#Created by Kbib version 0.6.1 #Last modified: Sat Jun 7 09:44:12 2008 @article{04012008, title = {{Announcements}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {543-548}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn077}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/543.pdf} } @article{04012008a, title = {{Books Received}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {539-542}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn076}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/539.pdf} } @article{Yagisawa2008, author = {Yagisawa, Takashi}, title = {{Review: Judith Thomson and Alex Byrne (eds): Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {532-537}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn075}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/532.pdf} } @article{Majors2008, author = {Majors, Brad}, title = {{Review: Folke Tersman: Moral Disagreement}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {529-532}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn074}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/529.pdf} } @article{Maibom2008, author = {Maibom, Heidi Lene}, title = {{Review: Karsten R. Stueber: Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {525-529}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn073}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/525.pdf} } @article{Robinson2008, author = {Robinson, Howard}, title = {{Review: A. D. Smith: The Problem of Perception}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {520-524}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn072}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/520.pdf} } @article{Watson2008, author = {Watson, Gary}, title = {{Review: George Sher: In Praise of Blame}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {515-520}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn071}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/515.pdf} } @article{Rea2008, author = {Rea, Michael}, title = {{Review: Thomas Sattig: The Language and Reality of Time}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {511-515}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn070}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/511.pdf} } @article{Bickle2008, author = {Bickle, John}, title = {{Review: W. Teed Rockwell: Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {508-511}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn069}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/508.pdf} } @article{Fales2008, author = {Fales, Evan}, title = {{Review: Hans Radder: The World Observed/The World Conceived}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {505-507}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn068}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/505.pdf} } @article{Marie2008, author = {Marie, McGinn}, title = {{Review: Denis McManus: The Enchantment of Words: Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {500-504}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn067}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/500.pdf} } @article{Longworth2008, author = {Longworth, Guy}, title = {{Review: Robert J. Matthews: The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {494-500}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn066}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/494.pdf} } @article{Giovannelli2008, author = {Giovannelli, Alessandro}, title = {{Review: Dominic McIver Lopes: Sight and Sensibility: Evaluating Pictures}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {490-494}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn065}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/490.pdf} } @article{Bantinaki2008, author = {Bantinaki, Katerina}, title = {{Review: John V. Kulvicki: On Images: Their Structure and Content}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {486-490}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn064}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/486.pdf} } @article{Lemos2008, author = {Lemos, Noah}, title = {{Review: Michael Huemer: Ethical Intuitionism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {483-486}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn063}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/483.pdf} } @article{Yaffe2008, author = {Yaffe, Gideon}, title = {{Review: James Harris: Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {480-483}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn062}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/480.pdf} } @article{Barnes2008, author = {Barnes, Jonathan}, title = {{Review: Daniel W. Graham: Explaining the Cosmos: The Ionian Tradition of Scientific Philosophy}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {476-480}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn061}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/476.pdf} } @article{Richardson2008, author = {Richardson, Henry S.}, title = {{Review: Roger Crisp: Reasons and the Good}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {473-476}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn060}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/473.pdf} } @article{Lawlor2008, author = {Lawlor, Krista}, title = {{Review: Akeel Bilgrami: Self-Knowledge and Resentment}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {469-472}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn059}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/469.pdf} } @article{de Gaynesford2008, author = {de Gaynesford, Maximilian}, title = {{Review: Jose Luis Bermudez: Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {462-468}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn058}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/462.pdf} } @article{Pugh2008, author = {Pugh, David}, title = {{Review: Frederick Beiser: Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {457-462}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn057}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/457.pdf} } @article{Kail2008, author = {Kail, P. J. E.}, title = {{Review: Helen Beebee: Hume on Causation}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {451-456}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn056}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/451.pdf} } @article{Weiner2008, author = {Weiner, Joan}, title = {{How Tarskian is Frege?}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {427-450}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/117/466/427}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn042}, abstract = {In Semantic Descent' I argued that Frege does not have a metatheory in the following sense: the justifications he offers for his basic laws and rules of inference neither employ nor require a truth-predicate or metalinguistic variables. In Does Frege Use a Truth-predicate in his "Justification" of the Laws of Logic?', Dirk Greimann disputes this. As Greimann interprets Frege, (i) Frege's remarks commit him to giving a metatheoretic justification of the basic laws and rules of his logic, and (ii) Frege actually gives such a justification in the early sections of Grundgesetze--although the truth-predicate that Frege employs is a non-standard one: it is neither a predicate that holds of all and only true sentences nor a predicate that holds of all and only true thoughts. I argue that Greimann's interpretation is not, in the end, true to the text, and that his non-standard view of what is required of a Tarskian truth-predicate is ultimately not viable.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/427.pdf} } @article{Greimann2008, author = {Greimann, Dirk}, title = {{Does Frege Use a Truth-Predicate in his 'Justification' of the Laws of Logic? A Comment on Weiner}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {403-425}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/117/466/403}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn035}, abstract = {Joan Weiner has recently claimed that Frege neither uses, nor has any need to use, a truth-predicate in his justification of the logical laws. She argues that because of the assimilation of sentences to proper names in his system, Frege does not need to make use of the Quinean device of semantic ascent in order to formulate the logical laws, and that the predicate is the True', which is used in Frege's justification, is not to be considered as a truth-predicate, because it does not apply to true sentences or true thoughts. The present paper aims to show that Frege needs to use, and does use, a truth-predicate in this context. It is argued, first, that Frege needs to use a truthpredicate in order to show that the truth of the logical laws is evident from the senses of the sentences by means of which they are formulated, and second, that the predicate that he actually uses, is the True', must be considered as a truth-predicate in the relevant sense, because it can be used and is actually used by Frege to explain the truth-conditions of thoughts. To defend this interpretation, it is discussed whether the explanatory use of is the True' in Frege's system is compatible with his deflationary analysis of true'. The paper's conclusion is that there is indeed a conflict here; but, from Frege's point of view, this conflict is due merely to the logical imperfection of natural language and does not affect the proper system but only its propaedeutic.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/403.pdf} } @article{Taschek2008, author = {Taschek, William W.}, title = {{Truth, Assertion, and the Horizontal: Frege on 'The Essence of Logic'}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {375-401}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/117/466/375}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn039}, abstract = {In the opening to his late essay, Der Gedanke', Frege asserts without qualification that the word true' points the way for logic'. But in a short piece from his Nachlass entitled My Basic Logical Insights', Frege writes that the word true' makes an unsuccessful attempt to point to the essence of logic', asserting instead that what really pertains to logic lies not in the word "true" but in the assertoric force with which the sentence is uttered'. Properly understanding what Frege takes to be at issue here is crucial for understanding his conception of logic and, in particular, what he takes to be its normative status vis-a-vis judgement, assertion, and inference. In this paper, I focus my attention on clarifying the latter claim and Frege's motivations for making it, exposing what I take to be a fundamental tension in Frege's conception of logic. Finally, I discuss whether Frege's deployment of the horizontal in his mature Begriffsschrift helps to resolve this tension.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/375.pdf} } @article{Rayo2008, author = {Rayo, Agustin}, title = {{Vague Representation}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {329-373}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/117/466/329}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn029}, abstract = {The goal of this paper is to develop a theory of content for vague language. My proposal is based on the following three theses: (1) language-mastery is not rulebased-- it involves a certain kind of decision-making; (2) a theory of content is to be thought of instrumentally--it is a tool for making sense of our linguistic practice; and (3) linguistic contents are only locally defined--they are only defined relative to suitably constrained sets of possibilities.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/329.pdf} } @article{Panjvani2008, author = {Panjvani, Cyrus}, title = {{Rule-Following, Explanation-Transcendence, and Private Language}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {303-328}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/117/466/303}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn041}, abstract = {I examine what I take to be an important consideration for the later Wittgenstein: the understanding of a rule does not exceed or transcend an understanding of explanations or instructions in the rule. I contend that this consideration plays a central role in the later Wittgenstein's views on rule-following. I first show that it serves as a key premiss in a sceptical argument concerning our ability to follow rules. I then argue that this consideration is vital to Wittgenstein's case against what I describe as a realist view of rules. This realist view requires that our understanding of a rule extend beyond what can be understood from any set of instructions or explanation. For Wittgenstein, because this is to transcend publicly available means of conveying understanding, this realist's understanding is a private understanding. He calls this private source of understanding an intuition' and the main line of argument against intuition in our understanding of a rule draws, appropriately, on what is called his private language argument'. In this paper, I defend a non-verificationist reading of this argument and its use against the realist so-construed.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/303.pdf} } @article{McDaniel2008, author = {McDaniel, Kris and Bradley, Ben}, title = {{Desires}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {267-302}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/117/466/267}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn044}, abstract = {It is not at all obvious how best to draw the distinction between conditional and unconditional desires. In this paper we examine extant attempts to analyse conditional desire. From the failures of those attempts, we draw a moral that leads us to the correct account of conditional desires. We then extend the account of conditional desires to an account of all desires. It emerges that desires do not have the structure that they have been thought to have. We attempt to explain the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic desire in light of our account of desire. We show how to use our account to solve Wollheim's paradox of democracy and to save modus ponens. Finally, we extend the account of desire to related phenomena, such as conditional promises, intentions, and commands.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/267.pdf} } @article{Crisp2008, author = {Crisp, Roger}, title = {{Goodness and Reasons: Accentuating the Negative}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {466}, pages = {257-265}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/117/466/257}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn031}, abstract = {This paper concerns the relation between goodness, or value, and practical reasons, and in particular the so-called buck-passing' account (BPA) of that relation recently offered by T. M. Scanlon, according to which goodness is not reason-providing but merely the higher-order property of possessing lower-order properties that provide reasons to respond in certain ways. The paper begins by briefly describing BPA and the motivation for it, noting that Scanlon now accepts that the lower-order properties in question may be evaluative. He also insists that the BPA is not biconditional (wisely, since otherwise goodness becomes a Cambridge property'), which leaves him with the task of explaining why goodness arises only in a sub-set of cases in which lower-order properties ground reasons. Having rejected two attempts to do this, based on elucidation of the responses and of the reasons, I suggest that Scanlon may claim that goodness arises in, and only in, cases where the lower-order properties are evaluative and that goodness itself provides us with a way of distinguishing the evaluative from the non-evaluative. In other words, he should retain the negative component of BPA, according to which being good is not itself reason-providing, while surrendering the positive, according to which the property of goodness is merely the higher-order property of having lower-order properties that provide reasons to respond.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/466/257.pdf} } @article{Angere2008, author = {Angere, Staffan}, title = {{Coherence as a Heuristic}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {1-26}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/117/465/1}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn001}, abstract = {The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and Olsson (2005) call into question the strength of the connection between coherence and truth. As part of the inquiry into this alleged link, I define a notion of degree of truth-conduciveness, relevant for measuring the usefulness of coherence measures as rules-of-thumb for assigning probabilities in situations of partial knowledge. I use the concept to compare the viability of some of the measures of coherence that have been suggested so far under different circumstances. It turns out that all of these, including the prior, are just about equally good in cases of very little knowledge. Nevertheless, there are differences in when they are applicable, and they also depart more from each other when more knowledge is added.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/1.pdf} } @article{Holton2008, author = {Holton, Richard}, title = {{Partial Belief, Partial Intention}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {27-58}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/117/465/27}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn002}, abstract = {Is a belief that one will succeed necessary for an intention? It is argued that the question has traditionally been badly posed, framed as it is in terms of all-out belief. We need instead to ask about the relation between intention and partial belief. An account of partial belief that is more psychologically realistic than the standard credence account is developed. A notion of partial intention is then developed, standing to all-out intention much as partial belief stands to all-out belief. Various coherence constraints on the notion are explored. It is concluded that the primary relations between intention and belief should be understood as normative and not essential.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/27.pdf} } @article{Manley2008, author = {Manley, David and Wasserman, Ryan}, title = {{On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {59-84}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/117/465/59}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn003}, abstract = {Analyses of dispositional ascriptions in terms of conditional statements famously confront the problems of finks and masks. We argue that conditional analyses of dispositions, even those tailored to avoid.nks and masks, face five further problems. These are the problems of: (i) Achilles' heels, (ii) accidental closeness, (iii) comparatives, (iv) explaining context sensitivity, and (v) absent stimulus conditions. We conclude by offering a proposal that avoids all seven of these problems.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/59.pdf} } @article{Nelson2008, author = {Nelson, William}, title = {{Kant's Formula of Humanity}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {85-106}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/117/465/85}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn004}, abstract = {This paper is concerned with the normative content of Kant's formula of humanity (FH). More specifically, does FH, as some seem to think, imply the specific and rigid prescriptions in 'standard' deontological theories? To this latter question, I argue, the answer is 'no'. I propose reading FH largely through the formula of autonomy and the formula of the kingdom of ends, where I understand FA to describe the nature of the capacity of humanity-a capacity for self-governance. The latter, I suggest, is akin to the capacity for planning and intentional action described in Michael Bratman's work. A significant part of what FH requires, I then propose, is that we exercise these capacities for planning in such a way that we accommodate and coordinate with the (permissible) plans and intentions of others. Kant himself, as do many commentators, emphasizes the idea that our human capacities give us a distinctive kind of value. On my interpretation, by contrast, what is fundamentally important is not the value of the capacities but rather what they make possible: distinctive ways of mistreating (using) persons, but also a distinctive kind of morally desirable relationship.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/85.pdf} } @article{Pincock2008, author = {Pincock, Christopher}, title = {{Russell's Last (and Best) Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgement}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {107-140}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/117/465/107}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn005}, abstract = {Russell's version of the multiple-relation theory from the Theory of Knowledge manuscript is presented and defended against some objections. A new problem, related to defining truth via correspondence, is reconstructed from Russell's remarks and what we know of Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's theory. In the end, understanding this objection in terms of correspondence helps to link Russell's multiplerelation theory to his later views on propositions.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/107.pdf} } @article{Gibbard2008, author = {Gibbard, Allan and Gibbard, Allan}, title = {{Review: Horwich on Meaning}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {141-166}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn006}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/141.pdf} } @article{Skyrms2008, author = {Skyrms, Brian}, title = {{Review: Cristina Bicchieri: The Grammar of Society}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {167-170}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn007}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/167.pdf} } @article{Lennox2008, author = {Lennox, James}, title = {{Review: David Bostock: Space, Time, Matter, and Form: Essays on Aristotle's Physics}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {170-174}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn008}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/170.pdf} } @article{Archard2008, author = {Archard, David}, title = {{Review: R. A. Duff and Stuart P. Green (eds): Defining Crimes: Essays on the Special Part of the Criminal Law}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {174-176}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn009}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/174.pdf} } @article{Macdonald2008, author = {Macdonald, Cynthia}, title = {{Review: Gregg Ten Elshof: Introspection Vindicated}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {176-180}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn010}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/176.pdf} } @article{Oakley2008, author = {Oakley, Justin}, title = {{Review: Jonathan Glover: Choosing Children: The Ethical Dilemmas of Genetic Intervention}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {180-183}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn011}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/180.pdf} } @article{Mantykoski2008, author = {Mantykoski, Janne}, title = {{Review: Patrick Greenough and Michael P. Lynch (eds): Truth and Realism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {183-186}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn012}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/183.pdf} } @article{Gaskin2008, author = {Gaskin, Richard}, title = {{Review: Anil Gupta: Empiricism and Experience}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {187-191}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn013}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/187.pdf} } @article{Blatti2008, author = {Blatti, Stephan}, title = {{Review: Raymond Martin and John Barresi: The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {191-195}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn014}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/191.pdf} } @article{Fischer2008, author = {Fischer, John Martin}, title = {{Review: Alfred R. Mele: Free Will and Luck}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {195-201}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn015}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/195.pdf} } @article{Love2008, author = {Love, Alan C.}, title = {{Review: Massimo Pigliucci and Jonathan Kaplan: Making Sense of Evolution: The Conceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Biology}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {201-205}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn016}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/201.pdf} } @article{Battaly2008, author = {Battaly, Heather}, title = {{Review: Nicholas Rescher: Cognitive Harmony: The Role of Systematic Harmony in the Constitution of Knowledge; Epistemic Logic: A Survey of the Logic of Knowledge; and Realism and Pragmatic Epistemology}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {205-210}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn017}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/205.pdf} } @article{Molyneux2008, author = {Molyneux, Bernard}, title = {{Review: Antti Revonsuo: Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {210-213}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn018}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/210.pdf} } @article{Lurz2008, author = {Lurz, Robert W.}, title = {{Review: David M. Rosenthal: Consciousness and Mind}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {214-217}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn019}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/214.pdf} } @article{Reshotko2008, author = {Reshotko, Naomi}, title = {{Review: Daniel Russell: Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {218-223}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn020}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/218.pdf} } @article{Martin2008, author = {Martin, Raymond}, title = {{Review: Richard Sorabji: Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {223-228}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn021}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/223.pdf} } @article{Levine2008, author = {Levine, Joseph}, title = {{Review: Daniel Stoljar: Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {228-231}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn022}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/228.pdf} } @article{Delancy2008, author = {Delancy, Craig}, title = {{Review: Paul Thagard (in collaboration with Fred Kroon, Josef Nerb, Baljinder Sahdra, Cameron Shelley, and Brandon Wagner): Hot Thought: Mechanisms and Applications of Emotional Cognition}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {231-234}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn023}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/231.pdf} } @article{Olson2008, author = {Olson, Eric}, title = {{Review: Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (eds): Persons: Human and Divine}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {234-237}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn024}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/234.pdf} } @article{Reginster2008, author = {Reginster, Berhard}, title = {{Review: Julian Young: Nietzsche's Philosophy of Religion}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {237-241}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn025}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/237.pdf} } @article{Dainton2008, author = {Dainton, Barry}, title = {{Review: Dan Zahavi: Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, volume = {117}, number = {465}, pages = {241-245}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzn026}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/465/241.pdf} } @article{Whiting2007, author = {Whiting, Daniel}, title = {{Review: A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1132-1136}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1132}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1132.pdf} } @article{Boys-Stones2007, author = {Boys-Stones, G. R.}, title = {{Review: Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1129-1132}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1129}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1129.pdf} } @article{Smith2007, author = {Smith, Thomas H.}, title = {{Review: A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1126-1129}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1126}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1126.pdf} } @article{Kukla2007, author = {Kukla, AndrE}, title = {{Review: Scientific Perspectivism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1122-1125}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1122}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1122.pdf} } @article{Cross2007, author = {Cross, Charles B.}, title = {{Review: Conditionals in Context}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1119-1122}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1119}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1119.pdf} } @article{Dodd2007, author = {Dodd, Julian}, title = {{Review: Experience and the World's Own Language: A Critique of John McDowell's Empiricism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1114-1119}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1114}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1114.pdf} } @article{Bourne2007, author = {Bourne, Craig}, title = {{Review: Truth and the Past}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1110-1114}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1110}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1110.pdf} } @article{Martin2007, author = {Martin, Rex}, title = {{Review: T. H. Green: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Political Philosophy}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1104-1110}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1104}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1104.pdf} } @article{Fitzpatrick2007, author = {Fitzpatrick, William J.}, title = {{Review: The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1098-1104}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1098}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1098.pdf} } @article{Zalabardo2007, author = {Zalabardo, Jose L.}, title = {{Review: The Possibility of Language: Internal Tensions in Wittgenstein's Tractatus}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1095-1098}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1095}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1095.pdf} } @article{Yoo2007, author = {Yoo, Julie}, title = {{Review: Fodor: Language, Mind, and Philosophy}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1092-1095}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1092}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1092.pdf} } @article{Hetherington2007, author = {Hetherington, Stephen}, title = {{Review: Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1088-1092}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1088}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1088.pdf} } @article{Bridges2007, author = {Bridges, Jason}, title = {{Review: The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1083-1088}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1083}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1083.pdf} } @article{Milne2007, author = {Milne, Peter}, title = {{Existence and Identity in Free Logic: Two Comments}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1079-1082}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/464/1079}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1079}, abstract = {Professor Tennant and I agree on much regarding the proof-theoretic semantics of free logic. Here I point to two issues, one on which we disagree, the other on which I find it hard to say how closely we may agree. The first concerns the exact content of Tennant's Rule of Atomic Denotation. The second concerns the nature of assumptions whose formal counterparts contain parametric occurrences of names.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1079.pdf} } @article{Tennant2007, author = {Tennant, Neil}, title = {{Existence and Identity in Free Logic: A Problem for Inferentialism?}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1055-1078}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/464/1055}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1055}, abstract = {Peter Milne (2007) poses two challenges to the inferential theorist of meaning. This study responds to both. First, it argues that the method of natural deduction idealizes the essential details of correct informal deductive reasoning. Secondly, it explains how rules of inference in free logic can determine unique senses for the existential quantifier and the identity predicate. The final part of the investigation brings out an underlying order in a basic family of free logics.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1055.pdf} } @article{Millican2007, author = {Millican, Peter}, title = {{Ontological Arguments and the Superiority of Existence: Reply to Nagasawa}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1041-1054}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/464/1041}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1041}, abstract = {Yujin Nagasawa accuses me of attributing to Anselm a principle (the 'principle of the superiority of existence', or PSE) which is not present in his text and which weakens, rather than strengthens, his Ontological Argument. I am undogmatic about the interpretative issue, but insist on a philosophical point: that Nagasawa's rejection of PSE does not help the argument, and appears to do so only because he overlooks the same ambiguity that vitiates the original. My conclusion therefore remains: that the fatal flaw in Anselm's argument--as in many other variants--is a relatively shallow ambiguity rather than a deep metaphysical mistake.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1041.pdf} } @article{Nagasawa2007, author = {Nagasawa, Yujin}, title = {{Millican on the Ontological Argument}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1027-1040}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/464/1027}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1027}, abstract = {Peter Millican (2004) provides a novel and elaborate objection to Anselm's ontological argument. Millican thinks that his objection is more powerful than any other because it does not dispute contentious 'deep philosophical theories' that underlie the argument. Instead, it tries to reveal the 'fatal flaw' of the argument by considering its 'shallow logical details'. Millican's objection is based on his interpretation of the argument, according to which Anselm relies on what I call the 'principle of the superiority of existence' (PSE). I argue that (i) the textual evidence Millican cites does not provide a convincing case that Anselm relies on PSE and that, moreover, (ii) Anselm does not even need PSE for the ontological argument. I introduce a plausible interpretation of the ontological argument that is not vulnerable to Millican's objection and conclude that even if the ontological argument fails, it does not fail in the way Millican thinks it does.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1027.pdf} } @article{Yalcin2007, author = {Yalcin, Seth}, title = {{Epistemic Modals}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {983-1026}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/464/983}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm983}, abstract = {Epistemic modal operators give rise to something very like, but also very unlike, Moore's paradox. I set out the puzzling phenomena, explain why a standard relational semantics for these operators cannot handle them, and recommend an alternative semantics. A pragmatics appropriate to the semantics is developed and interactions between the semantics, the pragmatics, and the definition of consequence are investigated. The semantics is then extended to probability operators. Some problems and prospects for probabilistic representations of content and context are explored.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/983.pdf} } @article{Textor2007, author = {Textor, Mark}, title = {{Frege's Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Developed and Defended}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {947-982}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/464/947}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm947}, abstract = {Does the English demonstrative pronoun 'that' (including complex demonstratives of the form 'that F') have sense and reference? Unlike many other philosophers of language, Frege answers with a resounding 'No'. He held that the bearer of sense and reference is a so-called 'hybrid proper name' (Kunne) that contains the demonstrative pronoun and specific circumstances of utterance such as glances and acts of pointing. In this paper I provide arguments for the thesis that demonstratives are hybrid proper names. After outlining why Frege held the hybrid proper name view, I will defend it against recent criticism, and argue that it is superior to views that take demonstrative pronouns to be the bearer of semantic properties.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/947.pdf} } @article{McCullagh2007, author = {McCullagh, Mark}, title = {{Understanding Mixed Quotation}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {927-946}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/464/927}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm927}, abstract = {It has proved challenging to account for the dual role that a directly quoted part of a 'that'-clause plays in so-called mixed quotation. The Davidsonian account, elaborated by Cappelen and Lepore, handles many cases well; but it fails to accommodate a crucial feature of mixed quotation: that the part enclosed in quotation marks is used to specify not what the quoter says when she utters it, but what the quoted speaker says when she utters it. Here I show how the Davidsonian can do better. The proposal rests on the idea that mixed quotation involves deferred demonstration: a mixed quotati on specifies what the subject says partly by demonstrating the quoter's utterance of the unquoted part and partly by deferred-demonstrating the subject's utterance of the quotation-marked part.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/927.pdf} } @article{Katz2007, author = {Katz, Bernard D. and Olin, Doris}, title = {{A Tale of Two Envelopes}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {903-926}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/464/903}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm903}, abstract = {This paper deals with the two-envelope paradox. Two main formulations of the paradoxical reasoning are distinguished, which differ according to the partition of possibilities employed. We argue that in the first formulation the conditionals required for the utility assignment are problematic; the error is identified as a fallacy of conditional reasoning. We go on to consider the second formulation, where the epistemic status of certain singular propositions becomes relevant; our diagnosis is that the states considered do not exhaust the possibilities. Thus, on our approach to the paradox, the fallacy, in each formulation, is found in the reasoning underlying the relevant utility matrix; in both cases, the paradoxical argument goes astray before one gets to questions of probability or calculations of expected utility.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/903.pdf} } @article{Faulkner2007, author = {Faulkner, Paul}, title = {{On Telling and Trusting}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {875-902}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/464/875}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm875}, abstract = {A key debate in the epistemology of testimony concerns when it is reasonable to acquire belief through accepting what a speaker says. This debate has been largely understood as the debate over how much, or little, assessment and monitoring an audience must engage in. When it is understood in this way the debate simply ignores the relationship speaker and audience can have. Interlocutors rarely adopt the detached approach to communication implied by talk of assessment and monitoring. Audiences trust speakers to be truthful and demonstrate certain reactive attitudes if they are not. Trust and the accompanying willingness to these reactive attitudes can then provide speakers with a reason to be trustworthy. So through ignoring interlocutors' engagement with the communicative process, the existing debate misses the possibility that it is an audience's trusting a speaker that makes it reasonable for the audience to accept what the speaker says.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/875.pdf} } @article{Rocca2007, author = {Rocca, Michael Della}, title = {{Spinoza and the Metaphysics of Scepticism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {851-874}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/464/851}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm851}, abstract = {Spinoza's response to a certain radical form of scepticism has deep and surprising roots in his rationalist metaphysics. I argue that Spinoza's commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason leads to his naturalistic rejection of certain sharp, inexplicable bifurcations in reality such as the bifurcations that a Cartesian system posits between mind and body and between will and intellect. I show how Spinoza identies and rejects a similar bifurcation between the representational character of ideas or mental states and the epistemic status of these ideas, a bifurcation to which Spinoza sees the radical sceptic committed. Spinoza's rejection of this bifurcation helps to explain some of his most cryptic statements concerning scepticism and also reveals a promising and highly metaphysical strategy for understanding and responding to scepticism.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/851.pdf} } @article{Collins2007, author = {Collins, John}, title = {{Syntax, More or Less}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {805-850}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/464/805}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm805}, abstract = {Much of the best contemporary work in the philosophy of language and content makes appeal to the theories developed in generative syntax. In particular, there is a presumption that--at some level and in some way--the structures provided by syntactic theory mesh with or support our conception of content/linguistic meaning as grounded in our first-person understanding of our communicative speech acts. This paper will suggest that there is no such tight fit. Its claim will be that, if recent generative theories are on the right lines, syntactic structure provides both too much and too little to serve as the structural partner for content, at least as that notion is generally understood in philosophy. The paper will substantiate these claims by an assessment of the recent work of King, Stanley, and others.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/805.pdf} } @article{11012007, title = {{Index of MIND Vol. 116 Nos 1 4, 2007}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1175-1192}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1175}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1175.pdf} } @article{11012007a, title = {{Announcements}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1171-1174}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1171}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1171.pdf} } @article{11012007b, title = {{Books Received}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1167-1170}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1167}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1167.pdf} } @article{Morris2007, author = {Morris, Katherine}, title = {{Review: Wittgenstein: A Feminist Interpretation}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1162-1165}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1162}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1162.pdf} } @article{Meeker2007, author = {Meeker, Kevin}, title = {{Review: Epistemic Luck}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1159-1162}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1159}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1159.pdf} } @article{Rysiew2007, author = {Rysiew, Patrick}, title = {{Review: Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1154-1158}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1154}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1154.pdf} } @article{Everett2007, author = {Everett, Anthony}, title = {{Review: The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1151-1154}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1151}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1151.pdf} } @article{Willard2007, author = {Willard, Dallas}, title = {{Review: Theories of Judgment: Psychology, Logic, Phenomenology}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1146-1151}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1146}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1146.pdf} } @article{Lapointe2007, author = {Lapointe, Sandra}, title = {{Review: Linguistic Turns in Modern Philosophy}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1143-1146}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1143}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1143.pdf} } @article{Holl2007, author = {Holland, Stephen}, title = {{Review: Persons, Humanity, and the Definition of Death}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1140-1143}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1140}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1140.pdf} } @article{Faulkner2007a, author = {Faulkner, Paul}, title = {{Review: The Epistemology of Testimony}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {464}, pages = {1136-1139}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm1136}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/464/1136.pdf} } @article{Danielsson2007, author = {Danielsson, Sven and Olson, Jonas}, title = {{Brentano and the Buck-Passers}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {511-522}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/463/511}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm511}, abstract = {According to T. M. Scanlon's 'buck-passing' analysis of value, x is good means that x has properties that provide reasons to take up positive attitudes vis-a-vis x. Some authors have claimed that this idea can be traced back to Franz Brentano, who said in 1889 that the judgement that x is good is the judgement that a positive attitude to x is correct ('richtig'). The most discussed problem in the recent literature on buck-passing is known as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem (the WKR problem): it seems quite possible that there is sometimes reason to favour an object although that object is not good and possibly very evil. The problem is to delineate exactly what distinguishes reasons of the right kind from reasons of the wrong kind. In this paper we offer a Brentano-style solution. We also note that one version of the WKR problem was put forward by G. E. Moore in his review of the English translation of Brentano's Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Before getting to how our Brentano-style approach might offer a way out for Brentano and the buck-passers, we briefly consider and reject an interesting attempt to solve the WKR problem recently proposed by John Skorupski.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/511.pdf} } @article{Frankish2007, author = {Frankish, Keith}, title = {{Deciding to Believe Again}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {523-548}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/463/523}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm523}, abstract = {This paper defends direct activism--the view that it is possible to form beliefs in a causally direct way. In particular, it addresses the charge that direct activism entails voluntarism--the thesis that we can form beliefs at will. It distinguishes weak and strong varieties of voluntarism and argues that, although direct activism may entail the weak variety, it does not entail the strong one. The paper goes on to argue that strong voluntarism is non-contingently false, sketching a new argument for that conclusion. This argument does not tell against the weak form of voluntarism, however, and the final part of the paper argues that weak voluntarism, and consequently direct activism, remains a coherent and defensible position.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/523.pdf} } @article{Hoefer2007, author = {Hoefer, Carl}, title = {{The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Sceptic's Guide to Objective Chance}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {549-596}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/463/549}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm549}, abstract = {The goal of this paper is to sketch and defend a new interpretation or 'theory' of objective chance, one that lets us be sure such chances exist and shows how they can play the roles we traditionally grant them. The account is 'Humean' in claiming that objective chances supervene on the totality of actual events, but does not imply or presuppose a Humean approach to other metaphysical issues such as laws or causation. Like Lewis (1994) I take the Principal Principle (PP) to be the key to understanding objective chance. After describing the main features of Humean objective chance (HOC), I deduce the validity of PP for Humean chances, and end by exploring the limitations of Humean chance.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/549.pdf} } @article{Peijnenburg2007, author = {Peijnenburg, Jeanne}, title = {{Infinitism Regained}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {597-602}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/463/597}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm597}, abstract = {Consider the following process of epistemic justification: proposition E0 is made probable by E1, which in turn is made probable by E2, which is made probable by E3, and so on. Can this process go on indefinitely? Foundationalists, coherentists, and sceptics claim that it cannot. I argue that it can: there are many infinite regresses of probabilistic reasoning that can be completed. This leads to a new form of epistemic infinitism.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/597.pdf} } @article{Schellenberg2007, author = {Schellenberg, Susanna}, title = {{Action and Self-Location in Perception}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {603-632}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/463/603}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm603}, abstract = {I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that having such a conception of space presupposes that a subject represent her location in relation to perceived objects. More precisely the thesis is that a subject represents her location as the location from which she both perceives objects and would act in relation to objects were she to act. So I argue that perception depends on the capacity to know what it would be to act in relation to objects.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/603.pdf} } @article{Varzi2007, author = {Varzi, Achille C.}, title = {{Supervaluationism and Its Logics}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {633-676}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/463/633}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm633}, abstract = {If we adopt a supervaluational semantics for vagueness, what sort of logic results? As it turns out, the answer depends crucially on how the standard notion of validity as truth preservation is recast. There are several ways of doing this within a supervaluational framework, the main alternative being between 'global' construals (e.g. an argument is valid if and only if it preserves truth-under-all-precisifications) and 'local' construals (an argument is valid if and only if, under all precisifications, it preserves truth). The former alternative is by far more popular, but I argue in favour of the latter, for (i) it does not suffer from a number of serious objections, and (ii) it makes it possible to restore global validity as a defined notion.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/633.pdf} } @article{Weiner2007, author = {Weiner, Joan}, title = {{What's in a Numeral? Frege's Answer}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {677-716}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/463/677}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm677}, abstract = {Frege wanted to define the number 1 and the concept of number. What is required of a satisfactory definition? A truly arbitrary definition will not do: to stipulate that the number one is Julius Caesar is to change the subject. One might expect Frege to define the number 1 by giving a description that picks out the object that the numeral '1' already names; to define the concept of number by giving a description that picks out precisely those objects that are numbers. Yet Frege appears to do no such thing. Indeed, when he defends his definitions, he does not argue that they pick out objects that we have been talking about all along--the issue never comes up. The aim of this paper is to explain why. I argue that, on Frege's view, our numerals do not, antecedent to his work, name particular objects. This raises an obvious question: If (like 'Odysseus') the numerals do not name particular objects, how can Frege write (as he does) as if sentences in which numerals appear state truths? One central concern of this paper is exegetical--to answer these questions. But my aim is not solely exegetical. For these questions direct us to something that, I believe, creates only an apparent problem for Frege but an actual problem for many contemporary philosophers: the assumption that singular terms appearing in statements about the world must actually have referents. Another aim of this paper is to suggest that the problem--as well as a solution that can be found in Frege's writings--should be of import to contemporary philosophers.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/677.pdf} } @article{Sorensen2007, author = {Sorensen, Roy A.}, title = {{Knowledge Beyond the Margin for Error}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {717-722}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/463/717}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm717}, abstract = {Epistemicists say there is a last positive instance in a sorites sequence--we just cannot know which is the last. Timothy Williamson explains that knowledge requires a margin for error and this ensures that the last heap will not be knowable as a heap. However, there is a class of disjunctive predicates for which knowledge at the thresholds is possible. They generate sorites paradoxes that cannot be diagnosed with the margin for error principle.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/717.pdf} } @article{Williamson2007, author = {Williamson, Timothy}, title = {{Knowledge Within the Margin for Error}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {723-726}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/463/723}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm723}, abstract = {Roy Sorensen's criticism of my use of margin for error principles to explain ignorance in borderline cases fails because it misidentifies the relevant margin for error principles. His alternative explanation in terms of truth-maker gaps is briefly criticized.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/723.pdf} } @article{Tanney2007, author = {Tanney, Julia}, title = {{Review: Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {727-732}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm727}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/727.pdf} } @article{Sinclair2007, author = {Sinclair, Neil}, title = {{Review: Hume, Reason, and Morality: A Legacy of Contradiction}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {733-736}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm733}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/733.pdf} } @article{Rickles2007, author = {Rickles, Dean}, title = {{Review: Physical Relativity: Space-time Structure from a Dynamical Perspective}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {736-740}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm736}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/736.pdf} } @article{Mendola2007, author = {Mendola, Joseph}, title = {{Review: The Two Faces of Justice}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {740-743}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm740}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/740.pdf} } @article{Chappell2007, author = {Chappell, Timothy}, title = {{Review: The Spiritual Dimension: Religion, Philosophy, and Human Value}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {743-746}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm743}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/743.pdf} } @article{Liggins2007, author = {Liggins, David}, title = {{Review: Bare Facts and Naked Truths: A New Correspondence Theory of Truth}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {746-749}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm746}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/746.pdf} } @article{Kriegel2007, author = {Kriegel, Uriah}, title = {{Review: The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {749-753}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm749}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/749.pdf} } @article{Smith2007a, author = {Smith, David Livingstone}, title = {{Review: The New Unconscious}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {753-756}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm753}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/753.pdf} } @article{Lillehammer2007, author = {Lillehammer, Hallvard}, title = {{Review: Metaethics after Moore}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {756-758}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm756}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/756.pdf} } @article{Westerhoff2007, author = {Westerhoff, Jan}, title = {{Review: The Four-Category Ontology}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {759-762}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm759}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/759.pdf} } @article{Lowe2007, author = {Lowe, E. J.}, title = {{Review: How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {762-766}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm762}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/762.pdf} } @article{Price2007, author = {Price, Carolyn}, title = {{Review: Language: A Biological Model}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {766-769}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm766}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/766.pdf} } @article{Roberts2007, author = {Roberts, M. A.}, title = {{Review: Future People: A Moderate Consequentialist Account of Our Obligations to Future Generations}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {770-775}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm770}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/770.pdf} } @article{Lenman2007, author = {Lenman, James}, title = {{Review: Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {776-778}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm776}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/776.pdf} } @article{Pappas2007, author = {Pappas, George S.}, title = {{Review: Berkeley's World: An Examination of the Three Dialogues}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {779-781}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm779}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/779.pdf} } @article{Caze2007, author = {Caze, Marguerite La}, title = {{Review: Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {781-785}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm781}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/781.pdf} } @article{Snow2007, author = {Snow, Nancy E.}, title = {{Review: Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {785-789}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm785}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/785.pdf} } @article{Swinburne2007, author = {Swinburne, Richard}, title = {{Review: The Problem of Evil}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {789-792}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm789}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/789.pdf} } @article{Gallagher2007, author = {Gallagher, Shaun}, title = {{Review: Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {463}, pages = {792-796}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm792}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/792.pdf} } @article{Adams2007, author = {Adams, Tom}, title = {{Sorting Out the Anti-Doomsday Arguments: A Reply to Sowers}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {269-273}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/462/269}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm269}, abstract = {Sowers's (2002) claim that his thought experiment shows that a currently living person is not a random sample is refuted. His thought experiment is reduced to a probability model, and is shown to be identical to one previously developed by Dieks. The status of the Doomsday Argument is left unresolved, since Dieks's refutation attempt is disputed in the literature.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/269.pdf} } @article{Keefe2007, author = {Keefe, Rosanna}, title = {{Vagueness Without Context Change}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {275-292}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/462/275}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm275}, abstract = {In this paper I offer a critique of the recent popular strategy of giving a contextualist account of vagueness. Such accounts maintain that truth-values of vague sentences can change with changes of context induced by confronting different entities (e.g. different pairs through a sorites series). I claim that appealing to context does not help in solving the sorites paradox, nor does it give us new insights into vagueness per se. Furthermore, the contextual variation to which the contextualist is committed is problematic in various ways. For example, it yields the consequence that much of our everyday (non-soritical) reasoning is fallacious, and it renders us ignorant of what we and others have said.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/275.pdf} } @article{Owens2007, author = {Owens, David}, title = {{Duress, Deception, and the Validity of a Promise}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {293-315}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/462/293}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm293}, abstract = {An invalid promise is one whose breach does not wrong the promisee. I describe two different accounts of why duress and deception invalidate promises. According to the fault account duress and deception invalidate a promise just when it was wrong for the promisee to induce the promisor to promise in that way. According to the injury account, duress and deception invalidate a promise just when by inducing the promise in that way the promisee wrongs the promisor. I demonstrate that the injury account is superior. I then argue that in this respect promising is like any exercise of a normative power. I conclude by distinguishing two theories of promissory obligation, a widely held view which I call the information interest theory and an alternative which I call the authority interest theory. I argue that the points established earlier support the authority interest theory over its rival.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/293.pdf} } @article{Shoemaker2007, author = {Shoemaker, David W.}, title = {{Personal Identity and Practical Concerns}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {317-357}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/462/317}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm317}, abstract = {Many philosophers have taken there to be an important relation between personal identity and several of our practical concerns (among them moral responsibility, compensation, and self-concern). I articulate four natural methodological assumptions made by those wanting to construct a theory of the relation between identity and practical concerns, and I point out powerful objections to each assumption, objections constituting serious methodological obstacles to the overall project. I then attempt to offer replies to each general objection in a way that leaves the project intact, albeit significantly changed. Perhaps the most important change stems from the recognition that the practical concerns motivating investigation into personal identity turn out to be not univocal, as is typically thought, such that each of the different practical concerns may actually be related to personal identity in very different ways.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/317.pdf} } @article{Broome2007, author = {Broome, John}, title = {{Wide or Narrow Scope?}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {359-370}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/462/359}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm359}, abstract = {This paper is a response to Why Be Rational?' by Niko Kolodny. Kolodny argues that we have no reason to satisfy the requirements of rationality. His argument assumes that these requirements have a logically narrow scope. To see what the question of scope turns on, this comment provides a semantics for requirement'. It shows that requirements of rationality have a wide scope, at least under one sense of requirement'. Consequently Kolodny's conclusion cannot be derived.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/359.pdf} } @article{Kolodny2007, author = {Kolodny, Niko}, title = {{State or Process Requirements?}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {371-385}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/462/371}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm371}, abstract = {In his Wide or Narrow Scope?', John Broome questions my contention in Why Be Rational?' that certain rational requirements are narrow scope. The source of our disagreement, I suspect, is that Broome believes that the relevant rational requirements govern states, whereas I believe that they govern processes. If they govern states, then the debate over scope is sterile. The difference between narrow- and wide-scope state requirements is only as important as the difference between not violating a requirement and satisfying one. Broome's observations about conflicting narrow-scope state requirements only corroborate this. Why, then, have we thought that there was an important difference? Perhaps, I conjecture, because there is an important difference between narrow- and wide-scope process requirements, and we have implicitly taken process requirements as our topic. I clarify and try to defend my argument that some process requirements are narrow scope, so that if there were reasons to conform to rational requirements, there would be implausible bootstrapping. I then reformulate Broome's observations about conflicting narrow-scope state requirements as an argument against narrow-scope process requirements, and suggest a reply.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/371.pdf} } @article{Egan2007, author = {Egan, Andy}, title = {{Review: Relativism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {387-390}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm387}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/387.pdf} } @article{Paseau2007, author = {Paseau, Alexander}, title = {{Review: Logical Pluralism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {391-396}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm391}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/391.pdf} } @article{Clapp2007, author = {Clapp, Lenny}, title = {{Review: Minimal Semantics}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {396-402}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm396}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/396.pdf} } @article{Rudebusch2007, author = {Rudebusch, George}, title = {{Review: Knowledge, Nature, and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {402-404}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm402}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/402.pdf} } @article{Ludwig2007, author = {Ludwig, Kirk}, title = {{Review: Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective * Review: Problems of Rationality * Review: Truth, Language, and History}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {405-416}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm405}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/405.pdf} } @article{Collins2007a, author = {Collins, John}, title = {{Review: Ignorance of Language}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {416-423}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm416}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/416.pdf} } @article{Pritchard2007, author = {Pritchard, Duncan}, title = {{Review: Scepticism Comes Alive}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {423-427}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm423}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/423.pdf} } @article{David2007, author = {David, Marian}, title = {{Review: From a Deflationary Point of View}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {427-434}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm427}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/427.pdf} } @article{Weiss2007, author = {Weiss, Roslyn}, title = {{Review: Remembering Socrates}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {434-439}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm434}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/434.pdf} } @article{Demetriou2007, author = {Demetriou, Daniel and Oddie, Graham}, title = {{Review: Moral Fictionalism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {439-446}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm439}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/439.pdf} } @article{Evnine2007, author = {Evnine, Simon}, title = {{Review: Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {446-453}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm446}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/446.pdf} } @article{Ribeiro2007, author = {Ribeiro, Anna Christina}, title = {{Review: Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {453-459}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm453}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/453.pdf} } @article{Bacon2007, author = {Bacon, John}, title = {{Review: If Tropes}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {459-462}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm459}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/459.pdf} } @article{Dancy2007, author = {Dancy, Jonathan}, title = {{Review: Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {462-467}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm462}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/462.pdf} } @article{Nogales2007, author = {Nogales, Patti}, title = {{Review: The Extent of the Literal}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {467-471}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm467}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/467.pdf} } @article{Bogen2007, author = {Bogen, Jim}, title = {{Review: Tracking Truth}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {472-478}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm472}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/472.pdf} } @article{Easwaran2007, author = {Easwaran, Kenny}, title = {{Review: Ambiguity and Logic}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {478-482}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm478}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/478.pdf} } @article{Kail2007, author = {Kail, P.J.E.}, title = {{Review: Analytic Philosophy and the History of Philosophy}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {483-486}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm483}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/483.pdf} } @article{DeRose2007, author = {DeRose, Keith}, title = {{Review: Knowledge and Practical Interests}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {486-489}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm486}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/486.pdf} } @article{Sillari2007, author = {Sillari, Giacomo}, title = {{Review: Realistic Decision Theory: Rules for Nonideal Agents in Nonideal Circumstances}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {489-493}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm489}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/489.pdf} } @article{Bencivenga2007, author = {Bencivenga, Ermanno}, title = {{Review: Plotinus' Cosmology: A Study of Ennead II.1 (40) - Text, Translation, and Commentary}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {462}, pages = {493-496}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm493}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/462/493.pdf} } @article{Hutto2007, author = {Hutto, Daniel D.}, title = {{Review: Mind and Supermind}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {170-173}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm170}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/170.pdf} } @article{Gregory2007, author = {Gregory, Mark and Read, Rupert}, title = {{Review: Persons and Passions: Essays in Honor of Annette Baier}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {173-176}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm173}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/173.pdf} } @article{Bloomfield2007, author = {Bloomfield, Paul}, title = {{Review: The Evolution of Morality}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {176-180}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm176}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/176.pdf} } @article{Berry2007, author = {Berry, Brian D.}, title = {{Review: Where Law and Morality Meet}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {180-183}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm180}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/180.pdf} } @article{Bolton2007, author = {Bolton, C. J.}, title = {{Review: Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {184-187}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm184}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/184.pdf} } @article{Nolan2007, author = {Nolan, Daniel}, title = {{Review: Modality}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {187-190}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm187}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/187.pdf} } @article{Weatherson2007, author = {Weatherson, Brian}, title = {{Review: David Lewis}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {191-193}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm191}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/191.pdf} } @article{Bradley2007, author = {Bradley, Richard}, title = {{A Defence of the Ramsey Test}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {1-21}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/461/1}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm001}, abstract = {According to the Ramsey Test hypothesis the conditional claim that if A then B is credible just in case it is credible that B, on the supposition that A. If true the hypothesis helps explain the way in which we evaluate and use ordinary language conditionals. But impossibility results for the Ramsey Test hypothesis in its various forms suggest that it is untenable. In this paper, I argue that these results do not in fact have this implication, on the grounds that similar results can be proved without recourse to the Ramsey test hypothesis. Instead they show that a number of well entrenched principles of rational belief and belief revision do not apply to conditionals.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/1.pdf} } @article{Milne2007a, author = {Milne, Peter}, title = {{Existence, Freedom, Identity, and the Logic of Abstractionist Realism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {23-53}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/461/23}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm023}, abstract = {From the point of view of proof-theoretic semantics, we examine the logical background invoked by Neil Tennant's abstractionist realist account of mathematical existence. To prepare the way, we must first look closely at the rule of existential elimination familiar from classical and intuitionist logics and at rules governing identity. We then examine how well free logics meet the harmony and uniqueness constraints familiar from the proof-theoretic semantics project. Tennant assigns a special role to atomic formulas containing singular terms. This, we find, secures harmony and uniqueness but militates against the putative realism.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/23.pdf} } @article{Rosenkranz2007, author = {Rosenkranz, Sven}, title = {{Agnosticism as a Third Stance}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {55-104}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/461/55}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm055}, abstract = {Within certain philosophical debates, most notably those concerning the limits of our knowledge, agnosticism seems a plausible, and potentially the right, stance to take. Yet, in order to qualify as a proper stance, and not just the refusal to adopt any, agnosticism must be shown to be in opposition to both endorsement and denial and to be answerable to future evidence. This paper explicates and defends the thesis that agnosticism may indeed define such a third stance that is weaker than scepticism and hence offers a genuine alternative to realism and anti-realism about our cognitive limits.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/55.pdf} } @article{Barnes2007, author = {Barnes, Elizabeth}, title = {{Vagueness and Arbitrariness: Merricks on Composition}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {105-113}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/461/105}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm105}, abstract = {In this paper I respond to Trenton Merricks's (2005) paper Composition and Vagueness'. I argue that Merricks's paper faces the following difficulty: he claims to provide independent motivation for denying one of the premisses of the Lewis-Sider vagueness argument for unrestricted composition, but the alleged motivation he provides begs the question.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/105.pdf} } @article{Merricks2007, author = {Merricks, Trenton}, title = {{Remarks on Vagueness and Arbitrariness}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {115-119}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/461/115}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm115}, abstract = {In Composition and Vagueness', I argued, among other things, that the Vagueness Argument for unrestricted composition fails. In Vagueness and Arbitrariness: Merricks on Composition', Elizabeth Barnes objects to my argument. This paper replies to Barnes, and also offers further support for the views defended in my original paper.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/115.pdf} } @article{Hoeltje2007, author = {Hoeltje, Miguel}, title = {{Theories of Meaning and Logical Truth: Edwards versus Davidson}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {121-129}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/461/121}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm121}, abstract = {Donald Davidson has claimed that for every logical truth S of a language L, a theory of meaning for L will entail that S is a logical truth of L. Jim Edwards has argued (2002) that this claim is false if we take entails' to mean has as a logical consequence'. In this paper, I first show that, pace Edwards, Davidson's claim is correct even under this strong reading. I then discuss the argument given by Edwards and offer a diagnosis of where he went wrong.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/121.pdf} } @article{Edwards2007, author = {Edwards, Jim}, title = {{Response to Hoeltje: Davidson Vindicated?}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {131-141}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/461/131}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm131}, abstract = {In response to Hoeltje I concede the main point of his first section: for each logical truth S of the object language, it is a logical consequence of the Davidsonian theory of meaning I offered in my paper that S is logically true, contrary to what I asserted in the paper. However, I now argue that a Davidsonian theory of meaning may be formulated equally well in such a way that it not a logical consequence of the theory that S is a logical truth. Nonetheless, the revised theory of meaning will still entail' in a wider sense that S is a logical truth, for we can prove by induction on the consequence class of the revised theory that S is a logical truth. So far, my disagreement with Hoeltje is over the more charitable interpretation of a passage from Davidson. I close by arguing that Davidson was mistaken on one point, a theory of meaning will entail a threefold distinction among the sentences of the object language, not a twofold distinction as he claimed.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/131.pdf} } @article{01012007, title = {{Errata}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {143-}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/461/143}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm143}, abstract = {10.1093/mind/fzl659 p. 688, line 10: for So if is a theorem of M read So if {phi} is a theorem of M p. 688, line 13: for where {phi}* is the result of indexing the terms of {phi}* to M read where {phi}* is the result of indexing the terms of {phi} to M}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/143.pdf} } @article{Saka2007, author = {Saka, Paul}, title = {{Review: Renewing Meaning}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {145-148}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm145}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/145.pdf} } @article{Sidorsky2007, author = {Sidorsky, David}, title = {{Review: Perfectionism and the Common Good: Themes in the Philosophy of T. H. Green}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {148-155}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm148}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/148.pdf} } @article{Gaukroger2007, author = {Gaukroger, Stephen}, title = {{Review: Descartes, A Biography}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {155-157}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm155}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/155.pdf} } @article{Bonjour2007, author = {Bonjour, Laurence}, title = {{Review: Evidentialism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {157-161}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm157}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/157.pdf} } @article{Otteson2007, author = {Otteson, James R.}, title = {{Review: On Adam Smith's 'Wealth of Nations': A Philosophical Companion}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {161-165}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm161}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/161.pdf} } @article{Cerbone2007, author = {Cerbone, David R.}, title = {{Review: Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {165-169}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm165}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/165.pdf} } @article{Brady2007, author = {Brady, Michael S.}, title = {{Review: Value, Reality, and Desire}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {193-197}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm193}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/193.pdf} } @article{Ben-Yami2007, author = {Ben-Yami, Hanoch}, title = {{Review: The Old New Logic: Essays on the Philosophy of Fred Sommers}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {197-202}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm197}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/197.pdf} } @article{Read2007, author = {Read, Stephen}, title = {{Review: The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {203-206}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm203}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/203.pdf} } @article{Atkin2007, author = {Atkin, Albert}, title = {{Review: Common-Sense: A New Look at Old Tradition}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {206-209}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm206}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/206.pdf} } @article{Higgins2007, author = {Higgins, Kathleen Marie}, title = {{Review: Deeper than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {209-212}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm209}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/209.pdf} } @article{Walker2007, author = {Walker, Ralph C. S.}, title = {{Review: Accessing Kant: A Relaxed Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {212-215}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm212}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/212.pdf} } @article{Patterson2007, author = {Patterson, Sarah}, title = {{Review: Descartes's Dualism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {215-219}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm215}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/215.pdf} } @article{Davis2007, author = {Davis, Wayne A.}, title = {{Review: The Three Faces of Desire}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {220-225}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm220}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/220.pdf} } @article{Feagin2007, author = {Feagin, Susan L.}, title = {{Review: In Defense of Sentimentality}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {225-228}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm225}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/225.pdf} } @article{Schroeder2007, author = {Schroeder, William R.}, title = {{Review: Living with Nietzsche}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {228-233}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm228}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/228.pdf} } @article{Collins2007b, author = {Collins, John}, title = {{Review: Veritas: The Correspondence Theory and its Critics}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {234-237}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm234}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/234.pdf} } @article{Stegmann2007, author = {Stegmann, Ulrich}, title = {{Review: Genes and the Agents of Life: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {238-240}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm238}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/238.pdf} } @article{Young2007, author = {Young, Robert}, title = {{Review: Moral Animals: Ideals and Constraints in Moral Theory}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {240-244}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm240}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/240.pdf} } @article{Kolbel2007, author = {Kolbel, Max}, title = {{Review: Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {244-251}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm244}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/244.pdf} } @article{Jolley2007, author = {Jolley, Nicholas}, title = {{Review: The Two Intellectual Worlds of John Locke: Man, Person, and Spirits in the 'Essay'}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {251-254}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm251}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/251.pdf} } @article{Carson2007, author = {Carson, Thomas L.}, title = {{Review: Divine Motivation Theory}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2007}, volume = {116}, number = {461}, pages = {254-257}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm254}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/461/254.pdf} } @article{Braddon-Mitchell2006, author = {Braddon-Mitchell, David}, title = {{Believing Falsely Makes It So}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {833-866}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/115/460/833}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl833}, abstract = {The internalist intuition--that there is something rationally or conceptually defective in judging that an act is right without being in any way motivated towards it--is one which has tended to lead either to error theories of ethics on the one hand, or acceptance of the truth of internalism on the other. This paper argues that it does play a kind of subject-setting role, but that our responses to cases can be rationalised without requiring that internalism is true for ethical realism to be vindicated. Instead what is required is that something like internalism be believed to be true. The widespreadness of the internalist intuition is part of what makes it the case that some actions are right and others wrong. Of course these beliefs might be false--as the present author holds--consistent with ethical realism, just so long as they are widely held, and whatever else it takes to vindicate realism is the case. In such a situation, widespread false belief would be part of what makes it so that some acts are right, and others wrong.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/833.pdf} } @article{Biggs2006, author = {Biggs, Stephen}, title = {{Review: A Place for Consciousness}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1166-1171}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1166}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1166.pdf} } @article{Sharples2006, author = {Sharples, R. W.}, title = {{Review: The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1171-1174}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1171}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1171.pdf} } @article{Leplin2006, author = {Leplin, Jarrett}, title = {{Review: Reality and Rationality}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1174-1178}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1174}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1174.pdf} } @article{Brown2006, author = {Brown, Lesley}, title = {{Review: The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1178-1181}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1178}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1178.pdf} } @article{Draper2006, author = {Draper, Kai}, title = {{Review: Facing Death: Epicurus and his Critics}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1182-1185}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1182}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1182.pdf} } @article{Wilkerson2006, author = {Wilkerson, T. E.}, title = {{Review: Kant and the Empiricists: Understanding Understanding}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1186-1188}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1186}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1186.pdf} } @article{10012006, title = {{Books Received}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1189-1192}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1189}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1189.pdf} } @article{Goldstein2006, author = {Goldstein, Laurence}, title = {{Fibonacci, Yablo, and the Cassationist Approach to Paradox}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {867-890}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/115/460/867}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl867}, abstract = {A syntactically correct number-specification may fail to specify any number due to underspecification. For similar reasons, although each sentence in the Yablo sequence is syntactically perfect, none yields a statement with any truth-value. As is true of all members of the Liar family, the sentences in the Yablo sequence are so constructed that the specification of their truth-conditions is vacuous; the Yablo sentences fail to yield statements. The revenge' problem is easily defused. The solution to the semantical paradoxes offered here revives the mediaeval cassatio approach, one that largely disappeared due to its incomprehending rejection by influential contemporary writers such as William Shyreswood and Thomas Bradwardine. The diagnosis readily extends to the set-theoretic paradoxes.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/867.pdf} } @article{Hyman2006, author = {Hyman, John}, title = {{Knowledge and Evidence}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {891-916}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/115/460/891}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl891}, abstract = {The modest' theory of knowledge defended in Timothy Williamson's book Knowledge and its Limits is compared here with the theory defended in the author's articles How Knowledge Works' and Knowledge and Self-Knowledge'. It is argued that there are affinities between these theories, but that the latter has considerably more explanatory power.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/891.pdf} } @article{Lange2006, author = {Lange, Marc}, title = {{How to Account for the Relation between Chancy Facts and Deterministic Laws}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {917-946}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/115/460/917}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl917}, abstract = {Suppose that unobtanium-346 is a rare radioactive isotope. Consider: (1) Every Un346 atom, at its creation, decays within 7 microseconds ({micro}s). (50%) Every Un346 atom, at its creation, has a 50% chance of decaying within 7{micro}s. (1) and (50%) can be true together, but (1) and (50%) cannot together be laws of nature. Indeed, (50%)'s mere (non-vacuous) truth logically precludes (1)'s lawhood. A satisfactory analysis of chance and lawhood should nicely account for this relation. I shall argue first that David Lewis's Humean picture accounts for this relation only by inserting this relation by hand'. Next, I shall argue that this relation between law and chance also threatens a radically non-Humean picture of laws and chances. Finally, I shall offer an account of natural law that nicely explains the relation between chancy facts and deterministic laws. This explanation is not ad hoc because it derives the relation from the very same features of lawhood that account for the laws' special relation to counterfactuals and explain how the laws (unlike the accidents) possess a variety of necessity. The reason that a chancy fact such as (50%) keeps (1) from being a law, without keeping (1) from being true, is ultimately that a chancy fact constrains the subjunctive facts and (1)'s lawhood, unlike (1)'s truth, depends upon the subjunctive facts.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/917.pdf} } @article{McCarty2006, author = {McCarty, Charles}, title = {{The Coherence of Antirealism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {947-956}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/115/460/947}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl947}, abstract = {The project of antirealism is to construct an assertibility semantics on which (1) the truth of statements obeys a recognition condition so that (2) counterexamples are forthcoming to the law of the excluded third and (3) intuitionistic formal predicate logic is provably sound and complete with respect to the associated notion of validity. Using principles of intuitionistic mathematics and employing only intuitionistically correct inferences, we show that prima facie reasonable formulations of (1), (2), and (3) are inconsistent. Therefore, it should not be assumed that the project of anti-realism as it bears upon intuitionistic mathematics and logic can be accomplished.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/947.pdf} } @article{Rodriguez-Pereyra2006, author = {Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo}, title = {{Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjunction Thesis}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {957-982}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/115/460/957}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl957}, abstract = {In this paper I undermine the Entailment Principle according to which if an entity is a truthmaker for a certain proposition and this proposition entails another, then the entity in question is a truthmaker for the latter proposition. I argue that the two most promising versions of the principle entail the popular but false Conjunction Thesis, namely that a truthmaker for a conjunction is a truthmaker for its conjuncts. One promising version of the principle understands entailment as strict implication but restricts the field of application of the principle to purely contingent truths (i.e. those that contain no necessary proposition at any level of analysis). But a conjunction of purely contingent truths strictly implies its conjuncts. So this version of the principle is committed to the Conjunction Thesis. The same is true of the version of the principle where entailment is understood in the sense of systems T, R, and E of relevant logic, since in these systems conjunctions entail their conjuncts. I argue that the Conjunction Thesis is false because a truthmaker is that in virtue of what a certain proposition is true and it is false that, for example, what the proposition that Peter is a man is true in virtue of is the conjunctive fact that Peter is man and Saturn is a planet (or the facts that Peter is a man and that Saturn is a planet taken together). I also argue against other versions of the principle.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/957.pdf} } @article{Schirn2006, author = {Schirn, Matthias}, title = {{Concepts, Extensions, and Frege's Logicist Project}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {983-1006}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/115/460/983}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl983}, abstract = {Although the notion of logical object plays a key role in Frege's foundational project, it has hardly been analyzed in depth so far. I argue that Marco Ruffino's attempt to fill this gap by establishing a close link between Frege's treatment of expressions of the form the concept F' and the privileged status Frege assigns to extensions of concepts as logical objects is bound to fail. I argue, in particular, that Frege's principal motive for introducing extensions into his logical theory is not to be able to make in-direct statements about concepts, but rather to define all numbers as logical objects of a fundamental kind in order to ensure that we have the right cognitive access to them qua logical objects via Axiom V. Contrary to what Ruffino claims, reducibility to extensions cannot be the ultimate criterion' for Frege of what is to be regarded as a logical object.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/983.pdf} } @article{Frances2006, author = {Frances, Bryan}, title = {{The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1007-1022}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/115/460/1007}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1007}, abstract = {For years philosophers argued for the existence of distinct yet materially coincident things by appealing to modal and temporal properties. For instance, the statue was made on Monday and could not survive being flattened; the lump of clay was made months before and can survive flattening. Such arguments have been thoroughly examined. Kit Fine has proposed a new set of arguments using the same template. I offer a critical evaluation of what I take to be his central lines of reasoning.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1007.pdf} } @article{King2006, author = {King, Jeffrey C.}, title = {{Semantics for Monists}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1023-1058}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/115/460/1023}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1023}, abstract = {Assume that the only thing before you is a statue made of some alloy. Call those who think that there is one thing before you in such a case monists. Call those who think there are at least two things before you in such a case pluralists. The most common arguments for pluralism run as follows. The statue is claimed to have some property P that the piece of alloy lacks (or vice versa), and hence it is concluded that they are distinct. Most often, the predicates employed in such arguments to express the crucial property are predicates expressing temporal properties', such as existing at a certain time; or modal properties', such as possibly being spherical; or constitution properties', such as being made of a certain sort of material. In a recent paper, Kit Fine has noted that such predicates suffer from various defects that make it possible for the monist to plausibly resist the relevant versions of the pluralist's arguments. For this reason, Fine considers a number of predicates that do not suffer from these defects, and constructs new versions of the above argument using them. Fine argues that any attempt on the monist's part to resist his versions of the argument force the monist to adopt implausible positions in the philosophy of language. As against this, I argue that the monist has perfectly plausible responses to Fine's arguments that require the monist to adopt only quite reasonable positions in the philosophy of language.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1023.pdf} } @article{Fine2006, author = {Fine, Kit}, title = {{Arguing for Non-identity: A Response to King and Frances}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1059-1082}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/115/460/1059}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1059}, abstract = {I defend my paper The Non-identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter' against objections from Bryan Frances and Jeffrey King.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1059.pdf} } @article{Pettit2006, author = {Pettit, Philip}, title = {{Review: On Thinking How to Live: A Cognitivist View}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1083-1106}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1083}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1083.pdf} } @article{Kirk2006, author = {Kirk, Robert}, title = {{Review: Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1107-1110}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1107}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1107.pdf} } @article{Maudlin2006, author = {Maudlin, Tim}, title = {{Review: Quantum Entanglements: Selected Papers}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1111-1120}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1111}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1111.pdf} } @article{Wilkerson2006a, author = {Wilkerson, T.E.}, title = {{Review: A Philosophy of Gardens}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1120-1122}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1120}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1120.pdf} } @article{Wilson2006, author = {Wilson, Catherine}, title = {{Review: The Moral Demands of Affluence}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1122-1126}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1122}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1122.pdf} } @article{Smith2006, author = {Smith, Joel}, title = {{Review: Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1126-1129}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1126}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1126.pdf} } @article{Janiak2006, author = {Janiak, Andrew}, title = {{Review: The Architecture of Matter}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1130-1133}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1130}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1130.pdf} } @article{Graham2006, author = {Graham, Gordon}, title = {{Review: The Roots of Evil}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1133-1135}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1133}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1133.pdf} } @article{Witmer2006, author = {Witmer, D. Gene}, title = {{Review: Physicalism, or Something Near Enough}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1136-1141}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1136}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1136.pdf} } @article{Jenkins2006, author = {Jenkins, Carrie S.}, title = {{Review: The Knowability Paradox}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1141-1147}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1141}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1141.pdf} } @article{Kenny2006, author = {Kenny, Anthony}, title = {{Review: Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1147-1150}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1147}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1147.pdf} } @article{Bailey2006, author = {Bailey, D. T. J.}, title = {{Review: Epistemology After Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle and Democritus}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1151-1153}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1151}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1151.pdf} } @article{Lacey2006, author = {Lacey, Hugh}, title = {{Review: Is Science Neurotic?}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1154-1158}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1154}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1154.pdf} } @article{Nadler2006, author = {Nadler, Steven}, title = {{Review: Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1158-1160}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1158}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1158.pdf} } @article{Matthen2006, author = {Matthen, Mohan}, title = {{Review: Action in Perception}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1160-1166}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1160}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1160.pdf} } @article{10012006a, title = {{Announcements}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1193-1196}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1193}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1193.pdf} } @article{10012006b, title = {{Index of MIND Vol. 115 Nos 1-4, 2006}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {460}, pages = {1197-1214}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1197}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/460/1197.pdf} } @article{Beauchamp2006, author = {Beauchamp, Tom L.}, title = {{Review: Affirmative Action and Racial Preference: A Debate}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {747-750}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl747}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/747.pdf} } @article{Whittle2006, author = {Whittle, Ann}, title = {{Review: Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of Metaphysics}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {750-753}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl750}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/750.pdf} } @article{Eaker2006, author = {Eaker, Erin L.}, title = {{Review: Reflecting the Mind: Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {754-757}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl754}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/754.pdf} } @article{Stecker2006, author = {Stecker, Robert}, title = {{Review: Arts and Minds}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {757-760}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl757}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/757.pdf} } @article{Pacherie2006, author = {Pacherie, Elisabeth}, title = {{Review: How the Body Shapes the Mind}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {760-765}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl760}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/760.pdf} } @article{Silverman2006, author = {Silverman, Allan}, title = {{Review: Plato's Natural Philosophy}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {765-769}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl765}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/765.pdf} } @article{Quong2006, author = {Quong, Jonathan}, title = {{Review: Relativism and the Foundations of Liberalism}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {769-773}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl769}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/769.pdf} } @article{Eagle2006, author = {Eagle, Antony}, title = {{Review: Probability: A Philosophical Introduction}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {773-777}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl773}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/773.pdf} } @article{Morton2006, author = {Morton, Adam}, title = {{Review: Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {777-780}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl777}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/777.pdf} } @article{Carroll2006, author = {Carroll, John W.}, title = {{Review: Laws in Nature}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {780-784}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl780}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/780.pdf} } @article{Vranas2006, author = {Vranas, Peter B. M.}, title = {{Review: Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {784-790}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl784}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/784.pdf} } @article{Cross2006, author = {Cross, Charles B.}, title = {{Review: Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {790-793}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl790}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/790.pdf} } @article{Cottingham2006, author = {Cottingham, John}, title = {{Review: The Will and Human Action From Antiquity to the Present Day}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {793-796}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl793}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/793.pdf} } @article{Szabo2006, author = {Szabo, Zoltan Gendler}, title = {{Review: Descriptions and Beyond}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {796-800}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl796}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/796.pdf} } @article{Levine2006, author = {Levine, Joseph}, title = {{Review: Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {800-803}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl800}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/800.pdf} } @article{Brown2006a, author = {Brown, Gregory}, title = {{Review: Leibniz: Nature and Freedom}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {804-808}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl804}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/804.pdf} } @article{Torretti2006, author = {Torretti, Roberto}, title = {{Review: The Reign of Relativity: Philosophy in Physics 1915-1925}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {808-811}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl808}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/808.pdf} } @article{Scarantino2006, author = {Scarantino, Andrea}, title = {{Review: Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions * Review: Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {812-820}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl812}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/812.pdf} } @article{Menzies2006, author = {Menzies, Peter}, title = {{Review: Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {821-826}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl821}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/821.pdf} } @article{Barnett2006, author = {Barnett, David}, title = {{Zif is If}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006}, volume = {115}, number = {459}, pages = {519-566}, url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/115/459/519}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl519}, abstract = {A conditional takes the form If A, then C'. On the truth-conditional view of conditionals, conditional statements state things with truth-conditions. On the suppositional view, conditional statements involve the expression of a supposition. I develop and defend a view on which conditional statements both state things with truth-conditions and express suppositions. On this view, something is fundamentally right about standard truth-conditional and standard suppositional views. Considerations in favor of conditional contents lead us to attribute truth-conditional contents to conditional statements; considerations in favor of the suppositional view then lead us to an unexpected account of these contents. The resulting view has a number of benefits, including a unified treatment of conditional speech acts, a plausible account of our practice of ascribing truth-values to conditional statements, a simple explanation of the apparent equivalence between probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities, an intuitive treatment of Gibbardian stand-offs', a plausible logic of conditionals, and an explanation of why theorizing about conditionals has proved so difficult.}, eprint = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/459/519.pdf} } @article{Field2006, author = {Field, Hartry}, title = {{Truth and the Unprovability of Consistency}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2006