to be prepared to pay for public goods even when you do not receive them at all. And furthermore, it can be right to force you to do so.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Dowell2008, author = {Dowell, J. L.}, title = {A priori entailment and conceptual analysis: Making room for type-C physicalism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {1}, pages = {93--111}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701846582}, abstract = {One strategy for blocking Chalmers's overall case against physicalism has been to deny his claim that showing that phenomenal properties are in some sense physical requires an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones. Here I avoid this well-trodden ground and argue instead that an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones does not require an analysis in the Jackson/Chalmers sense. This is to sever the dualist's link between conceptual analysis and a priori entailment by showing that the lack of the former does not imply the absence of the latter.

Moreover, given the role of the argument from conceptual analysis in Chalmers's overall case for dualism, undermining that argument effectively undermines that case as a whole in a way that, I'll argue, undermining the conceivability arguments as stand-alone arguments does not.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hauska2008, author = {Hauska, Jan}, title = {In defence of causal bases}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {1}, pages = {23--43}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701846509}, abstract = {C. B. Martin's finkish cases raise one of the most serious objections to conditional analyses of dispositions. David Lewis's reformed analysis is widely considered the most promising response to the objection. Despite its sophistication, however, the reformed analysis still provokes questions concerning its ability to handle finkish cases. They focus on the applicability of the analysis to {\^a}€˜baseless{\^a}€™ dispositions. After sketching Martin's objection and the reformed analysis, I argue that all dispositions have causal bases which the analysis can unproblematically invoke.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Clarke2008, author = {Clarke, Randolph}, title = {Autonomous reasons for intending}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, number = {2}, pages = {191--212}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400801886181}, abstract = {An autonomous reason for intending to A would be a reason for so intending that is not, and will not be, a reason for A-ing. Some puzzle cases, such as the one that figures in the toxin puzzle, suggest that there can be such reasons for intending, but these cases have special features that cloud the issue. This paper describes cases that more clearly favour the view that we can have practical reasons of this sort. Several objections to this view are considered and rejected. Finally, it is considered whether the existence of such reasons would conflict with an attractive coherence principle linking the rationality of intending with that of acting as intended. The paper concludes with a qualified affirmation of autonomous reasons for intending.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Choi2007, author = {Choi, Sungho}, title = {Causes and probability-raisers of processes}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {1}, pages = {81--91}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601154400}, abstract = {Schaffer proposes a new account of probabilistic causation that synthesizes the probability-raising and process-linkage views on causation. The driving idea of Schaffer's account is that, although an effect does not invariably depend on its cause, a process linked to the effect does. In this paper, however, I will advance counterexamples to Schaffer's account and then demonstrate that Schaffer's possible responses to them do not work. Finally, I will argue that my counterexamples suggest that the driving idea of Schaffer's account is misdirected.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Johansson2007, author = {Johansson, Jens}, title = {Non-Reductionism and Special Concern}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {4}, pages = {641--657}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701654804}, abstract = {The so-called {\^a}€˜Extreme Claim{\^a}€™ asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar problems do not arise for non-reductionism. In this paper I challenge this widely held assumption.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Coady2007, author = {Coady, C. A. J.}, title = {William Joseph (Bill) Ginnane}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {3}, pages = {513--514}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701574275}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ball2007, author = {Ball, Derek}, title = {Twin-earth externalism and concept possession}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {3}, pages = {457--472}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701572220}, abstract = {It is widely believed that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments show that the contents of a person's thoughts fail to supervene on her intrinsic properties. Several recent philosophers have made the further claim that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments produce metaphysically necessary conditions for the possession of certain concepts. I argue that the latter view is false, and produce counterexamples to several proposed conditions. My thesis is of particular interest because it undermines some attempts to show that externalism is incompatible with privileged access.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Chignell2007, author = {Chignell, Andrew}, title = {Kant on the normativity of taste: The role of aesthetic ideas}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {3}, pages = {415--433}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701571677}, abstract = {For Kant, the form of a subject's experience of an object provides the normative basis for an aesthetic judgement about it. In other words, if the subject's experience of an object has certain structural properties, then Kant thinks she can legitimately judge that the object is beautiful{\^a}€”and that it is beautiful for everyone. My goal in this paper is to provide a new account of how this {\^a}€˜subjective universalism{\^a}€™ is supposed to work. In doing so, I appeal to Kant's notions of an aesthetic idea and an aesthetic attribute, and the connection that Kant makes between an object's expression of rational and the normativity of aesthetic judgements about it.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Denby2007, author = {Denby, David}, title = {A note on analysing substancehood}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {3}, pages = {473--484}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701572238}, abstract = {I propose an analysis of the notion of a substance. I define two {\^a}€˜quasi-logical{\^a}€™ independence relations, and state the analysis in terms of the distribution of these relations among substances and properties generally. This analysis treats the categories of substance and property as mutually dependent. To show that it (probably) states a sufficient condition for substance, I argue that it is in a certain kind of equilibrium. This illustrates a promising general approach to analysing fundamental metaphysical notions.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Tiberius2007, author = {Tiberius, Valerie}, title = {Substance and procedure in theories of prudential value}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {3}, pages = {373--391}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701571628}, abstract = {In this paper I argue that the debate between subjective and objective theories of prudential value obscures the way in which elements of both are needed for a comprehensive theory of prudential value. I suggest that we characterize these two types of theory in terms of their different aims: procedural (or subjective) theories give an account of the necessary conditions for something to count as good for a person, while substantive (or objective) theories give an account of what is good for a person, given some set of necessary conditions. Characterizing the theories in this way allows us to see their mutual compatibility. To make this case, I assume that a theory of prudential value ought to be descriptively and normatively adequate. The criterion of descriptive adequacy requires that our theory explain the subject relativity of prudential value. I characterize subject relativity in terms of justifiability to subjects and I argue that certain procedural theories are well suited to meet this criterion. The criterion of normative adequacy requires that our theory be capable of guiding action and I argue that a certain kind of substantive theory is needed to meet this requirement.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Schroer2007, author = {Schroer, Robert}, title = {The reticence of visual phenomenal character: A spatial interpretation of transparency}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {3}, pages = {393--414}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701571644}, abstract = {It is often claimed that the phenomenal character of visual experience is {\^a}€˜transparent{\^a}€™ in that the phenomenal features of visual experience do not seem {\^a}€˜mental{\^a}€™. It is then claimed that this transparency speaks in favour of some theories of experience while speaking against others. In this paper, I advance both a negative and a positive thesis about transparency. My negative thesis is that visual phenomenal character is reticent in that it does not reveal whether it is mental or non-mental in nature. This, in turn, means that, by itself, transparency does not speak in favour of (and against) the theories it is often thought to speak in favour of (and against). My positive thesis is that the phenomenon referred to as the {\^a}€˜transparency{\^a}€™ of visual phenomenal character is best characterized in spatial, not mental, terms.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Drai2007, author = {Drai, Dalia}, title = {The Phenomenal Sorites and Response Dependence}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {4}, pages = {619--631}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701676401}, abstract = {Since Nelson Goodman 1951, the assumption that phenomenal indiscriminability is non-transitive is taken generally for granted. Moreover, this assumption was used (by Goodman 1951, Travis 1985, Dummett 1975 and others) to argue against the existence or coherence of subjective and/or observational properties. Recently, however, the assumption has been questioned [Fara 2001] and I agree with Fara that the assumption is much more problematic than was thought, partly because it is not clear what is meant by the relation of phenomenal indiscriminability, and partly because it is not clear how to interpret ideas such as continuous change, and the limitations of our power of perceptual discrimination.

In this paper I will bypass the question of the transitivity of phenomenal indiscriminability. I will use only the assumption about the existence (or even the possibility of existence) of a phenomenal sorites. This assumption is less controversial, and accepted (at least the version I will use) by opponents and defenders of transitivity alike. I will argue that the incoherence of {\^a}€˜red{\^a}€™ (as response-dependent or purely observational) can be derived without committing ourselves to a view on the question of transitivity, and I will use this incoherence, to argue against the account of {\^a}€˜red{\^a}€™ as a response-dependent concept.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Effingham2007, author = {Effingham, Nikk and Robson, Jon}, title = {A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {4}, pages = {633--640}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701728541}, abstract = {In this paper, we argue that time travel is problematic for the endurantist. For it appears to be possible, given time travel, to construct a wall out of a single time travelling brick. This commits the endurantist to one of the following: (a) the wall is composed of the time travelling brick many times over; (b) the wall does not in fact exist at all; (c) the wall is identical to the brick. We argue that each of these options is unsatisfactory.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Schroeter2007, author = {Schroeter, Laura}, title = {Illusion of Transparency}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {4}, pages = {597--618}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701654820}, abstract = {It's generally agreed that, for a certain a class of cases, a rational subject cannot be wrong in treating two elements of thought as co-referential. Even anti-individualists like Tyler Burge agree that empirical error is impossible in such cases. I argue that this immunity to empirical error is illusory and sketch a new anti-individualist approach to concepts that doesn't require such immunity.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Walker2007, author = {Walker, Mark}, title = {Superlongevity and Utilitarianism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {4}, pages = {581--595}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701654846}, abstract = {Peter Singer has argued that there are good utilitarian reasons for rejecting the prospect of superlongevity: developing technology to double (or more) the average human lifespan. I argue against Singer's view on two fronts. First, empirical research on happiness indicates that the later years of life are (on average) the happiest, and there is no reason to suppose that this trend would not continue if superlongevity were realized. Second, it is argued that there are good reasons to suppose that there will be a certain amount of self-selection: the happiest are more likely to adopt superlongevity technology. This means that the adoption of superlongevity technology will have the effect of raising the level of aggregate utility.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Fern{\~A}\textexclamdownndez2007, author = {Fern{\~A}\textexclamdownndez, Jordi}, title = {Desire and Self-Knowledge}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {4}, pages = {517--536}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701676419}, abstract = {In this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account to two other similar accounts of self-knowledge.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ward2007, author = {Ward, Barry}, title = {Laws, Explanation, Governing, and Generation}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {4}, pages = {537--552}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701654853}, abstract = {Advocates and opponents of Humean Supervenience (HS) have neglected a crucial feature of nomic explanation: laws can explain by generating descriptions of possibilities. Dretske and Armstrong have opposed HS by arguing that laws construed as Humean regularities cannot explain, but their arguments fail precisely because they neglect to consider this generating role of laws. Humeans have dismissed the intuitive violations of HS manifested by John Carroll's Mirror Worlds as erroneous, but distinguishing the laws' generating role from the non-Humean notion that laws govern undermines such responses, and renews the force of Carroll's critique of HS. However, it also undermines the assumption that HS is constitutive of Humeanism. The generating role of laws readily motivates a non-reductive Humeanism that violates HS. An account is sketched, and is seen to provide a novel explanation of the governing intuition.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Paoli2007, author = {Paoli, Francesco}, title = {Implicational Paradoxes and the Meaning of Logical Constants}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {4}, pages = {553--579}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701728574}, abstract = {I discuss paradoxes of implication in the setting of a proof-conditional theory of meaning for logical constants. I argue that a proper logic of implication should be not only relevant, but also constructive and nonmonotonic. This leads me to select as a plausible candidate LL, a fragment of linear logic that differs from R in that it rejects both contraction and distribution.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Russell2007, author = {Russell, Luke}, title = {Is Evil Action Qualitatively Distinct from Ordinary Wrongdoing?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {4}, pages = {659--677}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701728566}, abstract = {Adam Morton, Stephen de Wijze, Hillel Steiner, and Eve Garrard have defended the view that evil action is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. By this, they do not that mean that evil actions feel different to ordinary wrongs, but that they have motives or effects that are not possessed to any degree by ordinary wrongs. Despite their professed intentions, Morton and de Wijze both offer accounts of evil action that fail to identify a clear qualitative difference between evil and ordinary wrongdoing. In contrast, both Steiner's and Garrard's accounts of evil do point to qualitative distinctions between kinds of action, but it is implausible that either account correctly characterizes evil. The most plausible accounts maintain that evil actions have a necessary connection to extreme harms, and this suggests that evil is not qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Wiel2007, author = {Wieland, Nellie}, title = {Linguistic authority and convention in a speech act analysis of pornography}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {3}, pages = {435--456}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701572196}, abstract = {Recently, several philosophers have recast feminist arguments against pornography in terms of Speech Act Theory. In particular, they have considered the ways in which the illocutionary force of pornographic speech serves to set the conventions of sexual discourse while simultaneously silencing the speech of women, especially during unwanted sexual encounters. Yet, this raises serious questions as to how pornographers could (i) be authorities in the language game of sex, and (ii) set the conventions for sexual discourse{\^a}€”questions which these speech act-theoretic arguments against pornography have thus far failed to adequately answer. I fill in this gap of the argumentation by demonstrating that there are fairly weak standards for who counts as an authority or convention-setter in sexual discourse. With this analysis of the underpinnings of a speech act analysis of pornography in mind, I discuss a range of possible objections. I conclude that (i) the endorsement of censorship by a speech act analysis of pornography competes with its commitment to the conventionality of speech acts, and, more damningly, that (ii), recasting anti-pornography arguments in terms of linguistic conventions risks an unwitting defence of a rapist's lack of mens rea{\^a}€”an intolerable result; and yet resisting this conclusion requires that one back away from the original claim to women's voices being {\^a}€˜silenced{\^a}€™.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Haji2007, author = {Haji, Ishtiyaque and Cuypers, Stefaan E.}, title = {Magical agents, global induction, and the internalism/externalism debate}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {3}, pages = {343--371}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701571602}, abstract = {Externalism is the view that facts about one's history or past in the external world that bear on the acquisition of one's responsibility-grounding psychological elements are pertinent to whether one's actions are free and, hence, pertinent to whether one can be morally responsible for them. Internalism is the thesis that the conditions of moral responsibility can be specified independently of facts about how the person acquired her responsibility-grounding psychological elements. In this paper we defend a position that navigates between externalism and internalism: moral responsibility does not require that one have a past but it does require that one not have certain kinds of past.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Elder2007, author = {Elder, Crawford L.}, title = {Conventionalism and the world as bare sense-data}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {2}, pages = {261--275}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701343093}, abstract = {We are confident of many of the judgements we make as to what sorts of alterations the members of nature's kinds can survive, and what sorts of events mark the ends of their existences. But is our confidence based on empirical observation of nature's kinds and their members? Conventionalists deny that we can learn empirically which properties are essential to the members of nature's kinds. Judgements of sameness in kind between members, and of numerical sameness of a member across time, merely project our conventions of individuation. Our confidence is warranted because apart from those conventions there are no phenomena of kind-sameness or of numerical sameness across time. There is just {\^a}€˜stuff{\^a}€™ displaying properties. This paper argues that conventionalists can assign no properties to the {\^a}€˜stuff{\^a}€™ beyond immediate phenomenal properties. Consequently they cannot explain how each of us comes to be able to wield {\^a}€˜our conventions{\^a}€™.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Keller2007, author = {Keller, Simon}, title = {Virtue ethics is self-effacing}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {2}, pages = {221--231}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701343010}, abstract = {An ethical theory is self-effacing if it tells us that sometimes, we should not be motivated by the considerations that justify our acts. In his influential paper {\^a}€˜The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories{\^a}€™ [1976], Michael Stocker argues that consequentialist and deontological ethical theories must be self-effacing, if they are to be at all plausible. Stocker's argument is often taken to provide a reason to give up consequentialism and deontology in favour of virtue ethics. I argue that this assessment is a mistake. Virtue ethics is self-effacing in just the same way as are the theories that Stocker attacks. Or, at the very least: if there is a way for virtue ethics to avoid self-effacement then there are ways for its rivals to avoid self-effacement too. Therefore, considerations of self-effacement provide no reason to prefer virtue ethics to its major rivals.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Chuard2007, author = {Chuard, Philippe}, title = {Indiscriminable shades and demonstrative concepts}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {2}, pages = {277--306}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701343143}, abstract = {Conceptualists have it that the representational content of perceptual experience is determined by the concepts a subject applies in having such an experience. Conceptualists like Bill Brewer [1999] and John McDowell [1994] have laid particular emphasis on demonstrative concepts in trying to account for the fact that subjects can perceive and discriminate very many specific shades of colour in experience. Against this, it has been objected that such demonstrative concepts have incoherent conditions of extension and/or of individuation, due to the fact that chromatic indiscriminability is non-transitive. In this paper, I consider three different versions of this objection and show why each fails.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Abell2007, author = {Abell, Catharine}, title = {Pictorial realism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {1}, pages = {1--17}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601185529}, abstract = {I propose a number of criteria for the adequacy of an account of pictorial realism. Such an account must: explain the epistemic significance of realistic pictures; explain why accuracy and detail are salient to realism; be consistent with an accurate account of depiction; and explain the features of pictorial realism. I identify six features of pictorial realism. I then propose an account of realism as a measure of the information pictures provide about how their objects would look, were one to see them. This account meets the criteria I have identified and is superior to alternative accounts of realism.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Whittle2007, author = {Whittle, Ann}, title = {The co-instantiation thesis}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {1}, pages = {61--79}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601185511}, abstract = {The co-instantiation thesis is pivotal to a significant solution to the problem of causal exclusion. But this thesis has been subject to some powerful objections. In this paper, I argue that these difficulties arise because the thesis lacks the necessary metaphysical framework in which its claims should be interpreted and understood. Once this framework is in place, we see that the co-instantiation thesis can answer its critics. The result is a rehabilitated co-instantiation solution to the troubling problem of causal exclusion. But questions remain concerning the viability of certain of its applications.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Piccinini2007, author = {Piccinini, Gualtiero}, title = {Computational modelling vs. Computational explanation: Is everything a Turing Machine, and does it matter to the philosophy of mind?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {1}, pages = {93--115}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601176494}, abstract = {According to pancomputationalism, everything is a computing system. In this paper, I distinguish between different varieties of pancomputationalism. I find that although some varieties are more plausible than others, only the strongest variety is relevant to the philosophy of mind, but only the most trivial varieties are true. As a side effect of this exercise, I offer a clarified distinction between computational modelling and computational explanation.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Bernecker2007, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Remembering without knowing}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {1}, pages = {137--156}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601176460}, abstract = {This paper challenges the standard conception of memory as a form of knowledge. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Williams2007, author = {Williams, J. Robert G.}, title = {The possibility of onion worlds: Rebutting an argument for structural universals}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {2}, pages = {193--203}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701380129}, abstract = {Some argue that theories of universals should incorporate structural universals, in order to allow for the metaphysical possibility of worlds of {\^a}€˜infinite descending complexity{\^a}€™ ({\^a}€˜onion worlds{\^a}€™). I argue that the possibility of such worlds does not establish the need for structural universals. So long as we admit the metaphysical possibility of emergent universals, there is an attractive alternative description of such cases.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Schaffer2007, author = {Schaffer, Jonathan}, title = {From nihilism to monism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {2}, pages = {175--191}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701343150}, abstract = {Mereological nihilism is the view that all concrete objects are simple. Existence monism is the view that the only concrete object is one big simple: the world. I will argue that nihilism culminates in monism. The nihilist demands the simplest sufficient ontology, and the monist delivers it.


Nothing is cheaper and commoner in philosophy than monism; what, unhappily, is still rare, is an attempt to defend it, and critically to establish its assumptions.

[Schiller 1897: 62]

}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Kierl2007, author = {Kierland, Brian and Monton, Bradley}, title = {Presentism and the objection from being-supervenience}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {3}, pages = {485--497}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701572279}, abstract = {In this paper, we show that presentism{\^a}€”the view that the way things are is the way things presently are{\^a}€”is not undermined by the objection from being-supervenience. This objection claims, roughly, that presentism has trouble accounting for the truth-value of past-tense claims. Our demonstration amounts to the articulation and defence of a novel version of presentism. This is brute past presentism, according to which the truth-value of past-tense claims is determined by the past understood as a fundamental aspect of reality different from things and how things are.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Polger2007, author = {Polger, Thomas W.}, title = {Realization and the metaphysics of mind}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {2}, pages = {233--259}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701343085}, abstract = {According to a familiar view in philosophy of mind, mental states or properties are realized by physical states or properties but are not identical to them. This view is often called realization physicalism. But what is realization? I argue that recent approaches to realization, represented by Carl Gillett's {\^a}€˜dimensioned{\^a}€™ view, fail to acknowledge some textbook cases of realization. I also argue Gillett's account in particular admits realization relations that should not count if realization physicalism is to be distinguished from its competitors in the usual ways. I offer my own account of realization, and argue that it is superior not only in passing the above tests but also in its utility for answering questions about multiple realizability.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Egan2007, author = {Egan, Andy}, title = {Quasi-realism and fundamental moral error}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {2}, pages = {205--219}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701342988}, abstract = {A common first reaction to expressivist and quasi-realist theories is the thought that, if these theories are right, there's some objectionable sense in which we can't be wrong about morality. This worry turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make stick{\^a}€”an account of moral error as instability under improving changes provides the quasi-realist with the resources to explain many of our concerns about moral error. The story breaks down, though, in the case of fundamental moral error. This is where the initial worry finally sticks{\^a}€”quasi-realism tells me that I can't be fundamentally wrong about morality, though others can.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Schneider2007, author = {Schneider, Susan}, title = {What is the significance of the intuition that laws of nature govern?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {2}, pages = {307--324}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701343119}, abstract = {Recently, proponents of Humean Supervenience have challenged the plausibility of the intuition that the laws of nature {\^a}€˜govern{\^a}€™, or guide, the evolution of events in the universe. Certain influential thought experiments authored by John Carroll, Michael Tooley, and others, rely strongly on such intuitions. These thought experiments are generally regarded as playing a central role in the lawhood debate, suggesting that the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis view of the laws of nature, and the related doctrine of the Humean Supervenience of laws, are false. In this paper, I take on these recent challenges, arguing that the intuition that the laws govern should be taken seriously. Still, I find the recent discussions insightful, in certain ways. Employing some ideas from one of the critics (Barry Loewer), I draw some non-standard conclusions about the significance of the thought experiments to the lawhood debate.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Haukioja2007, author = {Haukioja, Jussi}, title = {How (not) to specify normal conditions for response-dependent concepts}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {2}, pages = {325--331}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701342996}, abstract = {The extensions of response-dependent concepts are a priori connected with the subjective responses that competent users of that concept have in normal conditions. There are two strategies for specifying normal conditions for response-dependent concepts: topic-specific and topic-neutral. On a topic-specific specification, a characterization of normal conditions would be given separately for each response-dependent concept (or a non-trivial subset of response-dependent concepts, such as our colour concepts), whereas a topic-neutral specification would be given in a uniform way for all response-dependent concepts. In this paper I argue, using a thought experiment, that only topic-neutral specifications will deliver the a priori knowledge constitutive of response-dependence.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Malpas2007, author = {Malpas, Jeff}, title = {William David Joske 1928{\^A} {\^a}€“{\^A} 2006 emeritus professor of philosophy, university of Tasmania}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {2}, pages = {341--342}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400701380236}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Armstrong2006, author = {Armstrong, D. M.}, title = {Reply to Rissler}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {2}, pages = {211--212}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400600758995}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hawley2006, author = {Hawley, Katherine}, title = {Principles of composition and criteria of identity}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {4}, pages = {481--493}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601078955}, abstract = {I argue that, despite van Inwagen's pessimism about the task, it is worth looking for answers to his General Composition Question. Such answers or {\^a}€˜principles of composition{\^a}€™ tell us about the relationship between an object and its parts. I compare principles of composition with criteria of identity, arguing that, just as different sorts of thing satisfy different criteria of identity, they may satisfy different principles of composition. Variety in criteria of identity is not taken to reflect ontological variety in the identity relation; I discuss whether variety in principles of composition should be taken to reflect ontological variety in the composition relation.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Beebe2006, author = {Beebe, James R.}, title = {Reliabilism and deflationism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {4}, pages = {495--510}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601078971}, abstract = {In this article I examine several issues concerning reliabilism and deflationism. I critique Alvin Goldman's account of the key differences between correspondence and deflationary theories and his claim that reliabilism can be combined only with those truth theories that maintain a commitment to truthmakers. I then consider how reliability could be analysed from a deflationary perspective and show that deflationism is compatible with reliabilism. I close with a discussion of whether a deflationary theory of knowledge is possible.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Rea2006, author = {Rea, Michael C.}, title = {Presentism and fatalism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {4}, pages = {511--524}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601079003}, abstract = {It is widely believed that presentism is compatible with both a libertarian view of human freedom and an unrestricted principle of bivalence. I argue that, in fact, presentists must choose between bivalence and libertarianism: if presentism is true, then either the future is open or no one is free in the way that libertarians understand freedom.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Olson2006, author = {Olson, Jonas}, title = {G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {4}, pages = {525--534}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601079029}, abstract = {Several proponents of the {\^a}€˜buck-passing{\^a}€™ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Pautz2006, author = {Pautz, Adam}, title = {Can the physicalist explain colour structure in terms of colour experience?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {4}, pages = {535--564}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601079094}, abstract = {Physicalism about colour is the thesis that colours are identical with response-independent, physical properties of objects. I endorse the Argument from Structure against Physicalism about colour. The argument states that Physicalism cannot accommodate certain obvious facts about colour structure: for instance, that red is a unitary colour while purple is a binary colour, and that blue resembles purple more than green. I provide a detailed formulation of the argument. According to the most popular response to the argument, the Physicalist can accommodate colour structure by explaining it in terms of colour experience. I argue that this response fails. Along the way, I examine other interesting issues in the philosophy of colour and colour perception, for instance the relational structure of colour experience and the description theory of how colour names refer.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Gert2006, author = {Gert, Joshua}, title = {A realistic colour realism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {4}, pages = {565--589}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601079128}, abstract = {Whether or not one endorses realism about colour, it is very tempting to regard realism about determinable colours such as green and yellow as standing or falling together with realism about determinate colours such as unique green or green31. Indeed some of the most prominent representatives of both sides of the colour realism debate explicitly endorse the idea that these two kinds of realism are so linked. Against such theorists, the present paper argues that one can be a realist about the determinable colours of objects, and thus hold that most of the colour ascriptions made by competent speakers are literally true, while denying that there are any positive facts of the matter as to the determinate colours of objects. The result is a realistic colour realism that can certify most of our everyday colour ascriptions as literally correct, while acknowledging the data regarding individual variation.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Parsons2006, author = {Parsons, Josh}, title = {Negative truths from positive facts?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {4}, pages = {591--602}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601079144}, abstract = {I argue that Colin Cheyne and Charles Pigden's recent attempt to find truthmakers for negative truths fails. Though Cheyne and Pigden are correct in their treatment of some of the truths they set out to find truthmakers for (such as {\^a}€˜There is no hippopotamus in S223{\^a}€™ and {\^a}€˜Theatetus is not flying{\^a}€™) they over-generalize when they apply the same treatment to {\^a}€˜There are no unicorns{\^a}€™. In my view, this difficulty is ineliminable: not every truth has a truthmaker.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Price2006, author = {Price, Huw}, title = {Blackburn and the war on error}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {4}, pages = {603--614}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601079177}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Horgan2006, author = {Horgan, Terry}, title = {Retreat from Non-Being}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {4}, pages = {615--627}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601079185}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Kabay2006, author = {Kabay, Paul}, title = {When seeing is not believing: A critique of priest's argument from perception}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {3}, pages = {443--460}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400600895979}, abstract = {In this paper I critically examine an argument proposed by Graham Priest in support of the claim that the observable world is consistent. According to this argument we have good reason to think that the observable world is consistent, specifically we perceive it to be consistent. I critique this argument on two fronts. First, Priest appears to reason from the claim {\^a}€˜we know what it is to have a contradictory perception{\^a}€™ to the claim {\^a}€˜we know what it is to perceive a contradiction{\^a}€™. I argue that this inference fails to be valid. Secondly, I give reasons for thinking that if an observable state of affairs were to be contradictory, we would perceive it to be consistent. As such that the world we observe appears consistent does not constitute evidence that it is in fact consistent. That we see a consistent world is no reason to believe that the world is consistent. I conclude the paper with some reflections on the implications of this analysis for the plausibility of trivialism.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Armstrong2006a, author = {Armstrong, D. M.}, title = {Reply to Cheyne and Pigden}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {2}, pages = {267--268}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400600759118}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Swinburne2006, author = {Swinburne, Richard}, title = {Relations between universals,or divine laws?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {2}, pages = {179--189}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400600758938}, abstract = {Armstrong's theory of laws of nature as relations between universals gives an initially plausible account of why the causal powers of substances are bound together only in certain ways, so that the world is a very regular place. But its resulting theory of causation cannot account for intentional causation, since this involves an agent trying to do something, and trying is causing. This kind of causation is thus a state of an agent and does not involve the operation of a law. It is simpler to suppose that non-intentional causing is also causing by substances (and not events) in virtue of their powers to act. That raises again the question of why their powers are bound together only in certain ways. The most probable answer is that God, the simplest kind of person there could be, brings this about because it is necessary for the existence of finite rational creatures such as ourselves.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Forrest2006, author = {Forrest, Peter}, title = {The Operator Theory of instantiation}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {2}, pages = {213--228}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400600759001}, abstract = {Armstrong holds the Supervenience Theory of instantiation, namely that the instantiation of universals by particulars supervenes upon what particulars and what universals there are, where supervenience is stipulated to be explanatory or dependent supervenience. I begin by rejecting the Supervenience Theory of instantiation. Having done so it is then tempting to take instantiation as primitive. This has, however, an awkward consequence, undermining one of the main advantages universals have over tropes. So I examine another account hinted at by Armstrong. This is the Operator Theory of instantiation, by which I mean the theory that universals are operators, and that a particular instantiates a monadic universal because the universal operates on the particular, resulting in the state of affairs. On this theory the state of affairs supervenes on the instantiation rather than vice versa. In the second part of the paper I develop this theory of universals as operators, including an account of structural universals, which are useful for accounts of modality and of mathematics.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cresswell2006, author = {Cresswell, M. J.}, title = {Now is the time}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {3}, pages = {311--332}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400600895805}, abstract = {The aim of this paper is to consider some logical aspects of the debate between the view that the present is the only {\^a}€˜real{\^a}€™ time, and the view that the present is not in any way metaphysically privileged. In particular I shall set out a language of first-order predicate tense logic with a now predicate, and a first order (extensional) language with an abstraction operator, in such a way that each language can be shewn to be exactly translatable into the other. I shew that this translation is preserved at the metalinguistic level, so that equivalent truth conditions can be defined in a tensed metalanguage or an indexical metalanguage. I then make some remarks about the connection between proofs of relative consistency and metaphysical truth; and some historical remarks about Arthur Prior's use of formal logic in expressing his presentist views.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cohen2006, author = {Cohen, Jonathan and Meskin, Aaron}, title = {An objective counterfactual theory of information}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {3}, pages = {333--352}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400600895821}, abstract = {We offer a novel theory of information that differs from traditional accounts in two respects: (i) it explains information in terms of counterfactuals rather than conditional probabilities, and (ii) it does not make essential reference to doxastic states of subjects, and consequently allows for the sort of objective, reductive explanations of various notions in epistemology and philosophy of mind that many have wanted from an account of information.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Bigelow2006, author = {Bigelow, John and Pargetter, Robert}, title = {Re-acquaintance with qualia}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {3}, pages = {353--378}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400600895847}, abstract = {Frank Jackson argued, in an astronomically frequently cited paper on {\^a}€˜Epiphenomenal qualia{\^a}€™[Jackson 1982 that materialism must be mistaken. His argument is called the knowledge argument. Over the years since he published that paper, he gradually came to the conviction that the conclusion of the knowledge argument must be mistaken. Yet he long remained totally unconvinced by any of the very numerous published attempts to explain where his knowledge argument had gone astray.

Eventually, Jackson did publish a diagnosis of the reasons why, he now thinks, his knowledge argument against materialism fails to prove the falsity of materialism [Jackson 2005. He argues that you can block the knowledge argument against materialism{\^a}€”but only if you tie yourself to a dubious doctrine called representationalism.

We argue that the knowledge argument fails as a refutation of either representational or nonrepresentational materialism. It does, however, furnish both materialists and dualists with a successful argument for the existence of distinctively first-person modes of acquaintance with mental states. Jackson's argument does not refute materialism: but it does bring to the surface significant features of thought and experience, which many dualists have sensed, and most materialists have missed.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Luper2006, author = {Luper, Steven}, title = {Dretske on knowledge closure}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {3}, pages = {379--394}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400600895862}, abstract = {In early essays and in more recent work, Fred Dretske argues against the closure of perception, perceptual knowledge, and knowledge itself. In this essay I review his case and suggest that, in a useful sense, perception is closed, and that, while perceptual knowledge is not closed under entailment, perceptually based knowledge is closed, and so is knowledge itself. On my approach, which emphasizes the safe indication account of knowledge, we can both perceive, and know, that sceptical scenarios (such as being a brain in a vat) do not hold.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Armour-Garb2006, author = {Armour-Garb, Bradley and Woodbridge, James A.}, title = {Dialetheism, semantic pathology, and the open pair}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {3}, pages = {395--416}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400600895912}, abstract = {Over the past 25 years, Graham Priest has ably presented and defended dialetheism, the view that certain sentences are properly characterized as true with true negations. Our goal here is neither to quibble with the tenability of true, assertable contradictions nor, really, with the arguments for dialetheism. Rather, we wish to address the dialetheist's treatment of cases of semantic pathology and to pose a worry for dialetheism that has not been adequately considered.

The problem that we present seems to have broader bite, afflicting both consistent and inconsistent proposals for resolving semantic pathology. Thus, while our primary goal is to uncover some important connections between dialetheism, semantic pathology, and other, more general issues, the problem that we pose might be a worry for anyone who aims to resolve semantic pathology{\^a}€”consistently or not.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Nelson2006, author = {Nelson, Mark T.}, title = {Moral realism and program explanation}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {3}, pages = {417--428}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400600895946}, abstract = {Alexander Miller has recently considered an ingenious extension of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit's account of {\^a}€˜program explanation{\^a}€™ as a way of defending non-reductive naturalist versions of moral realism against Harman's explanatory criticism. Despite the ingenuity of this extension, Miller concludes that program explanation cannot help such moral realists in their attempt to defend moral properties. Specifically, he argues that such moral program explanations are dispensable from an epistemically unlimited point of view. I show that Miller's argument for this negative claim is inadequate, and that he has, in spite of himself, identified a promising defence of moral realism.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Siegel2006, author = {Siegel, Susanna}, title = {How does visual phenomenology constrain object-seeing?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2006}, volume = {84}, number = {3}, pages = {429--441}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400600895961}, abstract = {I argue that there are phenomenological constraints on what it is to see an object, and that these are overlooked by some theories that offer allegedly sufficient causal and counterfactual conditions on object-seeing.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Brogaard2007, author = {Brogaard, Berit}, title = {Descriptions: Predicates or quantifiers?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {1}, pages = {117--136}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601185495}, abstract = {In this paper I revisit the main arguments for a predicate analysis of descriptions in order to determine whether they do in fact undermine Russell's theory. I argue that while the arguments without doubt provide powerful evidence against Russell's original theory, it is far from clear that they tell against a quantificational account of descriptions.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ney2007, author = {Ney, Alyssa}, title = {Physicalism and our knowledge of intrinsic properties}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {1}, pages = {41--60}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601154376}, abstract = {This paper examines recent arguments by Rae Langton and David Lewis intended to prove Humility: the thesis that we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of substances. I argue that at best, these arguments are internally incoherent. They at once presuppose a strong version of physicalism according to which physical science is in a position to give a complete list of the fundamental properties of reality, and at the same time various metaphysical principles which in actuality challenge the completeness of the list of properties given by science. Although these arguments are unsound, their consideration enables us to draw important conclusions regarding the tension between the metaphysician's practice of positing intrinsic properties that give colour to the world, and the scientific attempt at giving a complete account of all phenomena.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Dilworth2007, author = {Dilworth, John}, title = {In support of content theories of art}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, number = {1}, pages = {19--39}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400601154434}, abstract = {A content theory of art would identify an artwork with the meaningful or representational content of some concrete artistic vehicle, such as the intentional, expressive, stylistic, and subject matter-related content embodied in, or resulting from, acts of intentional artistic expression by artists. Perhaps surprisingly, the resultant view that an artwork is nothing but content seems to have been without theoretical defenders until very recently, leaving a significant theoretical gap in the literature.

I present some basic arguments in defence of such a view, including the following. Content views of linguistic communication are ubiquitous, so why should they not be applicable in artistic cases as well? Also, propositional accounts of language involve two kinds of content (the proposition expressed by a sentence, plus the worldly state of affairs it represents), both of which kinds can be used in explaining artworks. In addition, the differing modal properties of artworks and concrete artefacts can be used to show that artworks could not be, or include, such physical artefacts.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Kroon2005, author = {Kroon, Frederick and McKeown-Green, Jonathan}, title = {Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {3}, pages = {423--430}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500191982}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Leite2005, author = {Leite, Adam}, title = {A localist solution to the regress of epistemic justification}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {3}, pages = {395--421}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500191974}, abstract = {Guided by an account of the norms governing justificatory conversations, I propose that person-level epistemic justification is a matter of possessing a certain ability: the ability to provide objectively good reasons for one's belief by drawing upon considerations which one responsibly and correctly takes there to be no reason to doubt. On this view, justification requires responsible belief and is also objectively truth-conducive. The foundationalist doctrine of immediately justified beliefs is rejected, but so too is the thought that coherence in one's total belief system is sufficient, or indeed necessary, for justification. The problem of the regress is solved by exploiting the {\^a}€˜localist{\^a}€™ idea that in order to possess the ability to justify any given belief, one only needs to be in a position to draw upon appropriate justified background beliefs to provide good reasons for holding the belief; one needn't be able to defend the relevant background beliefs, and so on, all at one sitting.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Drewery2005, author = {Drewery, Alice}, title = {The logical form of universal generalizations}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {3}, pages = {373--393}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500191966}, abstract = {First order logic does not distinguish between different forms of universal generalization; in this paper I argue that lawlike and accidental generalizations (broadly construed) have a different logical form, and that this distinction is syntactically marked in English. I then consider the relevance of this broader conception of lawlikeness to the philosophy of science.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Schroeder2005, author = {Schroeder, Mark}, title = {The hypothetical imperative?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {3}, pages = {357--372}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500191958}, abstract = {According to the standard view, Kant held that hypothetical imperatives are universally binding edicts with disjunctive objects: take-the-means-or-don't-have-the-end. But Kant thought otherwise. He held that they are edicts binding only on some{\^a}€”those who have an end.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Sorensen2005, author = {Sorensen, Roy A.}, title = {The ethics of empty worlds }, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {3}, pages = {349--356}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500191933}, abstract = {Drawing inspiration from the ethical pluralism of G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica, I contend that one empty world can be morally better than another. By {\^a}€˜empty{\^a}€™ I mean that it is devoid of concrete entities (things that have a position in space or time). These worlds have no thickets or thimbles, no thinkers, no thoughts. Infinitely many of these worlds have laws of nature, abstract entities, and perhaps, space and time. These non-concrete differences are enough to make some of them better than others.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Schroeter2005, author = {Schroeter, Laura}, title = {Considering empty worlds as actual}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {3}, pages = {331--347}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500191925}, abstract = {This paper argues that David Chalmer's new epistemic interpretation of 2-D semantics faces the very same type of objection he takes to defeat earlier contextualist interpretation of the 2-D framework.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{McGrath2005, author = {McGrath, Matthew}, title = {No objects, no problem?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {4}, pages = {457--486}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500338609}, abstract = {One familiar form of argument for rejecting entities of a certain kind is that, by rejecting them, we avoid certain difficult problems associated with them. Such problem-avoidance arguments backfire if the problems cited survive the elimination of the rejected entities. In particular, we examine one way problems can survive: a question for the realist about which of a set of inconsistent statements is false may give way to an equally difficult question for the eliminativist about which of a set of inconsistent statements fail to be {\^a}€˜factual{\^a}€™. Much of the first half of the paper is devoted to explaining a notion of factuality that does not imply truth but still consists in {\^a}€˜getting the world right{\^a}€™. The second half of the paper is a case study. Some {\^a}€˜compositional nihilists{\^a}€™ have argued that, by rejecting composite objects (and so by denying the composition ever takes place), we avoid the notorious puzzles of coincidence, for example, the statue/lump and the ship of Theseus puzzles. Using the apparatus developed in the first half of the paper, we explore the question of whether these puzzles survive the elimination of composite objects.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Heathwood2005, author = {Heathwood, Chris}, title = {The problem of defective desires}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {4}, pages = {487--504}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500338690}, abstract = {This paper defends the actualist desire-satisfaction theory of welfare against a popular line of objection{\^a}€”namely, that it cannot accommodate the fact that, sometimes, it is bad for a person to get what he wants. Ill-informed desires, irrational desires, base desires, poorly cultivated desires, pointless desires, artificially aroused desires, and the desire to be badly off, are alleged by objectors to be defective in this way. I attempt to show that each of these kinds of desire either is not genuinely defective or else is defective in a way fully compatible with the theory.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ebert2005, author = {Ebert, Philip A.}, title = {Transmission of warrant-failure and the notion of epistemic analyticity}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {4}, pages = {505--521}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500338724}, abstract = {In this paper I will argue that Boghossian's explanation of how we can acquire a priori knowledge of logical principles through implicit definitions commits a transmission of warrant-failure. To this end, I will briefly outline Boghossian's account, followed by an explanation of what a transmission of warrant-failure consists in. I will also show that this charge is independent of the worry of rule-circularity which has been raised concerning the justification of logical principles and of which Boghossian is fully aware. My argument comes in two steps: firstly, I will argue for the insufficiency of Boghossian's template which is meant to explain how a subject can acquire a warrant for logical principles. I will show however that this insufficiency of his template can be remedied by adopting what I call the Disquotational Step. Secondly, I will argue that incorporating this further step makes his template subject to a transmission of warrant-failure, assuming that certain rather basic and individually motivated principles hold. Thus, Boghossian's account faces a dilemma: either he adopts the Disquotational Step and subjects his account to the charge of a transmission of warrant-failure, or he drops this additional step leaving the account confronted with explaining the gap that has previously been highlighted. I will then suggest various rejoinders that Boghossian might adopt but none of which{\^a}€”I will argue{\^a}€”can resolve the dilemma. Lastly, I will raise and briefly discuss the question whether this worry generalizes to other accounts, such as Hale and Wright's that aim to explain our knowledge of logic and/or mathematics in virtue of implicit definitions.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Macdonald2005, author = {Macdonald, Cynthia}, title = {Book note}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {4}, pages = {615--615}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500339078}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Darwall2005, author = {Darwall, Stephen}, title = {Virtue Ethics}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {4}, pages = {589--597}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500339003}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Lange2005, author = {Lange, Marc}, title = {Reply to Ellis and to Handfield on essentialism, laws, and counterfactuals}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {4}, pages = {581--588}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500338971}, abstract = {In Lange 2004a, I argued that {\^a}€˜scientific essentialism{\^a}€™ [Ellis 2001 cannot account for the characteristic relation between laws and counterfactuals without undergoing considerable ad hoc tinkering. In recent papers, Brian Ellis 2005 and Toby Handfield 2005 have defended essentialism against my charge. Here I argue that Ellis's and Handfield's replies fail. Even in ordinary counterfactual reasoning, the {\^a}€˜closest possible world{\^a}€™ where the electron's electric charge is 5\% greater may have less overlap with the actual world in its fundamental natural kinds than a {\^a}€˜more distant possible world{\^a}€™ where the electron's charge is 5\% greater. But more importantly, essentialism's flexibility in being able to accommodate virtually any relation between laws and counterfactuals is a symptom of essentialism's explanatory impotence as far as that relation is concerned.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Douven2005, author = {Douven, Igor}, title = {Lewis on fallible knowledge}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {4}, pages = {573--580}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500338963}, abstract = {Lewis has offered a contextualist epistemology that he claims is non-fallibilist. The present note aims to show that, while there seems to be a simple argument for Lewis's claim, the argument is fallacious, and Lewis's epistemology is fallibilist after all.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Dainton2005, author = {Dainton, Barry and Bayne, Tim}, title = {Consciousness as a guide to personal persistence}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {4}, pages = {549--571}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500338856}, abstract = {Mentalistic (or Lockean) accounts of personal identity are normally formulated in terms of causal relations between psychological states such as beliefs, memories, and intentions. In this paper we develop an alternative (but still Lockean) account of personal identity, based on phenomenal relations between experiences. We begin by examining a notorious puzzle case due to Bernard Williams, and extract two lessons from it: first, that Williams's puzzle can be defused by distinguishing between the psychological and phenomenal approaches, second, that so far as personal identity is concerned, it is phenomenal rather than psychological continuity that matters. We then consider different ways in which the phenomenal approach may be developed, and respond to a number of objections.

That with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing can join itself, makes the same person, and is one self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to itself and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects will perceive.

{\^a}€ƒ{\^a}€ƒ{\^a}€ƒLocke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding [II.xxvii.17]}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Bird2005, author = {Bird, Alexander}, title = {Unexpected a posteriori necessary laws of nature}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {4}, pages = {533--548}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500338799}, abstract = {In this paper I argue that it is not a priori that all the laws of nature are contingent. I assume that the fundamental laws are contingent and show that some non-trivial, a posteriori, non-basic laws may nonetheless be necessary in the sense of having no counterinstances in any possible world. I consider a law LS (such as {\^a}€˜salt dissolves in water{\^a}€™) that concerns a substance S. Kripke's arguments concerning constitution show that the existence of S requires that a certain deeper level law or variants thereof hold. At the same time, that law and its variants may each entail the truth of LS. Thus the existence of S entails LS. Consequently there is no world in which S exists and fails to obey LS. I consider the conditions concerning the fundamental laws that would make this phenomenon ubiquitous. I conclude with some consequences for metaphysics.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Balashov2005, author = {Balashov, Yuri}, title = {On vagueness, 4D and diachronic universalism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {4}, pages = {523--531}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500338740}, abstract = {I offer a new criticism of the argument from vagueness to four-dimensionalism [Sider 2001. The argument is modelled after an older argument for mereological universalism [Lewis 1986 and may be looked upon as a tightened-up and extended version of the latter. While I agree with other critics [Koslicki 2003; Markosian 2004 that the argument from vagueness fails precisely because of this affinity, my recipe for dealing with it is different. I reject the assumption, shared by Sider with his opponents, that synchronic composition and {\^a}€˜minimal diachronic fusion{\^a}€™ are sufficiently similar to use considerations inspired by the analysis of the former to bear on the latter. My objection to a crucial premise of the argument from vagueness turns on the relevant aspect of dissimilarity between these two cases.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Nolan2005, author = {Nolan, Daniel and Restall, Greg and West, Caroline}, title = {Moral fictionalism versus the rest}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {3}, pages = {307--330}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500191917}, abstract = {In this paper we introduce a distinct metaethical position, fictionalism about morality. We clarify and defend the position, showing that it is a way to save the {\^a}€˜moral phenomena{\^a}€™ while agreeing that there is no genuine objective prescriptivity to be described by moral terms. In particular, we distinguish moral fictionalism from moral quasi-realism, and we show that fictionalism possesses the virtues of quasi-realism about morality, but avoids its vices.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Woods2005, author = {Woods, John}, title = {The economics of paradox: a response to armour-garb}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {1}, pages = {103--113}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500044322}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Armour-Garb2005, author = {Armour-Garb, Bradley}, title = {Wrestling with (and without) dialetheism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {1}, pages = {87--102}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500044306}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{H2005, author = {Handfield, Toby}, title = {Lange on essentialism, counterfactuals, and explanation}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {1}, pages = {81--85}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500044249}, abstract = {Marc Lange objects to scientific essentialists that they can give no better account of the counterfactual invariance of laws than Humeans. While conceding this point succeeds ad hominem against some essentialists, I show that it does not undermine essentialism in general. Moreover, Lange's alternative account of the relation between laws and counterfactuals is{\^a}€”with minor modification{\^a}€”compatible with essentialism.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ellis2005, author = {Ellis, Brian}, title = {Marc lange on essentialism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {1}, pages = {75--79}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500044025}, abstract = {For scientific essentialists, the only logical possibilities of existence are the real (or metaphysical) ones, and such possibilities, they say, are relative to worlds. They are not a priori, and they cannot just be invented. Rather, they are discoverable only by the a posteriori methods of science. There are, however, many philosophers who think that real possibilities are knowable a priori, or that they can just be invented. Marc Lange [Lange 2004] thinks that they can be invented, and tries to use his inventions to argue that the essentialist theory of counterfactual conditionals developed in Scientific Essentialism [Ellis 2001, hereafter SE] is flawed.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ellis2005a, author = {Ellis, Jonathan}, title = {Colour irrealism and the formation of colour concepts}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {1}, pages = {53--73}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500043985}, abstract = {According to colour irrealism, material objects do not have colour; they only appear to have colour. The appeal of this view, prominent among philosophers and scientists alike, stems in large part from the conviction that scientific explanations of colour facts do not ascribe colour to material objects. To explain why objects appear to have colour, for instance, we need only appeal to surface reflectance properties, properties of light, the neurophysiology of observers, etc.

Typically attending colour irrealism is the error theory of ordinary colour judgement: ordinary judgements in which colour is ascribed to a material object are, strictly speaking, false. In this paper, I claim that colour irrealists who endorse the error theory cannot explain how we acquire colour concepts (yellow, green, etc.), concepts they must acknowledge we do possess. Our basic colour concepts, I argue, could not be phenomenal concepts that we acquire by attending to the colour properties of our experience. And, I explain, all other plausible explanations render colour concepts such that our ordinary colour judgements involving them are often true. Given the explanatory considerations upon which the irrealist's position is based, this is a severe problem for colour irrealism.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Watkins2005, author = {Watkins, Michael}, title = {Seeing red, the metaphysics of colours without the physics}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {1}, pages = {33--52}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500043936}, abstract = {By treating colours as sui generis intrinsic properties of objects we can maintain that (1) colours are causally responsible for colour experiences (and so agree with the physicalist) and (2) colours, along with the similarity and difference relations that colours bear to one another, are presented to us by casual observation (and so agree with the dispositionalist). The major obstacle for such a view is the causal overdetermination of colour experience. Borrowing and expanding on the works of Sydney Shoemaker and Stephen Yablo, the paper offers a solution.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cogburn2005, author = {Cogburn, Jon}, title = {The logic of logical revision formalizing dummett's argument}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {1}, pages = {15--32}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500043910}, abstract = {Neil Tennant and Joseph Salerno have recently attempted to rigorously formalize Michael Dummett's argument for logical revision. Surprisingly, both conclude that Dummett commits elementary logical errors, and hence fails to offer an argument that is even prima facie valid. After explicating the arguments Salerno and Tennant attribute to Dummett, I show how broader attention to Dummett's writings on the theory of meaning allows one to discern, and formalize, a valid argument for logical revision. Then, after correctly providing a rigorous statement of the argument, I am able to delineate four possible anti-Dummettian responses. Following recent work by Stewart Shapiro and Crispin Wright, I conclude that progress in the anti-realist's dialectic requires greater clarity about the key modal notions used in Dummett's proof.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Smith2005, author = {Smith, Nicholas JJ}, title = {Vagueness as closeness}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {2}, pages = {157--183}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500110826}, abstract = {This paper presents and defends a definition of vagueness, compares it favourably with alternative definitions, and draws out some consequences of accepting this definition for the project of offering a substantive theory of vagueness. The definition is roughly this: a predicate {\^a}€˜F{\^a}€™ is vague just in case for any objects a and b, if a and b are very close in respects relevant to the possession of F, then {\^a}€˜Fa{\^a}€™ and {\^a}€˜Fb{\^a}€™ are very close in respect of truth. The definition is extended to cover vagueness of many-place predicates, of properties and relations, and of objects. Some of the most important advantages of the definition are that it captures the intuitions which motivate the thought that vague predicates are tolerant, without leading to contradiction, and that it yields a clear understanding of the relationships between higher-order vagueness, sorites susceptibility, blurred boundaries, and borderline cases. The most notable consequence of the definition is that the correct theory of vagueness must countenance degrees of truth.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Adams2005, author = {Adams, Fred and Clarke, Murray}, title = {Resurrecting the tracking theories}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {2}, pages = {207--221}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500111030}, abstract = {Much of contemporary epistemology proceeds on the assumption that tracking theories of knowledge, such as those of Dretske and Nozick, are dead. The word on the street is that Kripke and others killed these theories with their counterexamples, and that epistemology must move in a new direction as a result. In this paper we defend the tracking theories against purportedly deadly objections. We detect life in the tracking theories, despite what we perceive to be a premature burial.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Mumford2005, author = {Mumford, Stephen}, title = {The true and the false}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {2}, pages = {263--269}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500111170}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Simons2005, author = {Simons, Peter}, title = {Negatives, numbers, and necessity some worries about Armstrong's version of truthmaking}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {2}, pages = {253--261}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500111162}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Armstrong2005, author = {Armstrong, David}, title = {Reply to Simons and Mumford}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {2}, pages = {271--276}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500111196}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Diekemper2005, author = {Diekemper, Joseph}, title = {Presentism and ontological symmetry}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {2}, pages = {223--240}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500111097}, abstract = {In this paper, I argue that there is an inconsistency between two presentist doctrines: that of ontological symmetry and asymmetry of fixity. The former refers to the presentist belief that the past and future are equally unreal. The latter refers to the A-Theoretic intuition that the past is closed or actual, and the future is open or potential. My position in this paper is that the presentist is unable to account for the temporal asymmetry that is so fundamentally a part of her theory. In Section I, I briefly outline a recent defence of presentism due to Craig, and argue that a flaw in this defence highlights the tension between the presentist's doctrines of ontological symmetry and asymmetry of fixity. In Section II, I undertake an investigation, on the presentist's behalf, in order to determine whether she is capable of reconciling these two doctrines. In the course of the investigation, I consider different asymmetries, other than that of ontology, which might be said fundamentally to constitute temporal asymmetry, and the asymmetry of fixity in particular. In Section III, I also consider whether the presentist is able to avail herself of some of the standard B-Theoretic accounts of the asymmetry of fixity, and argue that she cannot. Finally, I conclude that temporal asymmetry cannot be accounted for (or explained) other than through the postulation of an ontological asymmetry.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Bergmann2005, author = {Bergmann, Michael and Rea, Michael}, title = {In defence of sceptical theism: a reply to Almeida and Oppy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {2}, pages = {241--251}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500111147}, abstract = {Some evidential arguments from evil rely on an inference of the following sort: {\^a}€˜If, after thinking hard, we can't think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil then it is likely that there is no such reason{\^a}€™. Sceptical theists, us included, say that this inference is not a good one and that evidential arguments from evil that depend on it are, as a result, unsound. Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy have argued (in a previous issue of this journal) that Michael Bergmann's way of developing the sceptical theist response to such arguments fails because it commits those who endorse it to a sort of scepticism that undermines ordinary moral practice. In this paper, we defend Bergmann's sceptical theist response against this charge.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Pritchard2005, author = {Pritchard, Duncan}, title = {Scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemic angst}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {2}, pages = {185--205}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500110867}, abstract = {A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological scepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant anti-sceptical theories. In this paper I outline the main approaches to scepticism and argue that they each fail to capture what is essential to the sceptical challenge because they fail to fully understand the role that the problem of epistemic luck plays in that challenge. I further argue that scepticism is best thought of not as a quandary directed at our possession of knowledge simpliciter, but rather as concerned with a specific kind of knowledge that is epistemically desirable. On this view, the source of scepticism lies in a peculiarly epistemic form of angst.

It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something.


[Wittgenstein 1969: {\^A}\textsection505]
}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Parsons2005, author = {Parsons, Josh}, title = {I am not now, nor have I ever been, a turnip.}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2005}, volume = {83}, number = {1}, pages = {1--14}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400500043894}, abstract = {This paper considers how to put together two popular ideas in the philosophy of time: detenserism (the view that tense can be analysed in token-reflexive terms) and perdurantism (the view that objects persist through time by having temporal parts. On the most obvious way of doing this, certain problems arise. I argue that to deal with these problems we need a tool that is unfamiliar to most detensers and perdurantists{\^a}€”the distinction between sortal and non-sortal predicates.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Papineau2004, author = {Papineau, David}, title = {Kim Sterelny, Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition , Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, pp. xi 262, {\^A}\textsterling50 (cloth), {\^A}\textsterling16.95 (paper). Friendly Thoughts on the Evolution of Cognition}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {491--502}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/715691176}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ehring2004, author = {Ehring, Douglas}, title = {Property Counterparts and Natural Class Trope Nominalism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {443--463}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659878}, abstract = {'Natural class' trope nominalism makes a trope's being of a certain sort--its nature--a matter of its membership in a certain natural class of actual tropes. It has been objected that on this theory had even a single member of the class of red tropes not existed, for example, then the type 'being red' would not have been instantiated and nothing would have been red. I argue that natural class trope nominalism can avoid this implication by way of counterpart theory as applied to properties.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Priest2004, author = {Priest, Graham and Read, Stephen}, title = {Intentionality: Meinongianism and the Medievals}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {421--442}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659877}, abstract = {Intentional verbs create three different problems: problems of non-existence, of indeterminacy, and of failure of substitutivity. Meinongians tackle the first problem by recognizing non-existent objects; so too did many medieval logicians. Meinongians and the medievals approach the problem of indeterminacy differently, the former diagnosing an ellipsis for a propositional complement, the latter applying their theory directly to non-propositional complements. The evidence seems to favour the Meinongian approach. Faced with the third problem, Ockham argued bluntly for substitutivity when the intentional complement is non-propositional; Buridan developed a novel way of resisting substitutivity. Ockham's approach is closer to the Meinongian analysis of these cases; Buridan's seems to raise difficulties for a referential semantics. The comparision between the Meinongian and medieval approaches helps to bring out merits and potential pitfalls of each.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Wyatt2004, author = {Wyatt, Nicole}, title = {What Are Beall and Restall Pluralists About?Thanks to the attendees at the Western Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings of 2001 for a helpful discussion of this paper, and also to two anonymous referees for the AJP for their useful comments.}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {409--420}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659876}, abstract = {In this paper I argue that Beall and Restall's claim that there is one true logic of metaphysical modality is incompatible with the formulation of logical pluralism that they give. I investigate various ways of reconciling their pluralism with this claim, but conclude that none of the options can be made to work.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Lynch2004, author = {Lynch, Michael P.}, title = {Truth and Multiple Realizability}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {384--408}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659875}, abstract = {Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Weatherson2004, author = {Weatherson, Brian}, title = {Luminous MarginsThanks to Tamar Szab{\~A}\textthreesuperior Gendler, John Hawthorne, Chris Hill, Ernest Sosa, and the AJP 's referees.}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {373--383}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659874}, abstract = {Timothy Williamson has recently argued that few mental states are luminous , meaning that to be in that state is to be in a position to know that you are in the state. His argument rests on the plausible principle that beliefs only count as knowledge if they are safely true. That is, any belief that could easily have been false is not a piece of knowledge. I argue that the form of the safety rule Williamson uses is inappropriate, and the correct safety rule might not conflict with luminosity.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cresswell2004, author = {Cresswell, M. J.}, title = {The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {550--551}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659873}, abstract = {Book Information The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle. The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann , ed. Gordon Baker , London : Routledge , 2003 , 528 , US\$100 ( cloth ) Edited by Gordon Baker . By Ludwig Wittgenstein. and Friedrich Waismann. Routledge. London. Pp. 528. US\$100 (cloth:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ferrell2004, author = {Ferrell, Robyn}, title = {A Politics of Impossible Difference: The Later Work of Luce Irigaray}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {547--549}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659872}, abstract = {Book Information A Politics of Impossible Difference: The Later Work of Luce Irigaray. A Politics of Impossible Difference: The Later Work of Luce Irigaray Penelope Deutscher , Ithaca : Cornell University Press , 2002 , 228 , US \$17.95 By Penelope Deutscher. Cornell University Press. Ithaca. Pp. 228. US \$17.95,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Thomson2004, author = {Thomson, Katherine}, title = {Art and Morality}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {544--547}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659871}, abstract = {Book Information Art and Morality. Art and Morality Jos{\~A}\textcopyright Luis Berm{\~A}\textonesuperiordez and Sebastian Gardener , London : Routledge , 2003 , 303 , {\^A}\textsterling50 ( cloth ) By Jos{\~A}\textcopyright Luis Berm{\~A}\textonesuperiordez. and Sebastian Gardener. Routledge. London. Pp. 303. {\^A}\textsterling50 (cloth:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ridge2004, author = {Ridge, Michael}, title = {Moral Realism: A Defence}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {540--544}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659870}, abstract = {Book Information Moral Realism: A Defence. Moral Realism: A Defence Russ Shafer-Landau , Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2003 , x + 322 , {\^A}\textsterling35 ( cloth ) By Russ Shafer-Landau. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. x + 322. {\^A}\textsterling35 (cloth:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Russell2004, author = {Russell, Deborah}, title = {The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {538--540}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659869}, abstract = {Book Information The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom Chandran Kukathas , Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2003 , xii + 292 , {\^A}\textsterling25.00 ( cloth ), US \$45.00 ( cloth ) By Chandran Kukathas. Oxford University Press. Oxford. Pp. xii + 292. {\^A}\textsterling25.00 (cloth:), US \$45.00 (cloth:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Oppy2004, author = {Oppy, Graham}, title = {The Rationality of Theism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {535--538}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659868}, abstract = {Book Information The Rationality of Theism. The Rationality of Theism P. Copan and P. Moser , eds., London : Routledge , 2003 xi + 292 , {\^A}\textsterling70 ( cloth ), {\^A}\textsterling20.99 ( paper ) Edited by P. Copan; and P. Moser . Routledge. London. Pp. xi + 292. {\^A}\textsterling70 (cloth:), {\^A}\textsterling20.99 (paper:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Fish2004, author = {Fish, William}, title = {Perception}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {532--535}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659867}, abstract = {Book Information Perception. Perception Barry Maund , Chesham : Acumen Publishing , 2003 , 240 , {\^A}\textsterling12.95 ( paper ) By Barry Maund. Acumen Publishing. Chesham. Pp. 240. {\^A}\textsterling12.95 (paper:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Parsons2004, author = {Parsons, Josh}, title = {Real Metaphysics}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {530--532}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659866}, abstract = {Book Information Real Metaphysics. Real Metaphysics Hallvard Lillehammer and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra , eds., London : Routledge , 2003 , VIII + 248 , {\^A}\textsterling65 ( cloth ), {\^A}\textsterling19.99 ( paper ) Edited by Hallvard Lillehammer; and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra . Routledge. London. Pp. VIII + 248. {\^A}\textsterling65 (cloth:), {\^A}\textsterling19.99 (paper:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Smith2004, author = {Smith, Nicholas J. J.}, title = {Travels in Four Dimensions: The Enigmas of Space and Time}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {527--530}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659865}, abstract = {Book Information Travels in Four Dimensions: The Enigmas of Space and Time. Travels in Four Dimensions: The Enigmas of Space and Time Robin Le Poidevin , Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2003 , xvii + 275 , {\^A}\textsterling14.99 ( cloth ); {\^A}\textsterling8.99 ( paper ) By Robin Le Poidevin. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. xvii + 275. {\^A}\textsterling14.99 (cloth:); {\^A}\textsterling8.99 (paper:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Akiba2004, author = {Akiba, Ken}, title = {Conceptions of Truth}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {525--527}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659864}, abstract = {Book Information Conceptions of Truth. Conceptions of Truth Wolfgang K{\~A}{\OE}nne , Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2003 , xiii + 493 , {\^A}\textsterling50.00 ( cloth ) By Wolfgang K{\~A}{\OE}nne. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. xiii + 493. {\^A}\textsterling50.00 (cloth:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Prado2004, author = {Prado, C. G.}, title = {Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {523--525}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659863}, abstract = {Book Information Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy Bernard Williams , Princeton : Princeton University Press , 2002 , 328 , US\$27.95 ( cloth ) By Bernard Williams. Princeton University Press. Princeton. Pp. 328. US\$27.95 (cloth:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Gibb2004, author = {Gibb, S. C.}, title = {The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {464--476}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659879}, abstract = {Despite the fact that the nature of the properties of causation is rarely discussed within the mental causation debate, the implicit assumption is that they are universals as opposed to tropes. However, in recent literature on the problem of mental causation, a new solution has emerged which aims to address the problem by appealing to tropes. It is argued that if the properties of causation are tropes rather than universals, then a psychophysical reductionism can be advanced which does not face the problem of multiple realizability. However, the 'trope solution' rests upon the assumption that one can combine a trope monism with a type dualism. I argue that such a combination cannot be allowed. Given a plausible interpretation of types within a trope ontology, trope monism in fact entails type monism. Consequently, if one identifies mental tropes with physical tropes, one must also identify mental and physical types and in doing so face a modified version of the multiple realizability argument.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Marcus2004, author = {Marcus, Eric}, title = {Why Zombies Are Inconceivable}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {477--490}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659880}, abstract = {I argue that zombies are inconceivable. More precisely, I argue that the conceivability-intuition that is used to demonstrate their possibility has been misconstrued. Thought experiments alleged to feature zombies founder on the fact that, on the one hand, they must involve first-person imagining, and yet, on the other hand, cannot . Philosophers who take themselves to have imagined zombies have unwittingly conflated imagining a creature who lacks consciousness with imagining a creature without also imagining the consciousness it may or may not possess.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{McDermott2004, author = {McDermott, Michael}, title = {Jonathan Bennett, A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003, pp. 402, {\^A}\textsterling50 (cloth), {\^A}\textsterling17.99 (paper)}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {341--350}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/715691148}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Johnston2004, author = {Johnston, D. K.}, title = {The Natural History of Fact}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {275--291}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/715691147}, abstract = {The article provides an example of the application of the techniques and results of historical linguistics to traditional problems in the philosophy of language. It takes as its starting point the dispute about the nature of facts that arose from the 1950 Aristotelian Society debate between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. It is shown that, in some cases, expressions containing the noun fact refer to actions and events; while in other cases, such expressions do not have a referring function at all. Thus, nothing corresponding to Strawson's 'pseudomaterial correlate' need be postulated in order to account for the reference of the noun fact . It is suggested that many philosophically problematic expressions may be better understood by tracing their historical evolution in natural language.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{LaFollette2004, author = {LaFollette, Hugh}, title = {The Moral and Political Status of Children}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {4}, pages = {658--660}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659908}, abstract = {Book Information The Moral and Political Status of Children. The Moral and Political Status of Children David Archard , Colin M. Macleod , eds. , Oxford and New York : Oxford University Press , 2002 , viii + 296 , US\$60 (cloth). Edited by David Archard; , Colin M. Macleod; , eds.. Oxford University Press. Oxford and New York. Pp. viii + 296. US\$60 (cloth).,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Goldstein2004, author = {Goldstein, Laurence}, title = {Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range and Resolution}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {4}, pages = {656--658}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659907}, abstract = {Book Information Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range and Resolution. Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range and Resolution Nicholas Rescher , Chicago and La Salle : Open Court , 2001 , xxiii + 293 , US\$24.95 ( paper ). By Nicholas Rescher. Open Court. Chicago and La Salle. Pp. xxiii + 293. US\$24.95 (paper:).,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Linnebo2004, author = {Linnebo, {\~A}˜ystein}, title = {The Limits of Abstraction}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {4}, pages = {653--656}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659906}, abstract = {Book Information The Limits of Abstraction. The Limits of Abstraction Kit Fine , Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2002 , x + 203 , {\^A}\textsterling18.99 (cloth). By Kit Fine. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. x + 203. {\^A}\textsterling18.99 (cloth).,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004, author = {Jackson, Frank}, title = {Corrupting the Youth: A History of Philosophy in Australia}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {4}, pages = {652--653}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659905}, abstract = {Book Information Corrupting the Youth: A History of Philosophy in Australia. Corrupting the Youth: A History of Philosophy in Australia James Franklin , ( Sydney : Macleay Press , 2003 ), 465 , AU\$59.95 By James Franklin. Macleay Press. Sydney. Pp. 465. AU\$59.95,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Rodriguez-Pereyra2004, author = {Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo}, title = {Paradigms and Russell's Resemblance Regress}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {4}, pages = {644--651}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659904}, abstract = {Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a recently advocated strategy to stop Russell's regress by using paradigms does not succeed.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Oppy2004a, author = {Oppy, Graham}, title = {Facing facts?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {4}, pages = {621--643}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659903}, abstract = {In his recent book, Stephen Neale provides an extended defence of the claim that G{\~A}\textparagraphdel's slingshot has dramatic consequences for fact theorists (and, in particular, for fact theorists who look with favour on referential treatments of definite descriptions). I argue that the book-length treatment provides no strengthening of the case that Neale has made elsewhere for this implausible claim. Moreover, I also argue that various criticisms of Neale's case that I made on a previous occasion have met with no successful resistance. If Neale is serious about facing facts, then he needs to face the fact that his central contentions are unsupportable.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Westerhoff2004, author = {Westerhoff, Jan}, title = {The Construction of Ontological Categories}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {4}, pages = {595--620}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659902}, abstract = {I describe an account of ontological categories which does justice to the facts that not all categories are ontological categories and that ontological categories can stand in containment relations. The account sorts objects into different categories in the same way in which grammar sorts expressions . It then identifies the ontological categories with those which play a certain role in the systematization of collections of categories. The paper concludes by noting that on my account what ontological categories there are is partially interest-relative, and that furthermore no object can belong essentially to its ontological category.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Maslen2004, author = {Maslen, Cei}, title = {Degrees of Influence and the Problem of Pre-emption}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {4}, pages = {577--594}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659901}, abstract = {This paper is an investigation into the notion of degree of influence, and its application to the problem of pre-emption. In 'Causation as Influence', Lewis presented a new account of causation under determinism and some new observations on the problem of pre-emption. He claimed that, in cases of pre-emption, the pre-empting cause is much more of a cause than its pre-empted alternative; it has much more influence. I begin by trying to make sense of the notion of degree of influence. Then I emend Lewis's approach to pre-emption in response to objections, compare it to Kvart's Sustainably Reducible Influence account, and finally conclude that all these accounts fail to solve the problem of pre-emption.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Kroon2004, author = {Kroon, Frederick}, title = {Millian Descriptivism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {4}, pages = {553--576}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659900}, abstract = {Mill is a detractor of the view that proper names have meanings, defending in its place the view that names are nothing more than (meaningless) marks. Because of this, Mill is often regarded as someone who anticipated the theory of direct reference for names: the view that the only contribution a name makes to propositions expressed through its use is the name's referent. In this paper I argue that the association is unfair. With some gentle interpretation, Mill can be portrayed as someone who is a Millian in the sense he most cares about (names are meaningless marks) but a descriptivist in so far as he takes the determinants of reference to be properties in the possession of speakers. I contend that this view is not only one that Mill comes close to holding, but, in light of the reasons that (nearly) led him to such a view, one that is worth taking seriously on its own terms.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Stich2004, author = {Stich, Stephen}, title = {Some Questions from the Not-So-Hostile WorldI'm grateful to Kent Bach, Peter Godfrey-Smith, and Shaun Nichols for their helpful advice.}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {503--511}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659882}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Sterelny2004, author = {Sterelny, Kim}, title = {Reply to Papineau and Stich}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {512--522}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659862}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Sterelny2004a, author = {Sterelny, Kim}, title = {Philosophy of Mental Representation}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {351--353}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659843}, abstract = {Book Information Philosophy of Mental Representation. Philosophy of Mental Representation Hugh Clapin , ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press , 2002 , xv + 332 , {\^A}\textsterling40 ( cloth ), {\^A}\textsterling18.99 ( paper ) Edited by Hugh Clapin . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. xv + 332. {\^A}\textsterling40,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004a, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and Hall, Ned}, title = {Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {93--111}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659806}, abstract = {David Lewis's influential work on the epistemology and metaphysics of objective chance has convinced many philosophers of the central importance of the following two claims: First, it is a serious cost of reductionist positions about chance (such as that occupied by Lewis) that they are, apparently, forced to modify the Principal Principle--the central principle relating objective chance to rational subjective probability--in order to avoid contradiction. Second, it is a perhaps more serious cost of the rival non-reductionist position that, unlike reductionism, it can give no coherent explanation for why the Principal Principle should hold. I argue that both of these claims are fundamentally mistaken.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004b, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and H{\~A}\textexclamdownjek, Alan and Pettit, Philip}, title = {Desire Beyond Belief}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {77--92}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659805}, abstract = {David Lewis [1988; 1996] canvases an anti-Humean thesis about mental states: that the rational agent desires something to the extent that he or she believes it to be good. Lewis offers and refutes a decision-theoretic formulation of it, the 'Desire-as-Belief Thesis'. Other authors have since added further negative results in the spirit of Lewis's. We explore ways of being anti-Humean that evade all these negative results. We begin by providing background on evidential decision theory and on Lewis's negative results. We then introduce what we call the indexicality loophole: if the goodness of a proposition is indexical, partly a function of an agent's mental state, then the negative results have no purchase. Thus we propose a variant of Desire-as-Belief that exploits this loophole. We argue that a number of meta-ethical positions are committed to just such indexicality. Indeed, we show that with one central sort of evaluative belief--the belief that an option is right--the indexicality loophole can be exploited in various interesting ways. Moreover, on some accounts, 'good' is indexical in the same way. Thus, it seems that the anti-Humean can dodge the negative results.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004c, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and Elga, Adam}, title = {Infinitesimal Chances and the Laws of Nature}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {67--76}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659804}, abstract = {The 'best-system' analysis of lawhood [Lewis 1994] faces the 'zero-fit problem': that many systems of laws say that the chance of history going actually as it goes--the degree to which the theory 'fits' the actual course of history--is zero. Neither an appeal to infinitesimal probabilities nor a patch using standard measure theory avoids the difficulty. But there is a way to avoid it: replace the notion of 'fit' with the notion of a world being typical with respect to a theory.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004d, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and Egan, Andy}, title = {Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of PropertiesThanks to Tyler Doggett, Liz Harman, Sarah McGrath, Jim John, Juan Comesa{\~A}\textpma, Doug Marshall, Tony Corsentino, Daniel Stoljar, Vann McGee, Alex Byrne, Bob Stalnaker, Steve Yablo, Sally Haslanger, Jeff King, Michael Glanzberg, Laurie Paul, Adam Elga, Michael Smith, John Hawthorne, Adam Sennett, Laura Shroeter, Brian Weatherson, Karen Bennett, and most of all to Ned Hall for discussion, comments, criticisms, suggestions, objections, and guidance.}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {48--66}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659803}, abstract = {Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, and to identify properties with functions from {\^a}Œ\textcopyrightworld, time{\^a}Œ\textordfeminine pairs to extensions. Again, the replacement theory is neutral with respect to a metaphysical dispute that the old theory (arguably) forces us to take a stand on--the dispute over whether objects have temporal parts. It also allows us to give a smoother semantics for predication, to better accommodate our intuitions about which objects temporary properties are properties of, and to make temporally self-locating beliefs genuinely self -locating.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004e, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and David, Marian}, title = {Don't Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {42--47}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659802}, abstract = {Contra Lewis, it is argued that the correspondence theory is a genuine rival theory of truth: it goes beyond the redundancy theory; it competes with other theories of truth; it is aptly summarized by the slogan 'truth is correspondence to fact'; and it really is a theory of truth.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004f, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and Cresswell, M. J.}, title = {Adequacy Conditions for Counterpart Theory}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {28--41}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659801}, abstract = {David Lewis's modal realism claims that nothing can exist in more than one world or time, and that statements about how something would have been are to be analysed in terms of its counterpart . I first explain why the counterpart relation depends on de re modal statements in an intensional language, so that intuitive properties of similarity relations cannot be used to show that the counterpart relation is not an equivalence relation. I then look at test sentences in (the intensional) natural language, and show that none of them provide compelling evidence that a counterpart semantics is needed.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004g, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and Casati, Roberto and Varzi, Achille C.}, title = {Counting the Holes}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {23--27}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659800}, abstract = {Argle claimed that holes supervene on their material hosts, and that every truth about holes boils down to a truth about perforated things. This may well be right, assuming holes are perforations. But we still need an explicit theory of holes to do justice to the ordinary way of counting holes--or so says Cargle.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004h, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and Lewis, David}, title = {How Many Lives Has Schr{\~A}\textparagraphdinger's Cat?{\^A}\textcopyrightThe Estate of David Kellogg Lewis. Thanks for valuable comments are due to David Albert, D. M. Armstrong, Phillip Bricker, Jeremy Butterfield, David Chalmers, John Collins, Adam Elga, Alan H{\~A}\textexclamdownjek, Richard Hanley, Rae Langton, Peter Lewis, Stephanie Lewis, Barry Loewer, Jonathan Schaffer, Bas van Fraassen, Steven Weinstein, and Sam Wheeler.}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {3--22}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659799}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004i, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham}, title = {Introduction}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {1--2}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659798}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004j, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and Taylor, Barry}, title = {Transworld Similarity and Transworld BeliefI would like to thank Douglas Adeney, Edwin Coleman, Bruce Langtry, Greg Restall, and Robert Stalnaker for comments on an earlier draft.}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {213--225}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659797}, abstract = {Relations of transworld similarity play an essential role in Lewis's system. Analysis reveals that they involve the possibility of detailed transworld belief. Such belief is problematic within Lewis's framework. He has an answer to the problems raised, but it relies on a dubious distinction between natural and mere properties. Replacing that distinction with a respectable one undermines an essential part of his case against one of his chief opponents, the linguistic ersatzist.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004k, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and Stalnaker, Robert}, title = {Lewis on Intentionality}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {199--212}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659796}, abstract = {David Lewis's account of intentionality is a version of what he calls 'global descriptivism'. The rough idea is that the correct interpretation of one's total theory is the one (among the admissible interpretations) that come closest to making it true. I give an exposition of this account, as I understand it, and try to bring out some of its consequences. I argue that there is a tension between Lewis's global descriptivism and his rejection of a linguistic account of the intentionality of thought. I distinguish some different senses in which Lewis's theory might permit, or be committed to, a kind of holism about intentional content, and I consider the sense in which Lewis's account might be said to be an internalist account, and the motivation for this kind of internalism.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004l, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and Rosen, Gideon and Smith, Nicholas J. J.}, title = {Worldly Indeterminacy: A Rough Guide}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {185--198}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659795}, abstract = {This paper defends the idea that there might be vagueness or indeterminacy in the world itself--as opposed to merely in our representations of the world--against the charges of incoherence and unintelligibility. First we consider the idea that the world might contain vague properties and relations ; we show that this idea is already implied by certain well-understood views concerning the semantics of vague predicates (most notably the fuzzy view). Next we consider the idea that the world might contain vague objects ; we argue that an object is indeterminate in a certain respect (colour, size, etc.) just in case it is a borderline case of a maximally specific colour (size, etc.) property. Finally we consider the idea that the world as a whole might be indeterminate; we argue that the world is indeterminate just in case it lacks a determinate division into determinate objects.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004m, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and Paul, L. A.}, title = {The Context of EssenceI'm indebted to David Lewis and John Hawthorne for discussion of a very early version of the ideas expressed in this paper, and to Frank Jackson, Kathrin Koslicki, Denis Robinson, Jason Stanley, Brian Weatherson and audiences at the 2001 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, the 2001 Annual Conference of the Australasian Association for Philosophy, and the University of Washington for comments on written versions.}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {170--184}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659794}, abstract = {I address two related questions: first, what is the best theory of how objects have de re modal properties? Second, what is the best defence of essentialism given the variability of our modal intuitions? I critically discuss several theories of how objects have their de re modal properties and address the most threatening antiessentialist objection to essentialism: the variability of our modal intuitions. Drawing on linguistic treatments of vagueness and ambiguity, I show how essentialists can accommodate the variability of modal intuitions while holding that objects have their modal properties independently of contexts.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004n, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and Papineau, David}, title = {David Lewis and Schr{\~A}\textparagraphdinger's Cat}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {153--169}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659793}, abstract = {In 'How Many Lives Has Schr{\~A}\textparagraphdinger's Cat?' David Lewis argues that the Everettian no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is in a tangle when it comes to probabilities. This paper aims to show that the difficulties that Lewis raises are insubstantial. The Everettian metaphysics contains a coherent account of probability. Indeed it accounts for probability rather better than orthodox metaphysics does.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004o, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and McDaniel, Kris}, title = {Modal Realism with Overlap}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {137--152}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659792}, abstract = {In this paper, I formulate, elucidate, and defend a version of modal realism with overlap , the view that objects are literally present at more than one possible world. The version that I defend has several interesting features: (i) it is committed to an ontological distinction between regions of spacetime and material objects; (ii) it is committed to compositional pluralism , which is the doctrine that there is more than one fundamental part-whole relation; and (iii) it is the modal analogue of endurantism , which is the doctrine that objects persist through time by being wholly present at each moment they are located.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004p, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and Langton, Rae}, title = {Elusive Knowledge of Things in Themselves}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {129--136}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659791}, abstract = {Kant argued that we have no knowledge of things in themselves, no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things, a thesis that is not idealism but epistemic humility. David Lewis agrees (in 'Ramseyan Humility'), but for Ramseyan reasons rather than Kantian. I compare the doctrines of Ramseyan and Kantian humility, and argue that Lewis's contextualist strategy for rescuing knowledge from the sceptic (proposed elsewhere) should also rescue knowledge of things in themselves. The rescue would not be complete: for knowledge of things in themselves would remain elusive.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Kroon2004a, author = {Kroon, Fred}, title = {Terms and Truth: Reference Direct and Anaphoric}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {353--356}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659820}, abstract = {Book Information Terms and Truth: Reference Direct and Anaphoric. Terms and Truth: Reference Direct and Anaphoric Alan Berger , Bradford; Cambridge MA: MIT Press , 2002 , xvii + 234 , US\$35 ( cloth ) By Alan Berger. Bradford; Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Pp. xvii + 234. US\$35 (cloth:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Liston2004, author = {Liston, Michael}, title = {Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {356--359}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659821}, abstract = {Book Information Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism. Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism Colin Cheyne , Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers , 2001 , xvi + 236 , {\^A}\textsterling55 ( cloth ) By Colin Cheyne. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Pp. xvi + 236. {\^A}\textsterling55,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Markosian2004, author = {Markosian, Ned}, title = {SoC It To Me?: Reply to McDaniel On MaxCon Simples}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {332--340}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659841}, abstract = {I raised the following question in a recent paper: What are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an object's being a simple? And I proposed and defended this answer (which I called 'MaxCon'): Necessarily, x is a simple iff x is a maximally continuous object. In a more recent paper, Kris McDaniel raises several objections to MaxCon, including, in particular, two objections based on a principle about the supervenience of constitution that he calls 'SoC'. The purpose of the present paper is to address the main objections raised by McDaniel, and to show that none of them poses a serious threat to MaxCon.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Alm2004, author = {Alm, David}, title = {Atomism About Value}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {312--331}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659840}, abstract = {Atomism is defined as the view that the moral value of any object is ultimately determined by simple features whose contribution to the value of an object is always the same, independently of context. A morally fundamental feature, in a given context, is defined as one whose contribution in that context is determined by no other value fact. Three theses are defended, which together entail atomism: (1) All objects have their moral value ultimately in virtue of morally fundamental features; (2) If a feature is morally fundamental, then its contribution is always the same; (3) Morally fundamental features are simple.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Djukic2004, author = {Djukic, George}, title = {Do Four-Dimensionalists Have To Be Counterpart Theorists?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {292--311}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659839}, abstract = {In 'Four-Dimensional Objects' Peter van Inwagen gives two arguments for the claim that proponents of four-dimensionalism have to be counterpart theorists. Recently Jack Copeland, Heather Dyke, and Diane Proudfoot, echoing in part points made by Mark Heller in this journal in 1993, have sought to rebut one of van Inwagen's arguments. In this paper I shall criticize their discussion and by implication certain points made by Heller. In so doing I shall also rebut a possible objection to van Inwagen's second argument. While I shall conclude that Copeland et al . fail to make their case, I nevertheless argue that van Inwagen's argument can be resisted, provided that the four-dimensionalist is willing to adopt a certain conception of transworld identity. Moreover, I shall argue that to the extent that van Inwagen's paper highlights something problematic for four-dimensionalism in this particular conception of transworld identity, the paper highlights something equally problematic for three-dimensionalism.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Olson2004, author = {Olson, Eric T.}, title = {Animalism and the Corpse Problem}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {265--274}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659837}, abstract = {The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism). Some critics, however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism. According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal coincides with a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our not being animals. I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not affect the case for animalism.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Brown2004, author = {Brown, Bryson}, title = {The Pragmatics of Empirical AdequacyThanks are due to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and to the University of Melbourne for support of this research. This paper has benefited from discussion with members of the Philosophy and History and Philosophy of Science departments at the University of Melbourne and the Philosophy department at La Trobe University, as well as from the comments and suggestions of three anonymous referees.}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {242--264}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659836}, abstract = {Empirical adequacy is a central notion in van Fraassen's empiricist view of science. I argue that van Fraassen's account of empirical adequacy in terms of a partial isomorphism between certain structures in some model(s) of the theory and certain actual structures (the observables) in the world, is untenable. The empirical adequacy of a theory can only be tested in the context of an accepted practice of observation. But because the theory itself does not determine the correct practice of observation, its failure to pass the test does not show the failure of an isomorphism between the empirical substructure of some model(s) of the theory and observable structures in nature. Further, because the choice of a practice of observation is a pragmatic one grounded in epistemic goals we seek in observation, van Fraassen's anthropocentric view of observability is epistemically unmotivated.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Lange2004, author = {Lange, Marc}, title = {A Note on Scientific Essentialism, Laws of Nature, and Counterfactual Conditionals}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {227--241}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659835}, abstract = {Scientific essentialism aims to account for the natural laws' special capacity to support counterfactuals. I argue that scientific essentialism can do so only by resorting to devices that are just as ad hoc as those that essentialists accuse Humean regularity theories of employing. I conclude by offering an account of the laws' distinctive relation to counterfactuals that portrays laws as contingent but nevertheless distinct from accidents by virtue of possessing a genuine variety of necessity.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jenkins2004, author = {Jenkins, Fiona}, title = {The Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {369--370}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659831}, abstract = {Book Information The Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy. The Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy Robert C. Solomon and David Sherman , eds., Oxford: Blackwell , 2003 , viii + 345 , \$69.30 ( cloth ) Edited by Robert C. Solomon; and David Sherman . Oxford: Blackwell. Pp. viii + 345. \$69.30 (cloth:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Nagasawa2004, author = {Nagasawa, Yujin}, title = {Mind and Body}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {368--369}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659830}, abstract = {Book Information Mind and Body. Mind and Body Robert Kirk , Chesham: Acumen , 2003 , vii + 200 , US\$75.00 ( cloth ), US\$22.95 ( paper ) By Robert Kirk. Chesham: Acumen. Pp. vii + 200. US\$75.00 (cloth:), US\$22.95 (paper:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Phillips2004, author = {Phillips, James}, title = {Off the Beaten Track}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {368--368}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659829}, abstract = {Book Information Off the Beaten Track. Off the Beaten Track Heidegger Martin , trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 2002 , 291 , AUS\$49.95 By Heidegger Martin. , trans. Julian Young. and Kenneth Haynes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 291. AUS\$49.95,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Sankey2004, author = {Sankey, Howard}, title = {Humans and Other Animals}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {367--368}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659828}, abstract = {Book Information Humans and Other Animals. Humans and Other Animals John Dupr{\~A}\textcopyright , Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2002 , 272 , {\^A}\textsterling17.99 ( cloth ) By John Dupr{\~A}\textcopyright. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 272. {\^A}\textsterling17.99 (cloth:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Damnjanovic2004, author = {Damnjanovic, Nic}, title = {The Compositionality Papers}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {366--367}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659827}, abstract = {Book Information The Compositionality Papers. The Compositionality Papers Jerry A. Fodor and Ernest Lepore , Oxford: Clarendon Press , 2002 , viii + 212 , US\$65.00 ( cloth ), US\$19.95 ( paper ) By Jerry A. Fodor. and Ernest Lepore. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. viii + 212. US\$65.00 (cloth:), US\$19.95 (paper:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Nunn2004, author = {Nunn, Barbara V.}, title = {The Myths We Live By}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {366--366}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659826}, abstract = {Book Information The Myths We Live By. The Myths We Live By Mary Midgley , London: Routledge , 2003 , 175 , US\$29.95 ( cloth ) By Mary Midgley. London: Routledge. Pp. 175. US\$29.95 (cloth:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Barwell2004, author = {Barwell, Ismay}, title = {Charles Taylor: Meaning Morals and Modernity}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {364--365}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659825}, abstract = {Book Information Charles Taylor: Meaning Morals and Modernity. Charles Taylor: Meaning Morals and Modernity Nicholas H. Smith , Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press , 2002 , ix + 285 , US\$24.95 ( paperback ) By Nicholas H. Smith. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press. Pp. ix + 285. US\$24.95 (paperback:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hull2004, author = {Hull, Louise}, title = {Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {363--364}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659824}, abstract = {Book Information Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology Christoph Hoerl and McCormack Teresa , eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press , 2001 , xiii + 419 , {\^A}\textsterling45 ( cloth ), {\^A}\textsterling17.99 ( paper ) Edited by Christoph Hoerl; and McCormack Teresa . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. xiii + 419. {\^A}\textsterling45 (cloth:), {\^A}\textsterling17.99 (paper:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Levey2004, author = {Levey, Geoffrey Brahm}, title = {Culture and Equality}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {361--363}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659823}, abstract = {Book Information Culture and Equality. Culture and Equality Brian Barry , Cambridge: Polity Press , 2001 , xi + 399 , US\$19.95 ( paper ) By Brian Barry. Cambridge: Polity Press. Pp. xi + 399. US\$19.95 (paper:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Sripada2004, author = {Sripada, Chandra Sekhar}, title = {The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {359--361}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659822}, abstract = {Book Information The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics. The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics Adam Morton , London; New York: Routledge , 2002 , 240 , US\$95 ( cloth ), US\$29.95 ( paper ) By Adam Morton. London; New York: Routledge. Pp. 240. US\$95 (cloth:), US\$29.95 (paper:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2004q, author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham and Hanley, Richard}, title = {As Good As It Gets: Lewis on Truth in Fiction}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, number = {1}, pages = {112--128}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659790}, abstract = {David Lewis's approach to analysing truth in fiction, significantly amended by 'Postscripts' in 1983, has been widely criticized on three main grounds, and it seems fair to say that nearly every writer on the subject thinks that one of these grounds is sufficient to show that Lewis is mistaken. I argue that with some minor revision, Lewis's approach survives all extant objections. Indeed, I judge the Lewis approach to be even more successful than Lewis himself seems to think.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Agar2003, author = {Agar, N.}, title = {The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {445--447}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659692}, abstract = {Book Information The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. By Jeff McMahan. Oxford University Press. New York. 2002. Pp. xiii + 540. Aus\$110.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Pelletier2003, author = {Pelletier, F. J. and Stainton, R. J.}, title = {On 'the Denial of Bivalence is Absurd'}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {369--382}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659705}, abstract = {Timothy Williamson, in various places, has put forward an argument that is supposed to show that denying bivalence is absurd. This paper is an examination of the logical force of this argument, which is found wanting.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Armour-Garb2003, author = {Armour-Garb, B. and Beall, J.}, title = {Minimalism and the Dialetheic Challenge}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {383--401}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659706}, abstract = {Minimalists, following Horwich, claim that all that can be said about truth is comprised by all and only the nonparadoxical instances of (E) {\^a}Œ\textcopyright p {\^a}Œ\textordfeminine is true iff p. It is, accordingly, standard in the literature on truth and paradox to ask how the minimalist will restrict (E) so as to rule out paradox-inducing sentences (alternatively: propositions). In this paper, we consider a prior question: On what grounds does the minimalist restrict (E) so as to rule out paradox-inducing sentences and, thereby, avoid contradictions? We argue that there is no good reason for thinking that the minimalist can furnish such grounds. Accordingly, while we are tempted to conclude from this that the minimalist should acknowledge the contradictoriness of truth, instead, we end with a challenge: Provide grounds, compatible with minimalism, for banning the paradoxical instances of (E), or embrace dialetheism.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Bueno2003, author = {Bueno, O. and Colyvan, M.}, title = {Yablo's Paradox and Referring to Infinite Objects}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {402--412}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659707}, abstract = {The blame for the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes is often placed on self-reference and circularity. Some years ago, Yablo [1985; 1993] challenged this diagnosis, by producing a paradox that's liar-like but does not seem to involve circularity. But is Yablo's paradox really non-circular? In a recent paper, Beall [2001] has suggested that there are no means available to refer to Yablo's paradox without invoking descriptions, and since Priest [1997] has shown that any such description is circular, Beall concludes that Yablo's paradox itself is circular. In this paper, we argue that Beall's conclusion is unwarranted, given that (i) descriptions are not the only way to refer to Yablo's paradox, and (ii) we have no reason to believe that because the description involves self-reference, the denotation of that description is also circular. As a result, for all that's been said so far, we have no reason to believe that Yablo's paradox is circular.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Wasserman2003, author = {Wasserman, R.}, title = {The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {413--419}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659708}, abstract = {The problem of temporary intrinsics is the problem of how persisting objects can have different intrinsic properties at different times. The relativizer responds to this problem by replacing ordinary intrinsic properties with relations to times. In this note, I identify and respond to three different objections to the relativizer's proposal, each of which can be traced to the work of David Lewis.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Gilmore2003, author = {Gilmore, C. S.}, title = {In Defence of Spatially Related Universals}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {420--428}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659709}, abstract = {Immanent universals, being wholly present wherever they are instantiated, are capable both of bi-location (one entity's being wholly present in two places at one time) and of co-location (two entities' being wholly present in the same place at one time). As a result, they can become involved in some bizarre situations, situations whose contradictory appearance cannot be dispelled by any of the relativizing techniques familiar to metaphysicians as solutions to the problem of change. Douglas Ehring takes this to be a fatal problem for immanent universals, but I do not. Although the old relativizing techniques don't solve the problem, I propose a new one that does. I spend half the paper defending the proposed solution against objections, and in the course of this task I have occasion to touch upon such topics as backward time travel and the distinction between universals and particulars. I close by putting forward--merely as an option--a new way to draw the distinction in question.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Gennaro2003, author = {Gennaro, Rocco J.}, title = {Papineau on the Actualist HOT Theory of Consciousness}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {581--586}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659742}, abstract = {In Thinking About Consciousness , David Papineau [2002] presents a criticism of so-called 'actualist HOT theories of consciousness'. The HOT theory, held most notably by David Rosenthal, claims that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of an actual higher-order thought directed at the mental state. Papineau contends that actualist HOT theory faces an awkward problem in relation to higher-order memory judgements; for example, that the theory cannot explain how one could later recall an earlier experience that was not introspected. He argues that, on the HOT theory, we are even left with the absurd conclusion that the consciousness of, say, an earlier visual experience might even depend on the later act of memory. I show that Papineau's criticism of actualist HOT theory not only fails, but also that it seriously mischaracterizes and underestimates the theory. In particular, Papineau badly conflates the crucial difference between an introspective state (i.e., where a conscious HOT is directed at a mental state) and an outer-directed first-order conscious state (i.e., a case where one has a nonconscious HOT).}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Sattig2003, author = {Sattig, T.}, title = {Temporal Predication with Temporal Parts and Temporal Counterparts}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {355--368}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659704}, abstract = {If ordinary objects have temporal parts, then temporal predications have the following truth conditions: necessarily, ( a is F) at t iff a has a temporal part that is located at t and that is F. If ordinary objects have temporal counterparts, then, necessarily, ( a is F) at t iff a has a temporal counterpart that is located at t and that is F. The temporal-parts account allows temporal predication to be closed under the parthood relation: since all that is required to be F at t is to have a temporal part, a t , that is located at t and that is F, every object that has a t as a temporal part is F at t . Similarly for the temporal-counterparts account. Both closure under parthood and closure under counterparthood are shown to have unacceptable consequences. Then strategies for avoiding closure are considered and rejected.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Rosenkranz2003, author = {Rosenkranz, S.}, title = {Pragmatism, Semantics, and the Unknowable}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {340--354}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659703}, abstract = {Pragmatism in semantics is hampered by its proponents' tendency to tie understanding too closely to our mastery of epistemic practice. Both Brandom's inferentialist semantics and the anti-realist semantics championed by Dummett and Tennant amply illustrate this tendency. As a consequence, neither theory can successfully handle cases of the innocuously unknowable in which two sentences, though mutually consistent, nonetheless cannot be known to be true together. On Brandom's account, such sentences are treated as being mutually inconsistent after all. According to both Dummett's and Tennant's version of anti-realist semantics, we cannot know that there are any true sentences of this kind. Neither result is the least acceptable, whence either theory fails. The lesson to be learnt from this failure is that understanding should not be identified with the ability to reach warranted verdicts, but with the ability to think, where thinking is constitutively involved in, but nonetheless distinct from judging.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Das2003, author = {Das, R.}, title = {Virtue Ethics and Right Action}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {324--339}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659702}, abstract = {In this paper I evaluate some recent virtue-ethical accounts of right action [Hursthouse 1999; Slote 2001; Swanton 2001]. I argue that all are vulnerable to what I call the insularity objection : evaluating action requires attention to worldly consequences external to the agent, whereas virtue ethics is primarily concerned with evaluating an agent's inner states. More specifically, I argue that insofar as these accounts are successful in meeting the insularity objection they invite the circularity objection : they end up relying upon putatively virtue-ethical considerations that themselves depend on unexplained judgments of rightness. Such accounts thus face a dilemma that is characteristic of virtue-ethical accounts of right action. They avoid the insularity objection only at the cost of inviting the circularity objection: they become intuitively plausible roughly to the extent that they lose their distinctively virtue-ethical character.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Walsh2003, author = {Walsh, A.}, title = {Moral Particularism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {447--449}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659693}, abstract = {Book Information Moral Particularism. Edited by Brad Hooker and Margaret Little. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xiv + 317. Hardback, Aus\$110.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Das2003a, author = {Das, Ramon}, title = {World Poverty and Human Rights}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {449--451}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/jag320}, abstract = {Book Information World Poverty and Human Rights. World Poverty and Human Rights Thomas Pogge Cambridge Polity Press 2002 vii + 284 Paperback US\$28, {\^A}\textsterling18 By Thomas Pogge. Polity Press. Cambridge. Pp. vii + 284. Paperback:US\$28, {\^A}\textsterling18,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{van Hooft2003, author = {van Hooft, S.}, title = {Integrity and the Fragile Self}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {451--453}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659695}, abstract = {Book Information Integrity and the Fragile Self. By Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze and Michael P. Levine. Ashgate. Aldershot. 2003. Pp. 168. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling45.00. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling17.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Sterelny2003, author = {Sterelny, K.}, title = {The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {454--454}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659696}, abstract = {Book Information The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Edited by Stephen Turner and Paul Roth. Blackwell. Oxford. 2003. Pp. viii + 382. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling17.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Browne2003, author = {Browne, D.}, title = {The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {454--455}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659697}, abstract = {Book Information The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Edited by Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield. Blackwell Publishing. Oxford. 2003. Pp. xii + 417. Paperback, US\$34.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{D'Agostino2003, author = {D'Agostino, F.}, title = {Relativism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {455--455}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659698}, abstract = {Book Information Relativism. By Paul O'Grady. Acumen. Chesham. 2002. Pp. xi + 196. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling12.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Vincent2003, author = {Vincent, A.}, title = {Patriotism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {455--456}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659699}, abstract = {Book Information Patriotism. Edited by Igor Primoratz. Humanity Books. New York. 2002. Pp. 298. Paperback, US\$29.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Baltzly2003, author = {Baltzly, D.}, title = {The Blackwell Guide to Ancient Philosophy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {456--456}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659700}, abstract = {Book Information The Blackwell Guide to Ancient Philosophy. Edited by Christopher Shields. Blackwell. Oxford. 2003. Pp. xi + 333. Hardback, Aus\$69.30.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{McKinnon2003, author = {McKinnon, Neil}, title = {Presentism and Consciousness}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {305--323}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/jag301}, abstract = {The presentist view of time is psychologically appealing. I argue that, ironically, contingent facts about the temporal properties of consciousness are very difficult to square with presentism unless some form of mind/body dualism is embraced.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Field2003, author = {Field, Hartry}, title = {No Fact of the Matter}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {457--480}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659756}, abstract = {Are there questions for which 'there is no determinate fact of the matter' as to which answer is correct? Most of us think so, but there are serious difficulties in maintaining the view, and in explaining the idea of determinateness in a satisfactory manner. The paper argues that to overcome the difficulties, we need to reject the law of excluded middle; and it investigates the sense of 'rejection' that is involved. The paper also explores the logic that is required if we reject excluded middle, with special emphasis on the conditional. There is also discussion of higher order indeterminacy (in several different senses) and of penumbral connections; and there is a suggested definition of determinateness in terms of the conditional and a discussion of the extent to which the notion of determinateness is objective. And there are suggestions about a unified treatment of vagueness and the semantic paradoxes.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{DeVidi2003, author = {DeVidi, David and Kenyon, Tim}, title = {Analogues of Knowability}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {481--495}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659757}, abstract = {An interesting recent reply to the Paradox of Knowability is Neil Tennant's proposal: to restrict the anti-realist's knowability thesis to truths the knowing of which is logically consistent. However, this proposal is egregiously ad hoc unless motivated by something other than the wish to save anti-realism from embarrassment. We examine Tennant's argument that his restriction is motivated by parallel considerations in cases that are neutral with respect to debates about realism. We conclude that the cases are not neutral, nor the considerations parallel. The failure of Tennant's argument provides an opportunity to reflect on, among other things, the nature of Moore's paradox, and the role of idealization in doxastic logic.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Almeida2003, author = {Almeida, Michael J. and Oppy, Graham}, title = {Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {496--516}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659758}, abstract = {Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Heathwood2003, author = {Heathwood, Christopher}, title = {Book Reviews}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {615--617}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/715691022}, abstract = {Book Information Welfare and Rational Care. Welfare and Rational Care Stephen Darwall , Princeton: Princeton University Press , 2003 , pp. xi + 135 , US\$24.95 ( cloth ) . By Stephen Darwall. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pp. xi + 135. US\$24.95 (cloth:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Lycan2003, author = {Lycan, William G.}, title = {David Papineau, Thinking About Consciousness , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, pp. 280, {\^A}\textsterling25 (cloth).}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {587--596}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/715691060}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Baker2003, author = {Baker, Lynne Rudder}, title = {Book Reviews}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {597--598}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724050596}, abstract = {Book Information Objects and Persons. Objects and Persons Trenton Merricks . Oxford: Clarendon Press , 2001 , pp. xii + 203 , {\^A}\textsterling30 ( cloth ), {\^A}\textsterling14.99 ( paper ) . By Trenton Merricks. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. xii + 203. {\^A}\textsterling30 (cloth:), {\^A}\textsterling14.99 (paper:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Armstrong2003, author = {Armstrong, D. M.}, title = {Book Reviews}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {599--601}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724050597}, abstract = {Book Information Essays on Realism and Rationalism. Essays on Realism and Rationalism Alan Musgrave , Amsterdam \& Atlanta: Rodopi , 1999 , pp. xi + 367 , US\$83 . By Alan Musgrave. Amsterdam \& Atlanta: Rodopi. Pp. xi + 367. US\$83,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Roy2003, author = {Roy, Tony}, title = {Book Reviews}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {601--603}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724050598}, abstract = {Book Information The Fullness of Being: A New Paradigm for Existence. The Fullness of Being: A New Paradigm for Existence Barry Miller , South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press , 2002 , pp. xii + 175 , US\$29.95 ( cloth ) . By Barry Miller. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press. Pp. xii + 175. US\$29.95 (cloth:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Witmer2003, author = {Witmer, D. Gene}, title = {Book Reviews}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {603--606}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724050599}, abstract = {Book Information World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism. World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism Michael Rea , Oxford: Clarendon Press , 2002 , pp. viii + 245 , US\$35.00 ( cloth ) . By Michael Rea. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. viii + 245. US\$35.00 (cloth:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Rowe2003, author = {Rowe, William L.}, title = {Book Reviews}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {606--608}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724050600}, abstract = {Book Information Divine Hiddenness: New Essays. Divine Hiddenness: New Essays Daniel Howard-Snyder Paul K. Moser , eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 2002 , pp. 252 , {\^A}\textsterling42.50 ( cloth ), {\^A}\textsterling15.95 ( paper ) . Edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder; Paul K. Moser . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 252. {\^A}\textsterling42.50 (cloth:), {\^A}\textsterling15.95 (paper:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Beall2003, author = {Beall, J. C.}, title = {Book Reviews}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {609--611}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724050601}, abstract = {Book Information Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth. Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth Colin McGinn , Oxford: Clarendon Press , 2000 , pp. vi + 114 , {\^A}\textsterling25 ( cloth ), {\^A}\textsterling12.99 ( paper ) . By Colin McGinn. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. vi + 114. {\^A}\textsterling25 (cloth:), {\^A}\textsterling12.99 (paper:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Deutscher2003, author = {Deutscher, Max}, title = {Book Reviews}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {611--612}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724050602}, abstract = {Book Information The Analytic Imaginary. The Analytic Imaginary Marguerite La Caze , Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press , 2001 , pp. ix + 194 , \$US32.50 ( cloth ) . By Marguerite La Caze. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Pp. ix + 194. \$US32.50 (cloth:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Edwards2003, author = {Edwards, J.}, title = {Dummett: Philosophy of Language}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {298--300}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/715690950}, abstract = {Book Information Dummett: Philosophy of Language. By Karen Green. Polity Press. Cambridge. 2002. Pp. xi + 220. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling55. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling14.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Edwards2003a, author = {Edwards, J.}, title = {Michael Dummett}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {298--300}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/715690949}, abstract = {Book Information Michael Dummett. By Bernhard Weiss. Acumen. Chesham. 2002. Pp. ix + 197. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling13.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Studtmann2003, author = {Studtmann, P.}, title = {Counterfactuals and Inferences A New Form of the Three-Parameter Account of Counterfactuals}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {51--61}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/715690948}, abstract = {In 'Subjunctive Conditionals: Two Parameters vs. Three' Pavel Tichy articulates and defends a three-parameter account of counterfactuals. In the paper, he responds to a well known objection against the validity of various forms of inference, in particular strengthening of the antecedent, contraposition, and hypothetical syllogism. In this paper, I argue that his response to the objection is inadequate. I then propose an alternative form of the three-parameter account of counterfactuals that avoids the objection in question.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Bostock2003, author = {Bostock, Simon}, title = {Are All Possible Laws Actual Laws?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {517--533}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659759}, abstract = {Suppose it is a law that all Fs are G. Does the law hold in all possible worlds? According to Necessitarianism, it holds in at least all those worlds containing F-ness. I argue that the Necessitarian must also take the law to hold in all those possible worlds which do not contain F-ness. Accepting the principle that a law can only hold in a world if it has some ontological grounding in that world, I argue that Necessitarianism is committed to the claim that any law holding in the actual world is grounded in every possible world, and that any law holding in any possible world is grounded in the actual world. In other words, Necessitarianism takes all possible laws to be actual.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Davis2003, author = {Davis, Richard Brian}, title = {'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars Exposed}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {534--548}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659760}, abstract = {In a recent series of articles, J. P. Moreland has attempted to revive the idea that bare particulars are indispensable for individuating concrete particulars. The success of the project turns on Moreland's proposal that while bare particulars are indeed 'partially clad'--that is, exemplify at least some properties--they are nevertheless 'bare' in that they lack internal constituents. I argue that 'partially clad' bare particulars (PCBPs) are impervious not only to traditional objections, but also those recently urged in this journal by D. W. Mertz. The real problem with Moreland's view, I contend, is that together with his containment model of predication, it leads to the unwanted conclusion that PCBPs actually contain themselves as constituents, thereby ensnaring them in a vicious (individuative) circularity.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cargile2003, author = {Cargile, James}, title = {On Russell's Argument Against Resemblance Nominalism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {549--560}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659761}, abstract = {Russell famously argued that Resemblance Nominalism leads to a vicious infinite regress in attempting to avoid admitting universals. Saying that a number of things are white only in that they resemble a particular white thing leaves a number of resemblances to that white thing, each of them constituting the holding of the same relation to the paradigm, qualifying that resemblance relation as a universal. Trying to dismiss that new universal by appeal to resemblances between those first resemblances only leads to a new universal of resemblance, and so on. It is argued here that this does not arise for a properly formulated resemblance theory, which only requires one complex relation among the many particulars we deal with, a complex relation which is not multiply instantiated and thus not a universal.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Sludds2003, author = {Sludds, Paul}, title = {The Importance of Being Actual: Some Reasons for and Against Procreation}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {561--568}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659762}, abstract = {In 'Axiological Actualism' Josh Parsons attempts to defend both the intuition that the anticipated welfare of a person cannot constitute a reason to bring him or her into being and the intuition that such considerations can constitute a reason not to . The former, 'basic' intuition he defends by an appeal to the belief that 'ethical theory should refrain from assigning levels of welfare {\^a}€{\vS} or anything of the sort to merely possible people'. The latter, 'converse' intuition he defends by an appeal to prudential considerations. I argue that Parsons's attempts to defend these intuitions are unpersuasive. On the one hand, and notwithstanding his attempts to demonstrate the contrary, the basic intuition is undermined by the claim that an actual person could have been worse off if she had never existed. On the other, his grounding of the converse intuition in prudential considerations runs counter to the ought implies can dictum and is also highly counterintuitive.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Bays2003, author = {Bays, Timothy}, title = {Hudson on Receptacles}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {569--572}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659763}, abstract = {This note concerns a recent paper by Hud Hudson on the nature of 'receptacles'. It simplifies the mathematics in Hudson's paper, and it eliminates almost all of the topology in Hudson's arguments.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Choi2003, author = {Choi, Sungho}, title = {Improving Bird's Antidotes}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {573--580}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659764}, abstract = {In this paper I will first consider Bird's cases against the conditional analysis of dispositions and defend them from Gundersen's objection. This does not mean that I believe that Bird's cases are successful. To the contrary, I take it that we can save the conditional analysis from Bird's cases by taking Lewis's two-step approach to dispositions. However, I will go on to argue that if Bird's cases are supplemented with the assumption that dispositions are intrinsic matter, they are able to do what they are intended to do.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Lai2003, author = {Lai, K.}, title = {Critical Notice of Joel J. Kupperman, Learning from Asian Philosophy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {126--133}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/715690945}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Morel2003, author = {MorelandPickavance, J. P. T.}, title = {Bare Particulars and Individuation Reply to Mertz}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {1--13}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/715690946}, abstract = {Not long ago, one of us has clarified and defended a bare particular theory of individuation. More recently, D. W. Mertz has raised a set of objections against this account and other accounts of bare particulars and proffered an alternative theory of individuation. He claims to have shown that 'the concept of bare particulars, and consequently substratum ontology that requires it, is untenable.' We disagree with this claim and believe there are adequate responses to the three arguments Mertz raises against bare particulars. To substantiate this assertion, we clarify the nature of bare particulars as individuators, state Mertz's objections, and respond to them. We conclude that Mertz has failed to show that bare particular theory is untenable.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Mertz2003, author = {Mertz, D. W.}, title = {Against Bare Particulars A Response to Moreland and Pickavance}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {14--20}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/715690947}, abstract = {In a recent article [Mertz 2001] in this journal I argued for the virtues of a realist ontology of relation instances (unit attributes). A major strength of this ontology is an assay of ontic ('material') predication that yields an account of individuation without the necessity of positing and defending 'bare particulars'. The crucial insight is that it is the unifying agency or combinatorial aspect of a relation instance as predicable that is for ontology the principium individuationis [Mertz 2002; 1996]. Or in short, what is ontically predicable, precisely as such, is the cause of individuation. As a preface to this positive doctrine I offered arguments against the coherence of bare particulars as defended in an article by J. P. Moreland [1998]. In a reply contained in this issue Moreland and Timothy Pickavance (hereafter M/P) propose to answer my objections [2002]. The response that follows provides reasons why, I contend, M/P have not succeeded in parrying my objections to bare particulars.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Curthoys2003, author = {Curthoys, Jean}, title = {Book Reviews}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {613--615}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724050603}, abstract = {Book Information Culture and Enlightenment: Essays for Gyorgy Markus. Culture and Enlightenment: Essays for Gyorgy Markus John Grumley , Paul Crittenden , and Pauline Johnson , eds., Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing , 2002 , pp. vii + 339 , {\^A}\textsterling47.50 ( cloth ) . Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Pp. vii + 339. {\^A}\textsterling47.50 (cloth:),}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Brueckner2003, author = {Brueckner, A.}, title = {Self-Knowledge Via Inner Observation of External Objects?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {118--122}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659568}, abstract = {Harold Langsam has recently presented a novel observational account of self-knowledge. I critically discuss this account and argue that it fails to provide a uniform understanding of how we are able to know the contents of our own thoughts.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Barker2003, author = {Barker, S.}, title = {A Dilemma for the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {62--77}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659585}, abstract = {If we seek to analyse causation in terms of counterfactual conditionals then we must assume that there is a class of counterfactuals whose members (i) are all and only those we need to support our judgements of causation, (ii) have truth-conditions specifiable without any irreducible appeal to causation. I argue that (i) and (ii) are unlikely to be met by any counterfactual analysis of causation. I demonstrate this by isolating a class of counterfactuals called non-projective counterfactuals, or NP-counterfactuals, and indicate how counterfactual analyses of causation must appeal to them to account for the correct causal judgements we make. I show that the truth-conditions of NP-counterfactuals are specifiable only by irreducible appeal to causation. A dilemma then holds: if counterfactual analyses of causation eschew appeal to NP-counterfactuals they are empirically inadequate, but if they appeal to NP-counterfactuals they are circular and thus conceptually inadequate.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cohen2003, author = {Cohen, J.}, title = {On the Structural Properties of the Colours}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {78--95}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659586}, abstract = {Primary quality theories of colour claim that colours are intrinsic, objective, mind-independent properties of external objects. However, a recent, empirically motivated argument seems to have convinced many that primary quality theories cannot be sustained. This argument, in outline, alleges that colours bear structural relations to each other that no primary qualities bear to each other, and therefore that colours cannot be primary qualities. I believe the argument in question has been misunderstood. In this paper I shall examine arguments based on the structural properties of the colours in order to discern what they do and do not show about primary quality theories of colour.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Black2003, author = {Black, T.}, title = {The Relevant Alternatives Theory and Missed Clues}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {96--106}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659587}, abstract = {According to the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge (RA), I know that p only if my evidence eliminates all relevant alternatives to p . Jonathan Schaffer has recently argued that David Lewis's version of RA, which is perhaps the most detailed version yet provided, cannot account for our failure to know in cases involving missed clues, that is, cases in which we see but fail to appreciate decisive evidence. I argue, however, that Lewis's version of RA survives exposure to missed clue cases. Moreover, even though Schaffer maintains that Lewis's Rule of Belief provides no protection against missed clue cases, I argue that we should credit the Rule of Belief with ensuring the survival of Lewis's version of RA.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Kallestrup2003, author = {Kallestrup, J.}, title = {Paradoxes About Belief}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {107--117}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659588}, abstract = {Referentialism is the view that all there is to the meaning of a singular term is its referent. Referentialism entails Substitutivity, i.e., that co-referring terms are intersubstitutable salva veritate . Frege's Paradox shows that Referentialism is inconsistent given two principles: Disquotation says that if S assents to 'P', then S believes that P, and Consistency says that if S believes that P and that not-P, then S is not fully rational. Kripke's strategy was to save Substitutivity by showing that those intuitively plausible principles already led to paradox. I argue that this generalising strategy fails. The Descriptivist, who thinks that a singular term has descriptive meaning, will reject Substitutivity in Frege's Paradox, and deny that Consistency finds application in Kripke's Paradox. The Referentialist, however, may reject Consistency: if the logical properties of the contents of S's beliefs are not reflectively accessible, then S can hold contradictory beliefs without being irrational. Even if successful against Frege's and Kripke's Paradox, this response is ineffective against a strengthened version of the former which rests on Disquotation and Substitutivity, and a strengthened version of the latter which rests only on Disquotation.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ruse2003, author = {Ruse, M.}, title = {Science, Truth, and Democracy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {280--281}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659614}, abstract = {Book Information Science, Truth, and Democracy. By Philip Kitcher. Oxford. New York. 2001. Pp. xiii + 219. US\$27.50.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Davies2003, author = {Davies, S.}, title = {Philosophy, Music and Emotion}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {281--283}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659615}, abstract = {Book Information Philosophy, Music and Emotion. By Geoffrey Madell. Edinburgh University Press. Edinburgh. 2002. Pp. vii + 162. {\^A}\textsterling40.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cresswell2003, author = {Cresswell, M. J.}, title = {Logical Form and Language}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {283--284}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659616}, abstract = {Book Information Logical Form and Language. Edited by G. Preyer and G. Peter. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2002. Pp. x + 512. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling55. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling19.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Armstrong2003a, author = {Armstrong, D. M.}, title = {Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {285--286}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659617}, abstract = {Book Information Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. By Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2002. Pp. xii + 238. {\^A}\textsterling35.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Wasserman2003a, author = {Wasserman, R.}, title = {How Things Persist}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {286--288}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659618}, abstract = {Book Information How Things Persist. By K. Hawley. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. ix + 221. {\^A}\textsterling30.50.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Arstila2003, author = {Arstila, V.}, title = {True Colours, False Theories}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {41--50}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659583}, abstract = {The question of the constituting nature of colour is largely open. The old dispute between colour objectivism and colour subjectivism is still relevant. The former has defended itself against accusations of not being able to explain colour structures, while the latter view has received criticism for not being able to provide a plausible theory of the location of colours. By weakening the notion of physical categories, making some of them perceiver-depended, colour objectivists have managed to overcome at least some of the previous accusations. However, the arguments based on Crane's and Piantanida's findings of the existence of binary colours like greenish-red and yellowish-blue, indicate the inadequacy of colour objectivism. Consequently, we have colours but our theories of them are false.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Noordhof2003, author = {Noordhof, P.}, title = {Something Like Ability}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {21--40}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659582}, abstract = {One diagnosis of what is wrong with the Knowledge Argument rests on the Ability Hypothesis. This couples an ability analysis of knowing what an experience is like together with a denial that phenomenal propositions exist. I argue against both components. I consider three arguments against the existence of phenomenal propositions and find them wanting. Nevertheless I deny that knowing phenomenal propositions is part of knowing what an experience is like. I provide a hybrid account of knowing what an experience is like which is the coherent expression of a single idea: knowing what an experience is like is knowing what it would be like to have the phenomenal content of the experience as the content of an experience one is currently having. I explain how my conclusions indicate that the focus of discussion should be on the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal facts and physical facts and not on the Knowledge Argument. The latter is a poor expression of the difficulty Physicalists face.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ewin2003, author = {Ewin, R. E.}, title = {Obituary}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {153--154}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/jag123}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Miller2003, author = {Miller, Dale E.}, title = {Axiological Actualism and the Converse Intuition}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {123--125}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/jag111}, abstract = {In 'Axiological Actualism' Josh Parsons argues that 'axiological actualism', which is 'the doctrine that ethical theory should refrain from assigning levels of welfare, or preference orderings, or anything of the sort to merely possible people', lends plausibility to 'the converse intuition'. This is the proposition that 'the welfare a person would have, were they actual, can give us a reason not to bring that person into existence'. I show that Parsons's argument delivers less than he promises. It could be convincing only to actualists who hold certain views about normative ethics, and could at most convince them to heed the converse intuition only under certain circumstances.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Kingsbury2003, author = {Kingsbury, Justine}, title = {A Philosophy of Mass Art}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {134--135}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/jag113}, abstract = {Book Information A Philosophy of Mass Art. A Philosophy of Mass Art No{\~A}«l Carroll Oxford Clarendon Press 1998 x + 425 Paperback Aus.\$45.00 By No{\~A}«l Carroll. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. x + 425. Paperback:Aus.\$45.00,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Forrest2003, author = {Forrest, P.}, title = {Epistemic Justification}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {135--138}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659572}, abstract = {Book Information Epistemic Justification. By Richard Swinburne. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. vi + 262. Hardback, US\$55.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Wheeler2003, author = {Wheeler, S.}, title = {Real Conditionals}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {138--140}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659573}, abstract = {Book Information Real Conditionals. By William Lycan. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. 234. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling25.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Nerlich2003, author = {Nerlich, G.}, title = {Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {141--142}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659574}, abstract = {Book Information Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity. By William Lane Craig. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Dordrecht. 2001. Pp. xi + 279. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling62.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Sutton2003, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Psyche And Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {142--144}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/jag117}, abstract = {Book Information Psyche And Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment. Psyche And Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment John P. Wright Paul Potter Oxford Clarendon Press 2000 xii + 298, Hardback {\^A}\textsterling45.00 Edited by John P. Wright; Paul Potter . Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. xii + 298,. Hardback:{\^A}\textsterling45.00,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Levey2003, author = {Levey, G. B.}, title = {Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {144--146}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659576}, abstract = {Book Information Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights. By Ayelet Shachar. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 2001. Pp. xiv + 193. Hardback, Aus.\$140. Paperback, \$48.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Lebeck2003, author = {Lebeck, C.}, title = {The Post-National Constellation}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {146--147}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659577}, abstract = {Book Information The Post-National Constellation. By J{\~A}{\OE}rgen Habermas. Polity Press. Cambridge. 2000. Pp. xvii + 190. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling13.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Limnatis2003, author = {Limnatis, N.}, title = {Hegel and Aristotle}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, pages = {148--150}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659578}, abstract = {Book Information Hegel and Aristotle. By A. Ferrarin. Cambridge University Press. New York. 2001. Pp. xxii + 442. Hardback, US\$65.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Nerlich2003a, author = {Nerlich, G.}, title = {Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {288--290}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659619}, abstract = {Book Information Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. By Theodore Sider. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xxiv + 255. {\^A}\textsterling30.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Weatherson2003, author = {Weatherson, Brian}, title = {Vagueness and Contradiction}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {290--292}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/jag216}, abstract = {Book Information Vagueness and Contradiction. Vagueness and Contradiction Roy Sorensen Oxford Clarendon Press 2001 208 {\^A}\textsterling25 By Roy Sorensen. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. 208. {\^A}\textsterling25,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Mele2003, author = {Mele, A. R.}, title = {Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {292--295}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659621}, abstract = {Book Information Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. MIT Press. Cambridge MA. 2002. Pp. 381. US\$45.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{McDaniel2003, author = {McDaniel, Kris}, title = {Against Maxcon Simples}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {265--275}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/jag208}, abstract = {In a recent paper titled 'Simples', Ned Markosian asks and answers the Simple Question, which is, 'under what circumstances is it true of some object that it has no proper parts?' Markosian's answer to the simple question is MaxCon , which states that an object is a simple if and only if it is a maximally continuous object. I present several arguments against MaxCon.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Weatherson2003a, author = {Weatherson, Brian}, title = {Epistemicism, Parasites, and Vague Names}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {276--279}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/jag209}, abstract = {John Burgess has recently argued that Timothy Williamson's attempts to avoid the objection that his theory of vagueness is based on an untenable metaphysics of content are unsuccessful. Burgess's arguments are important, and largely correct, but there is a mistake in the discussion of one of the key examples. In this note I provide some alternative examples and use them to repair the mistaken section of the argument.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Smart2003, author = {Smart, J. J. C.}, title = {Critical Notice}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {429--433}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659684}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Wright2003, author = {Wright, J. P.}, title = {Hume's Enlightenment Tract: The Unity and Purpose of 'An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding'}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {434--436}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659685}, abstract = {Book Information Hume's Enlightenment Tract: The Unity and Purpose of 'An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding'. By Stephen Buckle. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xi + 351. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling40.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Kornblith2003, author = {Kornblith, H.}, title = {Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {436--437}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659686}, abstract = {Book Information Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses. By Laurence BonJour. Rowman and Littlefield. Lanham MD. 2002. Pp. viii + 289. Hardback, US\$75. Paperback, US\$23.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Beall2003a, author = {Beall, J.}, title = {Truth and the Absence of Fact}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {437--439}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659687}, abstract = {Book Information Truth and the Absence of Fact. By Hartry Field. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xi + 401. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling45.00, US\$65.00. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling16.99, \$24.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{McKeown-Green2003, author = {McKeown-Green, J.}, title = {Introduction to a Philosophy of Music}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {439--440}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659688}, abstract = {Book Information Introduction to a Philosophy of Music. By Peter Kivy. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2002. Pp. xii + 283. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling45. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling14.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Restall2003, author = {Restall, Greg}, title = {Modal Logic and Philosophy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {441--442}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/jag315}, abstract = {Book Information Modal Logic and Philosophy. Modal Logic and Philosophy Roderic Girle Teddington Acumen 2000 198 Hardback {\^A}\textsterling40 Paperback {\^A}\textsterling16.95 By Roderic Girle. Acumen. Teddington. Pp. 198. Hardback:{\^A}\textsterling40; Paperback:{\^A}\textsterling16.95,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Beall2003b, author = {Beall, J.}, title = {Algebraic Methods in Philosophical Logic}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {442--444}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659690}, abstract = {Book Information Algebraic Methods in Philosophical Logic. By J. Michael Dunn and Gary Hardegree. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xv + 470. {\^A}\textsterling60.50.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Baker2003a, author = {Baker, A.}, title = {Does the Existence of Mathematical Objects Make a Difference?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {246--264}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659635}, abstract = {In this paper I examine a strategy which aims to bypass the technicalities of the indispensability debate and to offer a direct route to nominalism. The starting-point for this alternative nominalist strategy is the claim that--according to the platonist picture--the existence of mathematical objects makes no difference to the concrete, physical world. My principal goal is to show that the 'Makes No Difference' (MND) Argument does not succeed in undermining platonism. The basic reason why not is that the makes-no-difference claim which the argument is based on is problematic. Arguments both for and against this claim can be found in the literature; I examine three such arguments, uncovering flaws in each one. In the second half of the paper, I take a more direct approach and present an analysis of the counterfactual which underpins the makes-no-difference claim. What this analysis reveals is that indispensability considerations are in fact crucial to the proper evaluation of the MND Argument, contrary to the claims of its supporters.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hamilton2003, author = {Hamilton, Andy}, title = {'Scottish Commonsense' about Memory}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {229--245}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/jag206}, abstract = {Reid rejects the image theory --the representative or indirect realist position--that memory-judgements are inferred from or otherwise justified by a present image or introspectible state. He also rejects the trace theory , which regards memories as essentially traces in the brain. In contrast he argues for a direct knowledge account in which personal memory yields unmediated knowledge of the past. He asserts the reliability of memory, not in currently fashionable terms as a reliable belief-forming process, but more elusively as a principle of Commonsense. There remains a contemporary consensus against Reid's position. I argue that Reid's critique is essentially sound, and that the consensus is mistaken; personal memory judgements are spontaneous and non-inferential in the same way as perceptual judgements. But I question Reid's account of the connection between personal memory and personal identity. My primary concern is rationally reconstructive rather than scholarly, and downplays recent interpretations of Reid's faculty psychology as a precursor of functionalism and other scientific philosophies of mind.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{H2003, author = {Hand, M.}, title = {Knowability and Epistemic Truth}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {216--228}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659633}, abstract = {The so-called knowability paradox results from Fitch's argument that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This threatens recent versions of semantical antirealism, the central thesis of which is that truth is epistemic. When this is taken to mean that all truths are knowable, antirealism is thus committed to the conclusion that no truths are unknown. The correct antirealistic response to the paradox should be to deny that the fundamental thesis of the epistemic nature of truth entails the knowability of all truths. Correctly understood, the antirealistic conditions on a proposition's truth do not require that the proposition possess a verification-procedure which, when executed under the given conditions, issues in an agent's recognition of truth, but merely that there be a verification-procedure which, under these conditions, takes the value true . The knowability paradox and the related idealism problem (that antirealism seems, but is not, committed to the necessary existence of an epistemic agent) draw attention to the fact that certain propositions, those that are about verification-procedures themselves, may under certain conditions take the value true despite their unperformability under these circumstances. Thus these propositions' procedures can only be performed when the propositions are false, and they gain the appearance of antirealistic impossibility (e.g., that there is an unknown truth). This differs from the unperformability that antirealists object to, pertaining merely to matters of execution rather than to the logical structure of the procedures themselves. The force of antirealism's notion of epistemic truth is piecemeal, rather than consisting in a blanket characterization of truth as knowable.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ludwig2003, author = {Ludwig, Kirk}, title = {Causing Actions}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {295--297}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/jag218}, abstract = {Book Information Causing Actions. Causing Actions Paul Pietroski New York Oxford University Press 2002 288 Hardback US\$49.95 Paperback US\$22 By Paul Pietroski. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. 288. Hardback:US\$49.95; Paperback:US\$22,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Tuomela2003, author = {Tuomela, R.}, title = {Social Action: A Teleological Account}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {300--301}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659625}, abstract = {Book Information Social Action: A Teleological Account. By Seumas Miller. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 2001. Pp. xi + 308. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling45. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling16.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Menzies2003, author = {Menzies, Peter}, title = {Current Issues in Causation}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {302--302}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/jag221}, abstract = {Book Information Current Issues in Causation. Current Issues in Causation Wolfgang Spohn Marion Ledwig Michael Esfeld Paderborn Mentis 2001 207 Paperback DM 78 Edited by Wolfgang Spohn; Marion Ledwig; Michael Esfeld . Mentis. Paderborn. Pp. 207. Paperback:DM 78,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Pigden2003, author = {Pigden, C.}, title = {Notes and News}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {303--303}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659627}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Franklin2003, author = {Franklin, R. L.}, title = {David George Londey, 1927-2002}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {304--304}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659628}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{McKitrick2003, author = {McKitrick, J.}, title = {A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {155--174}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659629}, abstract = {Many philosophers think that dispositions are necessarily intrinsic. However, there are no good positive arguments for this view. Furthermore, many properties (such as weight, visibility, and vulnerability) are dispositional but are not necessarily shared by perfect duplicates. So, some dispositions are extrinsic. I consider three main objections to the possibility of extrinsic dispositions: the Objection from Relationally Specified Properties, the Objection from Underlying Intrinsic Properties, and the Objection from Natural Properties. These objections ultimately fail.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Macarthur2003, author = {Macarthur, D.}, title = {McDowell, Scepticism, and the 'Veil of Perception'}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {175--190}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659630}, abstract = {McDowell has argued that external world scepticism is a pressing problem only in so far as we accept, on the basis of the argument from illusion, the claim that perceiving that p and hallucinating that p involve a highest common factor--something which functions, in the manner of the classical 'veil of ideas', as a perceptual intermediary. McDowell traces the power of this argument to disputable Cartesian assumptions about the transparency of subjectivity to itself. I argue, contra McDowell, that the reflections to be found in, paradigmatically, Descartes's First Meditation are better interpreted as offering a causal argument for scepticism that depends upon a naturalistic conception of sense experience. This is more powerful than the argument from illusion, since it requires no commitment to a highest common factor in perception, nor to the transparency of the mental. The availability of this alternative route to scepticism raises serious problems for McDowell's quietism, which aims to earn the right to avoid, rather than answer, the sceptic. Since the appeal to externalism about content cannot settle the matter, I conclude that there is, at present, an unsatisfactory stand-off between the sceptic and McDowell's position.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Schroeter2003, author = {Schroeter, L. and Schroeter, F.}, title = {A Slim Semantics for Thin Moral Terms?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {191--207}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659631}, abstract = {This paper is a critique of Ralph Wedgwood's recent attempt to use the framework of conceptual role semantics in metaethics. Wedgwood's central idea is that the action-guiding role of moral terms suffices to determine genuine properties as their semantic values. We argue that Wedgwood cannot get so much for so little. We explore two interpretations of Wedgwood's account of what it takes to be competent with a thin moral term. On the first interpretation, the account does not warrant the assignment of a normative property as the semantic value of the target expression. On the second interpretation, the account presupposes that the subject has a prior understanding of normative notions.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Varzi2003, author = {Varzi, A. C.}, title = {Perdurantism, Universalism, and Quantifiers}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {208--215}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659632}, abstract = {I argue that the conjunction of perdurantism (the view that objects are temporally extended) and universalism (the thesis that any old class of things has a mereological fusion) gives rise to undesired complications when combined with certain plausible assumptions concerning the semantics of tensed statements.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cohen2003a, author = {Cohen, Daniel}, title = {Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, pages = {444--445}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/jag317}, abstract = {Book Information Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology. Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology Jeanette Kennett New York Oxford University Press 2001 viii + 229 Hardback US\$45 By Jeanette Kennett. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. viii + 229. Hardback:US\$45,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Nerlich2002, author = {Nerlich, G.}, title = {Time and Space}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {530--531}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659517}, abstract = {Book Information Time and Space. By Barry Dainton. Acumen. Chesham. 2001. Pp. xiv + 386. Paperback, US\$22.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{McGrew2002, author = {McGrew, L.}, title = {Agency and the Metalottery Fallacy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {440--464}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659530}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cuneo2002, author = {Cuneo, T.}, title = {Reconciling Realism with Humeanism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {465--486}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659531}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Wee2002, author = {Wee, C.}, title = {Descartes's Two Proofs of the External World}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {487--501}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659532}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hershenov2002, author = {Hershenov, D.}, title = {Olson's Embryo Problem}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {502--511}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659533}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Brueckner2002, author = {Brueckner, Anthony}, title = {The Consistency of Content-Externalism and Justification-Internalism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {512--515}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.4.512}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Moore2002, author = {Moore, A.}, title = {Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {113--114}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713931206}, abstract = {Book Information Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. By Brad Hooker. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xiii + 213. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling25.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Walsh2002, author = {Walsh, A.}, title = {Greek Thought: A Guide to Classical Knowledge}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {132--132}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/715690779}, abstract = {Book Information Greek Thought: A Guide to Classical Knowledge. By Jacques Bruschwig and Geoffrey, E. R. Lloyd. MA, Belnap Press. Cambridge. 2000. Pp. xv + 1024. Hardback, US\$49.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Saunders2002, author = {Saunders, N.}, title = {Intercultural Philosophy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {132--132}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/715690780}, abstract = {Book Information Intercultural Philosophy. By Ram Adhar Mall. Rowman \& Littlefield. 2000. Pp. xiii + 152. Hardback, US\$62.00. Paperback, US\$16.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Nieuwenburg2002, author = {Nieuwenburg, P.}, title = {Emotion and Perception in Aristotle's Rhetoric}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {86--100}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/715690816}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hudson2002, author = {Hudson, H.}, title = {The Liberal View of Receptacles}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {432--439}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659529}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Barnes2002, author = {Barnes, E. C.}, title = {Neither Truth Nor Empirical Adequacy Explain Novel Success}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {418--431}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659528}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Turner2002, author = {Turner, A. J.}, title = {Kant and the Sciences}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {531--533}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659518}, abstract = {Book Information Kant and the Sciences. Edited by Eric Watkins. Oxford University Press. New York. 2001. Pp. xiii + 290. Hardback, US\$49.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Baker2002, author = {Baker, Alan}, title = {The Foundations of Mathematics in the Theory of Sets}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {533--534}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.4.533}, abstract = {Book Information The Foundations of Mathematics in the Theory of Sets. The Foundations of Mathematics in the Theory of Sets J. P. Mayberry Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2000 xx + 424 Hardback US\$80.00 By J. P. Mayberry. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. Pp. xx + 424. Hardback:US\$80.00,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Driver2002, author = {Driver, J.}, title = {The Metaphysics of Beauty}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {535--536}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659520}, abstract = {Book Information The Metaphysics of Beauty. By Nick Zangwill. Cornell University Press. Ithaca. 2001. Pp. xi + 224. US\$39.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Schellekens2002, author = {Schellekens, E.}, title = {Aesthetic Concepts--Essays after Sibley}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {536--538}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659521}, abstract = {Book Information Aesthetic Concepts--Essays after Sibley. Edited by Emily Brady and Jerrold Levinson. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. ix + 239. {\^A}\textsterling35.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cullity2002, author = {Cullity, G.}, title = {Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {538--540}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659522}, abstract = {Book Information Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. Edited by Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xii + 316. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling35.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hobson2002, author = {Hobson, Peter}, title = {Gandhi's Philosophy of Education}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {541--542}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.4.541}, abstract = {Book Information Gandhi's Philosophy of Education. Gandhi's Philosophy of Education Glynn Richards Oxford Oxford University Press 2001 viii + 118 Hardback By Glynn Richards. Oxford University Press. Oxford. Pp. viii + 118. Hardback:,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Forrest2002, author = {Forrest, P.}, title = {The Oxford Handbook of Free Will}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {542--542}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659524}, abstract = {Book Information The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Edited by Robert Kane. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2002. Pp. xvii + 638.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{McKinnon2002, author = {McKinnon, C.}, title = {Desire-Frustration and Moral Sympathy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {401--417}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659527}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2002, author = {Jackson, F.}, title = {Critical Notice of Knowledge and Its Limits by Timothy Williamson}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {516--521}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/715690940}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{MacBride2002, author = {MacBride, F.}, title = {Articulating Reasons: An Introduction To Inferentialism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {237--238}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724051014}, abstract = {Book Information Articulating Reasons: An Introduction To Inferentialism. By Brandom Robert. Harvard University Press. Cambridge. 2000. Pp. 230. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling23.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Parsons2002, author = {Parsons, Josh}, title = {Axiological Actualism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {137--147}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.2.137}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Black2002, author = {Black, T.}, title = {A Moorean Response to Brain-in-a-Vat Scepticism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {148--163}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724051028}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Mulgan2002, author = {Mulgan, Tim}, title = {Transcending the Infinite Utility Debate}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {164--177}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.2.164}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Fishkind2002, author = {Fishkind, Donniell and Hamkins, Joel David and Montero, Barbara}, title = {New Inconsistencies in Infinite Utilitarianism: is Every World Good, Bad or Neutral?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {178--190}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.2.178}, abstract = {In the context of worlds with infinitely many bearers of utility, we argue that several collections of natural Utilitarian principles--principles which are certainly true in the classical finite Utilitarian context and which any Utilitarian would find appealing--are inconsistent.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Rachels2002, author = {Rachels, S.}, title = {Nagelian Arguments Against Egoism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {191--208}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724051031}, abstract = {Ethical egoism is a wicked doctrine that is wickedly hard to refute. On ethical egoism, the fact that I would suffer is no reason by itself for you not to torture me. This may seem implausible--monstrous, even--but what evidence can we offer against it? Here I examine several arguments which receive some expression in Thomas Nagel's work. Each tries to show that a normative reason to end my pain is a reason for all agents. The arguments in section I emphasize reasons that don't entail agents and thus purportedly apply to all agents. In section II, I examine the Argument from Dissociation, according to which my pain seems bad upon reflection, even without reflecting on its relation to me. Section III examines the Argument from Inability, which claims that my occurrent pains would seem bad to me, even if I couldn't think about their relation to me. Finally, I discuss the Argument from Introspection, according to which I seem, introspectively, to have a reason to end my pain, a reason that has nothing to do with the pain's being mine. Egoism, as Sidgwick thought, is resilient; all but one of these arguments fail utterly. However, the Argument from Introspection provides some grounds for rejecting egoism.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Uniacke2002, author = {Uniacke, Suzanne}, title = {A Critique of the Preference Utilitarian Objection to Killing People}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {209--217}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.2.209}, abstract = {Preference utilitarianism is widely considered a significant advance on classical utilitarianism when it comes to explaining why it is wrong to kill people. This paper focuses attention on the nature of the preference utilitarian 'direct' objection to killing a person and on the related claim that a person's preferences are non-replaceable. I argue that the preference utilitarian case against killing people is overstated and overrated. My concluding remarks indicate the relevance of this discussion to deeper issues in normative moral theory.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Goddu2002, author = {Goddu, G. C.}, title = {What Exactly is Logical Pluralism?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {218--230}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.2.218}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Smith2002, author = {Smith, B.}, title = {Truthmaker Realism: Response to Gregory}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {231--234}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724051034}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Woodcock2002, author = {Woodcock, P.}, title = {Freedom. An Introduction with Readings}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {254--254}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724051024}, abstract = {Book Information Freedom. An Introduction with Readings. By Warburton Nigel. Routledge. London. 2001. Pp. viii + 252. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling12.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jacobs2002, author = {Jacobs, J.}, title = {The Architecture of Reason}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {239--239}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724051015}, abstract = {Book Information The Architecture of Reason. By Robert Audi. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xvi + 286. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling26.50.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Das2002, author = {Das, Ramon}, title = {Suffering and Moral Responsibility}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {240--241}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.2.240}, abstract = {Book Information Suffering and Moral Responsibility. Suffering and Moral Responsibility Meyerfeld Jamie New York Oxford University Press ix + 237 Hardback {\^A}\textsterling35 By Meyerfeld Jamie. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. ix + 237. Hardback:{\^A}\textsterling35,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hay2002, author = {Hay, M.}, title = {An Identity Theory of Truth}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {242--243}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724051017}, abstract = {Book Information An Identity Theory of Truth. By Dodd Julian. Macmillan. Basingstoke. 2000. Pp. ix + 199. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling42.50.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Nagasawa2002, author = {Nagasawa, Yujin}, title = {Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {245--246}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.2.245}, abstract = {Book Information Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness Levine Joseph New York Oxford University Press 2001 204 Hardback {\^A}\textsterling22.50 By Levine Joseph. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. 204. Hardback:{\^A}\textsterling22.50,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Bortolotti2002, author = {Bortolotti, L.}, title = {Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {247--248}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724051019}, abstract = {Book Information Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Edited by Fisette Denis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Dordrecht. 1999. Pp. viii + 361. Hardback, US\$140, {\^A}\textsterling88.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Noble2002, author = {Noble, W.}, title = {The origins of complex language}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {249--250}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724051020}, abstract = {Book Information The origins of complex language. By Carstairs-McCarthy Andrew. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. vi + 260.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Buck2002, author = {Buck, Mabs}, title = {A Theory of Art}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {251--251}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.2.251}, abstract = {Book Information A Theory of Art. A Theory of Art Berger Karol Oxford Oxford University Press 2000 287 Hardback By Berger Karol. Oxford University Press. Oxford. Pp. 287. Hardback:,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Trochatos2002, author = {Trochatos, Maria}, title = {Matters of the Mind}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {252--253}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.2.252}, abstract = {Book Information Matters of the Mind. Matters of the Mind Lyons William Edinburgh Edinburgh University Press 2001 xxix + 288 Paperback By Lyons William. Edinburgh University Press. Edinburgh. Pp. xxix + 288. Paperback:,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Filmer2002, author = {Filmer, S.}, title = {Death and Philosophy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {253--253}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724051023}, abstract = {Book Information Death and Philosophy. By Jeff Malpas and Robert C. Solomon. Routledge. London. 1998. Pp. xii + 211. Paperback.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Baltzly2002, author = {Baltzly, D.}, title = {Emotion and Peace of Mind: from Stoic agitation to Christian temptation}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {235--236}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/724051035}, abstract = {Book Information Emotion and Peace of Mind: from Stoic agitation to Christian temptation. By Richard Sorabji. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xi + 499. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling30.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Forrest2002a, author = {Forrest, P.}, title = {Warranted Christian Belief}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {109--111}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659330}, abstract = {Book Information Warranted Christian Belief. By Alvin Plantinga. Oxford University Press. New York. 2000. Pp. xx + 508.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Brakel2002, author = {Brakel, L. A. W.}, title = {Phantasy and Wish: A Proper Function Account for Human A-Rational Primary Process Mediated Mentation}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {1--16}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659346}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ehring2002, author = {Ehring, D.}, title = {Spatial Relations Between Universals}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {17--23}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659347}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Kaufman2002, author = {Kaufman, Dan}, title = {Descartes's Creation Doctrine and Modality}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {24--41}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.1.24}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Langsam2002, author = {Langsam, H.}, title = {Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Inner Observation}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {42--61}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659349}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Reid2002, author = {Reid, Jasper}, title = {Natural Kind Essentialism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {62--74}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.1.62}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Watkins2002, author = {Watkins, M. and Jolley, K. D.}, title = {Pollyanna Realism: Moral Perception and Moral Properties}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {75--85}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659351}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cross2002, author = {Cross, C. B.}, title = {Doesn't-Will and Didn't-Did}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {101--106}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659353}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{McMahon2002, author = {McMahon, J. A.}, title = {Making Sense. A Theory of Interpretation}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {107--109}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659354}, abstract = {Book Information Making Sense. A Theory of Interpretation. By Paul Thom. Rowman \& Littlefield. Lanham. 2000. Pp. vii + 117. Hardback, US\$59.95. Paperback, US\$17.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Crittenden2002, author = {Crittenden, P.}, title = {Nietzsche's Ethics and his War on 'Morality'}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {2}, pages = {244--244}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659397}, abstract = {Book Information Nietzsche's Ethics and his War on 'Morality'. By May Simon. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. xiv + 212. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling30.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Armstrong2002, author = {Armstrong, D. M.}, title = {David Lewis, 1941-2001}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {134--135}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659345}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Buck2002a, author = {Buck, M.}, title = {Music In The Moment}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {133--133}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659344}, abstract = {Book Information Music In The Moment. By Jerrold Levinson. Cornell University Press. Ithaca. 1997. Pp. 175. Hardback.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Thompson2002, author = {Thompson, J.}, title = {Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {111--113}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659331}, abstract = {Book Information Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. By Martha C. Nussbaum. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge/New York. 2000. Pp. xxi + 312.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Crittenden2002a, author = {Crittenden, Paul}, title = {On Virtue Ethics}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {114--116}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.1.114}, abstract = {Book Information On Virtue Ethics. On Virtue Ethics Rosalind Hursthouse Oxford Oxford University Press 1999 ix + 275 Hardback {\^A}\textsterling25 By Rosalind Hursthouse. Oxford University Press. Oxford. Pp. ix + 275. Hardback:{\^A}\textsterling25,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Macdonald2002, author = {Macdonald, C.}, title = {Perception and Reason}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {117--119}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659335}, abstract = {Book Information Perception and Reason. By Bill Brewer. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. xviii + 281.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{De Rosa2002, author = {De Rosa, Raffaella}, title = {What's Within. Nativism Reconsidered}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {119--122}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.1.119}, abstract = {Book Information What's Within. Nativism Reconsidered. What's Within. Nativism Reconsidered F. Cowie New York/Oxford Oxford University Press 1999 xvii + 334 Hardback US\$35.00 By F. Cowie. Oxford University Press. New York/Oxford. Pp. xvii + 334. Hardback:US\$35.00,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Petersen2002, author = {Petersen, P.}, title = {Ethics and Sex}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {122--124}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659337}, abstract = {Book Information Ethics and Sex. By Igor Primoratz. Routledge. London/New York. 1999. Pp. xi + 205. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling14.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{McCullagh2002, author = {McCullagh, C. B.}, title = {The Logic of the History of Ideas}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {124--125}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659338}, abstract = {Book Information The Logic of the History of Ideas. By Mark Bevir. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1999. Pp. xii + 337. Hardback, \$120.80.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Goldstein2002, author = {Goldstein, A.}, title = {Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {126--128}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659339}, abstract = {Book Information Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology. Edited by Allen Colin, Bekoff Mark and Lauder George. MIT Press. Cambridge. 1998. Pp. vi + 597. Paperback, US\$31.50.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hodges2002, author = {Hodges, H. J.}, title = {The Weight of Finitude: On the Philosophical Question of God}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {128--130}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659340}, abstract = {Book Information The Weight of Finitude: On the Philosophical Question of God. By Ludwig Heyde. State University of New York Press. Albany. 1999. Pp. 177 + xviii. Paperback, US\$17.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Bishop2002, author = {Bishop, J.}, title = {Faith with Reason}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {130--131}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659341}, abstract = {Book Information Faith with Reason. By Paul Helm. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xvi + 185.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Bortolotti2002a, author = {Bortolotti, Lisa}, title = {Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {380--381}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.3.380}, abstract = {Book Information Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content Carolyn Price Oxford Clarendon Press 2001 vi + 263 Hardback {\^A}\textsterling35 By Carolyn Price. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. vi + 263. Hardback:{\^A}\textsterling35,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Johnson2002, author = {Johnson, K.}, title = {Aspects of Reason}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {381--383}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659456}, abstract = {Book Information Aspects of Reason. By Paul Grice. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xxxviii + 136. Hardback, US\$29.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Forrest2002b, author = {Forrest, P.}, title = {Reenchantment without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {383--384}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659457}, abstract = {Book Information Reenchantment without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion. By David Ray Griffin. Cornell University Press. Ithaca. 2001. Pp. viii + 426. Hardback, US\$55.00. Paperback, US\$24.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Eklund2002, author = {Eklund, Matti}, title = {Deep Inconsistency}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {321--331}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.3.321}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Sutrop2002, author = {Sutrop, Margit}, title = {Imagination and the Act of Fiction-Making}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {332--344}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.3.332}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Wedgwood2002, author = {Wedgwood, R.}, title = {Practical Reason and Desire}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {345--358}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659471}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Bourne2002, author = {Bourne, C.}, title = {When am I?: A Tense Time for Some Tense Theorists?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {359--371}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659472}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Braddon-Mitchell2002, author = {Braddon-Mitchell, D. and Jackson, F.}, title = {A Pyrrhic Victory for Teleonomy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {372--377}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659473}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cheyne2002, author = {Cheyne, C.}, title = {The Indispensability of Mathematics}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {378--379}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659474}, abstract = {Book Information The Indispensability of Mathematics. By Mark Colyvan. Oxford University Press. New York. 2001. Pp. 172. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling30.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Smart2002, author = {Smart, J. J. C.}, title = {Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {522--524}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.4.522}, abstract = {Book Information Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology. Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology John Leslie Oxford Clarendon Press 2001 xii + 234 {\^A}\textsterling25 By John Leslie. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. xii + 234. {\^A}\textsterling25,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Dickerson2002, author = {Dickerson, A. B.}, title = {Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {525--526}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.4.525}, abstract = {Book Information Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations Crispin Wright Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press 2001 x + 484 Hardback US\$55 By Crispin Wright. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA. Pp. x + 484. Hardback:US\$55,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Buckle2002, author = {Buckle, S.}, title = {Hume's Reason}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {526--528}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659515}, abstract = {Book Information Hume's Reason. By D. Owen. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. x + 234. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling30.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Lombardo2002, author = {Lombardo, Eugenio S. G.}, title = {Analogical Versus Discrete Theories of Possibility}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {307--320}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.3.307}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{McKinnon2002a, author = {McKinnon, N.}, title = {The Endurance/Perdurance Distinction}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {288--306}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659467}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Oppy2002, author = {Oppy, G.}, title = {New Essays on the A Priori}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {384--386}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659458}, abstract = {Book Information New Essays on the A Priori. Edited by Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xi + 478. {\^A}\textsterling15.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Dickerson2002a, author = {Dickerson, A. B.}, title = {Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {386--388}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659459}, abstract = {Book Information Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy. By Robert Hanna. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xv + 312. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling45.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Legg2002, author = {Legg, C.}, title = {Reading Peirce Reading}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {388--390}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659460}, abstract = {Book Information Reading Peirce Reading. By Richard A. Smyth. Rowman and Littlefield. Maryland. 1997. Pp. ix + 327. Hardback, US\$64.50. Paperback, US\$24.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Crittenden2002b, author = {Crittenden, Paul}, title = {Nietzsche's Middle Period}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {390--392}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.3.390}, abstract = {Book Information Nietzsche's Middle Period. Nietzsche's Middle Period Ruth Abbey New York Oxford University Press 2000 xvii + 208 Hardback {\^A}\textsterling33.50 By Ruth Abbey. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. xvii + 208. Hardback:{\^A}\textsterling33.50,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hancock2002, author = {Hancock, Jan}, title = {Environmental Philosophy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {393--393}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/80.3.393}, abstract = {Book Information Environmental Philosophy. Environmental Philosophy Christopher Belshaw Chesham Acumen 2001 xiv + 322 Paperback {\^A}\textsterling15.95 By Christopher Belshaw. Acumen. Chesham. Pp. xiv + 322. Paperback:{\^A}\textsterling15.95,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Tanaka2002, author = {Tanaka, K.}, title = {The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {394--394}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659463}, abstract = {Book Information The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic. Edited by Lou Goble. Blackwell Publishers. Oxford. 2001. Pp. x + 510. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling16.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Jackson2002a, author = {Jackson, F. and Priest, G.}, title = {Notes and News}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {399--400}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659465}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Baltzly2002a, author = {Baltzly, D.}, title = {What Goes Up: Proclus Against Aristotle on the Fifth Element}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {261--287}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659466}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hancock2002a, author = {Hancock, J.}, title = {Life's Intrinsic Value: Science, Ethics and Nature}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {528--530}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659516}, abstract = {Book Information Life's Intrinsic Value: Science, Ethics and Nature. By Nicholas Agar. Colombia University Press. New York. 2001. Pp. x + 200. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling17.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Campbell2001, author = {Campbell, Keith}, title = {The Quest for Reality; Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {443--444}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/79.3.443}, abstract = {Book Information The Quest for Reality; Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour. The Quest for Reality; Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour Barry Stroud New York Oxford University Press 2000 xv + 228 Hardback By Barry Stroud . Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. xv + 228. Hardback:,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Gregory2001, author = {Gregory, D.}, title = {Smith on Truthmakers}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {422--427}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659269}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Phillips2001, author = {Phillips, S. H.}, title = {Hindu Ethics}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {428--429}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659270}, abstract = {Book Information Hindu Ethics. By Roy Perrett. University of Hawaii Press. Honolulu. 1998. Pp. xi + 105. Paperback, US\$28.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{von Thun2001, author = {von Thun, M.}, title = {Probability Theory and Probability Semantics}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {570--571}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659287}, abstract = {Book Information Probability Theory and Probability Semantics. By P. Roeper and H. Leblanc. University of Toronto Press. Toronto. 1999. Pp. xii + 240. Hardback, US\$65.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Lynch2001, author = {Lynch, Tony}, title = {A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {572--574}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/79.4.572}, abstract = {Book Information A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice. A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice Raimond Gaita London Routledge 2000 xxxi, 293 Hardback {\^A}\textsterling17.99 By Raimond Gaita. Routledge. London. Pp. xxxi, 293. Hardback:{\^A}\textsterling17.99,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Skelton2001, author = {Skelton, Anthony}, title = {Singer and His Critics}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {574--576}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/79.4.574}, abstract = {Book Information Singer and His Critics. Singer and His Critics Dale Jamieson Oxford Blackwell Press 1999 368 Hardback {\^A}\textsterling50.00 Paperback {\^A}\textsterling15.99 Edited by Dale Jamieson . Blackwell Press. Oxford. Pp. 368. Hardback:{\^A}\textsterling50.00; Paperback:{\^A}\textsterling15.99,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Oppy2001, author = {Oppy, G.}, title = {Naturalism: A Critical Analysis}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {576--577}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659290}, abstract = {Book Information Naturalism: A Critical Analysis. Edited by William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland. Routledge. London. 2000. Pp. xv + 286. {\^A}\textsterling60.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Pigden2001, author = {Pigden, C.}, title = {The Is-Ought Problem: An Investigation in Philosophical Logic}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {578--580}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659291}, abstract = {Book Information The Is-Ought Problem: An Investigation in Philosophical Logic. By Gerhard Schurz. Kluwer. Dordrecht. 1997. Pp. x + 332. {\^A}\textsterling92.25.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{White2001, author = {White, F. C.}, title = {Substantial Knowledge: Aristotle's Metaphysics}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {580--582}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/79.4.580}, abstract = {Book Information Substantial Knowledge: Aristotle's Metaphysics. Substantial Knowledge: Aristotle's Metaphysics C.D.C. Reeve Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2000 xviii + 322 US\$34.95 By C.D.C. Reeve. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.. Pp. xviii + 322. US\$34.95,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Kvart2001, author = {Kvart, I.}, title = {Lewis's 'Causation as Influence'}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {409--421}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659268}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Rodriguez-Pereyra2001, author = {Rodriguez-Pereyra, G.}, title = {Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {395--408}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659267}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Losonsky2001, author = {Losonsky, M.}, title = {Aristotle on Artifacts: A Metaphysical Puzzle}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {445--445}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659257}, abstract = {Book Information Aristotle on Artifacts: A Metaphysical Puzzle. By Errol G. Katayama. State University of New York Press. Albany. 1999. Pp. xiii + 202. Paperback.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Michael2001, author = {Michael, M.}, title = {Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {445--446}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659258}, abstract = {Book Information Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language. Edited by Peter V. Lamarque. Pergamon Press. 1997. Pp. xix + 599. Dfl 298, US\$171.50.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Brock2001, author = {Brock, G.}, title = {The Morality of Nationalism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {446--447}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659259}, abstract = {Book Information The Morality of Nationalism. Edited by R. McKim and J. McMahan. Oxford University Press. New York. 1997. Pp. xii + 371. Paperback, \$42.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Walsh2001, author = {Walsh, A. J.}, title = {A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {447--447}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659260}, abstract = {Book Information A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. By John Rawls. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. xxii + 538. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling25.00. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling12.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Oddie2001, author = {Oddie, G.}, title = {Axiological Atomism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {313--332}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659262}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{MacIntosh2001, author = {MacIntosh, Duncan}, title = {Prudence and the Reasons of Rational Persons}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {346--365}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/79.3.346}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hunter2001, author = {Hunter, D.}, title = {Mind-Brain Identity and the Nature of States}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {366--376}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659265}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Canfield2001, author = {Canfield, J. V.}, title = {Private Language: the Diary Case}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {377--394}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659266}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Oppy2001a, author = {Oppy, G.}, title = {The Semantics of Media}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {582--583}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659293}, abstract = {Book Information The Semantics of Media. By Jeff Ross. Dordrecht, Kluwer. 1997. Pp. vii + 137. {\^A}\textsterling56.75.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Skelton2001a, author = {Skelton, A.}, title = {Sorting Out Ethics}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {583--585}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659294}, abstract = {Book Information Sorting Out Ethics. By R.M. Hare. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1997. Pp. x + 191. Hardback, US\$19.95. Paperback, US\$18.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hodges2001, author = {Hodges, Horace Jeffery}, title = {Environmental Philosophy and Ethics in Buddhism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {585--587}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/79.4.585}, abstract = {Book Information Environmental Philosophy and Ethics in Buddhism. Environmental Philosophy and Ethics in Buddhism Padmasiri de Silva London Macmillan Press 1998 xviii + 195 Hardback AUS\$69.95 By Padmasiri de Silva. Macmillan Press. London. Pp. xviii + 195. Hardback:AUS\$69.95,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Kirk2001, author = {Kirk, Robert}, title = {Nonreductive Physicalism and Strict Implication}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {544--552}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/79.4.544}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Campbell2001a, author = {Campbell, S.}, title = {Fixing a Hole in the Ground of Induction}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {553--563}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659309}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Beall2001, author = {Beall, J. C. and Colyvan, Mark}, title = {Looking for Contradictions}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {564--569}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/79.4.564}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Scott2001, author = {Scott, M.}, title = {Tactual Perception}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {149--160}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713931200}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Conee2001, author = {Conee, E.}, title = {Friendship and Consequentialism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {161--179}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713931201}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Newman2001, author = {Newman, D. V.}, title = {Chaos, Emergence, and the Mind-Body Problem}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {180--196}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713931202}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Keller2001, author = {Keller, S. and Nelson, M.}, title = {Presentists Should Believe in Time-Travel}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {333--345}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713931204}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Walsh2001a, author = {Walsh, A.}, title = {Are Market Norms and Intrinsic Valuation Mutually Exclusive?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {525--543}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659307}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Burgess2001, author = {Burgess, J.}, title = {Vagueness, Epistemicism and Response-Dependence}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {507--524}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659306}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Laverty2001, author = {Laverty, M.}, title = {The Moral Self}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {587--589}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659296}, abstract = {Book Information The Moral Self. By Pauline Chazan. Routledge. London and New York. 1998. Pp. 225.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ardagh2001, author = {Ardagh, D.}, title = {The Ethics of Bankruptcy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {589--591}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659297}, abstract = {Book Information The Ethics of Bankruptcy. By J. Kilpi. Routledge. London. 1999. Pp. xiii + 220. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling15.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hough2001, author = {Hough, G.}, title = {Frege. An Introduction to the Founder of Modern Analytic Philosophy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {592--592}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659298}, abstract = {Book Information Frege. An Introduction to the Founder of Modern Analytic Philosophy. By Anthony Kenny. Blackwell Publishers. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xi + 223. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling12.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Buck2001, author = {Buck, M.}, title = {Musical Worlds: New Directions in the Philosophy of Music}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {593--593}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659299}, abstract = {Book Information Musical Worlds: New Directions in the Philosophy of Music. Edited by Philip Alperson. Pennsylvania State University Press. University Park. 1998. Pp. 188. Paperback.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Baxter2001, author = {Baxter, Donald L. M.}, title = {Instantiation as Partial Identity}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {449--464}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/79.4.449}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Miller2001, author = {Miller, D. E.}, title = {Atomists, Liberals and Civic Republicans: Taylor on the Ontology of Citizenship}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {465--478}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659303}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Eshleman2001, author = {Eshleman, A. S.}, title = {Being is not Believing: Fischer and Ravizza on Taking Responsibility}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {479--490}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659304}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Reimer2001, author = {Reimer, Marga}, title = {The Problem of Empty Names}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {4}, pages = {491--506}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/79.4.491}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Christiano2001, author = {Christiano, Thomas}, title = {Knowledge and Power in the Justification of Democracy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {197--215}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/79.2.197}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Forrest2001, author = {Forrest, P.}, title = {J. J. C. Smart and J. J. Haldane, Atheism and Theism, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996, pp. vi + 234.}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {125--126}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659166}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Mertz2001, author = {Mertz, D. W.}, title = {Individuation and Instance Ontology}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {45--61}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659177}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Shafer-L2001, author = {Shafer-Landau, R.}, title = {Knowing Right from Wrong}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {62--80}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659178}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{MacBride2001, author = {MacBride, F.}, title = {Four New Ways to Change your Shape}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {81--89}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659179}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Shogenji2001, author = {Shogenji, T.}, title = {The Role of Coherence in Epistemic Justification}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {90--106}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659180}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Tennant2001, author = {Tennant, N.}, title = {Is Every Truth Knowable?: Reply to Hand and Kvanvig}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {107--113}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659181}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Coady2001, author = {Coady, C. A. J.}, title = {Critical Notice of Republicanism by Philip Pettit}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {119--124}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659183}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Thompson2001, author = {Thompson, J.}, title = {Faking Nature: The Ethics of Environmental Restoration}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {290--291}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659204}, abstract = {Book Information Faking Nature: The Ethics of Environmental Restoration. By Robert Elliot. Routledge. London, New York. 1997. Pp. xii + 177. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling35.00. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling11.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Craig2001, author = {Craig, W. Lane}, title = {McTaggart's Paradox and Temporal Solipsism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {32--44}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659176}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Buckle2001, author = {Buckle, S.}, title = {Marvels, Miracles, and Mundane Order}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {1--31}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659175}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Dunn2001, author = {Dunn, R.}, title = {Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998, pp. iv + 334.}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {127--128}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659167}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Mummery2001, author = {Mummery, J.}, title = {Tamsin Lorraine, Irigaray and Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1999, pp. xiv 272, \$US19.95 (paper).}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {128--130}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659168}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{White2001a, author = {White, F. C.}, title = {Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede (eds.), The Original Sceptics: A Controversy, Hackett Publishing Co., 1997, pp. xiii 155, cloth US\$34.95, paperback US\$14.95.}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {130--132}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659169}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Laverty2001a, author = {Laverty, M.}, title = {John Bayley, Iris: A Memoir of Iris Murdoch, London, Gerald Duckworth \& Co, Ltd, 1998, pp. 189.}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {132--133}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659170}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Teichman2001, author = {Teichman, J.}, title = {Mary Warnock, An Intelligent Persons Guide to Ethics, London, Duckworth, 1998, pp. 128, 12.95 (cloth).}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {134--136}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659171}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Levy2001, author = {Levy, N.}, title = {Nicholas H. Smith, Strong Hermeneutics: Contingency and Moral Identity, London, Routledge, 1997, pp. x 197, 14.99 (paper).}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {136--138}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659172}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Chuard2001, author = {Chuard, P.}, title = {William Seager, Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment, London and New York, Routledge, 1999, pp. x 306, 15.99 (paper).}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {138--139}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659173}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{McKie2001, author = {McKie, J.}, title = {Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting (eds.), Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. ix 310, \$33.95 (paper).}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {140--141}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659174}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Varzi2001, author = {Varzi, A. C.}, title = {Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {291--295}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659205}, abstract = {Book Information Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness. By A. Gallois. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1998. Pp. xiii + 296. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling35.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Levy2001a, author = {Levy, N.}, title = {Strong Hermeneutics: Contingency and Moral Identity}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {296--297}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659206}, abstract = {Book Information Strong Hermeneutics: Contingency and Moral Identity. By Nicholas H. Smith. Routledge. London. 1997. Pp. x + 197. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling14.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ashford2001, author = {Ashford, S.}, title = {The Paradox of Self-Consciousness}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {298--300}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659207}, abstract = {Book Information The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. By Jos{\~A}\textcopyright Luis Berm{\~A}\textordmasculinedez. Bradford/MIT. Cambridge, MA. 1998. Pp. xv + 338. \$US30.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Mossel2001, author = {Mossel, B.}, title = {The Individuation of Actions}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {258--278}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659226}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Papineau2001, author = {Papineau, D.}, title = {The Status of Teleosemantics, or How to Stop Worrying about Swampman}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {279--289}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659227}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Barbone2001, author = {Barbone, S.}, title = {Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {429--431}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659249}, abstract = {Book Information Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present. By Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd. Routledge. London and New York. 1999. Pp. vi + 169. Paperback, US\$20.99, {\^A}\textsterling12.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Reidy2001, author = {Reidy, D. A.}, title = {Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {431--434}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659250}, abstract = {Book Information Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy. By Eamonn Callan. Oxford University Press. New York. 1997. Pp. viii + 262. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling25.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Coady2001a, author = {Coady, D.}, title = {Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {434--435}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659251}, abstract = {Book Information Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind. By Gilbert Harman. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. viii + 291. Hardback, \$120.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hunt2001, author = {Hunt, Ian}, title = {Hegel's Idea of Freedom}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {435--437}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/79.3.435}, abstract = {Book Information Hegel's Idea of Freedom. Hegel's Idea of Freedom Alan Patten Oxford University Press 1999 xiii + 216 Hardback {\^A}\textsterling30 By Alan Patten. Oxford University Press. Pp. xiii + 216. Hardback:{\^A}\textsterling30,}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Gunther2001, author = {Gunther, Y. H.}, title = {On the Emotions}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {437--439}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659253}, abstract = {Book Information On the Emotions. By R. Wollheim. Yale University Press. New Haven/London. 1999. Pp. xiii + 269. Hardback, US\$25.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Gill2001, author = {Gill, J.}, title = {Hume, Holism, and Miracles}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {439--440}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659254}, abstract = {Book Information Hume, Holism, and Miracles. By David Johnson. Cornell University Press. Ithaca. 1999. Pp. xi + 106. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling22.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Schaffer2001, author = {Schaffer, J.}, title = {The Individuation of Tropes}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {247--257}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659225}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Chase2001, author = {Chase, J.}, title = {Is Externalism about Content Inconsistent with Internalism about Justification?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {227--246}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659224}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Young2001, author = {Young, R.}, title = {Self-Governance and Cooperation}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {300--301}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659208}, abstract = {Book Information Self-Governance and Cooperation. By Robert H. Myers. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. vi + 179. Hardback, {\^A}\textsterling30.00.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Wilkins2001, author = {Wilkins, J.}, title = {Tower of Babel: the evidence against the new creationism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {302--304}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659209}, abstract = {Book Information Tower of Babel: the evidence against the new creationism. By Robert T. Pennock. Bradford/MIT Press. Cambridge MA. 1999. Pp. xviii + 429.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Beall2001a, author = {Beall, J. C.}, title = {Understanding Truth}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {304--306}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659210}, abstract = {Book Information Understanding Truth. By Soames Scott. Oxford University Press. New York. 1999. Pp. ix + 268. Cloth.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Gray2001, author = {Gray, F.}, title = {Philosophy and the Maternal Body: Reading Silence}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {306--307}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659211}, abstract = {Book Information Philosophy and the Maternal Body: Reading Silence. By Michelle Boulous Walker. Routledge. London and New York. 1998. Pp. x + 235.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Walsh2001b, author = {Walsh, A.}, title = {Necessary Goods: Our Responsibilities to Meet Others' Needs}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {308--308}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659212}, abstract = {Book Information Necessary Goods: Our Responsibilities to Meet Others' Needs. Edited by Gillian Brock. Rowman and Littlefield. Lanham, MD. 1998. Pp. ix + 238. Hardback, US\$63.00. Paperback, US\$23.95.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Beall2001b, author = {Beall, J.}, title = {The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and Its Origins}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {308--309}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659213}, abstract = {Book Information The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and Its Origins. Edited by Paul Humphreys and James Fetzer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Boston. Pp. xiii + 290. Hardback, US\$105.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Beall2001c, author = {Beall, J. C.}, title = {Truth}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {309--310}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1093/ajp/79.2.309}, abstract = {Book Information Truth. Truth Enrique Villanueva Atascadero, CA Ridgeview Publishing Company 1997 i + 446 Edited by Enrique Villanueva . Ridgeview Publishing Company. Atascadero, CA. Pp. i + 446.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Dowe2001, author = {Dowe, P.}, title = {A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and 'Causation' by Omission}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {216--226}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659223}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Lammenranta2001, author = {Lammenranta, M.}, title = {Knowledge in a Social World}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {441--442}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/713659255}, abstract = {Book Information Knowledge in a Social World. By Alvin I. Goldman. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. xiii + 407. Paperback, {\^A}\textsterling16.99.}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hamkins2000, author = {Hamkins, Joel David and Montero, Barbara}, title = {With infinite utility, more needn't be better}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {2}, pages = {231--240}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349511}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Leeds2000, author = {Leeds, Stephen}, title = {Tooley on causation and probabilities}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {2}, pages = {223--230}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349501}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Everett2000, author = {Everett, Theodore J.}, title = {Other voices, other minds}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {2}, pages = {213--222}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349491}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Wyatt2000, author = {Wyatt, Nicole}, title = {Did duns scotus invent possible worlds semantics?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {2}, pages = {196--212}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349481}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Priest2000, author = {Priest, Graham}, title = {Could everything be true?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {2}, pages = {189--195}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349471}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Lango2000, author = {Lango, John W.}, title = {Relation instances and musical sounds}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {2}, pages = {176--188}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349461}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Smith2000, author = {Smith, Nicholas J. J.}, title = {Frege's judgement stroke}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {2}, pages = {153--175}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349451}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Eggleston2000, author = {Eggleston, Ben}, title = {Should consequentialists make Parfit's second mistake?: A refutation of Jackson}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {1}, pages = {1--15}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349301}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Perrett2000, author = {Perrett, Roy W.}, title = {Indigenous language rights and political theory: The case of Te Reo M{\"A}ori}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {3}, pages = {405--417}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349681}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Kolers2000, author = {Kolers, Avery}, title = {The Lockean efficiency argument and aboriginal land rights}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {3}, pages = {391--404}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349671}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{R{\~A}\texteuroikk{\~A}\texteuro2000, author = {R{\~A}\texteuroikk{\~A}\texteuro, Juha}, title = {The moral relevance of cultural disadvantage}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {3}, pages = {374--390}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349661}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ivison2000, author = {Ivison, Duncan}, title = {Political community and historical injustice}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {3}, pages = {360--373}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349651}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Sparrow2000, author = {Sparrow, Robert}, title = {History and collective responsibility}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {3}, pages = {346--359}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349641}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Thompson2000, author = {Thompson, Janna}, title = {Historical obligations}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {3}, pages = {334--345}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349631}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Goodin2000, author = {Goodin, Robert E.}, title = {Waitangi tales}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {3}, pages = {309--333}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349621}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hoaglund2000, author = {Hoaglund, John}, title = {Reasoning and giving reasons}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {4}, pages = {575--594}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349811}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Peregrin2000, author = {Peregrin, Jaroslav}, title = {{\^a}€˜Fregean{\^a}€™ logic and {\^a}€˜Russellian{\^a}€™ logic}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {4}, pages = {557--574}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349801}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hazen2000, author = {Hazen, A. P. and Davoren, J. M.}, title = {Russell's 1925 logic}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {4}, pages = {534--556}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349791}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Orenstein2000, author = {Orenstein, Alex}, title = {The logical form of categorical sentences}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {4}, pages = {517--533}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349781}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Mares2000, author = {Mares, Edwin D.}, title = {Even dialetheists should hate contradictions}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {4}, pages = {503--516}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349771}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Priest2000a, author = {Priest, Graham}, title = {Objects of thought}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {4}, pages = {494--502}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349761}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Beall2000, author = {Beall, J. C. and Restall, Greg}, title = {Logical pluralism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {4}, pages = {475--493}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349751}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Humberstone2000, author = {Humberstone, Lloyd}, title = {Contra-classical logics}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {4}, pages = {438--474}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349741}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Goddard2000, author = {Goddard, L.}, title = {The inconsistency of Aristotelian logic?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {4}, pages = {434--437}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349731}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Martin2000, author = {Martin, Errol}, title = {Introduction}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {4}, pages = {433--433}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349721}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Pritchard2000, author = {Pritchard, Duncan}, title = {Closure and context}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {2}, pages = {275--280}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349571}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Rysiew2000, author = {Rysiew, Patrick}, title = {Testimony, simulation, and the limits of inductivism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {2}, pages = {269--274}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349561}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Blackburn2000, author = {Blackburn, Simon}, title = {Critical notice of Frank Jackson, from metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysis}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {1}, pages = {119--124}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349401}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Beall2000a, author = {Beall, J. C.}, title = {Is the observable world consistent?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, number = {1}, pages = {113--118}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048400012349391}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Lowe2000, author = {Lowe, E. 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Simulation and rule following}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {4}, pages = {566--586}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348681}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Ramach1998, author = {Ramachandran, Murali}, title = {Sortal modal logic and counterpart theory}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {4}, pages = {553--565}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348671}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Burgess1998, author = {Burgess, John A.}, title = {Error theories and values}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {4}, pages = {534--552}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348661}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Sawyer1998, author = {Sawyer, Sarah}, title = {Privileged access to the world}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {4}, pages = {523--533}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348651}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Melnyk1998, author = {Melnyk, Andrew}, title = {The prospects for Kirk's non-reductive physicalism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {323--332}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348451}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Colyvan1998, author = {Colyvan, Mark}, title = {Is platonism a bad bet?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {115--119}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348261}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Brueckner1998, author = {Brueckner, Anthony and Fischer, John Martin}, title = {Being born earlier}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {110--114}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348251}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Peacocke1998, author = {Peacocke, Christopher}, title = {The concept of a natural number}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {105--109}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348241}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hill1998, author = {Hill, Christopher S.}, title = {Peacocke on semantic values}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {97--104}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348231}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Meeker1998, author = {Meeker, Kevin}, title = {Chisholming away at Plantinga's critique of epistemic deontology}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {90--96}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348221}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Witmer1998, author = {Witmer, D. Gene}, title = {What is wrong with the manifestability argument for supervenience}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {84--89}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348211}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Rachels1998, author = {Rachels, Stuart}, title = {Counterexamples to the transitivity of better than}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {71--83}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348201}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hyslop1998, author = {Hyslop, Alec}, title = {Methodological epiphenomenalism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {61--70}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348191}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Kornblith1998, author = {Kornblith, Hilary}, title = {What is it like to be me?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {48--60}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348181}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cheyne1998, author = {Cheyne, Colin}, title = {Existence claims and causality}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {34--47}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348171}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Pettit1998, author = {Pettit, Philip}, title = {Practical belief and philosophical theory}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {15--33}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348161}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Martin1998, author = {Martin, Thomas}, title = {The role of emotion in Sartre's portrait of anti-Semitism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {141--151}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348311}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{McCall1998, author = {McCall, Storrs}, title = {Time flow does not require a second time dimension}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {317--322}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348441}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Nerlich1998, author = {Nerlich, Graham}, title = {Falling branches and the flow of time}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {309--316}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348431}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Taylor1998, author = {Taylor, Barry}, title = {Response to Melia}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {307--308}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348421}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Cohen1998, author = {Cohen, Stewart}, title = {Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lottery}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {289--306}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348411}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Zimmerman1998, author = {Zimmerman, Dean W.}, title = {Temporal parts and supervenient causation: The incompatibility of two Humean doctrines}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {265--288}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348401}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Walsh1998, author = {Walsh, D. M.}, title = {The scope of selection: Sober and neander on what natural selection explains}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {250--264}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348391}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Hetherington1998, author = {Hetherington, Stephen Cade}, title = {Stove's new irrationalism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {244--249}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348381}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Savulescu1998, author = {Savulescu, Julian}, title = {The present-aim theory: a submaximizing theory of reasons?}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {229--243}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348371}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Markosian1998, author = {Markosian, Ned}, title = {Simples}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {213--228}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348361}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Lamont1998, author = {Lamont, Julian}, title = {A solution to the puzzle of when death harms its victims}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {198--212}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348351}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Mortensen1998, author = {Mortensen, Chris}, title = {On the possibility of science without numbers}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {182--197}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348341}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Paprzycka1998, author = {Paprzycka, Katarzyna}, title = {Collectivism on the horizon: A challenge to Pettit's critique of collectivism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {165--181}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348331}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Goddard1998, author = {Goddard, Leonard}, title = {The inconsistency of traditional logic}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {152--164}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348321}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} } @article{Papineau1998, author = {Papineau, David}, title = {Teleosemantics and indeterminacy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {1--14}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00048409812348151}, issn = {0004-8402}, publisher = {Routledge} }