#Created by Kbib version 0.6.1 #Last modified: Thu Jun 19 17:24:45 2008 @article{ABEL1966, author = {ABEL, REUBEN}, title = {PRAGMATISM AND THE OUTLOOK OF MODERN SCIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {45-54}, keywords = {empiricism, fact, logic, meaning, pragmatism, reality, science, truth}, abstract = {"I HOPE I HAVE SHOWN THE UNIQUE PERTINENCE OF PRAGMATISM TO THE CHARACTERISTIC OUTLOOK AND PROBLEMS OF THE WORLD OF MODERN SCIENCE. IN ITS THEORY OF REALITY AS CONSTITUTED BY THE INTERACTION OF MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT, AND IN ITS VIEW OF TRUTH AS ENTAILING HUMAN ACTIVITY AND INQUIRY, PRAGMATISM PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPTS, CONSTRUCTS, FACTS, THEORIES, AND LAWS OF SCIENCE; FOR COMPREHENDING THE STATUS OF GEOMETRY AND LOGIC; FOR DEALING WITH DETERMINISM, INDUCTION, PROBABILITY, AND RATIONALITY; FOR A THEORY OF MEANING; AND FOR AN ATTITUDE OF EMPIRICIST OPEN-MINDEDNESS...."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ABEL1972, author = {ABEL, REUBEN}, title = {ON "FORM" IN ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {371-376}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, form}, abstract = {'FORM' IN A WORK OF ART IS ANALYSED NOT AS A NOUN BUT AS A VERB. THE MATERIALS OF A WORK OF ART ARE FORMED (COMPOSED, ARRANGED, ETC.) INTENTIONALLY, BY A PERSON, WHO DOES SO FOR THE SAKE OF DOING SO (REGARDLESS OF OTHER MOTIVES), AND WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF EVOKING A RESPONSE FROM SOME OTHER PERSON TO HIM. THIS EXPLAINS OUR ATTITUDE TO FORGERIES, COPIES, COMPUTER PRODUCTS, NATURAL OBJECTS, ETC. IT ALSO CLARIFIES WHAT MAKES US UNEASY ABOUT SO MUCH RECENT ART: THE WIDESPREAD MINIMISATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF FORM. THE PASSIONATE INTEREST IN FORM IS SUGGESTED AS A DIFFERENTIA OF HOMO SAPIENS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ABELSON1961, author = {ABELSON, RAZIEL}, title = {IN DEFENSE OF FORMAL LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {333-346}, keywords = {defense, empiricism, formal-logic; logic, rationalism, textual-criticis}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR SUMMARIZES S TOULMIN'S MAIN CRITICISMS OF LOGIC, AND THEN OPPOSES THEM AS BEING TOO EXTREME. TOULMIN'S THESIS IS THAT LOGIC IS NOT A THEORETICAL SCIENCE BUT A GROUP OF PRACTICAL SKILLS AND ITS PRINCIPALS ARE NOT A PRIORI LAWS BUT SPECIFIC AND CONTEXT-BOUND RULES FOR SUCCESSFUL INFERENCES. ABELSON WANTS TO COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE EXTREME EMPIRICISM OF TOULMIN AND THE EXTREME RATIONALISM OF PROFESSIONAL LOGICIANS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ONE MUST FIND A MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN A PURELY FORMAL LOGIC THAT IN ITSELF HAS NO PRACTICAL VALUE, AND A PRACTICAL, CONTEXT-DEPENDENT LOGIC THAT REALLY ISN'T LOGIC AT ALL. SOMEWHERE, PURE LOGIC AND FACTUAL KNOWLEDGE BLEND TOGETHER INTO "PRACTICAL LOGIC" WHICH IS THE PROVINCE OF BOTH LOGIC AND EMPIRICAL INQUIRY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ABELSON1961a, author = {ABELSON, RAZIEL}, title = {A REPLY TO EVANS'S "MEANING AND USE".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {262-263}, keywords = {language, meaning, ontology, sentence, use, word}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Achinstein2001, author = {Achinstein, Peter}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {740-743}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Book of Evidence}, volume = {68(3)}, year = {2001} } @article{ACKERMANN1982, author = {ACKERMANN, ROBERT}, title = {CONTEXT DEPENDENT KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {425-433}, keywords = {context, epistemology, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ACKERMANN1964, author = {ACKERMANN, ROBERT}, title = {NORMATIVE EXPLANATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {522-529}, keywords = {deducibility, ethics, explanation, fact, naturalism, normative-judgment; science}, abstract = {IN THE "LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS", HUSSERL EXPLAINS OUR PERCEPTION OF EXTERNAL REALITY IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: HE CLAIMS THAT WE EXPERIENCE IMMANENT SENSATIONS THAT ARE APPREHENDED OR ANIMATED BY INTENTIONS, WHICH OBJECTIVATE THEM. IN THE LECTURES ON TIME, HUSSERL TRIES TO EXPLAIN HOW BOTH SENSATIONS AND INTENTIONS ARE CONSTITUTED FOR CONSCIOUSNESS. THE CONCEPT OF AN EXTENDED PRESENT INSTANT, INVOLVING BOTH PROTENTION AND RETENTION, IS THE KEY TO HIS EXPLANATION; IT ALLOWS HIM TO SAY THAT WE CAN RETAIN IN OUR PRESENT CONSCIOUSNESS THE ELAPSING SENSATION AND INTENTION, AND THUS BE AWARE OF THEM AS IMMANENT OBJECTS. IN ADDITION, HUSSERL IDENTIFIES IMMANENT TEMPORALITY WITH INTENTIONS AND SENSATIONS. AS A RESULT, HE CAN NO LONGER CLAIM THAT THEY ARE REALLY DISTINCT FROM ONE ANOTHER, FOR BOTH ARE CONSTITUTED OUT OF THE SAME ELEMENT, INNER TIME. THUS THE DISTINCTION THAT SERVES AS THE BASIS FOR HIS ANALYSIS IN THE "INVESTIGATIONS" IS SUPPRESSED BY HIS CONCLUSIONS IN THE LECTURES ON TIME.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADAMS1982, author = {ADAMS, E-M}, title = {PERSONS AND MORALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {384-390}, keywords = {ethics, morality, person}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADAMS1974, author = {ADAMS, E-M}, title = {LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS AND EPISTEMIC ENCOUNTERS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {34}, pages = {404-414}, keywords = {asserting, epistemology, experience, knowing, language, thinking}, abstract = {AN EPISTEMIC ENCOUNTER IS AN ACT OF 'THINKING THAT P' WHICH NOT ONLY INVOLVES BEING CORRECT, HAVING GOOD GROUNDS OR REASONS AND THOSE GROUNDS OR REASONS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR GETTING IT RIGHT, BUT ALSO THE ACT OF 'THINKING THAT P' BEING AT LEAST PARTIALLY SELF-WARRANTING, AND THE MODE OF 'THINKING THAT P' BEING SUCH THAT IT PROVIDES AN ORIGINAL, INDIGENOUS SEMANTIC CONTENT. THE MODES OF EXPERIENCE AND THOUGHT WE TAKE TO PROVIDE EPISTEMIC ENCOUNTERS DETERMINE WHAT AREAS OF DISCOURSE APPEAR PHILOSOPHICALLY OPAQUE AND PROBLEMATIC AND HOW WE SEEK PHILOSOPHICAL CLARITY, FOR IT IS ONLY THROUGH EPISTEMIC ENCOUNTERS WE CAN ESTABLISH SEMANTIC TIES BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND ITEMS AND FEATURES OF THE WORLD.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adams2002, author = {Adams, Robert-M}, title = {Precis of Finite and Infinite Goods}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {439-444}, keywords = {ethics, framework, goods, infinite, metaethics, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adams2002a, author = {Adams, Robert-Merrihew}, title = {Responses}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {475-490}, keywords = {ethics, goods, metaethics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adams2003, author = {Adams, Robert-Merrihew}, title = {Anti-Consequentialism and the Transcendence of the Good}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {114-132}, keywords = {consequentialism, ethics, good, metaethics, transcendence}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adams1997, author = {Adams, Robert-Merrihew}, title = {Things in Themselves}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {801-825}, keywords = {metaphysics, object, reality, thing-in-itsel}, abstract = {The paper is an interpretation and defense of Kant's conception of things in themselves as noumena, along the following lines. Noumena are transempirical realities. As such they have several important roles in Kant's critical philosophy (Section 1). Our theoretical faculties cannot obtain enough content for a conception of noumena that would assure their real possibility as objects, but can establish their merely formal logical possibility (Sections 2-3). Our practical reason, however, grounds belief in the real possibility of some noumena, and even knowledge of the noumenal reality of a free will (Section 4). Section 5 defends Kant's conception of noumena as a good piece of philosophy, particularly with respect to its distinction between logical and real possibility. Are noumena numerically identical with experienced (phenomenal) objects? Kantian principles yield the answers that human selves are, God isn't, and it's harder to say about bodies (Section 6).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adams1994, author = {Adams, Robert-M}, title = {Religious Disagreements and Doxastic Practices}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {885-890}, keywords = {belief, existence, god, perception, religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADAMS1989, author = {ADAMS, ROBERT-MERRIHEW}, title = {REPLY TO KVANVIG: "ADAMS ON ACTUALISM AND PRESENTISM".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {299-301}, keywords = {future, metaphysics, present, proposition}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADDIS1986, author = {ADDIS, LAIRD}, title = {PAINS AND OTHER SECONDARY MENTAL ENTITIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {59-74}, keywords = {intentionality, mental-states; metaphysics, pain}, abstract = {SECONDARY MENTAL ENTITIES INCLUDE SENSATIONS SUCH AS PAIN AND ITCHES, PERCEPTION-RELATED ENTITIES SUCH AS IMAGES AND AFTERIMAGES, AND EMOTIONS. THE THEORY IS ADVANCED, AND DEFENDED AGAINST LIKELY OBJECTIONS, THAT SECONDARY MENTAL ENTITIES EXIST ONLY AS "OBJECTS" OF STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS (THE PRIMARY MENTAL ENTITIES) AND ARE THEREFORE ALWAYS DISTINCT FROM THE AWARENESS OF THEM. PAIN IS USED AS THE MAIN EXAMPLE BECAUSE IT HAS A FEATURE THAT MAKES IT SEEM ESPECIALLY RESISTANT TO THE THEORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADDIS1972, author = {ADDIS, LAIRD}, title = {ARISTOTLE AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF SUBSTANCES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {107-111}, keywords = {attribute, independence, metaphysics, substance, time}, abstract = {AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO EXPLICATE WHAT ARISTOTLE MAY REASONABLY BE TAKEN TO HAVE MEANT IN HOLDING THAT SUBSTANCES ARE 'INDEPENDENT' AND ATTRIBUTES 'DEPENDENT'. THE ACCOUNTS OF BERGMANN, ROSS, AND SELLARS ARE REJECTED EACH ON ITS OWN GROUND AND ALL BECAUSE OF THEIR COMMON FAILURE TO BRING TIME INTO THE EXPLICATION. IT IS SHOWN THAT WHAT IS TAKEN TO BE THE CORRECT EXPLICATION IS CONSISTENT ONLY WITH A REJECTION OF NON-PLATONIC UNIVERSALS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADELMANN1962, author = {ADELMANN, FREDERICK-J}, title = {THE ROOT OF EXISTENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {405-408}, keywords = {causality, epistemology, existence, experience, phenomenology, self-consciousness; sensation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adler2002, author = {Adler, Jonathan-E}, title = {Is the Generality Problem Too General?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {87-97}, keywords = {epistemology, generality, reliabilism}, abstract = {Reliabilism holds that knowledge is true belief reliably caused. Reliabilists should say something about individuating processes; critics deny that the right degree of generality can be specified without arbitrariness. It is argued that this criticism applies as well to processes mentioned in scientific explanations. The gratuitous puzzles created thereby show that the "generality problem" is illusory.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adler1997, author = {Adler, Jonathan-E}, title = {Constrained Belief and the Reactive Attitudes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {891-905}, keywords = {attitude, belief, epistemology, evidentialism}, abstract = {Evidentialism implies that, for epistemic purposes, belief should be responsive only to evidence. Focusing on our reactive attitude such as resentment or indignation, I construct an argument that the beliefs or judgments accompanying those attitudes are constrained in advance by circumstances to be full, rather than being open to the whole range of partial beliefs. These judgments or beliefs imply strong claims to justification. But the circumstances in which those attitudes are formed allow only very limited evidence. Nevertheless, we cannot opt out regularly since the formation of such attitudes is so central a feature of a minimally content human social life.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AIKEN1982, author = {AIKEN, HENRY-DAVID}, title = {THE ORIGINALITY OF HUME'S THEORY OF OBLIGATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {374-383}, keywords = {obligation, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ainslie2001, author = {Ainslie, Donald-C}, title = {Hume's Reflections on the Identity and Simplicity of Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {557-578}, keywords = {identity, metaphysics, mind, simplicity}, abstract = {The belief in the identity and simplicity of the mind as a bundle of perceptions is an abstruse belief, not one held by the "vulgar" who rarely turn their minds on themselves so as to think of their perceptions. The author suggests that it is this philosophical observation of the mind that creates the problems that Hume finally acknowledges in the "Appendix." He is unable to explain why we believe that the perceptions by means of which we observe our minds while philosophizing are themselves part of our minds. This suggestion is then tested against seven criteria that any interpretation of the "Appendix" must meet. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Ainslie1992, author = {Ainslie, George}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {981-983}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Picoeconomics}, volume = {55(4)}, year = {1992} } @article{AIRAKSINEN1987, author = {AIRAKSINEN, TIMO}, title = {BERKELEY AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF BELIEFS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {235-256}, keywords = {belief, body, justification, metaphysics}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ANALYZES BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. IT IS SHOWN THAT OUR KNOWLEDGE OF SPATIO-TEMPORAL BODIES CANNOT BE CERTAIN. CERTAINTY IS RESTRICTED TO THE REALM OF SENSORY IDEAS THEMSELVES. BUT THERE IS HARDLY ANY REASON TO BE INTERESTED IN IDEAS AS SUCH. BERKELEY IS A COMMON SENSE THINKER WHO WANTS TO KNOW THE WORLD AND ITS SCIENTIFIC LAWS. BODIES ARE CONSTRUCTED ON THE BASIS OF BOTH REAL AND IMAGINARY IDEAS. THIS TOPIC IS ANALYZED STARTING FROM PAPPAS'S AND PITCHER'S VIEWS. IT IS SHOWN THAT BODIES ARE COMPLETE COMPLEXES OF IDEAS AND THAT IMAGINATION PLAYS AN ESSENTIAL ROLE HERE. THE CONTINUITY OF BODIES IS DISCUSSED. THE METHODS OF MAKING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAL AND IMAGINARY IDEAS ARE ANALYZED. CONCERNING BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND--IT IS SHOWN THAT ONE CAN REACH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY IN THIS FIELD BUT ONE CANNOT FIND MUCH INFORMATION CONCERNING THE VARIOUS PARTS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MIND. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ACTIVE AND THE PASSIVE MIND IS DISCUSSED. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN IDEAS AND THE MIND IS EXPLORED BRIEFLY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AIRAKSINEN1980, author = {AIRAKSINEN, TIMO}, title = {PROBLEMS IN HEGEL'S DIALECTIC OF FEELING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {1-25}, keywords = {dialectic, feeling, metaphysics, mind, soul, subjective}, abstract = {THIS PAPER SHOWS HOW HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF SUBJECTIVE MIND CAN BE USED TO ELUCIDATE THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF DIALECTICS. A TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF DIALECTICS IS PRESENTED. SEVERAL APPARENT ANOMALIES BOTH IN HEGEL'S PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY ARE ANALYZED AND RESOLVED BY USING THIS NOTION OF DIALECTICS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alanen2003, author = {Alanen, Lilli}, title = {What Are Emotions About?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {311-334}, keywords = {cognitivism, emotion, intentionality, metaphysics, morality, phenomenology}, abstract = {This paper discusses the interrelations between three aspects of human emotions: their intentionality, their expressivity and their moral significance. It distinguishes three kinds of philosophical views of emotions: the cognitivist (classically held by the Stoics), the emotivist which reduces emotions to nonintentional bodily sensations and physiological states, and the moral phenomenologist, the latter being held by Annette Baier, whose work is the focus of the discussion. Her view, which represents an original development of ideas found in Descartes and Hume, avoids the reductionism of cognitivist and emotivist accounts. The paper gives special attention to her notion of 'deep' objects of emotions and to her account of the expressivity of emotions, arguing that while the first is problematic, the second is a significant contribution to our understanding of the role of emotions in our moral lives.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALBERSHEIM1965, author = {ALBERSHEIM, GERHARD}, title = {THE SCALE STEP.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {63-79}, keywords = {aesthetic-experience; aesthetics, dimensionality, movement, music, pitch, space}, abstract = {"TONAL SPACE" IS STRUCTURED BY DIFFERENT SCALE SYSTEMS WHOSE STEPS ARE DEFINED BY THE MEASURING ROD OF THE CONSONANT INTERVALS OCTAVE, FIFTH, AND MAJOR THIRD. THUS, MUSICAL HEARING, CONDITIONED BY AGE-OLD CONVENTIONS, IS PREFORMED BY OUR THINKING IN SCALE STEPS ON WHICH THE COMMUNICABILITY OF MUSICAL MEANING RESTS. BECAUSE OF THEIR DISTINCTIVE MUSICO-CONCEPTUAL CHARACTER WE COMPREHEND STEPS DESPITE THEIR VARYING INTONATION. THE RELATIVE INDEPENDENCE OF OUR CONCEPTION OF SCALE STEPS FROM THEIR ACTUAL PITCH PREVENTS THE CONSIDERABLE DEVIATIONS FROM JUST INTONATION BY PERFORMERS AND BY OUR TEMPERED TUNING SYSTEM FROM INTERFERING WITH OUR MUSICAL UNDERSTANDING. ACCORDINGLY, "ABSOLUTE PITCH" IS NOT A MEMORY FOR PITCH SIMPLY, BUT FOR THE ACCUSTOMED INTONATION OF SCALE STEPS, REFERRED TO BY THE TONE NAMES. LIKEWISE, THE STEP CHARACTER ACCOUNTS FOR WHAT SOME PSYCHOLOGISTS CALL "CHROMA" AND MISTAKE FOR A PROPERTY OF SINGLE TONES LIKE PITCH OR TIMBRE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Albert1992, author = {Albert, David-Z}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {973-975}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Quantum Mechanics and Experience}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1992} } @other{Alcoff1996, author = {Alcoff, Linda-Martin}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {740-743}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory}, volume = {64(3)}, year = {1996} } @article{ALDRICH1971, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-A}, title = {ILLOCUTIONARY SPACE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {15-28}, keywords = {assertion, language}, abstract = {SEARLE DRAWS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TRUTH CONDITIONS AND ASSERTIBILITY CONDITIONS IN THE WRONG WAY. IT SUGGESTS THAT ONE CAN THINK THAT P IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO SAY IT, IN SOME LOGICAL SENSE OF 'CAN'T', STRONGER THAN ANY PROHIBITION OF ETIQUETTE OR SOCIAL MANNERS. THIS IS COUNTER-INTUITIVE. SPEECH-ACTS, LIKE PHYSICAL, CAN BE PERFORMED ONLY WHERE THERE IS ROOM FOR THEM - ILLOCUTIONARY 'SPACE'. THIS IS THE SPACE OF HUMAN ACTION, IN WHICH 'FREEDOM,' 'CONSTRAINT', ETC. MAKES SENSE. 'PHYSICAL SPACE' IS AN ABSTRACTION OUT OF THIS. IN SHORT, 'ILLOCUTIONARY SPACE' IS NOT A METAPHORICAL EXTENSION OF 'PHYSICAL SPACE.' 'THIN' SAYINGS - SAYINGS OF SENTENCES - ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM 'THICK' ONES, IN WHICH SOMETHING IS SAID (DONE) WITH THE SENTENCES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALDRICH1962, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-C}, title = {IMAGE-MONGERING AND IMAGE-MANAGEMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {51-61}, keywords = {contradiction, image, imagination, language, meaning, possibility, situation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALDRICH1981, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-C}, title = {CAN REPRESENTATIONS BE IDENTICAL WITH ANYTHING?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {401-404}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, representation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALDRICH1966, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-C}, title = {AN ASPECT THEORY OF MIND.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {313-326}, keywords = {aspect-theory; body, introspection, knowledge, mental-states; metaphysics, minds}, abstract = {OLDER ASPECT THEORIES OF MIND, SUCH AS THE DOUBLE ASPECT THEORY, ARE BY-PASSED IN FAVOR OF "ASPECT" IN WITTGENSTEIN'S SENSE. WHAT ONE PERCEIVES WHEN ONE PERCEIVES SOMEONE'S "STATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS"--HIS INTENTION, HIS EMOTION, HIS PAIN--IS COMPARABLE TO WHAT ONE PERCEIVES WHEN ONE HAS AN "ASPECT-EXPERIENCE" OF, SAY, THE DUCK-RABBIT PICTURE. THIS CONCEPT OF "PERCEPTION" OF PERSONS BY PERSONS IS EXPLORED HERE, UNCOVERING SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES TO THE PICTURE CASE. SEEING A PERSON AS A PHYSICAL OBJECT IN MOTION--NOT IN "ACTION"--IS FEASIBLE THOUGH DIFFICULT BECAUSE UNNATURAL. THIS KIND OF "ASPECTION" IS CALLED "CATEGORIAL" AND DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER KINDS. EVEN THE HUMAN "BODY" IS NOT NATURALLY SEEN AS A "PHYSICAL OBJECT."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALDRICH1964, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-C}, title = {A POINT ABOUT SPACES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {397-401}, keywords = {aesthetics, description, expression, object, phenomenology, physical, space}, abstract = {IT IS ARGUED THAT MATERIAL THINGS APPEAR AS EITHER PHYSICAL OBJECTS, (INVOLVING THE LOGIC OF DESCRIPTIVE PORTRAYAL) OR AESTHETIC OBJECTS, (INVOLVING THE LOGIC OF EXPRESSIVE PORTRAYAL). A PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPACES IS PRESENTED, SHOWING HOW A THING APPEARS DIFFERENTLY IN PHYSICAL THAN IN AESTHETIC SPACE. IT IS CLAIMED THAT THE PHYSICAL HAS NO ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY OVER, AND IS NOT PRESUPPOSED BY, THE AESTHETIC. THERE IS MUCH DISCUSSION ON WHY ONE DOES NOT "FRAME" A PHYSICAL OBJECT AND CONCLUSIONS ARE DRAWN ABOUT THE FUNCTION OF A FRAME, (NOT TO LOOK BEYOND FOR MEANING AND VALUE). (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALDRICH1979, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-C}, title = {POINT OF VIEW.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {498-510}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, physicalism, point}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALEXANDER1963, author = {ALEXANDER, H-G}, title = {A SUGGESTION CONCERNING EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMAGINATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {427-431}, keywords = {a-priori; abstraction, empiricism, epistemology, experience, imagination, logic, mathematics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALKER1965, author = {ALKER, HENRY-A}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {534-543}, keywords = {concept, mental-health; morality, ontology, psychiatry, science}, abstract = {THE QUESTION IS RAISED, AS TO WHAT STANDARDS SHOULD BE USED IN ANY DECISION ABOUT THE SCIENTIFIC LEGITIMACY OF A GIVEN CONCEPT. THREE STANDARDS ARE PROPOSED: (1) ONTOLOGICAL STANDARD--BASICALLY FREE FROM INNER INCONSISTENCY, (2) TECHNICAL ADEQUACY--A GIVEN CONCEPT IS ONLY AS GOOD AS THE SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATIONS IT PRESUPPOSES, AND (3) THAT OF NONMORALITY. THE ENTIRE DISCUSSION IS DEVOTED TO THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Allen1993, author = {Allen, Barry}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {719-723}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Truth in Philosophy}, volume = {56(3)}, year = {1993} } @article{ALLEN1970, author = {ALLEN, GLEN-O}, title = {FROM THE "NATURALISTIC FALLACY" TO THE IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {533-549}, keywords = {cause, ethics, good, metaethics}, abstract = {G. E. MOORE'S PROOF THAT 'GOOD' CANNOT BE DEFINED IS THE ANALOGUE OF HUME'S PROOF THAT THE IDEA OF CAUSE HAS NO EMPIRICAL CORRELATE. AS A PROOF, IT CANNOT SUSTAIN ETHICAL INTUITIONISM, EMOTIVISM, OR THE VARIOUS MODIFICATIONS OF ETHICAL NATURALISM WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE TO REST UPON IT. HOWEVER, IT DOES SUSTAIN THE THEORY THAT VALUES ARE CAUSES OF HUMAN RESPONSES, AND THAT, UNDER A METHODOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF OBJECTIVITY, VALUES HAVE OBJECTIVE COGNITIVE STATUS AS CAUSES OF RESPONSES IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF A HYPOTHETICAL BEING, AN IDEAL OBSERVER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALLEN1982, author = {ALLEN, JEFFNER}, title = {WHAT IS HUSSERL'S FIRST PHILOSOPHY?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {610-620}, keywords = {first-philosophy; history-of-ideas; metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALLERS1960, author = {ALLERS, RUDOLF}, title = {HEIDEGGER ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {365-373}, keywords = {being, metaphysics, reason, sufficient, textual-criticis}, abstract = {HEIDEGGER'S METHOD IS EXPLORED IN RELATION TO THE "BEING QUESTION," AND THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION OF LANGUAGE, LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS AND ETYMOLOGICAL EXPLANATION IS SHOWN AS HAVING REPLACED PHENOMENOLOGY. HEIDEGGER'S THESIS--THAT THE MODE IN WHICH BEING BECOMES MANIFEST IN DIFFERENT PERIODS OF HISTORY, IS ILLUSTRATED WITH HIS THOUGHTS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON. THAT THIS PRINCIPLE LASTED SO MANY CENTURIES OF INCUBATION UNTIL IT WAS FORMULATED BY LEIBNIZ, IS A SIGNIFICANT FACT IN THE HISTORY OF BEING. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS NO RETURNING TO PARMENIDES AND THE ORIGINAL INTUITION OF BEING; WE MUST ADOPT A NEW APPROACH, IN ORDER TO RENDER MAN AGAIN CONSCIOUS OF THE PRIMORDIAL IMPORT OF BEING; OTHERWISE WE WILL BE SUFFOCATED BY THE ALL-PERVADING TECHNICALIZATION. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Allison1996, author = {Allison, Henry-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {825-829}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy}, volume = {59(3)}, year = {1996} } @article{Almeder1994, author = {Almeder, Robert-F}, title = {Defining Justification and Naturalizing Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {669-681}, keywords = {epistemology, justification, knowledge, natural-sciences; reason}, abstract = {In this paper I examine the claim that no theory of epistemic justification is possible because whatever definition one gives admits of the question "Are you justified in accepting your definition of justification?" which cannot be answered without begging the question in favor of the original definition offered. I examine various replies to the argument and then argue that the question need not be answered.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Almeder1998, author = {Almeder, Robert}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {493-495}, publisher = {Open Court}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy}, volume = {62(2)}, year = {1998} } @other{Almeder1992, author = {Almeder, Robert}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {715-719}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Blind Realism}, volume = {55(3)}, year = {1992} } @article{Almog2005, author = {Almog, Joseph}, title = {Precis of What Am I?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {696-700}, keywords = {body, dualism, essentialism, metaphysics, mind, separability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Almog2005a, author = {Almog, Joseph}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {717-734}, keywords = {dualism, essence, intuition, metaphysics, possibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alspector-Kelly2002, author = {Alspector-Kelly, Marc}, title = {Stroud's Carnap}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {276-302}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, metaphysics, ontology, semantics}, abstract = {In "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" Carnap drew his famous distinction between 'internal' and 'external' questions of existence, pronouncing the former meaningful and the latter meaningless. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud understands Carnap to be applying the verification criterion of meaningfulness in order to refute Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that Stroud misrepresents both Carnap's aim and method. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston1993, author = {Alston, W-P}, title = {Epistemic Desiderata}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {527-551}, keywords = {argument, condition, epistemology, justification, language}, abstract = {There are endless disputes over alleged necessary conditions for epistemic justice, e.g., that the belief is "based on" adequate grounds and that the justifier is accessible on reflection. But perhaps it is a mistake to suppose that there is some unique status, "justification" concerning the necessary conditions for which they are arguing. If we abandon that view we can reconstrue this part of epistemology as a study of epistemic desiderata, their nature, viability, and importance for various interests and purposes.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALSTON1986, author = {ALSTON, WILLIAM-P}, title = {EPISTEMIC CIRCULARITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {1-30}, keywords = {belief, circularity, epistemology, justification}, abstract = {SUPPOSE THAT WE CANNOT PROVIDE ANY OTHERWISE STRONG ARGUMENT FOR THE RELIABILITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION WITHOUT MAKING USE OF WHAT WE TAKE OURSELVES TO HAVE LEARNED FROM SENSE PERCEPTION. WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE US? THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT IT DOES NOT PREVENT US FROM JUSTIFYING, AND BEING JUSTIFIED IN, A BELIEF THAT SENSE PERCEPTION IS RELIABLE; THOUGH IT DOES PREVENT US FROM GIVING AN IDEALLY EXPLICIT AND COMPLETE JUSTIFICATION OF SUCH A BELIEF, OR OF ANY OTHER BELIEF.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALSTON1989, author = {ALSTON, WILLIAM-P}, title = {REPLY TO DANIELS' "EXPERIENCING GOD".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {501-506}, keywords = {belief, christian, epistemology, experience, god, religion}, abstract = {DANIELS HOLDS THAT THE UNDISCERNING IN SECULAR MATTERS HAVE REASONS FOR SUPPOSING THAT OTHERS CAN DISCERN, WHILE THERE ARE NO ANALOGOUS REASONS IN THE RELIGIOUS SPHERE. THOUGH SOME OF HIS CONTRASTS ARE OVERDRAWN, I DON'T REALLY CONTEST THAT. BUT HE ALSO SEEMS TO SUPPOSE THAT THESE DIFFERENCES PROVIDE A STRONG REASON FOR SUPPOSING THAT NO ONE DOES PERCEIVE GOD, AND HERE I OBJECT, ON THE GROUNDS THAT DANIELS UNWARRANTEDLY SUPPOSES THAT ANY VERIDICAL PERCEPTION MUST PROVE ITSELF IN THE SAME WAY AS SENSE PERCEPTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALSTON1990, author = {ALSTON, William-P}, title = {Externalist Theories of Perception.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {causality, doxography, epistemology, externalism, perception}, abstract = {The title refers to theories that require a certain sort of relation between X and an experience of S in order that S perceive X. The relation might be causal, counterfactual, doxastic, or otherwise. It is argued against such theories that there are possible cases in which X stands in the required relation to an experience of S and S does not perceive X and cases in which X is perceived though it does not stand in the required relation.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston2002, author = {Alston, William-P}, title = {Sellars and the "Myth of the Given"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {69-86}, keywords = {empiricism, metaphysics, mind, myth, perception}, abstract = {Sellars is well known for this critique of the "myth of the given" in his Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. That text does not make it unambiguous just how he understands the "myth". Here I take it that whatever else may be involved, his critique is incompatible with the view that there is a nonconceptual mode of "presentation" or "givenness" of particulars that is the heart of sense perception and what is most distinctive of perception as a type of cognition. A critical examination of Sellars's argument, particularly those directed at the 'theory of appearing', results in the conclusion that he has failed to eliminate the above view of perception. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston1994, author = {Alston, William-P}, title = {Precis of "Perceiving God"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {863-868}, keywords = {existence, experience, god, perception, religion, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston1994a, author = {Alston, William-P}, title = {Reply to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {891-899}, keywords = {existence, experience, god, religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston2005, author = {Alston, William}, title = {Perception and Representation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {253-289}, keywords = {epistemology, experience, perception, representation, representationalism}, abstract = {My criticism of the representationalist position is in sections. (1) There is no sufficient reason for positing a representative function for perceptual experience. It doesn't seem on the face of it to be that, and nothing serves in place of such seeming. (2) Even if it did have such a function, it doesn't have the conceptual resources to represent a state of affairs. (3) Even if it did, it is not suited to represent, e.g., a physical property of color. (4) Finally, even if I am wrong about the first three points, it is still impossible for the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience to consist in it's representing what it does. My central argument for this central claim of the paper is that it is metaphysically, de re possible that one have a certain perceptual experience without it's presenting any state of affairs. And since all identities hold necessarily, this identity claim fails. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston2000, author = {Alston, William-P}, title = {Virtue and Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {185-189}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, knowledge, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Alston1996, author = {Alston, William-P}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {231-234}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A Realist Conception of Truth}, volume = {60(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{ALTRICHTER1973, author = {ALTRICHTER, F}, title = {ON WHAT CANNOT HAVE SPATIAL LOCATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {252-256}, keywords = {mentalism, metaphysics, quantity, space}, abstract = {THE AIM OF THIS DISCUSSION PAPER IS TO EXAMINE A WELL-KNOWN ARGUMENT USED AGAINST THE SO-CALLED IDENTITY THEORY. ACCORDING TO THE ARGUMENT, THE IDENTITY THEORY CANNOT BE A MEANINGFUL HYPOTHESIS, SINCE THE LEIBNIZ PRINCIPLE FORMULATED IN RESPECT TO SPACE PREDICATES IS NOT SATISFIED IN THE CASE OF THE ASSUMED IDENTITY OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND BRAIN STATES OR PROCESSES OR PHENOMENA. IN EXAMINING THE ARGUMENT THREE CASES ARE DIFFERENTIATED; FIRST, THE CASE OF THE SUPPOSED IDENTITY OF MENTAL PHENOMENA WITH BRAIN STATES. IT IS ARGUED THAT IN THIS CASE THE LEIBNIZ PRINCIPLE FORMULATED IN RESPECT TO SPACE PREDICATES IS VACUOUSLY SATISFIED, SINCE IT IS MEANINGLESS TO ASCRIBE 'SPATIAL LOCATION' NOT ONLY TO MENTAL PHENOMENA, BUT TO BRAIN STATES AS WELL. NEXT, THE CASE OF SUPPOSED IDENTITY OF MENTAL PHENOMENA WITH BRAIN PROCESSES IS EXAMINED WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT, ALSO IN THIS CASE, THE LEIBNIZ PRINCIPLE IS VACUOUSLY SATISFIED. LAST, THE CASE OF IDENTIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA WITH BRAIN PHENOMENA IS EXAMINED. AND I CONCLUDE THAT SINCE THE WORD 'PHENOMENON' MAY COVER MANY THINGS FALLING UNDER DIFFERENT CATEGORIES, NOTHING DEFINITE CAN BE SAID ABOUT THE VALIDITY OR INVALIDITY OF THE ARGUMENT IN QUESTION. (EDITED).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AMERIKS1985, author = {AMERIKS, KARL}, title = {HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF KANT'S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {1-36}, keywords = {idealism, phenomenology, philosophy, transcendental-deductio}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ANALYZES HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF KANT'S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY IN TERMS OF THREE SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION (CONCERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF THE I, THE NECESSITY OF THE CATEGORIES, AND THE PROBLEM OF A PRELIMINARY EPISTEMOLOGY) AND THREE SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM (CONCERNING THE THING IN ITSELF, THE ANTINOMIES, AND OTHER SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ameriks1992, author = {Ameriks, Karl}, title = {Recent Work on Hegel: The Rehabilitation of an Epistemologist?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {177-202}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {This paper focuses largely on a set of recent books in English that have attempted to defend the theoretical validity of Hegel's system, and in particular its relevance to current discussions in epistemology. T Rockmore, K Westphal, M Forster, R B Pippin, and T Pinkard each fasten on different aspects (respectively: Hegel as pragmatist, coherentist, anti-skeptic, transcendentalist, or category theorist) and periods of Hegel's theoretical philosophy. I argue that their analyses have significantly raised the level of discussion here, but they do not yet establish that Hegel's theoretical philosophy can be saved from the traditional objection of being overly dogmatic.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ameriks2003, author = {Ameriks, Karl}, title = {Problems from Van Cleve's Kant: Experience and Objects}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {196-202}, keywords = {a-priori; experience, metaphysics, object, transcendence}, abstract = {This article is part of a review discussion concerning James Van Cleve's very valuable book, Problems from Kant. Although Van Cleve traces many significant connections between Kant's first Critique and rationalist positions in contemporary analytic metaphysics, he interprets Kant's transcendental deduction in a manner that is more typical of empiricist approaches. He reconstructs--and then sharply criticizes--the deduction in a way that stresses starting from a relatively "thin" rather than "thick" concept of experience. I offer historical and systematic considerations in favor of an opposite approach to the deduction, one that would save it from objections like Van Cleve's.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Ameriks2000, author = {Ameriks, Karl}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {728-741}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical Philosophy}, volume = {69(3)}, year = {2000} } @other{Amico1993, author = {Amico, Robert}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {226-229}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Problem of the Criterion}, volume = {57(1)}, year = {1993} } @other{Anderson1993, author = {Anderson, Elizabeth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {956-959}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Value in Ethics and Economics}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1993} } @article{Anderson2004, author = {Anderson, R-Lanier}, title = {It Adds Up After All: Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic in Light of the Traditional Logic}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {501-540}, keywords = {analyticity, arithmetic, concept, containment, metaphysics, traditional-logi}, abstract = {Officially, for Kant, judgments are analytic iff the predicate is "contained in" the subject. I defend the containment definition against the common charge of obscurity, and argue that arithmetic cannot be analytic, in the resulting sense. My account deploys two traditional logical notions: logical division and concept hierarchies. Division separates a genus concept into exclusive, exhaustive species. Repeated divisions generate a hierarchy, in which lower species are derived from their genus, by adding differentia(e). Hierarchies afford a straightforward sense of containment: genera are contained in the species formed from them. To capture both relations, hierarchies must posit overlaps between concepts that violate the exclusion rule. Thus, such truths are synthetic. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ANGUELOV1972, author = {ANGUELOV, STEFAN}, title = {ETHICS AS A SCIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {207-215}, keywords = {ethics, marxism, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Annas1995, author = {Annas, Julia}, title = {Reply to Cooper}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {599-610}, keywords = {ethics, eudaimonism, happiness}, abstract = {The reply shows that eudaimonist ethical theories need not essentially include claims of a metaphysical sort. Ancient ethical theories debate with one another (as in Cicero) without being trapped in their own larger theories; hence it is legitimate to reconstruct ancient ethical theories from ancient ethical debates.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Annas1995a, author = {Annas, Julia}, title = {Precis of The Morality of Happiness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(4)}, pages = {909-912}, keywords = {ethical-theory; ethics, happiness, morality, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Annas2005, author = {Annas, Julia}, title = {Comments on John Doris's Lack of Character}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {636-642}, keywords = {behavior, character, character-trait; ethics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ANNIS1980, author = {ANNIS, DAVID-B}, title = {MEMORY AND JUSTIFICATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {324-333}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, justification, memory}, abstract = {IN THIS PAPER I DEVELOP AN ANALYSIS OF FACTUAL MEMORY AS THE RETENTION OF KNOWLEDGE AND DISCUSS SOME OF ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AN ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ANTON1974, author = {ANTON, ANATOLE}, title = {COMMODITIES AND EXCHANGE: NOTES FOR AN INTERPRETATION OF MARX.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {34}, pages = {355-385}, keywords = {commodity, economics, exchange, marxism, rule, social-philosophy; value}, abstract = {THE AIM OF THE PAPER IS TO SHOW THAT MAKING THE ASSUMPTION THAT COMMODITIES ARE DEFINED BY CONSTITUTIVE, IF CHANGING, RULES FOR THE PRACTICE OF EXCHANGE IS ILLUMINATING. IT IS ILLUMINATING SINCE IT PROVIDES INSIGHTS INTO MARX'S SAYING THAT HE 'COQUETTED' WITH HEGELIAN TERMINOLOGY; IT FREES MARX FROM SOME CHARGES OF INCONSISTENCY AND OF THE USE OF A PRIORI METAPHYSICS IN SCIENCE; IT HELPS US UNDERSTAND THE RELATION BETWEEN MARX'S METHOD IN "CAPITAL" AND HIS GENERAL EMPHASIS ON HISTORICAL PROCESS; IT HELPS EXPLICATE MARX'S THIRD THESIS ON FEUERBACH, AND, FINALLY, IT SUGGESTS A SHARP CONTRAST BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND MARXIST PHILOSOPHY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ANTON1965, author = {ANTON, JOHN-P}, title = {JOHN DEWEY AND ANCIENT PHILOSOPHIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {477-499}, keywords = {ancient, cognition, context, criticism, dualism, method, problem, relativism, social-philosoph}, abstract = {THREE ASPECTS OF DEWEY'S RELATIONSHIP TO GREEK PHILOSOPHY ARE DISCUSSED: "THE POLEMICAL", WHICH REFERS TO HIS EARLIER REJECTION OF THE CLASSICAL TRADITION AS BEING INCURABLY DUALISTIC; "THE HISTORICO-CRITICAL", WHICH FOCUSES ON HIS CULTURAL RELATIVISM AS THE CONTEXT FOR HIS MORE JUDICIOUS ASSESSMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS; AND "THE CUMULATIVE", WHICH EXAMINES CERTAIN CENTRAL FEATURES DEWEY SHARED WITH PLATO AND ARISTOTLE AND EXTENDED SIGNIFICANTLY. DEWEY'S DEVELOPMENT IN APPROACHING THE GREEKS IS EXAMINED AND HIS OVERSIMPLIFICATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS EXPOSED. DEWEY ACKNOWLEDGED A DEEP AFFINITY TO PLATO WHILE FOR ARISTOTLE HE SHOWED MARKED REPROBATION. THE MAIN REASON FOR DEWEY'S LIMITED INSIGHTS INTO GREEK PHILOSOPHY MUST BE PRIMARILY ATTRIBUTED TO HIS FAILURE TO EXTEND TO HIS HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS THE SAME CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS HE CONSIDERED CENTRAL TO HIS PRAGMATIC METHODOLOGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Antony1997, author = {Antony, Louise-M}, title = {Feeling Fine About the Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {381-387}, keywords = {feeling, feminism, knowledge, mind, social-philosoph}, abstract = {The article presents a critique of John Searle's attack on computationalist theories of mind in his recent book, The Rediscovery of the Mind. Searle is guilty of caricaturing his opponents and of ignoring their arguments. Moreover, his own positive theory of mind, which he claims "takes account of" subjectivity, turns out to offer no discernible advantages over the views he rejects.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AQUILA1989, author = {AQUILA, RICHARD-E}, title = {INTENTIONALITY, CONTENT, AND PRIMITIVE MENTAL DIRECTEDNESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {583-604}, keywords = {content, intentionality, mental-states; metaphysics, quality}, abstract = {A WAY OF LOOKING AT THE OPAQUE INTENTIONALITY OF MENTAL STATES IS PROPOSED. THE PROPOSAL COMBINES A FEATURE OF EACH OF TWO APPROACHES. ONE MAY APPEAL TO THOSE OF A MORE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSUASION, ANALYZING INTENTIONALITY IN TERMS OF DETERMINATE FORMS OF AN IRREDUCIBLE QUALITY OF MENTAL DIRECTEDNESS. THE OTHER REDUCES INTENTIONALITY TO THE IN-PRINCIPLE TRANSLATABILITY OF THE "CONTENTS" OF MENTAL STATES. BOTH APPROACHES MAY ALSO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY MEANS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF NONINTENTIONAL (AND UNTRANSLATABLE) IMPRESSIONS OR "RAW FEELS." THE PROPOSAL AFFORDS A MORE ADEQUATE FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOMMODATING THE ROLE OF BEHAVIORAL, AND OTHER "CONTEXTUAL," MATERIAL IN INTENTION. IN GENERAL, IT PROVIDES FOR A SYNTHESIS OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND AT LEAST BROADLY BEHAVIORISTIC, OR EVEN FUNCTIONALISTIC, INTUITIONS. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AQUILA1977, author = {AQUILA, RICHARD-E}, title = {TWO PROBLEMS OF BEING AND NON-BEING IN SARTRE'S "BEING AND NOTHINGNESS".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {167-186}, keywords = {body, consciousness, factuality, negative-facts; nothingness, person, phenomena, philosophical-anthropolog}, abstract = {SARTRE'S CLAIM THAT "BEING-FOR-ITSELF" IS A KIND OF NON-BEING IS REALLY TWO CLAIMS WHICH DIFFER IN A WAY NOT GENERALLY RECOGNIZED BY COMMENTATORS. THAT THE BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS A KIND OF NON-BEING IS SARTRE'S WAY OF SAYING THAT A STATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS A STATE OF AFFAIRS INVOLVING AN OBJECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND NOTHING ELSE. PUTTING IT THUS MAKES IT CLEARER THAN SARTRE DOES WHAT ONTOLOGICAL ISSUES ARE RAISED BY HIS CLAIM THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS UNIQUE. THE CLAIM THAT THE BEING OF PERSONS IS A KIND OF NON-BEING IS A VERY DIFFERENT SORT OF CLAIM. UNLIKE THE OTHER, IT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE VIEW THAT PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PERSONS, AS DISTINCT FROM CERTAIN PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THOSE PROPOSITIONS, HAVE AN OBJECTIVE TRUTH VALUE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AQUILA1974, author = {AQUILA, RICHARD-E}, title = {BRENTANO, DESCARTES, AND HUME ON AWARENESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {223-239}, keywords = {awareness, epistemology, intentionality}, abstract = {BRENTANO'S CLAIMS ABOUT INTENTIONALITY DO NOT BEAR SOLELY ON A CONCERN WITH THE POSITIVE NATURE OF MENTAL STATES. THEY ALSO HAVE NO BEARING ON THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL/MATERIAL IDENTITY. PART OF THEIR POINT IS JUST TO OPPOSE A CERTAIN VIEW ABOUT THE PROPER OBJECTS OF AWARENESS, NAMELY THAT INSOFAR AS WE ARE AWARE OF OBJECTS THEY HAVE AN EXISTENCE "IN THE MIND." BOTH HUME AND DESCARTES HELD SUCH A VIEW. AN EXAMINATION OF THE NOTIONS OF "IDEA" AND "OBJECTIVE REALITY" SHOWS THE INACCURACY OF REGARDING DESCARTES AS A "REPRESENTATIVE REALIST." WHAT REPRESENTS EXTERNAL NATURES IN THE MIND IS JUST THOSE NATURES THEMSELVES INSOFAR AS THEY EXIST IN THE MIND.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AQVIST1962, author = {AQVIST, LENNART}, title = {SEMANTIC CONCEPTS OF EXPRESSION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {89-100}, keywords = {emotivism, expression, language, meaning, mental-states; persuasive-definition; proposition, semantics, sentence}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARD1983, author = {ARD, DAVID-J}, title = {KNOWING A NAME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {377-388}, keywords = {language, name, proposition}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Arkonovich2001, author = {Arkonovich, Steven}, title = {Defending Desire: Scanlon's Anti-Humeanism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {499-519}, keywords = {desire, ethics, humean, reason}, abstract = {In the opening chapter of What We Owe To Each Other, Tim Scanlon produces a sustained critique of a Humean conception of practical reason. Scanlon claims he will argue that unless having a desire just is to see something as a reason, desires play (almost) no role in the explanation or justification of action. Yet his specific arguments against Humeanism all employ a very austere understanding of desire (which he calls the "standard model"), and attempt to show that desires so understood are not up to any explanatory or justificatory task. Since the standard model represents only one understanding of desire (distinct from the "recognition of reasons") his specific arguments cannot establish his stated general thesis. I show how a more robust conception of desire will leave the Humean account safe from Scanlon's specific arguments.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARMSTRONG1973, author = {ARMSTRONG, A-MAC}, title = {ON METHODOLOGICAL MATERIALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {62-72}, keywords = {historiography, materialism, natural-sciences; science}, abstract = {CONTRASTS THE PRINCIPLES OF HISTORIOGRAPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE, AND CONCLUDES THAT IT IS WAYWARD TO PREDICT THAT THE PHENOMENA OF ALL LIVING ORGANISMS WILL EVENTUALLY BE EXPLAINED SOLELY IN TERMS OF PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY. FOR THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO HISTORY OF NATURAL SCIENCE AND NO SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS, IF THE ASCERTAINMENT OF SCIENTIFIC TRUTH HAD NOT ITSELF BEEN UNDERSTOOD (NOT IN SCIENTIFIC BUT) IN HISTORICAL TERMS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARMSTRONG1963, author = {ARMSTRONG, A-MAC-C}, title = {REPLY TO PROFESSOR ROBINSON'S "MR ARMSTRONG ON PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {437-438}, keywords = {cognition, common-sense; definition, philosophy, scottish}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARMSTRONG1962, author = {ARMSTRONG, A-MAC-C}, title = {PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {354-359}, keywords = {common-sense; error, philosophy, public, relevance, reliability, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Armstrong1993, author = {Armstrong, D-M}, title = {The Identification Problem and the Inference Problem}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {421-422}, keywords = {epistemology, inference, laws, nature, universal}, abstract = {The object is to answer Van Fraassen's criticism, in his "Laws and Symmetry", of the view that laws of nature are relationships of properties. Such a view, Van Fraassen holds, must either fail to make clear what is the law-making relation (the Identity problem) or else fail to tell us about "what happens and what things are like" (the inference problem). The answer proposed begins with the claim that there is direct perception of singular causal connection.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARMSTRONG1970, author = {ARMSTRONG, ROBERT-L}, title = {THE SWITCHES PARADOX.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {421-427}, keywords = {implication, intuition, logic, paradox}, abstract = {"IF YOU CLOSE SWITCH P AND YOU CLOSE SWITCH Q, THEN BELL R WILL RING. THEREFORE, IF YOU CLOSE SWITCH P BELL R WILL RING OR, IF YOU CLOSE SWITCH Q BELL R WILL RING". THIS ARGUMENT IS FORMALLY VALID BUT ORDINARY INTUITION NATURALLY REJECTS IT. IT IS RESOLVED BY OBSERVING THAT THE ORDINARY INTUITION INTERPRETS THE CONCLUSION, (P IMPLIES R) OR (Q IMPLIES R), AS IF IT WERE (P OR Q) IMPLY R. SUGGESTIONS INVOLVING BOTH LANGUAGE USAGE AND FORMAL LOGIC ARE OFFERED FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF THIS PARADOX.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARONOVITCH1979, author = {ARONOVITCH, HILLIARD}, title = {RATIONAL MOTIVATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {173-193}, keywords = {action, justification, metaphysics, motivation, reasons}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Arpaly2005, author = {Arpaly, Nomy}, title = {Comments on Lack of Character by John Doris}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {643-647}, keywords = {behavior, character, empiricism, ethics, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARTHADEVA1961, author = {ARTHADEVA, B-M}, title = {NAIVE REALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF COLOR-SEEING IN DIM LIGHT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {467-478}, keywords = {change, color, epistemology, light, object, perception, realism, seeing}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ASENJO1966, author = {ASENJO, F-G}, title = {ONE AND MANY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {361-370}, keywords = {composition, division, many, metaphysics, one, ontology, part, reality, whole, world}, abstract = {AMONG THE CATEGORIES THAT ARISTOTLE EMPLOYED, EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY, FEW HAVE UNDERGONE LESS CRITICAL ANALYSIS THAN "ONE" AND "MANY." THIS ARTICLE REVERSES THE ATOMISTIC CONCEPTION THAT "MANY" IS A MULTIPLICITY OF "ONES" AND INSTEAD TAKES THE POSITION THAT ONTOGENETICALLY DIVISION OCCURS PRIOR TO COMPOSITION. FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW, ONE AND MANY ARE DEFINED AS CHARACTERISTICS OF REALITY THAT APPEAR WHEN LARGE CONGLOMERATES ARE BEING DIVIDED INTO DISTINGUISHABLE PARTS. THIS DEFINITION IS FOLLOWED BY DESCRIPTIONS OF POSSIBLE WORLDS THAT CAN BE BUILT ON THE BASIS OF THE VARIOUS HIERARCHIC INTERRELATIONS WITH WHICH ONE AND MANY CAN BE INTERPRETED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ATHERTON1983, author = {ATHERTON, MARGARET}, title = {THE COHERENCE OF BERKELEY'S THEORY OF MIND.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {389-400}, keywords = {metaphysics, mind, spiritual-substanc}, abstract = {BERKELEY HAS BEEN NOTORIOUSLY CHARGED WITH INCONSISTENCY BECAUSE HE HELD THAT SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE EXISTS, ALTHOUGH HE ARGUED AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCE. BERKELEY IS ONLY INCONSISTENT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT HIS ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE PARALLELS THE REJECTED ARGUMENT FOR MATERIAL SUBSTANCE. I SHOW THAT BERKELEY IS RELYING ON QUITE A DIFFERENT ARGUMENT, ONE PERFECTLY CONSISTENT WITH HIS THEORY OF IDEAS, BASED ON PRESUPPOSITIONS THE GERMS OF WHICH CAN BE FOUND IN THE THOUGHT OF HIS PREDECESSORS IN THE THEORY OF IDEAS, DESCARTES AND LOCKE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Atherton2003, author = {Atherton, Margaret}, title = {How Berkeley Can Maintain That Snow Is White}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {101-113}, keywords = {color, epistemology, experience, mind}, abstract = {This paper develops an alternative reading of the First Dialogue arguments, in which their project is not to establish the mind-dependence of colors but instead to undermine the position that colors are also mind-independent. Under these circumstances, the coherence of the First and the Third Dialogue arguments is assured, just so long as the Third Dialogue claim to have established that snow is really white is not taken to mean that snow is mind-independently white, but instead, something like that our experiences of snow are stably and regularly white. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ATWELL1966, author = {ATWELL, JOHN-E}, title = {AUSTIN ON INCORRIGIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {261-266}, keywords = {epistemology, incorrigibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AUDI1988, author = {AUDI, ROBERT}, title = {JUSTIFICATION, TRUTH, AND RELIABILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {1-29}, keywords = {epistemology, justification, reliability, truth}, abstract = {THIS PAPER DEVELOPS AN ACCOUNT OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION--TELEOLOGICAL NORMATIVISM--WHICH IS INTERNALIST BUT NOT DEONTOLOGICAL, AND TELEOLOGICAL BUT NOT RELIABILIST. THE ACCOUNT ATTEMPTS TO DO JUSTICE TO BOTH THE NORMATIVE CHARACTER OF JUSTIFICATION AND ITS CONNECTION WITH TRUTH. SPECIAL EMPHASIS IS GIVEN TO DISTINGUISHING THE PROPERTY FROM THE PROCESS OF JUSTIFICATION AND TO EXPLAINING THEIR MUTUAL INTEGRATION. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Audi2003, author = {Audi, Robert}, title = {Precis of The Architecture of Reason}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {177-180}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, person, practical-reason; rationality}, abstract = {This book constructs a comprehensive theory of rationality. Part I addresses theoretical rationality, roughly the territory of epistemology. Part II concerns practical rationality, roughly the territory of rational action, rational desire, and moral conduct. The third, final part addresses global rationality, the overall rationality of persons. Throughout, the role of experience is central: theoretical reason represents, in good part, our cognitive responses to experience, and it yields our map of the world. Practical reason represents, in good part, our conative responses to experience, and, in the light of our beliefs, it yields a kind of itinerary for our lives. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Audi2003a, author = {Audi, Robert}, title = {Experience and Inference in the Grounding of Theoretical and Practical Reasons: Replies to Professors Fumerton, Marras, and Sinnott-Armstrong}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {202-221}, keywords = {epistemology, experience, inference, rationality, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Audi1996, author = {Audi, Robert}, title = {Objectivity and the Internal-External Reasons Controversy: A Study of Paul K. Moser's Philosophy after Objectivity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {395-400}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, objectivity, reason}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Audi1993, author = {Audi, Robert}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {968-970}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Structure of Justification}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1993} } @other{Audi1996a, author = {Audi, Robert and Wolterstorff, Nicholas}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {486-489}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate}, volume = {60(2)}, year = {1996} } @article{Aune1996, author = {Aune, Bruce}, title = {Haack's Evidence and Inquiry}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {627-632}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, evidence, inquiry}, abstract = {The essay is a critical comment on Susan Haack's Evidence and Inquiry; it attempts to show that in this work she does not fully come to terms with a basic problem faced squarely, though not successfully, by the alternative views that she rejects--namely, foundationalism and coherentism. The problem is how epistemically justified empirical propositions can reasonably be supposed to be true, approximately true, or probable. Haack uses two basic arguments to show that foundationalism and coherentism cannot solve this problem; it is argued that the view she favors, foundherentism, does not elude the force, evidently, of these same arguments.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AUNE1963, author = {AUNE, BRUCE}, title = {ABILITIES, MODALITIES, AND FREE WILL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {397-413}, keywords = {ability, action, can, coercion, could-have; determinism, free-will; metaphysics, modality}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE IS TO ESTABLISH THAT "COULD HAVE" STATEMENTS, THOUGH IN NO WAY EQUIVALENT TO A SET OF HYPOTHETICALS, ARE STILL SUFFICIENTLY IFFY TO VINDICATE MOORE'S ANALYSIS OF THE FREE-WILL PROBLEM. THE ARTICLE EXAMINES THE DIFFERENT SENSES OF "COULD," AND CONCLUDES THAT THE "ABILITY" SENSE IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE. THE MOOREAN SOLUTION IS ELABORATED, IN ORDER TO SAVE FREE-WILL IN THE FACE OF DETERMINISM. PEOPLE COULD HAVE DONE OTHER THAN WHAT THEY DID--EVEN THOUGH THE ACTIONS THEY ACTUALLY PERFORMED HAD CAUSAL ANTECEDENTS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AUSTIN1978, author = {AUSTIN, JAMES-W}, title = {RUSSELL'S CRYPTIC RESPONSE TO STRAWSON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {531-537}, keywords = {denoting, description, egocentrism, epistemology, extensionality, particulars, referring, sentence}, abstract = {IN A HASTILY WRITTEN PAPER, "MR. STRAWSON ON REFERRING," BERTRAND RUSSELL DEFENDED HIS THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS FROM THE CRITICISM LEVELED AT IT IN STRAWSON'S "ON REFERRING." RUSSELL'S DEFENSE, HOWEVER, RAMBLES AND APPEARS CURT IN PLACES AND GENERALLY CRYPTIC. CONSEQUENTLY, LITTLE ATTENTION IS PAID TO IT NOWADAYS. I TRY TO SHOW THAT IT DOES CONTAIN A COHERENT THOUGH SKELETAL REBUTTAL. IN SPITE OF THIS FACT, IT MUST BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE THEORY IS VULNERABLE FROM ANOTHER FLANK, VIZ., FROM ITS ORIGINS IN THE THEORY OF PROPER NAMES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AUSTIN1980, author = {AUSTIN, JAMES}, title = {WITTGENSTEIN'S SOLUTIONS TO THE COLOR EXCLUSION PROBLEM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {142-149}, keywords = {color, language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AVERILL1978, author = {AVERILL, EDWARD}, title = {EXPLAINING THE PRIVACY OF AFTERIMAGES AND PAINS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {299-314}, keywords = {after-image; epistemology, object, pain, perception, public, reflection}, abstract = {AN AFTER-IMAGE IS (1) AN EXPERIENCE OF A COLOR SPOT THAT IS CAUSED A CERTAIN WAY AND (2) THE COLOR SPOT IS PRIVATE. CONDITION (1) DOES NOT IMPLY CONDITION (2). IF THE RIGHT CONCEPT WERE INTRODUCED INTO OUR LANGUAGE, EXPERIENCE THAT MEETS CONDITION ONE WOULD BE CONCEIVED OF AS A PERCEPTION OF A PUBLIC OBJECT. SUCH A CONCEPT IS FULLY DEVELOPED. THUS THE PRIVACY ASSOCIATED WITH AFTER-IMAGES IS DUE TO THE HISTORICAL REASONS THAT LED TO THE ADOPTION OF ONE CONCEPT RATHER THAN ANOTHER. A PARALLEL EXPLANATION IS GIVEN FOR THE PRIVACY OF PAIN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AVERILL1982, author = {AVERILL, EDWARD}, title = {ESSENCE AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY IN KRIPKE AND PUTNAM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {253-258}, keywords = {discovery, science}, abstract = {THE CLAIM THAT IF GOLD HAS THE ATOMIC NUMBER 79 THEN GOLD NECESSARILY HAS THE ATOMIC NUMBER 79 IS SHOWN TO BE FALSE. THE KRIPKE-PUTNAM ARGUMENT FOR THIS CLAIM IS REWORKED TO SHOW THIS: IF A PROPERTY OF GOLD (LIKE ATOMIC NUMBER) PLAYS A BASIC ROLE IN A THEORY OF SUBSTANCE, THAT IS BOTH TRUE AND THE BEST MOST COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF SUBSTANCE POSSIBLE, THEN GOLD NECESSARILY HAS THIS PROPERTY. 'BASIC ROLE' IS EXPLAINED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AXINN1964, author = {AXINN, SIDNEY}, title = {AND YET: A KANTIAN ANALYSIS OF AESTHETIC INTEREST.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {108-116}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, contradiction, human-nature; intention, interest, poetry}, abstract = {SUPPOSE THAT, IN ADDITION TO HAVING CONTRADICTORY INTENTIONS AS THEIR ESSENTIAL NATURE, HUMANS KNOW THEMSELVES TO HAVE CONTRADICTORY INTENTIONS. THE SPECTACLE THAT SUCH INDIVIDUALS PRESENT TO THEMSELVES IS THAT OF AN ENTITY THAT TRIES TO MOVE IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS, "AND YET" HAS COHERENCE. FOR KANT, INDIVIDUALS ARE CONTINUALLY TORN BETWEEN THEIR PERSONAL INTEREST IN PLEASURE AND THEIR HUMAN INTEREST IN MANKIND'S RATIONAL PROGRESS. THIS IS THE ONE-MANY PREDICAMENT THAT ART WORKS OBJECTIFY. THE "NATURE" THAT ART IMITATES IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NATURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL. BY GENERALIZING ON THIS FRAMEWORK WE FIND A BASIS FOR THE AESTHETIC INTEREST OF DEVICES SUCH AS "CONTRAPPOSTO", RHYTHM, ALLITERATION, A PLAY WITHIN A PLAY, ETC. THE AESTHETIC MOMENT IS ASSUMED TO BE THE MOMENT IN WHICH ONE BOTH WANTS SOMETHING TO CONTINUE BECAUSE IT GIVES PLEASURE "AND YET" FEELS THAT IT MUST NOT CONTINUE BECAUSE IT IS IRRATIONAL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Aydede2000, author = {Aydede, Murat}, title = {An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Pain}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(3)}, pages = {537-570}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, pain, pleasure}, abstract = {After distinguishing between affective and sensory (informational) components of these experiences, I argue that although pain experiences normally consist of both components proper to them, pleasure, in contradistinction to pain, is only the affective component of a total experience that may involve many sensations proper and cognitions. Moreover, I hold that although the so-called "physical" pleasure is itself not a sensation proper, it is nevertheless an episodic affective reaction (in a primitive sense) to sensations proper. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baber1992, author = {Baber, Harriet-E}, title = {Almost Indiscernible Twins}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {365-382}, keywords = {epistemology, extrinsic, intrinsic, object, temporality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BACH1981, author = {BACH, KENT}, title = {AN ANALYSIS OF SELF-DECEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {351-370}, keywords = {epistemology, rationalization, self-deceptio}, abstract = {PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD, SELF-DECEPTION IS NOT PARADOXICAL. IT DOES NOT INVOLVE EXPLICITLY CONTRADICTORY BELIEFS, INCOHERENT INTENTIONS, OR MULTIPLE SELVES. DISTINGUISH (OCCURRENTLY) THINKING THAT "P" FROM BOTH BELIEVING THAT "P" AND FROM ENTERTAINING THAT "P". THEN DEFINE SELF-DECEPTION AS MOTIVATED (THOUGH NOT INTENTIONAL) AVOIDANCE OF SUSTAINED OR RECURRENT THOUGHT THAT "P" (DESPITE ONE'S BELIEF). THERE ARE THREE WAYS OF DOING IT: "EVASION, JAMMING", AND "RATIONALIZATION", WHICH INVOLVE, RESPECTIVELY, AVOIDING THE NASTY THOUGHT, COVERING IT UP, AND EXPLAINING IT AWAY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BACH1985, author = {BACH, KENT}, title = {MORE ON SELF-DECEPTION: REPLY TO HELLMAN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {611-614}, keywords = {believing, philosophy, self-deceptio}, abstract = {THIS IS A REPLY TO NATHAN HELLMAN'S TWO OBJECTIONS, IN "BACH ON SELF-DECEPTION" (PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 44, SEPTEMBER, 1983), TO "AN ANALYSIS OF SELF-DECEPTION" (PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 41, MARCH, 1981). FOR ME SELF-DECEPTION IS NOT A MATTER OF GETTING ONESELF TO BELIEVE THE OPPOSITE OF A PROPOSITION "P" ONE BELIEVES (OR HAS PATENTLY STRONG EVIDENCE FOR) BUT IS SOMETHING WEAKER THAN THAT: AVOIDING THE THOUGHT THAT "P", AT LEAST ON A SUSTAINED OR RECURRENT BASIS. HELLMAN FINDS IT "PUZZLING THAT ONE COULD THINK THAT NOT-"P" ON A SUSTAINED, RECURRENT BASIS" IF ONE POSSESSED CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE FOR "P". HIS PUZZLE SUFFERS FROM A MISPLACED "NOT": MY ANALYSIS REQUIRES NOT THAT THE SELF-DECEIVER THINK THAT NOT-"P" BUT THAT HE NOT THINK THAT "P" ON A SUSTAINED, RECURRENT BASIS. HELLMAN'S SECOND OBJECTION IS ALSO ANSWERED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BACH1977, author = {BACH, KENT}, title = {WHEN TO ASK, "WHAT IF EVERYONE DID THAT".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {464-481}, keywords = {categorical-imperative; deliberation, ethics, morality, obligation, utilitarianism}, abstract = {WHEN IS IT MORALLY RELEVANT TO ASK THE "EVERYONE ELSE QUESTION" (EEQ) ABOUT A CONTEMPLATED ACTION? NOT IN PRIVATE DELIBERATION, EVEN ABOUT A "CUMULATIVE ACTION." A SOCIAL RULE REQUIRING PEOPLE TO ASK THE EEQ IS JUSTIFIED ONLY IF (1) GENERAL BUT NOT UNIVERSAL PERFORMANCE OF THE ACTION IN QUESTION IS SOCIALLY NECESSARY, (2) PEOPLE'S DECISIONS WHETHER TO DO IT ARE INTERDEPENDENT, AND (3) THERE IS "COGNITIVE SYMMETRY." ASKING THE EEQ ACHIEVES NOT JUSTICE BUT COGNITIVE STABILITY IN SOCIAL EFFORTS. EVERYONE'S ASKING IT AVOIDS THE COGNITIVE ONE-UPMANSHIP OF TOO MANY PEOPLE, EACH THINKING ENOUGH OTHERS WILL DO THEIR PART, MAKING EXCEPTIONS OF THEMSELVES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BACHRACH1971, author = {BACHRACH, JAY-E}, title = {TYPE AND TOKEN AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE WORK OF ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {415-420}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, identity, token, type}, abstract = {SOME PHILOSOPHERS FAVOR A TYPE/TOKEN ANALYSIS FOR IDENTIFYING WORKS OF ART. CERTAIN ARGUMENTS SHOW THAT THIS SCHEME IS MISTAKEN. THE GENERAL QUESTION IS RAISED: WHAT SORTS OF THINGS DO TITLES OF WORKS IDENTIFY? SOMETIMES TITLES DO NOT NAME; BUT INSOFAR AS THE STATEMENTS IN WHICH TITLES OCCUR ARE MEANINGFUL, SUITABLE EQUIVALENCES CAN BE FOUND WHICH DO REFER TO PHYSICAL OBJECTS OR EVENTS. ON OTHER OCCASIONS, TITLES OFTEN REFER TO AESTHETIC OBJECTS. STILL AT OTHER TIMES NONAESTHETIC OBJECTS ARE NAMED. THE LOCATION OF THE WORK OF ART IS THUS DETERMINED BY THE USE OF THE TITLE. IN THE CASE IN WHICH THE TITLE IS NONREFERRING IT IS ERRONEOUS TO SEEK THE AESTHETIC OBJECT. IN THE CASE OF THE TITLE REFERRING TO A PARTICULAR AESTHETIC OBJECT OR EVENT THE WORK CAN BE READILY LOCATED. THE THIRD USE OF THE TITLE AS REFERRING TO NONAESTHETIC OBJECTS IS, OF COURSE, NOT DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO THE QUESTION OF THE LOCATION OF THE WORK.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BADHWAR1987, author = {BADHWAR, NEERA-KAPUR}, title = {FRIENDS AS ENDS IN THEMSELVES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {1-23}, keywords = {ethics, friendship, love}, abstract = {IN END FRIENDSHIPS, FRIENDS LOVE EACH OTHER INTRINSICALLY, NOT INSTRUMENTALLY, AND AS A SOURCE OF PLEASURE, THUS AS A GOOD TO THEMSELVES. BUT IT IS COMMONLY THOUGHT THAT END LOVE IS "UNCONDITIONAL", SELF-BENEFICIAL LOVE "INSTRUMENTAL", AND FRIENDSHIP THEREFORE BOTH UNCONDITIONAL AND INSTRUMENTAL. THIS VIEW, HOWEVER, CONTRADICTS THE IDEA THAT IN END FRIENDSHIP, THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS UNIQUE AND IRREPLACEABLE. IF SOMEONE LOVES YOU UNCONDITIONALLY, HE LOVES YOU REGARDLESS OF YOUR QUALITIES; IF INSTRUMENTALLY, THEN AS REPLACEABLE BY ANYONE WITH YOUR USEFUL QUALITIES. IN NEITHER CASE DOES HE LOVE THE UNIQUE INDIVIDUAL THAT IS "YOU". THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT END LOVE, AND THE PLEASURE THAT PARTLY DEFINES IT, IS CONDITIONAL ON THE FUNDAMENTAL QUALITIES THAT MAKE THE FRIEND THAT PARTICULAR, IRREPLACEABLE PERSON, NOT ON THE FRIEND FULFILLING ONE'S INDEPENDENTLY DEFINED GOALS. THIS ANALYSIS OPENS THE LOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF JUSTIFYING MORALITY AS BOTH AN END IN ITSELF AND A GOOD TO ONESELF.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAHM1961, author = {BAHM, ARCHIE-J}, title = {POLARITY: A DESCRIPTIVE HYPOTHESIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {347-360}, keywords = {category, complementarity, metaphysics, opposition, polarity, tension}, abstract = {IT IS ASKED, WHAT IS POLARITY? BAHM STATES THAT THE CONCEPT INVOLVES AT LEAST THREE CATEGORIES--OPPOSITENESS, COMPLEMENTARITY, AND TENSION. HIS HYPOTHESIS IS THAT ANY TWO CATEGORIES ESSENTIAL TO THE NATURE OF POLARITY MUTUALLY INVOLVE EACH OTHER. OPPOSITENESS HAS TWO POSITIVES, EACH OF WHICH IS OPPOSED TO THE OTHER. COMPLEMENTARITY PRESUPPOSES OPPOSITENESS, AND HAS: SUPPLEMENTARITY, INTERDEPENDENCE, DIMENSION, RECIPROCITY. TENSION IS A STRETCHING OF ANYTHING DUE TO TWO OR MORE DIVERGENT TENDENCIES. HENCE, POLARITY CATEGORICALLY INVOLVES OPPOSITENESS, COMPLEMENTARITY, AND TENSION. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAHM1961a, author = {BAHM, ARCHIE-J}, title = {MEANINGS OF NEGATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {179-184}, keywords = {metaphysics, negation, organicism, relation, theory, type}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAIER1991, author = {BAIER, Annette-C}, title = {MacIntyre on Hume.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {ethics, judgment}, abstract = {MacIntyre's treatment of Hume's ethics, in Whose Justice, Which Rationality? is praised for its rich textual basis, and criticised for its over-emphasis on Hume's endorsement of early capitalist forms of life, what MacIntyre calls his "anglicising subversion" of Scottish culture. Hume was cosmopolitan more than "anglophile," as were many other Scots in the eighteenth century.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAIER1980, author = {BAIER, ANNETTE}, title = {HELPING HUME TO "COMPLEAT THE UNION".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {167-186}, keywords = {associationism, family-resemblance; modern, thought}, abstract = {HUME'S KEY EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONCEPTS, THOSE OF "VIVACIOUS" PERCEPTIONS, DERIVATIVE LESS LIVELY IDEAS, OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN IDEAS, ARE RELATED TO HIS VIEWS ABOUT LIVING PERSONS AND THEIR OFFSPRING, AND THE FORMS OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PERSONS. THE PRIMACY IN HUME'S THOUGHT OF THE NATURAL FAMILY, AND OF ASSOCIATION IN THE FAMILY, IS EXPLORED AND DEVELOPED, AND THE EXTENSION OF ASSOCIATION BEYOND THE FAMILY, BY SOCIAL ARTIFICES, IS RELATED TO THE FICTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING, WHICH EXTEND THE COMBINATORIAL POTENTIAL OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. TO DERIVE MENTAL ASSOCIATION FROM SOCIAL ASSOCIATION IS BOTH TO INTERCONNECT THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL ASSOCIATION, COMPLETE THEIR UNION, AND ALSO TO COMPLETE THE MASTERY OF REASON BY THE SOCIAL PASSIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baier2001, author = {Baier, Kurt-E}, title = {Justified Morality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {427-433}, keywords = {ethics, justification, morality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAILIFF1964, author = {BAILIFF, JOHN-D}, title = {SOME COMMENTS ON THE 'IDEAL OBSERVER'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {423-428}, keywords = {disinterestedness, ethics, ideal-observer; language, meaning, objectivity}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS NOT TO EXAMINE THE CONCEPT OF THE IDEAL OBSERVER AS TO ITS QUALIFICATIONS AS AN ETHICAL THEORY, BUT TO EXPOSE THE IMPLICATIONS IT HAS FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF RATIONALITY IN ETHICAL DISCOURSE. THE "IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY" IS REALLY NOT VALUE-FREE, ACCORDING TO THE AUTHOR. THE MEANING OF SUCH AN OBSERVER IS FULLY EXPLORED, IN TERMS OF BEING "IMPARTIAL," "FULLY INFORMED," "IDEALLY RATIONAL," ETC., AND RATIONALITY IS FINALLY NOTED TO BE NOT A PERFECT UNIFORMITY OF ATTITUDES AMONG IDEAL OBSERVERS BUT THE FREEDOM AND WILLINGNESS TO ASK FOR REASONS, TO ARGUE. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baker2002, author = {Baker, Lynne-Rudder}, title = {The Ontological Status of Persons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {370-388}, keywords = {metaphysics, ontology, person, status}, abstract = {Things of kind K have ontological significance if their persistence conditions are determined by their being members of K. On Chisholm's view, persons have ontological significance, but animals do not. On animalism, animals have ontological significance, but persons do not. After explaining the notion of ontological significance, this article argues that persons do have ontological significance and, hence, that animalism is not true. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baker2002a, author = {Baker, Lynne-Rudder}, title = {Brief Reply to Rosenkrantz's Comments on My "The Ontological Status of Persons"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {394-396}, keywords = {knowledge, metaphysics, ontology, person}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baker2002b, author = {Baker, Lynne-Rudder}, title = {Precis of Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {592-598}, keywords = {body, constitution, human, metaphysics, person}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baker2002c, author = {Baker, Lynne-Rudder}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {623-635}, keywords = {constitution, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baker1999, author = {Baker, Lynne-Rudder}, title = {What Am I?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {151-159}, keywords = {biology, embryo, person, personal-identity; science}, abstract = {Eric T. Olson has argued that any view of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity has a consequence that he considers untenable--namely, that he was never an early-term fetus. I have several replies. First, the psychological-continuity view of personal identity does not entail the putative consequence; the appearance to the contrary depends on not distinguishing between de re and de dicto theses. Second, the putative consequence is not untenable anyway; the appearance to the contrary depends on not taking seriously an idea that underlies a plausible view of persons that I call 'the Constitution View." Finally, Olson's own "Biological View of personal identity" has liabilities of its own.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bakhurst2005, author = {Bakhurst, David}, title = {Wiggins on Persons and Human Nature}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {462-469}, keywords = {human-nature; interpretation, metaphysics, person, social-constructionis}, abstract = {This paper examines the evolution of David Wiggins's view that persons are human animals. Wiggins maintains that person is "akin to" a natural kind concept. Yet he holds that the states and capacities constitutive of personhood are not explicable in natural-scientific terms. His view thus requires a way of acknowledging the intimate connection between our rationality and our animality. I argue that his position would be strengthened by embracing the idea that personhood is acquired as an aspect of our "second nature". If such a view is developed along lines suggested by McDowell and Vygotsky -- rather the social constructionism Wiggins's distains -- the resulting position harmonizes with Wiggins's broadly Aristotelian perspective and intensifies connections between the moral and metaphysical dimensions of his thought.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Balaguer1998, author = {Balaguer, Mark}, title = {Attitudes without Propositions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {805-826}, keywords = {attitude, belief, epistemology, proposition, semantics}, abstract = {This paper develops a novel version of anti-Platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the Platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing 'that'-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the for 'x believes that p' and 'delta means that p'. Briefly, the view is that (a) Platonists are right that 'that'-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions and, hence, (c) 'that'-clause-containing sentences of the above sort are not true--they are useful fiction. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Balaguer1998a, author = {Balaguer, Mark}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {239-242}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics}, volume = {63(1)}, year = {1998} } @article{BALL1991, author = {BALL, Stephen-W}, title = {Linguistic Intuitions and Varieties of Ethical Naturalism.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {ethical-naturalism; ethics, intuition, linguistics}, abstract = {The purpose of this essay is to develop, and defend, a linguistic argument against various forms of ethical naturalism. Contrary to both standard criticisms, the pre-philosophic linguistic intuitions of native speakers can provide helpful evidence against ethical naturalism. Variations on objections are considered, with emphasis on the current emotivist use of the argument. The essay concludes with an analysis of the application and limitations of the argument, as related to other, nonsemantic forms of naturalism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Balog2001, author = {Balog, Katalin}, title = {Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {645-652}, keywords = {conceptual-analysis; epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, physicalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bar-On1993, author = {Bar-On, Dorit}, title = {Indeterminacy of Translation -- Theory and Practice}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {781-810}, keywords = {eliminativism, indeterminacy, language, translation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bar-On2001, author = {Bar-On, Dorit and Long, Douglas-C}, title = {Avowals and First-Person Privilege}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {311-335}, keywords = {avowals, epistemology, first-person; knowledge, language, privilege, truth}, abstract = {When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called "first-person privilege." According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a sociolinguistic convention governing avowals. We reject both approaches. On our proposed account, a full explanation of the privilege must recognize avowals as expressive performances, which can be taken to reveal directly the subject's present mental condition. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BARBER1971, author = {BARBER, KENNETH}, title = {PART II: MEINONG'S ANALYSIS OF RELATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {564-584}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, relation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BARBER1970, author = {BARBER, KENNETH}, title = {MEINONG'S HUME STUDIES PART I: MEINONG'S NOMINALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {550-567}, keywords = {metaphysics, nominalism, realism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Barnes1997, author = {Barnes, Annette}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {242-245}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Seeing through Self-Deception}, volume = {63(1)}, year = {1997} } @article{BARNETTE1978, author = {BARNETTE, R-L}, title = {GROUNDING THE MENTAL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {39}, pages = {92-105}, keywords = {belief, identity-theory; individual, mentalism, metaphysics, physicalism}, abstract = {I EXAMINE CRITICALLY A RULE THAT IS TACITLY INVOKED BY NEARLY ALL PROPONENTS OF PHYSICALISM, WHICH I CALL THE RULE OF "GROUNDING THE MENTAL" (GM). AFTER FIRST CLARIFYING THE RULE, I THEN SHOW PRECISELY HOW STANDARD VERSIONS OF THE IDENTITY THESIS UNCRITICALLY ACCEPT IT (SPECIFICALLY, ARMSTRONG'S CENTRAL STATE MATERIALISM AND PUTNAM'S FUNCTIONALISM), AND SHOW HOW THESE POSITIONS ARE AFFECTED BY SERIOUS LOGICAL DIFFICULTIES. NEXT, I ARGUE THAT THE RULE SHOULD BE ABANDONED AND ALSO SHOW THAT THIS POSITION SHOULD NOT BOTHER A PHYSICALIST, FOR ADHERENCE TO THE GM RULE IS NOT A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR PHYSICALISM. I GO ON TO DEVELOP A DIRECTION FOR A PHYSICALISTIC THEORY WHICH DOES NOT ACCEPT GM, ONE WHICH IS HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY WORK IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND SYSTEMS-THEORY. I CONCLUDE WITH A LIST OF EIGHT AXIOMS WHICH WOULD BE HELPFUL IN ARTICULATING A FORMAL SEMANTICS FOR THE THEORY I OUTLINE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Baron1997, author = {Baron, Marcia-W and Pettit, Philip and Slote, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {721-723}, publisher = {Blackwell}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Three Methods of Ethics}, volume = {62(3)}, year = {1997} } @article{Barrett1999, author = {Barrett, Martin and Eells, Ellery and Fitelson, Branden (and-others)}, title = {Models and Reality--A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {237-241}, keywords = {epistemology, game-theory; model, reality, social-contrac}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Barrett2002, author = {Barrett, Matthew and Godfrey-Smith, Peter}, title = {Group Selection, Pluralism, and the Evolution of Altruism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {685-691}, keywords = {altruism, ethics, evolution, group, pluralism}, abstract = {Sober and Wilson have done evolutionary biologists and philosophers of biology a great service in writing this book. They vigorously defend a "multilevel" view of natural selection, in which group selection can play a significant role, and argue that group selection was involved in the evolution of altruistic behavior in humans. The book is entirely persuasive in its argument that attempts to marginalize group-selectionist ideas in the latter part of the 20th century were mistaken. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BARTKY1970, author = {BARTKY, S-L}, title = {ORIGINATIVE THINKING IN THE LATER PHILOSOPHY OF HEIDEGGER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {368-381}, keywords = {being, historicism, naming, nihilism, thinking}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BARTKY1979, author = {BARTKY, SANDRA-LEE}, title = {HEIDEGGER AND THE MODES OF WORLD-DISCLOSURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {212-236}, keywords = {being, disclosure, language, metaphysics, thinking, world}, abstract = {FOR THE LATER HEIDEGGER, THE BEING-EVENT TAKES TWO FORMS: THE "HORIZONTAL" BEING-EVENT REFERS TO THE WAY IN WHICH BEING HAS GIVEN BIRTH TO THE EPOCHS OF METAPHYSICS, WHILE WHAT I CALL THE "VERTICAL" BEING-EVENT REFERS TO THE MODES OF WORLD-DISCLOSURE "WITHIN" ANY EPOCH. FIVE MODES OF WORLD-DISCLOSURE MENTIONED IN A KEY CITATION FROM "HOLZWEGE" ARE SCRUTINIZED. I CONCLUDE THAT THE FIVE MODES COLLAPSE TO ONLY TWO, DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH FROM ONE ANOTHER AND THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A VERTICAL BEING-EVENT AS A WHOLE IS BEST BY A VARIETY OF CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES HAVING TO DO WITH THE "UNITY" OF THE MODES OF DISCLOSURE AND THE "CRITERIA" BY WHICH WE DISTINGUISH WHAT IS DISCLOSIVE FROM WHAT IS NOT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAUMER1964, author = {BAUMER, WILLIAM-H}, title = {EVIDENCE AND IDEAL EVIDENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {567-572}, keywords = {confirmation, epistemology, evidence, ideal, paradox, probability}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR NOTES THAT VINCENT'S REFUTATION OF POPPER'S CRITICISM OF A SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY FAILS. THERE IS A PARADOX OF IDEAL EVIDENCE; HOWEVER, THE SOURCE OF THIS PARADOX DISAPPEARS WHEN A CERTAIN RELATIONSHIP IS MADE CLEAR. THE FOLLOWING IS PRESENTED: IDEAL EVIDENCE MUST BE TAKEN AS SUPPORTING AN EMPIRICAL STATEMENT (NOT SOME LOGICAL TRUTH). "A, RELATIVE TO SOME EMPIRICAL STATEMENT IS PROBABLE TO THE DEGREE 1/2." (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAUMER1967, author = {BAUMER, WILLIAM-H}, title = {THE ONE SYSTEMATICALLY AMBIGUOUS CONCEPT OF PROBABILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {264-268}, keywords = {logic, probability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAXTER1991, author = {BAXTER, Donald-L-M}, title = {Berkeley, Perception, and Identity.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {identity, metaphysics, perception}, abstract = {Berkeley says both that one 'sometimes' immediately perceives the same thing by sight and touch, and that one 'never' does. To solve the contradiction I recommend and explain a distinction Berkeley himself makes-between two uses of 'same'. This solution unifies two seemingly inconsistent parts of Berkeley's whole project: He argues both that what we see are bits of light and color organized into a language by which God speaks to us about tactile sensations, and yet that we directly see ordinary objects. My solution explains how these can come to the same thing.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baxter1997, author = {Baxter, Donald-L-M}, title = {Abstraction, Inseparability, and Identity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {307-330}, keywords = {abstraction, epistemology, identity}, abstract = {Berkeley and Hume object to Locke's account of abstraction. Abstraction is separating in the mind what cannot be separated in reality. Their objection is that if a is inseparable in reality from b, then the idea of a is inseparable from the idea of b. The former inseparability is the reason for the latter. In most interpretations, however, commentators leave the former unexplained in explaining the latter. This article assumes that Berkeley and Hume present a unified from against Locke. Hume supplements Berkeley's argument just where there are gaps. In particular, Hume makes explicit something Berkeley leaves implicit: The argument against Locke depends on the principle that things are inseparable if and only if they are identical. Abstraction is thinking of one of an inseparable pair while not thinking of the other. But doing so entails thinking of something while not thinking of it. This is the fundamental objection.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baxter2005, author = {Baxter, Donald-L-M}, title = {Altruism, Grief, and Identity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {371-383}, keywords = {altruism, grief, identity, metaphysics}, abstract = {The divide between oneself and others has made altruism seem irrational to some thinkers, as Sidgwick points out. I use characterizations of grief, especially by St. Augustine, to question the divide, and use a composition-as-identity metaphysics of parts and wholes to make literal sense of those characterizations.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAYLIS1963, author = {BAYLIS, CHARLES-A}, title = {A CRITICISM OF LOVEJOY'S CASE FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL DUALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {527-537}, keywords = {critical-realism; dualism, epistemology, memory, monism, object, perception, sense-dat}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bayne2001, author = {Bayne, Tim}, title = {Chalmers on Justification of Phenomenal Judgments}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {407-419}, keywords = {consciousness, judgment, metaphysics, mind, phenomenology}, abstract = {We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind (TCM), David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully-justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PJs are justified, because it alone can underwrite the certainty of our phenomenal judgments. I argue that Chalmers is unable to sustain this claim.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEARD1966, author = {BEARD, ROBERT-W}, title = {ON PROFESSOR WHITE'S PUZZLE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {107-109}, keywords = {identicals, intensional-logic; logic, name, paradox, substitutivity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEARDSLEY1960, author = {BEARDSLEY, ELIZABETH-L}, title = {DETERMINISM AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {1-20}, keywords = {blame, determinism, equality, ethics, moral-judgment; praise, responsibility, worth}, abstract = {THE QUESTION IS POSED: CAN DETERMINISTS FIND A SATISFACTORY RATIONALE FOR MORAL PRAISE AND BLAME? THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT JUDGMENTS OF MORAL PRAISE AND BLAME, AFFIRMATIVE AS WELL AS NEGATIVE, CAN BE MADE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF DETERMINISM, PROVIDED THAT ONE ACCEPTS A MORE COMPLEX ACCOUNT OF THESE JUDGMENTS AND THEIR FOUNDATIONS THAN IS ORDINARILY SUPPLIED OR ASSUMED. SUCH JUDGMENTS ARE MADE FROM SEVERAL DIFFERENT STANDPOINTS, CALLED "MORAL PERSPECTIVES," AND IF THESE ARE UNDERSTOOD, DETERMINISTS NEED NOT FEEL UNEASY WHEN CONFRONTED BY THE CONCEPTS OF MORAL PRAISE AND BLAME. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEARDSLEY1970, author = {BEARDSLEY, ELIZABETH-LANE}, title = {MORAL DISAPPROVAL AND MORAL INDIGNATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {161-176}, keywords = {blame, ethics, illocutionary-act; indignation, moral}, abstract = {THE ILLOCUTIONARY ACT OF BLAMING---IN THE "BEHABITIVE" MODE DISTINGUISHED BY J L AUSTIN FROM THE "VERDICTIVE" AND "EXERCITIVE" MODES---IS BEST ANALYZED AS EXPRESSING MORAL DISAPPROVAL (ON WHICH MORAL INDIGNATION IS BASED). AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIVE CONDITIONS OF BEHABITIVE BLAMING REVEALS THAT VERDICTIVE BLAMING IS PRESUPPOSED BY IT, AND THEREFORE--CONTRARY TO A WIDELY-HELD VIEW---VERDICTIVE BLAMING CANNOT BE ANALYZED IN TERMS OF AN EMOTION OR ATTITUDE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEARDSLEY1965, author = {BEARDSLEY, MONROE-C}, title = {INTRINSIC VALUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {1-17}, keywords = {axiology, consequence, desire, end, intrinsic-value; justification, mean, naturalism}, abstract = {BEARDSLEY, ATTACKS THE PROPOSITION THAT THERE IS SUCH A THING AS INTRINSIC VALUE. SUCH VALUE WOULD HAVE TO BE INDEPENDENT OF ITS RELATION TO ANYTHING ELSE! THE REASONS FOR BELIEVING IN INTRINSIC VALUE ARE GIVEN: ARGUMENTS FROM DEFINITION, FROM A DIALECTICAL DEMONSTRATION, AND AN ATTEMPT AT EMPIRICAL CONFIRMATION. BEARDSLEY CONCLUDES THAT THE CONCEPT OF INTRINSIC VALUE IS INAPPLICABLE. EVEN IF SOMETHING HAS INTRINSIC VALUE WE COULD NOT KNOW IT, AND THEREFORE IT CAN PLAY NO ROLE IN ETHICAL OR AESTHETIC REASONING. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEARDSLEY1962, author = {BEARDSLEY, MONROE-C}, title = {THE METAPHORICAL TWIST.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {293-307}, keywords = {aesthetics, comparison, extension, intension, linguistic-analysis; metaphor, modifier, object, poetry, predicate}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO DISTINGUISH A THING-APPROACH AND A WORD-APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF ANALYZING METAPHOR. BEARDSLEY REJECTS THE OBJECT-COMPARISON THEORY OF METAPHOR IN FAVOR OF THE VERBAL-OPPOSITION THEORY, WHICH HE EXPLAINS AND DEFENDS. HE CONCLUDES THAT THE LATTER EXPLAINS THE ACKNOWLEDGED FEATURES OF METAPHOR AND MAKES NO ASSUMPTIONS THAT A SOUND PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE WOULD BE UNWILLING TO GRANT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Becker1998, author = {Becker, Lawrence-C}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {737-740}, publisher = {Princeton Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A New Stoicism}, volume = {64(3)}, year = {1998} } @article{Bedau1992, author = {Bedau, Mark}, title = {Where's the Good in Teleology?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {781-806}, keywords = {biology, good, science, teleology, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Beebee2000, author = {Beebee, Helen}, title = {The Non-Governing Conception of Laws of Nature}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(3)}, pages = {571-594}, keywords = {epistemology, natural-law; supervenience}, abstract = {Recently several thought experiments have been developed (by John Carroll amongst others) which have been alleged to refute the Ramsey-Lewis view of laws of nature. The paper aims to show that two such thought experiments fail to establish that the Ramsey-Lewis view is false, since they presuppose a conception of laws of nature that is radically at odds with the Humean conception of laws embodied by the Ramsey-Lewis view. In particular, the thought experiments presuppose that laws of nature govern the behavior of objects. The paper argues that the claim that laws govern should not be regarded as a conceptual truth. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEK1978, author = {BEK, KIM-H}, title = {THE LIMITS OF POSSIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {514-523}, keywords = {contradiction, incorrigibility, intuitionism, logic, possibility, proposition}, abstract = {IN HIS BOOK "CATEGORIAL FRAMEWORKS" STEPHAN KORNER ARGUES THAT THERE ARE NO PROPOSITIONS, NOT EVEN THE CLASSICAL LAW OF CONTRADICTION, WHICH ARE EXTERNALLY INCORRIGIBLE, I.E., PRESUPPOSED IN EVERY POSSIBLE THEORY. HIS RELATIVISTIC CONCLUSION RESTS ON AN INTERPRETATION OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC, WHICH IS FIRST CALLED IN QUESTION. IT IS THEN ARGUED THAT, THE QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION APART, IT IS ALL THE SAME NECESSARY TO ASSUME THE ABSOLUTE VALIDITY OF THE CLASSICAL LAW OF CONTRADICTION, BECAUSE IT IS A SUPREME AND INDISPENSABLE CRITERION OF WHAT A LOGICALLY POSSIBLE THEORY MEANS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BELAIEF1975, author = {BELAIEF, LYNNE}, title = {SELF-ESTEEM AND HUMAN EQUALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {25-43}, keywords = {equality, psychology, right, self-esteem; self-identity; social-philosoph}, abstract = {AIMING TO UNDERSTAND THE MEANING OF HUMAN EQUALITY AS IT EFFECTS SELF-ESTEEM, A PRELIMINARY DISTINCTION IS MADE BETWEEN EQUALITY EXPERIENCED AS A SUBJECTIVE (PSYCHOLOGICAL) PHENOMENON AND EQUALITY EXISTING AS AN ELEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE (SOCIAL) PATTERN OF A CULTURE. ATTENTION IS THEN GIVEN TO THE CAUSAL INTERACTION BETWEEN THE TWO LEVELS. THE SUBJECTIVE DIMENSION IS EXTENSIVELY ANALYZED, BOTH PHENOMENOLOGICALLY AND ETHICALLY. THE LATTER ANALYSIS LEADS TO GRIM CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF EQUALITY BEING TRULY UNDERSTOOD OR VALUED BY INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE ACCEPTED THE JUVENILE IDENTITY CONSCIOUSNESS THAT BASES SELF-ESTEEM ON COMPETITIVE SUPERIORITY. CONCRETE SPECULATION IS GIVEN CONCERNING POSSIBLE MEANS FOR ETHICAL CHANGE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bell1996, author = {Bell, David}, title = {The Formation of Concepts and the Structure of Thoughts}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {583-596}, keywords = {epistemology, language, sentence, structure, thought}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BELLIOTTI1987, author = {BELLIOTTI, RAYMOND-A}, title = {IS LAW A SHAM?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {25-44}, keywords = {ideology, jurisprudence, political-philosophy; politics}, abstract = {THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (CLS) IS COMPOSED MOSTLY OF ACADEMIC LAWYERS WHO SHARE A DISSATISFACTION WITH THE CURRENT STATUS OF CENTRIST-LIBERAL LEGAL THEORY, AND WHO ASPIRE TO RECONSTRUCT THE POLITICAL ORDER ALONG MORE EGALITARIAN BASES. THIS PAPER (1) EXPLAINS CLS'S VIEW OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND CLS'S POLITICAL AGENDA; (2) CRITICIZES ASPECTS OF CLS'S ATTACK ON CENTRIST-LIBERAL POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY; AND (3) SHOWS HOW THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN CLS AND CENTRIST-LIBERALS ARE MIRED IN A FAMILIAR DICHOTOMY: OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM, WHICH DICHOTOMY CLS MUST TRANSCEND IF IT IS TO REALIZE ITS RADICAL PROJECT. FINALLY, A NOTION OF THE "SELF" WHICH MAY BE HELPFUL TO CLS IN CONSTRUCTING ITS ALTERNATIVE LEGAL AND POLITICAL VISION IS SUGGESTED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BELNAP1991, author = {BELNAP, Nuel}, title = {Backwards and Forwards in the Modal Logic of Agency.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {action, agency, intensionality, logic, modal-logi}, abstract = {A modal logic is a logic whose grammar includes an intensional construct having sentences as both inputs and outputs. A "modal logic of agency" intends that some such construct express agency (or action), as, for example, the English construct "a sees to it that Q." The paper has four sections: (1) gives a brief retrospective, (2) restates some claims from an earlier work, (3) motivates the desirability of a modal logic of agency, and (4) draws ten pictures illustrating some of the cases in which such a logic can provide clarification.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ben-Ze'ev2004, author = {Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron}, title = {Emotions Are Not Mere Judgments}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {450-457}, keywords = {emotion, ethics, feeding, judgment, motivation}, abstract = {The search for the essence of emotions is a common feature of various views of emotions---many of which attempt to reduce emotions to one central component. Three major views that seek to define emotions via a basic component are: (a) that emotions are essentially a cognitive-evaluative state; (b) that emotions are feelings; (c) that emotions are desires. I believe that all these reductions are inadequate. I focus here on (a) as expressed in Nussbaum's recent view of emotions. I begin, however, by briefly discussing (b) and (c).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENCIVENGA1988, author = {BENCIVENGA, ERMANNO}, title = {THAT OBSCURE OBJECT OF DESIRE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {533-544}, keywords = {desire, metaphysics, object}, abstract = {VERBS OF DESIRE AND SEARCH ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO ACCOUNT FOR THAN (OTHER) INTENTIONAL CONTEXTS BECAUSE, WHEREAS WHAT WE THINK OF MAY WELL BE NONEXISTENT, WHAT WE DESIRE CANNOT BE. THIS DIFFICULTY IS TREATED HERE AS AN ANOMALY FOR THE TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL PARADIGM BASED ON THE CONCEPTUAL PRIORITY OF OBJECTS, AND THE POSSIBILITY IS EXPLORED OF DEALING WITH THE ANOMALY IN A DIFFERENT (KANTIAN) PARADIGM WHICH ATTRIBUTES CONCEPTUAL PRIORITY TO EXPERIENCES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENCIVENGA1987, author = {BENCIVENGA, ERMANNO}, title = {ECONOMY OF EXPRESSION AND AESTHETIC PLEASURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {615-630}, keywords = {aesthetic-judgment; aesthetics, completeness, expression, literature}, abstract = {MANY CRITICS FIND ECONOMICAL WORKS OF ART TO BE AESTHETICALLY MORE VALUABLE, BUT THEY DO NOT SAY WHY. AN EXPLANATION IS PROPOSED HERE IN THREE STEPS. FIRST, IT IS POINTED OUT THAT THE SPECTATOR OR READER GETS INVOLVED IN CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITIES, ANALOGOUS TO THOSE ORIGINALLY PERFORMED BY THE AUTHOR. SECOND, IT IS NOTICED THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE GENERALLY USEFUL FOR PEOPLE'S PRESERVATION AND WELFARE. THIRD, A COMBINED FREUD-LORENZ MODEL IS USED TO EXPLAIN WHY GENERALLY USEFUL ACTIVITIES SHOULD GIVE PLEASURE: PLEASURE IS THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL COUNTERPART OF THE DISCHARGE OF DRIVE ENERGY, WHICH ACCOMPANIES (NOT THE CONSUMMATION OF AN OBJECT, BUT) THE PERFORMING OF SOME MOVES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENDITT1976, author = {BENDITT, T-M}, title = {BENEFIT AND HARM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {116-120}, keywords = {benefit, harm, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENFIELD1971, author = {BENFIELD, DAVID-W}, title = {JOHNSTONE ON THE TRUTH OF PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {96-102}, keywords = {language, philosophy, statement, truth}, abstract = {IN THE THIRD CHAPTER OF "PHILOSOPHY AND ARGUMENT" H.W. JOHNSTONE ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS ARE NOT PROPOSITIONS WHICH ARE TRUE OR FALSE. IN THIS PAPER I ARGUE THAT JOHNSTONE FAILS TO ESTABLISH HIS THESIS. JOHNSTONE'S ARGUMENT DEPENDS ON HIS CLAIM THAT PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS ARE TRUE RELATIVE TO ARGUMENT. THIS CONCEPT OF TRUTH IS HIGHLY PROBLEMATIC, ALLOWING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT A PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENT CAN BE BOTH TRUE AND FALSE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENFIELD1977, author = {BENFIELD, DAVID-W}, title = {THE A PRIORI AND THE SELF-EVIDENT: A REPLY TO MR CASULLO'S "THE DEFINITION OF A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {225-227}, keywords = {a-priori; contingent, epistemology, necessary, proposition, self-eviden}, abstract = {IN AN EARLIER PAPER, "THE A PRIORI A POSTERIORI DISTINCTION," I ARGUED THAT ALL SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITIONS COULD BE KNOWN "A PRIORI". MR. CASULLO DISAGREES CLAIMING THAT IN KNOWING A CONTINGENT SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITION ONE MUST "APPEAL TO, OR TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, HIS PRESENT EXPERIENTIAL STATE...." IN THIS BRIEF REPLY I CONSIDER TWO ARGUMENTS DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE WAY IN WHICH WE KNOW CONTINGENT SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITIONS DIFFERS EPISTEMICALLY FROM THE WAY IN WHICH WE KNOW NECESSARY SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITIONS. I FIND BOTH ARGUMENTS DEFECTIVE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENFIELD1974, author = {BENFIELD, DAVID-W}, title = {THE A PRIORI-A POSTERIORI DISTINCTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {151-166}, keywords = {a-posteriori; a-priori; epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {PHILOSOPHERS FROM KANT TO QUINE HAVE CONFLATED THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE "A PRIORI" AND THE "A POSTERIORI", THE NECESSARY AND THE CONTINGENT, AND THE ANALYTIC AND THE SYNTHETIC. HOWEVER, IF THESE DISTINCTIONS ARE NOT BLURRED AND IF SUFFICIENT ATTENTION IS PAID TO THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF THE "A PRIORI", THEN IT IS CLEAR THAT THE "A PRIORI" SHOULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE NECESSARY. IN THIS PAPER I OFFER A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE "A PRIORI" AND I ARGUE THAT CERTAIN SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITIONS CAN BE KNOWN "A PRIORI" EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE NEITHER NECESSARY NOR ANALYTIC. I ALSO PROVIDE DEFINITIONS OF SEVERAL QUITE ONTOLOGICALLY DIVERSE "A PRIORI" ENTITIES. I CONCLUDE WITH AN EXPLANATION OF WHY THE "A POSTERIORI" IS NOT SIMPLY THE LOGICAL COMPLEMENT OF THE "A PRIORI" AND I OFFER ANALOGOUS DEFINITIONS OF "A POSTERIORI" ENTITIES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bennett1995, author = {Bennett, Jonathan}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {979-983}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Act Itself}, volume = {58(4)}, year = {1995} } @article{Bennett2004, author = {Bennett, Karen}, title = {Global Supervenience and Dependence}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {501-529}, keywords = {dependence, global, metaphysics, possible-world; supervenience, variation}, abstract = {Two versions of global supervenience have recently been distinguished from each other. I introduce a third version, which is more likely what people had in mind all along. However, I argue that one of the three versions is equivalent to strong supervenience in every sense that matters, and that neither of the other two versions counts as a genuine determination relation. I conclude that global supervenience has little metaphysically distinctive value.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENSMAN1968, author = {BENSMAN, JOSEPH and LILIENFELD, ROBERT}, title = {A PHENOMENOLOGICAL MODEL OF THE ARTISTIC AND CRITICAL ATTITUDES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {353-367}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, attitude, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BERGMAN1965, author = {BERGMAN, HUGO}, title = {BRENTANO ON THE HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {94-99}, keywords = {ancient, development, greek, history, laws, philosophy}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES BRENTANO'S GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY, ESPECIALLY AS A SCIENCE. IT ELUCIDATES FOUR PHASES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY, AS WELL AS IN ANY EPOCH; THESE ARE: ASCENDING, POPULARIZING, SKEPTICAL, AND MYSTICAL. THE ARTICLE ENDS BY ATTEMPTING TO SHOW THAT BRENTANO ATTEMPTED TO SEARCH FOR LAWS EVEN IN HISTORY AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, AND ACTUALLY THOUGHT OF PHILOSOPHY AS A LAWFUL DEVELOPMENT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bergmann2004, author = {Bergmann, Michael}, title = {Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {709-727}, keywords = {circularity, epistemology, justification, testimony}, abstract = {If I form a belief in the trustworthiness of one of my belief sources, X, and, in the formation of that belief, I depend upon X, then that belief is infected with epistemic circularity. Many people think that epistemic circularity is a bad thing in the sense that beliefs infected by it cannot be justified. I argue, first, that if justified belief is possible, epistemic circularity needn't be a bad thing. Then I give an account of the difference between malignant and benign epistemic circularity and I provide a Reidian example of benign epistemically circular belief that is justified.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bergmann2004a, author = {Bergmann, Michael}, title = {What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {161-165}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, foundationalism, justification, knowledge}, abstract = {One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially--i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing foundationalist. In this paper, I will explain why his objections to foundationalism fail.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bergmann2000, author = {Bergmann, Michael}, title = {Deontology and Defeat}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {87-102}, keywords = {defeat, deontology, epistemology, internalism, knowledge}, abstract = {I shall argue that no deontological conception of epistemic justification provides a good reason for endorsing internalism. My main contention is that a requirement having to do with epistemic defeat--a requirement that many externalists impose on knowledge--guarantees the only sorts of deontological justification that have a chance at inducing internalism. Given this compatibility of externalism and deontology, we may safely conclude that deontology by itself doesn't lend support to internalism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BERLEANT1966, author = {BERLEANT, ARNOLD}, title = {ON THE CIRCULARITY OF THE COGITO.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {431-433}, keywords = {circularity, cogito, doubt, epistemology, method, scepticism}, abstract = {ON THE BASIS OF THE DUBITO, DESCARTES INFERS THAT HE IS THINKING AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THAT HE EXISTS AS A THINKING BEING. THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO RAISE A LOGICAL ISSUE, NAMELY THAT THE METHOD OF DOUBTING ITSELF CONTAINS THE NECESSITY FOR A DOUBTER. HENCE, DESCARTES' CONCLUSION FOLLOWS, NOT FROM THE USE OF THE METHOD, BUT FROM ITS ADOPTION, SINCE DOUBTING LOGICALLY PRESUPPOSES A DOUBTER AND THUS AN EXISTENT BEING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BERLEANT1969, author = {BERLEANT, ARNOLD}, title = {SURROGATE THEORIES OF ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {163-185}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, communication, emotion, expression, imitation}, abstract = {THE MAJOR THEORIES OF ART--IMITATION, EMOTIONALIST, EXPRESSION, COMMUNICATION, FORMALIST--ALL FAIL TO EXPLAIN WHAT ART IS. THEY COMMIT A COMMON ERROR BY INTERPRETING THE NATURE OF ART IN TERMS OF NON-AESTHETIC MODES OF EXPERIENCE. THESE MODES ARE MORE FAMILIAR BUT SHARPLY DIFFERENT FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF ART AND ACT AS SURROGATES FOR IT, MISLEADING US AND DIRECTING US AWAY FROM ART. A GENUINELY EMPIRICAL AESTHETICS WILL DEAL WITH ART IN THE LIGHT OF ITS OWN DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BERLEANT1964, author = {BERLEANT, ARNOLD}, title = {A NOTE ON THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING 'ART'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {239-241}, keywords = {aesthetic-experience; aesthetic-object; aesthetics, art, concept, definition}, abstract = {THIS PAPER PROPOSES THAT RATHER THAN BEGINNING WITH A DEFINITION OF ART WHICH IS THEN TESTED AGAINST EXAMPLES, WE START WITH THE PHENOMENA OF ART AND THE EXPERIENCES BY WHICH THEY ARE KNOWN. THIS CORRECTS THE TENDENCY TO JUDGE ART BY A CONCEPT RATHER THAN DEVELOPING CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS THAT RESPOND TO THE OPEN AND CHANGING CHARACTER OF ART. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION IS REALLY ONE OF THE DESCRIPTION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE EXPERIENCES OF ART.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bermudez1997, author = {Bermudez, Jose-Luis}, title = {Practical Understanding vs Reflective Understanding}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {635-641}, keywords = {epistemology, past, self, space, understanding}, abstract = {This contribution to a book symposium on John Campbell's Past, Space and Self examines the dualism between two different ways of understanding the world developed in the book. One such mode, the causally indexical mode, is practical and engaged. The other, the causally nonindexical mode, is disengaged and reflective. The tenability of this dualism is explored with reference to theories of nonconceptual content, of the conditions upon content ascription and of tacit knowledge.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bermudez2000, author = {Bermudez, Jose-Luis}, title = {Naturalized Sense Data}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {353-374}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, sense-data; vision}, abstract = {This paper examines and defends the view that the immediate objects of visual perception, or what are often called sense data, are parts of the facing surfaces of physical objects--the naturalized sense data (NSD) theory. Occasionally defended in the literature on the philosophy of perception, most famously by G. E. Moore (1918-1919), it has not proved popular and, indeed, was abandoned by Moore himself. The contemporary situation in the philosophy of perception seems ripe for a revaluation of the NSD theory, however. The NSD theory allows us to accommodate the very real shortcomings in uncritical direct realism without postulating the existence of nonphysical sense data in a way that has seemed to many incompatible with any robust form of philosophical naturalism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bermudez1997a, author = {Bermudez, Jose-Luis}, title = {Scepticism and Science in Descartes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {743-772}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, method, scepticism, science}, abstract = {Recent Descartes scholarship has revised the traditional view of the Cartesian project as one of strictly deductive rationalism. This revision has particularly stressed the role of science in Descartes's thought. The revisionist conception of Descartes also downplays the significance of the sceptical arguments offered in the First Meditation, seeing them as tools for 'turning the mind away from the senses' in the interest of Cartesian science, rather than as reflecting genuinely epistemological concerns. This paper takes issue with this aspect of the revisionist reading of Descartes. It argues that seeing scepticism as critically important for Descartes is independent of interpreting him as a canonical rationalist. In fact, it is precisely Descartes's scientific thought and practice which make scepticism such a problem for him.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bermudez1998, author = {Bermudez, Jose-Luis}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {727-730}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Paradox of Self-Consciousness}, volume = {63(3)}, year = {1998} } @article{BERNDTSON1970, author = {BERNDTSON, ARTHUR}, title = {THE MEANING OF POWER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {73-84}, keywords = {change, metaphysics, novelty, power}, abstract = {POWER IS THE CAUSE OF CHANGE, THE GROUND OF CHANGE, AND IMMANENT IN CHANGE. IT HAS A TENDENCY TOWARD CHANGE: A VECTOR WITHOUT GOAL AND ANTICIPATION WITHOUT IDEA OR POTENTIALITY. THAT WHICH TENDS IS INTENSITY, WHICH IS RADICALLY INDETERMINATE. POWER IS EXPERIENCED IN EMOTION AND VOLITION. IT IS COMPATIBLE WITH UNIFORM OR VARIABLE OPERATION. IT MAY COMPEL, BUT NOT INEVITABLY. IT IS AN UNCAUSED CAUSE. THE PAPER CLAIMS TO ESTABLISH THE MEANING AND APPEARANCE OF POWER. IT DOES NOT CONSIDER REALITY OF POWER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BERNDTSON1960, author = {BERNDTSON, ARTHUR}, title = {BEAUTY, EMBODIMENT, AND ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {50-61}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, beauty, embodiment, emergence, emotion, expression, form}, abstract = {EMBODIMENT IS SEEN AS THE PERCEPTION OF ADEQUATE EMOTION AS FUSED WITH FORM, AND IT OCCURS INSOFAR AS THE PRELIMINARY ACTIVITIES OF CREATION HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. THIS DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE IS CALLED TRANSITIVE EXPRESSION; IT IS THE PASSAGE OF EMOTION FROM A PRIMITIVE TO AN ADEQUATE STATE THROUGH THE MEDIATION OF FORM. TRANSITIVE EXPRESSION IMPLIES EMBODIMENT AS ITS FINAL STATE OR OUTCOME. THE PURPOSE OF THE PAPER IS TO SHOW THAT BEAUTY IS THE EMERGENT QUALITY OF EMBODIMENT. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE UGLY (A FEELING OF LOATHING) IS WHOLLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH EMBODIMENT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bernecker2004, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Memory and Externalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {605-632}, keywords = {content, context, epistemology, externalism, individuation, memory}, abstract = {Content externalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past environment. I defend externalism about memory by arguing neither philosophical nor psychological considerations stand in the way of accepting the context dependency of memory that follows from externalism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bernstein1998, author = {Bernstein, Mark-H}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {730-733}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally Matters}, volume = {63(3)}, year = {1998} } @other{Bernstein1992, author = {Bernstein, Richard-J}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {977-981}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The New Constellation}, volume = {55(4)}, year = {1992} } @article{Berofsky1998, author = {Berofsky, Bernard}, title = {Through Thick and Thin: Mele on Autonomy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {689-697}, keywords = {autonomy, dependence, internalism, metaphysics}, abstract = {Since the structure of preferences of a self-controlled person might result from external control, Mele insists that an autonomous agent's current condition not have arisen through influences that bypassed his control over his mental life. This requirement is deemed too weak; the agent must not be in the grip of forces inhibiting a proper cognitive, conative, and affective connection to the world. As neutral on the free-will question, Mele perhaps establishes the possibility of libertarianism; but his more ambitious project to show how indetermination can contribute to freedom fails. Mele argues convincingly that autonomy depends in part upon causal history. This book makes a very important contribution to the literature.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Berofsky2000, author = {Berofsky, Bernard}, title = {Ultimate Responsibility in a Deterministic World}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {135-140}, keywords = {determinism, metaphysics, responsibility, world}, abstract = {Robert Kane's The Significance of Free Will is evaluated. Kane insists that the compatibilist cannot account for Ultimate Responsibility since determinism would preclude responsibility for any sufficient reason for our wills. But he concedes that there is no incompatibilist case for the denial of "personal responsibility" in a deterministic world, where personal responsibility includes the capacity to act otherwise along with all the other compatibilist freedoms, such as the absence of either coercion or noncoercive control, knowledge, critical competence, higher-order reflectiveness, and mental health. It is argued that indetermination does not provide any additional element relevant to moral responsibility.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Berofsky1996, author = {Berofsky, Bernard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {995-996}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Liberation from Self: A Theory of Personal Autonomy}, volume = {58(4)}, year = {1996} } @article{Bezuidenhout1996, author = {Bezuidenhout, Anne}, title = {Resisting the Step Toward Naturalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {743-770}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, naturalism, psychologism}, abstract = {Some epistemologists believe that epistemology is a branch of empirical psychology. Others, while not willing to equate epistemology with (any part of) psychology, believe nevertheless that there is an intimate connection between the two. This naturalistic attitude is bolstered by a belief in psychologism, which is defined as the view that epistemic properties of beliefs depend on properties of the psychological processes responsible for those beliefs. Several arguments meant to establish a link between psychologism and naturalism are discussed and shown wanting. Finally, an alternative framework for epistemological investigation is sketched, which endorses psychologism, but is nonnaturalist, in that it relies on the use of a priori methods.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BHARADWAJA1981, author = {BHARADWAJA, V-K}, title = {A THEORY OF TARKA SENTENCES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {532-546}, keywords = {language, nyaya, sentence}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR ANALYZES "TARKA" SENTENCES OF THE FORM 'IF "X" WERE THE CASE, THEN "Y" WOULD HAVE BEEN THE CASE' AS CONTRAFACTUAL CONDITIONALS IN THE CONTEXT OF SUPPORT FOR "VYAPTIS" (EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATIONS). HIS ANALYSIS GIVES AN ADEQUATE CRITERION FOR DIFFERENTIATING "TARKA" FROM "VYAPTI" SENTENCES AND IT SHOWS HOW "VYAPTIS" MUST SUPPORT BUT THEMSELVES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY "TARKA" SENTENCES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BHATT1976, author = {BHATT, S-R}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF MIKSA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {564-570}, keywords = {hinduism, religion, self-realizatio}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bicchieri1999, author = {Bicchieri, Cristina}, title = {Local Fairness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {229-236}, keywords = {epistemology, fairness, game-theory; psychology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bickle1996, author = {Bickle, John}, title = {New Wave Psychophysical Reductionism and the Methodological Caveats}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {57-78}, keywords = {methodology, mind, psychology, reductionism, science}, abstract = {A new brand of psychology-to-neuroscience reductionism has emerged over the past fifteen years, grounded on a novel account of theory reduction in science. In this paper, I continue defending this new wave reductionism by addressing three "methodological caveats." Each is so-called because it warns of dire consequences for theory construction and development in special sciences should we impose reductionism. But each rests on a mistake about the methodological implications of new wave reductionism; and what the latter does imply (or suggest) about methodology for targeted reduced theories is reasonable.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIDERMAN1984, author = {BIDERMAN, SHLOMO and KASHER, ASA}, title = {RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS OF PUNISHMENT AND REWARD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {433-452}, keywords = {punishment, religion, reward, symmetry}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIEN1981, author = {BIEN, JOSEPH}, title = {POLITICS OF THE PRESENT: MACHIAVELLIAN HUMANISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {197-204}, keywords = {humanism, individual, political-action; political-philosophy; virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIERMAN1962, author = {BIERMAN, ARTHUR-K}, title = {THAT THERE ARE NO ICONIC SIGNS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {243-249}, keywords = {connotation, conventionality, denotation, iconic, language, semiotics, sign, signification}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIGELOW1990, author = {BIGELOW, JOHN and PARGETTER, ROBERT}, title = {From Extroverted Realism to Correspondence: A Modest Proposal.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(3)}, pages = {435-460}, keywords = {correspondence, epistemology, metaphysics, realism, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIGELOW1990a, author = {BIGELOW, JOHN and PARGETTER, ROBERT}, title = {From Extroverted Realism to Correspondence: A Modest Proposal.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(3)}, pages = {435-460}, keywords = {correspondence, epistemology, metaphysics, realism, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIGELOW1986, author = {BIGELOW, PATRICK}, title = {THE INDETERMINABILITY OF TIME IN "SEIN UND ZEIT".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {357-379}, keywords = {extension, metaphysics, ontological-proof; presence, time}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bilgrami1998, author = {Bilgrami, Akeel}, title = {Precis of Belief and Meaning}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {595-605}, keywords = {belief, meaning, metaphysics}, abstract = {This essay provided a summary of my book, Belief and Meaning, showing how I thought that it was possible to combine a view of intentional content that was externalist as well as one which keeps faith with Frege's constraint raised by his puzzle about identity and Kripke's puzzle about belief. The account criticizes current externalist accounts owing to Putnam, Burge, McDowell and Davidson. A great deal turns on meaning and intentional content being contextual in a way that the book elaborates.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bilgrami1998a, author = {Bilgrami, Akeel}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {635-647}, keywords = {belief, meaning, metaphysics}, abstract = {This essay replies to four commentators and critics of my book, Belief and Meaning, ranging on a wide variety of themes including: Frege's and Kripke's puzzles about identity and belief, the normativity of meaning, the nature of concepts, the nature of intentionality, externalism versus internalism, the role of reference in intentional content, self-knowledge, etc.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BINKLEY1971, author = {BINKLEY, TIMOTHY}, title = {ON READING INVESTIGATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {429-432}, keywords = {language, meaning}, abstract = {REMARK 43 OF THE INVESTIGATIONS IS OFTEN READ AS WITTGENSTEIN'S DEFINITION OR THEORY OF MEANING. HOWEVER, SUCH AN INTERPRETATION IS DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE WITH WITTGENSTEIN'S REPEATED INSISTENCE THAT HIS INVESTIGATION IS DESCRIPTIVE. IN THIS PAPER IT IS ARGUED THAT REMARK 43 IS BEST UNDERSTOOD AS A DESCRIPTION OF HOW ONE MIGHT DEFINE OR EXPLAIN 'MEANING', AND SOME ATTEMPT IS MADE TO SHOW HOW SUCH AN INTERPRETATION CAN BE CARRIED OUT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIRCHALL1982, author = {BIRCHALL, B-C}, title = {FREGE'S 'OBJECTS' AND 'CONCEPTS': REVOLUTIONARY OR REACTIONARY?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {343-358}, keywords = {concept, epistemology, object, predicate}, abstract = {FAR FROM BEING A "GREAT PHILOSOPHICAL ACHIEVEMENT," FREGE'S DIVISION BETWEEN "OBJECTS" AND "CONCEPTS," IN BEING A RECRUDESCENCE OF THE DIVISION BETWEEN THE "PURE PARTICULAR" AND THE "PURE UNIVERSAL," IS, IT IS ARGUED, REACTIONARY. FREGE'S MISTAKE WAS THAT OF CONFUSING BETWEEN "A TERM" AND ITS "FUNCTION" IN THE PROPOSITION. THE SUBJECT-FUNCTION OF THE PROPOSITION IS TRANSFORMED INTO AN "OBJECT" OR "ENTITY WHOSE NATURE IT IS TO BE DESIGNATED" WHILST THE PREDICATE-FUNCTION OF THE PROPOSITION IS TRANSFORMED INTO A "CONCEPT" OR "ENTITY WHOSE NATURE IT IS TO CHARACTERIZE."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIRCHALL1981, author = {BIRCHALL, B-C}, title = {THE INTENTIONAL PROJECT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {147-159}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionalism, knowing, mental-act; object}, abstract = {THE CLASSICAL DILEMMA IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT FOR A MENTAL ACT TO "HAVE AN OBJECT," THE MENTAL ACT MUST BE RELATED, IN SOME WAY, TO THAT OBJECT. BUT ONCE "HAVING AN OBJECT" IS UNDERSTOOD AS A RELATION HOLDING BETWEEN A MENTAL ACT AND ITS OBJECT, THE POSTULATION OF "PECULIAR ENTITIES," AT LEAST IN THE CASE OF FALSE BELIEF, SEEMS UNAVOIDABLE. TO REJECT A RELATIONAL INTERPRETATION OF "HAVING AN OBJECT" SEEMS TO HAVE EQUALLY UNACCEPTABLE IMPLICATIONS. AS GROSSMANN PUTS IT: "IF ACTS ARE NOT RELATIONS NO CONNECTION IS LEFT BETWEEN A SELF AND THE REST OF THE WORLD." SO THE CLASSICAL DILEMMA FORCES A CHOICE BETWEEN BEING RELATED TO AN OBJECT AND NOT BEING RELATED TO AN OBJECT. THIS PAPER IS AN ATTEMPT TO ARGUE THAT THE CLASSICAL DILEMMA CAN BE OVERCOME AND THAT THE RELATIONAL AND NON-RELATIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF "HAVING AN OBJECT" CAN BE RECONCILED IN A "CONATIONALIST" ACCOUNT OF MENTAL ACTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIRO1982, author = {BIRO, J-I}, title = {INTENTION, DEMONSTRATION, AND REFERENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {35-41}, keywords = {demonstration, intention, metaphysics, reference}, abstract = {D KAPLAN'S HINT THAT IN A CASE OF OSTENSION THE OBJECT INTENDED TO BE DEMONSTRATED AND THE OBJECT ACTUALLY DEMONSTRATED MAY FAIL TO COINCIDE IS ELABORATED AN DEFENDED AGAINST AN OBJECTION BROUGHT BY R BERTOLET. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE PHENOMENON IN QUESTION IS BY NO MEANS ISOLATED OR EXOTIC, BUT ONE THAT ILLUSTRATES A GENERAL FEATURE OF ALL REFERENCE AND MEANING, NAMELY, THAT CONTEXT IS AN INDEPENDENT FACTOR IN DETERMINING THE CONTENT OF UTTERANCES, A FACTOR SOMETIMES MORE POWERFUL THAN THE UTTERER'S OWN INTENTIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bishop2003, author = {Bishop, John}, title = {Prospects for a Naturalist Libertarianism: O'Connor's Persons and Causes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {228-243}, keywords = {causation, libertarianism, metaphysics, naturalism, person}, abstract = {What commitments are needed for a 'reconciliatory naturalist' understanding of agency that meets our ethical presuppositions while regarding action as belonging wholly to the natural order? In Persons and Causes (OUP, 2000), Timothy O'Connor argues that reconciliatory naturalists should affirm metaphysical libertarianism, 'agency theory' (free action requires ontologically irreducible agent-causation), and emergentism (agency introduces a qualitatively new macrofeature that exerts an ontologically basic "downward" causal influence on microstructural events). Through examining O'Connor's arguments, this paper presents the case for the contrary view that reconciliatory naturalists should reject emergentism and ontological agent-causationism and accept a broadly compatibilist account of free action.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bittner2001, author = {Bittner, Rudiger}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {495-497}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Doing Things for Reasons}, volume = {69(2)}, year = {2001} } @article{Blackburn1998, author = {Blackburn, Simon-W}, title = {Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {195-198}, keywords = {ethics, moral-theory; objectivity, relativism}, abstract = {This paper is a brief reaction to the contributions by Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson to their joint volume, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. I describe Harman's relativism and Thomson's objectivism. I argue that the latter, by making moral qualities epiphenomenal, cuts itself off from any satisfactory explanation of why we should be interested in them. The former, I argue, needs to explain what is 'salient' about the 'moral framework' to which judgments are relativized: eventually, this needs explaining in terms of its being the one we hold, and this in turn needs explaining in terms Harman does not allow himself, such as mine.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLACKBURN1990, author = {BLACKBURN, Simon}, title = {Hume and Thick Connexions.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {causation, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Blackburn2002, author = {Blackburn, Simon}, title = {Precis of Ruling Passions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {122-135}, keywords = {desire, ethics, greek, human-nature; passion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Blackburn2002a, author = {Blackburn, Simon}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {164-176}, keywords = {ethics, passion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Blackburn1992, author = {Blackburn, Simon-W}, title = {Gibbard on Normative Logic}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {947-952}, keywords = {ethics, normative}, abstract = {The point of this paper is to compare and evaluate the different approaches to normative logic revealed in the work of Allan Gibbard, and in my own apparently different approach to the issue. I argue that although in Chapter 5 of his "Wise Choices, Apt Feelings" Gibbard may seem to make use of illegitimate resources, bringing in extra materials (some of which are in other chapters) keeps the theory afloat, and brings the two theories substantially into line.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Blackburn1993, author = {Blackburn, Simon}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {965-968}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Essays in Quasi-Realism}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1993} } @article{BLACKBURN1988, author = {BLACKBURN, THOMAS-S}, title = {ON THE VERY IDEA OF A FORMATIVE EXPERIENCE: DEPAUL'S CHALLENGE TO COHERENCE THEORIES IN ETHICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {139-144}, keywords = {coherence, ethics, moral-judgmen}, abstract = {IN SEVERAL RECENT ARTICLES, MICHAEL DEPAUL HAS ARGUED THAT THE EPISTEMIC CONDITIONS TO BE SATISFIED BY ANY COMPETENT MORAL JUDGE MAY INCLUDE THE UNDERGOING OF CERTAIN "FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES," THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF WHICH HAVE BEEN NEGLECTED IN USUAL APPEALS TO "REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM." DEPAUL FAILS TO MAKE CLEAR, HOWEVER, HOW THE LACK OF SUCH EXPERIENCES CAN BE UNDERSTOOD AS A MERELY "EPISTEMIC" FAILING, RATHER THAN AS A FAILURE TO HAVE ACHIEVED A CERTAIN MORAL INSIGHT OR MATURITY. THERE IS, I ARGUE, NO WAY TO INCORPORATE THIS ELEMENT INTO A THEORY OF MORAL COMPETENCE WHILE ALSO PRESERVING NEUTRALITY TOWARD COMPETING MORAL VIEWPOINTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Blackson2004, author = {Blackson, Thomas-A}, title = {An Invalid Argument for Contextualism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {344-345}, keywords = {assertion, contextualism, epistemology, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLANSHARD1968, author = {BLANSHARD, BRAND}, title = {REJOINDER TO MR KEARNS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {116-118}, keywords = {epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLANSHARD1967, author = {BLANSHARD, BRAND and SKINNER, B-F}, title = {THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS - A DEBATE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {317-337}, keywords = {behaviorism, consciousness, epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Blattner1996, author = {Blattner, William-D}, title = {Existence and Self-Understanding in Being and Time}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {97-110}, keywords = {being, existence, metaphysics, self, time, understanding}, abstract = {Heidegger's existentialism in Being and Time may be captured in the thesis that Dasein is what it understands itself to be. To defend this thesis, we need two further claims: First, Dasein's characteristics are all abilities, rather than properties. Second, Heidegger embraces a dualism between self-interpretive characteristics and factual ones, and Dasein possesses exclusively the former. Furthermore, an analysis of Heidegger's account of self-understanding and projection implies that one cannot ever acquire any settled characteristic that continues to apply to one, simply in virtue of having already attained it. This makes possible what Heidegger calls "death."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLOCK1960, author = {BLOCK, IRVING}, title = {ARISTOTLE AND THE PHYSICAL OBJECT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {93-101}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, object, perception, physical, sense}, abstract = {HOW WE BECOME AWARE OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS OVER AND ABOVE THE PERCEPTUAL ACTS OF SEEING COLOR, SHAPES AND HEARING SOUNDS, ETC., IS A QUESTION THAT HAS OCCUPIED MANY CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. DID ARISTOTLE EVER FACE THIS PROBLEM, AND IF HE DID, HOW DID HE DEAL WITH IT? THIS ARTICLE DISCUSSES THIS QUESTION AND CONCLUDES THAT THE ANSWER TO IT CAN BE FOUND "DE INSOMNIAS" IN ARISTOTLE'S DISCUSSION OF DREAMS AND ILLUSIONS. THERE IS AN ACT AFFIRMATION ("PHESIN") CARRIED OUT BY THE CONTROLLING AND DISCRIMINATING SENSE ("TO KURION KAI TO EPIKRINON") WHICH DOES THIS. "FOR, SPEAKING GENERALLY, THE CONTROLLING POWER ("ERXE") AFFIRMS ("PHESIN") THE REPORT GIVEN BY EACH SENSE UNLESS SOME MORE AUTHORITATIVE POWER CONTRADICTS IT."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Block1998, author = {Block, Ned}, title = {Is Experiencing Just Representing?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {663-670}, keywords = {earth, experience, metaphysics, representation}, abstract = {My inverted earth argument purports to describe a situation in which intentional content changes whereas phenomenal character remains constant. Tye says intentional contents don't shift-crossed wires in the visual system introduce a malfunction. I say there is nothing more defective about crossed wires than about straight wires. Tye also says that if intentional contents do shift, so do phenomenal characters. I argue that he requires an unacceptable notion of phenomenal character in which it can be logically impossible for the subject to notice a change in phenomenal character.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Block2003, author = {Block, Ned}, title = {Do Causal Powers Drain Away?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {133-150}, keywords = {causation, exclusion, metaphysics, physicalism}, abstract = {This paper discusses the main argument of Mind in a Physical World (Kim, 1998), the 'causal exclusion argument'. The paper raises the question of whether it is a consequence of the causal exclusion argument that all macro level causation (that is, causation above the level of fundamental physics) is an illusion, with all of the apparent causal powers of mental and other macro properties draining into the bottom level of physics. The paper argues that such a consequence would give us reason to reject the causal exclusion argument. The paper also considers a stronger challenge, the charge that, as Kim says, if there is no bottom level of physics, the causal exclusion argument has the consequence that "causal powers would drain away into a bottomless pit and there wouldn't be any causation anywhere." It is argued that the causal exclusion argument is incompatible with our explanatory practice.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLOCKER1969, author = {BLOCKER, H-GENE}, title = {PHYSIOGNOMIC PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {377-390}, keywords = {epistemology, perception}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE IS A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE THEORY OF WERNER AND OTHERS THAT THERE ARE TWO BASIC TYPES OF PERCEPTION, "GEOMETRIC-TECHNICAL", CHARACTERIZING MORE "SOPHISTICATED" CULTURES, IN WHICH PRIMARY AND POSSIBLY SECONDARY QUALITIES PREDOMINATE, AND "PHYSIOGNOMIC", CHARACTERIZING MORE "PRIMITIVE" CULTURES, IN WHICH TERTIARY (EXPRESSIVE) QUALITIES PREDOMINATE. THE DISTINCTION IS BASED ON (A) THE RELATIVITY OF WHAT IS SEEN TO THE PERCIPIENT'S POINT OF VIEW AND (B) THE FACT THAT IN "SOPHISTICATED" TECHNOLOGICAL CULTURES, THE PERCEPTUAL POINT OF VIEW IS THE SELF-ALIENATING EGO-OBJECT POLARIZATION IN WHICH TERTIARY QUALITIES ARE INTERNALIZED AND REGARDED AS SUBJECTIVE, WHILE IN MORE "PRIMITIVE" CULTURES IT IS CHARACTERIZED BY EGO-OBJECT INTEGRATION IN WHICH TERTIARY FEATURES ARE UNDIFFERENTIATED FROM OBJECTIVE FEATURES OF A PUBLIC ENVIRONMENT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bloomfield2000, author = {Bloomfield, Paul}, title = {Virtue Epistemology and the Epistemology of Virtue}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {23-43}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, knowledge, skill, virtue}, abstract = {The ancient Greeks almost universally accepted the thesis that virtues are skills. Skills have an underlying intellectual structure (logos), and having a particular skill entails understanding the relevant logos, possessing a general ability to diagnose and solve problems (phronesis), as well as having appropriate experience. Two implications of accepting this thesis for moral epistemology and epistemology in general are considered. Thinking of virtues as skills yields a viable virtue epistemology in which moral knowledge is a species of a general kind of knowledge that is not philosophically suspect. Also, the debate between internalists and externalists in epistemology is subversively resolved. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLOSE1981, author = {BLOSE, B-L}, title = {MATERIALISM AND DISEMBODIED MINDS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {59-74}, keywords = {behaviorism, disembodiment, materialism, metaphysics, minds}, abstract = {A BELIEF ALMOST UNIVERSALLY HELD BY PHILOSOPHERS--THAT THE PHILOSOPHICAL BEHAVIORIST CANNOT UNDERSTAND, CANNOT ALLOW FOR THE LOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF, DISEMBODIED EXISTENCE--IS TAKEN TO TASK. THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT IN THE LAST ANALYSIS THE BEHAVIORIST HAS BETTER RESOURCES THAN EITHER THE NONMATERIALIST PHILOSOPHER OF MIND OR THE CENTRAL-STATE OR IDENTITY-THEORY MATERIALIST FOR PROVIDING AN ADEQUATE CONCEPTION OF DISEMBODIED EXISTENCE, AND HE PRESENTS TWO SORTS OF DISEMBODIED EXISTENCE THAT THE BEHAVIORIST CAN UNDERSTAND--ONE THAT INVOLVES THE POWER OF ACTING ON THE BODILY WORLD OR OF BEING RE-EMBODIED OR REALIZED IN IT, AND THE OTHER, SATISFYINGLY LESS FULL-BLOODED, THAT IS UNDERSTOOD IN TERMS MERELY OF THE LOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF ACQUIRING THIS POWER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLOSSER1987, author = {BLOSSER, PHILIP}, title = {MORAL AND NONMORAL VALUES: A PROBLEM IN SCHELER'S ETHICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {139-143}, keywords = {ethics, moral, nonmoral, phenomenology}, abstract = {IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A TELEOLOGICAL ETHICS THAT AVOIDS THE PROBLEMS CRITICIZED BY KANT IN CONSEQUENTIALIST THEORIES, SCHELER TRIES TO SHOW THAT THE MORAL VALUE OF AN ACTION LIES IN ITS REALIZATION OF OTHER, NONMORAL VALUES, WHICH ARE "POSITIVE" "A PRIORI" IN THEIR RELATION TO THOSE LEFT UNREALIZED. THE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IS THAT ONE CAN IDENTIFY NUMEROUS NONMORAL VALUES (ECONOMIC, AESTHETIC, LINGUISTIC, LOGICAL, ETC.) WHOSE "REALIZATION" ONE WOULD HESITATE TO CALL "MORALLY" "GOOD" OR "EVIL." WE SAY THAT OUR SPEECH "OUGHT" TO EXHIBIT GOOD GRAMMAR AND OUR REASONING, GOOD LOGIC; BUT WE WOULD BE HARD PRESSED, I THINK, TO CALL THESE "MORAL" OBLIGATIONS. HENCE, NOT ONLY "MORAL" "GOOD," BUT LINGUISTIC, LOGICAL, AESTHETIC, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND MANY OTHER KINDS OF "GOOD" APPEAR IN THE REALIZATION OF VALUES. THIS MEANS, IN TURN, THAT NOT ONLY "NON"-MORAL, BUT "MORAL" VALUES THEMSELVES (SUCH AS "FIDELITY," "FORGIVENESS," "HONESTY," AND THE LIKE) ARE CANDIDATES FOR REALIZATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Blum1994, author = {Blum, Lawrence-A}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {477-479}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Moral Perception and Particularity}, volume = {57(2)}, year = {1994} } @article{BLUM1985, author = {BLUM, ROLAND-PAUL}, title = {DECONSTRUCTION AND CREATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {293-306}, keywords = {creation, metaphysics, self}, abstract = {EMMANUEL LEVINAS, IN "OTHERWISE THAN BEING OR BEYOND ESSENCE", ATTEMPTS TO SHOW, BY USING DECONSTRUCTIONIST TECHNIQUES, THAT A SELF WHOSE ESSENCE IS TEMPORALITY IS NECESSARILY "OTHER" THAN ITSELF. THIS OTHERNESS IS "AUTRUI," THE OTHER PERSON. HOWEVER, LEVINAS ONLY DECONSTRUCTS THE SELF, NOT THE OTHER, A CONCEPT WHICH PRESUPPOSES RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS INCOMPATIBLE WITH A CONSISTENT PROJECT OF DECONSTRUCTION. THUS, LEVINAS' RECENT WORK IS MORE AKIN TO THE THEORIES OF "TOTALITY AND INFINITY" THAN WOULD INITIALLY APPEAR.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLUM1983, author = {BLUM, ROLAND-P}, title = {EMMANUEL LEVINAS' THEORY OF COMMITMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {145-168}, keywords = {ethics, intersubjectivity, phenomenology}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE ATTEMPTS TO CLARIFY LEVINAS' COMPLICATED AND ELUSIVE IDEAS CONCERNING THE RELATION BETWEEN SELF AND OTHER BY A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE CARTESIAN, KIERKEGAARDIAN AND HUSSERLIAN INFLUENCES UPON THEM. IT CONCLUDES THAT, DESPITE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH THE THEORY THAT THE OTHER PERSON IS BOTH INFINITELY SEPARATE FROM THE SELF AND YET PLACES AN ABSOLUTE DEMAND UPON IT, LEVINAS HAS MADE A VALUABLE ATTEMPT TO AVOID THE EXTREMES OF HOBBESIAN INDIVIDUALISM AND HEGELIAN CONTEXTUALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLUMBERG1977, author = {BLUMBERG, DAVID}, title = {ANTINATURALISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF MORALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {498-515}, keywords = {autonomy, ethics, freedom, judgment, morality, naturalism, relativity, standard}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLUMENFELD1988, author = {BLUMENFELD, DAVID}, title = {FREEDOM, CONTINGENCY, AND THINGS POSSIBLE IN THEMSELVES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {81-101}, keywords = {contingency, freedom, metaphysics}, abstract = {THIS ESSAY IS A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF ONE OF LEIBNIZ'S PRINCIPAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM AND CONTINGENCY IN HIS SYSTEM, VIZ., HIS THEORY OF THINGS POSSIBLE IN THEMSELVES. SECTION I SETS UP THE PROBLEM BY CONSTRUCTING TWO ARGUMENTS: A GENERAL ONE PURPORTING TO SHOW THAT NEITHER GOD NOR MAN CAN ACT FREELY AND A MORE RESTRICTED ONE DIRECTED ONLY AGAINST HUMAN FREEDOM. SECTION II DEVELOPS THE THEORY OF POSSIBILITY IN ITSELF. SECTIONS III AND IV, RESPECTIVELY, DISCUSS THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE TO THE TWO ARGUMENTS AGAINST FREEDOM, AND THE PROBLEMS THAT LEIBNIZ ENCOUNTERS IN MAKING HIS VIEWS STICK.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLUMENFELD1985, author = {BLUMENFELD, DAVID}, title = {LEIBNIZ ON CONTINGENCY AND INFINITE ANALYSIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {483-514}, keywords = {analysis, contingency, necessity, philosophy}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Blumenfeld1993, author = {Blumenfeld, David-C}, title = {Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence by R C Sleigh, Jr}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {933-943}, keywords = {correspondence, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLUMENFELD1980, author = {BLUMENFELD, JEAN-BEER}, title = {ACTING INTENTIONALLY AND ACTING VOLUNTARILY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {228-231}, keywords = {ethics, intending, wanting}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLUMENFELD1961, author = {BLUMENFELD, WALTER}, title = {VALUE AND VALUATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {314-332}, keywords = {aesthetics, awareness, axiology, ethics, logic, objectivism, religion, valuation, value}, abstract = {IT IS MAINTAINED HERE THAT VALUES ARE NOT SUBSTANCE LIKE THINGS IN THEMSELVES, AS AUTONOMOUS ENTITIES OR PRINCIPLES. THE AUTHOR OPPOSES OBJECTIVISM AND IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHIES. IT IS NOT MERELY THAT THE SUBJECT PRODUCES VALUES AND LENDS THEM TO OBJECTS; AND IT IS NOT THAT VALUES PERTAIN DIRECTLY TO OBJECTS. BLUMENFELD ASKS PHENOMENOLOGICALLY, WHAT HAPPENS WHEN A SUBJECT ESTIMATES CERTAIN THINGS AS VALUABLE, AND DIFFERENTIATES BETWEEN SUCH VALUE QUALITIES AS: HEALTHY, AGREEABLE, INTERESTING, TRUE, JUST, MORALLY GOOD, SYMPATHETIC, AESTHETICALLY SATISFACTORY, AND HOLY, WITH THEIR CORRESPONDING OPPOSITES. IN EACH OF THE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF VALUATION THERE IS A SPECIFIC CORRELATION BETWEEN THE OBJECT, THE SUBJECT, THE PARTICULAR SITUATION, AND THE SOCIETY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bogdan1993, author = {Bogdan, Radu-J}, title = {The Pragmatic Psyche}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {157-158}, keywords = {cognition, epistemology, intentionality, pragmatism, psyche}, abstract = {In a recent article ("Semantics and the Psyche", "Phil Phenomenol Res", 52, 1992, 395-399), Dascal and Horowitz criticize two claims I made in "Does Semantics Run the Psyche?" ("Phil and Phenomenol Res", 49, 1989, 687-700) about Fodor's psychosemantic project. One claim was that the semantics does not run the psyche, the other that Fodor's naturalization of content assumes rather than explains intentionality. I show, first, that my claims survive their criticisms, and second, that that it is because intentionality is left unexplained that the semantics appears to run the psyche.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BOGDAN1989, author = {BOGDAN, RADU-J}, title = {DOES SEMANTICS RUN THE PSYCHE?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {687-700}, keywords = {metaphysics, mind, psyche, semantics}, abstract = {THE PAPER DISCUSSES AND CRITICIZES THE VIEW THAT IT IS THE SEMANTIC PROPERTIES OF COGNITION THAT HAVE CAUSAL EFFICACY. THIS IS THE VIEW DEFENDED BY JERRY FODOR IN HIS LATEST BOOK, "PSYCHOSEMANTICS" (1987). I ARGUE THAT THE INFORMATION CAUSALLY EFFICACIOUS IN CENTRAL COGNITION IS TYPICALLY PRAGMATIC (BECAUSE SENSITIVE NOT ONLY TO FACTS OF REFERENCE BUT ALSO TO RELATIONS TO MEMORY, PLANNING AND ACTION) AND CAUSAL IN VIRTUE OF ITS PRAGMATIC PROPERTIES. I ALSO SHOW THAT FODOR'S ANALYSIS OF SEMANTIC ABOUTNESS AS A RELIABLE MIND-WORLD COVARIATION EXPLAINS THE SEMANTIC SUCCESS BUT NOT THE SEMANTIC NATURE OF OUR COGNITIVE STATES. FODOR'S NATURALIZATION HANDLES THE SEMANTIC, NOT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PART OF PSYCHOSEMANTICS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bogdan1997, author = {Bogdan, Radu-J}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {737-739}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Interpreting Minds: The Evolution of a Practice}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1997} } @article{Boghossian2001, author = {Boghossian, Paul-Artin}, title = {Inference and Insight}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {633-640}, keywords = {epistemology, inference, knowledge, reason}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Boghossian1994, author = {Boghossian, Paul-A}, title = {Sense, Reference and Rule-Following}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {139-144}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, language, rule}, abstract = {This is a critical discussion of Jerrold Katz's "The Metaphysics of Meaning". The essay raises some questions about exactly how Katz's new intensionalism' is to be understood, and about its plausibility. It also questions the views ability to solve the outstanding problems in the philosophy of mind and language.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bok2002, author = {Bok, Hilary}, title = {Wallace's 'Normative Approach' to Moral Responsibility}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {682-686}, keywords = {ethics, moral-sentiment; morality, responsibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BOLER1968, author = {BOLER, JOHN-F}, title = {AGENCY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {165-181}, keywords = {agency, epistemology, explanation}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE SKETCHES AN ARISTOTELIAN SCHEMA FOR AGENCY AS A DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF OUR NON-TECHNICAL CONCEPT OF ACTION, EMPHASIZING ITS DISTINCTION FROM DEEPER EXPLANATIONS AND ALTERNATE DESCRIPTIVE SCHEMES. THE METHOD IS DESCRIPTIVE RATHER THAN ARGUMENTATIVE, THOUGH IT IS MORE PROBLEMATIC THAN HISTORICAL. ONLY VAGUE REFERENCES ARE MADE TO ARISTOTLE. SOME FOOTNOTES ALLUDE TO WORK BY DONALD DAVIDSON.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bond2005, author = {Bond, E-J}, title = {Does the Subject of Experience Exist in the World?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {124-133}, keywords = {experience, metaphysics, mind, subject, time}, abstract = {In this paper I attempt to show, by considering a number of sources, including Wittgenstein, Sartre, Thomas Nagel and Spinoza, but also adding something crucial of my own, that it is impossible to construe the subject of experience as an object among other objects in the world. My own added argument is the following. The subject of experience cannot move in time along with material events and processes or it could not be aware of the passage of time, hence, neither of change nor of motion. The subject cannot therefore be identified with any neural process, function, or location since whatever goes on in the CNS is necessarily objective and part of the temporal flux. However, this does not imply any form of dualism for experiences exist only for the subject whose experiences they are and, hence, they have no objective reality.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bonevac2002, author = {Bonevac, Daniel}, title = {Sellars vs. the Given}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {1-30}, keywords = {atomism, epistemology, foundationalism, given, immediacy, indistinguishable, justification, knowledge}, abstract = {John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars's arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the 'given' is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars's arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument--the "inconsistent triad" argument--addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there are several ways of escaping its conclusion. Invocations of Sellars's refutation of the Myth of the Given are empty.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BonJour2004, author = {BonJour, Laurence}, title = {In Search of Direct Realism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {349-367}, keywords = {direct-realism; epistemology, knowledge, perception, representationalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BonJour2001, author = {BonJour, Laurence}, title = {Precis of In Defense of Pure Reason}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {625-631}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology, justification, knowledge, pure-reaso}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BonJour2001a, author = {BonJour, Laurence}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {673-698}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BONJOUR1990, author = {BONJOUR, LAURENCE}, title = {Reply to Solomon's "Apriority and Metajustification in BonJour's 'Structure of Empirical Knowledge'".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {779-782}, keywords = {empirical-knowledge; epistemology, justification}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BOONIN1966, author = {BOONIN, LEONARD-G}, title = {CONCERNING THE DEFEASIBILITY OF LEGAL RULES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {371-378}, keywords = {decision, defeasibility, law, legal, reasoning, rule, social-philosoph}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF DEFEASIBILITY AS IT APPLIES TO THE ANALYSIS OF LEGAL CONCEPTS AND THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL DECISIONS. AN EXAMINATION IS MADE OF H L A HART'S USE OF DEFEASIBILITY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT. A DISTINCTION IS DRAWN BETWEEN TWO CONCEPTS OF DEFEASIBILITY AND A COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPT OF "EXTENDABILITY" IS INTRODUCED. A FURTHER DISTINCTION IS MADE BETWEEN THE DEFEASIBILITY OF LEGAL RULES AND THE OPEN TEXTURE OF LEGAL FACTS. IT IS ARGUED THAT DEFEASIBILITY IS A FRUITFUL CONCEPT IN LEGAL ANALYSIS, AND THAT PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE DEFEASIBILITY OF LEGAL RULES, THE TRADITIONAL LEGAL THEORY WHICH TREATED LEGAL DECISIONS AS LOGICAL DEDUCTIONS FROM LEGAL RULES IS INADEQUATE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BOSSERT1974, author = {BOSSERT, PHILIP-J}, title = {A COMMON MISUNDERSTANDING CONCERNING HUSSERL'S 'CRISIS' TEXT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {20-33}, keywords = {crisis, twentieth}, abstract = {IN THE ARTICLE, I ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT IT IS A MISCONCEPTION THAT PART III OF EDMUND HUSSERL'S "CRISIS" TEXT IS INCOMPLETE, A CLAIM OFTEN MADE BY HUSSERL COMMENTATORS. THE EVIDENCE FOR THIS VIEW IS PRESENTED IN THREE PARTS: 1) A HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE EVENTS BETWEEN 1928 AND 1938 RELEVANT TO HUSSERL'S WRITING OF THE "CRISIS;" 2) A TEXT-CRITICAL STUDY OF PART III OF THE "CRISIS" IN LIGHT OF EUGENE FINK'S 1936 OUTLINE FOR THE COMPLETE TEXT; AND 3) A BRIEF LITERARY ANALYSIS OF PARTS IIIA AND IIIB. THE REASON FOR ATTEMPTING TO SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT PART III OF THE "CRISIS" IS COMPLETE IS THAT MANY OF THE IMPORTANT STATEMENTS IN THIS PART ARE OFTEN REJECTED BY HUSSERL COMMENTATORS BECAUSE IT WAS LEFT 'UNFINISHED' BY HUSSERL. I BELIEVE THE "CRISIS" DESERVES EQUAL WEIGHT WITH HUSSERL'S OTHER 'FINISHED' PUBLICATIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bovens1999, author = {Bovens, Luc}, title = {The Value of Hope}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {667-681}, keywords = {epistemology, hope, rationality}, abstract = {Hope obeys Aristotle's doctrine of the mean: one should neither hope too much, not too little. But what determines what constitutes too much and what constitutes too little for a particular person at a particular time? The sceptic presents an argument to the effect that it is never rational to hope. An attempt to answer the sceptic leads us in different directions. Decision-theoretic and preference-theoretic arguments support the instrumental value of hope. An investigation into the nature of hope permits us to assess the intrinsic value of hope. However, it must be granted to the sceptic that there is a tension between hope and epistemic rationality. I conclude with some reflections about the relationship between hope and character features that are constitutive of inner strength.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bovens1995, author = {Bovens, Luc}, title = {The Intentional Acquisition of Mental States}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(4)}, pages = {821-840}, keywords = {action, epistemology, intentionality, mental-states; morality}, abstract = {A common strategy to bring about a change in one's own beliefs, moral judgments or desires is to act as if one already had the projected beliefs, moral judgments or desires. There is a curious asymmetry between intentionally changing one's beliefs and moral judgments on the one hand and intentionally changing one's desires on the other hand in that the former phenomenon typically meets with qualms while the latter does not. I provide an explanation of this asymmetry by laying out the different role that as if actions play within the respective phenomena and by appealing to Carnap's requirement of total evidence.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Boyd2003, author = {Boyd, Richard}, title = {Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part II}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {24-47}, keywords = {consequentialism, ethics, metaphysics, naturalism, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Boyd2003a, author = {Boyd, Richard}, title = {Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part I}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(3)}, pages = {505-553}, keywords = {consequentialism, ethics, finite, metaphysics, naturalism, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Braddon-Mitchell2001, author = {Braddon-Mitchell, David and West, Caroline}, title = {Temporal Phase Pluralism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {59-83}, keywords = {metaphysics, modality, personal-identity; pluralism, temporality}, abstract = {Some theories of personal identity allow some variation in what it takes for a person to survive from context to context; and sometimes this is determined by the desires of person-stages or the practices of communities. This leads to problems for decision making in contexts where what is chosen will affect personal identity. 'Temporal Phase Pluralism' solves such problems by allowing that there can be a plurality of persons constituted by a sequence of person stages. This illuminates difficult decision making problems when persons have to choose between different life-altering choices.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BRADY1973, author = {BRADY, JAMES-B}, title = {STATUS RESPONSIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {408-411}, keywords = {ethics, responsibility}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE CRITICIZES JOHN SILBER'S VIEW THAT A PERSON MAY BE BLAMEWORTHY IN SOME DEGREE EVEN THOUGH HIS CONDUCT IS NEITHER INTENTIONAL, RECKLESS NOR NEGLIGENT. TWO POSSIBLE CRITERIA FOR 'STATUS' RESPONSIBILITY, THAT THE PERSON MAY EXPERIENCE REGRET AND THAT ONE MAY BE BLAMEWORTHY FOR TAKING NONRECKLESS OR NON-NEGLIGENT RISKS ARE DISCUSSED AND REJECTED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BRAND1975, author = {BRAND, MYLES}, title = {ON PHILOSOPHICAL DEFINITIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {151-172}, keywords = {definition, language, location}, abstract = {IN THIS PAPER, THE LEGITIMACY OF NONREDUCTIVE DEFINITIONS OR ANALYSES IS DEFENDED. IN THE FIRST SECTION, THE ISSUES ARE ILLUSTRATED USING QUINE'S ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH THE ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC QUESTION. THE NEXT SECTION CLARIFIES THE NOTIONS OF NONREDUCTIVE AND REDUCTIVE DEFINITIONS, OR BETTER, "SYSTEMIC" AND "EXTRASYSTEMIC" DEFINITIONS. IN ORDER TO MAKE THESE NOTIONS CLEAR, IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER AN ILLUSTRATION IN SOME DEPTH; HENCE, IN THE FINAL SECTION, AN ARGUMENT IS MADE TO SHOW THAT A SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF CAUSATION IS REQUIRED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br1997, author = {Brandl, Johannes}, title = {Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {697-702}, keywords = {austrian, german, history, philosophy}, abstract = {This review essay critically examines the claim made by Barry Smith in his book on The Legacy of Franz Brentano (Open Court 1994), namely that there is a specific unity in Austrian philosophy which connects the members of the Brentano-School with other Austrian philosophers, especially with the logical empiricist. It is argued that this claim can neither be supported by the rising political liberalism in Austria at the time, nor by generalizing the Aristotelianism characteristic of Brentano, nor by tracing back the antimetaphysical attitude characteristic of the Vienna Circle. Despite its questionable historic perspective, however, Smith's book can be recommended as a competent introduction to the philosophy of Brentano and his followers, notably Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, Kasimir Twardowski, Tadeusz Kotarbinski and Christian Ehrenfels.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br1993, author = {Brandom, Robert}, title = {The Social Anatomy of Inference}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {661-666}, keywords = {inference, language, linguistics, semantics, social}, abstract = {In response to Fodor and Lepore's arguments against holism, it is argued that there are good reasons to demarcate specifically "conceptual" contentfulness by its "inferential" articulation. If that is right, possession of such content must be anatomic' in their sense. It is claimed further that conceiving conceptual contents in terms of inferential roles does not by itself commit one to a two-factor' approach, in which truth and reference are added on as independent elements. Nor does such an approach preclude meaningful talk of shared conceptual contents.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br2001, author = {Brandom, Robert-B}, title = {Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {587-609}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, modality, normativity, teleology}, abstract = {I argue that just as it is legitimate, where helpful, to use modal vocabulary in explaining various features of intentionality, so it is in principle legitimate to appeal to normative vocabulary to do so. It is not circular or otherwise objectionable to appeal to nonextensional modal concepts to make sense of the kind of intensionality peculiar to intentional phenomena. And for the same reasons that justify appeals to counterfactuals and dispositions in naturalistic programs in semantics, it is not circular or otherwise objectionable to appeal to normative concepts to make sense of the specifically conceptual normativity distinctive of intentional phenomena.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br1997a, author = {Brandom, Robert-B}, title = {Precis of Making It Explicit}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {153-156}, keywords = {expression, language, linguistics, meaning}, abstract = {The book is an attempt to explain the meanings of linguistic expressions in terms of their use. The explanatory strategy is to begin with an account of social practices, to identify the particular structure they must exhibit in order to qualify as specifically linguistic practices, and then to consider what different sorts of semantic contents those practices can confer on states, performances, and expressions caught up in them in suitable ways. The result is a kind of conceptual role semantics that is at once firmly rooted in actual practices of producing and consuming speech acts, and sufficiently finely articulated to make clear how those practices are capable of conferring a rich variety of kinds of content.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br1997b, author = {Brandom, Robert-B}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {189-204}, keywords = {epistemology, language, linguistics, meaning}, abstract = {Four replies to comments on Making It Explicit. The reply to John McDowell concerns the semantic privileging of inference over representation. The reply to Gideon Rosen concerns the role of discursive norms, specifically the relations between normative statuses and normative attitudes. The reply to Richard Rorty concerns relativism and the identification of facts with true claims (in the sense of what is claimed or claimable, rather than on claimings). The reply to Jay Rosenberg concerns objectivity and the differences between various sorts of facts (for instance, between natural facts and normative facts).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br1998, author = {Brandom, Robert-B}, title = {Perception and Rational Constraint}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {369-374}, keywords = {empiricism, metaphysics, mind, perception, world}, abstract = {McDowell understands the requirement that the world have a rational and not merely a causal bearing on perceptual judgment as the requirement that experience have a rational and not merely a causal bearing on perceptual judgments. This is why he sees the rational constraint as requiring a notion of conceptually articulated but prejudgmental perceptual experiences. There are alternatives he overlooks. The problem is traced to a residual individualism in McDowell's thinking about reasoning--a systematic underestimation of the significance of the fact that talk of the space of reasons is an abstraction from concrete, essentially social practices of giving and asking for reasons.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br1995, author = {Brandom, Robert-B}, title = {Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(4)}, pages = {895-908}, keywords = {epistemology, external, internal, knowledge, reason}, abstract = {A critical discussion of McDowell's epistemology. He sees both skepticism and dogmatism as running together the truth and justification conditions on knowledge, and both extreme and hybrid externalism as incorrectly divorcing them. He diagnoses their mistakes as stemming from a common presupposition: internalizing the space of reasons. I argue that, like these positions, McDowell individualizes the space of reasons, and that factives and warrantives can be properly understood as standings in the space of reasons once we appreciate the social articulation of the practices of giving and asking for reasons that are made explicit in assessments and attributions of knowledge.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br1994, author = {Brandom, Robert}, title = {Expressing and Attributing Beliefs}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {905-912}, keywords = {belief, cartesianism, experience, metaphysics, mind}, abstract = {This piece is a contribution to a symposium on Arthur Collins' book "The Nature of Mental Things". Collins' argument from the observation that there is no state of belief that the subject might report without asserting that "p"' to the conclusion that beliefs are not inner states is expounded and critically assessed.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BRANDT1989, author = {BRANDT, R-B}, title = {PRACTICAL RATIONALITY: A RESPONSE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {125-130}, keywords = {choice, metaphysics, practical-reason; rationality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BRANDT1991, author = {BRANDT, R-B}, title = {Roderick Firth's Contribution to Ethics.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {attitude, epistemology, ethics}, abstract = {Firth rejected both noncognitive and self-evidence theories of ethical statements. He offered an account of the actual meaning of ethical language, following his "radical empiricist" theory of meaning that the meaning of any statement can be expressed by a conjunction of statements which refer only to observable events, as Berkeley and Lewis held for "That daffodil if yellow." So he explained "That was morally wrong" as "If a person were factually omniscient, vividly imaginative, were devoid of interest and emotions concerned with particular persons/places, but were otherwise a normal human being, he would experience disapproval toward that act." People learn this meaning by correction of using "is wrong" to mean only "I disfavor/disapprove that." The article summarizes various criticisms made of this view.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bransen2000, author = {Bransen, Jan}, title = {Alternatives of Oneself: Recasting Some of Our Practical Problems}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {381-400}, keywords = {choice, ethics, morality, rationality, self}, abstract = {This paper argues that there are practical problems of such a kind that neither impartial morality nor rational choice theory can provide us with comfort and guidance in our attempt to make the right choice if confronted with such a problem. It argues that both morality and rational choice theory are bound to misconstrue problems of this kind. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bratman1998, author = {Bratman, Michael-E}, title = {The Sources of Normativity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {699-709}, keywords = {belief, intention, metaphysics, normativity}, abstract = {This is a review essay discussing Christine M. Korsgaard's 1996 book, The Sources of Normativity. Korsgaard argues that a rational, reflective human agent is committed to valuing reflectiveness (and so "humanity") in her own person and in the person of others. I present this argument and discuss problems about a threatened regress, and problems about the supposed connection between agency and the endorsement of universal principles. I point to the possibility of a theory of agency and will in the territory between a Humean view and the sort of Kantian view for which Korsgaard argues.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bratman2000, author = {Bratman, Michael-E}, title = {Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility and History}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {453-458}, keywords = {ethics, history, morality, responsibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BRATMAN1990, author = {BRATMAN, MICHAEL-E}, title = {Dretske's Desires.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {795-800}, keywords = {action, behavior, desire, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bratman1999, author = {Bratman, Michael-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {238-241}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency}, volume = {65(1)}, year = {1999} } @article{Braun2004, author = {Braun, David-M}, title = {Consciousness and Cognition}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {484-491}, keywords = {cognition, consciousness, metaphysics}, abstract = {This paper is an extended critical review of Michael Thau's book Consciousness and Cognition.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BREITHAUPT1978, author = {BREITHAUPT, ERWIN and GOTESKY, RUBIN}, title = {CREATIVITY: A METASOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {39}, pages = {23-41}, keywords = {activity, creativity, person, process, product, social-philosophy; standard}, abstract = {SOCIOLOGY, IT IS SUGGESTED, PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF THE ART-INSTITUTION, IS THE BEST APPROACH FOR UNDERSTANDING CREATIVITY IN THE ARTS. THE ART-INSTITUTION IS TAKEN AS THE MATRIX WITHIN WHICH ART-STANDARDS ARE PRODUCED AND IN TERMS OF WHICH CREATIVITY IS UNDERSTOOD AND DISTINGUISHED FROM THE NON-CREATIVE. ART-STANDARDS ARE DISTINGUISHED INTO THREE MAIN CATEGORIES: ACCEPT, REJECT AND MOOT. ACCEPT-STANDARDS ARE FURTHER DISTINGUISHED INTO APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL STANDARDS. CREATIVITY, IT IS FURTHER SUGGESTED, IS BEST UNDERSTOOD IN TERMS OF MOOT-STANDARDS WHICH ARE STANDARDS NOT YET ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNING ART-ELITE AS DESERVING OF INCORPORATION IN THE CORPUS OF ART-STANDARDS. WHEN MOOT-STANDARDS ARE APPROVED AS ACCEPT-STANDARDS, IT IS THEN THAT ART-PRODUCTS PRODUCED IN TERMS OF THE MOOT-STANDARDS ARE "RETROSPECTIVELY" CALLED "CREATIVE." THE CEASELESS STRUGGLE BETWEEN ART-GROUPS OVER ART-PRODUCTS AND ART-STANDARDS OFTEN RESULTS IN THE FORMULATION OF CREATIVITY-STANDARDS USED TO JUDGE THE ACCEPTABILITY OF MOOT-STANDARDS AND THE REJECTABILITY OF LONG-ESTABLISHED ACCEPT-STANDARDS. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brewer2001, author = {Brewer, Bill}, title = {Precis of Perception and Reason}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {405-416}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, knowledge, perception, reason}, abstract = {The main arguments of my book, Perception and Reason, are outlined. Part I argues that perceptual experiences provide reasons for empirical beliefs. For such beliefs depend for their contents upon their relations with experiences, and only reason-giving relations may play this crucial content-determining role. Part II argues that reasons require conceptual contents, and explains in detail how perceptual experiences provide such reasons for empirical beliefs. Connections are drawn with traditional foundationalism, coherentism, skepticism, externalism and a priori knowledge.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brewer2001a, author = {Brewer, Bill}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {449-464}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, openness, perception}, abstract = {The arguments and views of my book, Perception and Reason, are developed and defended in response to critical commentaries by Richard Fumerton, Susan Hurley, Naomi Eilan and Michael Martin. The key issues discussed are: whether perceptual experiences have conceptual contents; the bearing of traditional arguments from hallucination; context-dependent reasons for action in minimally rational infants and animals; whether I succeed in capturing the intuitively explanatory role of perceptual experience in connection with the possibility of demonstrative thought; whether it is correct to regard the reason-giving role of perceptual experiences as a product purely of their content.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brewer2004, author = {Brewer, Bill}, title = {Stroud's Quest for Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {408-414}, keywords = {belief, color, metaphysics, reality, sensation}, abstract = {The discussion focuses mainly on Stroud's central argument against the likelihood of any successful unmasking explanation in connection with colour. The suggestion is that his final position is unstable. Either his conclusion that the unmasker's overall strategy is self-defeating is stronger than is warranted, or his insistence that no conclusive result is established in connection with the fundamental quest for reality is unduly cautious, depending on how precisely the dependence, which he rightly insists upon, of the identification of perceptions of colour upon some identification of colour properties themselves, is to be taken.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brewer2003, author = {Brewer, Talbot}, title = {Two Kinds of Commitments (and Two Kinds of Social Groups)}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(3)}, pages = {554-583}, keywords = {commitment, group, metaphysics, promise, social}, abstract = {I argue that theories which seek to model all commitments on promises, or to ground them all on voluntary consent, can account only for one sort of obligation and not for the other. Since social groups are most perspicuously categorized in terms of the sorts of commitments that bind their members together, this puts me in a position to distinguish two importantly different kinds of social groups, which I call aggregations and associations. I try to show that this position can account for features of the normative structure of social groups that are overlooked by those theorists (e.g., Margaret Gilbert) who have attempted to offer a unitary, voluntarist account of the phenomena under investigation. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bringsjord1999, author = {Bringsjord, Selmer}, title = {The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {41-69}, keywords = {computation, metaphysics, mind, zombie}, abstract = {It is true that if zombies--creatures who are behaviorally indistinguishable from us, but no more conscious than a rock--are logically possible, the computational conception of mind is false? Are zombies logically possible? Are they physically possible? This paper is a careful, sustained argument for affirmative answers to these three questions.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Brittain2001, author = {Brittain, Charles}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {738-740}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics}, volume = {68(3)}, year = {2001} } @article{Broackes2004, author = {Broackes, Justin}, title = {Realism, Scepticism and the Lament for an Archimedean Point: Stroud and the Quest for Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {415-422}, keywords = {color, metaphysics, phenomenalism, realism, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Broadie1991, author = {Broadie, Sarah}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {728-731}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Ethics With Aristotle}, volume = {55(3)}, year = {1991} } @article{Brock2001, author = {Brock, Dan-W}, title = {Gert on the Limits of Morality's Requirements}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {435-440}, keywords = {ethics, good, limits, morality, nature}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brock1998, author = {Brock, Dan-W}, title = {Aggregating Costs and Benefits}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {963-967}, keywords = {ethics, morality, mortality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BROCKHAUS1991, author = {BROCKHAUS, Richard-R}, title = {Realism and Psychologism in 19th Century Logic.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {logic, nineteenth, psychologism, realism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brooks1994, author = {Brooks, D-H-M}, title = {How to Perform a Reduction}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {803-814}, keywords = {biology, knowledge, physics, reductionism, science}, abstract = {The reductionist wishes to show that everything ontologically "is" physical, everything is ultimately determined by the physical and finally that everything is ultimately explicable in terms of physics. The Nagel model of reduction was based on the classical positivist hypothetico-deductive model of explanation. This model does not extend to biology, because of the crucial notion of a biological function. I wish to argue that those who argue for the irreducibility of biology and psychology are basing their arguments on an outmoded model of reduction.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Broome1998, author = {Broome, John}, title = {Kamm on Fairness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {955-961}, keywords = {ethics, fairness, morality, mortality}, abstract = {When you have a choice between saving five people and saving one, what is a fair way to choose? In her Morality, Mortality, Frances Kamm describes three procedures for choosing, each of which she considers fair. This paper examines her arguments for all three and rejects them. It argues that the only fair procedure is one Kamm does not recommend: to decide by tossing a coin. Nevertheless, despite the fairness of tossing a coin, you should simply save the five directly, without tossing a coin, because the greater good of saving the five is enough to override fairness.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BROWN1967, author = {BROWN, CLIFFORD}, title = {LEIBNIZ AND AESTHETICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {70-80}, keywords = {aesthetics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brown1992, author = {Brown, Curtis}, title = {Direct and Indirect Belief}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {289-316}, keywords = {being, belief, consciousness, mental-states; metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brown2001, author = {Brown, Charlotte}, title = {Is the General Point of View the Moral Point of View?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {197-203}, keywords = {commitment, metaphysics, morality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brown1992a, author = {Brown, Harold-I}, title = {Direct Realism, Indirect Realism, and Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {341-363}, keywords = {mental-states; metaphysics, object, perception, realism}, abstract = {I argue that direct realism does not leave us in a better situation than indirect realism for learning the nature of the physical world. In either case, claims about physical objects must be justified by the hypothetico-deductive procedures that provide the basis for all justifications of scientific theories. The main metaphysical thesis of direct realism is accepted in this paper and the heart of the paper consists of a reconstruction of two traditional arguments against direct realism--the arguments from illusion and from causality--as arguments for an epistemological, rather than a metaphysical, conclusion.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brown2000, author = {Brown, Jessica}, title = {Critical Reasoning, Understanding and Self-Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(3)}, pages = {659-676}, keywords = {epistemology, reasoning, self-knowledge; understanding}, abstract = {The paper extends Burge's own work on critical reasoning. He argued that critical reasoning imposes a limit on the extent to which we can be mistaken about what thoughts we are having; in general, we can know nonempirically what we are thinking (Burge, "Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society XCVI, 1996). He does not explicitly consider whether critical reasoning also imposes a limit on incomplete understanding of thoughts. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BROWN1971, author = {BROWN, PATTERSON}, title = {STACE'S REFUTATION OF REALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {426-428}, keywords = {metaphysics, realism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BROWNING1988, author = {BROWNING, DOUGLAS}, title = {SAMENESS THROUGH CHANGE AND THE COINCIDENCE OF PROPERTIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {103-121}, keywords = {change, identity, metaphysics}, abstract = {ANY ATTEMPT TO ASSIMILATE THE RELATION OF NUMERICAL SAMENESS IN CASES OF SAMENESS THROUGH CHANGE TO THE RELATION OF IDENTITY AS SPECIFIED BY LEIBNIZ'S LAW FAILS. THIS ARTICLE TRIES TO SHOW WHY THIS IS SO. IT ARGUES, FIRST, THAT THE STANDARDLY ACCEPTED VIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF LEIBNIZ'S LAW TO SUCH CASES, THOUGH QUITE PROPER, DOES NOT REST UPON NOR PRESUPPOSE SUCH AN ASSIMILATION. IT THEN ARGUES THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO ENSURE THE COINCIDENCE OF PROPERTIES IN SUCH CASES BY LIMITING THE SCOPE OF LEIBNIZ'S LAW TO "GENUINE PROPERTIES" HAS THE RESULT OF MARKING OUT WHAT SHALL COUNT AS SUCH PROPERTIES IN A MANNER WHICH IS EITHER PROMISCUOUS OR ALTOGETHER ARBITRARY, AND IN ANY CASE VACUOUS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BROWNING1968, author = {BROWNING, DOUGLAS}, title = {CREATIVITY, CORRESPONDENCE, AND STATEMENTS ABOUT THE FUTURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {514-536}, keywords = {correspondence, creativity, epistemology, future, statement, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BROWNING1973, author = {BROWNING, DOUGLAS}, title = {THE CANON OF SUBJECTABLES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {171-186}, keywords = {language, logic, predicate-logic; predication, singulars}, abstract = {IT IS ARGUED THAT THE CANON OF SUBJECTABLES, NAMELY, THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO REFER TO ANY SINGULAR BY MEANS OF A SUBJECTING-EXPRESSION, IS QUESTIONABLE. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THERE MAY BE REFERENTS OF CERTAIN SENTENCES OR CERTAIN PREDICATE-EXPRESSIONS WHICH CAN ONLY MISLEADINGLY BE SUBJECTED TO PREDICATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brueckner1993, author = {Brueckner, Anthony}, title = {One More Failed Transcendental Argument}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {633-636}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, scepticism, self, transcendentalism}, abstract = {This paper is a critical discussion of an argument (by Douglas C Long) to show that if one knows that one is the subject of various mental states, then one has knowledge that this subject is a material thing.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brueckner1994, author = {Brueckner, Anthony}, title = {The Shifting Content of Knowledge Attributions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {123-126}, keywords = {context, epistemology, knowledge, language, truth}, abstract = {Does the content of a knowledge-attributing sentence depend only upon features of the context of utterance? Or do features of the knower's own context affect such content?}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brueckner1998, author = {Brueckner, Anthony}, title = {Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {361-364}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, paradox, self-knowledg}, abstract = {In a number of papers, Sydney Shoemaker has argued that first-order belief plus rationality implies second-order belief. This paper is a critical discussion of Shoemaker's argument.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BRUECKNER1986, author = {BRUECKNER, ANTHONY-L}, title = {HUMEAN FICTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {655-664}, keywords = {metaphysics, personal-identity; scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brueckner1994a, author = {Brueckner, Anthony}, title = {The Structure of the Skeptical Argument}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {827-835}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, language, scepticism}, abstract = {A "closure principle" for knowledge is thought to be required by a now standard formulation of the Cartesian skeptic's argument to show that one lacks knowledge about the external world. It is argued that another epistemic principle is also required, an "underdetermination principle" that renders closure superfluous.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brueckner2005, author = {Brueckner, Anthony}, title = {Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {436-443}, keywords = {epistemology, evidence, knowledge, scepticism}, abstract = {This is a critical discussion of Williamson's claims that (1) e is evidence iff e is known, and (2) skepticism about knowledge of the external world can be blocked by denying that one's evidence is the same in a normal situation and in a skeptical brain-in-a-vat situation.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brueckner2005a, author = {Brueckner, Anthony}, title = {Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {384-391}, keywords = {epistemology, fallibilism, knowledge, scepticism, underdetermination}, abstract = {Fallibilism about knowledge and justification is a widely held view in epistemology. In this paper, I will try to arrive at a proper formulation of fallibilism. Fallibilists often hold that Cartesian skepticism is a view that deserves to be taken seriously and dealt with somehow. I argue that it turns out that a canonical form of skeptical argument depends upon the denial of fallibilism. I conclude by considering a response on behalf of the skeptic.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BRUNIUS1970, author = {BRUNIUS, TEDDY}, title = {THE AESTHETICS OF ROMAN INGARDEN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {590-595}, keywords = {aesthetics, art-object; phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BUCHANAN1976, author = {BUCHANAN, ALLEN}, title = {BASIC KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {101-108}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, proposition}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BUCHDAHL1961, author = {BUCHDAHL, G}, title = {THE PROBLEM OF NEGATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {163-178}, keywords = {dialogue, epistemology, evidence, meaning, negation, perception, reality, relation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BUNGE1968, author = {BUNGE, MARIO}, title = {THEORY OF PARTIAL TRUTH, NOT PROVED INCONSISTENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {297-298}, keywords = {epistemology, truth}, abstract = {R. ACKERMANN'S CHARGE THAT THE AUTHOR'S AXIOM SYSTEM FOR PARTIAL TRUTH IS INCONSISTENT, IS SHOWN TO BE UNJUSTIFIED AND TO REST ON THE CRITIC'S NEGLECT OF THE CLAUSES OF CERTAIN THEOREMS IN THE THEORY. THE LATTER OCCURS IN THE AUTHOR'S "THE MYTH OF SIMPLICITY", (ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, N.J.: PRENTICE-HALL, 1963).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BUNGE1961, author = {BUNGE, MARIO}, title = {ETHICS AS A SCIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {139-152}, keywords = {ethics, fact, goodness, justification, linguistic-analysis; moral-judgment; norm, science, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bunzl1997, author = {Bunzl, Martin}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {490-493}, publisher = {Routledge}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Real History: Reflections on Historical Practice}, volume = {62(2)}, year = {1997} } @article{BURBIDGE1981, author = {BURBIDGE, JOHN}, title = {MAN, GOD, AND DEATH IN HEGEL'S "PHENOMENOLOGY".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {183-196}, keywords = {death, god, man, negativity, philosophical-anthropolog}, abstract = {RELYING SOLELY ON MASTER/SLAVE AND THE PREFACE, KOJEVE HAS CONTRASTED THE DEATH AND NEGATIVITY OF MODERN MAN WITH THE POSITIVITY OF GOD. THIS PAPER TRACES THE THEME OF DEATH THROUGHOUT THE "PHENOMENOLOGY": THE LIFE-AND-DEATH STRUGGLE, MASTER/SLAVE, UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS, ANTIGONE, CULTURE AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT, THE REIGN OF TERROR, AND REVEALED RELIGION. IT CONCLUDES NOT ONLY THAT DIVINITY FOR HEGEL IS DEFINED BY NEGATIVITY AND DEATH, BUT THAT MODERN MAN'S NEGATIVITY, FAR FROM OPPOSING HIM TO THE DIVINE, RECONCILES HIM WITH GOD. A FINAL COMMENT RELATES THE THREE TYPES OF NEGATIVITY IN DEATH TO SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT HEGEL'S LOGICAL METHOD.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Burge2003, author = {Burge, Tyler}, title = {Perceptual Entitlement}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {503-548}, keywords = {belief, entitlement, epistemology, individualism, perception}, abstract = {The paper develops a conception of epistemic warrant as applied to perceptual belief, called "entitlement", that does not require the warranted individual to be capable of understanding the warrant. It characterizes entitlement as fulfillment of an epistemic norm that is a priori associated with a certain representational function that can be known a priori to be a function of perception. The paper connects anti-individualism, a thesis about the nature of mental states, and perceptual entitlement. It presents an argument that explains the objectivity and validity of perceptual entitlement partly in terms of the nature of perceptual states--hence the nature of perceptual beliefs, which are constitutively associated with perceptual states. The paper discusses ways that an individual can be entitled to perceptual belief through its connection to perception, and ways that entitlement to perceptual belief can be undermined. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Burge2003a, author = {Burge, Tyler}, title = {Social Anti-Individualism, Objective Reference}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {682-690}, keywords = {inference, language, objectivity, reference}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Burgess1997, author = {Burgess, John-P and Rosen, Gideon}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {723-727}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics}, volume = {62(3)}, year = {1997} } @article{Burke1994, author = {Burke, Michael}, title = {Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Among Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {591-624}, keywords = {epistemology, matter, metaphysics, object, sortal, substance}, abstract = {This article presents a novel account of the relations among objects, sorts, sortals, and persistence conditions. Among its advantages over the standard account is its compatibility with the commonsense principle of one material object to a place. The account enables us to dispose of the full range of putative counterexamples to that principle, including, notably, that of persons and their bodies. And it enables us to do so without resorting to anti- essentialism, temporal parts, sortal relativism, temporal relativism, mereological essentialism, or other theories that conflict with our ordinary ways of thinking about the world.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BURKE1962, author = {BURKE, RICHARD}, title = {G H MEAD AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {81-88}, keywords = {empiricism, experience, metaphysics, methodology, science, speculation}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE IS A SUMMARY OF THE "EMPIRICIST METAPHYSICS" OF GEORGE HERBERT MEAD. AGAINST THE COMMON INTERPRETATION (OF M NATANSON, A E MURPHY, P PFUETZE AND OTHERS) THAT MEAD BEGAN AS A TOUGH-MINDED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGIST AND ENDED AS A METAPHYSICIAN LIKE WHITEHEAD AND BERGSON, I ARGUE THAT (1) HE HELD A CONSISTENTLY POSITIVIST OR ANTI-METAPHYSICAL POSITION THROUGHOUT HIS LIFE; AND (2) HIS ATTEMPT TO INCORPORATE "SUBJECTIVE" AND "PHENOMENOLOGICAL" DATA INTO THE METHOD OF SCIENCE DESERVES SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BURKE1967, author = {BURKE, RICHARD-J}, title = {ARISTOTLE ON THE LIMITS OF ARGUMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {386-400}, keywords = {argument, logic}, abstract = {"IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO EXAMINE EVERY PROBLEM AND EVERY THESIS, BUT ONLY THOSE ABOUT WHICH DOUBT MIGHT BE FELT BY THE KIND OF PERSON WHO NEEDS ARGUMENT RATHER THAN PUNISHMENT OR PERCEPTION. FOR THOSE WHO DOUBT WHETHER OR NOT THE GODS OUGHT TO BE HONORED AND PARENTS LOVED NEED PUNISHMENT, WHILE THOSE WHO DOUBT WHETHER OR NOT SNOW IS WHITE NEED PERCEPTION" ("TOPICS" I, 11, 105A3-8). SUCH PASSAGES APPEAR FREQUENTLY IN ARISTOTLE, AND AT CRUCIAL POINTS. THE MODERN READER IS LIKELY TO CONCLUDE (AND GOOD STUDENTS DO CONCLUDE) THAT ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE, IN CONTRAST TO PARTICULAR IDEAS AND ARGUMENTS, IS FLAGRANTLY DOGMATIC; FOR JUST SUCH QUESTIONS HAD BEEN LIVE ISSUES TO PLATO AND THE SOPHISTS. A MORE PLAUSIBLE APPROACH IS TO CREDIT THE INVENTOR OF FORMAL LOGIC WITH MORE PERSPICACITY THAN THE AVERAGE LOGICIAN RATHER THAN LESS. AN EXAMINATION OF HIS ACTUAL PROCEDURE, WHICH IS ALMOST ALWAYS "DIALECTICAL" RATHER THAN "DEMONSTRATIVE" ("TOPICS" I, 1), REVEALS A SOPHISTICATED THEORY: THAT "PROOF" IN PHILOSOPHY IS ALWAYS RELATIVE TO THE CONDITIONS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF INQUIRY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Burns1991, author = {Burns, Linda-Claire}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {483-486}, publisher = {Kluwer}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Vagueness}, volume = {54(2)}, year = {1991} } @article{BURTON1976, author = {BURTON, ROBERT-G}, title = {THE HUMAN AWARENESS OF TIME: AN ANALYSIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {303-318}, keywords = {anticipation, future, memory, metaphysics, past, time}, abstract = {THIS ANALYSIS OF MEMORY, ANTICIPATION, AND AUDITORY EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT IN MEMORY WE HAVE DIRECT AWARENESS OF THE PAST AS FULLY DETERMINATE, WHEREAS ANTICIPATION IS DIRECTED TOWARD A FUTURE THAT IS DETERMINATE ONLY IN ITS GENERAL CHARACTER BUT NEVER IN ITS ACTUAL DETAILS. WE EXPERIENCE THE PRESENT IN A CONTEXT THAT INCLUDES BOTH THE BACKGROUND OF THE IMMEDIATE PAST AND THE HORIZON OF THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THE NOVELTY OF EACH EXPERIENCE CAN BE APPREHENDED ONLY AGAINST THE CONTRASTING BACKGROUND OF ITS IMMEDIATE PAST. THE AWARENESS OF CONTINUING PROCESS REFLECTS A COORDINATE ANTICIPATION OF THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BURTON1982, author = {BURTON, ROBERT-G}, title = {CHOICE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {581-586}, keywords = {choice, free-will; metaphysics}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO CAPTURE KEY FEATURES IN OUR EXPERIENCE OF CHOICE. THE INITIAL FORMULA, "I CHOOSE X," UNDERGOES TRANSFORMATIONS EVENTUATING IN THE FORMULA, "I CHOOSE TO DO X RATHER THAN Y BECAUSE...." MOST OF THE ELEMENTS THAT EMERGE ARE IMPLICIT IN THE DICTIONARY DEFINITION OF 'CHOICE' AS "THE VOLUNTARY ACT OF SELECTING OR SEPARATING FROM TWO OR MORE THINGS THAT WHICH IS PREFERRED." FINALLY, THE PROBLEM OF "CHOICE WITHOUT PREFERENCE" IS RESOLVED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BUTCHVAROV1960, author = {BUTCHVAROV, PANAYOT}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF POSSIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {318-337}, keywords = {actuality, fact, metaphysics, noncontradiction, nonexistence, possibility, thing, thought}, abstract = {THREE GENERAL THEORIES ARE DISTINGUISHED: (1) A POSSIBLE THING IS ONLY IN AND FOR THOUGHT; (2) WHAT IS POSSIBLE IS MERELY WHAT IS NOT SELF-CONTRADICTORY; (3) POSSIBLES ARE ACTUAL IN THEMSELVES BUT THEY ARE NOT IN THE WORLD. NEITHER OF THESE THEORIES SEEM TO BE WHOLLY SATISFACTORY TO THE AUTHOR. A SUBSTITUTE THEORY IS GIVEN, WHERE POSSIBILITY IS DEFINED AS "BEING-THOUGHT-ABOUT." HOWEVER, THIS APPEARS TO CONFLICT WITH THE ORDINARY MEANING OF THE TERM, IN REFERENCE TO ACTUALITY. IT IS THEN ARGUED THAT THE TRADITIONAL MEANING OF POSSIBILITY IN TERMS OF ACTUALITY IS ITSELF CONTRADICTORY. SO, THE NEW THEORY STANDS, PROVIDES SATISFACTORY CRITERIA OF THE POSSIBLE, SOLVES CERTAIN PUZZLES, AND IMPROVES ON THE TRADITIONAL MEANING OF THE TERM. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BUTLER1976, author = {BUTLER, CLARK}, title = {HEGEL AND FREUD: A COMPARISON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {506-522}, keywords = {consciousness, philosophical-anthropology; self-consciousnes}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE POINTS TO CONSIDERABLE CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THE FREUDIAN THEORY OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND THE DIALECTIC OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN HEGEL'S "PHENOMENOLOGY", BETWEEN THE FREUDIAN THEORY OF PSYCHO-SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, AND BETWEEN THE FREUDIAN AND HEGELIAN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHIES. BOTH MEN TAKE THE "DIALECTIC OF REVOLUTION AND RESTORATION" TO BE AN ESSENTIAL KEY TO BOTH INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE HISTORY. IT IS ARGUED THAT FREUD IS, THOUGH UNWITTINGLY, A DIALECTICIAN, AND THAT PSYCHOANALYSIS LENDS ITSELF TO EXPRESSION IN THE LANGUAGE OF HEGELIAN DIALECTICS BETTER THAN IN THE MECHANISTIC-PHYSIOLOGICAL LANGUAGE FREUD IN FACT USED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BUTLER1988, author = {BUTLER, DOUGLAS}, title = {CHARACTER TRAITS IN EXPLANATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {215-238}, keywords = {behavior, character-trait; explanation, metaphysics}, abstract = {IT WOULD BE LUNACY OUTSIDE OF METAETHICS TO DENY ALL INFERENCES FROM FACTS ABOUT TRAITS OF CHARACTER TO THE ASCRIPTIONS OF VIRTUES OR VICES. IN ORDER TO EVALUATE SUCH INFERENCES THIS PAPER EXTENSIVELY EXPLORES THE NATURE OF CHARACTER TRAITS AS DEVICES FOR ENRICHING COMMON SENSE EXPLANATIONS OF BEHAVIOUR. TRAITS ARE NOT INSTRUMENTALLY STRUCTURED BUNDLES OF BELIEFS AND DESIRES. THEY ARE COMPLEXES INVOLVING DISPOSITIONS TO FORM CERTAIN REPRESENTATIONS AND TO ATTACH PRACTICAL SALIENCE TO THEM; IN MANY CASES THEY ALSO INVOLVE CONDITIONAL DESIRES. IF WE UNDERSTAND TRAITS THIS WAY WE CAN COMPLETE SOME MORAL INFERENCES THAT WE CANNOT COMPLETE IF WE ASCRIBE ONLY INSTRUMENTAL MOTIVES. BUT THIS CHARACTER TRAIT STRUCTURE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO GET FACT-TO-VALUE INFERENCES OFF THE GROUND FROM SCRATCH, IF WE DISREGARD OUR EVERYDAY MORAL EVALUATIONS OF THE DESIRES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS THAT WE USE TO FILL OUT THE STRUCTURE OF SPECIFIC TRAITS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Butler1997, author = {Butler, Keith}, title = {Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {773-800}, keywords = {content, epistemology, externalism, internalism, knowledge}, abstract = {Externalism holds, and internalism denies, that the individuation of many of an individual's mental states (e.g., thoughts about the physical world) depends necessarily on relations that individual bears to the physical and/or social environment. Many philosophers, externalists and internalists alike, believe that introspection yields knowledge of the contents of our thoughts that is direct and authoritative. It is not obvious, however, that the metaphysical claims of externalism are compatible with this epistemological thesis. Some have sought to dispel the worry that there is a conflict, though they admit that if such a conflict exists, it spells trouble for externalism. Boghossian has argued that there is indeed a conflict between externalism and introspective knowledge of content. Surprisingly, however, he also argues that there is a conflict between internalism and introspective knowledge of content. I will defend Boghossian's claim that there is a conflict between externalism and knowledge of content, but criticize his claim that there is a conflict between internalism and knowledge of content.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BYKHOVSKII1973, author = {BYKHOVSKII, BERNARD}, title = {A PHILOSOPHY OF DESPAIR.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {187-200}, keywords = {existentialism, idealism, nineteenth, science}, abstract = {THE PHILOSOPHY OF EXISTENTIALISM IS BASED ON THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN EGOCENTRIC VOLUNTARISM AND OBJECTIVE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. A CONVERSION OF ITS THEORY INTO GOAL-DIRECTED, PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IS OPPOSED BY ITS PERSPECTIVELESS, PATHETIC-IRRATIONAL DISORIENTATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY GIVES NO ALTERNATIVES TO FEAR AND DESPAIR AND STIFLES EFFORTS TO REBUILD THE WORLD ON A RATIONAL FOUNDATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BYKHOVSKII1969, author = {BYKHOVSKII, B}, title = {MARCUSISM AGAINST MARXISM: A CRITIQUE OF UNCRITICAL CRITICISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {203-218}, keywords = {dialectic, marxism, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Byrne2002, author = {Byrne, Alex}, title = {Semantic Values?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {201-207}, keywords = {language, meaning, normativity, semantics}, abstract = {This is a commentary on Lance and Hawthorne's The Grammar of Meaning and focuses on their view that meaning is normative.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Byrne1996, author = {Byrne, Alex}, title = {On Misinterpreting Kripke's Wittgenstein}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {339-343}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, private-languag}, abstract = {I argue that Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language has been widely misinterpreted. According to the prevailing interpretation, Kripke's Wittgenstein says that, contrary to appearances, attributions of meaning are not factual claims at all. They look like statements of alleged fact, but really they have some entirely different role. On my reading Kripke's Wittgenstein claims that no reductive account of meaning facts is possible, and that the demand for such an account is motivated by misleading philosophical pictures of what it is to mean something by a word.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Byrne2003, author = {Byrne, Alex}, title = {Color and Similarity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(3)}, pages = {641-665}, keywords = {color, epistemology, perception, similarity}, abstract = {Similarity claims about the colors, for instance that blue is more similar to purple than to yellow, are sometimes held to pose a serious problem for physicalism about color: the view that colors are physical properties of some kind. I examine various responses to this problem, find them wanting, and give my own solution, which appeals to the way colors are visually represented. Finally, I argue that the proposed account removes the principal motivation for Lewis's and Walker's response to Kripke's Wittgenstein, in terms of "natural" properties.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CAHN1977, author = {CAHN, STEVEN-M}, title = {RANDOM CHOICES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {549-551}, keywords = {choice, free-will; metaphysics, randomness}, abstract = {THE CLAIM THAT THE DOCTRINE OF FREE WILL CAN BE TRUE ONLY IF THE DOCTRINE OF DETERMINISM IS FALSE HAS OFTEN BEEN ATTACKED ON THE GROUNDS THAT WHAT IS RANDOM IS NO MORE FREE THAN WHAT IS CAUSED. I CALL ATTENTION TO A COMMON PHENOMENON THAT SUGGESTS THAT A RANDOM ACT, THOUGH PERHAPS UNCAUSED, NEED BE NEITHER ACCIDENTAL NOR IRRESPONSIBLE. DISCUSSION CENTERS ON AN EXAMPLE SUCH AS CHOOSING A NUMBER FROM 1 TO 10.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CAM1987, author = {CAM, PHILIP}, title = {PROPOSITIONS ABOUT IMAGES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {335-338}, keywords = {image, mental, metaphysics, proposition}, abstract = {THE PAPER CRITICIZES A LINE OF ARGUMENT WITH WHICH DANIEL DENNETT DEFENDS A PROPOSITIONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MENTAL IMAGERY. IT ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT DENNETT'S PROPOSITIONAL RECONSTRUCTIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH A DEPICTIVE REPRESENTATIONAL FORMAT FOR IMAGERY, WHILE THEY FAIL TO FULLY CAPTURE ITS PHENOMENOLOGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CAM1984, author = {CAM, PHILIP}, title = {DENNETT ON INTELLIGENT STORAGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {247-262}, keywords = {artificial-intelligence; brain-processes; metaphysics}, abstract = {ACCORDING TO DENNETT, THERE ARE ONLY TWO SORTS OF ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION HOW THE BRAIN STORES AND USES INFORMATION IN SATISFYING THE ORGANISM'S NEEDS. FIRST, THERE ARE FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNTS OF THE KIND SKETCHED BY DENNETT IN "CONTENT AND CONSCIOUSNESS" AND, SECONDLY, THERE IS THE "BRAIN-WRITING" HYPOTHESIS THAT THE BRAIN EMPLOYS ITS OWN LANGUAGE. I ATTEMPT BOTH TO BRING OUT THE INADEQUACY OF DENNETT'S APPROACH AND TO SHOW THAT THE "BRAIN-WRITING" HYPOTHESIS IS NOT UNDERMINED BY HIS CRITICISMS. IF, AS DENNETT SAYS, THIS HYPOTHESIS FORMS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO HIS OWN ACCOUNT, THEN THE FACT THAT DENNETT'S STORY MUST BE REJECTED SHOWS THAT SOME SUCH ALTERNATIVE IS CORRECT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Campbell1997, author = {Campbell, John}, title = {Precis of Past, Space and Self}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {633-634}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, past, self, space}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Campbell1997a, author = {Campbell, John}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {655-670}, keywords = {epistemology, metaphysics, past, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Campos2003, author = {Campos, Manuel}, title = {Analyticity and Incorrigibility}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(3)}, pages = {689-708}, keywords = {analyticity, epistemology, incorrigibility, meaning, necessity}, abstract = {The traditional point of view on analyticity implies that truth in virtue only of meaning entails a priori acceptability and vice versa. The argument for this claim is based on the idea that meaning as it concerns truth and meaning as it concerns competence are one and the same thing. In this paper I argue that the extensions of these notions do not coincide. I hold that truth in virtue of meaning--truth for semantic reasons--doesn't imply a priori acceptability, and that a priori reflection based only on knowledge of meaning--in the sense of competence--doesn't necessitate true conclusions. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Care2000, author = {Care, Norman-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {738-740}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Decent People}, volume = {66(3)}, year = {2000} } @other{Care1998, author = {Care, Norman-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {1090-1093}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Living with One's Past: Personal Fates and Moral Pain}, volume = {49(4)}, year = {1998} } @article{Cargile1996, author = {Cargile, James}, title = {Evidence and Inquiry by Susan Haack}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {621-625}, keywords = {belief, coherentism, epistemology, evidence}, abstract = {This is a discussion of some points from Susan Haack's Evidence and Inquiry. One point is the definition of terms such as "basic belief" and "one-directional justification." Another is the claim that "assuming A's evidence held constant, the less strongly A believes that p, the more justified he is in this (weak) belief." Another is the criticism of C.I. Lewis's famous saying that "If anything is to be probable, something must be certain."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cargile2000, author = {Cargile, James}, title = {Skepticism and Possibilities}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {157-171}, keywords = {epistemology, possibility, scepticism, truth}, abstract = {One skeptical strategy against A's claim to know that P is to hold that it is logically possible for someone to have the same "base" (a term needing explaining) for P as A does in spite of its not being true that P. Philosophical replies have focused on showing that these are not genuine possibilities. Whether they are can be an interesting question of metaphysics, but it is argued in this paper that this metaphysical discussion is not the proper focus for an assessment of skepticism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carlson2003, author = {Carlson, Erik}, title = {Counterexamples to Principle Beta: A Response to Crisp and Warfield}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(3)}, pages = {730-737}, keywords = {consequence, determinism, freedom, metaphysics}, abstract = {The well-known "consequence argument" for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism relies on a certain rule of inference; "principle beta". Thomas Crisp and Ted Warfield have recently argued that all hitherto suggested counterexamples to beta can be easily circumvented by proponents of the consequence argument. I present a new counterexample which, I argue, is free from the flaws Crisp and Warfield detect in earlier examples.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carman2001, author = {Carman, Taylor}, title = {On Making Sense (and Nonsense) of Heidegger}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {561-572}, keywords = {being, metaphysics}, abstract = {Herman Philipse's Heidegger's Philosophy of Being is an attempt to interpret, analyze, and ultimately discredit the whole of Heidegger's thought. But Philipse's reading of the texts is uncharitable, and the ideas he presents and criticizes often bear little resemblance to Heidegger's views. Philipse relies on a crude distinction between "theoretical" and "applicative" interpretations in arguing that Heidegger's conception of interpretation as a kind of projection (Entwurf) is, like the liar's paradox, formally self-defeating. But even granting the distinction, the charge of reflective incoherence is fallacious and question-begging. Finally, Philipse advances the astonishing "interpretive hypothesis" that the seemingly morbid existential themes in Being and Time were part of a deliberate "Pascalian strategy" to win converts to Heidegger's own idiosyncratic "postmonotheist worship of Being." (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARMICHAEL1969, author = {CARMICHAEL, PETER-A}, title = {"BASED ON".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {113-115}, keywords = {epistemology, induction}, abstract = {ARE GENERAL STATEMENTS BASED ON PARTICULARS? NO. VICE VERSA. SO FAR AS THEY HAVE A BASE, IT IS SPECULATION OR HYPOTHESIS, OF WHICH THE DATA OF EXPERIENCE, OR PROPOSITIONS REPRESENTING THEM, ARE CONFIRMATORY INSTANCES. IF A GENERAL STATEMENT DERIVED FROM THE DATA, IT COULD NOT BE DENIED SO LONG AS THE DATA WERE ADMITTED. INDUCTION IS NOT FROM THE DATA, THOUGH IT MAY BE INSPIRED BY THEM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARMICHAEL1966, author = {CARMICHAEL, PETER-A}, title = {THE RHETORICAL CONCEPTION OF TRUTH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {104-106}, keywords = {language, metalanguage, rhetoric, semantics, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARMICHAEL1974, author = {CARMICHAEL, PETER-A}, title = {MILL AND 'DESIRABLE'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {34}, pages = {435-436}, keywords = {desire, ethics, linguistic-analysi}, abstract = {MILL'S CONTENTION ("UTILITARIANISM," CHAPTER 4) THAT THE TERM 'DESIRABLE' SIGNIFIES A DESIRING, NOT JUST A CAPACITY OR DUTY OF DESIRING, IS JUSTIFIED BY THE FACT THAT WITHOUT DESIRE 'DESIRABLE' WOULD BE VACUOUS. THE DESIRABLE IS ANYTHING REGARDED DESIRINGLY, AS MILL CONTENDED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARMICHAEL1973, author = {CARMICHAEL, PETER-A}, title = {KANT AND JESUS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {412-416}, keywords = {categorical-imperative; christ, ethics}, abstract = {A REJOINDER TO AN ARGUMENT BY S K THOMAS IN "MIND" THAT THE 'CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE' AND THE 'GOLDEN RULE' ARE SIDES OF THE SAME COIN, THIS ARTICLE HOLDS THAT, RATHER, THERE IS AN ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THEM, THE 'GOLDEN RULE' ENJOINING EGOISM, TACITLY EXTENDED UNIVERSALLY, AND THE 'CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE' A SELFLESS UNIVERSALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARMICHAEL1977, author = {CARMICHAEL, PETER-A}, title = {THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AT WORK IN RELIGION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {247-250}, keywords = {belief, ontological-proof; religion}, abstract = {THE CREEDS OF RELIGION, NOT BEING OPEN TO OBJECTIVE REVIEW AND CONFIRMATION, ARE SUBJECTIVE ONLY. THEY PRESUME THAT THE IDEA INTERNALLY RAISES THE OBJECT. THIS IS THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT EXTENDED. IT REMAINS INTERNAL, OF NO EXTERNAL IMPORT, AND ISSUES IN SOLIPSISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARNES1964, author = {CARNES, ROBERT-D}, title = {DESCARTES AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {502-511}, keywords = {attribute, circularity, concept, existence, god, necessary, ontological-proof; property, religion}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO PINPOINT EXPLICITLY THE VICIOUS CIRCULARITY IN PROPOSITION I OF DESCARTES' "GEOMETRICAL DEMONSTRATIONS" OF GOD'S EXISTENCE. THE ARGUMENT IS TREATED BOTH DISCURSIVELY AND SYMBOLICALLY. SINCE THE PHRASE "NATURE OR CONCEPT" OCCURS CRUCIALLY, THE TERM "CONCEPT" IS EXAMINED RELEVANT TO THE FOLLOWING DISTINCTIONS: (I) PROPERTY CONCEPTS--GENERAL AND INDIVIDUAL (ENUMERATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVELY UNIQUE) (II) PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS--DEPENDING ON HOW ONE INTERPRETS "CONCEPT," THE ARGUMENT DIFFERS IN FORM AND CONCLUSION. WHEN "CONCEPT" IS TAKEN IN THE SENSE OF: GENERAL PROPERTY CONCEPTS AND DESCRIPTIVELY UNIQUE, INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY CONCEPTS--ONLY A HYPOTHETICAL CONCLUSION IS DERIVABLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARNEY1962, author = {CARNEY, JAMES-D}, title = {WAS MOORE TALKING NONSENSE IN 1918?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {521-527}, keywords = {after-image; appearance, epistemology, object, perception, reality, seeing, sense-dat}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carney1993, author = {Carney, James-D}, title = {Representation and Style}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {811-828}, keywords = {metaphysics, phenomenology, representation, style, visual-ar}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARR1973, author = {CARR, DAVID}, title = {THE "FIFTH MEDITATION" AND HUSSERL'S CARTESIANISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {14-35}, keywords = {cartesianism, epistemology, experience, phenomenology, solipsism}, abstract = {THIS PAPER IS A STUDY OF HUSSERL'S FIFTH CARTESIAN MEDITATION IN RELATION TO THE FIRST FOUR. IT ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT THIS SECTION OF HUSSERL'S WORK EXHIBITS A PROFOUND DEPARTURE FROM THE PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES OF CARTESIAN PHILOSOPHY, IN SPITE OF THE WORK'S TITLE. IN PARTICULAR, IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO ADDRESS THE TRADITIONAL PROBLEM OF SOLIPSISM, A TYPICALLY CARTESIAN PROBLEM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carrier1993, author = {Carrier, L-S}, title = {The Impossibility of Massive Error}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {405-409}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, scepticism, semantics}, abstract = {Kirk Ludwig thinks that Davidson's anti-skeptical argument is designed to show the "logical" impossibility of massive error, which begs the question against the skeptic. Ludwig's criticism can be overcome by interpreting Davidson as arguing, instead, for its "epistemic" impossibility: massive error is inconsistent with many things that we know, including our knowledge of language, its intertranslatability, and its being learned in the presence of that which our words describe. If the skeptic responds that we lack knowledge of these things, Davidson's position is best defended by denying that the only good reasons for believing factual claims are experiential reasons.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carroll2005, author = {Carroll, John-W}, title = {Natural Laws in Scientific Practice}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {240-245}, keywords = {induction, natural-law; science}, abstract = {This is a review of Marc Lange's Natural Laws in Scientific Practice.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Carroll1994, author = {Carroll, John-W}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {971-973}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Laws of Nature}, volume = {57(4)}, year = {1994} } @other{Carroll1998, author = {Carroll, Noel}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {481-485}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A Philosophy of Mass Art}, volume = {61(2)}, year = {1998} } @article{Carruthers2004, author = {Carruthers, Peter}, title = {Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {316-336}, keywords = {concept, consciousness, experience, metaphysics, phenomena}, abstract = {Relying on a range of now-familiar thought-experiments, it has seemed to many philosophers that phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of reductive explanation. This paper is concerned to explain, and then to meet, the challenge of showing how purely recognitional concepts are possible if there are no such things as qualia--in the strong sense of intrinsic (nonrelational, nonintentional) properties of experience. It argues that an appeal to higher-order experiences is necessary to meet this challenges, and then deploys a novel form of higher-order thought theory to explain how such experiences are generated. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Carruthers1996, author = {Carruthers, Peter}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {553-555}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Language, Thought, and Consciousness: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {59(2)}, year = {1996} } @article{CARSON1989, author = {CARSON, THOMAS-L}, title = {COULD IDEAL OBSERVERS DISAGREE: A REPLY TO TALIAFERRO.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {115-124}, keywords = {disagreement, ethics, ideal-observer; impartiality, moral-judgmen}, abstract = {IN "THE STATUS OF MORALITY" I ARGUE THAT FIRTH'S VERSION OF THE IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY COMMITS HIM TO AN EXTREME VERSION OF MORAL RELATIVISM. FIRTHIAN IDEAL OBSERVERS COULD DISAGREE IN THEIR ATTITUDES ABOUT ALL POSSIBLE MORAL QUESTIONS. I ALSO PROPOSE AN ALTERNATIVE VERSION OF THE IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY WHICH I BELIEVE COMMITS US TO A MODERATE VERSION OF MORAL RELATIVISM. IN "RELATIVIZING THE IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY" CHARLES TALIAFERRO DEFENDS FIRTH'S FORMULATION OF THE IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY. HE ALSO REJECTS MY CLAIM THAT FIRTH IS COMMITTED TO RELATIVISM. IN THIS PAPER I DEFEND MY VIEWS AGAINST TALIAFERRO'S CRITICISMS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carson2001, author = {Carson, Thomas-L}, title = {Gert on Rationality, Intrinsic Value, and the Overridingness of Morality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {441-446}, keywords = {ethics, intrinsic-value; morality, rationality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carson1992, author = {Carson, Thomas}, title = {Gibbard's Conceptual Scheme for Moral Philosophy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {953-956}, keywords = {ethics, morality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARTER1968, author = {CARTER, ROBERT-EDGAR}, title = {THE IMPORTANCE OF INTRINSIC VALUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {567-577}, keywords = {axiology, ethics, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carter2004, author = {Carter, W-R}, title = {'Partist' Resistance to the Many}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {713-723}, keywords = {identity, location, materialism, metaphysics, particulars, perdurance, person}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carter1999, author = {Carter, William-R}, title = {Will I Be a Dead Person?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {167-171}, keywords = {embryo, fetus, person, personal-identity; science}, abstract = {Eric Olsen argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the standard view of personal identity is mistaken. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olsen's favored biological view of personal identity.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carter1997, author = {Carter, W-R}, title = {Dion's Left Foot (and the Price of Burkean Economy)}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {371-379}, keywords = {economy, epistemology, object, violence}, abstract = {Two recent papers by Michael Burke bearing upon the persistence of people and commonplace things illustrate the fact that the quest for synchronic ontological economy is likely to encourage a disturbing diachronic proliferation of entities. This discussion argues that Burke's promise of ontological economy is seriously compromised by the fact that his proposed metaphysic does violence to standard intuitions concerning the persistence of people and commonplace things. In effect, Burke would have us achieve synchronic economy (rejection of coincident entities) by postulating strongly counterintuitive transtemporal claims of numerical diversity. The argument is made that the price of Burkean economy is too high.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cartwright1995, author = {Cartwright, Nancy}, title = {"Precis of" Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {153-155}, keywords = {causality, epistemology, measurement, nature}, abstract = {Three levels of causal claims are pointed out: singular claims, causal laws, and ascriptions of capacities. Singular causal facts are primary. The relation between probabilities and causal laws cannot be characterized correctly without referring to such facts. Causal laws describe what causal relations obtain in specified situations. However generic causal claims are best thought of as ascriptions of capacities. Capacities describe what kinds of causal laws can obtain across different kinds of situations. If laws are mere regularities then all laws are "ceteris paribus" laws, hence causal law do not have the same fundamental status as ascriptions of capacities, since in order to get a regularity we must first have an arrangement with an appropriate capacity.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cartwright1995a, author = {Cartwright, Nancy}, title = {Reply to Eells, Humphreys and Morrison}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {177-187}, keywords = {experiment, gravity, nature, science, universal}, abstract = {Humphreys points out that only some theoretical activities within modern science are committed to abstraction and concretization and not science as a whole. Cartwright does not claim the contrary: The model of explanation by concretization can argue in favor of an ontology of tendencies only in domains that use its analytic method. Contrary to Morrison's concerns, capacity claims can be tested by looking for their characteristic contributions in well- understood settings. Furthermore, ascriptions of capacities need not be universal; they may hold across restricted domains. Eell's proposal of counterfactually- defined properties serves as well as singular causes in treating the probabilistic relation between a cause and its effect when intermediate factors appear. However this approach doesn't seem to work for the problem of mixed capacities.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cartwright1993, author = {Cartwright, Nancy}, title = {In Defence of This Worldly' Causality: Comments on Van Fraassen's "Laws and Symmetry"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {423-429}, keywords = {causality, epistemology, laws, nature}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Cartwright1999, author = {Cartwright, Nancy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {244-247}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science}, volume = {66(1)}, year = {1999} } @other{Casebier1991, author = {Casebier, Allan}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {486-488}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Film and Phenomenology}, volume = {54(2)}, year = {1991} } @article{CASEY1971, author = {CASEY, EDWARD-S}, title = {IMAGINATION: IMAGINING AND THE IMAGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {475-490}, keywords = {epistemology, image, imagination}, abstract = {IMAGINATION IS EXAMINED IN TWO OF ITS ESSENTIAL ASPECTS THROUGH A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS. IMAGINING IS DESCRIBED AS THE CONSCIOUS PROJECTION AND CONTEMPLATION OF OBJECTS POSITED AS PURE POSSIBILITIES. THE IMAGE IS THEN SEEN AS THE INDETERMINATE PRESENTATION OF AN IMAGINED OBJECT TO CONSCIOUSNESS. IMAGINED OBJECTS ARE SHOWN TO BE INDEPENDENT OF PERCEPTION. THESE OBJECTS, TOGETHER WITH THE IMAGE, FORM THE TOTAL INTENTIONAL CORRELATE OF THE ACT OF IMAGINING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cassam1997, author = {Cassam, Quassim}, title = {Subjects and Objects}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {643-648}, keywords = {consciousness, epistemology, kantianism, object, subject}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Cassam1997a, author = {Cassam, Quassim}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {711-714}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Self and World}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1997} } @article{CASTANEDA1985, author = {CASTANEDA, HECTOR-NERI}, title = {THE SEMANTICS AND THE CAUSAL ROLES OF PROPER NAMES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {91-114}, keywords = {language, meaning, phenomenology, proper-name; semantics}, abstract = {HERE IS A SOMEWHAT COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT OF PROPER NAMES AS THEY FUNCTION IN ORDINARY EXPERIENCE. IT IS THE "RESTRICTED-VARIABLE/RETRIEVAL VIEW OF PROPER NAMES". SINCE THE WAY ANY STANDARD PIECE OF LANGUAGE FUNCTIONS IN EXPERIENCE HINGES ON THE MEANING OF THAT PIECE OF LANGUAGE, WE ARE HERE CONCERNED BOTH WITH THE MAIN PRAGMATIC ROLES OF PROPER NAMES AND WITH THEIR FUNDAMENTAL SEMANTIC PROPERTIES. BECAUSE WE AIM AT COMPREHENSIVENESS, AS WELL AS CORRECTNESS, WE COLLECT RICH AND DIVERSIFIED DATA, CAPABLE OF EXHIBITING SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTUAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PATTERNS OF OUR USES OF PROPER NAMES; WE ALSO COLLECT RICH AND CAREFUL EXEGESIS SO AS TO DISTILL CRITERIA OF ADEQUACY THAT CAN GUIDE US IN DEVELOPING A GOOD ACCOUNT OF SUCH PATTERNS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASTANEDA1960, author = {CASTANEDA, HECTOR-NERI}, title = {IMPERATIVE REASONINGS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {21-49}, keywords = {end, imperatives, inference, logic, means, ought, truth-value; value}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE IS TO RE-EXAMINE "THE LOGIC OF IMPERATIVES," AND DISCUSS IN WHAT SENSE THERE ARE IMPERATIVE INFERENCES. CASTANEDA AGREES WITH R HARE, THAT THERE ARE LEGITIMATE IMPERATIVE INFERENCES. HE TRIES TO FORMULATE THE IMPERATIVE ANALOGUES OF TRUTH-VALUES, WHICH ARE INVOLVED IN THE VALIDITY OF IMPERATIVE INFERENCES. THE AUTHOR SUGGESTS AN INTIMATE CONNECTION BETWEEN IMPERATIVES AND (OUGHT) SENTENCES, AND FINALLY SHOWS THE LOGICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN IMPERATIVES, INDICATIVES AND (OUGHT) SENTENCES. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASTANEDA1962, author = {CASTANEDA, HECTOR-NERI}, title = {BAIER'S JUSTIFICATION OF THE RULES OF REASON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {366-373}, keywords = {ethics, justification, morality, reason, rule, satisfaction, self-interes}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASTANEDA1978, author = {CASTANEDA, HECTOR-NERI}, title = {CONFLICTS OF COMMITMENTS AND MORALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {564-574}, keywords = {act, commitment, conflict, decision, ethics, morality, motivation}, abstract = {THIS PAPER EXPLAINS THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF MORALITY, ESTABLISHING HOW SERIOUS THE STANDARD ERROR IS OF THINKING THAT THERE IS A UNIVOCAL ANSWER TO THE QUESTION: "WHAT OUGHT I MORALLY TO DO HERE NOW?" THE FACT IS THAT THERE ARE, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE, THREE DIFFERENT ANSWERS THAT THIS QUESTION CAN RECEIVE. MORALITY IS A COMPLEX SYSTEM OF THREE NORMATIVE SUB-SYSTEMS, INTERRELATED IN VERY INTRICATE WAYS, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT ONE MAY ENGAGE IN CHANGING ONE'S MORAL CODE. (THIS BUILT-IN DEMAND OF PROGRESS IS CHARACTERISTICALLY LEFT OUT OF MANY THEORIES OF MORALITY.) THAT COMPLEX STRUCTURE OF MORALITY IS EXPLAINED IN FULL IN CASTANEDA'S "THE STRUCTURE OF MORALITY". THE ARTICLE DEFENDS THE BOOK FROM TWO INTERESTING ATTACKS LAUNCHED BY A A COX IN HER "CASTANEDA'S THEORY OF MORALITY". COX'S CRITICISMS FORMULATE TWO EXCELLENT TESTS FOR ANY THEORY OF MORALITY, AND CASTANEDA'S THEORY PASSES THOSE TESTS WITH FLYING COLORS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASTANEDA1960a, author = {CASTANEDA, HECTOR-NERI}, title = {"7 + 5 = 12" AS A SYNTHETIC PROPOSITION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {141-158}, keywords = {arithmetic, logic, number, object, part, proposition, relation, synthetic}, abstract = {THE STUDY HERE DISCUSSES KANT'S CLAIM THAT (MOST) ARITHMETICAL PROPOSITIONS ARE SYNTHETIC, AND ELUCIDATES ITS TRUTH TOGETHER WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS VIEW THAT NUMBERS ARE RELATIONS OF OBJECTS TO THEIR PARTS. THIS UNFASHIONABLE VIEW AND KANT'S INSIGHTS ARE DEVELOPED MORE COMPLETELY. THE AUTHOR FORMULATES KANT'S IDEA OF A SYNTHETIC PROPOSITION, PROVIDES A TEST FOR DECIDING WHETHER A PROPOSITION IS SYNTHETIC OR NOT, AND ARGUES FOR THE PLAUSIBILITY OF KANT'S VIEWS OF ORDINARY ARITHMETIC PROPOSITIONS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASTELL1972, author = {CASTELL, ALBUREY}, title = {THE STATUS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL CAUSATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {403-407}, keywords = {causation, metaphysics, presupposition}, abstract = {THE STATEMENT THAT EVERY EVENT HAS A CAUSE, IS AN ABSOLUTE PRESUPPOSITION. IT IS A MARK OF ABSOLUTE PRESUPPOSITIONS THAT THEY ARE NOT TESTABLE, NOT FALSIFIABLE, NOT CONTROVERTIBLE, NOT DISCOVERABLE. YOU CAN, OF COURSE, DISCOVER THAT YOU PRESUPPOSE THEM ABSOLUTELY. SO LONG AS THEY ARE PRESUPPOSED, THEY PROVIDE A LAUNCHING PAD FOR QUESTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Caston1998, author = {Caston, Victor}, title = {Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {249-298}, keywords = {existence, intentionality, metaphysics}, abstract = {Aristotle not only formulates the problem of intentionality explicitly, he makes a solution to it a requirement for any adequate theory of mind. His own solution, however, is not to be found in his theory of sensation, as Brentano and others have thought. In fact, it is precisely because Aristotle regards this theory as inadequate that he goes on to argue for a distinct new ability he calls "phantasia." The theory of content he develops on this basis (unlike Brentano's) is profoundly naturalistic: it is a representational theory, formulated in terms of the causal powers and physical magnitudes of the body.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Casullo1992, author = {Casullo, Albert}, title = {Causality, Reliabilism, and Mathematical Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {557-584}, keywords = {causality, logic, mathematics, reliabilism}, abstract = {Paul Benacerraf has argued that plausible causal constraints on knowledge preclude the possibility of knowledge of statements whose truth conditions involve abstract entities. There are two prevalent replies for this charge. The first is to maintain that if the causal constraints are correctly understood they do not preclude knowledge of abstract entities. The second is to maintain that an adequate account of knowledge does not involve the problematic causal constraints. The primary purpose of this paper is to argue that neither reply succeeds.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASULLO1989, author = {CASULLO, ALBERT}, title = {PERCEPTUAL SPACE IS MONADIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {131-134}, keywords = {metaphysics, monadic, perception, space, visualization}, abstract = {IN A RECENT PAPER, I DEFENDED THE "MONADIC THEORY" OF PERCEPTUAL SPACE: (MT) OBJECTS IN THE VISUAL FIELD HAVE THEIR LOCATION BY VIRTUE OF MONADIC POSITIONAL PROPERTIES. THE DEFENSE INVOLVED (A) RESPONDING TO SOME OBJECTIONS; AND (B) OFFERING AN INDEPENDENT ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE THEORY. LORNE FALKENSTEIN OFFERS TWO OBJECTIONS TO MY DEFENSE OF (MT). HE MAINTAINS THAT A PURELY RELATIONAL ACCOUNT OF LOCATIONS IN VISUAL SPACE IS POSSIBLE AND THAT MY ACCOUNT INVOLVES A TACIT RELIANCE ON SPATIAL RELATIONS. IN THIS PAPER I ARGUE THAT THESE OBJECTIONS ARE NOT CONVINCING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASULLO1987, author = {CASULLO, ALBERT}, title = {A DEFENSE OF SENSE-DATA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {45-61}, keywords = {event, metaphysics, sense-dat}, abstract = {IN RECENT YEARS, THE SENSE-DATUM ACCOUNT OF VISUAL EXPERIENCE HAS FALLEN INTO DISFAVOR. THE PRIMARY REASON FOR ITS DEMISE IS THE WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT THE ADVERBIAL APPROACH PROVIDES AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY WHICH ACCOMMODATES THE DATA OF VISUAL EXPERIENCE AS WELL AS THE SENSE-DATUM THEORY BUT HAS THE ADVANTAGES OF BEING A SIMPLER THEORY AND ONE WHICH AVOIDS SOME PUZZLING PROBLEMS FACED BY ITS COMPETITOR. HOWEVER, THE VERSIONS OF THE ADVERBIAL THEORY DEVELOPED BY ITS TWO LEADING PROPONENTS, R M CHISHOLM AND WILFRID SELLARS, FACE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. CONSEQUENTLY, MICHAEL TYE HAS RECENTLY ATTEMPTED TO DEVELOP A NEW VERSION OF THE THEORY WHICH AVOIDS THESE DIFFICULTIES. THE PRIMARY GOAL OF THIS PAPER IS TO SHOW THAT THE SENSE-DATUM THEORY IS SUPERIOR TO THIS LATEST VERSION OF THE ADVERBIAL THEORY IN A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT WAYS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Casullo2001, author = {Casullo, Albert}, title = {Experiment and A Priori Justification}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {665-671}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology, justification, reason}, abstract = {Laurence BonJour's In Defense of Pure Reason is rich and challenging. It offers a tightly integrated attack on empiricism and defense of rationalism. The tight texture of argument makes it difficult to isolate and assess specific aspects of the book in a brief discussion. My goal is to examine the role of experience in BonJour's conception of a priori justification.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASULLO1986, author = {CASULLO, ALBERT}, title = {THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF PERCEPTUAL SPACE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {665-671}, keywords = {epistemology, individuation, monads, perception, space}, abstract = {IT IS GENERALLY TAKEN FOR GRANTED THAT THE STRUCTURE OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE IS RELATIONAL IN CHARACTER. THIS VIEW IS USUALLY CONTRASTED WITH SUBSTANTIVAL THEORIES WHICH VIEW SPACE AS A KIND OF SUBSTANCE WHOSE EXISTENCE IS IN NO WAY DEPENDENT ON THE OBJECTS WHICH OCCUPY IT AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME. GIVEN THE PREVALENCE OF THE RELATIONAL VIEW OF PHYSICAL SPACE, IT IS NATURAL TO SUPPOSE THAT PERCEPTUAL SPACE HAS A SIMILAR STRUCTURE. BERTRAND RUSSELL AND NELSON GOODMAN HAVE ARGUED THAT THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF THE VISUAL FIELD IS NOT RELATIONAL IN CHARACTER. WHAT IS PARTICULARLY STRIKING ABOUT THEIR VIEW IS THAT THEY DO NOT ADOPT A SUBSTANTIVAL VIEW OF PERCEPTUAL SPACE BUT HOLD, INSTEAD, THAT OBJECTS IN THE VISUAL FIELD HAVE THEIR LOCATION BY VIRTUE OF "MONADIC POSITIONAL PROPERTIES". THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO DEFEND THE MONADIC THEORY OF PERCEPTUAL SPACE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASULLO1988, author = {CASULLO, ALBERT}, title = {REVISABILITY, RELIABILISM, AND A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {187-213}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology, reliability, revision}, abstract = {A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN UNDERSTOOD AS KNOWLEDGE WHICH IS INDEPENDENT OF EXPERIENTIAL EVIDENCE. MANY PHILOSOPHERS REJECT THE CLAIM THAT THERE IS SUCH KNOWLEDGE. ONE PROMINENT LINE OF ATTACK HAS BEEN FORCEFULLY DEVELOPED BY HILARY PUTNAM. IT BEGINS BY ANALYZING THE NOTION OF A STATEMENT KNOWN A PRIORI AS ONE WHICH IS RATIONALLY UNREVISABLE. PEIRCE'S CELEBRATED DOCTRINE OF FALLIBILISM IS THEN INVOKED IN SUPPORT OF THE CLAIM THAT NO STATEMENTS ARE RATIONALLY UNREVISABLE. THIS LINE OF ATTACK RAISES A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE. IS THERE ANY GOOD REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE ENTAILS RATIONAL UNREVISABILITY? THIS PAPER DISTINGUISHES TWO VERSIONS OF THIS THESIS AND ARGUES THAT BOTH SHOULD BE REJECTED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASULLO1977, author = {CASULLO, ALBERT}, title = {THE DEFINITION OF A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {220-224}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology, intuition, knowledge, proposition, self-eviden}, abstract = {IN HIS PAPER "THE A PRIORI--A POSTERIORI DISTINCTION," DAVID W BENFIELD OFFERS A DEFINITION OF A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE WHICH HAS THE CONSEQUENCE THAT "ALL" NONINFERENTIAL KNOWLEDGE IS A PRIORI. I ARGUE THAT BENFIELD'S DEFENSE OF THIS POSITION DEPENDS ON HIS FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITIONS AS OPPOSED TO PROPOSITIONS WHICH ARE BELIEVED ON THE BASIS OF NO EVIDENCE. I ALSO OFFER AN ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION OF A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE WHICH IS BOTH FAITHFUL TO THE TRADITIONAL MEANING OF THIS TERM AND DOES NOT HAVE THE CONSEQUENCE THAT ALL NONINFERENTIAL KNOWLEDGE IS A PRIORI.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CATALANO1990, author = {CATALANO, JOSEPH-S}, title = {Successfully Lying to Oneself: A Sartrean Perspective.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {673-693}, keywords = {bad-faith; lying, self-deception; twentieth}, abstract = {The crux of the argument is a distinction between a thetic and nonthetic consciousness. The point is that, for Sartre, translucency does not imply a thetic, or delineated, conceptual awareness. It is thus possible to be nonthetically aware of one's behavior, and still misrepresent this awareness conceptually to oneself. Beyond this, it is also possible to frame one's conceptual misrepresentations so that one eventually believes in them. Tension, of course, exists, but it is conceived by the individual to be the "normal" tension experienced by everyone.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CAWS1962, author = {CAWS, PETER}, title = {THE PARADOX OF INDUCTION AND THE INDUCTIVE WAGER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {512-520}, keywords = {future, induction, inference, justification, logic, paradox, self-referenc}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CERF1962, author = {CERF, WALTER}, title = {STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {537-558}, keywords = {dreaming, mental-act; mind, motivation, perception, philosophical-anthropology; psychology, social-sciences; text}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CERF1963, author = {CERF, WALTER}, title = {'IN A STATE'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {174-194}, keywords = {actuality, language, linguistic-analysis; mood, potentiality, state, statement}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chakrabarti1992, author = {Chakrabarti, Arindam}, title = {I Touch What I Saw}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {103-116}, keywords = {metaphysics, nyaya, object, realism, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chakrabarti1994, author = {Chakrabarti, Arindam}, title = {Testimony: A Philosophical Study}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {965-972}, keywords = {god, history, knowledge, language, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHAKRABARTI1976, author = {CHAKRABARTI, KISOR-KUMAR}, title = {SOME COMPARISONS BETWEEN FREGE'S LOGIC AND NAVYA-NYAYA LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {554-563}, keywords = {indian, logic, reference, sense}, abstract = {THE PAPER HAS THREE PARTS. THE FIRST PART DEALS WITH FREGE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENSE AND REFERENCE OF PROPER NAMES AND A SIMILAR DISTINCTION IN NAVYA-NYAYA LOGIC. IN THE SECOND PART WE HAVE COMPARED FREGE'S DEFINITION OF NUMBER TO THE NAVYA-NYAYA DEFINITION OF NUMBER. IN THE THIRD PART WE HAVE SHOWN HOW THE 'RUSSELL PARADOX' WHICH EXPOSED A CONTRADICTION IN FREGE'S NAIVE SET THEORY COULD BE AVOIDED IF AN INJUNCTION OF NAVYA-NYAYA LOGIC WERE FOLLOWED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chalmers1999, author = {Chalmers, David-J}, title = {Precis of The Conscious Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {435-438}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, mind, psychology, world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chalmers1999a, author = {Chalmers, David-J}, title = {Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {473-496}, keywords = {epistemology, materialism, metaphysics, modality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chalmers2004, author = {Chalmers, David-J}, title = {Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {182-190}, keywords = {imagination, indexicality, intension, metaphysics, zombie}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHANDRA1981, author = {CHANDRA, SURESH}, title = {WITTGENSTEIN AND STRAWSON ON THE ASCRIPTION OF EXPERIENCES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {280-298}, keywords = {ascription, experience, metaphysics, person}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chang2001, author = {Chang, Ruth}, title = {Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {447-453}, keywords = {action, ethics, morality, reasons}, abstract = {On a 'comparative' conception of practical reasons, reasons are like 'weights' that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a 'toggle' conception of practical reasons; something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert's conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception--his central claim that actions can be rational without there being reasons for them--does not require adoption of the toggle conception. The more intuitive comparative conception of reasons for action can accommodate the insight.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHARLESWORTH1970, author = {CHARLESWORTH, JAMES-H}, title = {REFLECTIONS ON MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF "WORD".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {609-613}, keywords = {language, meaning, phenomenology, word}, abstract = {THE DISCUSSION IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS: THE FIRST IS A DIALOGUE WITH MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING WORDS, AND THE SECOND CONTAINS A FEW OF CHARLESWORTH'S OWN REFLECTIONS ON THE SUBJECT. CHARLESWORTH AGREES WITH MERLEAU-PONTY THAT 'THOUGHT' AND 'WORD' ARE INSEPARABLE, THAT LANGUAGE IS THE SPEAKER TAKING A POSITION IN THE WORLD OF MEANINGS, AND THAT WORDS HAVE A PHYSIOGNOMY. IN THE SECOND SECTION CHARLESWORTH SUGGESTS THAT WORDS ARE LIVING ORGANISMS, HAVE HOOKS, APPEAR AND ARE NOT CHOSEN, ARE SEEN FROM A LIMITED PERSPECTIVE, LINKED THROUGH THOUGHT WITH THE PRECEDING AND SUCCEEDING WORD, AND ARE BOTH MEANS AND ENDS. FINALLY, IT IS STATED THAT "WE ARE WORDS" IN THE SENSE THAT WHEN WE SPEAK ORIGINALLY WE DO NOT CHOOSE WORDS; THEY SHOW THEMSELVES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHARLSON1964, author = {CHARLSON, PRICE}, title = {THE BEHAVIOR OF QUALITIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {233-238}, keywords = {aesthetics, art-object; expressiveness, quality, taste}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chase2004, author = {Chase, James}, title = {Indicator Reliabilism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(1)}, pages = {115-137}, keywords = {consequentialism, epistemology, reliabilism, rule}, abstract = {In "Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology" Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of epistemic access, and use this to present an analysis of justification as an indicator concept we use to track how well the evaluated agent is doing with respect to the primary epistemic norm of believing truths and not falsehoods. A theory of justification along these lines is then given, and its prospects of handling the evil demon objection to reliabilism are assessed.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHATTERJEE1969, author = {CHATTERJEE, MARGARET}, title = {LANGUAGE AS PHENOMENON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {116-121}, keywords = {language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHATTOPADHYAYA1971, author = {CHATTOPADHYAYA, D-P}, title = {COPERNICUS BETRAYED.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {57-63}, keywords = {modern}, abstract = {KANT THOUGHT THAT THE BEST WAY TO JUSTIFY NEWTONIAN PHYSICS IS TO SHOW (HUMAN) UNDERSTANDING MAKES NATURE POSSIBLE AND THAT OBJECTIVITY OF SCIENTIFIC OBJECTS CAN BE SAFELY SECURED IF ITS ORIGIN CAN BE STRESSED TO UNIVERSAL (INTER-SUBJECTIVE) MIND. A CRITIC OF CLASSICAL RATIONALISM AND THE EXPONENT OF CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY, KANT IN HIS BID TO DEFEND SCIENCE OVER DID HIS WORK. HE CREDITS HUMAN UNDERSTANDING WITH AN INFALLIBLE (I.E. UNIVERSAL AND NECESSARY) AUTHORSHIP OF NATURE, WHILE THE HISTORY OF NATURAL SCIENCE SPEAKS OF A DIFFERENT STORY, - STORY OF GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. HUMAN MIND MAY PROPOSE A PRIORI WHAT NATURE IS LIKE, BUT IT IS ALWAYS LIABLE TO BE DISPOSED OF BY WHAT NATURE IN ITSELF IS. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE MAY BE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI BUT NOT NECESSARILY VALID.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHAUDHURY1962, author = {CHAUDHURY, PRAVAS-JIVAN}, title = {NEWTON AND HYPOTHESIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {344-353}, keywords = {explanation, hypothesis, phenomena, physical-sciences; science, scientific-method; system}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE HERE IS A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF NEWTON'S VIEW OF THE ROLE OF HYPOTHESES IN PHYSICAL SCIENCE. IT IS MAINTAINED THAT AN HYPOTHESIS SUPPOSES SOME PHYSICAL ENTITY OR MECHANISM BEHIND SOME PHENOMENON TO EXPLAIN THE LATTER; THESE CAUSAL AGENCIES BEHIND THE PHENOMENA ARE THE CRUX OF SERIOUS HYPOTHESES IN THE PRACTICED METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE. HOWEVER, NEWTON AS A PERSON WAS AFRAID OF CONTROVERSY AND EXPOSURE, AND BECAUSE OF HIS ABNORMAL MENTAL COMPLEXES AND PERSONALITY, WHAT HE TALKED ABOUT WAS REALLY DESCRIPTION (QUANTITATIVE LAWS OF OBSERVED EVENTS); THIS WAS SAFER. SO, AS THE SCIENTIST, HE WORKED NORMALLY, BUT AS THE MAN, WRITING ABOUT HIS WORK (MOSTLY IN CONTROVERSY WITH CRITICS) HE DEVIATED FROM A CORRECT GRASP AND EXPRESSION OF WHAT HE WAS DOING--THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHENG1968, author = {CHENG, CHUNG-YING}, title = {REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VALIDITY OF INDUCTION: AN EXAMINATION OF CHARLES PEIRCE'S THEORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {392-402}, keywords = {induction, logic}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHERRY1986, author = {CHERRY, CHRISTOPHER}, title = {MINE AND MATTERING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {297-304}, keywords = {mental-states; metaphysics, personal-identit}, abstract = {MANY HAVE SUPPOSED THAT FOR EACH AND EVERY PERSON, HIS "OWN" STATES (PAIN, PLEASURE, ETC.) MUST MATTER MORE THAN THOSE OF ANY OTHER. THIS SUPPOSITION, WHICH IS AT BEST OBSCURE AND AT WORST FALSE, UNDERLIES MUCH WRITING ON EGOISM AND ALTRUISM. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN EPISTEMOLOGICAL CLAIMS TO THE EFFECT THAT PERSONS HAVE 'SPECIAL ACCESS' TO THEIR OWN, AND ONLY THEIR OWN, STATES, AND BROADLY "ETHICAL" CLAIMS ABOUT THE ROLE SUCH STATES MUST OR MAY HAVE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE MORAL LIVES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHERRY1980, author = {CHERRY, CHRISTOPHER}, title = {HOW DIFFERENCES MAKE A DIFFERENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {64-92}, keywords = {activity, difference, equality, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cheyne1997, author = {Cheyne, Colin}, title = {Getting in Touch with Numbers: Intuition and Mathematical Platonism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {111-125}, keywords = {intuition, logic, mathematics, number, platonism}, abstract = {Mathematics is about numbers, sets, functions, etc. and according to one prominent view, these are abstract entities lacking causal powers and spatio-temporal location. If this is so, then it is a puzzle how we come to have knowledge of such remote entities. One suggestion is intuition. But 'intuition' covers a range of notions. This paper identifies and examines those varieties of intuition which are most likely to play a role in the acquisition of our mathematical knowledge, and argues that none of them, singly or in combination, can plausibly account for knowledge of abstract entities.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Chihara1998, author = {Chihara, Charles-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {483-486}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Worlds of Possibility: Modal Realism and the Semantics of Modal Logic}, volume = {63(2)}, year = {1998} } @other{Child1994, author = {Child, William}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {711-715}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Causality, Interpretation and the Mind}, volume = {58(3)}, year = {1994} } @article{CHIPMAN1973, author = {CHIPMAN, LAUCHLAN}, title = {THINGS IN THEMSELVES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {489-502}, keywords = {appearance, modern, noumena}, abstract = {AN ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE AN ELUCIDATION AND QUALIFIED DEFENCE OF KANT'S NOTION OF A THING IN ITSELF, AS IT FIGURES IN HIS "CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON AND THE PROLEGOMENA". IT IS ARGUED THAT A THING IN ITSELF IS A THING INSOFAR AS IT IS NOT EXHAUSTED BY ITS ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL APPEARINGS. SO UNDERSTOOD, IT IS A NOTION WHICH HAS A PLACE IN OUR ORDINARY CONCEPTUAL SCHEME. FURTHERMORE IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAKE SENSE OF KANT'S CLAIM THAT THE CATEGORIES DO NOT APPLY TO THINGS IN THEMSELVES: FOR SOME OF THE CATEGORIES KANT'S CLAIM IS TRUE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chisholm1994, author = {Chisholm, Roderick-M}, title = {Ontologically Dependent Entities}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {499-507}, keywords = {epistemology, ontology, space}, abstract = {A discussion of the distinction between ontologically dependent and ontologically non- dependent entities presupposes a general theory of categories. I assume that there are four basic types of entity: states; contingent individuals; "abstracta"; and necessary substance. A theory of categories may be formulated by making use of the following undefined philosophical locations: 1) x "exemplifies" y; 2) x is "necessarily" such that it is F; 3) x is a "constituent" of y; 4) x is a "state" of y; and 5) the intentional concept of "believing".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHISHOLM1969, author = {CHISHOLM, RODERICK-M}, title = {ON THE OBSERVABILITY OF THE SELF.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {7-21}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHISHOLM1991, author = {CHISHOLM, Roderick-M}, title = {Firth and the Ethics of Belief.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, ethics, normative}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHISHOLM1969a, author = {CHISHOLM, RODERICK-M}, title = {ON A PRINCIPLE OF EPISTEMIC PREFERABILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {294-301}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, logic, preference}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHISHOLM1964, author = {CHISHOLM, RODERICK-M}, title = {BELIEVING AND INTENTIONALITY: A REPLY TO MR LUCE AND MR SLEIGH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {266-269}, keywords = {believing, existence, inference, intentionality, logic, mental}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHISHOLM1963, author = {CHISHOLM, RODERICK-M}, title = {NOTES ON THE LOGIC OF BELIEVING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {195-201}, keywords = {believing, error, intentionality, logic, modal-logic; psychology, statement}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHO1990, author = {CHO, Kah-Kyung}, title = {Phenomenology as Cooperative Task: Husserl-Farber Correspondence during 1936-37.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {metaphysics, phenomenology}, abstract = {Both Farber's straightforward questions and Husserl's unusually detailed answers documented in this article deserve their place in the annals of phenomenology. Husserl denies a critic's charge that he "borrowed" Brentano's ideas, and he gives a standard phenomenologist answer to the questions of historical materialism and "evolutionary" philosophy. We also learn why instead of a translation of Logical Investigations, as Husserl wished, its commentary version, The Foundations of Phenomenology, came into our hands. While Husserl exhorts his American followers to cooperate under the aspect of eternity, he also reveals his worries, as "a nationally ostracized man," and as a father.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chomsky1998, author = {Chomsky, Noam}, title = {Comments: Galen Strawson, Mental Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {437-441}, keywords = {mental, metaphysics, reality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Christensen1997, author = {Christensen, Carleton-B}, title = {Meaning Things and Meaning Others}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {495-522}, keywords = {meaning, metaphysics, ontology, phenomenology}, abstract = {At least phenomenologically the way communicative acts reveal intentions is different from the way noncommunicative acts do this: the former have an "addressed" character which the latter do not. The paper argues that this difference is a real one, reflecting the irreducibly "conventional" character of human communication. It attempts to show this through a critical analysis of the Gricean program and its methodologically individualist attempt to explain the "conventional" as derivative from the "nonconventional." It is shown how in order to eliminate certain counterexamples the Gricean analysis of utterer's meaning must be made self-referential. It is then shown how this in turn admits an "ontological difference" which undercuts all methodological individualism: meaning something by an utterance must then have a certain intrinsic, irreducible "conventionality" and "intersubjectivity."(edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Christensen1993, author = {Christensen, Carleton-B}, title = {Sense, Subject and Horizon}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {749-779}, keywords = {horizon, intentionality, metaphysics, phenomenology, sense, subject}, abstract = {Husserl's concept of (inner) horizon is interpreted as containing an intriguing conception of perceptual experience in which "concepts", abilities to act and capacities of imagination mesh with one another. As thus interpreted, the concept insinuates a non- Cartesian picture of the subject, object and act of perceptual experience. Husserl's conception of phenomenology, transcendental reduction and intentionality are sketched. Objections to the interpretation are dealt with by rejecting the overly Cartesian picture of transcendental reduction underlying them. The paper concludes by indicating a criticism Husserl can rightly make of Frege.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Christensen1993a, author = {Christensen, David}, title = {Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {301-321}, keywords = {epistemology, language, scepticism, semantics}, abstract = {Semantical answers to the skeptic have attracted much attention recently. They strike many as suspect, roughly because they seem to use purely linguistic considerations to answer substantive questions about the extralinguistic world. I defend the legitimacy of this anti-skeptical strategy, showing that the worries that have been expressed about it in the literature are without foundation. I then argue that precisely this sort of anti-skeptical argument must play a crucial role in epistemology. It provides our only defense against a very simple form of skeptical challenge which would, if unchecked, undermine our knowledge in virtually every area.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Christensen1998, author = {Christensen, Wayne and Hooker, Cliff-A}, title = {Churchland Symposium}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {871-878}, keywords = {ethics, metaphysics, mind, morality}, abstract = {Churchland holds that, instead of being a serial symbol-processing computational system, the mind is a vector-transforming parallel neural net (nnet) operating nonformally, subconceptually and subpersonally. While sympathetic to his general thrust, we argue that Churchland has not paid sufficient attention to what constitutes a dynamical account of mind: he has a crucially ambiguous notion of computation; treats nnets as computational modules, separable from perception-action-environment interaction cycles; treats nnets as associationist blocks without the directive, regulatory organization crucial to life and intelligence; and provides no account of functional, especially cognitive, normativity, nor of its roots in the management of interaction.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Christiano2005, author = {Christiano, Thomas}, title = {Democracy and Bureaucracy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {211-217}, keywords = {autonomy, democracy, policy, political-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Churchl1999, author = {Churchland, Paul-M}, title = {Densmore and Dennett on Virtual Machines and Consciousness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {763-767}, keywords = {consciousness, epistemology, machine}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Churchl1993, author = {Churchland, Paul-M}, title = {State-Space Semantics and Meaning Holism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {667-672}, keywords = {holism, language, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Churchl1992, author = {Churchland, Paul-M}, title = {Activation Vectors versus Propositional Attitudes: How the Brain Represents Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {419-424}, keywords = {attitude, brain, epistemology, reality, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Churchl2004, author = {Churchland, Paul-M}, title = {Philosophy of Mind Meets Logical Theory: Perry on Neo-Dualism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {199-206}, keywords = {knowledge, materialism, metaphysics, modality, zombie}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Churchl1998, author = {Churchland, Paul-M}, title = {Precis of The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {859-863}, keywords = {brain, consciousness, metaphysics, soul}, abstract = {This book aims to make the current elements of empirical neuroscience and the current techniques of artificial neural network modelling available to a wide academic and popular audience. Its second aim is to draw out the consequences of these developments for a variety of familiar philosophical issues, and for a variety of social, moral, legal, and technological issues. In particular, it proposes to sketch a positive account of the many dimensions of consciousness--such as qualia, attention, imagination, and dreaming--in neurocomputational terms. I have tried to write the most accessible and pictorial introduction to connectionism possible.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Churchl1998a, author = {Churchland, Paul-M}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {893-904}, keywords = {ethics, metaphysics, virtue}, abstract = {To MacIntyre (on Virtues and Rules), I reply that behavior-guiding rules are neither necessary nor effective in explaining the moral competence of normal humans. Slowly-acquired perceptual and social skills provide a better explanation. To Christensen & Hooker (on Regulatory Systems and the Dynamics of Science), I concede that regulatory mechanisms at the social level are integral to a proper account of scientific cognition. To Shapere (on Creativity in Science), I insist that the novel redeployment of existing explanatory prototypes can indeed account for all historical cases of scientific creativity. And to Philipse (on Theory Ladenness and Folk Psychology), I defend an updated (connectionist) holism on meaning and content, which leads us straight back to the theory-laden character of commonsense knowledge, and the replaceability of folk psychology.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Cioffi1998, author = {Cioffi, Frank}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {730-732}, publisher = {Open Court}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience}, volume = {62(3)}, year = {1998} } @article{CLACK1973, author = {CLACK, R-JEROLD}, title = {CHISHOLM AND HUME ON OBSERVING THE SELF.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {338-348}, keywords = {metaphysics, self}, abstract = {CHISHOLM HAS RECENTLY ATTACKED HUME'S VIEW THAT THE SELF IS UNOBSERVABLE. I ARGUE, CONTRA CHISHOLM, (1) THAT HUME DID NOT MAKE A CONCEPTUAL ERROR IN HIS NOTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES THE IDEA OF THE SELF, (2) THAT HUME DID NOT CONTRADICT HIMSELF IN ASSERTING THAT HE (A SELF) CANNOT LOCATE HIS SELF WITHIN EXPERIENCE, AND (3) THAT AWARENESS OF PARTICULAR MENTAL DATA DOES NOT ENTAIL SELF-AWARENESS. I CONCLUDE THAT NEITHER CHISHOLM NOR HUME EXHIBITS AWARENESS OF THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF SELF-OBSERVATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Clark1993, author = {Clark, Austen}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {245-246}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Sensory Qualities}, volume = {56(1)}, year = {1993} } @other{Clark1990, author = {Clark, Maudemarie}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {229-233}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy}, volume = {54(1)}, year = {1990} } @article{Clark2000, author = {Clark, Philip}, title = {What Goes without Saying in Metaethics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {357-379}, keywords = {belief, ethics, explanation, metaethics}, abstract = {Reflection on the nature of practical thought has led some philosophers to hold that some beliefs have a necessary influence on the will. Reflection on the nature of motivational explanation has led other philosophers to say that no belief can motivate without the assistance of a background desire. This way of thinking, I argue, is directly responsible for the deadlock between Humeans like Donald Davidson and Michael Smith, and anti-Humeans like Thomas Nagel and John McDowell. But there is an antidote. The traditional Greek conception of practical reason gives us an attractive way of holding both that all beliefs require assistance and that certain beliefs entail a disposition of the will. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Clark2004, author = {Clark, Philip}, title = {Kantian Morals and Humean Motives}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {109-126}, keywords = {amoralism, ethics, moral-imperative; moral-judgment; motivation}, abstract = {The idea that moral imperatives are categorical is commonly used to support internalist claims about moral judgment. I argue that the categorical quality of moral requirements shows at most that moral motivation need not flow from a background desire to be moral. It does not show that moral judgments can motivate by themselves, or that amoralism is impossible.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CLEMENTS1979, author = {CLEMENTS, COLLEEN}, title = {DEATH AND PHILOSOPHICAL DIVERSIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {524-536}, keywords = {death, personal-identity; philosophical-anthropolog}, abstract = {THREE AREAS ARE DEALT WITH: (1) THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF 'DEATH' INVOLVING MAJOR PHILOSOPHIC ISSUES, E.G., THE IDENTITY PROBLEM; (2) THE STATEMENT OF THE ACTUAL VITAL PROBLEMS MASKED BY CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS BUT WELL-UNDERSTOOD BY THE HUMAN POPULATION, BORROWING FROM NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER AND SARTRE; (3) ONE ALTERNATIVE FOR COPING WITH THE EMPIRICAL DATA OF DEATH, USING A SYSTEMS THEORY MODEL. A SYSTEMS CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL AND MODERN THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DEFENSES AGAINST FACING THIS REALITY IS GIVEN. THE DISCUSSION IS A VARIATION ON THE OLD THEME OF CHANGE OPPOSED TO PERMANENCE, CHAOS (POSITIVE ENTROPY) OPPOSED TO STABLE FORM (NEGATIVE ENTROPY), CONTINGENCY OPPOSED TO NECESSITY, FRAMED IN HUMAN TERMS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cling2003, author = {Cling, Andrew-D}, title = {Self-Supporting Arguments}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {279-303}, keywords = {inductive-logic; justification, language, logic, scepticism}, abstract = {Deductive and inductive logic confront this skeptical challenge: we can justify any logical principle only by means of an argument but we can acquire justification by means of an argument only if we are already justified in believing some logical principle. We could solve this problem if probative arguments do not require justified belief in their corresponding conditionals. For if not, then inferential justification would not require justified belief in any logical principle. So even arguments whose corresponding conditionals are epistemically dependent upon their conclusions--epistemically self-supporting arguments--need not be viciously circular. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Cockburn1997, author = {Cockburn, David}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {485-488}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future}, volume = {61(2)}, year = {1997} } @article{CODE1984, author = {CODE, LORRAINE}, title = {TOWARD A 'RESPONSIBILIST' EPISTEMOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {29-50}, keywords = {epistemology, foundationalism, intellectual-virtue; responsibility}, abstract = {IN THIS PAPER I PROPOSE THAT ONE WAY OF CIRCUMNAVIGATING THE CURRENT IMPASSE IN EPISTEMOLOGY, WHERE NEITHER FOUNDATIONALISM NOR COHERENTISM SEEMS TO BE ABLE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE, IS TO CONSTRUCT A THEORY IN WHICH THE EPISTEMIC CHARACTER OF WOULD-BE KNOWERS ACQUIRES GREATLY INCREASED EPISTEMOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE. IN EFFECT, THIS WOULD BE AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE, WHOSE MODES OF REASONING WOULD BE ANALOGOUS TO, THOUGH NOT DERIVATIVE FROM, AN ETHICS OF MORAL VIRTUE. GRANTING SUCH SIGNIFICANCE TO THE CHARACTER OF KNOWING SUBJECTS IS NOT A MATTER OF PROVIDING ALTERNATIVE FOUNDATIONS TO THOSE WHICH HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES TO BE EITHER ELUSIVE OR INADEQUATE, OR BOTH. THIS, RATHER, IS A PROPOSAL FOR AN ALTERNATIVE, BUT COMPLEMENTARY, ROUTE TO THE EVALUATION OF KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS. HERE I ELABORATE THE GENERAL FEATURES OF SUCH A POSITION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Code1991, author = {Code, Lorraine}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {495-496}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {What Can She Know?}, volume = {54(2)}, year = {1991} } @article{COHEN1984, author = {COHEN, ELLIOT-D}, title = {REASON AND EXPERIENCE IN LOCKE'S EPISTEMOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {71-86}, keywords = {epistemology, experience, reason}, abstract = {LOCKE IS FREQUENTLY CALLED AN EMPIRICIST. HOWEVER, THE ROLES OF REASON AND EXPERIENCE IN LOCKE'S EPISTEMOLOGY HAVE, THEREBY, BEEN OBSCURED. IN THIS PAPER, DIFFERENT SENSES OF "EMPIRICISM" AND "RATIONALISM" ARE DISTINGUISHED, AND RELEVANT PASSAGES FROM LOCKE'S WRITINGS ARE SCRUTINIZED FOR PURPOSES OF EXPLICATING HIS EPISTEMOLOGY. THROUGH THIS EXAMINATION, IT IS SEEN THAT LOCKE, LIKE KANT, SEEKS A "REASON-EXPERIENCE SYNTHESIS" AND THAT THE BLANKET LABEL "EMPIRICIST," AS APPLIED TO LOCKE, IS MOST UNFORTUNATE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cohen2000, author = {Cohen, Jonathan}, title = {Analyticity and Katz's New Intensionalism: Or, If You Sever Sense from Reference, Analyticity Is Cheap but Useless}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {115-135}, keywords = {analyticity, epistemology, intensionalism, reference}, abstract = {This paper argues that Katz's program cannot succeed. Because he rejects the Fregean thesis, Katz ends up with an impoverished account of analyticity incapable of doing the work Katz (or anyone else) requires of it. If this is right, then we have no reason to endorse Katz's idiosyncratic notions of sense and analyticity over their traditional competitors. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COHEN1991, author = {COHEN, L-Jonathan}, title = {Stephen P. Stich, "The Fragmentation of Reason".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {cognitive, epistemology, process, rationality}, abstract = {Stich objects to founding any rule of inference on an appeal to reflective equilibrium. But Stich fails to see that, if we think that someone has a really absurd and unacceptable rule of inference, it cannot have properly passed his reflective equilibrium test, because we always suppose that he has principles by reference to which we can teach him his error. Nor can we accept Stich's own attempt to found rules of inference on considerations of utility it is possible for a cognitive principle to be an intellectual error even if a pragmatically useful one.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cohen2002, author = {Cohen, Stewart}, title = {Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {309-329}, keywords = {epistemology, evidence, knowledge, reliability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cohen1998, author = {Cohen, Stewart}, title = {Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {143-159}, keywords = {argument, epistemology, knowledge, premise, scepticism}, abstract = {This paper compares two kinds of epistemic principles--an underdetermination principle and a deductive closure principle. It argues that each principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical argument. It examines the logical relations between the premises of the two kinds of skeptical argument and concludes that the deductive closure argument cannot be refuted without refuting the underdetermination argument. The underdetermination argument, however, can be refuted without refuting the deductive closure argument. In this respect, the deductive closure argument is the stronger of the two.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cohen2003, author = {Cohen, Stewart}, title = {Greco's Agent Reliabilism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {437-443}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, reliabilism, scepticism, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cohen1999, author = {Cohen, Stewart}, title = {Lehrer on Coherence and Self-Trust}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {1043-1048}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, self, trust}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cohen1998a, author = {Cohen, Stewart}, title = {Fumerton on Metaepistemology and Skepticism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {913-918}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, metatheory, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COHEN1977, author = {COHEN, STEPHEN}, title = {DISTINCTIONS AMONG BLAME CONCEPTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {149-166}, keywords = {act, attitude, belief, blame, ethics, judgment, speech-ac}, abstract = {THIS PAPER DISCUSSES A METAETHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NOTION OF MORAL BLAMING. DISTINCT FROM BLAMING "PER SE" ARE THE ACT OF BLAMING AND THE JUDGMENT OF BLAMEWORTHINESS. CONSTITUTIVE CONDITIONS ARE SUGGESTED FOR EACH OF THESE NOTIONS. THE BASIC NOTION IS THE JUDGMENT OF BLAMEWORTHINESS; BLAMING IS DERIVED FROM IT BY SUPPLEMENTING ITS CONSTITUTIVE CONDITIONS, REQUIRING THE PRESENCE OF AN AFFECTIVE ELEMENT. BLAMING IS NOT A DISTINCTIVELY MORAL NOTION; THAT WHICH MAKES FOR BLAMING MORALLY ARE THE REASONS IN VIRTUE OF WHICH ONE BLAMES, NOT A SPECIFIC KIND OF BLAMING ONE ENGAGES IN OR A SPECIFIC KIND OF ATTITUDE THAT ONE HAS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cohen2005, author = {Cohen, Stewart}, title = {Why Basic Knowledge Is Easy Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {417-430}, keywords = {closure, deduction, epistemology, knowledge, probability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Cohen1996, author = {Cohen, Sheldon-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {244-246}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Aristotle on Nature and Incomplete Substance}, volume = {60(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{Cohon1997, author = {Cohon, Rachel}, title = {The Common Point of View in Hume's Ethics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {827-850}, keywords = {ethics, judgment, moral-theor}, abstract = {I argue that every time we reflect upon someone's character from the common point of view, we feel an actual sentiment of approbation or disapprobation, which may alter and merge with the situated sentiment or may fail to do so, leaving two different feelings about the same character. Furthermore, whenever we make moral evaluations we also simultaneously make objective, causal judgments about the love and hatred, pride and humility that the trait will produce. We routinely take up the common point of view in order to achieve truth and consistency in our causal judgments, to avoid grave practical problems. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Collins1998, author = {Collins, Arthur-W}, title = {Beastly Experience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {375-380}, keywords = {experience, metaphysics, perception, world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Collins1994, author = {Collins, Arthur-W}, title = {Precis of "The Nature of Mental Things"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {901-903}, keywords = {causation, dualism, mental, metaphysics, phenomena}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Collins1994a, author = {Collins, Arthur-W}, title = {Reply to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {929-945}, keywords = {belief, mental, metaphysics, mind}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Collins1995, author = {Collins, H-M and Kusch, M}, title = {Two Kinds of Actions: A Phenomenological Study}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(4)}, pages = {799-819}, keywords = {action, epistemology, model, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Collins2002, author = {Collins, John}, title = {Truth or Meaning? A Question of Priority}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {497-536}, keywords = {deflationism, epistemology, meaning, truth}, abstract = {There is an incompatibility between the deflationist approach to truth, which makes truth transparent on the basis of an antecedent grasp of meaning, and the traditional endeavor, exemplified by Davidson, to explicate meaning through of truth. I suggest that both parties are in the explanatory red: deflationist lack a non-truth-involving theory of meaning and Davidsonians lack a nondeflationary account of truth. My focus is on the attempts of the latter party to resolve their problem. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Comesana2005, author = {Comesana, Juan}, title = {Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {367-383}, keywords = {belief, disjunctivism, epistemology, justification, warrant}, abstract = {In this paper I argue that McDowell's brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill-motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a "highest common factor" between veridical and nonveridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant (where "warrant" is understood as whatever has to be added to true belief to yield knowledge).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COMMENO1962, author = {COMMENO, CONSTANTINO-LASCARIS}, title = {THE PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT OF ABELARDO BONILLA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {119-124}, keywords = {aesthetics, history, humanism, latin-american; law, twentieth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Conee1992, author = {Conee, Earl}, title = {The Truth Connection}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {657-669}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, truth}, abstract = {A particular conception of the justification condition on knowledge is defended. It is argued that this sort of justification has a certain special bearing on truth.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Conee2002, author = {Conee, Earl}, title = {Innocuous Infallibility}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {406-408}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, infallibility, justification, truth}, abstract = {Alan Sidelle has offered an argument to show that internalism about justification implies us to have a certain sort of infallibility concerning some internal facts. This is true but harmless to internalism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CONEE1985, author = {CONEE, EARL}, title = {DISCUSSION: ON SEEKING A RATIONALE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {601-610}, keywords = {consequentialism, distributive-justice; ethics, rationale}, abstract = {IN SAMUEL SCHEFFLER'S BOOK, "THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM", A CERTAIN SORT OF DEFENSE--A "RATIONALE"--IS SOUGHT ON BEHALF OF VARIOUS MORAL THESES. THE PRESENT PAPER ARGUES AGAINST THE PHILOSOPHICAL VALUE OF THIS PROJECT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Conee1998, author = {Conee, Earl}, title = {Seeing the Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {847-857}, keywords = {epistemology, mental, phenomenon, proposition, truth}, abstract = {Some propositions are obvious in their own right. We can 'just see' that they are true. So there is some such epistemic phenomenon as seeing the truth of a proposition. This paper investigates the nature of this phenomenon. The aptness of the visual metaphor is explained. Accounts of the phenomenon requiring qualia by which the truth is apprehended are disputed. A limited theory is developed and applied.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Conee1994, author = {Conee, Earl}, title = {The Nature and the Impossibility of Moral Perfection}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {815-825}, keywords = {conduct, ethics, morality, nature, perfection}, abstract = {It is argued that a morally perfect agent is one who is ideal in every morally relevant respect. On the basis of this conception it is argued that morally perfect agency is impossible.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Conee2005, author = {Conee, Earl}, title = {The Comforts of Home}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {444-451}, keywords = {condition, epistemology, home, luminosity}, abstract = {A "luminous" condition is one that we are in a position to know that we are in, whenever we are in it. Timothy Williamson argued that there are no significant luminous conditions. Williamson's argument is faulted. A different argument is offered for the same conclusion. The epistemic importance of the conclusion is discussed.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CONLY1975, author = {CONLY, CRAIG-A}, title = {THE BASIS OF TIME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {82-93}, keywords = {change, continuity, force, measurement, metaphysics, motion, perception, time}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COOK1982, author = {COOK, DANIEL-J}, title = {MARX'S CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL LANGUAGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {530-554}, keywords = {ideology, language, praxis, social-consciousnes}, abstract = {THOUGH MARX NEVER SYSTEMATICALLY DEVELOPED A THEORY OF LANGUAGE, HE OFTEN COMMENTED IN HIS PRE-1848 WRITINGS ON THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHIES AND IDEOLOGIES. IN THIS PAPER, I EXAMINE MARX'S CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE. THE FIRST PART IS DEVOTED TO SKETCHING THE ORIGINS OF MARX'S IDEAS ON LANGUAGE. THE SECOND PART ANALYZES THE STRATEGIES MARX USED IN HIS EARLIEST CRITICAL WRITINGS TO CRITICIZE THE 'LANGUAGES' OF PHILOSOPHY AND IDEOLOGY. THE THIRD PART EXAMINES MARX'S (AND NOW ENGEL'S) COMMENTS IN "THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY" ON THE ROLE AND USE OF LANGUAGE IN FURTHERING THE IDEOLOGICAL PURPOSES OF THE RULING CLASS. THE FINAL PART OF THE PAPER EXTRAPOLATES MARX'S OWN POSITION ON THE NATURE OF THE PROPER LANGUAGE FOR PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Cooper2002, author = {Cooper, David-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {497-499}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Measure of Things: Humanism, Humility, and Mystery}, volume = {71(2)}, year = {2002} } @article{Cooper1995, author = {Cooper, John-M}, title = {Eudaimonism and the Appeal to Nature in the Morality of Happiness: Comments on Julia Annas, "The Morality of Happiness"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {587-598}, keywords = {ethics, eudaimonism, happiness, morality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COOPER1977, author = {COOPER, WESLEY-E}, title = {THE PERFECTLY JUST SOCIETY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {46-58}, keywords = {justice, political-philosophy; society}, abstract = {IF WE TAKE SERIOUSLY RAWLS' CONCEPTION OF IDEAL THEORY, WE FIND THAT HIS ALLEGEDLY PERFECTLY JUST SOCIETY IS CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN PERFECTLY JUST. ITS IMPERFECTIONS CAN BE TRACED TO A FAULT IN HIS DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY GOODS, AND THIS FAULT IN TURN IS DUE TO HIS FAILING TO DRAW SOME CRUCIAL DISTINCTIONS. I FIRST CHARACTERIZE IDEAL THEORY AND RAWLS' NOTION OF A PERFECTLY JUST SOCIETY; WITH IDEAL THEORY PROVIDING THE FRAME OF REFERENCE, I INTRODUCE AND DISCUSS SOME DISTINCTIONS WHICH UNDERMINE THE AFOREMENTIONED NOTION; I THEN APPLY THIS DISCUSSION IN A CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY GOODS; FINALLY, USING A REVISED DOCTRINE, I ADUMBRATE A MORE ADEQUATE IDEA OF A PERFECTLY JUST SOCIETY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COPELAND1971, author = {COPELAND, JOHN-W}, title = {B F SKINNER'S SKEPTICISM ABOUT CHOICES AND FUTURE CONSEQUENCES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {540-545}, keywords = {choice, consequence, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Copp2001, author = {Copp, David}, title = {Against Internalism about Reasons--Gert's Rational Options}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {455-461}, keywords = {choice, ethics, internalism, morality, motivation, reasons}, abstract = {There are at least two familiar "internalist" strategies for explaining the "normativity" or "prescriptivity" of reasons. According to one, which is defended by Williams, motivation is entailed by reasons. According to another, which is defended by Korsgaard, Scanlon, and Smith, motivation by reasons follows from rationality. Bernard Gert argues that both views conflict with the intuitive observation that there are "rational options." His theory of rationality is not internalist. I agree that there are rational options, but I argue that Gert's theory conflicts with another internalist doctrine, one that any plausible theory must accept.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Copp2002, author = {Copp, David}, title = {Goldman on the Goals of Democracy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {207-214}, keywords = {democracy, epistemology, goals, knowledge, social}, abstract = {In Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman argues that the success of democracy depends on its producing outcomes preferred by a majority of voters. He argues that its success in this requires voters to have a certain kind of knowledge. Goldman's argument depends on mistaken views about the goals of democracy. The essentials of democracy are found in a political system that aims to equalize political power and authority. A system of this kind would select the candidate voted for by most, but it would not be flawed as a democracy if it failed to secure their preferred outcomes.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Copp1995, author = {Copp, David}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {986-989}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Morality, Normativity, and Society}, volume = {58(4)}, year = {1995} } @article{CORBETT1988, author = {CORBETT, S-M}, title = {ZENO'S 'ACHILLES': A REPLY TO JOHN MCKIE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {325-331}, keywords = {metaphysics, motion, paradox}, abstract = {FROM ARISTOTLE TO JOHN MCKIE THE 'ACHILLES' HAS BEEN REGARDED AS A VARIATION OF ANOTHER OF ZENO'S ARGUMENTS, THE 'DICHOTOMY'. THERE IS, HOWEVER, AN ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO ARGUMENTS. WHILE THE INFINITE SERIES IN THE 'DICHOTOMY' IS GENERATED BY A PROCESS OF DIVISION, IN THE 'ACHILLES' THE INFINITE SERIES IS DERIVED BY MEANS OF A PROCESS OF "ADDITION". INDEED, IT IS ONLY BY MAKING THE ILLEGITIMATE ASSUMPTION THAT ACHILLES WILL OVERTAKE THE TORTOISE THAT THE 'ACHILLES' CAN BE TRANSFORMED INTO A VARIATION OF THE 'DICHOTOMY'. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO ARGUMENTS EFFECTIVELY BLOCKS SOLUTIONS LIKE THAT PROPOSED BY MCKIE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CORCORAN1972, author = {CORCORAN, JOHN}, title = {CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF CLASSICAL LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {25-47}, keywords = {argumentation, demonstration, implication, inference, logic, validity}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE DEVELOPS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF CLASSICAL LOGIC, PARTICULARLY FOR THAT PART OF CLASSICAL LOGIC CONCERNED WITH CORRECTNESS OF ARGUMENTS. THE VALIDITY OF THE FRAMEWORK IS SUPPORTED BY EXAMPLES OF ITS APPLICABILITY IN HISTORICALLY GIVEN SITUATIONS. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK TWO KINDS OF REDUCTIONISM ARE SEEN TO BE GROUNDLESS. FINALLY, THE CURRENTLY ACCEPTED EXPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE IS SUBJECTED TO CRITICAL REEVALUATION WHICH SHOWS THAT CONTINUED ACCEPTANCE IS NOT JUSTIFIED WITHOUT FURTHER RESEARCH.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CORCORAN1973, author = {CORCORAN, JOHN and WOOD, SUSAN}, title = {THE SWITCHES "PARADOX" AND THE LIMITS OF PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {102-108}, keywords = {logic, paradox, propositional-logic; sentential-calculu}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE IS A DISCUSSION OF THE DATA, PURPOSES, RESULTS, APPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF LOGICAL THEORY. CONCRETE CONTENT IS PROVIDED BY MEANS OF AN EXAMPLE, 'THE SWITCHES PARADOX', WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED IN THIS JOURNAL. BECAUSE OF ITS ELEMENTARY LEVEL, THIS ARTICLE MIGHT BE FOUND SUITABLE FOR UNDERGRADUATE COURSES IN LOGICAL THEORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CORRADO1975, author = {CORRADO, MICHAEL}, title = {ON BELIEVING INSCRIPTIONS TO BE TRUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {59-73}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, inscription, language, logic, proposition}, abstract = {I SCHEFFLER, IN "ANATOMY OF INQUIRY", ACCEPTS AN ARGUMENT THAT SHOWS THAT THE OBJECTS OF BELIEF, DESIRE, AND SO ON, MUST EXIST. THE ARGUMENT DEPENDS UPON THE NECESSITY OF APPEALING TO GENERALIZED PSYCHOLOGICAL STATEMENTS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION. TO AVOID COMMITMENT TO PROPOSITIONS HE PROPOSES INSCRIPTIONALISM AND TAKES THE OBJECTS OF BELIEF AND SO ON TO BE CONCRETE INDIVIDUAL INSCRIPTION.. BUT THERE ARE SOME TYPES OF BELIEF-STATEMENT--ESSENTIAL TO PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION--FOR WHICH INSCRIPTIONALISM WILL NOT WORK. THESE ARE BELIEF-STATEMENTS WHICH MUST BE UNDERSTOOD "DE RE". BUT WILL AN INSCRIPTIONAL TRANSLATION WORK FOR THE OTHERS, THOSE THAT ARE "DE DICTO"? I ARGUE THAT BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF BELIEF-STATEMENTS IN WHICH THE "DE RE" AND "DE DICTO" ARE MIXED, THOSE THAT ARE PURELY "DE DICTO" CANNOT BE GIVEN AN INSCRIPTIONAL ANALYSIS. THAT ARGUMENT IS INDEPENDENT OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE "DE RE".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COVAL1964, author = {COVAL, S-C}, title = {PERSONS AND CRITERIA IN STRAWSON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {406-409}, keywords = {criteria, meaning, metaphysics, person, predicate, scepticism, textual-criticis}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COWAN1969, author = {COWAN, JOSEPH-L}, title = {THE GAMBLER'S FALLACY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {238-251}, keywords = {argumentation, fallacy, logic, probability}, abstract = {"GAMBLER'S FALLACY" EXAMINED FOR INTRINSIC INTEREST AND LIGHT ON ROLE OF LOGICIAN AS CRITIC OF ORDINARY DISCOURSE. VARIETY OF "ANALYSES" BY LOGICIANS SINCE THEY MUST CONSTRUCT RATHER THAN SIMPLY DISCOVER CONNECTIONS BETWEEN PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS. ONE CONSTRUAL OF GAMBLER'S ARGUMENT AS VALID PRESENTED. THIS EMPLOYED WHEN REQUIRED PREMISES ARE FALSE BECAUSE "ARGUMENT" ITSELF IS INVENTION OF LOGICIAN, AND "GAMBLER'S ARGUMENT" MIGHT BE BETTER UNDERSTOOD AS NOT ARGUMENT MERELY BUT AS DRAMA.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COX1978, author = {COX, A-A and AL-HIBRI, A}, title = {CASTANEDA'S THEORY OF MORALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {557-563}, keywords = {deontology, duty, ethics, hierarchy, intuition, normative-ethics; obligation}, abstract = {CASTANEDA DEFENDS THE VIEW THAT OBLIGATIONS DO NOT CONFLICT BY INTRODUCING A HIERARCHY OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES. CONFLICTS ARE RESOLVED BY OPTING FOR THE OBLIGATION RESTING ON THE HIGHEST PRINCIPLE. SUCH A METHOD IS GENERALLY INADEQUATE FOR THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS. SPECIFICALLY, CASTANEDA'S SYSTEM IS COUNTER-INTUITIVE BECAUSE (I) AN ETHICAL HIERARCHY IS MUCH MORE COMPLEX THAN ENVISIONED BY CASTANEDA, (II) CASTANEDA'S METHOD FOR CALCULATING THE COMPARATIVE MORAL VALUE OF ACTIONS AS THE BASIS OF THE HIERARCHY IS ALSO INADEQUATE; AND (III) IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ABSTRACT EXCESSIVELY FROM THE SPECIFICITY OF A MORAL SITUATION WITHOUT GENERATING PROBLEMS. ALL THIS IS SHOWN BY CONSTRUCTING AND EVALUATING THE RELEVANT MORAL SITUATION IN EACH CASE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Craig2000, author = {Craig, Edward}, title = {Response to Lehrer}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {655-665}, keywords = {discourse, epistemology, knowledge, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Craig2001, author = {Craig, William-Lane}, title = {Wishing It Were Now Some Other Time}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {159-166}, keywords = {epistemology, meaning, time, truth}, abstract = {One of the most serious obstacles to accepting a tenseless view of time is the challenge posed by our experience of tense. A particularly striking example of such experience, pointed out by Schlesinger but largely overlooked in the literature, is the wish felt by probably all of us at some time or other that it were now some other time. Such a wish seems evidently rational to hold, and yet on a tenseless theory of time such a wish must be regarded as irrational, since it is logically impossible for the now to be located at some other time, there being no such thing as an objective now or present. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Craig1994, author = {Craig, William-Lane}, title = {Robert Adams's New Anti-Molinist Argument}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {857-861}, keywords = {argument, existence, knowledge, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Craig1993, author = {Craig, William-Lane and Smith, Quentin}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {733-737}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Theism, Atheism and Big Bang Cosmology}, volume = {56(3)}, year = {1993} } @article{Crane2005, author = {Crane, Tim}, title = {Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {155-162}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, phenomenology, physicalism}, abstract = {Central to Papineau's defence of physicalism is the claim that phenomenal concepts resemble their referents. I dispute that there any such concepts.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CRAWFORD1974, author = {CRAWFORD, DAN-D}, title = {PROPOSITIONAL AND NONPROPOSITIONAL PERCEIVING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {201-210}, keywords = {epistemology, perceiving, proposition}, abstract = {I DISCUSS THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS THAT EXIST BETWEEN PROPOSITIONAL AND NONPROPOSITIONAL USES OF PERCEPTUAL VERBS, E.G., 'S SEES THAT SOMETHING IS A DOOR', AND 'S SEES A DOOR'. I FOCUS ON CHISHOLM'S DEFINITION OF ONE PROPOSITIONAL USE AND SHOW THAT IT IS INADEQUATE AS IT STANDS, IN THAT IT APPLIES TO CASES IN WHICH ONE TAKES SOMETHING TO HAVE SOME CHARACTERISTIC BUT IS NOT PERCEIVING IT TO HAVE THAT CHARACTERISTIC. WE MUST ADD THE UNDEFINED EXPRESSION 'PERCEPTUALLY TAKES' TO THE DEFINITION. I THEN ARGUE FOR THE GENERAL THESIS THAT THE CONCEPT OF PERCEIVING IN BOTH OF ITS MOST IMPORTANT PROPOSITIONAL AND NONPROPOSITIONAL SENSES HAS A DUAL FUNCTION IN THAT IT REFERS TO CAUSAL, PSYCHO-PHYSICAL FACTS, AS WELL AS CONCEPTUAL FACTS, I.E., TAKINGS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CRAWFORD1964, author = {CRAWFORD, PATRICIA-A}, title = {A SURVEY OF RECENT RELIGIOUS LITERATURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {429-441}, keywords = {being, epistemology, faith, indian, judaism, knowledge, religion, text}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE IS A CRITICAL REVIEW AND SURVEY OF 28 BOOKS IN THE FIELD OF RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. THE MAJOR PART OF THE ARTICLE IS GIVEN TO REVIEWS OF THE FOLLOWING BOOKS: JOHN HICK'S "FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE", PAUL SCHMIDT'S "RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE", W T STACE'S "MYSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHY", HENRY NELSON WIEMAN'S "INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATION OF FAITH", A C DAS'S "A MODERN INCARNATION OF GOD: A COMMENTARY ON THE LIFE AND TEACHING OF SRI RAMAKRISHNA", HERMAN DOOYEWEERD'S "IN THE TWILIGHT OF WESTERN THOUGHT", AND HANS FREUND'S "THE BALANCED LIFE".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CRAWFORD1979, author = {CRAWFORD, T-D}, title = {ON THE USES OF 'IS' AND 'OUGHT'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {592-594}, keywords = {ethics, is, ought}, abstract = {SEARLE'S ATTEMPT TO BRIDGE THE "IS"-"OUGHT" GAP IS DISCUSSED FROM A LINGUISTIC POINT OF VIEW. "IS" IS NOT CONFINED TO FACTUAL STATEMENTS, NOR IS "OUGHT" CONFINED TO EVALUATIVE STATEMENTS. SEARLE'S STATEMENTS 3, 4 AND 5 CONTAIN AMBIGUOUS EXPRESSIONS BASED ON THE WORDS "IS" AND "OUGHT"; HIS ARGUMENT IS VALID ONLY IF THE EXPRESSIONS ARE READ AS FACTUAL, NOT EVALUATIVE. THUS THE "IS"-"OUGHT" GAP IS BRIDGED, BUT NOT THE FACT-VALUE GAP.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Creath1992, author = {Creath, Richard}, title = {Induction and the Gettier Problem}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {401-404}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, induction, knowledge, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CREEGAN1962, author = {CREEGAN, ROBERT-F}, title = {THE REFERENTIAL CONTINUUM, PART II.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {581-582}, keywords = {behavior, communication, language, meaning, perception, reference}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CREEGAN1960, author = {CREEGAN, ROBERT-F}, title = {THE REFERENTIAL CONTINUUM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {547-549}, keywords = {communication, expression, language, meaning, reference}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Cresswell1994, author = {Cresswell, Max-J}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {241-244}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Language in the World: A Philosophical Enquiry}, volume = {58(1)}, year = {1994} } @article{Crisp2005, author = {Crisp, Thomas-M and Smith, Donald-P}, title = {'Wholly Present' Defined}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {318-344}, keywords = {dimension, endurance, eternal, metaphysics, present, time}, abstract = {Three-dimensionalists, sometimes referred to an endurantists, think that objects persist through time by being "wholly present" at every time they exist. But what is it for something to be wholly present at a time? It is surprisingly difficult to say. The three-dimensionalist is free, of course, to take 'is wholly present at' as one of her theory's primitives, but this is problematic for at least one reason: some philosophers claim not to understand her primitive. Clearly the three-dimensionalist would be better off if she could state her theory in terms accessible to all. We think she can. What is needed is a definition of 'is wholly present at' that all can understand. In this paper, we offer one.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Crisp2000, author = {Crisp, Thomas-M and Warfield, Ted-A}, title = {The Irrelevance of Indeterministic Counterexamples to Principle Beta}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {173-184}, keywords = {consequence, counterexample, free-will; indeterminism, metaphysics}, abstract = {Incompatibilism about freedom and causal determinism is commonly supported by appeal to versions of the well-known consequence argument. Critics of the consequence argument have presented counterexamples to the consequence argument's central inference principle. The thesis of this article is that proponents of the consequence argument can easily bypass even the best of the counterexamples.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CRITTENDEN1970, author = {CRITTENDEN, CHARLES}, title = {ONTOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {85-96}, keywords = {description, existence, fiction, language, logic, ontology, quantification}, abstract = {THE THEORY CONSTRUES ALL STATEMENTS ABOUT FICTION AS FALSE; IT CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH COMMON PRACTICE. FOR IT ASSUMES THAT ONLY EXISTENT OBJECTS CAN BE VALUES OF VARIABLES. BUT BEING AN OBJECT IS DISTINCT FROM EXISTING; QUANTIFIERS SHOULD BE TAKEN AS INDICATING WHAT OBJECTS A SENTENCE PRESUPPOSES BUT NOT AS A CRITERION FOR WHAT EXISTENT ENTITIES IT ASSUMES. COLLAPSING THIS DISTINCTION IS REASONABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF A CONSTRUCTED SCIENTIFIC FRAMEWORK, BUT IN GENERAL LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY ARE SEPARATE CONCERNS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Crittenden1991, author = {Crittenden, Charles}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {225-229}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Unreality}, volume = {54(1)}, year = {1991} } @article{CROCKER1980, author = {CROCKER, LAWRENCE}, title = {MARX'S USE OF CONTRADICTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {558-563}, keywords = {contradiction, dialectic, formal-logic; social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CROWELL1990, author = {CROWELL, STEVEN-GALT}, title = {Husserl, Heidegger, and Transcendental Philosophy: Another Look at the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(3)}, pages = {501-518}, keywords = {metaphysics, phenomenology, transcendental}, abstract = {This essay interprets Husserl's first draft of his Encyclopaedia Britannica article and Heidegger's suggestions for revision, outlining a new way of reading the Husserl/Heidegger relationship. It is argued that these sources do not show Heidegger rejecting Husserl's transcendental phenomenology but rather, in specific disagreement over the phenomenological status of the "ego" and the "world," reinterpreting transcendental phenomenology as an ontological achievement, in a sense of "ontology" which itself derives in important ways from Husserl's transcendental reflection on the constitution of meaning. The essay argues that there is a significant sense in which Heidegger accepts the transcendental-phenomenological reduction.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Crowell2000, author = {Crowell, Steven-Galt}, title = {Metaphysics, Metontology, and the End of Being and Time}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {307-331}, keywords = {meaning, metaphysics, metontology, ontology}, abstract = {In 1928 Heidegger argued that the transcendental philosophy he had pursued in Being and Time needed to be completed by what he called "metontology." This paper analyzes what this notion amounts to. Far from being merely a curiosity of Heidegger scholarship, the place occupied by "metontology" opens onto a general issue concerning the relation between transcendental philosophy and metaphysics, and also between both of these and naturalistic empiricism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CROWTHER1983, author = {CROWTHER, PAUL}, title = {EXPERIENCE OF ART: SOME PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES OF HERMENEUTICAL ANALYSIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {347-362}, keywords = {aesthetic-experience; aesthetics, art}, abstract = {PART ONE OF THIS PAPER CONCENTRATES ON GADAMER'S CRITIQUE OF AESTHETIC FORMALISM. IT IS ARGUED THAT WHILST GADAMER FAILS TO REFUTE THE FORMALIST APPROACH, HE DOES AT LEAST ESTABLISH IT AS ONLY ONE LIMITED ASPECT TO OUR BROAD EXPERIENCE OF ART. IN PART TWO, SOME IDEAS FROM HEGEL, HEIDEGGER, AND MERLEAU-PONTY ARE BROACHED, IN ORDER TO ARTICULATE TWO OTHER PHENOMENOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF ARTISTIC EXPERIENCE--THE 'ALETHIC' AND THE 'NUMINOUS'.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CUA1970, author = {CUA, ANTONIO-S}, title = {MORAL JUDGMENT AND UNDERSTANDING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {614-616}, keywords = {ethics, moral-judgmen}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CUA1967, author = {CUA, A-S}, title = {TOWARD AN ETHICS OF MORAL AGENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {163-174}, keywords = {ethics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cullity2004, author = {Cullity, Garrett}, title = {Sympathy, Discernment, and Reasons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {37-62}, keywords = {discernment, ethics, reasons, rightness, sympathy}, abstract = {According to "the argument from discernment", sympathetic motivation is morally faulty, because it is morally undiscriminating. Sympathy can incline you to do the right thing, but it can also incline you to do the wrong thing. And if so, it is no better as a reason for doing something than any other morally arbitrary consideration. The only truly morally good form of motivation--because the only morally nonarbitrary one--involves treating and action's rightness as your reason for performing it. This paper attacks the argument from discernment and argues against its conclusion.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CUMMINS1990, author = {CUMMINS, PHILLIP-D}, title = {Pappas on the Role of Sensations in Reid's Theory of Perception.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {755-762}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, sensation}, abstract = {I challenge George Pappas's contention that there are both philosophical and textual grounds for holding that for Reid sensations are constituents of rather than merely concomitants of perceptions. The philosophical ground is that the latter option generates an inconsistency for Reid in cases in which sensations are perceived. I question the inconsistency by arguing that generating it requires a very implausible thesis about joint effects of a single cause. I also question Pappas's textual evidence that for Reid sensations are sometimes perceived.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CUMMINS1963, author = {CUMMINS, PHILLIP}, title = {PERCEPTUAL RELATIVITY AND IDEAS IN THE MIND.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {202-214}, keywords = {epistemology, idea, immaterialism, minds, perception, primary-quality; relativity, scepticism, secondary-qualit}, abstract = {THE MOST IMPORTANT LINK BETWEEN BERKELEY AND THE CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHERS IS EXAMINED, "VIZ.", THE ARGUMENT FROM PERCEPTUAL RELATIVITY, WHICH BERKELEY USED TO DESTROY THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES DISTINCTION. BERKELEY REFUTED BAYLES' SKEPTICISM AND IN SO DOING, STATED DOCTRINES SIMILAR TO THOSE OF MALEBRANCHE. THE ABOVE ARGUMENT IS BASICALLY THAT SECONDARY QUALITIES AS PERCEIVED ARE INCONSTANT AND RELATIVE, AND HENCE MUST BE SENSATIONS IN THE PERCEIVING MIND. IT IS ASSUMED THAT SENSED QUALITIES MUST BE PROPERTIES OF MINDS, (WHICH CANNOT BE PROPERTIES OF NON-MINDS). BERKELEY'S ARGUMENT PROVES THE DEPENDENCE OF ALL SENSIBLE QUALITIES UPON THE MIND. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cummins2000, author = {Cummins, Robert}, title = {Reply to Millikan}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {113-127}, keywords = {attitude, epistemology, representation}, abstract = {This is a response to Ruth Millikan's critical review of my Representations, Targets and Attitudes (MIT, 1996). My "Reply" focuses mainly on the charge that my equation of representation with isomorphism makes representation promiscuous and, hence, trivializes the concept. The main new point of interest in the discussion is that the content of a mental representation must be fixed independently of what its consumers can actually exploit in order to make room for the fact that it is possible to learn to exploit previously inaccessible content.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cuneo1999, author = {Cuneo, Terence-D}, title = {An Externalist Solution to the "Moral Problem"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {359-380}, keywords = {ethics, externalism, moral-theory; motivation}, abstract = {In his recent book, The Moral Problem, Michael Smith presents a number of arguments designed to expose the difficulties with so-called 'externalist' theories of motivation. This essay endeavors to defend externalism from Smith's attacks. I attempt three tasks in the essay. First, I try to clarify and reformulate Smith's distinction between internalism and externalism. Second, I formulate two of Smith's arguments--what I call the 'reliability argument' and 'the rationalist argument'--and attempt to show that these arguments fail to damage externalism. Third, I undertake to expose and question some of the motivations that drive internalism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CUNNINGHAM1983, author = {CUNNINGHAM, SUZANNE}, title = {HUSSERL AND PRIVATE LANGUAGES: A RESPONSE TO HUTCHESON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {103-112}, keywords = {language, phenomenology, private-languag}, abstract = {IN "CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS" EDMUND HUSSERL DESCRIBES HIS PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION AS LEAVING ONE WITHOUT "OTHER EGOS" AND WITHOUT "ALL THE FORMATIONS PERTAINING TO SOCIALITY AND CULTURE" (P. 19). I ARGUED IN MY BOOK, "LANGUAGE AND THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTIONS OF EDMUND HUSSERL", THAT THIS ACCOUNT OF THE REDUCTION LEAVES US WITH SOME VERSION OF A PRIVATE LANGUAGE AND THEREFORE OFFERS AN UNACCEPTABLE METHOD FOR ACHIEVING HUSSERL'S GOAL, I.E., ESTABLISHING ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN FOUNDATIONS FOR SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS. PETER HUTCHESON, IN HIS PAPER, "HUSSERL AND PRIVATE LANGUAGES," (PPR, SEPT. '81) TAKES ISSUE WITH MY CLAIMS. HIS CENTRAL OBJECTIONS RELATE TO MY CHARACTERIZATION OF PRIVATE LANGUAGES AND TO MY INTERPRETATION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION. IN THIS PAPER, I RESPOND TO HIS OBJECTIONS AND ARGUE THAT MY THESIS REGARDING HUSSERL'S METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO BE FALSE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CUNNINGHAM1985, author = {CUNNINGHAM, SUZANNE}, title = {PERCEPTUAL MEANING AND HUSSERL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {553-566}, keywords = {judgment, metaphysics, perception, phenomenology}, abstract = {THIS PAPER TAKES ISSUE WITH TWO OF THE MORE RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF HUSSERL'S NOTION OF "NOEMA" (ROUGHLY, 'MEANING'). THE FIRST, BY DAGFINN FOLLESDAL, ARGUES THAT THE "NOEMA" SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD ON ANALOGY WITH FREGEAN "SINN" AS AN ABSTRACT, TIMELESS ENTITY. THE SECOND, BY ROBERT SOLOMON, ARGUES THAT THIS IS NOT ADEQUATE FOR "NOEMATA"/MEANINGS IN PERCEPTION; THEY MUST BE PERCEIVED. I ARGUE AGAINST BOTH THAT PERCEPTUAL MEANING IS NEITHER AN ABSTRACT ENTITY OR A PERCEIVED ENTITY. IT IS A HIGHLY PARTICULARIZED, TIME-BOUND ENTITY UNCOVERED ONLY IN REFLECTION ON PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{D'AMICO1981, author = {D'AMICO, ROBERT}, title = {HUSSERL ON THE FOUNDATIONAL STRUCTURES OF NATURAL AND CULTURAL SCIENCES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {5-22}, keywords = {culture, human-sciences; metaphysics, natural-sciences; objectivism, phenomenology, scientific-metho}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE CONCERNS HUSSERL'S LATER WRITINGS ON SCIENCE AND ATTEMPTS TO GIVE A FOUNDATION FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. I TRY TO EMPHASIZE HUSSERL'S STRESS IN HIS "ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY" ON THE COMMUNICATIVE AND CULTURAL DIMENSION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH. HOWEVER, I ARGUE THAT CONTRARY TO COMMON OPINION, HUSSERL'S VIEWS ARE REMARKABLY SIMILAR TO TRADITIONAL AND POSITIVIST PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. SPECIFICALLY HUSSERL ACCEPTS THE ACCUMULATION MODEL OF PROGRESS AND THE EFFECT TO CONNECT SCIENTIFIC ABSTRACTIONS WITH SOME SECURE, REPEATABLE ACTS OF OBSERVATION. IN CONCLUSION, HUSSERL'S VIEWS ARE CONTRASTED WITH COMMENTS FROM HABERMAN, FOUCAULT AND KUHN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{D'Arms2000, author = {D'Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel}, title = {The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {65-90}, keywords = {appropriateness, emotion, ethics, fallacy, moral-theor}, abstract = {Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is wrong to be envious. These two senses of 'appropriate' have much less in common than philosophers have supposed. Indeed, the distinction between propriety and correctness is crucial to understanding the distinctive role of the emotions in ethics. We argue here that an emotion can be fitting despite being wrong to feel, and that various philosophical arguments are guilty of a systematic error which we term the moralistic fallacy. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DA-COSTA1989, author = {DA-COSTA, NEWTON-C-A and FRENCH, STEVEN}, title = {ON THE LOGIC OF BELIEF.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {431-446}, keywords = {belief, doxography, epistemic-logic; epistemology, paraconsistent-logic}, abstract = {THREE SYSTEMS OF DOXASTIC LOGIC ARE PRESENTED AND DISCUSSED. IT IS ARGUED THAT OUR ACTUAL BODIES OF BELIEF OFTEN INCORPORATE PRIMA FACIE CONTRADICTIONS AND THAT A LOGIC OF BELIEF APPROPRIATE FOR MODELLING SUCH BELIEF SYSTEMS SHOULD THEREFORE BE PARA-CONSISTENT. IT IS ALSO NOTED THAT THIS IDEA SHEDS NEW LIGHT ON MOORE'S PARADOX AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-DECEPTION, FOR EXAMPLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DACEY1975, author = {DACEY, RAYMOND}, title = {THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC THEORY IN SUPPORTING COUNTERFACTUAL ARGUMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {402-410}, keywords = {counterfactual, economics, logic}, abstract = {ECONOMIC HISTORY EMPLOYS COUNTERFACTUAL ARGUMENTS, I.E., ARGUMENTS BASED UPON A FALSE FACTUAL PREMISE, TO DISPEL MYTHS. SUCH ARGUMENTS HAVE AS CONCLUSIONS COUNTERFACTUAL STATEMENTS. THE QUESTION ADDRESSED IS WHAT IS THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC THEORY IN SUPPORTING COUNTERFACTUAL ARGUMENTS? TRADITIONAL ANALYSES OF COUNTERFACTUAL STATEMENTS REQUIRE TOO MUCH OF ECONOMIC THEORY, I.E., MODAL "IF..., THEN..." CONNECTIVES. AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS BASED UPON FINCH'S PAPER "AN EXPLICATION OF COUNTERFACTUALS BY PROBABILITY THEORY" ("PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH", VOL. 18, 1958) PROVIDES THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS: IN ORDER FOR AN ECONOMIC MODEL (OR THEORY) M TO SUPPORT A COUNTERFACTUAL ARGUMENT WITH FALSE PREMISE C AND CONSEQUENT E ONLY THREE REQUIREMENTS NEED BE MET. THEY ARE: 1) THE MODEL M MUST BE CONFIRMED TO AT LEAST THE (PROBABILITY) LEVEL 1/2; 2) THE MODEL M MUST BE NECESSARY TO DEDUCE E FROM C; AND 3) C MUST BE FACTUALLY AND NOT LOGICALLY FALSE. THESE CONDITIONS ARE STRIKINGLY SIMPLE AND AVOID THE NEEDLESS INTRUSION OF NOTIONS OF CAUSALITY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC HISTORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DAHL1991, author = {DAHL, Norman}, title = {Justice and Aristotelian Practical Reason.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {aristotelianism, justice, practical-reason; social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DAHL1991a, author = {DAHL, Norman-O}, title = {Plato's Defense of Justice.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {action, agent, ethics, justice, soul}, abstract = {This paper argues that Plato has a response to two familiar criticisms of his defense of justice in the Republic--that it commits a fallacy of irrelevance, and it provides people with the wrong reason for being just. The response commits Plato to a view much like the forms of intuitionism held in the early part of this century. This latter has two important consequences. It makes it doubtful that Plato held an'Iagent-centered' as opposed to an 'act-centered' theory of justice. And it leaves him to face criticisms analogous to those that have been raised against these forms of intuitionism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dancy2003, author = {Dancy, Jonathan}, title = {Precis of Practical Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {423-428}, keywords = {ethics, normative, practical, reality, reasons}, abstract = {This is a precis of my Practical Reality (OUP, 2000).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dancy2003a, author = {Dancy, Jonathan}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {468-490}, keywords = {axiology, belief, desire, motivation, normative}, abstract = {This is a series of replies to the criticisms of my Practical Reality (OUP, 2000) offered by Wayne Davis, Stephen Darwall, Christian Piller, Michael Smith and R. Jay Wallace.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DANIELS1989, author = {DANIELS, CHARLES-B}, title = {EXPERIENCING GOD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {487-499}, keywords = {belief, christian, epistemology, experience, god, religion}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ADDRESSES ITSELF TO ISSUES RAISED BY WILLIAM P ALSTON'S "RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF." IN SECTION 1, I BEGIN WITH A FEW WORDS OF DIRECT CRITICISM OF ALSTON'S VIEWS. IN SECTION 2, I PRESENT FOUR REASONS THE BLIND OR UNDISCERNING HAVE TO THINK THAT, DESPITE THE FACT THEY DO NOT EXPERIENCE CERTAIN FEATURES OF THE WORLD, THOSE FEATURES ARE THERE TO BE EXPERIENCED AND OTHERS HAVE THE ABILITY TO EXPERIENCE THEM. FINALLY, IN SECTION 3, I ARGUE THAT NONE OF THESE REASONS GIVES THE NONRELIGIOUS GROUNDS TO THINK A RELIGIOUS SIDE OF REALITY IS THERE TO BE EXPERIENCED AND THE RELIGIOUS AT TIMES EXPERIENCE IT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DANIELS1990, author = {DANIELS, Norman}, title = {Equality of What: Welfare, Resources, or Capabilities?.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {resource, social-philosophy; welfare}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Daniels1998, author = {Daniels, Norman}, title = {Kamm's Moral Methods}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {947-954}, keywords = {ethics, morality, mortality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DANTO1982, author = {DANTO, ARTHUR-C}, title = {DEPICTION AND DESCRIPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {1-19}, keywords = {depicting, description, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DANTO1969, author = {DANTO, ARTHUR-C}, title = {COMPLEX EVENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {66-77}, keywords = {action, event, man, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Darby2004, author = {Darby, Derrick}, title = {Rights Externalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {620-634}, keywords = {externalism, metaphysics, recognition, rights, social}, abstract = {Rights externalism is the thesis that a subject's status as a rightholder is secured not on account of it having a certain nature, but on account of it being afforded a certain sort of social recognition. I believe that rights externalism has been given short shrift, largely because a certain objection is widely taken to be a compelling reason for rejecting it. This objection goes roughly as follows. Both in theory and in practice we commonly appeal to the fact that subjects possess certain nonconventional rights to criticize immoral social practices, arrangements, and institutions. Although this objection is taken by some rights internalists to justify favoring rights internalism over rights externalism, I argue that it does not. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dardis1993, author = {Dardis, Anthony-B}, title = {Sunburn: Independence Conditions on Causal Relevance}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {577-598}, keywords = {causation, epistemology, natural-la}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Darwall1994, author = {Darwall, Stephen-L}, title = {From Morality to Virtue and Back?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {695-701}, keywords = {common-sense; ethics, morality, virtue}, abstract = {A critical discussion of Michael Slote's "From Morality to Virtue" in which worries are raised about abandoning moral for aretaic notions. Two examples: contemporary conceptions of the virtues assume morality in the background and aretaic notions fail to provide the idea of accountability central to morality --an idea we shouldn't give up.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Darwall2003, author = {Darwall, Stephen}, title = {Desires, Reasons, and Causes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {436-443}, keywords = {axiology, cause, desire, motivation, reasons}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Darwall1998, author = {Darwall, Stephen}, title = {Expressivist Relativism?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {183-188}, keywords = {ethics, moral-theory; objectivity, relativism, scepticism}, abstract = {This is part of a symposium on Harman and Thomson's Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Blackwell, 1996). I argue that Harman's acceptance of a quasi-absolutist semantics of fundamental normative claims blurs issues with at least some traditional critics of relativism, e.g., noncognitivists. I also raise some questions concerning the relation between quasi-absolutism and the idea that moral conventions derive from bargaining.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Darwall1995, author = {Darwall, Stephen}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {992-995}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought": 1640-1740}, volume = {58(4)}, year = {1995} } @article{Dascal1992, author = {Dascal, Marcelo and Horowitz, Amir}, title = {Semantics and the Psyche}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {395-399}, keywords = {epistemology, meaning, psyche, reality, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DAUENHAUER1981, author = {DAUENHAUER, BERNARD-P}, title = {SCHURMANN ON POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {130-132}, keywords = {coercion, political-philosoph}, abstract = {REINER SCHURMANN, BUILDING ON HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT, HAS PROPOSED A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY WHICH EXPLICITLY DISPENSES WITH QUESTIONS CONCERNING POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. IN THIS DISCUSSION, I POINT TO THE APPARENT PRACTICAL NECESSITY FOR RESTRICTED POLITICAL COERCION. THIS APPARENT NECESSITY, I ARGUE, MUST EITHER BE SHOWN TO BE ILLUSORY OR MUST BE TAKEN TO REQUIRE QUESTIONS CONCERNING POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. SINCE SCHURMAN HAS NOT AS YET DONE EITHER OF THESE, THEN HIS ARGUMENT REMAINS INCOMPLETE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{David1996, author = {David, Marian}, title = {Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {943-952}, keywords = {egocentrism, epistemology, judgment, knowledge}, abstract = {This fine book offers a wealth of illuminating and subtle discussions on a wide range of topics unified by the theme of rationality. At its heart lies Foley's proposal of a general framework for the theory of rationality: all rationality judgments are perspective-relative evaluations of how effective a person appears to be in satisfying her goals. Foley's main concern lies with a boldly subjective brand of epistemic rationality: it is egocentrically rational for S to believe p iff, reflecting on her own deepest standards, S would think that believing p furthers her purely epistemic goal of now having an accurate and comprehensive set of beliefs.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DAVID1991, author = {DAVID, Marian}, title = {Neither Mentioning 'Brains in a Vat' nor Mentioning Brains in a Vat Will Prove that We Are Not Brains in a Vat.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {brain, epistemology, externalism, scepticism}, abstract = {The paper considers some reconstructions of Putnam's anti-skeptical argument to the effect that we are not brains in a vat. The standard reconstructions of the argument are rejected because they employ a metalinguistic premise concerning the meaning of the sentence I am a brain in a vat' which makes them susceptible to skepticism about meaning. An invitingly simple object-language version of the argument is suggested. It, too, is rejected because the premise that we can think that we are brains in a vat remains open to skeptical doubt.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{David2006, author = {David, Marian}, title = {A Substitutional Theory of Truth?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {72(1)}, pages = {182-189}, keywords = {epistemology, metalinguistic, quantification, substitution, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Davidson2003, author = {Davidson, Donald}, title = {Responses to Barry Stroud, John McDowell, and Tyler Burge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {691-699}, keywords = {language, meaning, representation, use}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DAVIES1983, author = {DAVIES, KIM}, title = {EMPIRICISM AND THE BOUNDS OF SENSE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {401-406}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Davies1991, author = {Davies, Stephen}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {492-494}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Definitions of Art}, volume = {54(2)}, year = {1991} } @article{Davis1998, author = {Davis, Lawrence-H}, title = {Functionalism and Personal Identity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {781-804}, keywords = {epistemology, functionalism, metaphysics, personal-identit}, abstract = {Sydney Shoemaker has claimed that functionalism, a theory about mental states, implies a certain theory about the identity over time of persons, the entities that have mental states. He also claims that persons can survive a "Brain-State-Transfer" procedure. My examination of these claims includes description and analysis of imaginary cases, but--notably--not appeals to our "intuitions" concerning them. It turns out that Shoemaker's basic insight is correct. But there is no implication that it is necessary. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DAVIS1982, author = {DAVIS, WAYNE-A}, title = {MILLER ON WANTING, INTENDING, AND BEING WILLING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {107-110}, keywords = {intention, metaphysics, wanting, willing}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Davis2003, author = {Davis, Wayne-A}, title = {Psychologism and Humeanism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {452-459}, keywords = {axiology, explanation, humeanism, psychologism, reasons}, abstract = {Dancy argues that reasons are not psychological states, but perceived facts about the world, and shows that the reasons themselves are not causes. Dancy concludes that actions are not explained by beliefs and desires, and that reason explanations are not causal. I show that these further conclusions are unwarranted by sketching an alternative theory according to which what it is for an action to be done for a reason is for certain beliefs and desires to cause it. Our reasons are the contents of those beliefs and desires. This theory is compatible with Dancy's facts, and explains more.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Davis2005, author = {Davis, Wayne-A}, title = {Concepts and Epistemic Individuation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {290-325}, keywords = {concept, epistemology, individuation, integration}, abstract = {Peacocke (1999, 2001) defines what he calls the "integration challenge." The challenge is to integrate our metaphysics with our epistemology by showing that they are mutually acceptable. Peacocke's key conclusion is that the integration challenge can be met for "epistemically individuated concepts." A good theory of content, he believes, will close the apparent gap between an account of truth for any given subject matter and an overall account of knowledge. I shall argue that there are no epistemically individuated concepts, and shall critically analyze Peacocke's arguments for their existence. I will suggest more generally that the possession conditions of concepts and their principles of individuation shed little light on the epistemology or metaphysics of things other than concepts. My broader goal is to shed light on what concepts are by showing that they are more fundamental than the sorts of cognitive and epistemic factors a leading theory uses to define them. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Davis2003a, author = {Davis, Wayne-A}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {744-747}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Meaning, Expression, and Thought}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2003} } @other{Davis1998a, author = {Davis, Wayne-A}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {241-244}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory}, volume = {65(1)}, year = {1998} } @article{De-Almeida2001, author = {De-Almeida, Claudio}, title = {What Moore's Paradox Is About}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {33-58}, keywords = {argument, belief, language, paradox}, abstract = {On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore's paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which the believer can have no nonoverridden evidence. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DE-BELLIS1991, author = {DE-BELLIS, Mark}, title = {The Representational Content of Musical Experience.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {metaphysics, music, representation, sensation}, abstract = {In Sense and Content, Christopher Peacocke draws a distinction between sensational and representational properties of experience, illustrating it with ambiguous figures and their musical analogue, the tritone. The present paper, invoking music-theoretical accounts of musical listening, argues that musical experience has a representational content sufficiently rich to render Peacocke's postulation of sensational qualities unnecessary. (Content must be understood here on a fine grained conception, rather than, say as a set of possible worlds.)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DE-MONTPENSIER1972, author = {DE-MONTPENSIER, ROY-STONE}, title = {THE LOGIC OF ETHICAL STATEMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {297-321}, keywords = {ethics, laws, morality, scepticism, statement}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DE-PAUL1988, author = {DE-PAUL, MICHAEL-R}, title = {NAIVETE AND CORRUPTION IN MORAL INQUIRY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {619-635}, keywords = {coherence, corruption, ethics, experience, moral-developmen}, abstract = {CONTEMPORARY MORAL THEORISTS HAVE FOCUSED THEIR ATTENTION ON REASONING TYPES OF EXPERIENCE TO THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER TYPES OF EXPERIENCE THAT CAN CAUSE US TO ALTER OUR MORAL JUDGMENTS. AS A RESULT COHERENCE APPROACHES TO MORAL INQUIRY, E.G., RAWLSIAN WIDE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM, CONTAIN NO ELEMENT WHICH WOULD DRIVE NAIVE PERSONS TO ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL LIFE EXPERIENCE AS AN ELEMENT IN MORAL INQUIRY. THIS DEFICIENCY IS NOT EASY TO CORRECT. THERE ARE TWO PROMISING APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM, BUT NEITHER IS OBVIOUSLY SATISFACTORY. ONE OF THESE APPROACHES ACCEPTS THE BROAD COHERENTIST CONCEPTION, BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT IT IMPOSES A SUFFICIENTLY STRONG OBLIGATION TO SEEK OUT FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES. THE OTHER SOLUTION IS ARISTOTELIAN AND IS OPPOSED TO COHERENTISM. THE ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH REJECTS THE IDEAL OF A METHOD THAT IS NEUTRAL BETWEEN SUBSTANTIVE MORAL THEORIES, AND THEREFORE, IT IS OPPOSED TO THE WHOLE DIRECTION OF MODERN THINKING ABOUT MORAL INQUIRY. THIS DISCUSSION AIMS AT BRINGING ONE TO SEE THAT A FUNDAMENTAL CHOICE BETWEEN THESE APPROACHES MUST BE MADE AND TO APPRECIATE THE COST OF EACH CHOICE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{De-Pierris2002, author = {De-Pierris, Graciela}, title = {Causation As a Philosophical Relation in Hume}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {499-545}, keywords = {causation, epistemology, metaphysics, naturalism, phenomenology, scepticism}, abstract = {By giving the proper emphasis to both radical skepticism and naturalism as two independent standpoints in Hume, I wish to propose a more satisfactory account of some of the more puzzling Humean claims on causation. I place these claims alternatively in either the philosophical standpoint of the radical skeptic or in the standpoint of everyday and scientific beliefs. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{De-Rosa2004, author = {De-Rosa, Raffaella}, title = {Locke's Essay Book I: The Question-Begging Status of the Anti-Nativist Arguments}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(1)}, pages = {37-64}, keywords = {empiricism, metaphysics, nativism, question-beggin}, abstract = {In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I of Locke's Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) "the awareness principle", viz., the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn't currently aware or hasn't been aware in the past. I then argue that the arguments' dependence on this principle is question begging on two counts. Unless this principle is defended, Locke's arguments beg the question against Descartes and Leibniz because their nativism implies the denial of the awareness principle. And even when Locke defended the principle, his arguments remain question begging because they presuppose the empiricism they aim to prove. The disclosure of the question-begging status of these arguments debunks a seemingly powerful way of attacking nativism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DE-VRIES1983, author = {DE-VRIES, WILLEM}, title = {PROBLEMS IN AIRAKSINEN'S DIALECTIC OF FEELING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {85-94}, keywords = {dialectic, feeling, metaphysics}, abstract = {ACCORDING TO T AIRAKSINEN, THE RECURRENCE OF THE NOTION OF "FEELING" AT SEVERAL DIFFERENT STAGES OF HEGEL'S DIALECTIC IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT POSES DIFFICULT PROBLEMS FOR THE INTERPRETER. HE PROPOSES TO RESOLVE THEM BY DEVELOPING A DOUBLE ASPECT THEORY OF DIALECTIC. READING THE DIALECTIC FORWARDS, WE SEE THE "ONTOLOGICAL" ASPECT AND ENCOUNTER DIFFERENT THINGS AT EACH LEVEL. READING THE DIALECTIC BACKWARDS WE SEE THE "METHODICAL" ASPECT, AND CAN LUMP THINGS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS INTO GROUPS OF COMMON KINDS. THE AUTHOR ARGUES AGAINST AIRAKSINEN'S POSITION, FIRST BY CLAIMING THAT HE HAS MISCONSTRUED THE NOTION OF FEELING BY OVERLOOKING SEVERAL IMPORTANT HEGELIAN DISTINCTIONS, VIZ., BETWEEN SENSATION AND FEELING, AND BETWEEN INNER AND OUTER FEELINGS. THE AUTHOR THEN ARGUES THAT WITH A PROPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE FORM/CONTENT DISTINCTION THE RECURRENCE OF FEELING AT DIFFERENT POINTS IN THE DIALECTIC IS PERFECTLY INTELLIGIBLE WITHOUT A DOUBLE ASPECT INTERPRETATION OF THE DIALECTIC.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Debellis1996, author = {Debellis, M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {732-735}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Music and Conceptualization}, volume = {58(3)}, year = {1996} } @article{Dees1996, author = {Dees, Richard-H}, title = {Moral Conversations}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {531-550}, keywords = {conversation, conviction, ethics, morality, self}, abstract = {By considering their experiences when people undergo a change in their moral perspective, I argue that we can best explain and justify conversions by reference to the internal and contextual features of the convert herself. Conversions occur in three ways: by a gradual evolution in the convert's values, by the discovery of facts that alters her view of the world, and by a radical transformation that changes her whole life. Only in the last of these cases does a contextual view seem inadequate and then we are left with nothing meaningful to say except what will make sense to her.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Deigh2004, author = {Deigh, John}, title = {Nussbaum's Account of Compassion}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {465-472}, keywords = {compassion, emotion, ethics, eudaimonia, stoicism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Delaney1994, author = {Delaney, C-F}, title = {The Goal of Science and the Nature of Reality: Rescher's Pragmatic Idealism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {395-402}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, pragmatism, reality, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Della-Rocca2005, author = {Della-Rocca, Michael}, title = {Descartes, the Cartesian Circle, and Epistemology without God}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(1)}, pages = {1-33}, keywords = {doubt, epistemology, externalism, god, idea}, abstract = {This paper defends an interpretation of Descartes according to which he sees us as having normative (and not merely psychological) certainty of all clear and distinct ideas during the period in which they are apprehended clearly and distinctly. However, on this view, a retrospective doubt about clear and distinct ideas is possible. This interpretation allows Descartes to avoid the Cartesian circle in an effective way and also shows that Descartes is surprisingly, in some respects, an epistemological externalist. The paper goes on to defend this interpretation against some powerful philosophical objections by Margaret Wilson and others by showing how Descartes's doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths can be brought in to support his epistemology. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Della-Rocca2005a, author = {Della-Rocca, Michael}, title = {Descartes-Inseparability-Almog}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {701-708}, keywords = {dualism, essentialism, metaphysics, mind, separability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DEMOS1961, author = {DEMOS, RAPHAEL}, title = {SOME REMARKS ON ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL REASON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {153-162}, keywords = {attitude, cognition, emotion, ethics, imperatives, meaning, moral-judgment; practical-reaso}, abstract = {PRACTICAL WISDOM "PHRONESIS" INVOLVES SOMETHING MORE THAN COGNITIVE MEANING. THIS ARTICLE ATTEMPTS TO FIND OUT, WHAT, ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE, DIFFERENTIATES PRACTICAL WISDOM FROM OTHER COGNITIVE ATTITUDES. IT IS CLAIMED THAT ARISTOTLE VIEWS MORAL UTTERANCES AS HAVING BOTH AN EMOTIVE AND AN IMPERATIVE MEANING. HENCE, HIS VIEWS ON ETHICAL SENTENCES ANTICIPATED THOSE OF STEVENSON AND AYER. YET TODAY, EMOTIVE MEANING IS VIEWED AS EXCLUDING COGNITIVE-DESCRIPTIVE MEANING; HOWEVER, FOR ARISTOTLE THESE WERE NOT CONTRARIES. AN EMOTIVE--IMPERATIVE MEANING ALSO IS TRUE OR FALSE, ALSO IS BELIEVED. THUS ARISTOTLE IS BETTER COMPARED WITH KANT. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES WITH A DISCUSSION OF MAN'S BASIC DUTY--TO TRY TO FIND WHAT HIS DUTY IS. THIS, HIS META-DUTY, IS PROBLEMATIC; IS IT BY NATURE OR NOT? (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DEMPSTER1989, author = {DEMPSTER, DOUGLAS-J}, title = {EXEMPLIFICATION AND THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {393-412}, keywords = {art, cognitive, exemplification, symbol, twentieth, valuation}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE BEGINS BY ARGUING THAT NELSON GOODMAN'S ACCOUNT OF EXEMPLIFICATION IS CENTRAL NOT ONLY TO HIS THEORY OF ARTISTIC EXPRESSION AND HIS AMBITIOUS ASSIMILATION OF THE ARTS AND SCIENCES UNDER A THEORY OF SYMBOL SYSTEMS AND COGNITIVE VALUES, BUT THAT IT IS CENTRAL ALSO TO THE NOTORIETY OF SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF FICTIONAL DISCOURSE AND FICTIVE PICTORIAL REPRESENTATION. THE PAPER ARGUES AGAINST THE NECESSITY AND SUFFICIENCY OF GOODMAN'S ACCOUNT OF EXEMPLIFICATION, AND CONCLUDES THAT A SEMANTIC ACCOUNT OF EXEMPLIFICATION CANNOT BE CONSTRUCTED WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF NOMINALISM. IT CLOSES WITH SOME TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS TOWARD A NONSEMANTIC ACCOUNT OF EXEMPLIFICATION THAT WOULD STILL SUPPORT GOODMAN'S CLAIMS ABOUT THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF ART.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Denis2001, author = {Denis, Lara}, title = {From Friendship to Marriage: Revising Kant}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(1)}, pages = {1-28}, keywords = {ethics, friendship, marriage, moral-theor}, abstract = {This paper examines Kant's accounts of friendship and marriage, and argues for what can be called an ideal of "moral marriage" based on Kant's notion of moral friendship. After explaining why Kant values friendship so highly, it gives an account of the ways in which marriage falls far short, according to Kant, of what friendship has to offer. The paper then argues that many of Kant's reasons for finding marriage morally impoverished compared with friendship are wrong-headed. The paper further argues that a few of Kant's views about friendship are false. The main point is that, when we slightly revise Kant's account of friendship and jettison Kant's misguided notions about marriage, we see that marriages can aspire to much of the same moral richness as friendships. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Denkel1997, author = {Denkel, Arda}, title = {On the Compresence of Tropes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {599-606}, keywords = {cohesion, epistemology, internal, trope}, abstract = {Once we assume that objects are bundles of tropes, we want to know how that latter cohere. Are they held together by a substratum, are they linked by external relations or do they cling to one another by internal relations? This paper begins by exploring the reasons for eliminating the first two suggestions. Defending that the third option can be made plausible, it advances the following thesis: Maintaining that tropes are held in a compresence by appropriately qualified internal relations avoids the consequence that such properties will be essential to the object. The specific targets of the second part of the paper include, first, a more precise description of the notion of a cohesive internal relation, and second, an explanation of how alteration is possible in an object the particular properties of which hold together by qualified internal relations.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Denkel1992, author = {Denkel, Arda}, title = {Substance Without Substratum}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {705-711}, keywords = {epistemology, substance, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Denkel2000, author = {Denkel, Arda}, title = {The Refutation of Substrata}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {431-439}, keywords = {epistemology, individuation, sameness, substratum}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Denkel1995, author = {Denkel, Arda}, title = {Artifacts and Constituents}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(2)}, pages = {311-322}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, artifact, essentialism, object}, abstract = {Is this paper the author argues that a restricted form of artifact-essentialism is tenable. The essence of an artifact is the structure that gives it the same function in every possible world nomologically equivalent to the actual. The author refutes the claim that the reasons for regarding an artifact and the piece of stuff constituting it as nonidentical entities are inadequate, and demonstrates that an ontology intermediate between artifact-essentialism and its antithesis cannot be consistent. Failing to be an essentialist commits one to a full-fledged anti-essentialism in the same respect.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Denkel1996, author = {Denkel, Arda}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {238-240}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Object and Property}, volume = {62(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{Dennett2004, author = {Dennett, Daniel-C}, title = {Commentary on John Dupre's Human Nature and the Limits of Science}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {473-483}, keywords = {evolution, human-nature; limits, metaphysics, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dennett2002, author = {Dennett, Daniel-C}, title = {Commentary on Sober and Wilson, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {692-696}, keywords = {altruism, ethics, evolution, psychology, unselfishness}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DENNETT1990, author = {DENNETT, Daniel-C}, title = {The Interpretation of Texts, People and Other Artifacts.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {artifact, interpretation, language, people, text}, abstract = {The interpretation of texts (hermeneutics), people (intentional psychology), artifacts, and evolutionary design processes (adaptationism) are shown to be practices governed by the same principles, subject to the same problems and controversies, and limited by the same ultimate indeterminacies. In every exercise of interpretation, the intentions of the "author" (if any) are only defeasible indicators of meaning or function, and beyond an assessment of current or future functional prowess, there are no deeper facts to ground an original or fundamental attribution of meaning.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dennett1993, author = {Dennett, Daniel-C}, title = {Precis of Consciousness Explained}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {889-892}, keywords = {cognitive-science; consciousness, metaphysics, mind, phenomena}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dennett1993a, author = {Dennett, Daniel-C}, title = {The Message Is: There Is No Medium}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {919-931}, keywords = {cartesianism, consciousness, metaphysics, mind}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DENNETT1987, author = {DENNETT, DANIEL-C}, title = {COMMENTARY ON CAM'S "PROPOSITIONS ABOUT IMAGES".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {339-341}, keywords = {image, metaphysics, minds, proposition}, abstract = {IN "PROPOSITIONS ABOUT IMAGES" CAM CORRECTLY ANALYZES AND CRITICIZES THE GROUNDS I GAVE, IN THE WORKS HE CITES, FOR MY DENIAL THAT WE HAVE PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO ANYTHING DESERVING TO BE CALLED A MENTAL IMAGE. CAM CLAIMS, MOREOVER, THAT THERE IS NO WAY FOR ME TO CASH MY "PROMISSARY NOTES" ABOUT DESCRIPTIVE PROPOSITIONS. HE IS RIGHT, BUT I WAS WRONG TO THINK I NEEDED SUCH AN ESCAPE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DENNETT1968, author = {DENNETT, D-C}, title = {FEATURES OF INTENTIONAL ACTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {232-244}, keywords = {action, epistemology, intention}, abstract = {IN "INTENTION" (BLACKWELL'S 1957, SECOND EDITION 1963), G.E.M. ANSCOMBE OFFERS AN ARGUMENT TO SHOW THAT "AN ACTION IS NOT CALLED 'INTENTIONAL' IN VIRTUE OF ANY EXTRA FEATURE WHICH EXISTS WHEN IT IS PERFORMED"; ON THE MOST INTERESTING AND USEFUL INTERPRETATION THIS CONCLUSION IS UNTENABLE. SINCE ANSCOMBE'S ARGUMENT IS ABOUT WHAT COULD SERVE AS CRITERION FOR INTENTIONAL ACTION, THE NOTION OF A CRITERION FOR USE OF A WORD IS EXAMINED. IT IS THEN ARGUED THAT ANSCOMBE'S ARGUMENT DEPENDS ON A CLAIM THAT IS UNSUPPORTED AND IMPLAUSIBLE, AND WHICH, MOREOVER, ENTAILS PHYSICAL INDETERMINISM AT THE MACROSCOPIC LEVEL. A WEAKER, INDEED LARGELY TRIVIAL, VERSION OF THE ARGUMENT IS SEEN TO BE TENABLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Densmore1999, author = {Densmore, Shannon and Dennett, Daniel-C}, title = {The Virtues of Virtual Machines}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {747-761}, keywords = {epistemology, machine, virtual, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DePaul2002, author = {DePaul, Michael-R}, title = {A Half Dozen Puzzles Regarding Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {629-635}, keywords = {attitude, axiology, hedonism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{DePaul1993, author = {DePaul, Michael-R}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {959-962}, publisher = {Routledge}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Balance and Refinement}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1993} } @article{DeRose1996, author = {DeRose, Keith}, title = {Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {193-197}, keywords = {content, contextualism, epistemology, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DeRose2004, author = {DeRose, Keith}, title = {The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {346-350}, keywords = {contextualism, epistemology, knowledge, standard}, abstract = {A new form of invariantism in epistemology, the 'subject-sensitive invariantism' of John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley, now stalks contextualism, threatening both to provide a rival account of the linguistic phenomena contextualism seeks to explain within an invariantist semantics, and also, as Thomas Blackson points out, to undermine an argument for contextualism in DeRose's earlier "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context." The current paper attacks 'subject-sensitive invariantism' by showing how it mishandles certain third-person attributions of knowledge.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DeRose1992, author = {DeRose, Keith}, title = {Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {913-929}, keywords = {attribution, contextualism, epistemology, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DeRose2000, author = {DeRose, Keith}, title = {Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {697-706}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, evidence, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DERRIDA1969, author = {DERRIDA, JACQUES}, title = {THE ENDS OF MAN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {31-57}, keywords = {french, man, metaphysics}, abstract = {CETTE COMMUNICATION PROPOSEE A UN COLLOQUE FRANCO-AMERICAIN EST L'ANALYSE DE LA SITUATION PHILOSOPHIQUE FRANCAISE ACTUELLE. APRES QUELQUES CONSIDERATIONS SUR LA SIGNIFICATION POLITIQUE ET HISTORIQUE D'UN COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL DE PHILOSOPHIE, L'AUTEUR POSE LA QUESTION DE L'HOMME ET DE SES FINS (AU SENS A BIGU DE MORT ET DE FINALITE), TELLE QU'ELLE FASCINE LA PHILOSOPHIE FRANCAISE AUJOURD'HUI. POUR COMPRENDRE EN QUELS TERMES SE POSE AUJOURD'HUI CETTE QUESTION EN FRANCE, IL FAUT TENIR COMPTE DE LA LECTURE QUI A ETE FAITE PAR LES DEUX DERNIERES GENERATIONS DE KANT, HEGEL, HUSSERL ET HEIDEGGER. A UN PREMIER NIVEAU, CETTE LECTURE A MECONNU, DE MANIERE TRES SIGNIFICATIVE, LA CRITIQUE DE L'ANTHROPOLOGISME, SINON DE L'HUMANISME, QUI EST A L'OEUVRE CHEZ CES QUATRE PHILOSOPHES. LES PRINCIPAUX ARGUMENTS DE CETTE CRITIQUE SONT RECONSTITUES AU COURS D'UNE PREMIERE ETAPE. MAIS A UN DEUXIEME NIVEAU, IL APPARAIT QU'UN HUMANISME PROFOND SOUTIENT CETTE CRITIQUE. DEMONSTRATION EN EST FAITE, AVEC UNE ATTENTION PARTICULIERE EN CE QUI CONCERNE HEIDEGGER, DONT LA SITUATION EST PLUS DIFFICILE ET PLUS DECISIVE. C'EST CETTE DERMIERE ANALYSE QUI EST PRESUPPOSEE PAR TOUTE LA CRITIQUE DE L'HUMANISME QUI DOMINE AUJOURD'HUI EN FRANCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DEVINE1987, author = {DEVINE, PHILIP-E}, title = {RELATIVISM, ABORTION, AND TOLERANCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {131-138}, keywords = {abortion, ethics, relativism, taoism, tolerance}, abstract = {THIS PAPER REPLIES TO DAVID WONG'S CONTENTION, IN "MORAL RELATIVITY", THAT A PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL TOLERANCE CAN BE BUILT ON RELATIVIST PREMISES. TOLERANCE, IT IS ARGUED, CANNOT BE A SUPRA-SYSTEMIC PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE RELATIONS AMONG MORALITIES; RATHER, ITS MEANING WILL DEPEND ON THE PARTICULAR MORALITY IN WHICH IT IS EMBEDDED. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE ESSAY, SIMON BLACKBURN'S SIMILAR ARGUMENT IN "SPREADING THE WORD" IS BRIEFLY CONSIDERED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Devitt1993, author = {Devitt, Michael}, title = {Localism and Analyticity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {641-646}, keywords = {analysis, epistemology, logic, meaning}, abstract = {In their discussion of semantic holism, Fodor and Lepore claim that Quine showed that any inferential properties constituting a meaning cannot be distinguished on epistemic grounds like apriority. But they often write as if Quine showed that such properties cannot be distinguished at all. The paper argues that Quine did not show the latter. It goes on to propose a criterion for distinguishing the constitutive properties: they are the ones that determine reference. Fodor is not in a position to reject this criterion since he already uses an analogous one in his own theory.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Devitt2002, author = {Devitt, Michael}, title = {Meaning and Use}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {106-121}, keywords = {language, meaning, semantics, thought, use}, abstract = {Part I argues that the use theory in Horwich's Meaning does not give sufficient attention to the relation between language and thought. A development of the theory is proposed that gives explanatory priority to the mental. Part II argues that Horwich greatly overstates the case for his use theory; that the arguments from ignorance and error against description theories of reference can be adapted against the use theory; and that a tempting development of the use theory would risk both the collapse of the theory into truth referentialism and the difficulties that have plagued truth referentialism. Finally, a consideration of our ordinary thought ascriptions provides evidence against any use theory. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Devitt1996, author = {Devitt, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {489-492}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism}, volume = {60(2)}, year = {1996} } @other{Dicker1993, author = {Dicker, Georges}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {723-726}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction}, volume = {56(3)}, year = {1993} } @article{DICKIE1961, author = {DICKIE, GEORGE}, title = {BULLOUGH AND THE CONCEPT OF PSYCHICAL DISTANCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {233-238}, keywords = {aesthetics, attitude, inhibition, practical, principle, psychical-distanc}, abstract = {DICKIE DISCUSSES SOME MISINTERPRETATIONS AND INADEQUACIES OF BULLOUGH'S VIEW OF PSYCHICAL DISTANCE. THIS IS A PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTITUDE A SPECTATOR TAKES TOWARD SOME OBJECT, YET PSYCHICAL DISTANCE IS NOT THE WHOLE OF THE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE. IT IS A NECESSARY AND SUSTAINING, BUT NOT A SUFFICIENT CONDITION OF THE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THINKING OF ACTUAL SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL DISTANCE AS A SPECIES OF THE GENERAL TYPE PSYCHICAL DISTANCE IS INCORRECT. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED. PHYSICAL DISTANCE MAY HELP CAUSE, DESTROY, OR INHIBIT (DEPENDING ON THE DEGREE) PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE, BUT THESE TWO CANNOT BE THOUGHT OF AS THINGS OF THE SAME TYPE, DIFFERING ONLY IN GENERALITY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DIETL1968, author = {DIETL, PAUL}, title = {HUME ON THE PASSIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {554-566}, keywords = {ethics, passion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DIGBY1981, author = {DIGBY, TOM-F}, title = {KESARCODI-WATSON ON ATMA-VIDYA AND "EGO".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {123-124}, keywords = {atman, metaphysics, objectivism, self-knowledg}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dillard1996, author = {Dillard, Peter-S}, title = {Radical Anti-Deflationism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {173-182}, keywords = {deflation, epistemology, radicalism, truth}, abstract = {Paul Boghossian argues that deflationism about truth is incompatible with any demarcation between factual and nonfactual statements, and indeed presupposes a metaphysically loaded concept of truth. Both objections fail. I show that there is a coherent formulation of deflationism in terms Boghossian accepts, and I show that Boghossian takes as primitive a vague notion of "Correspondence between Language and Reality" that the deflationist is not committed and should reject.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Divers2004, author = {Divers, John}, title = {Agnosticism about Other Worlds: A New Antirealist Programme in Modality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {660-685}, keywords = {agnosticism, antirealism, metaphysics, modality, possible-worl}, abstract = {The modal antirealist, as presented here, aims to secure at least some of the benefits associated with talking in genuine modal realist terms while avoiding commitment to a plurality of Lewisian (or ersatz) worlds. The antirealist stance of agnosticism about other worlds combines acceptance of Lewis's account of what world-talk means with refusal to assert, or believe in, the existence of other worlds. Agnosticism about other worlds does not entail a comprehensive agnosticism about modality, but where such agnosticism about modality is enforced, the aim of the agnostic programme is to show that it is not detrimental to our modal practices. The agnostic programme consists in an attempt to demonstrate the rational dispensability of that disputed class of modal beliefs which the agnostic eschews, but which are held by the realist and the folk. Here I attempt to motivate, describe, and illustrate such an agnostic antirealist programme in modal philosophy.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DOAN1960, author = {DOAN, FRANK-M}, title = {ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASE OF LANGUAGE WITH "SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MATHEMATICAL" MODELS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {239-247}, keywords = {ideal-language; intelligibility, language, mathematics, metaphysics, model, structure, symbolism}, abstract = {IS THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASE OF LANGUAGE ULTIMATELY AN EXTRA LINGUISTIC ONE? THE AUTHOR THINKS THAT LANGUAGE MUST HAVE AN INTRINSIC VALUE; CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURES ARE NOT MERELY AN EXPRESSION OF THE INTEGRATION OF PERSONALITY. SYMBOLS MUST BE ALLOWED TO SATISFY THE CONDITIONS FOR DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION. THE BASE OF AN IDEAL LANGUAGE REMAINS AT THE LEVEL OF ITS SYMBOLS. THE COGNITIVE POWER RESIDES IN THE SYMBOLS AND NOT IN AN EXTRALINGUISTIC PRINCIPLE. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DOBSEVAGE1963, author = {DOBSEVAGE, A-P}, title = {EXISTENTIAL VALUES ARE HUMANISTIC, AND MORAL TOO.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {610-615}, keywords = {axiology, choice, existentialism, freedom, morality, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Doepke1996, author = {Doepke, Frederick-C}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {240-243}, publisher = {Open Court}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument}, volume = {62(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{DOMMEYER1961, author = {DOMMEYER, FREDERICK-C}, title = {A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF C J DUCASSE'S METAPHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {439-455}, keywords = {appraisal, ethics, knowledge, metaphilosophy, metaphysics, methodology, norm, philosophy, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DORE1984, author = {DORE, CLEMENT}, title = {DOES SUFFERING SERVE VALUABLE ENDS?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {103-110}, keywords = {god, religion, suffering}, abstract = {IN "DOES SUFFERING SERVE VALUABLE ENDS?" I FIRST CONSIDER A NUMBER OF ARGUMENTS FOR A NEGATIVE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. ONE ARGUMENT IS THAT, JUST AS WE KNOW THAT, SAY, WHISTLING DOESN'T ALWAYS CAUSE VALUABLE STATES OF AFFAIRS AND HEATING WATER TO THE BOILING POINT DOESN'T CAUSE TORNADOES, SO, TOO, WE HAVE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AGAINST THE THESIS THAT SUFFERING ALWAYS SERVES VALUABLE ENDS. ANOTHER ARGUMENT IS THAT EVEN THE THEIST DOESN'T ALWAYS THINK OTHERWISE, SINCE HE BELIEVES THAT THERE ARE SOME CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH HE IS OBLIGED TO ABOLISH SUFFERING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Doris2005, author = {Doris, John-M}, title = {Precis of Lack of Character}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {632-635}, keywords = {character, ethics, practical-reason; virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Doris2005a, author = {Doris, John-M}, title = {Replies: Evidence and Sensibility}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {656-677}, keywords = {adequacy, content, ethics, virtue-ethic}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Doris2002, author = {Doris, John-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {632-635}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2002} } @other{Doris2002a, author = {Doris, John-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {636-642}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2002} } @other{Doris2002b, author = {Doris, John-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {643-647}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2002} } @other{Doris2002c, author = {Doris, John-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {648-655}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2002} } @other{Doris2002d, author = {Doris, John-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {656-677}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2002} } @article{Dorr2003, author = {Dorr, Cian}, title = {Merricks on the Existence of Human Organisms}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {711-718}, keywords = {existence, human, metaphysics, organism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DOSS1970, author = {DOSS, SEALE-R}, title = {COPERNICUS REVISITED: TIME VERSUS "TIME" VERSUS TIME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {193-211}, keywords = {epistemology, time}, abstract = {WITTGENSTEIN'S REMARKS ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF TIME ARE ONLY HINTS AS TO ITS CHARACTER. PURSUED IN DETAIL, THESE HINTS LEAD TO THREE CONCLUSIONS: 1) THE WORD 'TIME' MAY BE USED IN MANY DIFFERENT WAYS, BUT NOT IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE QUESTION "WHAT IS TIME?" MAY BE ANSWERED; 2) OUR KNOWLEDGE OF TIME IS BASED UPON THE WAYS IN WHICH THE WORD 'TIME' MAY BE USED MEANINGFULLY; 3) OUR KNOWLEDGE OF TIME IS LIMITED BY THE WAYS IN WHICH THE WORD 'TIME' MAY BE USED MEANINGFULLY. THESE CONCLUSIONS SUGGEST A 'COPERNICAN REVOLUTION' REMINISCENT OF KANT, EXCEPT THAT WITTGENSTEIN'S POSITION (WHICH MAY BE CHARACTERIZED AS 'LINGUISTIC IDEALISM' AS OPPOSED TO 'TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM') REQUIRES NO NOUMENAL SUPPOSITIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DOSTAL1982, author = {DOSTAL, ROBERT-J}, title = {THE PROBLEM OF "INDIFFERENZ" IN SEIN UND ZEIT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {43-58}, keywords = {dasein, indifference, metaphysics}, abstract = {THE PAPER DISCUSSES THE TECHNICAL TERM "INDIFFERENZ" AS IT OCCURS IN "SEIN UND ZEIT". THROUGH THIS ONE CONFRONTS THE PROBLEM OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MODALITY OF "DASSEIN". HEIDEGGER AMBIVALENTLY ASSIGNS SOMETIMES A THREEFOLD MODALITY OF AUTHENTICITY, INAUTHENTICITY, AND INDIFFERENCE AND SOMETIMES A TWOFOLD MODALITY OF AUTHENTICITY AND INAUTHENTICITY. IT IS ARGUED THAT THE AMBIVALENCE IS SIGNIFICANT OF THE METHODOLOGICAL AMBIVALENCE OF HEIDEGGER TOWARD TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY. FINALLY THE MODALITY IS TWOFOLD WHICH UNDERMINES THE INDIFFERENT METHOD AND VOICE OF THE TEXT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DOSTAL1987, author = {DOSTAL, ROBERT-J}, title = {THE WORLD NEVER LOST: THE HERMENEUTICS OF TRUST.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {413-434}, keywords = {hermeneutics, language, text}, abstract = {THIS ESSAY EXAMINES GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS OF TRUST AND DEFENDS IT AGAINST THE CRITICISMS RAISED BY RORTY AND DERRIDA, AMONG OTHERS, WHO URGE A 'STRONG TEXTUALISM' AND A HERMENEUTICS OF SUSPICION. THE NOTIONS OF 'THE WORLD', 'THE MATTER AT HAND' ("SACHE SELBST"), AND 'TRUTH' ARE SEEN AS PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE HERMENEUTICS OF TRUST. IT IS ALSO ARGUED THAT GADAMER HAS NOT PROVIDED AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Double2004, author = {Double, Richard}, title = {The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {411-422}, keywords = {ethics, free-will; freedom, morality, subjectivism}, abstract = {Adopting metalevel free-will subjectivism is one among several ways to maintain that persons never experience moral freedom in their choices. The other ways of arguing against moral freedom I consider are presented by Saul Smilansky, Ted Honderich, Bruce Waller, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom. In this paper, without arguing for the acceptance of free-will subjectivism, I argue that subjectivism has some moral and theoretical advantages over its kindred theories.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DOUBLE1985, author = {DOUBLE, RICHARD}, title = {PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {383-392}, keywords = {dualism, materialism, metaphysics, phenomena, property}, abstract = {MANY FRIENDS AND FOES OF MATERIALISM BELIEVE THAT PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES (PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROPERTIES, QUALIA, THE SUBJECTIVE FEATURES OF EXPERIENCE) POSE SEVERE DIFFICULTIES FOR MATERIALISM AND REQUIRE MATERIALISTS TO DENY THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH PROPERTIES. THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT THIS BELIEF IS UNWARRANTED BECAUSE: (1) THERE IS NO ONTOLOGICAL GROUND BETWEEN MATERIALISM AND SUBSTANCE DUALISM, AND (2) PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES PROVIDE NO REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR SUBSTANCE DUALISM. MATERIALISTS SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF THE PHENOMENAL (SOMETHING MANY DO NOT), WHILE ANTI-MATERIALISTS CANNOT USE THE PHENOMENAL CHARACTER OF THE MENTAL TO DISCREDIT MATERIALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Double1996, author = {Double, Richard}, title = {Honderich on the Consequences of Determinism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {847-854}, keywords = {determinism, epistemology, mind, neuroscience}, abstract = {In How Free Are You? Ted Honderich presents his idea of how we should view human freedom and responsibility if we believe that all human actions are determined. In this paper I endorse Honderich's analysis of the attitudinal nature of the free will issue, but argue that on Honderich's conception of attitudes a better conclusion would be that determinism can have no consequences for our attitudes about persons. To show this I develop an analogy between metaethics and normative ethics to show that on the premise that attitudes are neither true nor false, metaphysical claims have no consequences for our lower-level theorizing, whether in normative ethics or in free will.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Double1996a, author = {Double, Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {1082-1086}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Metaphilosophy and Free Will}, volume = {49(4)}, year = {1996} } @article{DOUBROVSKY1960, author = {DOUBROVSKY, J-S}, title = {EXISTENCE AND SYMBOL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {229-238}, keywords = {existence, existentialism, man, metaphysics, psychoanalysis, quality, symbol, world}, abstract = {THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ON THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF SYMBOLS IS DISCUSSED. IT IS SHOWN HOW THE OBJECTIVE VALUE OF QUALITIES IS EXPLAINED AWAY BY THE THEORY OF EMOTIONAL PROJECTION OF THE EGO INTO THINGS. THE PRESUPPOSITION HERE IS THAT SYMBOLS ARE REALLY NEGATED AND DISCARDED, SINCE THEY STAND IN THE WAY OF KNOWLEDGE. THE AUTHOR FEELS THAT SYMBOLS HAVE TO BE UNDERSTOOD IN THEIR OWN WORLD, NOT THE WORLD OF SCIENCE, BUT THAT OF EXISTENCE. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT SARTRE RESTORED SYMBOLISM TO ITS ORIGINARY PRELOGICAL LEVEL; A SYMBOL HERE IS REVELATORY OF EXISTENCE OR MAN'S BEING IN THE WORLD. OUR SYMBOLIC WORLD IS THE REAL WORLD; SCIENCE IS BUILT ON THIS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT CERTAIN SYMBOLIC THEMES OR PATTERNS THROUGHOUT HUMAN HISTORY SHOW THE HUMAN CONDITION, WHICH DETERMINES SOME FUNDAMENTAL SITUATIONS (COMMON TO ALL MAN), WHICH ARE TRANSHISTORICAL. ONE CANNOT DO AWAY WITH SYMBOLS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Dowe2000, author = {Dowe, Phil}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {244-248}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Physical Causation}, volume = {67(1)}, year = {2000} } @article{DOWNES1965, author = {DOWNES, CHAUNCEY}, title = {HUSSERL AND THE COHERENCE OF THE OTHER MINDS PROBLEM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {253-259}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, naturalism, other-minds; person, phenomenology}, abstract = {IN STATING THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS IT IS ASSUMED THAT SELF-KNOWLEDGE IS POSSIBLE BUT THE EXISTENCE OF OTHERS IS DUBIOUS. STATING THE PROBLEM IS INCOHERENT BECAUSE A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IS ACCEPTED IN TERMS OF WHICH THE PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED. "STARTING FROM ONE'S OWN CASE," IN THE CARTESIAN TRADITION, CREATES A PSEUDO-PROBLEM. HUSSERL ATTACKS THIS TRADITION, BUT BY INVESTIGATING THE STRUCTURE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO, SEEMS TO BE IN THE TRADITION. DOWNES ARGUES THAT THIS IS NOT SO, AND THAT HUSSERL'S CAREFUL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE NATURALISTIC AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL ENABLES HIM TO AVOID INCOHERENCE IN HIS TREATMENT OF OTHER MINDS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE PROBLEM IS A SIGN OF THEORETICAL CONFUSION AT THE FOUNDATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PERSON, AND CAN ONLY BE CORRECTED BY AN EMPHASIS ON INTENTIONALITY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DOWNIE1963, author = {DOWNIE, R-S}, title = {HOPE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {248-251}, keywords = {belief, desire, hope, intention, mind, philosophical-anthropology; probability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Doyle2000, author = {Doyle, James}, title = {Moral Rationalism and Moral Commitment}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {1-22}, keywords = {commitment, ethics, morality, rationality}, abstract = {I argue that the moral rationalist is not in fact committed to the possibility of egoist-conversion, and that an explanation of its impossibility can be given which is compatible with rationalism; so this impossibility counts neither against rationalism nor for the want-belief model. I consider a number of apparent objections to my position and rebut them. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DRANGE1969, author = {DRANGE, THEODORE}, title = {REPLY TO MARTIN ON TYPE CROSSINGS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {136-139}, keywords = {language, sentence, type}, abstract = {THIS IS A DEFENSE OF DRANGE'S BOOK "TYPE CROSSINGS" (MOUTON, 1966) AGAINST OBJECTIONS RAISED BY ROBERT MARTIN IN HIS DISCUSSION ARTICLE "DRANGE ON TYPE CROSSINGS" (SAME ISSUE). DRANGE DEFENDS HIS ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT TYPE CROSSINGS (E.G., THE SENTENCE "VIRTUE IS BLUE") ARE BOTH (NECESSARILY) FALSE AND (CONCEPTUALLY) MEANINGLESS. HE ALSO DEFENDS THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD IN THE BOOK WHICH AIM AT REFUTING THE VIEW THAT THERE ARE TYPE=RULES IN EFFECT IN ORDINARY LANGUAGE. FOR THE MOST PART, MARTIN'S OBJECTIONS ARE SHOWN TO STEM FROM CERTAIN MISUNDERSTANDINGS, AND AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO CORRECT THESE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Draper2004, author = {Draper, Kai}, title = {Epicurean Equanimity Towards Death}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(1)}, pages = {92-114}, keywords = {death, equanimity, ethics, life}, abstract = {This paper assesses two reformulations of Epicurus's argument that "death...is nothing to us, since while we exist, death is not present; and whenever death is present, we do not exist." The first resembles many contemporary reformulations in that it attempts to reach the conclusion that death is not to the disadvantage of its subject. I argue that this rather anachronistic sort of reformulation cannot succeed. The second reformulation stays closer to the spirit of Epicurus's actual position on death by attempting to reach the conclusion that it is inappropriate to fear or dread or have any other negative affective response towards death. I raise a plausible objection to this argument, suggesting that dissatisfaction is sometimes an appropriate response to the approach of death. I then go on to consider the possibility that Epicurus was partly right in that it may always be inappropriate to dread death.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dreier2000, author = {Dreier, James}, title = {Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(3)}, pages = {619-638}, keywords = {ethics, externalism, model, morality, motivation}, abstract = {The disagreement between internalists and externalists runs deep, and it lingers even in the face of clever intuition pumps. An argument in Michael Smith's The Moral Problem seeks some leverage against externalism from a point within normative theory. Smith argues by dilemma: Externalists either fail to explain why motivation tracks moral judgment in a good moral agents. I argue that there are alternative models of moral motivation available to externalists, in particular a model according to which a good moral agent is one who is effectively regulated by a second order desire to desire to do what is right. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dreier2002, author = {Dreier, James}, title = {The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative Judgment}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {136-143}, keywords = {ethics, expression, judgment, normative, passion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dretske2000, author = {Dretske, Fred}, title = {Reply to Lopes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {455-459}, keywords = {metaphysics, mind, psychology, representation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dretske1997, author = {Dretske, Fred}, title = {So Do We Know or Don't We?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {407-409}, keywords = {epistemology, knowing, knowledge, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DRETSKE1990, author = {DRETSKE, FRED}, title = {Reply to Reviewers of "Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {819-839}, keywords = {behavior, indicator, intention, metaphysics}, abstract = {Professors Stich and Millikan question my use of indication (or information) as a basis on which to build a semantics of thought. They also ask about my use of teleological concepts (indicator functions) in my analysis of mental representation. Professor Stampe argues that I fail to capture the rationalizing aspect of desire and Bratman that I have two theories about the intentional content of desire. Tuomela challenges my idea that explanations in terms of reasons always provide structuring causes of action. While conceding some points and clarifying others, the general theory about the way reasons explain behavior is amplified and defended.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dretske2000a, author = {Dretske, Fred}, title = {Entitlement: Epistemic Rights without Epistemic Duties?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {591-606}, keywords = {belief, duty, entitlement, epistemology, ethics, rights}, abstract = {If an epistemic entitlement is a right to believe P, and use P in further cognitive inquiry, without a justification for thinking P true, externalists (about knowledge) are those who think we enjoy such entitlements. What is the source of these entitlements? It cannot be reliability since this would (contrary to most intuitions) deny entitlement to someone like a brain in a vat (not reliably hooked up to the environment he has beliefs about) who has the same reasons for believing as we do. It is argued that entitlements derive, ultimately, from the unavoidability of a belief: if an epistemically responsible agent cannot help believing P, then he has the right to believe P.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Dretske1995, author = {Dretske, Fred}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {459-468}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Naturalizing the Mind}, volume = {57(2)}, year = {1995} } @article{DREYFUS1962, author = {DREYFUS, H-L and TODES, S-J}, title = {THE THREE WORLDS OF MERLEAU-PONTY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {559-565}, keywords = {description, epistemology, life-world; objectivity, perception, phenomenology, world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Driver1997, author = {Driver, Julia}, title = {The Ethics of Intervention}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {851-870}, keywords = {agent, ethics, intervention, literature, obligation}, abstract = {This essay explores the obligations that may arise from benevolently intended interventions that go awry. The author argues that even when the intervening agent has acted with good intentions and in a non-negligent manner, she may be required to continue aid in cases where her initial intervention failed. This is surprising because it means that persons who perform supererogatory acts run the risk of incurring additional heavy obligations through no fault of their own. The author also considers deflationary accounts that run counter to her own analysis.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Driver2001, author = {Driver, Julia}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {238-240}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)}, volume = {69(1)}, year = {2001} } @article{DROST1990, author = {DROST, MARK-P}, title = {The Primacy of Perception in Husserl's Theory of Imagining.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(3)}, pages = {569-582}, keywords = {consciousness, imagining, metaphysics, perception}, abstract = {In the Logical Investigations Husserl outlines two distinct situations in which one speaks of an image: (a) there is the imaginal act in which one perceived physical object is an image of another perceivable object, and (b) there is the imaginal act in which a mental content is an intermediate in the intention of an object. In each case Husserl shows that the interpretation of anything as an image presupposes an object intentionally given to consciousness. Of the two imaginal acts, I argue that the first is logically dependent on a perceptual intention, and that the second is explicable in terms of a perceptual intention rather than in terms of pictorial representation. I conclude that nonmental images cannot be a paradigm for understanding the situation in which an image is a mental event, that images cannot be the basis for perceptual acts, and that Husserl is not committed to a picture theory of mental images.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DRUMMON1979, author = {DRUMMON, JOHN-J}, title = {ON SEEING "A" MATERIAL THING "IN" SPACE: THE ROLE OF KINAESTHESIS IN VISUAL PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {19-32}, keywords = {kinesthetic-experience; matter, metaphysics, perception, space, visual}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ANALYZES HUSSERL'S SOLUTION TO A PROBLEM ABOUT HOW WE DISTINGUISH ONE PERCEPTION FROM ANOTHER IN THE COURSE OF A CONTINUOUS PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE. HUSSERL'S POSITION IS THAT AGREEMENT OF SENSE OR QUALITY IN THE FLOW OF APPEARANCES IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THE PERCEPTION OF AN IDENTICAL OBJECT AND THAT A FURTHER APPEAL MUST BE MADE TO A CERTAIN BODILY ACTIVITIES WHICH MOTIVATE CHANGES IN THE APPEARANCE OF THE OBJECT. THESE CHANGES, IN TURN, INDICATE THE OBJECT'S FIXED POSITION IN SPACE AND ITS BODILY ENCLOSEDNESS. THUS IS THE SPATIAL IDENTITY OF THE OBJECT CONSTITUTED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1962, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {CONCERNING THE LOGICAL STATUS OF CRITERIA MORALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {127-130}, keywords = {criteria, ethics, morality, norm, principle}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1961, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {CONCERNING THE UNIFORMITY OF CAUSALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {97-101}, keywords = {causality, event, metaphysics, necessity, uniformity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1968, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {INTRINSIC VALUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {410-412}, keywords = {axiology, value}, abstract = {IN "INTRINSIC VALUE" BEARDSLEY PROPOSED THAT THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS INTRINSIC VALUE, BUT ARGUED ONLY THAT NOTHING HAS IT, WITHOUT SAYING WHAT IT IS. POSITIVE INTRINSIC VALUE IS PLEASURE; NEGATIVE INTRINSIC VALUE IS DISPLEASURE. WERE ALL VALUES INSTRUMENTAL, ANY REASON GIVEN FOR AN ACT WOULD LEAD ON TO ANOTHER WITHOUT END; AND NO REASON COULD BE THE ENJOYMENT DOING IT. WERE THERE ONLY INSTRUMENTAL VALUES, LOSS OF THE CAPACITY TO EXPERIENCE INTRINSIC VALUES WOULD LEAVE ALL LATER ACTS OF AGENTS THE SAME AS IF THE LOSS HAD NOT OCCURRED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1964, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {BROAD'S LECTURES ON PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {561-566}, keywords = {disposition, methodology, personality, psychicalism, science, textual-criticis}, abstract = {PARANORMAL PHENOMENA ARE DEFINED AS CONFLICTING WITH ONE OR MORE OF THE "BASIC LIMITING PRINCIPLES" WHICH ARE TAKEN FOR GRANTED. EXAMPLES ARE GIVEN: THOUGHTS (MENTAL EVENTS) OCCURRING IN A PERSON B CAN BE KNOWN BY ANOTHER PERSON A ONLY THROUGH PHYSICAL SIGNS OF THEM; HOWEVER, TELEPATHY IS AN EXCEPTION. AN EVENT WHICH AT A GIVEN TIME HAS NOT OCCURRED CANNOT BE PERCEIVED AT THAT TIME; HOWEVER, PRE-COGNITION IS AN EXCEPTION, THEN SEVERAL THEORIES OF PERCEPTION ARE EXAMINED AND A REPRESENTATIVE THEORY IS FAVORED OVER A PHENOMENALISTIC ONE. THE NATURE OF HUMAN PERSONALITY IS EXAMINED AND NO DEFINITE CONCLUSION IS REACHED REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE HUMAN PERSONALITY SURVIVING BODILY DEATH. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1961a, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {SOME COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR DOMMEYER'S CRITICISMS IN "A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF C J DUCASSE'S METAPHILOSOPHY".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {552-555}, keywords = {appraisal, ethics, norm, principle, science, theory}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1961b, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {THE SOURCES OF THE EMOTIONAL IMPORT OF AN AESTHETIC OBJECT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {556-557}, keywords = {aesthetic-object; aesthetics, emotion, expression, form, material}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1967, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {HOW LITERALLY CAUSATION IS PERCEIVABLE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {271-273}, keywords = {causation, epistemology, perception}, abstract = {CAUSATION BETWEEN CHANGES IS PERCEIVABLE AS AND ONLY AS LITERALLY AS PERCEIVING PHYSICAL OBJECTS OR RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM IS. PERCEIVING INVOLVES, BESIDES SENSATIONS, INTERPRETATION OF THEM LIKE JUDGING THAT, E.G., A BIRD EXISTS. SO PERCEIVING CAUSATION IS A CASE OF PROBABLE INFERENCE LIKE PERCEPTUAL JUDGMENTS OF EXISTENCE. IT IS NOT ARGUED THAT CAUSATION BETWEEN INHERENTLY UNPERCEIVABLE CHANGES, E.G., OF THEORETICAL ENTITIES OF PHYSICS, IS PERCEIVABLE, FOR THEIR EPISTEMIC STATUS IS POSTULATIONAL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1965, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {CAUSATION: PERCEIVABLE: OR ONLY INFERRED?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {173-179}, keywords = {causation, change, experiment, inference, perception, physics, science}, abstract = {In theoretical physics causation is the relation between any total state A of an isolated theoretical system S at a time T 'subscript 1' and its total state B at any later time T 'subscript 2'; S being such as to make equally possible inference of B from A, and of A from B. Since concepts are not perceivable, there is no causality among matters of fact. The physicist's definition of cause and effect is inapplicable to mental events. In the common verbs of causation, to bend, to remind, etc., causation is the triadic relation between a state of affairs S and only two changes in it: one, C, at a time T 'subscript 1'; the other, E, at a time T 'subscript 2'. This relation between perceivable events C and E is itself perceivable. It obtains in any "experiment" whether by man or by nature.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUERLINGER1982, author = {DUERLINGER, JAMES}, title = {UNSPOKEN CONNECTIONS IN THE DESIGN ARGUMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {519-529}, keywords = {analogical-argument; design-argument; epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUFRENNE1965, author = {DUFRENNE, MIKEL}, title = {EXISTENTIALISM AND EXISTENTIALISMS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {51-62}, keywords = {body, existence, existentialism, man, marxism, ontology, phenomenology, philosophical-anthropology; subjectivity, world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUFRENNE1969, author = {DUFRENNE, MIKEL}, title = {COMMENT ON WILFRID SELLARS' PAPER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {528-535}, keywords = {communication, language, thought}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Dummett1991, author = {Dummett, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {961-963}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics}, volume = {53(4)}, year = {1991} } @article{DUNCAN1966, author = {DUNCAN, ELMER-H}, title = {RULES AND EXCEPTIONS IN ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {267-273}, keywords = {aesthetics, ethics, rule}, abstract = {SOME OF THE MORE INFLUENTIAL WORK IN RECENT AESTHETICS IS A RESULT OF CARRYING OVER WORK DONE IN OTHER AREAS OF PHILOSOPHY. THE PRESENT PAPER IS AN ATTEMPT TO APPLY AN ETHICAL INSIGHT TO AESTHETICS. IT HAS BEEN CLAIMED THAT SUCH MORAL RULES AS "LYING IS WRONG" ARE ANALYTIC. THIS VIEW IS SUPPORTED BY ORDINARY LANGUAGE, SINCE TO CALL SOMEONE A LIAR OR A THIEF IS ALWAYS TO INSULT HIM. ORDINARY LANGUAGE ALSO SUPPORTS THE VIEW THAT SUCH RULES OF CRITICISM AS, "DISORGANIZATION IS AESTHETICALLY BAD," ARE ANALYTIC. READERS WHO HAVE QUALMS ABOUT THE ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION MAY RECAST THE ENTIRE ARGUMENT IN TERMS TAKEN FROM ROSS' DISCUSSION OR PRIMA FACIE DUTIES. THAT IS, JUST AS LYING IS PRIMA FACIE MORALLY WRONG, DISORGANIZATION IS PRIMA FACIE AESTHETICALLY BAD, THOUGH BOTH CLAIMS MAY BE OVERRIDDEN BY OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dupre2005, author = {Dupre, John}, title = {You Must Have Thought This Book Was about You: Reply to Daniel Dennett}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {691-695}, keywords = {explanation, free-will; human, nature, science}, abstract = {In a recent discussion in this journal, Daniel Dennett claims to be unable to find any arguments for my rejection of the version of human evolutionary psychology that he naively embraces. In this comment I summarize the main strand of argument that he missed and sketch the reasons why the views of both genetics and evolution that Dennett assumes have become obsolete. I also summarize part of the reason for my rejection of the compatibilist account of free will that Dennett endorses.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Dupre2001, author = {Dupre, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {473-483}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Human Nature and the Limits of Science}, volume = {69(2)}, year = {2001} } @article{DUPRE1964, author = {DUPRE, LOUIS}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN HUSSERL'S "LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {345-354}, keywords = {consciousness, epistemology, evidence, intuitionism, logic, logicism, psychologism, textual-criticism; truth}, abstract = {IT IS STATED THAT HUSSERL'S THEORY OF TRUTH IS AMBIGUOUS. WHEN HUSSERL ATTACKED PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF TRUTH, A LOGICISM SEEMED TO BE PREDOMINANT; LATER HE INCLINED TOWARD INTUITIONISM, WHERE TRUTH IS CONSTITUTED BY THE REAL PRESENCE OF THE OBJECT. PURELY LOGICAL RELATIONS IN AN ETERNAL ORDER OF TRUTH, INDEPENDENT OF THINGS, SEEMS TO CONFLICT WITH THE IDEA OF EVIDENCE, WHICH IS A PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT TRUTH IS THE RESULT OF AN INTUITION IN WHICH THE THING ITSELF IS GIVEN. FINALLY, PARALLELS ARE DRAWN BETWEEN HUSSERL'S DOUBLE TRUTH AND LEIBNIZ'S TRUTHS OF REASON AND TRUTHS OF FACT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUPRE1968, author = {DUPRE, LOUIS-K}, title = {HUSSERL'S THOUGHT ON GOD AND FAITH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {201-215}, keywords = {faith, god, religion}, abstract = {A STUDY OF HUSSERL'S UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS LED TO THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS. THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENCE ARISES OUT OF THE FACT THAT THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD IS NOT FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR BY THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF REALITY, THEREFORE, REQUIRES ANOTHER BEING THAN THE BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS. NOR DOES CONSCIOUSNESS PROVIDE ITS OWN FOUNDATION. HERE ALSO AN ABSOLUTE BEYOND THE ABSOLUTE BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS NEEDED. UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF FICHTE, HUSSERL GRADUALLY ADOPTED THE IDEA OF A TRANSCENDENT, INFINITE "TELOS." YET, HE NEVER REACHED MORE THAN A RELATIVE TRANSCENDENCE AND CONSIDERED THE EXISTENCE OF A PERSONAL, TRANSCENDENT BEING A MATTER OF "FAITH", TO WHICH THEORETICAL REASON HAS NO ACCESS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DURFEE1968, author = {DURFEE, HAROLD-A}, title = {THE REFORMULATION OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {385-391}, keywords = {god, religion, theology}, abstract = {THE ESSAY REFORMULATES THE DEBATE BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY THEISM AND NEO-NATURALISM. ASSUMING TILLICH'S ANALYSIS OF GOD AS THAT WHICH IS OF 'ULTIMATE CONCERN,' IT EMPHASIZES THE DENIAL BY RANDALL AND HOOK AS NEO-NATURALISTS, OF ANYTHING AS OF 'ULTIMATE CONCERN,' AND THUS THE DENIAL OF GOD'S EXISTENCE IN THE ONLY SENSE TILLICH WOULD ALLOW. THIS REFORMULATES THE QUESTION OF GOD'S EXISTENCE AS CENTERED AROUND THE QUESTION AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF 'ULTIMATE CONCERNS.' THIS DENIAL WOULD ELIMINATE THE GROUND FOR TILLICH'S PROTESTANT PRINCIPLE. PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IS NOW CALLED UPON TO REWORK PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY, DEBATING WHETHER OR NOT MAN HAS 'ULTIMATE CONCERNS,' HOW THEIR PRESENCE OR ABSENCE IS TO BE ESTABLISHED, WHAT THEIR UNIQUE CHARACTER WOULD BE, AND HOW UNIVERSAL THEY ARE IF PRESENT. SUCH A DEBATE WOULD REFORMULATE THE STRUCTURE OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION. THIS IS THE APPROPRIATE LOCUS OF THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE BETWEEN THEISM AND NEO-NATURALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DURFEE1975, author = {DURFEE, HAROLD-A}, title = {WAR, POLITICS, AND RADICAL PLURALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {549-558}, keywords = {pluralism, political-philosophy; politics, war}, abstract = {AN ANALYSIS OF THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF WAR AND POLITICS IN THE RADICALLY PLURALISTIC SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS. LEVINAS PROPOSES A COMPLETE SEPARATION OF SELVES BRIDGED ONLY BY LANGUAGE, THUS CONTINUING RECENT ONTOLOGIES OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY, AND DEVELOPING A UNIQUE ETHICS OF LANGUAGE. THE POLITICAL IS THE EXPRESSION OF TOTALIZATION AND RATIONALISM, THE NEGATION OF INTERIORITY, AND OPPOSED TO MORALITY. POLITICAL AND RATIONAL TOTALIZATION IS WAR. THE ONTOLOGY OF PEACE LIES RATHER IN THE INTERSUBJECTIVITY OF FACE TO FACE DIALOGUE. GENUINE SPEECH LIES IN THE WORDS OF APOLOGY AND JUSTIFICATION. WAR IS NOT TO CONVERSE WHILE PEACE IS GENUINE CONVERSATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUTTON1974, author = {DUTTON, DENIS}, title = {TO UNDERSTAND IT ON ITS OWN TERMS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {246-256}, keywords = {epistemology, understanding}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DWORKIN1966, author = {DWORKIN, GERALD}, title = {MARX AND MILL: A DIALOGUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {403-414}, keywords = {alienation, dialogue, freedom, human-nature; ideology, nineteenth, oppression, political-philosoph}, abstract = {THIS ESSAY EXPLORES, IN DIALOGUE FORM, THE SIMILARITIES AND CONTRASTS IN THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF KARL MARX AND JOHN STUART MILL. THEIR VIEWS ON THE DETERMINING FORCES OF HISTORY, THE IDEAL CHARACTER-TYPE, FREEDOM, AND PHILOSOPHY ARE DISCUSSED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DWYER1989, author = {DWYER, PHILIP}, title = {FREEDOM AND RULE-FOLLOWING IN WITTGENSTEIN AND SARTRE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {49-68}, keywords = {freedom, meaning, metaphysics, rule}, abstract = {WHAT SARTRE MEANS BY 'EXISTENCE PRECEDES ESSENCE' IS SKETCHED, AND HOW THIS NOTION CAPTURES THE GIST OF WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER CRITIQUE OF HIS EARLY CONCEPTION OF LANGUAGE IS SHOWN. A DETAILED COMPARISON OF SARTRE AND WITTGENSTEIN REVOLVES AROUND WITTGENSTEIN'S ACCOUNT OF RULE FOLLOWING. HIS ARGUMENTS AGAINST MEANING AS SOMETHING WHICH TRANSCENDS AND DETERMINES THE "USE" OF WORDS DUPLICATES SARTRE'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANY NOTION OF A HUMAN ESSENCE DETERMINING HUMAN ACTION IN GENERAL. IN DEBUNKING THE ILLUSION OF A METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF EITHER LANGUAGE OR HUMAN EXISTENCE, BOTH ANALYSES PUT FREEDOM AT THE CENTRE OF THE LANGUAGE-GAME AND OF HUMAN LIFE GENERALLY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EAMES1986, author = {EAMES, ELIZABETH-R}, title = {RUSSELL AND THE EXPERIENCE OF TIME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {681-682}, keywords = {experience, metaphysics, time}, abstract = {IN RESPONSE TO ROBERTS' "ON RUSSELL'S PERCEPTION OF AKOLUTHIC SENSATIONS," I ARGUE THAT THIS VIEW OF TIME IS CLOSE TO JAMES, RATHER THAN TO BRENTANO, AND SKETCH THE COMPLEX ROLE OF PRESENT EXPERIENCE (THE "SPECIOUS PRESENT") IN RUSSELL'S EPISTEMOLOGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EAMES1967, author = {EAMES, ELIZABETH-R}, title = {THE CONSISTENCY OF RUSSELL'S REALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {502-511}, keywords = {epistemology, realism}, abstract = {THE COMMON VIEWS OF RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHY, THAT IT SHIFTED FROM REALISM TO PHENOMENALISM, AND THAT LOGICAL ATOMISM OF 1920 WAS THE APEX OF ITS DEVELOPMENT, ARE HERE CRITICIZED IN THE CONTEXT OF THREE PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION OF HIS PHILOSOPHY: THAT OF THE STATUS OF UNIVERSALS, THAT OF 'NEUTRAL MONISM,' AND THAT OF THE ESCAPE FROM SOLIPSISM. A MODIFIED REALISM IS SHOWN TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE DIRECTION OF RUSSELL'S THOUGHT WHEN THESE PROBLEMS ARE UNRAVELLED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EAMES1961, author = {EAMES, S-MORRIS}, title = {EXPERIENCE, LANGUAGE, AND KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {102-105}, keywords = {being, existence, experience, inquiry, knowledge, language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EAMES1964, author = {EAMES, S-MORRIS}, title = {VALUING, OBLIGATION, AND EVALUATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {318-328}, keywords = {cognition, desire, ethics, evaluation, moral-judgment; naturalism, obligation, valuation}, abstract = {CONTEMPORARY NATURALISTIC THEORY (DEWEY) HAS BEEN CRITICIZED AS HAVING A MORAL PRINCIPLE OF MERE EXPEDIENCY, AND FOR A FAILURE TO DEVELOP A THEORY OF MORAL OBLIGATION. THE AUTHOR ATTEMPTS TO ANSWER THESE CRITICISMS AND TO EXTEND NATURALISTIC THEORY BEYOND WHAT HAS BEEN GENERALLY REGARDED AS THE GROUND OF GOOD AND RIGHT. THE AUTHOR IS SYMPATHETIC TO ARISTOTLE AND MILL, WHEN HE DEFINES INTEREST AS LONG-TERM DESIRE. IN GENERAL A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO VALUING IS TAKEN. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EARLE1960, author = {EARLE, WILLIAM}, title = {HEGEL AND SOME CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {352-364}, keywords = {existentialism, irrationalism, positivism, rationalism, reality, twentieth}, abstract = {EARLE ARGUES AGAINST TWO CONTEMPORARY ALTERNATIVES--POSITIVISM AND EXISTENTIALISM. IT IS CLAIMED THAT THESE ARE FORMS OF IRRATIONALISM; FOR THESE TWO MOVEMENTS, RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY HAS SHRUNK TO NOTHING AND HAS NO REAL CONTENT OF ITS OWN. HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD IS VINDICATED; THE "REAL IS THE RATIONAL, AND THE RATIONAL IS THE REAL" IS JUSTIFIED. THIS PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN ABANDONED BY THE ABOVE TWO MOVEMENTS WITHOUT DUE CAUSE, A RE-EXAMINATION OF HEGEL SHOWS WHY. UNFORTUNATELY, EXISTENTIALISM ENDS WITH LIFE AND POSITIVISM ENDS WITH CALCULUS, AND NEITHER HAVE REAL PHILOSOPHY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EARLE1975, author = {EARLE, WILLIAM-JAMES}, title = {DO FEELINGS CAUSE ACTIONS?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {540-548}, keywords = {action, agency, ethics, feeling}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Earman1993, author = {Earman, John}, title = {In Defense of Laws: Reflections on Bas Van Fraassen's "Laws and Symmetry"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {413-419}, keywords = {epistemology, laws, nature}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Earman2005, author = {Earman, John}, title = {Contact with the Nomic: A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature Part I: Humean Supervenience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {1-22}, keywords = {metaphysics, natural-law; nature, supervenience}, abstract = {This is the first part of a two-part article in which we defend the thesis of Humean supervenience about laws of nature (HS). According to this thesis, two possible worlds cannot differ on what is a law of nature unless they also differ on the Humean base. The Humean base is easy to characterize intuitively, but there is no consensus on how, precisely, it should be defined. Here in part I, we present and motivate a characterization of the Humean base that, we argue, enables HS to capture what is really stake in the debate, without taking on extraneous commitments.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Earman2000, author = {Earman, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {487-494}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Hume's Abject Failure: The Argument against Miracles}, volume = {68(2)}, year = {2000} } @other{Earman1992, author = {Earman, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {707-711}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1992} } @article{Earman2005a, author = {Earman, John and Roberts, John-T}, title = {Contact with the Nomic: A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature Part II: The Epistemological Argument for Humean Supervenience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {253-286}, keywords = {epistemology, natural-law; realism, science, supervenience}, abstract = {In part I, we presented and motivated a new formulation of Humean supervenience about laws of nature (HS). Here in part II, we present an epistemological argument in defense of HS, thus formulated. Our contention is that one can combine a modest realism about laws of nature with a proper recognition of the importance of empirical testability in the epistemology of science only if one accepts HS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EASTON1961, author = {EASTON, LOYD-D}, title = {ALIENATION AND HISTORY IN THE EARLY MARX.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {193-205}, keywords = {alienation, communism, community, dialectic, history, immediacy, individual, social-philosophy; subjectivity}, abstract = {USES OF THE CONCEPT OF "ALIENATION" IN CURRENT SOCIAL CRITICISM WIDELY REFER TO MARX'S EARLY VIEW THAT MAN'S OWN DEED IN GOVERNMENT, WEALTH, AND CULTURE "BECOMES TO HIM AN ALIEN POWER, STANDING OVER AGAINST HIM INSTEAD OF BEING RULED BY HIM" SO THAT HE IS NOT "AT HOME" OR WHOLE IN HIS SOCIAL LIFE. MY PRIMARY CONCERN IS NOT SO MUCH CURRENT USES OF "ALIENATION" AS ITS PLACE IN MARX'S THOUGHT, WITH EMPHASIS ON SEVERAL POINTS--HIS PARTICULAR APPROPRIATIONS FROM HEGEL AND FEUERBACH, HIS HELLENIC IMAGE OF COMMUNITY, IMPLICATIONS OF HIS AMBIVALENCE TOWARD HISTORY--WHICH ARE THEMSELVES GENERALLY ALIEN TO THE EXTENSIVE LITERATURE ON THE SUBJECT. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ebbs1998, author = {Ebbs, Gary}, title = {Bilgrami's Theory of Belief and Meaning}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {613-620}, keywords = {belief, meaning, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ebbs1996, author = {Ebbs, Gary}, title = {Can We Take Our Words at Face Value?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {499-530}, keywords = {content, epistemology, individualism, knowledge, language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EDDINS1966, author = {EDDINS, BERKLEY-B}, title = {HISTORICAL DATA AND POLICY-DECISIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {427-430}, keywords = {criteria, decision, history, intelligibility, objectivity, public-policy; speculation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EDGAR1971, author = {EDGAR, WILLIAM-J}, title = {PROFESSOR GOTESKY AND THE LAW OF NON-CONTRADICTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {32}, pages = {259-263}, keywords = {contradiction, inconsistency, metaphysics}, abstract = {In his article, 'the uses of inconsistency' (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 6/68), Rubin Gotesky tries to show (1) that the law of non-contradiction as an ontological principle, on the evidence, involves its denial, and (2) that relative to communication and social action (a) the law is rejected in all cases of lying and deception, and (b) that there are situations of unavoidable contradiction. Gotesky does not explicitly claim that the law is false; he asserts that all attempts, thus far, to establish it as a general truth have resulted in contradiction. Nor does he explicitly claim that contradictions exist in nature, although this is a possibility for him. I contend that Gotesky has not established (1), and that his discussion of (2) trades on senses of 'inconsistent' not relevant to the law of non-contradiction. in (1) Gotesky confuses finding a limiting condition on thought with thinking what cannot be thought. support for (2) rests largely on modal confusions, such as noting that what a man says may 'contradict' what he does. (edited).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Edgington2005, author = {Edgington, Dorothy}, title = {The Mystery of the Missing Boundary}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {704-711}, keywords = {certainty, epistemology, sorites, truth, vagueness}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EDIDIN1985, author = {EDIDIN, ARON}, title = {PHILOSOPHY: JUST LIKE SCIENCE ONLY DIFFERENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {537-552}, keywords = {intuition, methodology, philosophy, scientific-metho}, abstract = {A VIEW OF THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY IS DEVELOPED WHICH HOLDS THAT IT IS LIKE EMPIRICAL SCIENCE IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ITS THEORIES AND THE DATA WHICH CAN SUPPORT THEM, BUT UNLIKE SCIENCE IN THE NATURE OF THE DATA. AN ACCOUNT OF PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITION AS THE SOURCE OF DATA FOR PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY IS PROPOSED. SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE VIEW ARE CONSIDERED AND JUDGED INDECISIVE, BUT NO FINAL VERDICT ON THE VIEW'S ADEQUACY IS PROPOSED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EDIE1964, author = {EDIE, JAMES-M}, title = {TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND EXISTENTIALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {52-63}, keywords = {existentialism, intentionality, life-world; perception, phenomenology, philosophy, transcendental}, abstract = {THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO ATTEMPT TO DEFINE WHAT IS MEANT BY A TRANSCENDENTAL STRUCTURE IN TERMS OF THE SENSE IT HAS BEEN GIVEN BY THE DEVELOPING PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRADITION FROM HUSSERL TO THE PRESENT TIME. AFTER DISTINGUISHING THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL SENSE OF TRANSCENDENTAL FROM THE "OBJECTIVE" TRANSCENDENTALISM OF GREEK AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND FROM THE "SUBJECTIVE" TRANSCENDENTALISM OF KANTIANISM, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO GIVE THE TRANSCENDENTAL AN ONTOLOGICAL, I.E., "EXISTENTIAL," MEANING. IT IS THIS NEW DEFINITION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL WHICH IS THE UNIFYING ELEMENT IN THE EXTREMELY DIVERSIFIED STUDIES OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXISTENTIALISTS AND THE BASIS OF A NEW ONTOLOGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EDIE1963, author = {EDIE, JAMES-M}, title = {EXPRESSION AND METAPHOR.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {538-561}, keywords = {consciousness, experience, expression, intentionality, language, meaning, metaphor, phenomenology, philosophy}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE IS TO EXAMINE METAPHORICAL EXPRESSION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF AN INTENTIONAL THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND TO SUGGEST THAT THE NECESSITY OF SPEAKING (AND THINKING) IN METAPHORS IS NOT AN ACCIDENTAL WEAKNESS OF HUMAN THOUGHT BUT AN EXISTENTIAL NECESSITY THAT PERVADES ALL THE "SUB-UNIVERSES" OF MEANING. SOME OF THE FUNDAMENTAL METAPHORS IN PHILOSOPHICAL LANGUAGE ARE ANALYZED AND A GENERAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF METAPHOR IS SUGGESTED. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Eells1995, author = {Eells, Ellery}, title = {Cartwright on Probabilistic Causality: Types, Tokens, and Capacities}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {169-175}, keywords = {causality, empiricism, experiment, gravity, science}, abstract = {As part of a book symposium on Nancy Cartwright's "Nature's Capacities and their Measurement" (Oxford, 1989), the issues addressed have to do with generic and singular probabilistic causation, and with the relationship between theories at the two levels. In her book, Cartwright argues that singular causation is basic -- that the theory of generic probabilistic causation depends on the idea of singular causation. Although we have come to agree about many fine points involved in theories and examples, I argue that she has not established the direction of dependence, and I allude to arguments of my own that the direction is opposite.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Egan2006, author = {Egan, Andy}, title = {Secondary Qualities and Self-Location}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {72(1)}, pages = {97-119}, keywords = {color, epistemology, location, primary-quality; quality, secondary-quality; shape}, abstract = {There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer-independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less-than-fully-real, subjective, observer-dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically interesting because it is (a) often quite attractive to draw such a distinction, and (b) incredibly hard to spell it out in any kind of satisfying and sensible way. I attempt such a spelling-out after first trying to pin down in more detail what we want from the primary/secondary quality distinction, and saying a bit about why that is such a hard thing to get.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EHMAN1970, author = {EHMAN, ROBERT-R}, title = {REPLY TO MR CUA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {617-618}, keywords = {ethics, moral-judgmen}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EHMAN1967, author = {EHMAN, ROBERT-R}, title = {MORAL OBJECTIVITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {175-187}, keywords = {ethics, objectivity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EHMAN1964, author = {EHMAN, ROBERT-R}, title = {MORAL JUDGMENT AND ULTIMATE ENDS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {253-258}, keywords = {action, end, ethics, justification, moral-judgment; ultimate}, abstract = {IN SURVEYING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN JUDGMENTS AND ACTION, IT IS MAINTAINED THAT A MAN'S MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE MORE ESPECIALLY RELEVANT TO HIS ACTION THAN HIS ORDINARY FACTUAL JUDGMENTS. THE AUTHOR UPHOLDS THAT THE MORAL END IS ULTIMATE AND THAT MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE STATEMENTS OF OUR ULTIMATE ENDS OR MEANS TO THOSE ENDS. A JUSTIFICATION OF MORAL JUDGMENTS IS SHOWING THAT THEY STATE OUR OWN ULTIMATE END OR A MEANS TO OUR ULTIMATE END. THERE ARE TWO SORTS OF INQUIRY: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS OF POSSIBLE ULTIMATE ENDS AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE MEANS TO THESE ENDS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EHRIND1985, author = {EHRIND, DOUGLAS}, title = {"NORMAL" INTENTIONAL ACTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {155-158}, keywords = {action-theory; intentional, metaphysics, phenomenology}, abstract = {CAUSAL ACCOUNTS OF INTENTIONAL ACTION HOLD THAT S DOES B INTENTIONALLY IF AND ONLY IF S DESIRES G, S BELIEVES THAT B WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRODUCTION OF G, AND THIS DESIRE-BELIEF COMPLEX CAUSES B. COUNTEREXAMPLES INVOLVING UNUSUAL CAUSAL ROUTES FROM COMPLEX TO ACTION HAVE SHOWN THIS ACCOUNT NOT TO PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT CONDITION. ON A MODIFIED VERSION OF THIS VIEW, RESTRICTION IS MADE TO "NORMAL" CAUSAL PATHS. I ARGUE THAT THIS MODIFIED ACCOUNT IS UNSATISFACTORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EHRING1986, author = {EHRING, DOUGLAS}, title = {TELEOLOGY AND IMPOSSIBLE GOALS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {127-132}, keywords = {goals, impossibility, metaphysics, teleology}, abstract = {ACCORDING TO LARRY WRIGHT, TELEOLOGICAL BEHAVIOR IS BEHAVIOR WITH A "CONSEQUENCE-ETIOLOGY," I.E., BEHAVIOR WHICH OCCURS BECAUSE OF WHAT THE BEHAVIOR BRINGS ABOUT. IN THIS PAPER I ARGUE THAT WRIGHT'S ANALYSIS CANNOT HANDLE CASES INVOLVING PHYSICALLY OR LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE GOALS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Ehring1997, author = {Ehring, Douglas}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {483-486}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Causation and Persistence: A Theory of Causation}, volume = {60(2)}, year = {1997} } @article{Eilan2001, author = {Eilan, Naomi}, title = {Consciousness, Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {433-440}, keywords = {acquaintance, consciousness, epistemology, reason}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Eklund2002, author = {Eklund, Matti}, title = {Inconsistent Languages}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {251-275}, keywords = {inconsistency, language, logic, paradox, semantics, sorites}, abstract = {The main thesis of this paper is that we sometimes are disposed to accept false and even jointly inconsistent claims by virtue of our semantic competence, and that this comes to light in the sorties and liar paradoxes. Among the subsidiary theses are that this is an important source of indeterminacy in truth conditions, that we must revise basic assumptions about semantic competence, and that classical logic and bivalence can be upheld in the face of the sorties paradox.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Eklund2005, author = {Eklund, Matti}, title = {Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {557-579}, keywords = {assumption, fiction, fictionalism, indifference, language, ontology, utterance}, abstract = {In this paper I outline an alternative to hermeneutic fictionalism, an alternative I call indifferentism, with the same advantages as hermeneutic fictionalism with respect to ontological issues but avoiding some of the problems that face fictionalism. The difference between indifferentism and fictionalism is this. The fictionalist about ordinary utterances of a sentence S holds, with more orthodox views, that the speaker in some sense commits herself to the truth of S. It is only that for the fictionalist this is truth in the relevant fiction. According to the indifferentist, by contrast, we are simply noncommittal -- or indifferent -- with respect to some aspects of what is literally said in our assertive utterances (specifically, with respect to the ontologically committing aspects).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ekstrom1993, author = {Ekstrom, Laura-Waddell}, title = {A Coherence Theory of Autonomy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {599-616}, keywords = {action, autonomy, belief, desire, freedom, social-philosoph}, abstract = {This paper presents a conception of the self partially in terms of a particular notion of preference. It develops a coherentist account of when one's preferences are "authorized", or sanctioned as one's own, and presents a coherence theory of autonomous action. The view presented solves certain problems with hierarchical accounts of freedom, such as Harry Frankfurt's.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ekstrom1999, author = {Ekstrom, Laura-Waddell}, title = {Keystone Preferences and Autonomy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {1057-1063}, keywords = {autonomy, ethics, preference, trust}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elder1994, author = {Elder, Crawford-L}, title = {Laws, Natures, and Contingent Necessities}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {649-667}, keywords = {epistemology, identity, judgment, laws, nature}, abstract = {Many regard the empirical uniformities which science calls lawlike as more than brute regularities, but less than "full strength" necessities: they are ways the world is bound to go, but the world could have gone differently. This paper questions that position. Most illustrations of ways the laws of nature "might have failed to obtain" in effect deny that the laws are laws in the first place. Given genuine natural necessity, the substances which figure in the actual laws could not behave differently, or be differently composed from how science says they necessarily are, without ceasing to be themselves.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elder1996, author = {Elder, Crawford-L}, title = {Realism and Determinable Properties}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {149-159}, keywords = {epistemology, property, realism, universal, vagueness}, abstract = {Realists about properties typically see dangers in maintaining that, corresponding to determinable predicates, there exist determinable properties; they typically deny there are any determinable properties. Thus the only real properties are precisely delineated ones, which ordinary language rarely equips us to pick out individually. This paper argues property realists need not take so extreme a position. The dangers infect only one form of "determinable property"--those which, if real, would lack contrary opposites (e.g., being colored, having mass). There are also "determinable properties" which do have contrary opposites--e.g., being blue, being painful--and these property realists should recognize as real.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elder1998, author = {Elder, Crawford-L}, title = {Essential Properties and Coinciding Objects}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {317-331}, keywords = {existence, metaphysics, modality, object}, abstract = {How can a parcel of matter, or collection of particles, simultaneously compose three different objects, characterized by different modal properties? If the statue is gouged it still exists, but not exactly that piece of gold which originally occupied the statue's borders, and the (mass of) gold within that piece can survive dispersal, while the piece cannot. The solution to this "problem of coinciding objects", this paper argues, is that there is, in that space, only the statue. The properties which the piece and the mass supposedly must have, to go on being, are not properties which anything can have necessarily or essentially. Not even having that origin can be essential. There is no object of which the statue is composed, though there are objects (viz., gold atoms) and a kind of stuff (viz., gold) of which it is composed.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elder2001, author = {Elder, Crawford-L}, title = {Mental Causation Versus Physical Causation: No Contest}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {111-127}, keywords = {causation, epistemology, mental, physical}, abstract = {Common sense supposes thoughts can cause bodily movements and thereby bring about changes in where the agent is or how his surroundings are. Many philosophers suppose that any such outcome is realized in a complex state of affairs involving only microparticles; that previous microphysical developments were sufficient to cause that state of affairs; hence that, barring overdetermination, causation by the mental is excluded. This paper argues that the microphysical swarm that realizes the outcome is an accident (Aristotle) or a coincidence (David Owens) and has no cause, though each component movement in it has one. Mental causation faces no competition "from below".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ELDRIDGE1986, author = {ELDRIDGE, RICHARD}, title = {THE NORMAL AND THE NORMATIVE: WITTGENSTEIN'S LEGACY, KRIPKE, AND CAVELL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {555-575}, keywords = {knowledge, language, normal, normative}, abstract = {IF WITTGENSTEIN IS RIGHT THAT OUR PRACTICES REST ONLY ON NORMAL PROJECTIONS OF RULES, THEN HOW CAN PRACTICES BE CRITICIZED? KRIPKE'S ASSERTIBILITY-CONDITIONS ACCOUNT OF LICIT RULE-PROJECTIONS IS CRITICIZED FOR ITS UNCRITICAL CONVENTIONALISM. WITTGENSTEIN'S SO-CALLED PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT IS EXAMINED AS A PARADIGM SET OF NON-DEMONSTRATIVE FIRST-PERSON REFLECTIONS ON WHAT WE NORMALLY DO THAT HAVE CRITICAL FORCE. THIS CRITICAL FORCE IS THEN EXPLICATED THROUGH A CONSIDERATION OF CAVELL'S NOTION OF A "CLAIM OF REASON."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ELEY1972, author = {ELEY, LOTHAR}, title = {LIFE-WORLD CONSTITUTION OF PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC AND ELEMENTARY PREDICATE LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {322-340}, keywords = {logic, metalogic, phenomenology, propositional-logi}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE IS AN INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOGIC AS A POSITIVE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. THE METHOD IS THAT OF A METACRITIQUE, I.E. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE PARTICULAR TYPE OF CONSCIOUSNESS FOR WHICH POSITIVE LOGIC CONSTITUTES THE MEASURE OF TRUTH. AS A METACRITIQUE IT IS TRANSCENDENTAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL. AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO SHOW THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION IS, AS HUSSERL WOULD SAY, ONE OF INTERSUBJECTIVE GENESIS. FOR THE PURPOSES OF DEMONSTRATION THE EXAMPLES OF PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC AND ELEMENTARY PREDICATE LOGIC ARE USED. HUSSERL'S POSITION, TAKEN AS THE POINT OF DEPARTURE, IS DEVELOPED, USING IN PART THE WORK OF HEGEL, FREGE AND P. LORENZEN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elga2004, author = {Elga, Adam}, title = {Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {383-396}, keywords = {belief, duplicate, epistemology, indifference, principle, scepticism}, abstract = {Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate of Dr. Evil has been created. Upon learning this, how seriously should he take the hypothesis that he himself is that duplicate? I answer: very seriously. I defend a principle of indifference for self-locating belief which entails that after Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate has been created, he ought to have exactly the same degree of belief that he is Dr. Evil as that he is the duplicate. More generally, the principle shows that there is a sharp distinction between ordinary skeptical hypotheses, and self-locating skeptical hypotheses.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elgin2002, author = {Elgin, Catherine-Z}, title = {Take It from Me: The Epistemological Status of Testimony}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {291-308}, keywords = {argument, epistemology, knowledge, testimony}, abstract = {C. J. A. Coady argues, on Davidsonian grounds, that (1) most testimony is true, hence, (2) most testimony supplies warrant sufficient for knowledge. I appeal to Grice's maxims to undermine Coady's argument and to show that the matter is more complicated and context-sensitive than is standardly recognized. Informative exchanges take place within networks of shared, tacit assumptions that affect the scope and strength of our claims, and the level of warrant required for their responsible assertion. The maxims explains why different levels of warrant are transferred in different contexts. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elgin2004, author = {Elgin, Catherine-Z}, title = {Richard Foley's Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {724-734}, keywords = {authority, belief, epistemology, reliability, trust}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elgin2001, author = {Elgin, Catherine-Z}, title = {The Legacy of Nelson Goodman}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {679-690}, keywords = {aesthetics, appearance, art, epistemology, language}, abstract = {Nelson Goodman was one of the foremost philosophers of the twentieth century. His work radically reshaped the subject, forcing fundamental reconceptions of philosophy's problems, ends and means. Goodman not only contributed to diverse fields, from philosophy of language to aesthetics, from philosophy of science to mereology, his works cut across these and other fields, revealing shared features and connecting links that more narrowly focused philosophers overlook. This paper begins to assess Goodman's legacy by reviewing his major accomplishments and identifying a cluster of metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological commitments that run through his works.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ELGIN1987, author = {ELGIN, CATHERINE-Z}, title = {THE COST OF CORRESPONDENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {475-480}, keywords = {correspondence, metaphysics, realism}, abstract = {IN "CONCEPTS AND CORRESPONDENCE," SCOTT SHALKOWSKI MAINTAINS THAT GOODMAN DOES NOT REFUTE REALISM. HE'S RIGHT. BUT I ARGUE THAT THE PRICE THAT SHALKOWSKI PAYS TO PRESERVE REALISM IS EXCESSIVE. HE IS READY TO REJECT BIVALENCE OR THE GRAMMATICAL CRITERION FOR SENTENCEHOOD, AND TO CONCEDE THAT WE CAN'T TELL WHETHER TO BE REALISTS ABOUT 'GREEN' OR 'GRUE'. I SUGGEST THAT WITHOUT REFUTING REALISM GOODMAN PROVIDES POWERFUL REASONS FOR REJECTING IT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Elgin1996, author = {Elgin, Catherine-Z}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {724-726}, publisher = {Princeton Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Considered Judgment}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1996} } @article{Ellis1992, author = {Ellis, Anthony}, title = {Deontology, Incommensurability and the Arbitrary}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {855-875}, keywords = {arbitrariness, deontology, ethics, incommensurability}, abstract = {Non-absolutist deontology holds that certain acts are prohibited unless the consequences of not performing them are sufficiently bad. I argue that we cannot give an account of what sufficiently' means in this formulation, and that this destroys such a theory. The problem is that of specifying cutoff points'. I argue that such a theory cannot specify such cutoff points without arbitrariness. Nor will it solve the problem to hold that there "is" no cutoff point, or only a vague one. I then gesture towards one moral theory which responds to at least some of the motivations behind non-absolutist deontology but which does not encounter this problem.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ellis2000, author = {Ellis, Brian}, title = {Causal Laws and Singular Causation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {329-351}, keywords = {causation, disposition, epistemology, metaphysics, object}, abstract = {In this paper it will be argued that causal laws describe the actions of causal powers. The process which results from such an action is one which belongs to a natural kind, the essence of which is that it is a display of this causal power. Therefore, if anything has a given causal power necessarily, it must be naturally disposed to act in the manner prescribed by the causal law describing the action of this causal power. In the formal expressions of causal laws, the necessity operators occur within the scopes of the universal quantifiers. Hence, the necessities must hold of each instance. The causal laws may, thus, be shown to be concerned with necessary connections between events or circumstances of precisely the sort required for a decent account of singular causation.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Ellis1990, author = {Ellis, Brian}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {968-970}, publisher = {Blackwell}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Truth and Objectivity}, volume = {53(4)}, year = {1990} } @article{ELUGARDO1975, author = {ELUGARDO, REINALDO}, title = {LANDESMAN ON ABSTRACT PARTICULARS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {411-414}, keywords = {metaphysics, particulars, predication}, abstract = {PROFESSOR CHARLES LANDESMAN HAS RECENTLY PRESENTED SEVERAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE THESIS OF ABSTRACT PARTICULARS. ONE OF HIS ARGUMENTS IS THAT POSITIONAL DIFFERENCE AMONG QUALIFIED OBJECTS DOES NOT YIELD NUMERICAL DIFFERENCE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE NONRELATIONAL QUALITIES. IN THE PRESENT PAPER, I OFFER A CRITICISM OF LANDESMAN'S ARGUMENT. MY CRITICISM IS THAT HIS ARGUMENT RESTS ON AN ASSUMPTION WHICH SUPPORTS THE THESIS OF ABSTRACT PARTICULARS: OBJECTS AND THEIR QUALITIES OCCUPY THE SAME SPATIAL REGION AT THE SAME TIME. I TRY TO SHOW HOW THIS ASSUMPTION UNDERCUTS THE FORCE OF LANDESMAN'S ARGUMENT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elugardo1999, author = {Elugardo, Reinaldo}, title = {Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {513-523}, keywords = {attitude, metaphysics, mind}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elugardo1993, author = {Elugardo, Reinaldo}, title = {Burge on Content}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {367-384}, keywords = {cognition, empiricism, epistemology, externalism, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EMAD1972, author = {EMAD, PARVIS}, title = {MAX SCHELER'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SHAME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {361-370}, keywords = {epistemology, phenomenology, sex, shame}, abstract = {THIS PAPER IS AN ATTEMPT TO GIVE A BRIEF BUT THOROUGH GOING EXPOSITION OF M. SCHELER'S WAY OF COGNIZING, DESCRIBING AND EVALUATING THE PHENOMENON OF SHAME. THE FIRST PART OF THE PAPER IS GIVEN TO THE TASK OF DIFFERENTIATING SHAME FROM RELATED FEELINGS THUS DETERMINING ITS ESSENTIAL STRUCTURE. IN THE SECOND PART, BASIC FORMS OF SHAME ARE DISCUSSED AND MISCONCEPTIONS GIVEN IN THE EDUCATIONAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL THEORIES OF SHAME ARE DEALT WITH. PART THREE FOCUSES SOLELY ON SHAME AND SEX AND REVIEWS SCHELER'S CRITICISM OF FREUD. FINALLY THE METAPHYSICAL IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO SHAME BY SCHELER IS ELABORATED UPON, AND MENTION IS MADE OF THE ATTENTION PAID BY GERMAN PHILOSOPHERS TO THIS FEELING. THIS PAPER CONSIDERS THE SCHELERIAN VERSION OF PHENOMENOLOGY TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS INDISPENSIBLE FOR AN EXPOSITION OF HIS THOUGHT ON SHAME. TO CONTRIBUTE, HOWEVER, TO SCHELER-RESEARCH, THE UNITY AND ENTIRETY OF HIS THOUGHT AS SHOWN IN HIS PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF SHAME, IS EXPLICITLY EMPHASIZED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EMBREE1979, author = {EMBREE, LESTER}, title = {A NOTE ON 'IS' AND 'OUGHT' IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {595-597}, keywords = {is, language, ought}, abstract = {ATTENTION IS CALLED TO THE IS/OUGHT DISTINCTION AS MADE BY HUSSERL IN THE "PROLEGOMENA TO PURE LOGIC" AND ITS BEARING IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY. "OUGHTS" ARE INTERPRETED BY HUSSERL AS VALUE JUDGMENTS INCORPORATING THEORETICAL JUDGMENTS (OR "ISES") AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A FORMAL LOGIC OF SUCH VALUE JUDGMENTS IS SHOWN. CLARIFICATION OF THE DISTINCTION IS ALLEGED BY THE AUTHOR TO BE PRIOR TO THE QUESTION OF THE DERIVABILITY OR NON-DERIVABILITY OF OUGHTS FROM ISES OR VICE VERSA.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EMMANUEL1991, author = {EMMANUEL, Steven-M}, title = {Kierkegaard's Pragmatist Faith.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {christianity, faith, pragmatism, religion}, abstract = {The aim of this paper is to show that the Kierkegaardian conception of faith can be defended along traditional pragmatist lines. I interpret the Absolute Paradox as a conceptual expression for the total incommensurability between an infinite God and a finite human intellect. As such, the paradox clears logical space for faith by showing that theoretical reason is incapable of deciding the question of whether Christianity is true. However, where theoretical reason cannot decide the option between belief and unbelief, and where the attainment of an eternal happiness is effectively precluded by the failure to believe, the venture to become Christian may be validated on practical grounds.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Emmanuel1996, author = {Emmanuel, Steven-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {974-976}, publisher = {SUNY Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation}, volume = {57(4)}, year = {1996} } @article{ENGEL1963, author = {ENGEL, S-MORRIS}, title = {KANT'S 'REFUTATION' OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {20-35}, keywords = {existence, god, language, necessity, ontological-proof; predicate, religion, textual-criticis}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ENGEL1965, author = {ENGEL, S-MORRIS}, title = {REPLY TO DR SCHWARZ'S "PROFESSOR ENGEL ON KANT".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {412-413}, keywords = {existence, god, ontological-proof; predicate, religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ENGEL1970, author = {ENGEL, S-MORRIS}, title = {WITTGENSTEIN AND KANT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {403-414}, keywords = {modern}, abstract = {ALTHOUGH WITTGENSTEIN'S DEBT TO KANT HAS NOT FAILED TO CATCH THE EYE OF SOME OF HIS READERS, ITS TRUE DEPTH AND EXTENT HAS STILL TO BE RECORDED. NOR IS THE EXISTING LITERATURE ON THIS POINT VERY ILLUMINATING. ON THE CONTRARY, CONSIDERING THE ALREADY VAST SCOPE OF THIS LITERATURE, THE REFERENCES TO KANT ARE NOT ONLY OFTEN LACKING IN INTEREST BUT ARE IN THE MAJORITY OF CASES SIMPLY NOT THERE AT ALL. IN THE PRESENT PAPER AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO REDRESS THIS BALANCE BY DESCRIBING IN MORE DETAIL THAN HAS YET BEEN ATTEMPTED THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THIS RELATION AND WHAT IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING AND ILLUMINATING ABOUT IT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Engstrom1988, author = {Engstrom, Stephen}, title = {Conditioned Autonomy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {435-453}, keywords = {autonomy, ethics, morality, rigorism}, abstract = {My aim is to show that although there are passages in Kant's writings that suggest the presence in his moral theory of a rigoristic distinction between good and evil and an unacceptable associated view that all human agents are, without distinction, evil, there is nothing in his basic conception of morality as grounded in the autonomy of practical reason that commits him to rigorism or to the unacceptable associated view. In the first part of the paper, I make some preliminary remarks about the idea of autonomy and furnish a setting for it by outlining Kant's view of the practical context of deliberation and choice. In the second part I examine Kant's descriptions of two conditions of human character, namely, frailty and impurity, as a means of dissociating the idea of autonomy from the rigoristic distinction. In the third part I go on to develop a notion of conditioned autonomy that does not involve rigorism and so allows us to draw moral distinctions between human agents. I conclude by indicating some close connections between the idea of conditioned autonomy and Kant's notions of virtue and impurity.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Engstrom1992, author = {Engstrom, Stephen}, title = {The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant's Moral Theory}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {747-780}, keywords = {ethics, good, happiness, virtue}, abstract = {Kant claims that the concept of the highest good, the idea of happiness in proportion to virtue, is grounded in the moral law. But this claim has often been challenged. How can Kant justify including happiness in the highest good? Why should only the virtuous be worth of happiness? This paper argues that when the moral law is interpreted as the criterion for valid application of the concept of the good, the concept of the highest good does indeed follow from the moral law. It also argues that the duty to promote the highest good harmonizes with other duties.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Erwin1997, author = {Erwin, Edward}, title = {Psychoanalysis: Past, Present, and Future}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {671-696}, keywords = {past, present, psychoanalysis, science}, abstract = {This article discusses recent philosophic works on psychoanalysis by Patricia Kitcher, Adolf Grunbaum, Donald Levy, and Richard Wollheim. One issue that is addressed concerns the extent to which Freudian hypotheses once received support from discoveries in biology and the social sciences. A second issue concerns the current empirical status of Freud's views. A third issue concerns the future of psychoanalysis if Freudian theory is supplanted by either object relations theory or self psychology.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Erwin1996, author = {Erwin, Edward}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {268-271}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A Final Accounting: Philosophical and Empirical Issues in Freudian Psychology}, volume = {59(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{Estlund2005, author = {Estlund, David}, title = {What's So Rickety? Richardson's Non-Epistemic Democracy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {204-210}, keywords = {autonomy, democracy, policy, political-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EVANS1962, author = {EVANS, D-LUTHER}, title = {THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GETTING TRUTH AND GETTING WISE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {360-365}, keywords = {interpretation, knowledge, methodology, objectivity, philosophy, subjectivity, truth, wisdom}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EVANS1961, author = {EVANS, J-L}, title = {MEANING AND USE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {251-261}, keywords = {expression, language, meaning, ontology, reality, relation, rule, sentence, use, word}, abstract = {EVANS JUSTIFIES HIS CONCEPT OF MEANING IN LIGHT OF ABELSON'S CRITICISMS, WHICH ARISE FROM A PREJUDICE IN FAVOR OF CERTAIN LOGICAL CATEGORIES (SUBSTANCE, ATTRIBUTE AND RELATION), REPRESENTING A DESCENDING ORDER OF RESPECTABILITY. THE AUTHOR HOLDS THAT THIS INVOLVES THINKING THAT THE STATUS OF A CONCEPT WOULD BE ENHANCED IF IT COULD BE REGARDED AS SOME SORT OF OBJECTIVE ENTITY, SUCH AS A PLATONIC FORM, AND IF THIS SHOULD PROVE IMPOSSIBLE, THEN THE CONCEPT MUST BE EITHER ATTRIBUTIVE OR RELATIONAL. THERE IS A DISAPPOINTMENT AT SEEING THE DISPLACEMENT OF MEANING FROM THE CATEGORY OF SUBSTANCE BY THE "USE" THEORY OF MEANING. THE MAIN MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF THE PHRASE "RULES OF USE" ARE EXAMINED, AND THE ARTICLE ENDS BY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN USING AND MISUSING WORDS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Evans1991, author = {Evans, J-Claude}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {966-968}, publisher = {Univ of Minn Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Strategies of Deconstruction}, volume = {53(4)}, year = {1991} } @article{FACIONE1976, author = {FACIONE, PETER-A}, title = {COUNTEREXAMPLES AND WHERE THEY LEAD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {523-530}, keywords = {argumentation, counterfactual, logic, refutation}, abstract = {THE USE OF COUNTER-EXAMPLES IN PHILOSOPHY IS A FAMILIAR PRACTICE WHICH MAY LEAD A PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE THROUGH FOUR LEVELS OF SOPHISTICATION. LEVEL ONE TRANSACTIONS INCLUDE FRAMING THE ORIGINAL PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLICATION AND PROPOSING THE FIRST COUNTER-EXAMPLES. LEVEL TWO IS THE LEVEL OF REVISION AMENDMENT, NEW COUNTER-EXAMPLES AND NEW AMENDMENTS. WHEN IMAGINATION AND PATIENCE WITH THE WORK ON LEVEL TWO NEAR AN END, THE DEBATE CAN ADVANCE TO LEVEL THREE. HERE ATTACKS ARE MOUNTED WHICH QUESTION, IN FUNDAMENTAL WAYS, THE WHOLE ENTERPRISE THAT, ON LEVEL ONE, LEAD TO THE ORIGINAL EXPLICATION. IF THE ATTACKS ARE MET SUCCESSFULLY, THEN THE DEBATE MAY MOVE TO LEVEL FOUR. THE SIGN OF THIS TRANSITION IS THE COUNTER-ATTACK THAT THE "PURPORTED" COUNTER-EXAMPLES ARE NOT "GENUINE." ON LEVEL FOUR THERE EMERGES A BASIC CONFLICT OF PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS WHICH IS POTENTIALLY IRRECONCILABLE. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FAIR1976, author = {FAIR, FRANK-K}, title = {TWO PROBLEMS WITH RODERICK CHISHOLM'S PERCEIVING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {547-550}, keywords = {epistemology, language, perceiving}, abstract = {THE FIRST PROBLEM IS THAT RICHARD SEVERENS HAS PRODUCED A FAMILY OF COUNTEREXAMPLES TO CHISHOLM'S DEFINITION OF "THERE IS SOMETHING WHICH S PERCEIVES TO BE F." I THINK THAT THE COUNTEREXAMPLES WORK, BUT THAT CHISHOLM'S DEFINITION CAN BE EASILY AMENDED TO COPE WITH THEM. THE SECOND PROBLEM IS THAT CHISHOLM (AND FRED DRETSKE IN HIS 1969 BOOK ON SEEING AND KNOWING) ACCEPTS AS VALID AN ARGUMENT AGAINST CAUSAL THEORIES OF PERCEPTION WHICH IS ACTUALLY FALLACIOUS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fales2004, author = {Fales, Evan}, title = {Proper Basicality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {373-383}, keywords = {epistemology, externalism, foundationalism}, abstract = {Foundationalist epistemologies, whether internalist or externalist, ground noetic structures in beliefs that are said to be foundational, or properly basic. It is essential to such epistemologies that they provide clear criteria for proper basicality. This proves, I argue, to be a thorny task, at least insofar as the goal is to provide a psychologically realistic reconstruction of our actual doxastic practices. I examine some of the difficulties, and suggest some implications, in particular for the externalist epistemology of Alvin Plantinga.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FALES1984, author = {FALES, EVAN}, title = {DAVIDSON'S COMPATIBILISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {227-246}, keywords = {compatibilism, freedom, libertarianism, metaphysics}, abstract = {DONALD DAVIDSON ADVOCATES A VERSION OF COMPATIBILISM MOTIVATED BY HIS NON-REDUCTIVE MATERIALISM. WHILE THIS POSITION HAS A NUMBER OF ADVANTAGES OVER MORE CLASSICAL FORMS OF COMPATIBILISM, AN EXAMINATION OF DAVIDSON'S VIEWS ON CAUSATION AND EVENT-IDENTITY (UPON WHICH THE ARGUMENT DEPENDS) REVEALS A CHARACTERIZATION OF THE FORMER WHICH RENDERS THE LATTER UNINTELLIGIBLE. FINALLY A LIBERTARIAN VIEW IS SKETCHED WHICH IS GROUNDED IN A DISTINCTION BETWEEN CAUSAL RELATIONS AND THE CONNECTION BETWEEN REASONS AND ACTIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Falkenstein2000, author = {Falkenstein, Lorne}, title = {Reid's Account of Localization}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {305-328}, keywords = {color, epistemology, intuition, sensation, space}, abstract = {This paper contrasts three different positions taken by 18th century British scholars on how sensations, particularly sensations of color and touch, come to be localized in space: Berkeley's view (initiated, though not fully executed) that we learn to localize ideas of color by associating certain purely qualitative features of those ideas with ideas of touch and motion, Hume's view that visual and tangible impressions are originally disposed in space, and Reid's view (inspired by Porterfield) that we are innately disposed to refer appearances of color to the end of a line passing through the centre of the eye and originating from the spot on the back of the retina where the material impression causing that appearance was received. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FALKENSTEIN1989, author = {FALKENSTEIN, LORNE}, title = {IS PERCEPTUAL SPACE MONADIC?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {709-713}, keywords = {metaphysics, monadology, perception, space}, abstract = {AGAINST THE CLAIMS OF RUSSELL, GOODMAN, AND ALBERT CASULLO, THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT THE LOCATION OF PHENOMENA IN VISUAL SPACE CANNOT BE DETERMINED THROUGH REFERENCE TO MONADIC LOCAL PROPERTIES OF THE VISUAL FIELD.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FARBER1963, author = {FARBER, MARVIN}, title = {FIRST PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE WORLD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {315-334}, keywords = {experience, idealism, metaphysics, phenomenology, transcendence, transcendental-reduction; world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FARBER1969, author = {FARBER, MARVIN}, title = {THE IDEA OF A NATURALISTIC LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {598-601}, keywords = {logic, naturalism}, abstract = {THE IDEA OF A NATURALISTIC LOGIC AS CONCEIVED BY DEWEY IS COMPARED WITH THE IDEA OF A PURE LOGIC AS ADVANCED BY HUSSERL. DEFENDING THE NATURALISTIC AFFIRMATION OF INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE, THE WRITER REGARDS THE "LIFE-WORLD" OF PHENOMENOLOGY AS EVIDENCE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF SUBJECTIVISM. THE RADICALLY REFLECTIVE PROCEDURE OF PHENOMENOLOGY IS VIEWED AS A LEGITIMATE EXTENSION OF A NATURALISTIC LOGIC. THE CONCEPTS AND STRUCTURES DESCRIBED IN THE REFLECTIVE EXAMINATION OF EXPERIENCE MERELY ADD ANOTHER DIMENSION FOR INQUIRY, WITHOUT REMOVING MAN FROM NATURE IN ANY REAL SENSE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FARBER1965, author = {FARBER, MARVIN}, title = {PERVASIVE SUBJECTIVISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {527-533}, keywords = {epistemology, idealism, knowing, metaphysics, methodology, phenomenology, philosophy, reality, subjectivism}, abstract = {THE VARIOUS FORMS OF SUBJECTIVISM PROCEED FROM THE "COGITO" OR ACKNOWLEDGE ITS PRIMACY. THAT ALLOWS FOR CONSIDERABLE INGENUITY OF OPERATIONS WHILE INSURING A BASIC RELATEDNESS IN THE OUTCOME. THE NEED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE WORLD ON THAT BASIS PRESENTS THE MOST SERIOUS DIFFICULTY TO PURE SUBJECTIVISM. COVERT OR MIXED FORMS OF THAT PHILOSOPHY FACE THE SAME DIFFICULTY INSOFAR AS THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBJECTIVITY IS ASSUMED. MERLEAU-PONTY IS OF INTEREST IN THIS CONNECTION. THE CRITICAL REACTION THAT HAS DEVELOPED HAS BEEN DUE TO THE UNRESOLVED DIFFICULTIES, AS ILLUSTRATED BY FINK; BUT ALSO TO THE MANY FUNCTIONS PHILOSOPHY MUST PERFORM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FARBER1964, author = {FARBER, MARVIN}, title = {THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEW OF VALUES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {552-560}, keywords = {axiology, ethics, experience, individual, phenomenology, society, valuation, value}, abstract = {THERE IS AN EMPHASIS HERE ON THE WAY VALUES APPEAR IN EXPERIENCE AND ON THE CONCRETE EVENTS WHICH MANIFEST THEMSELVES IN THE PROCESS OF EXPERIENCE. IT IS ARGUED THAT VALUATION IS GROUNDED IN REASON; THE RATIONAL SUBJECT IS THE SUBJECT ESTABLISHING THE ETHICAL WORLD. A RATIONALLY GROUNDED AGREEMENT CONCERNING VALUATION AND WILLING IS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR A HARMONIOUS SOCIAL LIFE, ACCORDING TO HUSSERL. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FARBER1960, author = {FARBER, MARVIN}, title = {WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {255-259}, keywords = {being, existence, greek, methodology, ontology, philosophizing, philosophy, textual-criticis}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FAUVEL1975, author = {FAUVEL, J-G}, title = {TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL MATHEMATICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {16-24}, keywords = {information-theory; logic, mathematics, phenomenology, set-theory; structure}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FEIBLEMAN1962, author = {FEIBLEMAN, JAMES-K}, title = {FORMAL MATERIALISM RECONFIRMED.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {62-70}, keywords = {energy, formal, materialism, matter, metaphysics, mind, physical-sciences; property, substance}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FEIBLEMAN1965, author = {FEIBLEMAN, JAMES-K}, title = {ARTIFACTUALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {544-559}, keywords = {adaptation, artifact, culture, evolution, man, material, object, philosophical-anthropology; tool}, abstract = {THE TWO FACTORS WHICH PLAYED THE LARGEST ROLE IN HUMAN EVOLUTION WERE LANGUAGES AND MATERIAL TOOLS. THE PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF LANGUAGES HAS BEEN VIGOROUSLY PURSUED BY WITTGENSTEIN AND HIS FOLLOWERS, BUT THE EQUALLY IMPORTANT PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF MATERIAL TOOLS HAS BEEN NEGLECTED. CIVILIZED MAN LIVES IN A WORLD LARGELY COMPOSED OF MATERIAL TOOLS. HE HAS ALTERED EVERYTHING IN HIS IMMEDIATE ENVIRONMENT. HE HAS BROUGHT THIS DEVELOPMENT TO THE POINT WHERE HE IS NOW A VICTIM OF IT, FOR HE RESPONDS TO THE STIMULI OF THE ARTIFACTS WITH CHAIN-LEARNED BEHAVIOR. THE PROCESS OF EVOLUTION SHOULD BE ACCELERATED RATHER THAN STOPPED BY THIS DEVELOPMENT, BUT WE DO NOT YET KNOW WHERE IT WILL TAKE US. WE SHALL NOT BE ON TOP OF THE PROBLEM UNTIL WE HAVE ACQUIRED THE ABILITY TO PLAN TOOLS IN TERMS OF THE ANTICIPATED CONDITIONING TO WHICH THEY WILL SUBJECT US.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feit2003, author = {Feit, Neil}, title = {Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {304-327}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, infallibilism, knowledge, warrant}, abstract = {Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier problem that is compatible with fallibilism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feit2001, author = {Feit, Neil}, title = {Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(1)}, pages = {29-55}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, rationality}, abstract = {The author presents and defends a general view about belief, and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke's puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke's original puzzle, which have to do with belief attributions containing empty names and kind terms.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feldman1995, author = {Feldman, Fred}, title = {Adjusting Utility for Justice: A Consequentialist Reply to the Objection from Justice}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {567-585}, keywords = {consequentialism, epistemology, ethics, justice}, abstract = {Traditional forms of consequentialism are open to objections based on considerations of justice. Classic cases such as the Small Southern Town, the Organ Harvest, the Colosseum, etc. show that such forms of consequentialism, focussing exclusively on the total value of available outcomes, are insensitive to questions about the manner in which that value is distributed among the various recipients in the outcome. As a result, such theories sometimes permit serious injustices. In this paper, I formulate an axiology that is sensitive to justice, and combine it with a consequentialist normative theory. I try to show that the resulting view generates correct results in cases involving justice.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feldman2002, author = {Feldman, Fred}, title = {Comments on Two of DePaul's Puzzles}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {636-639}, keywords = {epistemology, hedonism, logic, pain, sensation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feldman2002a, author = {Feldman, Fred}, title = {The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {604-628}, keywords = {axiology, good-life; hedonism, pleasure, value}, abstract = {It is important to keep in mind that hedonism is a theory about the value of a person's life for the person who lives it, and not for the world or for others. It is also important to distinguish between sensory hedonism and attitudinal hedonism. "Desert Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism" appears to be immune to objections (a) and (b). A variant appears to be immune to all of them. Perhaps it is the answer to the question about the value of a life. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feldman1999, author = {Feldman, Fred}, title = {Comments on Living High and Letting Die}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {195-201}, keywords = {caring, choice, ethics}, abstract = {In Living High and Letting Die, Peter Unger asserts that "well-to-do folks like us" have a moral obligation to give most of our wealth to organizations that will use the money to help prevent premature death among distant third-world "tykes." I wonder why it is wrong to devote our wealth to other projects, such as saving the lives of nearby children, or teenagers, or making the world better in other ways. Unger's suggestion is that his doctrine follows from his moral theory, "Liberationism." I make the following claims: (1) Although Unger never clearly states the normative component of liberationism, he does state a smattering of principles that might be parts of it. (2) None of these principles implies that anyone has an all-in obligation to give anything to prevent premature deaths among tykes in distant lands. (3) We can formulate principles that have the desired implications. (4) Such principles are wholly implausible.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FELDMAN1989, author = {FELDMAN, FRED}, title = {ON DYING AS A PROCESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {375-390}, keywords = {death, dying, metaphysics, process}, abstract = {TO SAY THAT A THING IS DYING, IN THE PROCESS SENSE, IT TO SAY (ROUGHLY) THAT IT IS IN A "TERMINAL DECLINE," THAT IT IS "HEADING TOWARD DEATH." AFTER EXAMINING AND REJECTING SEVERAL PROPOSED ANALYSES OF THE CONCEPT OF DYING AS A PROCESS, I PRESENT MY OWN. WHEN AN ORGANISM IS DYING, IT IS ENGAGED IN A PROCESS CONSISTING OF THE SEQUENTIAL DECREASE OF THE THING'S VITAL PROPERTIES; A PROCESS WHICH, IF ALLOWED TO REACH ITS CONCLUSION WITHOUT INTERFERENCE, WILL TERMINATE WITH THE DEATH OF THE ORGANISM. I DISCUSS THE VIRTUES OF THIS ANALYSIS, AND ITS WEAKNESSES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Feldman1997, author = {Feldman, Fred}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {734-736}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1997} } @other{Feldman1992, author = {Feldman, Fred}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {233-237}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Confrontations with the Reaper}, volume = {55(1)}, year = {1992} } @article{Feldman1997a, author = {Feldman, Richard}, title = {Essay: Human Knowledge and Human Nature: A New Introduction to an Ancient Debate by Peter Carruthers and Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis by Edward Craig}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {205-221}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, nature}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feldman2000, author = {Feldman, Richard}, title = {The Ethics of Belief}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {667-695}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, ethics, knowledge}, abstract = {In this paper I first argue that we do have a form of voluntary control over a substantial number of beliefs, but this fact is of no great significance for epistemology since epistemic evaluations do not depend upon whether we have or exercise voluntary control over beliefs. Next, I argue that what we epistemically ought to do is to have the beliefs supported by the evidence we actually have. Finally, I express skepticism about the meaningfulness of questions about how to weigh epistemological considerations against moral or prudential considerations in figuring out what we ought to do all things considered.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feldman2002b, author = {Feldman, Richard and Conee, Earl}, title = {Typing Problems}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {98-105}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, generality, knowledge, reliabilism, type}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FEREJOHN1984, author = {FEREJOHN, MICHAEL-T}, title = {SOCRATIC VIRTUE AS THE PARTS OF ITSELF.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {377-388}, keywords = {epistemology, logic, virtue, whole}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fern2005, author = {Fernandez, Jordi}, title = {Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {533-556}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, justification, moore's-paradox; paradox, perception, rationality, self-knowledg}, abstract = {I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore's paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the model in question can account for both versions of Moore's paradox. Moore's paradox, I conclude, tells us something about our conceptions of rationality and self-knowledge. For it teaches us that we take it to be constitutive of being rational that one can have privileged access to one's own mind and it reveals that having privileged access to one's own mind is a matter of forming first-order beliefs and corresponding second-order beliefs on the same basis.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FERRATER-MORA1977, author = {FERRATER-MORA, J}, title = {FICTIONS, UNIVERSALS, AND ABSTRACT ENTITIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {353-367}, keywords = {abstract-entity; fiction, metaphysics, objectification, phenomenology, universal}, abstract = {FICTIONS, UNIVERSALS, AND ABSTRACTS ENTITIES ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS "OBJECTIFICATIONS" OF HUMAN SUBJECTS (OR ANY SUBJECTS HAVING A NEURAL ORGANIZATION SIMILAR TO, OR FUNCTIONING AS, MAN'S). UNIVERSALS ARE FOUNDED UPON LINGUISTIC ACTIVITY. ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE MORE RESILIENT TO THE ABOVE APPROACH, BUT ARE IN NO CASE ONTOLOGICALLY "INDEPENDENT."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Ferreira1991, author = {Ferreira, M-Jamie}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {734-737}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Transforming Vision}, volume = {54(3)}, year = {1991} } @article{FETHE1976, author = {FETHE, CHARLES}, title = {MIRACLES AND ACTION EXPLANATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {415-422}, keywords = {action, explanation, miracle, religion}, abstract = {TO DEFEND THE CONCEPT OF MIRACLES FROM ATTACKS SUCH AS THOSE RAISED BY NOWELL-SMITH, CERTAIN PHILOSOPHERS HAVE APPEALED TO ACTION THEORY AND ARGUED THAT THE THEIST'S EXPLANATION OF MIRACLES IS LIKE THE EXPLANATION OF AN ACTION AND NOT LIKE THE EXPLANATION OF A CAUSED EVENT. THIS ARTICLE SHOWS THAT NOWELL-SMITH'S OBJECTIONS CANNOT BE AVOIDED IN THIS WAY AND THAT BELIEF IN MIRACLES ONLY ACCENTS THE THEIST'S PROBLEM OF EXPLAINING GOD'S RELATION TO THE WORLD.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FEUER1963, author = {FEUER, LEWIS-S}, title = {THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD OF ARTHUR O LOVEJOY: CRITICAL REALISM AND PSYCHOANALYTICAL REALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {493-510}, keywords = {behaviorism, critical-realism; criticism, epistemology, irrationality, methodology, motive, philosophy, pragmatism, psychoanalysis}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FIESER1989, author = {FIESER, JAMES}, title = {IS HUME A MORAL SKEPTIC?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {89-105}, keywords = {descriptive-ethics; ethics, metaethics, moral, scepticism}, abstract = {USING J L MACKIE'S ANALYSIS OF MORAL SKEPTICISM AS A POINT OF REFERENCE, I ARGUE THAT, AS A NORMATIVE THEORY, HUME'S ACCOUNT OF MORALITY IS NOT SKEPTICAL SINCE HE IS OFFERING A RELATIVELY OPTIMISTIC CONSEQUENTIALIST THEORY OF RIGHT AND WRONG ACTION. AS A METAETHICAL THEORY, HOWEVER, I ARGUE THAT HUME IS A WEAK METAETHICAL SKEPTIC INSOFAR AS HE DENIES THAT MORALITY IS INDEPENDENT OF THE EXISTENCE AND CHARACTER OF HUMAN BEINGS. HE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A THOROUGH OR STRONG METAETHICAL SKEPTIC, THOUGH, SINCE HE ADVANCES A MORAL THEORY WHICH IS FIRMLY GROUNDED IN HUMAN INSTINCT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Fine1993, author = {Fine, Gail}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {489-491}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {On Ideas--Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms}, volume = {56(2)}, year = {1993} } @other{Fine2002, author = {Fine, Kit}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {223-232}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Limits of Abstraction}, volume = {72(1)}, year = {2002} } @article{FIRTH1978, author = {FIRTH, RODERICK}, title = {COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR POSTOW'S PAPER: "ETHICAL RELATIVISM AND THE IDEAL OBSERVER".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {39}, pages = {122-123}, keywords = {conflict, ethics, objectivism, obligation, observer}, abstract = {POSTOW HAS ARGUED THAT MY ANALYSIS OF ETHICAL TERMS IN "ETHICAL ABSOLUTISM AND THE IDEAL OBSERVER" LEAVES OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT AN IDEAL OBSERVER COULD REACT FAVORABLY TOWARD TWO INCOMPATIBLE ACTS. I REPLY THAT THIS RAISES NO DIFFICULTY FOR AN ANALYSIS OF 'RIGHT'. BUT FOR "EXCLUSIVE" TERMS LIKE 'DUTY' AND 'OBLIGATORY' THE ANALYSIS REQUIRES AN ADDITIONAL CLAUSE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fischer1999, author = {Fischer, John-Martin}, title = {Contribution on Martha Nussbaum's The Therapy of Desire}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {787-792}, keywords = {desire, epistemology, hellenism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fischer2000, author = {Fischer, John-Martin}, title = {The Significance of Free Will by Robert Kane}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {141-148}, keywords = {determinism, free-will; metaphysics, significance}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fischer2000a, author = {Fischer, John-Martin and Ravizza, Mark}, title = {Precis of Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {441-445}, keywords = {control, ethics, moral-responsibilit}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fischer2000b, author = {Fischer, John-Martin and Ravizza, Mark}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {467-480}, keywords = {control, ethics, responsibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FISHER1975, author = {FISHER, JOHN}, title = {FALLIBILITY AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE FUTURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {44-58}, keywords = {epistemology, future, knowledge, prediction, scepticism, verification}, abstract = {I DEFEND A POSITION THAT COMBINES KNOWLEDGE OF THE FUTURE WITH A ROBUST SENSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EVENTS SURPRISING OUR BEST JUSTIFIED EXPECTATIONS. THE SCEPTICAL ARGUMENT ALLUDES TO FUTURE POSSIBILITIES REFUTING OUR KNOWLEDGE; I ATTACK SEVERAL POPULAR BUT PERNICIOUS ANTISCEPTICAL RESPONSES. I ARGUE AGAINST THE CLAIM THAT IT MAKES NO SENSE TO ENTERTAIN THE SCEPTIC'S POSSIBILITIES. IN ANALYZING AUSTIN'S ACCOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE, I ARGUE THAT HIS PERFORMATIVE ANALYSIS WRONGLY MAKES KNOWLEDGE COMPATIBLE WITH ACTUALLY BEING WRONG, WHEREAS THE CORRECT RESPONSE TO THE SCEPTIC IS THAT KNOWLEDGE IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING WRONG.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FISHER1963, author = {FISHER, MARK}, title = {CATEGORY-ABSURDITIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {260-267}, keywords = {absurdity, category, grammar, language, metaphor, modality, necessity, rule}, abstract = {IT IS MAINTAINED THAT TO SHOW A STATEMENT TO BE ABSURD, ONE SHOWS THAT IT CAN'T BE TRUE, THAT IT IS NECESSARILY FALSE, FOR A PARTICULAR KIND OF REASON. SOMETIMES CATEGORY-ABSURDITIES ARISE BECAUSE LINGUISTIC RULES ARE BROKEN. THE AUTHOR HOLDS THAT ONE CAN SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF WHAT MAKES CATEGORY-MISTAKES MISTAKES WITHOUT MENTIONING MEANING AT ALL. THEN ONE CAN GO ON TO DISCUSS THE DIFFERENT KIND OF ERROR THAT ARISES WHEN MEANING RULES ARE IGNORED. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fitch1996, author = {Fitch, G-W}, title = {Representing Beliefs}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {597-609}, keywords = {action, argument, belief, epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FITCH1984, author = {FITCH, G-W}, title = {TWO ASPECTS OF BELIEF.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {87-102}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, indexical}, abstract = {THE ANALYSIS OF PROPER NAMES IN BELIEF CONTEXTS HAS BEEN A CONSTANT SOURCE OF DIFFICULTY FOR THOSE WHO HAVE ADOPTED THE DIRECT REFERENCE THEORY FOR NAMES. IT IS ARGUED THAT THE PROBLEM DOES NOT REST UPON THE DIRECT REFERENCE THEORY, BUT RATHER LIES WITH THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF BELIEF. AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF BELIEVING MOTIVATED IN PART BY RECENT WORK ON BELIEF AND INDEXICALS IS OFFERED THAT SOLVES THE PROBLEMS FOR NAMES IN BELIEF CONTEXTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FLAGE1985, author = {FLAGE, DANIEL-E}, title = {BERKELEY'S NOTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {407-426}, keywords = {causality, metaphysics, notion, perception, relation}, abstract = {THE PAPER EXAMINES THE EPISTEMIC FUNCTION OF BERKELEIAN NOTIONS. BEGINNING WITH AN ELUCIDATION OF BERKELEY'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN POSITIVE AND RELATIVE NOTIONS, IT IS ARGUED THAT RELATIVE NOTIONS FUNCTION IN THE COGNITIVE REALM IN A MANNER ANALOGOUS TO DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS. IT IS SHOWN THAT THIS MODEL OF RELATIVE NOTIONS IS CONSISTENT WITH BERKELEY'S ACCOUNTS OF ONE'S NOTIONS OF SUBSTANCE AND OF RELATIONS AMONG IDEAS, PROVIDED ONE ALLOWS THAT ONE HAS POSITIVE NOTIONS OF THE RELATIONS OF PERCEPTION AND CAUSATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Fleishacker1994, author = {Fleishacker, Samuel}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {233-235}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Ethics of Culture}, volume = {57(1)}, year = {1994} } @article{Floridi1996, author = {Floridi, Luciano}, title = {Followers of French Fashions: Neo-Cartesianism and Analytic Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {633-639}, keywords = {analytic, cartesianism, epistemology, french}, abstract = {This is a discussion of Susan Haack's epistemology, as it is outlined in her book Evidence and Inquiry. Haack explicitly characterises her foundherentism as a moderate form of Cartesianism in which rationalist or a priori solutions of the sceptical challenge are declined. The question then becomes whether a purely empirical, neo-Cartesian approach to epistemology (the withdrawal from the a priori) may be successfully antisceptical. As a theory of epistemic justification, foundherentism faces the fundamental thread of vicious circularity. In two occasions Haack argues that foundherentism can solve the metaepistemological problem of its own justification. In this article I explain why we should be rather more pessimistic.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Floridi2005, author = {Floridi, Luciano}, title = {Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {351-370}, keywords = {data, information, language, meaning, semantics}, abstract = {There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticizing and revising the standard definition of semantic information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favor of the Dretske-Grice approach: meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticized for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information, and misinformation (that is, false semantic information) is not a type of semantic information, but pseudoinformation, that is not semantic information at all. This is shown by arguing that none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing, whilst there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudoinformation. As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth-condition. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Floridi1996a, author = {Floridi, Luciano}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {711-714}, publisher = {E J Brill}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Scepticism and the Foundation of Epistemology: A Study in the Metalogical Fallacies}, volume = {61(3)}, year = {1996} } @article{Fodor2001, author = {Fodor, Jerry-A}, title = {Brandom's Burdens: Compositionality and Inferentialism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {465-481}, keywords = {composition, inference, language, pragmatism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FODOR1989, author = {FODOR, JERRY}, title = {"REMNANTS OF MEANING" BY STEPHEN SCHIFFER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {409-423}, keywords = {intention, language, meaning, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FODOR1981, author = {FODOR, JERRY-A}, title = {REPLY TO PROFESSOR ZAITCHIK ON PHYSICALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {292-293}, keywords = {intensionalism, metaphysics, representationalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fodor1994, author = {Fodor, Jerry-A and Lepore, Ernie}, title = {What "Is" The Connection Principle?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {837-845}, keywords = {connectionism, consciousness, intentionality, language, linguistics, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fogelin2004, author = {Fogelin, Robert-J}, title = {Stroud's Quest for Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {401-407}, keywords = {belief, color, error, metaphysics, reality}, abstract = {In The Quest for Reality Stroud defends the thesis that "we cannot get into a position to ask the metaphysical question about the reality of color in the right way (page 206)." Setting aside his extensive criticisms of secondary quality theories, I concentrate on Stroud's reasons for this strong and remarkable claim. His argument, I maintain, is based on four commitments: (1) a demand for an explanation of the seeming reality of colors, (2) a principle of charity concerning belief ascription, (3) a variant of the private language argument, and (4) a rejection of the principle of charity concerning truth.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fogelin1997, author = {Fogelin, Robert-J}, title = {Precis of Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {395-400}, keywords = {epistemology, justification, knowledge, pyrrhonism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fogelin1997a, author = {Fogelin, Robert-J}, title = {What Does a Pyrrhonist Know?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {417-425}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, pyrrhonism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FOGELIN1984, author = {FOGELIN, ROBERT-J}, title = {HUME AND THE MISSING SHADE OF BLUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {263-272}, keywords = {cognition, epistemology, idea, perception}, abstract = {THIS ESSAY ADDRESSES TWO QUESTIONS: (I) WHY DID HUME THINK THE IMAGINATION COULD SUPPLY THE MISSING SHADE OF BLUE? AND (II) WHY WAS HE UNDISTURBED BY THIS COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO HIS POSITION? IN ANSWERING THE FIRST QUESTION I ARGUE THAT HUME HELD THAT COLORS FORM A HIGHLY STRUCTURED INTERNALLY RELATED FIELD. THIS STRUCTURE PROVIDES THE BACKGROUND FOR SUPPLYING THE MISSING SHADE. I ANSWER THE SECOND QUESTION BY NOTING THAT NO SUCH CORRESPONDING BACKGROUND FIELDS EXIST FOR THE CONCEPTS HUME INVESTIGATES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Foley1994, author = {Foley, Richard}, title = {How Should Future Opinion Affect Current Opinion?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {747-766}, keywords = {experience, future, metaphysics, opinion, perception}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Foley2001, author = {Foley, Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {724-734}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others}, volume = {68(3)}, year = {2001} } @article{FOLLESDAL1990, author = {FOLLESDAL, Dagfinn}, title = {Noema and Meaning in Husserl.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {meaning, metaphysics, noema}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FONTAINE1968, author = {FONTAINE, WILLIAM-T}, title = {JOSIAH ROYCE AND THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {282-288}, keywords = {american, negro, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FORD1974, author = {FORD, LEWIS-S}, title = {THE DURATION OF THE PRESENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {100-106}, keywords = {duration, metaphysics, present, time}, abstract = {RICHARD M GALE ("NOUS" VOLUME 5, NUMBER 1, FEBRUARY, 1971, PAGES 39-47) ARGUES THAT THE DURATIONAL PRESENT CAN ALWAYS BE INTERPRETED IN TERMS OF THE PUNCTUAL PRESENT AS OCCURRING FROM SOME 'PAST' TIME UP UNTIL THE PUNCTUAL PRESENT. THIS IS TRUE IF EVENTS ONLY OCCUR BUT DO NOT ALSO COME INTO BEING. THE PUNCTUAL PRESENT ONLY DIVIDES THOSE EVENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN FROM THOSE THAT HAVE NOT, IGNORING THE DURATIONAL PRESENT IN WHICH EVENTS COME INTO BEING. IN THAT PRESENT CO-PRESENT MOMENTS NEED NOT BE SIMULTANEOUS; EARLIER AND LATER MOMENTS MAY BELONG TO THE SAME PRESENT. SUBSTANCES COME INTO BEING BY THE OCCURRING OF EVENTS. OCCURRING IS THE BEING OF EVENTS; DO EVENTS ALSO COME INTO BEING? IF SO, THEIR BECOMING CANNOT BE EXPLAINED BY ANY OTHER INITIATING EVENT WITHOUT INVOKING A VISIOUS REGRESS. GALE'S CRITICISM OF THIS ARGUMENT IMPLICITLY CONSTRUES IT IN TERMS OF OCCURRING RATHER THAN BECOMING; AS SIMPLY ARGUING THE LATTER HALF OF AN EVENT CANNOT OCCUR BEFORE THE EARLIER HALF. BUT IF EVENTS MERELY OCCUR AND DO NOT BECOME, THEN THERE IS NO INDETERMINATE FUTURE WE CAN RENDER DETERMINATE IN FREEDOM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FORD1970, author = {FORD, LEWIS-S}, title = {ON SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH WHITEHEAD'S DEFINITION OF ABSTRACTIVE HIERARCHIES}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {453-454}, keywords = {metaphysics}, abstract = {GEORGE W. ROBERTS (PPR 28, 437-9) AND VERNON M. ROOT (PPR 14, 198-9) DETECT AN INCONSISTENCY IN WHITEHEAD'S DEFINITION OF A FINITE ABSTRACTIVE HIERARCHY (GIVEN IN 'SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD', PP. 241F), BECAUSE THEY ASSUME THAT A "SET" MAY HAVE ONLY ONE MEMBER. BUT WHITEHEAD CLEARLY HAS IN MIND A MULTIPLICITY, THAT IS, A SET HAVING AT LEAST TWO MEMBERS, AND ON THIS BASIS THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY DISAPPEARS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FORREST1991, author = {FORREST, Peter}, title = {Aesthetic Understanding.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {aesthetics, intelligibility, meaning, religion, theism, understanding}, abstract = {In this paper I defend aesthetic understanding, which occurs when we understand by being aware of the aesthetic value of things. I defend aesthetic understanding partly because I would like to spread doubt where we are too complacent. And one of the areas in which there is complacency is, I suspect, the whole topic of understanding. I suggest that we have many different modes of understanding not just one or two. In addition, I am interested in aesthetic understanding because it could be described as a religious attitude, even in the absence of religious beliefs.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Forrest2005, author = {Forrest, Peter}, title = {Universals As Sense-Data}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {622-631}, keywords = {epistemology, ontology, platonism, scepticism, sense-data; trope, universal}, abstract = {This paper concerns the structure of appearances. I argue that to be appeared to in a certain way is to be aware of one or more universals. Universals therefore function like the sense-data, once highly favoured but now out of fashion. For instance, to be appeared to treely, in a visual way, is to be aware of the complex relation, being tree-shaped and tree-coloured and being in front of, a relation of a kind which could be instantiated by a material object and a perceiver, which is thus instantiated in the veridical case but not in the nonveridical.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Forster1998, author = {Forster, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {476-478}, publisher = {Univ of Chicago Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit}, volume = {65(2)}, year = {1998} } @article{Forster1992, author = {Forster, Paul}, title = {What Is at Stake Between Putnam and Rorty?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {585-603}, keywords = {epistemology, pragmaticism, relativism, truth}, abstract = {This paper examines the debate between Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty. Rorty's pragmatism is defended from Putnam's objection that it is a form of self-refuting relativism, and is also shown to be immune from difficulties with Putnam's limit theory of truth. The central argument is based on Rorty's view of interpretation.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Foster1994, author = {Foster, John}, title = {In Defence of Phenomenalistic Idealism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {509-529}, keywords = {god, idealism, knowledge, metaphysics, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Foster1991, author = {Foster, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {489-491}, publisher = {Routledge}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind}, volume = {54(2)}, year = {1991} } @article{FOSTER1988, author = {FOSTER, LAWRENCE}, title = {STRONG RELATIVISM REVISITED.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {145-150}, keywords = {constructionalism, metaphysics, relativism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FOSTER1971, author = {FOSTER, LEWIS-A}, title = {FATALISM AND PRECOGNITION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {341-351}, keywords = {epistemology, fatalism, precognition}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FOTI1986, author = {FOTI, VERONIQUE}, title = {THE CARTESIAN IMAGINATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {631-642}, keywords = {imagination, language, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FOX1976, author = {FOX, MICHAEL}, title = {UNCONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR MULLANE'S "UNCONSCIOUS AND DISGUISED EMOTIONS".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {412-414}, keywords = {emotion, epistemology, unconscious}, abstract = {IN THIS REPLY, I RE-EXAMINE AND DEFEND A NONDISPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT OF PSYCHOANALYSTS' ASCRIPTIONS OF UNCONSCIOUS EMOTIONS AS AGAINST THE DISPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT OFFERED BY PROFESSOR MULLANE. WHEREAS MULLANE CONTENDS THAT AN EXPERIENCED EMOTION CANNOT BE "UNCONSCIOUS" IN THE PSYCHOANALYTIC SENSE, I ARGUE THAT AN UNCONSCIOUS EMOTION IS PRECISELY ONE WHICH IS BOTH EXPERIENCED (OCCURRENT) AND DISGUISED. FOR WE CAN ONLY EXPLAIN THE THERAPEUTIC PHENOMENA OF SELF-DECEPTION, EMOTIONAL CONFLICT, AND AVOWALS OF "HARBORED FEELINGS" IF WE VIEW UNCONSCIOUS EMOTIONS IN THIS WAY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FOX1973, author = {FOX, MICHAEL}, title = {ON UNCONSCIOUS EMOTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {151-170}, keywords = {anxiety, emotion, epistemology, philosophical-anthropology; self-deception; unconscious}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE IS A CRITIQUE OF THE DISPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS OF UNCONSCIOUS EMOTIONS, FAVORED BY MANY RECENT CRITICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THAT OFFERED BY HARVEY MULLANE IN "UNCONSCIOUS EMOTIONS," "THEORIA," 31 (1965), 181-190. IT IS ARGUED THAT WHAT FREUD DESIGNATED AS 'UNCONSCIOUS EMOTIONS' ARE 'NOT' THE OBJECTIONABLE 'UNFELT FEELINGS' WHICH DISPOSITIONAL THEORISTS SUPPOSE, BUT RATHER, 'PRESENTLY EXPERIENCED' STATES, WHICH MUST BE CONCEPTUALIZED AS SELF-DECEIVINGLY MISDESCRIBED OR MISREPRESENTED BY THE PATIENT TO HIMSELF. SUPPORT FOR THIS VIEW IS FOUND BOTH IN FREUD'S OWN WORDS AND IN AN EXTENSIVE ANALYSIS OF MULLANE'S EXAMPLES. FINALLY, IT IS MAINTAINED THAT ONLY IN THE CASE OF HYSTERICAL CONVERSION ARE WE (LOGICALLY) REQUIRED TO RESORT TO A DISPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS OF PSYCHOANALYTIC STATEMENTS ABOUT UNCONSCIOUS EMOTIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FRANCE1976, author = {FRANCE, M-N}, title = {METALANGUAGE AND CATEGORY ACQUISITION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {165-180}, keywords = {category, communication, epistemology, language, learning, metalanguage}, abstract = {UNLESS A BABY HAS INNATE KNOWLEDGE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ACCOUNT FOR HIS ABILITY TO USE CERTAIN CATEGORIES, SUCH AS 'AGENT', 'PLACE', 'OBJECT' OR 'SELF', FOR WHICH THERE ARE NO OBJECTIVE DETERMINING CRITERIA. THIS PAPER POINTS OUT THAT ALL ACTS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PERSONS HAVE A METALINGUISTIC FUNCTION, OFTEN CONVEYED BY NON-VERBAL MEANS. ADDRESSED TO ADULTS, METALANGUAGE INDICATES THE APPROPRIATE CATEGORIES IN WHICH LISTENERS MAY CONSTRUE WHAT IS SAID. ADDRESSED TO VERY YOUNG CHILDREN, IT MAY ESTABLISH THE CATEGORIES AND SHOW HOW THEY SHOULD BE APPLIED. WE HAVE NO NEED FOR A RATIONALIST EXPLANATION OF CATEGORY ACQUISITION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FRANKENA1966, author = {FRANKENA, WILLIAM-K}, title = {J D WILD ON RESPONSIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {90-96}, keywords = {assumption, causation, condition, determinism, free-will; metaphysics, phenomenology, responsibility}, abstract = {WILD ARGUES THAT RESPONSIBILITY IS IDENTIFIED WITH A CERTAIN TYPE OF CAUSATION, INTERNAL CAUSATION, AND THAT TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SOMETHING IS TO BE ITS CAUSE. FRANKENA THINKS THIS IS ONLY PARTIALLY TRUE, AND THAT IT IS ONLY ASSUMED THAT X'S CAUSING Y IS A NECESSARY CONDITION OF X'S BEING HELD TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR Y, BUT NOT A SUFFICIENT CONDITION. MOREOVER, HE THINKS WILD MISTAKEN IN BELIEVING THAT EVERYONE IDENTIFIES RESPONSIBILITY WITH CAUSATION. FRANKENA AGREES WITH WILD, THAT NO ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO MERE ASSERTIONS OR DENIALS OF CAUSAL CONNECTIONS; NEVERTHELESS, HE DOES NOT THINK IT HAS REALLY BEEN ESTABLISHED. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FRANKENA1966a, author = {FRANKENA, WILLIAM-K}, title = {REPLY TO PROFESSOR WILD'S "REPLY TO PROFESSOR FRANKENA".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {103}, keywords = {causation, determinism, metaphysics, responsibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FRANKFURT1984, author = {FRANKFURT, HARRY-G}, title = {NECESSITY AND DESIRE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {1-14}, keywords = {desire, metaphysics, need}, abstract = {THIS ESSAY IS DEVOTED TO A PRELIMINARY EXPLORATION OF THE CONCEPT OF NEED. IT IS CONCERNED PARTICULARLY TO DETERMINE UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS IT IS REASONABLE TO SUPPOSE THAT A NEED FOR SOMETHING TAKES MORAL PRECEDENCE OVER A DESIRE FOR THAT THING. THIS LEADS TO AN ANALYSIS OF THE KIND OF NECESSITY A NEED MUST INVOLVE IF IT IS TO ENJOY THIS MORAL PRECEDENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FRANKLIN1984, author = {FRANKLIN, JAMES}, title = {NATURAL SCIENCES AS TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION: THE HERMENEUTICS OF THE NATURAL SIGN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {509-520}, keywords = {hermeneutics, methodology, natural-sciences; science}, abstract = {I DISCUSS THE PARALLELS BETWEEN PERCEPTION, THE "INTERPRETATION OF SENSORY EXPERIENCE AS REPRESENTING PHYSICAL OBJECTS," AND HERMENEUTICS, THE "INTERPRETATION OF SIGNS AS HAVING MEANING" (AND ASSERT THE TWO ARE "RADICALLY IDENTICAL," BUT THIS NEED NOT BE TAKEN LITERALLY). PERCEPTUAL ILLUSIONS ARE COMPARED TO AMBIGUITIES IN A TEXT, NAIVE REALISM ABOUT PERCEPTION TO FUNDAMENTALISM, THE SCIENTIST'S REINTERPRETATION OF THE "MANIFEST IMAGE" OF THE WORLD TO THE GLOBAL/LOCAL INTERPLAY IN THE EXEGESIS OF LARGE TEXTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FRANKLIN1983, author = {FRANKLIN, R-L}, title = {ON UNDERSTANDING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {307-328}, keywords = {concept, epistemology, ordinary-language; understanding}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FRENCH1983, author = {FRENCH, PETER-A}, title = {KINDS AND PERSONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {241-254}, keywords = {ethics, metaphysics, person}, abstract = {"PERSON" IS NOT A NATURAL KIND TERM NOR DOES IT HAVE, AS WIGGINS SUGGESTS, A NATURAL KIND ELEMENT. PERSON MIGHT BE A PURELY CONVENTIONAL NOTION AND ENTRY INTO THE CLASS OF PERSONS GOVERNED ONLY BY SOCIAL OR POLITICAL LEGISLATION. THAT IS UNACCEPTABLE, SO A LESS ARBITRARY ACCOUNT OF THE ENTRY REQUIREMENTS INTO THE KIND IS PROVIDED. THE OUTCOME IS THAT "PERSON" NAMES A KIND INTO WHICH MORE THAN HUMAN BEINGS MAY BE ADMITTED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FREY1978, author = {FREY, R-G}, title = {CAUSAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTRIBUTORY CAUSATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {39}, pages = {106-119}, keywords = {causality, duty, ethics, lying, responsibility}, abstract = {I HERE EXPLORE SOME OF THE MERITS AND DEMERITS FOR A PARTICULAR SORT OF CASE OF USING A CONTRIBUTORY THEORY OF CAUSATION, FIRST, AS A MEANS OF UNPACKING THE NOTION OF 'A PART CAUSE' OF SOME EFFECT, AND SECOND, AS A MEANS OF DETERMINING THE DEGREE OF CAUSAL RESPONSIBILITY THAT EACH OF THE PART CAUSES BEARS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF THAT EFFECT. I DEVELOP THESE MERITS AND DEMERITS, AND AT THE SAME TIME ILLUSTRATE THE SORT OF CASE TO WHICH MY DISCUSSION OF CONTRIBUTORY CAUSATION APPLIES, BY MEANS OF A WELL-KNOWN EXAMPLE OF KANT'S, WHOSE TREATMENT OF WHICH I REJECT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Friedman2001, author = {Friedman, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {702-712}, publisher = {CSLI Publications}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Dynamics of Reason: The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University}, volume = {68(3)}, year = {2001} } @article{FRIQUEGNON1972, author = {FRIQUEGNON, MARIE-LOUISE}, title = {THE PARADOXES OF DETERMINISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {112-116}, keywords = {determinism, fatalism, metaphysics, paradox}, abstract = {SOFT DETERMINISM, HARD DETERMINISM AND ANIMISTIC FATALISM ARE USUALLY RANKED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF CREDIBILITY. I ARGUE THAT THE CORRECT ORDER IS THE REVERSE. SOFT DETERMINISM IS SHOWN TO ENGENDER A CONTRADICTION, HARD DETERMINISM IS SHOWN TO BE UNACCEPTABLY IMPLAUSIBLE, AND ANIMISTIC FATALISM IS SHOWN TO REQUIRE SUPERNATURAL INDETERMINISM TO SUPPORT ITS CLAIMS ABOUT NATURAL FATALISM, AND THUS TO BE SELF-DEFEATING. THE FINAL CONCLUSION DRAWN IS THAT HUMANISTIC VOLUNTARISM IS THE ONLY PLAUSIBLE ALTERNATIVE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FRIQUEGNON1974, author = {FRIQUEGNON, MARIE-LOUISE}, title = {PURSUING PARADOX.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {275-276}, keywords = {determinism, freedom, metaphysics, paradox}, abstract = {"PURSUING PARADOX" IS A DEFENSE OF AN EARLIER PAPER, "THE PARADOXES OF DETERMINISM," AGAINST RECENT CRITICISMS BY R YOUNG AND C SMITH. BOTH CRITICIZED MY DEMONSTRATION THAT SOFT DETERMINISM ENTAILS THAT ONE CAN KNOW AND YET NOT KNOW THE SAME FUTURE FACT. THE REPLY TO YOUNG'S OBJECTION, THAT MY CONCLUSION VIOLATES THE LAW OF NON-CONTRADICTION, IS THAT THAT IS JUST THE POINT OF A "REDUCTIO ABSURDUM" ARGUMENT. IN REPLY TO SMITH'S OBJECTION, THAT, IF THE KNOWLEDGE OPERATOR IS "FLAGGED" I.E., IF WE DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TWO SENSES OF "KNOW" THEN THE PARADOX IS AVERTED, IT IS ARGUED THAT SMITH'S PROPOSAL CONFUSES THE KIND OF FACT KNOWN WITH THE MEANING OF THE WORD "KNOW," AND THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE MEANING OF "KNOW" HERE INVOLVED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FRITZ-JR1960, author = {FRITZ-JR, CHARLES-A}, title = {CONTEXTUAL PROPERTIES AND PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {338-351}, keywords = {context, epistemology, experience, object, perception, property, realism, relativity, subjectivity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FUCHS1976, author = {FUCHS, ALAN-E}, title = {THE PRODUCTION OF PLEASURE BY STIMULATION OF THE BRAIN: AN ALLEGED CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {494-505}, keywords = {brain, epistemology, pleasure, sensation, stimulation}, abstract = {PUCCETTI AND SOME SCIENTISTS CLAIM THAT PURE SENSATIONS OF PLEASURE HAVE BEEN PRODUCED BY DIRECT STIMULATION OF THE BRAIN. THIS RESULT APPARENTLY CONTRADICTS THE CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS WHICH SHOW THAT PLEASURE IS NOT A SENSATION. I ARGUE THAT THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. THE APPEARANCE OF DISAGREEMENT IS DUE TO THE SCIENTISTS' FAILURE TO FULLY UNDERSTAND THE RELEVANT PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS, THEIR FAILURE TO MAKE SEVERAL ESSENTIAL CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS, AND THEIR MISREPRESENTATION OF THE ACTUAL EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE. I BRIEFLY COMMENT ON EACH OF THESE ISSUES SO AS TO POINT OUT THE HARMONY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS WITH THE SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fumerton2001, author = {Fumerton, Richard}, title = {Brewer, Direct Realism, and Acquaintance with Acquaintance}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {417-422}, keywords = {acquaintance, epistemology, knowledge, realism}, abstract = {Part of a book symposium, this paper is a critical evaluation of some of the main positions defended by Bill Brewer in his book Perception and Reason.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fumerton2002, author = {Fumerton, Richard}, title = {Exemplarizing and Self-Presenting States}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {431-435}, keywords = {epistemology, exemplarism, knowledge, representation, self, state}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fumerton2003, author = {Fumerton, Richard}, title = {Audi on Rationality: Background Beliefs, Arational Enjoyment, and the Rationality of Altruism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {188-193}, keywords = {altruism, belief, enjoyment, epistemology, rationality}, abstract = {With his characteristic clarity, rigor, sophistication, and phenomenological subtlety, Audi presents a rich, plausible, and comprehensive overview of the structure of both theoretical (epistemic) and practical rationality. After suggesting an alternative to Audi's way of looking at the relationship between epistemic and theoretical rationality, I will focus on two main issues. The first concerns Audi's criticism of traditional versions of foundationalism. The second concerns the relationship between Audi's view and the Humean view that he opposes, his conception of the grounds of rational desire, and the way in which those grounds figure in an account of the rationality of altruism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FUMERTON1983, author = {FUMERTON, RICHARD-A}, title = {THE PARADOX OF ANALYSIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {477-498}, keywords = {language, linguistic-analysis; meaning, paradox-of-analysi}, abstract = {IN THIS PAPER I TRY TO ANSWER THE QUESTION OF HOW PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS CAN BE SIGNIFICANT OR DIFFICULT WHEN BEING COMPETENT TO FIND A CORRECT ANALYSIS SEEMS TO PRESUPPOSE A PRIOR UNDERSTANDING OF THAT WHICH IS ANALYZED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fumerton1998, author = {Fumerton, Richard}, title = {Precis of Metaepistemology and Skepticism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {905-906}, keywords = {epistemology, externalism, metatheory, scepticism}, abstract = {This is a brief outline of my recent book, Metaepistemology and Skepticism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fumerton1998a, author = {Fumerton, Richard}, title = {Replies to My Three Critics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {927-937}, keywords = {epistemology, normativity, scepticism}, abstract = {A response to Hookway's, Cohen's, and Klein's critical evaluation of my recent book Metaepistemology and Skepticism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fumerton2000, author = {Fumerton, Richard}, title = {Williamson on Skepticism and Evidence}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {629-635}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FURLONG1988, author = {FURLONG, JOHN}, title = {SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY AS HERMENEUTICS: RORTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {489-503}, keywords = {hermeneutics, metaphysics, psychology}, abstract = {RICHARD RORTY'S VIEW OF THE NATURE OF MIND SUFFERS FROM THE TENSION BETWEEN HIS STRATEGY OF HERMENEUTICIZING EPISTEMOLOGY AND HIS LOCAL TACTIC OF REPLACING FOLK PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS WITH A SCIENTIFIC TAXONOMY. STRATEGICALLY, RORTY WILL SAY, SCIENCE IS JUST ONE OF A NUMBER OF WELL-ENTRENCHED PRACTICES, NONE OF WHICH EXCEEDS THE OTHER IN ILLUMINATING THE TRUTH OF THINGS OR FACTS OF THE MATTER, SINCE THERE ARE NO SUCH TRUTHS OR FACTS. THIS "PRAGMATIC" OR "HOLIST" APPROACH SHOULD LEAD ONE TO EXPECT RORTY, AT THE LOCAL, TACTICAL LEVEL, TO BE SUITABLY SOFT--NONREDUCTIONIST, TOLERANT OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY, AND NEUTRAL REGARDING VERSIONS OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM. YET HE IS A SELF-CONFESSED FUNCTIONALIST AND ELIMINATIVIST. SUCH A "HARD" LOCAL VIEW, IT IS ARGUED, IS INCONSISTENT WITH RORTY'S "SOFT" STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURE AND BODES ILL FOR ANY COMMENSURATION BETWEEN "HOLIST" AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL FUNCTIONALIST POSITIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GAHRINGER1968, author = {GAHRINGER, ROBERT-E}, title = {OBSERVATIONS ON A PROGRAMMED COURSE IN LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {292-294}, keywords = {logic}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GALE1961, author = {GALE, RICHARD-M}, title = {PROFESSOR DUCASSE ON DETERMINISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {92-96}, keywords = {causality, determinism, event, metaphysics, uniformity, universality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gale1999, author = {Gale, Richard-M}, title = {William James and the Willfulness of Belief}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {71-91}, keywords = {action, belief, metaphysics, syllogism, will}, abstract = {It was important to James's philosophy, especially his doctrine of the will to believe, that we could believe at will. Toward this end he argues in The Principles of Psychology that attending to an idea is identical with believing it, which, in turn, is identical with willing that it be realized. Since willing is identical with believing and willing is an intentional action, it follows by Leibniz's Law that believing also is an intentional action. This paper explores the problems with James's thesis that attending-will-belief. An attempt is made to show that it has a salvageable core that is of considerable philosophical interest and importance.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GALE1964, author = {GALE, RICHARD-M}, title = {A REPLY ON THE ALLEGED FUTURITY OF YESTERDAY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {421-422}, keywords = {common-sense; future, history, meaning, methodology, ordinary-language; past}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GALE1962, author = {GALE, RICHARD-M}, title = {DEWEY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE ALLEGED FUTURITY OF YESTERDAY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {501-511}, keywords = {consequence, epistemology, future, knowledge, meaning, past, pragmatism, truth, verifiability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GALE1960, author = {GALE, RICHARD-M}, title = {NATURAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {521-531}, keywords = {ground, metaethics, metaphysics, natural-law; political-philosophy; purpose, right}, abstract = {A DISTINCTION IS DRAWN BETWEEN THE PURPOSE OF NATURAL LAW, WHICH IS THAT OF SUPPORTING A SET OF HUMAN RIGHTS THAT ARE POLITICALLY BASIC, AND, NATURAL LAW AS THE METAPHYSICAL OR META-ETHICAL GROUND FOR THIS NORMATIVE BELIEF IN HUMAN RIGHTS. THE ARTICLE ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT THE META-ETHICAL CONCEPT OF NATURAL LAW IS MOST UNFORTUNATE AND SHOULD BE DISPENSED WITH. IN REJECTING NATURAL LAW ONE IS NOT DISCARDING EVERYTHING, BECAUSE HUMAN RIGHTS AS A PIECE OF NORMATIVE ETHICS CAN BE SUPPORTED BY OTHER META-ETHICAL POSITIONS. IN CONCLUSION, THERE ARE OTHER WAYS OF DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS THAN BY TELLING MYTHS OR FAIRY TALES, AS DO THE DEFENDERS OF NATURAL LAW. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gale1994, author = {Gale, Richard}, title = {Why Alston's Mystical Doxastic Practice Is Subjective}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {869-875}, keywords = {existence, god, religion, subjectivism}, abstract = {William Alston argues in his "Perceiving God" that the doxastic practice of taking experiential inputs of apparent direct perceptions of God as giving prima facie justification, subject to defeat by overriders, for belief outputs that God exists and is as he presents himself is a reliable, cognitive practice. This paper argues that the practice is not cognitive, because its experiential inputs have cognate accusatives.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GALE1977, author = {GALE, RICHARD-M}, title = {A REPLY TO MR OAKLANDER'S "THE 'TIMELESSNESS' OF TIME".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {234-238}, keywords = {language, time}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Gale1999a, author = {Gale, Richard-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {491-494}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Divided Self of William James}, volume = {64(2)}, year = {1999} } @other{Gale1991, author = {Gale, Richard-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {950-954}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {On the Nature and Existence of God}, volume = {53(4)}, year = {1991} } @article{GALLAGHER1985, author = {GALLAGHER, KENNETH-T}, title = {RORTY'S ANTIPODEANS: AN IMPOSSIBLE ILLUSTRATION?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {449-456}, keywords = {cartesianism, dualism, materialism, metaphysics}, abstract = {RICHARD RORTY IN "PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE" ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT OUR USE OF MENTALIST PREDICATES IS NOT INDISPENSABLE BY IMAGINING A RACE OF PEOPLE (ANTIPODEANS) WHO GET ALONG PERFECTLY WELL WITHOUT THEM. THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT HIS ILLUSTRATION IS INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT AND HENCE THAT IT CANNOT PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR HIS MATERIALIST THESIS. (RORTY BASES THE NON-MENTALIST LANGUAGE OF THESE BEINGS ON THEIR ADVANCED "SCIENCE," BUT NEITHER IN RESPECT TO "PAIN" NOR "THOUGHT," THE TWO AREAS OF HIS CONCERN, COULD THEIR PURPORTED ABILITY BE ACQUIRED AS HE SUGGESTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GALLAGHER1976, author = {GALLAGHER, NEIL}, title = {A PLEA TO STOP DREAMING ABOUT DREAMING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {423-424}, keywords = {dreaming, epistemology}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE SHOWS THAT ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH CRITERIA FOR DREAMING/WAKING STATES ARE FUTILE. THE ARTICLE EXAMINES TWO POSSIBLE STATES OF MIND WITH ACCOMPANYING VARIATIONS: (A) SUBJECT IN DREAM STATE CONCLUDES THAT 'FEELING A PINCH' (FOR EXAMPLE) ESTABLISHES A WAKING STATE AND NOT FEELING A PINCH, A DREAMING STATE. (A-A) SUBJECT IN DREAM STATE CONCLUDES THAT FEELING A PINCH ESTABLISHES A DREAMING STATE AND NOT FEELING A PINCH, A WAKING STATE. (B) SUBJECT IN WAKING STATE CONCLUDES THAT FEELING A PINCH ESTABLISHES A WAKING STATE AND NOT FEELING A PINCH, A DREAMING STATE. (B-B) SUBJECT IN WAKING STATE CONCLUDES THAT FEELING A PINCH ESTABLISHES A DREAMING STATE AND NOT FEELING A PINCH A WAKING STATE. I SHOW THAT IN NO CASE DOES THE CONCLUSION ESTABLISHED BY THE SUBJECT TELL US IN WHAT STATE OF MIND HE WAS IN WHEN HE ESTABLISHED HIS CONCLUSION FOR DREAMING/WAKING CRITERIA. THE POINT: A STATE OF MIND CANNOT VERIFY ITSELF. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES THAT, "CONTINUING TO PURSUE THE PROBLEM OF DREAMING/WAKING CRITERIA (LIKE THE PROBLEMS OF MEMORY CRITERIA AND PERCEPTION CRITERIA) MAY BE INTERESTING AND IRRESISTIBLE BUT WILL REMAIN FRUITLESS."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gallois2004, author = {Gallois, Andre}, title = {Comments on Ted Sider: Four Dimensionalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {648-657}, keywords = {identity, mereology, metaphysics, presentism, supervenience}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Galloway1999, author = {Galloway, David}, title = {Seeing Sequences}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {93-112}, keywords = {intuition, logic, mathematics, perception}, abstract = {This article discusses Charles Parsons's conception of mathematical intuition. Intuition, for Parsons, involves seeing-as.... The type is abstract, but intuiting the type is supposed to be epistemically analogous to ordinary perception of physical objects. And some nontrivial mathematical knowledge is supposed to be intuitable in this way, again in a way analogous to ordinary perceptual knowledge. In particular, the successor axioms are supposed to be knowable intuitively. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GALLOWAY1977, author = {GALLOWAY, JOSEPH-W}, title = {ON JOHNSTONE'S 'PHENOMENOLOGY OF DEATH' AND 'PHILOSOPHY OF SLEEP'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {107-113}, keywords = {consciousness, death, phenomenology, philosophical-anthropology; sleep}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GANDHI1973, author = {GANDHI, RAMCHANDRA}, title = {INJURY, HARM, DAMAGE, PAIN, ETC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {266-269}, keywords = {ethics, humanism, value}, abstract = {THE MAIN ARGUMENT OF THIS PAPER IS THAT IN SO FAR AS HUMAN BEINGS ARE SELFCONSCIOUS CREATURES, THEY MUST LOGICALLY NECESSARILY REGARD THEMSELVES AS BEING MINIMALLY VALUABLE, AS UNCONDITIONALLY DESERVING TO BE SET IN A MINIMALLY HOSPITABLE HUMAN AND NATURAL ENVIRONMENT. BUT THEY ARE NOT, AS A MATTER OF FACT, SET IN AN UNFAILINGLY MINIMALLY HOSPITABLE ENVIRONMENT. IT IS THIS FACT WHICH RESULTS IN THE FORMATION OF THE CATEGORY OF THE 'UNACCEPTABLE'. THE CONCEPTS OF INJURY, HARM, DAMAGE, PAIN, ETC., ARE EXPLICATIONS OF THIS CATEGORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ganeri2000, author = {Ganeri, Jonardon}, title = {Cross-Modality and the Self}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(3)}, pages = {639-657}, keywords = {existence, intention, metaphysics, modality, self}, abstract = {The thesis of this paper is that the capacity to think of one's perceptions as cross-modally integrated is incompatible with a reductionist account of the self. In section 2, I distinguish three versions of the argument from cross-modality. According to the 'unification' version of the argument, what needs to be explained is one's capacity to identify an object touched as the same as an object simultaneously seen. According to the 'recognition' version, what needs to be explained is one's capacity, having once seen an object, to reidentify that same object by touch alone. According to the 'objectivity' version, what needs to be explained is one's capacity to think of one's perceptions in different modalities as perceptions of one and the same object. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GANGULY1968, author = {GANGULY, S.-M}, title = {CULTURE, COMMUNICATION AND SILENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {182-200.}, keywords = {communication, culture, language, silence, social-philosoph}, abstract = {THE PAPER TRIES TO SHOW THAT OUR DEMANDS FROM LANGUAGE ARE TOO EXACTING WHICH NATURALLY IT CANNOT SATISFY. AS A RESULT WE RETIRE INTO THE SUBJECTIVE ZONE OF SILENCE ONLY WHERE WE CAN ENJOY OUR CHERISHED VALUES OF SECURITY AND TRUE FREEDOM. AFTER INTRODUCTION THE RELATION OF MUTUAL DEPENDENCE OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND HIS CULTURE IS DISCUSSED. THEN THE PAPER EXPLORES LOGICALLY THE SPECIFIC POINTS WHERE LANGUAGE IS DOOMED TO SNAP. THE TWO MAIN FACTORS RESPONSIBLE ARE : "APPLICATIVE FAILURE" AND "DESCRIPTIVE FAILURE". FINALLY, THERE IS A DISCUSSION ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND SILENCE WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT THEY ARE EXCLUSIVE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GARCIA1987, author = {GARCIA, J-L-A}, title = {GOODS AND EVILS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {385-412}, keywords = {ethics, evil, goods, syntactics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Garcia-Carpintero2003, author = {Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel}, title = {Qualia That It Is Right to Quine}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {357-377}, keywords = {concept, metaphysics, particulars, qualia}, abstract = {Dennett (1988) provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information-processing consciousness; and against Loar and Searle, it defends the claim that qualia are constitutively representational in an externalist understanding of this. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GARFIELD1989, author = {GARFIELD, JAY-L}, title = {THE MYTH OF JONES AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE: REFLECTIONS ON INTROSPECTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {1-26}, keywords = {belief, empiricism, epistemology, introspection, mind}, abstract = {THE ATTACK ON GIVENNESS IN SELLAR'S "EMPIRICISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND" HAS BEEN INCORRECTLY TAKEN TO ENTAIL ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM. I ARTICULATE SELLAR'S ATTACK ON GIVENNESS AND CHARACTERIZE THE ELIMINATIVIST ARGUMENTS OF CHURCHLAND, RORTY, AND FEYERABEND. I ARGUE THAT THEIR USE OF THE MYTH OF JONES IS UNSUCCESSFUL, AND THAT IT IN FACT REQUIRES NOT ELIMINATIVISM BUT REALISM ABOUT MENTAL STATES. ELIMINATIVISTS, I ARGUE COVERTLY ADOPT A PERNICIOUS FORM OF GIVENNESS AND A LOCKEAN MODEL OF INTROSPECTION INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CENTRAL MORALS OF THE MYTH OF JONES. FINALLY, I DEFEND A REALISTIC SELLARSIAN MODEL OF INTROSPECTION AND OF BELIEF-ASCRIPTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Garfield1999, author = {Garfield, Jay-L}, title = {Just What Is Cognitive Science Anyway?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {1075-1082}, keywords = {cognitive-science; linguistics, metaphysics, mind, neuroscience}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GARNER1971, author = {GARNER, RICHARD-T}, title = {NONREFERRING USES OF PROPER NAMES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {358-368}, keywords = {language, name, referring}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GARNER1967, author = {GARNER, RICHARD}, title = {BEARDSLEY, FIRTH AND THE IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {618-623}, keywords = {epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Garrett1995, author = {Garrett, Brian-J}, title = {Non-Reductionism and John Searle's "The Rediscovery of the Mind"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {209-215}, keywords = {biology, body, mind, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GARRETT1991, author = {GARRETT, Brian}, title = {Personal Identity and Reductionism.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {continuity, metaphysics, personal-identity; reductionism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Garrett2001, author = {Garrett, Don}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {205-215}, keywords = {commitment, metaphysics, morality}, abstract = {This pair of replies is part of a book symposium on Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy. The reply to David Owen refines the book's interpretation of Hume's famous conclusion that (what we call) inductive inferences are "not determin'd by reason." According to the interpretation defended, Hume always uses the term 'reason' not as a term of epistemic approval but as the name for the inferential faculty. This interpretation is shown to be compatible with Owen's insight that Hume is rejecting Locke's theory of reasoning. The reply to Charlotte Brown argues that on Hume's account the moral sentiments that constitute our first moral evaluations can be experienced prior to taking up a "general point of view" that involves "correcting" and "regulating" sympathetic responses.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Garrett2001a, author = {Garrett, Don}, title = {Precis of Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {185-189}, keywords = {cognition, commitment, metaphysics, puzzle}, abstract = {This precis serves to introduce a book symposium on Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy. It sets out the main goals of the book and describes the book's approach to interpreting Hume's philosophy, an approach that involves (i) focusing on Hume's views about the nature of cognition, (ii) outlining the most important of Hume's arguments as explicitly and formally as possible; and (iii) attempting to resolve interpretive puzzles that give rise to consternation or dispute among Hume's readers. The precis also outlines the book's ten chapters, giving special attention to the primary symposium topics of induction and moral evaluation.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GARRETT1988, author = {GARRETT, JAN-EDWARD}, title = {PERSONS, KINDS, AND CORPORATIONS: AN ARISTOTELIAN VIEW.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {261-281}, keywords = {corporation, kind, person, social-philosoph}, abstract = {IN "COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY", PETER FRENCH ATTEMPTS TO DESCRIBE THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ARGUES, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT CORPORATIONS ARE PERSONS, NO MORE AND NO LESS THAN INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEINGS. THIS PAPER RESPONDS TO FRENCH FROM THE ARISTOTELIAN PERSPECTIVE. SUCH A RESPONSE IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE AT HIS ARGUMENT'S CENTER IS A CLAIM THAT PERSONHOOD CANNOT BE DEFINED IN TERMS OF NATURAL KINDS. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GARVER1984, author = {GARVER, EUGENE}, title = {ARISTOTLE'S GENEALOGY OF MORALS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {471-492}, keywords = {end, ethics, moral}, abstract = {ACTIONS THAT ARE THEIR OWN END DEVELOP OUT OF INSTRUMENTAL ACTION, AND ENDS IN THEMSELVES OUT OF EXTERNALLY GIVEN ENDS. ACTIONS WHICH ARE THEIR OWN END EMERGE NOT ONLY IN ETHICAL CONTEXTS BUT IN TECHNICAL REALMS AS WELL, WHENEVER AN ART OR MODE OF ACTIVITY DEFINES ITS OWN CRITERIA FOR DOING WELL NOT SIMPLY REDUCIBLE TO SUCCESS AT ATTAINING THE END WISHED FOR.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GARVER1971, author = {GARVER, NEWTON}, title = {CONCERNING HENRY VEATCH'S "TWO LOGICS".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {105-107}, keywords = {logic}, abstract = {VEATCH IS ALTOGETHER RIGHT THAT MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF LOGIC FAIL TO DO JUSTICE TO THE PROBLEMS OF REFERENCE, AND IN PARTICULAR TO THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINING WHAT A PROPOSITION IS ABOUT. THE MAIN CONTENTION IS THAT AN INTENTIONAL LOGIC IS DIFFERENT AND BROADER THAN AN EXTENSIONAL LOGIC, AND TO BE PREFERRED AT LEAST BY HUMANISTS. BUT HIS TREATMENT OF THE KEY PROBLEM OF ANALYTIC PROPOSITIONS, OR ESSENTIAL PREDICATIONS, IS UNCONVINCING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GARVER1971a, author = {GARVER, NEWTON}, title = {THE VARIABILITY OF THE ANALYTIC}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {409-414}, keywords = {analytic, epistemology}, abstract = {THIS PAPER CONSIDERS AN INCONSISTENT SET OF FOUR PROPOSITIONS WHICH MARC-WOGAU CLAIMS CAN PLAUSIBLY BE ATTRIBUTED TO KANT, AND THAT THE BEST WAY OUT IS TO ALLOW A VARIABILITY (BASED ON PHENOMENOLOGY OR GRAMMAR) IN WHAT JUDGMENTS ARE TO COUNT AS ANALYTIC.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GARVER1960, author = {GARVER, NEWTON}, title = {WITTGENSTEIN ON PRIVATE LANGUAGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {389-396}, keywords = {cartesianism, language, meaning, pain, private, reductio-ad-absurdum; sensation, understanding}, abstract = {COULD WE IMAGINE A LANGUAGE IN WHICH A PERSON COULD EXPRESS HIS INNER SENSATIONS OR EXPERIENCES FOR HIS PRIVATE USE? THE AUTHOR EXPLICATES WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEWS, GIVING ONE, AN EXPOSE OF CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS WHICH LEND PLAUSIBILITY TO THE NOTION OF A PRIVATE LANGUAGE, AND TWO, A REDUCTION "AD ABSURDUM" OF THE NOTION OF A PRIVATE LANGUAGE OR PRIVATE UNDERSTANDING. THE UTILITY OF A SIGN AND ITS INTELLIGIBILITY IN THE COMMON LANGUAGE GO HAND IN HAND; A SIGN WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE SIMPLY "ASSOCIATED" WITH A SENSATION CANNOT HAVE A USE. HENCE, ANY SIGN WHICH HAS A USE CANNOT BE SIMPLY ASSOCIATED WITH A SENSATION. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GARVER1965, author = {GARVER, NEWTON}, title = {VARIETIES OF USE AND MENTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {230-238}, keywords = {denotation, language, meaning, mention, name, use, word}, abstract = {SOME WAYS OF STATING THE USEFUL DISTINCTION BETWEEN USE AND MENTION MAKE IT SEEM (1) THAT THERE ARE CASES OF "PURE MENTION" AND (2) THAT THE DISTINCTION IN ITS SIMPLE FORM EXHAUSTS THE POSSIBLE MODES OF OCCURRENCE OF WORDS. THE POSTULATE OF PURE MENTION RESTS ON AN INTERESTING CONFUSION OF AN INDEX WITH A FUNCTION, AND HENCE LACKS PLAUSIBILITY. THE POSTULATE OF COMPREHENSIVENESS LEADS TO AN IMPOVERISHED LOGICAL VOCABULARY THAT HAS BEEN THE SOURCE OF SEVERAL FALLACIOUS ARGUMENTS, INCLUDING RUSSELL'S FAMOUS ARGUMENT AGAINST FREGE IN "ON DENOTING." TO PRESERVE THE DISTINCTION FROM ABUSE, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT THESE TWO POSTULATES ARE FALSE AND THAT THERE ARE VARIETIES OF BOTH USE AND MENTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Gaus1996, author = {Gaus, Gerald-F}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {821-825}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory}, volume = {59(3)}, year = {1996} } @article{Gauthier2003, author = {Gauthier, David}, title = {Are We Moral Debtors?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {162-168}, keywords = {debtor, ethics, morality, other, owe}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Geivett2003, author = {Geivett, R-Douglas}, title = {Is "Simple Reliabilism" Adequately Motivated?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {444-450}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, reliabilism, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GELLMAN1969, author = {GELLMAN, JEROME-I}, title = {SUTER ON RUSSELL ON MEINONG.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {441-445}, keywords = {metaphysics, object}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR REPLIES TO RONALD SUTER'S "RUSSELL'S 'REFUTATION' OF MEINONG IN 'ON DENOTING'," "PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH," JUNE, 1967. SUTER'S INTERPRETATION OF ONE OF RUSSELL'S ARGUMENTS IS CRITICIZED ON EXEGETICAL GROUNDS, AND HIS DEFENSE OF ANOTHER ARGUMENT IS REBUTTED ON LOGICAL GROUNDS. MEINONG'S THESIS IS PRESENTED AS THE THESIS THAT ALL STATEMENTS OF A CERTAIN FORM ARE TRUE. IT IS ARGUED THAT ALL OF RUSSELL'S ARGUMENTS ARE ATTEMPTS TO POSE COUNTER-EXAMPLES TO THIS SINGLE VIEW. MEINONG IS DEFENDED AGAINST RUSSELL'S COUNTER-EXAMPLES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gemes1992, author = {Gemes, Kenneth}, title = {Nietzsche's Critique of Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {47-65}, keywords = {being, god, metaphysics, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gemes2001, author = {Gemes, Ken}, title = {Postmodernism's Use and Abuse of Nietzsche}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {337-360}, keywords = {nihilism, philosophy, postmodernism}, abstract = {I focus on Nietzsche's architectural metaphor of self-construction in arguing for the claim that postmodern readings of Nietzsche misunderstand his various attacks on dogmatic philosophy as paving the way for acceptance of a self characterized by fundamental disunity. Nietzsche's attack on essentialist dogmatic metaphysics is a call to engage in a purposive self-creation under a unifying will, a will that possesses the strength to reinterpret history as a pathway to "the problem that we are". Nietzsche agrees with the postmodernists that unity is not a pregiven, however, he would disavow their rejection of unity as a goal. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gemes2005, author = {Gemes, Ken}, title = {Naturalism and Value in Nietzsche}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {729-740}, keywords = {ethics, genealogy, morality, naturalism, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GENDIN1967, author = {GENDIN, SIDNEY}, title = {THE MEANING OF PUNISHMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {235-240}, keywords = {ethics, punishment}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gendler2001, author = {Gendler, Tamar-Szabo}, title = {Empiricism, Rationalism and the Limits of Justification}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {641-648}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, justification, knowledge, rationalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gendler2002, author = {Gendler, Tamar-Szabo}, title = {Critical Study of Carol Rovane's The Bounds of Agency}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {229-240}, keywords = {agency, ethics, metaphysics, person, personal-identit}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GENOVA1976, author = {GENOVA, A-C}, title = {LINSKY ON QUINE'S WAY OUT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {109-115}, keywords = {language, referring}, abstract = {LEONARD LINSKY, IN HIS "REFERRING", PAGES 100-104, PRESENTS COUNTEREXAMPLES TO A POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF QUINE'S THESIS OF REFERENTIAL OPACITY, VIZ., THAT THE INVALIDITY OF INFERENCES BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTITUTIVITY OF IDENTICALS (LEIBNIZ'S LAW) IN RESPECT TO POSITIONS IN SENTENCES IS A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-PURELY REFERENTIAL STATUS (IMPURE REFERENCE) OF THESE POSITIONS. I ARGUE THAT ALL OF LINSKY'S COUNTEREXAMPLES MISS THEIR MARK BECAUSE THEY INVOLVE A MISUNDERSTANDING OF QUINE'S THEORY OF REFERENTIAL OPACITY OR AN OVER-SIMPLIFICATION OF LEIBNIZ'S LAW.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GENOVA1973, author = {GENOVA, A-C}, title = {DEATH AS A TERMINUS AD QUEM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {270-277}, keywords = {death, limits, metaphysics, philosophical-anthropolog}, abstract = {I CRITICIZE A NEO-EPICUREAN VIEW OF DEATH DERIVED FROM WITTGENSTEIN'S CRYPTIC REMARK "OUR LIFE HAS NO END IN JUST THE WAY IN WHICH OUR VISUAL FIELD HAS NO LIMIT" (6.4331). THIS VIEW CONSTRUES DEATH AS ANALOGOUS TO A LIMITING CONSTRUCT AS IT FUNCTIONS IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY, AND CONCLUDES THAT SINCE DEATH IS A NONEXPERIENCEABLE STATE WHICH CHARACTERIZES NOTHING, ALL ANXIETY ABOUT DEATH IS IRRATIONAL. I ARGUE THAT THE SUPPOSED ANALOGY IGNORES A MAJOR ALTERNATIVE, MISINTERPRETS WITTGENSTEIN, AND OVERLOOKS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE EXTENSIONAL CONTEXT OF SCIENCE AND THE INTENTIONAL CONTEXT OF CONSCIOUSNESS. DEATH IS A 'LIMIT' IN THE SENSE OF A TEMPORAL END (AN EVENT, NOT A STATE) TO THE INTENTIONAL ACTIVITY OF LIFE; AND OUR ANXIETY ABOUT DEATH IS NOT GROUNDED ON ANY ANTICIPATED EXPERIENCE OF DEATH, BUT ON THE FACT THAT ONE DAY WE SHALL CEASE TO EXIST.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{George2003, author = {George, Rolf}, title = {Van Cleve and Kant's Analogies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {203-210}, keywords = {a-priori; analogy, metaphysics, transcendence}, abstract = {Van Cleve (and J.H. Lambert) argued that if our representations change, then time is real. Hence, the Kantian Analogies presuppose what they mean to prove. Not so. For Kant and the common understanding time is a serial order that neither loops nor branches and stretches of time have different lengths. The mere change in our representations does not by itself provide for duration or connectedness (absence of branching). Rather, the former needs external enduring substances, while causal connections are required to establish connectedness. Reference is made to Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, sects. 87, 120, 171.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{George1996, author = {George, Rolf and Rusnock, Paul}, title = {The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {461-468}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, semantics}, abstract = {A review article of J Alberto Coffa's posthumously published The Semantic Tradition From Kant to Carnap, ed. Linda Wessels, Cambridge University Press 1991. This is meant to be a history of epistemology "the way Carnap would have written it had he been Hegel." The article discusses Coffa's sorting out of various Kantian confusions, beginning with the shinning work of Bolzano and the contributions of various 19th century mathematicians and scientists down to Wittgenstein, Russell and Carnap. Coffa's book is an enormously import contribution to the history of thought.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{George1994, author = {George, Rolf-A and Rusnock, Paul}, title = {Snails Rolled Up Contrary to All Sense}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {459-466}, keywords = {dogma, intuition, metaphysics, science, space}, abstract = {By 1763, Kant had noticed a defect in contemporary presentations of geometry. Following Euclid, geometers had developed their definitions of similarity first for plane figures, and only afterwards extended them to solids. As error crept in: figures which are mirror images may be similar and equal under these definitions but incongruent. For Kant, this was "paradox". His reaction has caused puzzlement for generations of commentators: here we discuss these matters in the course of a review of a collection of essays edited by J Van Cleve and R E Frederick ("The Philosophy of Right and Left").}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gert1993, author = {Gert, Bernard}, title = {Transplants and Trolleys}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {173-178}, keywords = {consequentialism, epistemology, rights, transplantation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GERT1967, author = {GERT, BERNARD}, title = {CAN A BRAIN HAVE A PAIN?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {432-436}, keywords = {brain, epistemology, pain}, abstract = {IN A SYMPOSIUM ON 'MATERIALISM,' J J C SMART PRESENTED AN EXAMPLE OF A HUMAN BRAIN SEPARATED FROM THE REST OF THE BODY BEING KEPT ALIVE AND HAVING PAINS. NORMAN MALCOLM, IN THIS SAME SYMPOSIUM CLAIMED IT WAS SENSELESS TO SUPPOSE THAT A BRAIN IN SUCH A CONDITION COULD HAVE A PAIN. IN THIS ARTICLE I PROVIDE A DETAILED EXAMPLE SHOWING CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH WE WOULD ALL BE INCLINED TO SAY THAT SUCH A BRAIN DID HAVE A PAIN. HAVING DONE THIS, I ADMIT THAT THIS DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY SUPPORT FOR THE IDENTITY OF THOUGHTS AND BRAIN PROCESSES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gert2001, author = {Gert, Bernard}, title = {Precis of Morality: Its Nature and Justification}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {421-426}, keywords = {ethics, impartiality, justification, morality, nature}, abstract = {In this precis, I summarize some of the main points of my book, including providing brief descriptions of the concepts of impartiality, morality, and rationality. I also provide a brief description of common morality, the moral system we all use, usually not consciously, in making our moral decisions and judgments. The primary parts of this system are the moral rules, the moral ideals, the morally relevant features, and the two-step procedure for determining whether a violation of a moral rule is unjustified, weakly justified, or strongly justified.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gert2001a, author = {Gert, Bernard}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {463-481}, keywords = {ethics, morality}, abstract = {I reply to essays on Morality: Its Nature and Justification by Kurt Baier, Dan W. Brock, Thomas L. Carson, Ruth Chang, and David Copp. Although I defend most of the positions that I put forward in my book, I acknowledge that I have not been as clear as I should have been on several points, and even that I have made some mistakes. However, I claim that these clarifications and corrections, although not trivial, do not require a significant revision of my moral theory and that my theory is even stronger as a result of these changes.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gert2002, author = {Gert, Heather-J}, title = {The Standard Meter by Any Name Is Still a Meter Long}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {50-68}, keywords = {epistemology, language, name}, abstract = {In section 50 of Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein wrote the sentence, "There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris." Given that Wittgenstein introduces this sentence as analogous to the claim that "existence cannot be attributed to an element," and that the preceding passages discuss a language-game the simples of which can be described by their own names, there is good reason to think that Wittgenstein did not intend to assert this infamous sentence. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gert2002a, author = {Gert, Joshua}, title = {Korsgaard's Private-Reasons Argument}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {303-324}, keywords = {epistemology, normativity, private-language; rationality, reasons}, abstract = {This paper explains both of Korsgaard's Wittgensteinian arguments, and shows why neither of them work. The paper also provides a brief sketch of a different Wittgensteinian account of reasons that distinguishes the normative role of justification from that of requirement. On this account, the real agent-neutrality of reasons applies to their justificatory role, but not to their requiring role. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gertler2001, author = {Gertler, Brie}, title = {Introspecting Phenomenal States}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {305-328}, keywords = {condition, epistemology, knowledge, metaphysics, phenomenon, state}, abstract = {This paper defends a novel account of how we introspect phenomenal states, the demonstrative attention account (DA). First, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal state introspection which are not psychological, but purely metaphysical and semantic. Next, to explain how these conditions can be satisfied, I describe how demonstrative reference to a phenomenal content can be achieved through attention alone. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Giaquinto1993, author = {Giaquinto, M}, title = {Visualizing in Arithmetic}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {385-396}, keywords = {arithmetic, geometry, logic, mathematics, visual}, abstract = {Focusing on two examples, this paper appraises a couple of objections to the possibility of discovering general arithmetical truths by visualizing. The first objection is that one cannot make a discovery about all numbers of a certain kind by imagining a particular number of items. It is argued that this rests on the false premise that an image of an array of items must be numerically determinate. The second objection is that an image of an array will exclude relevant cases. It is argued that this is sometimes true, but not always. So these objections are not fatal to the possibility of arithmetical discovery by visualizing.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gibbard1996, author = {Gibbard, Allan}, title = {Thought, Norms, and Discursive Practice: Commentary on Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {699-717}, keywords = {discourse, epistemology, norm, thought}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gibbard1995, author = {Gibbard, Allan-F}, title = {Why Theorize How to Live with Each Other?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(2)}, pages = {323-342}, keywords = {community, ethics, existence, life, moral-theory; sharing, utilitarianism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gibbard2003, author = {Gibbard, Allan}, title = {Reasons to Reject Allowing}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {169-175}, keywords = {allowing, ethics, morality, reasons}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gibbard2002, author = {Gibbard, Allan}, title = {Normative and Recognitional Concepts}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {151-167}, keywords = {concept, constitution, ethics, normative, recognition}, abstract = {The paper offers a possibility proof for an expressivistic analysis of normative concepts. We plan how to live, and from this planning stem concepts of a special kind, plan-laden concepts. These behave somewhat as non-naturalists have thought that moral concepts behave: as concepts they are non-naturalistic, but they pick out natural properties. These properties are built up, finitely or infinitely, from properties we can recognize. A planner may recognize her situation in "thick", plan-laden terms, but such a perception must be treated with caution: whether it is virtuous or vicious is itself a question of how to live.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gibbard2002a, author = {Gibbard, Allan}, title = {Reply to Hawthorne}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {179-183}, keywords = {concept, ethics, normative, recognition}, abstract = {Hawthorne ("Practical Realism", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64, 2002) asks how a normative thought could "lock on" to a causally gruesome property. Expressivism offers an answer, whereas orthodox theories of language don't: whether the concept ought picks out a property is a planning question, a question of whether to pursue that property. Plans can be couched in objective terms, but that leaves the further planning question, how to cope with one's evidence. As for haloes of goodness, either it's a planning question whether something qualifies as one, or being a halo isn't a non-natural property in Moore's sense.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gibbard1992, author = {Gibbard, Allan-F}, title = {Precis of "Wise Choices, Apt Feelings"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {943-945}, keywords = {emotion, ethics, morality, normative}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gibbard1992a, author = {Gibbard, Allan-F}, title = {Reply to Blackburn, Carson, Hill, and Railton}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {969-980}, keywords = {ethics, moral-sentiment; normative-judgment; rationality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GIBBONS1975, author = {GIBBONS, ALAN}, title = {LANDESMAN ON UNIVERSALS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {415-418}, keywords = {metaphysics, predication, universal}, abstract = {THE PAPER IS A RESPONSE TO CHARLES LANDESMAN'S ARTICLE IN "PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH" AND PROVIDES A "REDUCTIO AD ABSURDAM" OF HIS ARGUMENT FOR A REALISTIC THEORY OF UNIVERSALS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gibbons2001, author = {Gibbons, John}, title = {Knowledge in Action}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {579-600}, keywords = {action, epistemology, explanation, knowledge, reason}, abstract = {This paper argues that the role of knowledge in the explanation and production of intentional action is as indispensable as the roles of belief and desire. If we are interested in explaining intentional actions rather than intentions or attempts, we need to make reference to more than the agent's beliefs and desires. It is easy to see how the truth of your beliefs, or perhaps, facts about a setting will be involved in the explanation of an action. If you believe you can stop your car by pressing a pedal, then, if your belief is true, you will stop. If it is false, you will not. By considering cases of unintentional actions, actions involving luck and cases of deviant causal chains, I show why knowledge is required. By looking at the notion of causal relevance, I argue that the connection between knowledge and action is causal and not merely conceptual.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GIBSON1976, author = {GIBSON, JAMES-J}, title = {THE MYTH OF PASSIVE PERCEPTION: A REPLY TO RICHARDS' "JAMES GIBSON'S PASSIVE THEORY OF PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {234-238}, keywords = {epistemology, information, nerve, passivity, perception}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gibson1998, author = {Gibson, Martha-I}, title = {The Unity of the Sentence and the Connection of Causes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {827-845}, keywords = {causation, epistemology, language, predication, sentence, unity}, abstract = {This paper attempts a solution to the classical problem of predication, "the unity of the sentence": how, instead of merely listing the several things they designate, the parts of the sentence combine to represent something as being the case. While this capacity of a sequence of terms to "say some single thing" is standardly attributed to the distinct function of 'subject' and 'predicate' terms, these functional differences need explaining. Here, they are traced to the distinctive, asymmetrical causal explanation of the tokening of the expressions serving one role or another in the speech act. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gibson1994, author = {Gibson, Roger}, title = {Katz on Indeterminacy and the Proto-Theory}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {133-138}, keywords = {epistemology, indeterminacy, meaning, metaphysics, naturalism}, abstract = {In "The Metaphysics of Meaning" Jerrold Katz argues against Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of radical translation and in favor of a non-Fregean sense theory. I argue that Katz's construal of Quine's indeterminacy thesis is not Quine's construal. I also raise two questions regarding Katz's sense theory: a) can Katz really distinguish between "contingent" analyticity and "necessary" analyticity, as he maintains? b) how can Katz guard against an unchecked proliferation of senses?}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GILL1979, author = {GILL, JERRY-H}, title = {WITTGENSTEIN AND METAPHOR.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {272-284}, keywords = {language, language-game; linguistics, logic, metaphor}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE IS TO EXPLORE WITTGENSTEIN'S "USE" OF METAPHOR, IN THE "TRACTATUS", "INVESTIGATIONS", AND "ON CERTAINTY", BY WAY OF WORKING TOWARD HIS "VIEW" OF METAPHOR. IN HIS EARLY WORK HE USED STATIC, FORMALISTIC METAPHORS, WHILE IN HIS LATER BOOKS HE MOVED TOWARD ORGANIC, SOCIAL, AND NATURALISTIC METAPHORS. THROUGHOUT HE IS UNEMBARRASSED BY HIS RELIANCE ON THE METAPHORICAL MODE, AND IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT HE IS ACTUALLY, IF IMPLICITLY, SUGGESTING THAT THIS IS THE PROPER MODE FOR PHILOSOPHY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GILL1967, author = {GILL, JERRY-H}, title = {KANT, KIERKEGAARD, AND RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {188-204}, keywords = {faith, knowledge, religion}, abstract = {THE THESIS OF THIS ARTICLE IS THAT KIERKEGAARD FOLLOWS A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE WITH RESPECT TO RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE. BOTH DENY THE POSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE ON THE BASIS OF ABSOLUTE DICHOTOMIES. BOTH "DENY REASON TO MAKE ROOM FOR FAITH".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gillett2003, author = {Gillett, Carl}, title = {Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(3)}, pages = {709-717}, keywords = {epistemology, infinitism, metaphysics, reasons}, abstract = {Foundationalist, coherentist, skeptic, etc., have all been united in one respect--all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and nonrepeating, chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls "infinitism"--the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to infinitism, but I will argue that he fails to address a venerable metaphysical concern about a certain type of regress. My conclusion will be that until Klein answers these metaphysical worries he will not have restored infinitism as a viable option in epistemology.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gillett1997, author = {Gillett, Grant}, title = {Husserl, Wittgenstein and the Snark: Intentionality and Social Naturalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {331-349}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, naturalism, social}, abstract = {The Snark is an intentional object. I examine the general philosophical characteristics of thoughts of objects from the perspective of Husserl's, hyle, noesis and noema and show how this meets constraints of opacity, normativity and possible existence as generated by a sensitive theory of intentionality. Husserl introduces terms which indicate the normative features of intentional content and attempts to forge a direct relationship between the norms he generates and the actual world object which a thought intends. I then attempt to relate Husserl's account to Fregean insights about the sense and reference of a term. Neither Husserl nor Frege suggests plausible routes to a naturalistic account of intentionality and I turn to Wittgenstein to provide a naturalistic reading of the crucial terms involved in the analysis of intentional content. His account is normative in a way required by both Husserl and Frege and yet manages a kind of Aristotelian naturalism which avoids crude biologism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GILLETT1988, author = {GILLETT, GRANT}, title = {LEARNING TO PERCEIVE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {601-618}, keywords = {aboutness, mental-states; metaphysics, perception, philosophical-psychology; realism}, abstract = {PERCEPTION IS A MATTER OF DERIVING CONTENT FOR THOUGHT FROM ONE'S SENSORY CONTACT WITH THE ENVIRONMENT. IT IS OFTEN THOUGHT TO BEGIN WITH PROXIMAL STATES OR SENSORY GIVENS CONSTRUED WITH ONE EYE ON PHYSICAL RECEPTOR FUNCTION. BUT PERCEPTION INVOLVES TECHNIQUES WHEREBY ONE COMES TO SEE THINGS AROUND ONE AS BEING THUS AND SO. THESE TECHNIQUES ARE LEARNED IN INTERACTIONS WHERE CONCEPTS ARE USED AND THEIR USE IS MANIFEST. THUS THE TECHNIQUES INVOLVED ARE INFORMED AND PARTLY DETERMINED BY LANGUAGE WHICH PICKS THINGS OUT AND PRESENTS THEM TO THE SUBJECT. DEMONSTRATIVE TERMS WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. THIS ENTAILS THAT AGREEMENT IN JUDGMENTS AND ASPECTS OF THE WORLD ABOUT WHICH SUBJECTS CAN CONVERGE IN JUDGMENT ARE THE BASICS OF AN ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GINSBERG1972, author = {GINSBERG, ROBERT}, title = {PHILOSOPHICAL ACTIVITY AND WAR.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {174-185}, keywords = {social-philosophy; war}, abstract = {THE QUESTION RAISED IS WHAT CAN A PHILOSOPHER AS PHILOSOPHER DO ABOUT WAR? THE QUESTION IS ANSWERED HERE IN TERMS OF THE ACTIVITIES PHILOSOPHERS SHOULD UNDERTAKE WHICH ARE APPROPRIATE PRELIMINARIES TO THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF WAR. THESE ACTIVITIES INCLUDE REORGANIZING THE PROFESSION OF PHILOSOPHY, WITH HUMAN VALUES AT ITS HEART, REORGANIZING THE UNIVERSITY WITH PHILOSOPHY AT ITS HEART, REORGANIZING SOCIETY WITH THE UNIVERSITY AT ITS HEART, AND REORGANIZING THE WORLD WITH PEACE AT ITS HEART.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Glanzberg2004, author = {Glanzberg, Michael}, title = {Quantification and Realism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {541-572}, keywords = {logic, quantification, realism, semantics}, abstract = {This paper argues for the thesis that, roughly put, it is impossible to talk about absolutely everything. To put the thesis more precisely, there is a particular sense in which, as a matter of semantics, quantifiers always range over domains that are in principle extensible, and so cannot count as really being 'absolutely everything'. The paper presents an argument for this thesis and considers some important objections to the argument and to the formulation of the thesis. The paper also offers an assessment of just how implausible the thesis really is. It argues that the intuitions against the thesis come down to a few special cases, which can be given special treatment. Finally, the paper considers some metaphysical ideas that might surround the thesis. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GLOSSOP1974, author = {GLOSSOP, RONALD-J}, title = {'GOOD,' 'DOOG,' AND NATURALISM IN ETHICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {34}, pages = {437-439}, keywords = {ethics, good, linguistic-analysis; naturalism}, abstract = {R M HARE HAS CLAIMED THAT ALL NATURALISTIC ETHICAL THEORIES ARE INCORRECT BECAUSE THEY FAIL TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE COMMENDING FUNCTION OF ETHICAL TERMS. BUT HARE ASSUMES THE POINT AT ISSUE BY SUPPOSING THAT NO DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS COULD THEMSELVES BE TAKEN AS COMMENDATORY. IF 'X IS GOOD' IS TAKEN TO MEAN 'AN INFORMED, DISINTERESTED, RATIONAL, NORMAL HUMAN SPECTATOR WOULD APPROVE OF X', THEN THE DEFINIENS WOULD BE JUST AS COMMENDATORY AS THE DEFINIENDUM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GLOSSOP1970, author = {GLOSSOP, RONALD-J}, title = {EXPLAINING HUMAN BEHAVIOR.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {444-449}, keywords = {action, behavior, epistemology, explanation, intention, man, mechanism, teleology}, abstract = {THE VIEW THAT HUMAN ACTIONS SHOULD BE EXPLAINED EITHER MECHANISTICALLY OR TELEOLOGICALLY BUT NOT BOTH WAYS IS CHALLENGED. THE ARGUMENT OF C. TAYLOR THAT HUMAN ACTIONS CANNOT BE EXPLAINED MECHANISTICALLY WITHOUT CHANGING THE MEANING OF WORDS SUCH AS "INTENTION" IS ATTACKED BY NOTING THAT THOUGH THE RELATION BETWEEN "INTENTION" AND "ACTION" MAY BE LOGICAL, THE RELATION BETWEEN "INTENTION" AND "SUBSEQUENT BEHAVIOR" IS CAUSAL. MECHANISTIC EXPLANATIONS DO NOT RULE OUT TELEOLOGICAL ONES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GLOSSOP1967, author = {GLOSSOP, RONALD-J}, title = {THE NATURE OF HUME'S ETHICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {527-536}, keywords = {ethics}, abstract = {HUME'S ETHICAL THEORY CONTAINS: (1) A DEFINITION OF WHAT IT MEANS TO CALL SOMETHING A VIRTUE, AND (2) AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF WHAT QUALITIES OF CHARACTER ARE VIRTUES. IN REGARD TO HIS DEFINITION HUME OFFERS A 'QUALIFIED SPECTATOR' VIEW WHICH CAN BE UNDERSTOOD ONLY IF ONE MAKES A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SPECTATOR'S ACTUAL SENTIMENTS OF APPROBATION AND HIS 'CORRECTED' JUDGMENTS OF APPROBATION. THE EMPIRICAL PART OF THE THEORY IS UTILITARIAN. INTERPRETATIONS OF HUME'S ETHICAL THEORY AS A QUALIFIED OR IDEAL SPECTATOR THEORY, AS A SUBJECTIVIST VIEW, OR AS A UTILITARIAN VIEW ARE ALL PARTIALLY, BUT ONLY PARTIALLY, CORRECT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GLOUBERMAN1976, author = {GLOUBERMAN, M}, title = {DOCTRINE AND METHOD IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF P F STRAWSON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {364-383}, keywords = {language, methodology}, abstract = {THE SYNCHRONIZATION ONE EXPECTS BETWEEN THE METHODS USED BY A PHILOSOPHER AND THE DOCTRINES THESE METHODS SUPPORT IS ABSENT FROM CENTRAL PORTIONS OF THE POSITION OF P F STRAWSON. FOR EXAMPLE, IN "INDIVIDUALS" AND 'PARTICULAR AND GENERAL', STRAWSON APPEALS TO FEATURE CONCEPTS LIKE "SNOW" IN ANATOMIZING INDIVIDUATIVE CONCEPTS LIKE "SNOWBALL". BUT IT IS A STRAWSONIAN DOCTRINE THAT PARTICULARS ARE PRIOR TO NON-PARTICULARS. TO ENFORCE ORDER, STRAWSON MUST DENY TO ELEMENTS OF A PUTATIVE "ANALYSANS" ANY STATUS IN THE "ANALYSANDUM". BUT THIS UNUSUAL ALIGNMENT, WHICH I DUB 'ANALYTICISM', IS HIGHLY PROBLEMATIC. I SUGGEST THAT A MODERATION OF STRAWSON'S ANTI-IDEALISTIC DOCTRINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS IS ONE WAY TO RESTORE THE DESIRED SYNCHRONIZATION, FAILING WHICH THE METHODS MUST BE ASSESSED, DAMAGINGLY, AS UNMOTIVATED AND INCAPABLE OF RATIONALIZING THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Godfrey-Smith1996, author = {Godfrey-Smith, Peter}, title = {Meaning, Models and Selection: A Review of Philosophical Naturalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {673-678}, keywords = {epistemology, model, naturalism, teleology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GODOW-JR1976, author = {GODOW-JR, REW-A}, title = {ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM AND DENOTATION: A REPLY TO RESENBAUM'S "DENOTATION AND ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {398-402}, keywords = {denotation, materialism, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOEDECKE1970, author = {GOEDECKE, W-ROBERT}, title = {ON THE USE OF CRUCIAL TERMS IN JURISPRUDENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {576-589}, keywords = {jurisprudence, language, political-philosoph}, abstract = {EXAMINES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN USING AND MENTIONING TERMS IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND FINDS THAT MENTIONING TERMS IS A MODE OF REJECTING THEM; DISCOVERS THAT TERMS SUCH AS "DUE PROCESS" ARE USED IN OPPOSITE WAYS IN DIFFERENT JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHIES, BUT THAT SUCH CONTRARY FUNCTIONING LEADS TO EFFECTIVE ADJUDICATION RATHER THAN OTHERWISE IN PRACTICE. BRIEF CRITICISM IS MADE OF ONE-SIDED LINGUISTIC AND ONE-SIDED PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHIES OF JURISPRUDENCE, AND A PHILOSOPHY OF JURISPRUDENCE WHEREIN LEGAL SYSTEM MAINTAINS POWER TO MOVE IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS AND ASSUME ALTERNATIVE RATIONALES IS ASSUMED TO BE BASIC.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOETZ1988, author = {GOETZ, STEWART-C}, title = {A NONCAUSAL THEORY OF AGENCY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {303-316}, keywords = {agency, causality, freedom, metaphysics, reasons}, abstract = {IN THIS PAPER, A NONCAUSAL THEORY OF AGENCY IS DEVELOPED. MOST AGENCY THEORISTS HAVE BEEN AGENT-CAUSATIONISTS. HOWEVER, THE THREE PRINCIPAL ADVOCATES OF AGENT-CAUSATION HAVE NOW RENOUNCED IT. THEREFORE, AN IMPORTANT QUESTION IS WHETHER ONE CAN HAVE AGENCY WITHOUT AGENT-CAUSATION. SECTION I DOES TWO THINGS. FIRST, IT STATES A DESIDERATUM WHICH THE AGENT-CAUSATIONIST CLAIMS ANY THEORY OF AGENCY MUST SATISFY, AND SUMMARIZES WHY AGENT-CAUSATIONISTS BELIEVE THAT THE CONCEPT OF AGENT-CAUSATION IS A NECESSARY ELEMENT IN AN AGENCY THEORY WHICH SATISFIES THIS DESIDERATUM. SECOND, IT EXPLAINS HOW AGENT-CAUSATION DOES NOT PROVIDE AN AGENCY THEORY WHICH SATISFIES THIS DESIDERATUM AND SHOWS HOW AGENT-CAUSATION IS ACTUALLY SUPERFLUOUS FOR THIS TASK, ONCE THE CONCEPT OF A REASON FOR ACTING HAS BEEN INVOKED TO EXPLAIN AN ACTION'S PERFORMANCE. SECTION II CONSISTS OF A DISCUSSION OF HOW A REASON EXPLAINS AN ACTION WITHOUT CAUSING THE LATTER'S OCCURRENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOGOL1972, author = {GOGOL, DANIEL}, title = {ON THE SWITCHES PARADOX.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {410-411}, keywords = {logic, paradox}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOGOL1970, author = {GOGOL, DANIEL}, title = {DETERMINISM AND THE PREDICTING MACHINE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {455-456}, keywords = {determinism, machine, metaphysics, production}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOLDMAN1991, author = {GOLDMAN, Alvin-I}, title = {Stephen P. Stich, "The Fragmentation of Reason".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {cognitive, epistemology, normative, process}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Goldman2001, author = {Goldman, Alvin-I}, title = {Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(1)}, pages = {85-110}, keywords = {epistemology, expert, knowledge, trust}, abstract = {When is a person rationally justified in trusting one putative expert over others when they differ? The problem is situated within the epistemology of testimony, and expertise is define. Five sources of evidence that a novice might use in choosing among experts are: (1) their arguments, (2) agreement by additional experts, (3) appraisals by "metaexperts", (4) interests and biases, and (5) past track records. A Bayesian analysis shows that relying on agreement from others is problematic, because concurring believers may not be (conditionally) independent. Despite the apparent inability of novices to determine experts' track records, this is sometimes feasible and very helpful.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Goldman1995, author = {Goldman, Alan-H}, title = {The Aesthetic Value of Representation in Painting}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(2)}, pages = {297-310}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, experience, painting, representation, visual}, abstract = {Plato's criterion of pictorial representation is defended against contemporary objections. Several answers to his question about the value of representation are considered and rejected as incomplete, and a more complex answer in terms of the interaction of representation with other sources of aesthetic value is provided.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOLDMAN1990, author = {GOLDMAN, ALAN-H}, title = {Aesthetic Versus Moral Evaluations.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {715-730}, keywords = {aesthetic-judgment; aesthetics, evaluation, moral-judgment; realism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Goldman2002, author = {Goldman, Alvin-I}, title = {Precis of Knowledge in a Social World}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {185-190}, keywords = {democracy, epistemology, knowledge, social, truth, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Goldman2002a, author = {Goldman, Alvin-I}, title = {Reply to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {215-227}, keywords = {bayesian, democracy, epistemology, goals, knowledge, model, social, truth, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOLDMAN1976, author = {GOLDMAN, ALAN-H}, title = {APPEARING AS IRREDUCIBLE IN PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {147-164}, keywords = {appearing, belief, epistemology, materialism, perception, reductionism}, abstract = {I ARGUE THAT ANALYSES OF PERCEPTION WHICH REDUCE IT TO THE ACQUISITION OF BELIEF THROUGH THE SENSES WILL NOT WORK. IT IS PLAUSIBLE TO ATTRIBUTE PERCEPTION TO INFANTS BEFORE ATTRIBUTING CONCEPTS OR BELIEFS. TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE TRADITIONAL EMPIRICIST MODEL OF PERCEPTION 'ARROW/VALIDATES' CONCEPTS 'ARROW/VALIDATES' BELIEFS IS STILL INTUITIVE AND ACCEPTABLE (NOT THE ASSOCIATIONIST MECHANISTIC MODEL TRADITIONALLY ASSOCIATED WITH IT), A PURELY EPISTEMIC ANALYSIS IS IMPLAUSIBLE. THIS CLAIM SUPPORTS FRED DRETSKE'S POSITION ON NON-EPISTEMIC PERCEPTION, ALTHOUGH I DISMISS HIS ARGUMENTS FOR IT AND OFFER OTHERS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Goldman2005, author = {Goldman, Alvin}, title = {Kornblith's Naturalistic Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {403-410}, keywords = {epistemology, ethology, knowledge, metaphilosophy}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Goldman2005a, author = {Goldman, Alan-H}, title = {Reason Internalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {505-532}, keywords = {deliberation, epistemology, internalism, motivation, rationality, reason}, abstract = {This paper defends strong internalism about reasons, the view that reasons must relate to pre-existing motivational states, from several kinds of counterexamples, supposed desire independent reasons, that have been proposed. A central distinction drawn is that between there being a reason and an agent's having a reason. It is claimed also that prudential and moral reasons are desire independent. By offering an account of rationality as coherence, by appealing to broader concerns as opposed to specific desires, and by appealing to the distinction noted above, the paper exposes weaknesses in recent arguments for desire independent reasons by Millgram, Smith, Korsgaard, and Searle. The reasons they propose can be interpreted as internal (not desire independent) or dismissed as nonexistent. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Goldman1995a, author = {Goldman, Alan-H}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {490-492}, publisher = {Westview Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Aesthetic Value}, volume = {63(2)}, year = {1995} } @article{Goldstein1996, author = {Goldstein, Irwin}, title = {Ontology, Epistemology, and Private Ostensive Definition}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {137-147}, keywords = {epistemology, learning, ontology, private}, abstract = {There are five theories people regard as dependent on words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions. These include: (1) skepticism about other minds, (2) skepticism about an external world, (3) foundationalism, (4) dualism, and (5) immaterialism. People say Wittgenstein refuted these theories by showing no words can be learnable only through private ostensive definitions. I defend these theories by arguing that proponents of the challenged theories are not committed to using private ostensive definitions. Thus, even if people could prove no words can be learnable only through such introspective acts, they would not refute the contested theories.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOLDSTEIN1989, author = {GOLDSTEIN, IRWIN}, title = {PLEASURE AND PAIN: UNCONDITIONAL, INTRINSIC VALUES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {255-276}, keywords = {axiology, intrinsic-value; pain, pleasure}, abstract = {THAT "ALL" PLEASURE IS GOOD AND "ALL" PAIN BAD IN ITSELF IS AN ETERNALLY VALID ETHICAL PRINCIPLE. THE COMMON CLAIM THAT SOME PLEASURE IS NOT GOOD, OR SOME PAIN NOT BAD, IS MISTAKEN. STRICT "PARTICULARISM" (ETHICAL DECISIONS MUST BE MADE CASE BY CASE; THERE ARE NO SOUND UNIVERSAL NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES) AND "RELATIVISM" (ALL GOOD AND BAD ARE RELATIVE TO SOCIETY) ARE AMONG THE ETHICAL THEORIES WE MAY REFUTE THROUGH AN APPEAL TO PLEASURE AND PAIN. DANIEL DENNETT, PHILIPPA FOOT, R M HARE, GILBERT HARMAN, IMMANUEL KANT, J L MACKIE, AND JEAN-PAUL SARTRE ARE AMONG THE MANY PHILOSOPHERS DISCUSSED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOLDSTEIN1985, author = {GOLDSTEIN, IRWIN}, title = {LEARNING THE WORD 'TOOTHACHE'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {337-338}, keywords = {language, private-languag}, abstract = {PEOPLE DO NOT LEARN THE WORD 'TOOTHACHE' VIA SWOLLEN MOUTHS, CRYING, HOLDING ONE'S CHEEK OR ANY OTHER BEHAVIOR THAT MIGHT BE THOUGHT UNIQUELY EXPRESSIVE OF TOOTHACHES. TO BE ABLE TO LEARN WORDS FOR ACHES IN DIFFERENT BODILY LOCATIONS IT IS NOT EVEN NECESSARY THAT THERE BE UNIQUE PHYSICAL SIGNS CORRESPONDING TO ACHES IN EACH LOCATION. WITTGENSTEINIAN PRIVATE LANGUAGE PROBLEMS REQUIRE, AT MOST, THAT THERE BE BEHAVIORAL SIGNS FOR THE GENERIC TERM 'ACHE'.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOLDSTEIN1980, author = {GOLDSTEIN, LEON}, title = {AGAINST HISTORICAL REALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {426-429}, keywords = {epistemology, historical-realism; science}, abstract = {THIS PAPER REPLIES TO THAT OF C B MCCULLAGH WHICH PRECEDES IT. IT OBSERVES THAT SHOWING METHODOLOGICAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN HISTORY AND SCIENCE DOESN'T SUPPORT HISTORICAL REALISM SINCE IT ISN'T OBVIOUS THAT REALISM IS A SOUND EPISTEMOLOGY FOR SCIENCE. THE ARTICLE ALSO POINTS OUT THAT MCCULLAGH DOESN'T DISTINGUISH THE GOAL OF MY PAPER CONCERNED WITH THE APPREHENSION OF HISTORICAL EVIDENCE AND MY AIMS IN WRITINGS CONCERNED WITH KNOWING THE HISTORICAL PART, AND, FINALLY, ARGUES THAT SINCE OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE HUMAN PAST COMES ONLY FROM THE DISCIPLINE OF HISTORY AND SINCE THERE IS NO WAY TO REACH OUT FROM THAT DISCIPLINE TO A REAL PAST WHICH IS INDEPENDENT OF IT, THE CLAIMS OF HISTORICAL REALISM ARE FACTUALLY VACUOUS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOLDSTEIN1964, author = {GOLDSTEIN, LEON-J}, title = {THE "ALLEGED" FUTURITY OF YESTERDAY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {417-420}, keywords = {common-sense; future, history, methodology, ordinary-language; past, time}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOLDSTEIN1976, author = {GOLDSTEIN, LEON-J}, title = {EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND HISTORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {181-192}, keywords = {epistemology, evidence, history, realism}, abstract = {TWO EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES OR ORIENTATIONS ARE DISTINGUISHED, THE PERCEPTUAL AND THE HERMENEUTIC. THE PERCEPTUAL ATTITUDE BEGINS WITH THAT WHICH IS PRESENTED TO SENSE, THE MEANS WHEREBY THE WORLD COMMON TO ALL IS GIVEN. THIS EPISTEMIC ATTITUDE IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO HISTORY. HISTORICAL EVENTS ARE NOT GIVEN PERCEPTUALLY, BUT ARE THE OUTCOME OF AN INTELLECTUAL PROCEDURE OF RECONSTRUCTION; HISTORICAL EVIDENCE AND THE WAY THIS EVIDENCE IS APPREHENDED BY THE HISTORIAN OCCASION PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES BUT NOT AS HISTORICAL EVIDENCE. THE APPREHENSION OF ANYTHING AS HISTORICAL EVIDENCE IS AN HERMENEUTIC ACT, AND IS AVAILABLE ONLY TO THOSE FOR WHOM THE IDEA OF HISTORY IS CULTURALLY ACCESSIBLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOLDSTEIN1964a, author = {GOLDSTEIN, LEON-J}, title = {ON AUSTIN'S UNDERSTANDING OF PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {223-232}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, ordinary-language; phenomenology, philosophy, problem, reality, word}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOLDSTEIN1964b, author = {GOLDSTEIN, SIGNE-BURKE}, title = {SOME OTHER DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {452-456}, keywords = {ethics, philosophy, science, structure, system}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOLDSTICK1987, author = {GOLDSTICK, D}, title = {SECONDARY QUALITIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {145-146}, keywords = {epistemology, secondary-qualit}, abstract = {LOCKE WAS RIGHT TO SAY PRIMARY QUALITIES "RESEMBLE" OUR IDEAS OF THEM IN A WAY SECONDARY QUALITIES DO NOT, BECAUSE HAVING THE APPROPRIATE PRIMARY-QUALITY "IDEA" IS LOGICALLY SUFFICIENT IN EACH CASE FOR KNOWING HOW SOMETHING MUST BE (INTRINSICALLY) IN ORDER FOR THE "QUALITY" TO INHERE IN IT. COMPARE THE WAY A PERSON IS SAID TO "RESEMBLE" A VERBAL DESCRIPTION IN THE EVENT OF "ANSWERING TO" IT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Goldstick1992, author = {Goldstick, D}, title = {Cognitive Reason}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {117-124}, keywords = {belief, cognition, epistemology, rationalism, reason}, abstract = {Beliefs are called "rational" or "irrational". An epistemological "reliabilist" definition is offered of what cognitive (versus practical) "reason" means in methodological debates, say, over "simplicity" (is it really a criterion of what is rational to believe?) or debates over "fideism" (which denies it's always a mistake to believe something it wouldn't be irrational not to believe). A belief can be directly or indirectly reason-backed. Your "reason" is the ensemble of your natural, reliable doxastic dispositions (dispositions about what to believe when). "Natural" dispositions are those without which the species wouldn't exist. Other species and nonnatural thinking machines are considered.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOLDSTICK1979, author = {GOLDSTICK, D}, title = {WHY IS THERE SOMETHING RATHER THAN NOTHING?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {265-271}, keywords = {existence, metaphysics, nonexistence, nothingness, vacuum}, abstract = {A HEGELIAN-TYPE ANSWER DENIES EVEN THE CONCEIVABILITY OF ANY ABSOLUTE AND QUANTITATIVE, AS OPPOSED TO MERELY RELATIVE, QUALITATIVE BEING AND NONBEING ALIKE. A RELATIVE VACUUM IS SIMPLY THE NONEXISTENCE SOMEWHERE OF SOMETHING SPECIFIC. AN ABSOLUTE VACUUM, IF IT EVER DID EXIST, WOULD HAVE TO BE ITSELF AN EXISTENT--ABSURDLY. NOR COULD THIS CONCLUSION BE EVADED BY ATTRIBUTING A SEPARATE SENSE TO "EXIST" FOR VACUUMS. TO THAT EXTENT, PARMENIDES AND MELISSUS WERE RIGHT! THE NONEXISTENCE OF A MOUNTAIN SOMEWHERE JUST IS, THEREFORE, THE EXISTENCE OF A NONMOUNTAIN THERE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOLOMB1976, author = {GOLOMB, JACOB}, title = {PSYCHOLOGY FROM THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL STANDPOINT OF HUSSERL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {451-471}, keywords = {phenomenology, psychologism, psychology, science}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE ANALYZES HUSSERL'S AMBIVALENT ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN THE COTEMPORANEOUS PSYCHOLOGY, TO PLACE THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY ABOVE IT, AND TO DETERMINE POSITIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO. HUSSERL'S "RIGOROUS SCIENCE" IS CONSIDERED AS AN ALTERNATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE TO THAT OF POSITIVISM. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "EXPERIMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS" AND "INTENTIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS" IS EXPLICATED. THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY IS POSSIBLE AT ALL FROM THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL STANDPOINT. HUSSERL VACILLATES BETWEEN TWO ATTITUDES, BUT TENDS TO EMBRACE THE ONE WHICH ENTAILS THE ELIMINATION OF PSYCHOPHYSICS, AND THE MERGER OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL "SCIENTIFIC" PSYCHOLOGY WITH DESCRIPTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gomez-Torrente2002, author = {Gomez-Torrente, Mario}, title = {Vagueness and Margin for Error Principles}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {107-125}, keywords = {epistemic, error, knowledge, logic, predicate, semantics, vagueness}, abstract = {Timothy Williamson's potentially most important contribution to epistemicism about vagueness lies in his arguments for the basic epistemicist claim that the alleged cut-off points of vague predicates are not knowable. His arguments for this are based on so-called 'margin for error principles'. This paper argues that these principles fail to provide a good argument for the basic claim. Williamson has offered at least two kinds of margin for error principles applicable to vague predicates. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GOODIN1985, author = {GOODIN, ROBERT-E}, title = {THE PRIORITY OF NEEDS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {615-626}, keywords = {ethics, necessity, need, priority}, abstract = {WHY GIVE NEEDS PRIORITY OVER MERE DESIRES? SOME ARGUMENTS ASSIMILATE MEETING NEEDS TO AVOIDING HARMS, AS OPPOSED TO MERELY PROVIDING (WANTED) BENEFITS. OTHERS TURN ON THE PROPOSITION THAT NEEDS ARE, IN SOME SENSE, LESS VOLUNTARY. STILL OTHERS EMPHASIZE THE RELATIVE URGENCY OR PRIMARY-GOOD NATURE OF THE NEEDED RESOURCES. NONE OF THESE ARGUMENTS PROVIDE AN IRONCLAD CASE FOR THE PRIORITY RULE, HOWEVER. AT MOST, NEEDS CORRELATE IN ONLY A ROUGH AND READY WAY WITH VARIOUS OTHER FACTORS WHICH DO DESERVE PRIORITY CONSIDERATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Goodin1995, author = {Goodin, Robert-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {265-268}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy}, volume = {59(1)}, year = {1995} } @article{GOODRUN1977, author = {GOODRUN, CRAIG-R}, title = {RAWLS AND EQUALITARIANISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {386-393}, keywords = {efficiency, equality, freedom, justice, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GORDON1984, author = {GORDON, JEFFREY}, title = {NAGEL OR CAMUS ON THE ABSURD?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {15-28}, keywords = {absurd, metaphysics}, abstract = {THE ABSURD, CAMUS DECLARED, EMERGES IN THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN MAN, WITH HIS DESIRE FOR HAPPINESS AND ORDER, AND THE BRUTE SILENCE OF THE WORLD. NAGEL INSISTS THAT THE CONDITIONS FOR THE ABSURDITY OF HUMAN LIFE ARE IN MAN ALONE, IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY FACT OR POSSIBLE FACT ABOUT THE WORLD. THIS ESSAY POINTS OUT THE FLAWS IN NAGEL'S VIEW AND DEVELOPS CAMUS' SYMPATHETICALLY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Gordon1999, author = {Gordon, Jill}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {743-745}, publisher = {Penn St Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Turning Toward Philosophy: Literary Device and Dramatic Structure in Plato's Dialogues}, volume = {66(3)}, year = {1999} } @article{GOTESKY1968, author = {GOTESKY, RUBIN}, title = {THE USES OF INCONSISTENCY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {471-500}, keywords = {action, communication, consistency, metaphysics, social}, abstract = {THIS SHORT ARTICLE POINTS OUT THAT THE PAPERS PUBLISHED ON PERSON IN THE ABOVE ISSUE SAY NOTHING ORIGINAL AND FURTHERMORE ARE USELESS TO ANY CLINICIAN, PSYCHIATRIST OR PSYCHOANALYST INTERESTED IN THE PREDICTION OF PERSONAL BEHAVIOR AND THE CURE OF 'ABNORMAL' OR 'DEVIANT' BEHAVIOR.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gowans2002, author = {Gowans, Christopher-W}, title = {Practical Identities and Autonomy: Korsgaard's Reformation of Kant's Moral Philosophy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {546-570}, keywords = {autonomy, ethics, identity, moral-theor}, abstract = {After briefly explaining Korsgaard's understanding of practical identities and their role in her reformation of Kant's moral philosophy, I argue that she gives an inadequate explanation of how the obligations that arise from a person's practical identities derive their authority from the person's will. I then consider how her position might be developed to meet this objection in accordance with her allegiance to "constructivism" and I argue that the epistemic commitments of people's actual identities makes it unlikely that such a development could preserve Kantian autonomy as she interprets it. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Gowans1994, author = {Gowans, Christopher-W}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {487-490}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Innocence Lost: An Examination of Inescapable Moral Wrongdoing}, volume = {63(2)}, year = {1994} } @article{GOWEN1980, author = {GOWEN, JULIE}, title = {A REPLY TO MORILLO'S "THE LOGIC OF ARGUMENTS FROM CONTINGENCY".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {430-433}, keywords = {contingency, logic, necessary}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GRACIA1975, author = {GRACIA, JORGE-J-E}, title = {THE MEANING OF 'DESIRABLE'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {398-401}, keywords = {desire, ethics}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE SHOWS HOW THE CONFUSION BETWEEN OBJECTIVISTS AND SUBJECTIVISTS STEMS FROM THEIR RESTRICTED UNDERSTANDING OF THE MEANING OF 'DESIRABLE'; WHILE THE OBJECTIVIST INTERPRETS 'X IS DESIRABLE' AS X IS WORTHY OF BEING DESIRED, THE SUBJECTIVIST INTERPRETS IT AS X CAN BE DESIRED. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A THIRD AND MORE FUNDAMENTAL MEANING TO THIS EXPRESSION, NAMELY: X IS CAPABLE OF BEING DESIRED. IT IS THIS LATTER SENSE, THE ARTICLE ARGUES, THAT OPENS UP THE WAY TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIVIST-SUBJECTIVIST IMPASSE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Gracia1999, author = {Gracia, Jorge-J-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {728-730}, publisher = {SUNY Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Metaphysics and Its Task: The Search for the Categorial Foundation of Knowledge}, volume = {65(3)}, year = {1999} } @other{Gracia1991, author = {Gracia, Jorge-J-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {233-236}, publisher = {SUNY Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Philosophy and Its History}, volume = {54(1)}, year = {1991} } @article{Graff2002, author = {Graff, Delia}, title = {An Anti-Epistemicist Consequence of Margin for Error Semantics for Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {127-142}, keywords = {epistemic, knowledge, logic, semantics, vagueness}, abstract = {A proposition p is transparent just in case p is known, and it is known that p is known, and it is known that it is known that p is known, and so on. I show that, given Timothy Williamson's margin for error semantics for epistemological operators, such as 'it is known that', the existence of transparent propositions--for example, "any man with 0% scalp coverage is bald"--requires (in a large class of models) that certain higher-order predicates (such as 'it is known that it is known that ... it is known that any many with x% scalp coverage is bald' for some large number of iterations of 'it is known that') have known boundaries. This is a fact which is apparently incompatible with an epistemicist theory of vagueness.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GRAFSTEIN1985, author = {GRAFSTEIN, ROBERT}, title = {ONTOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF JUSTICE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {115-138}, keywords = {justice, metaphysics, ontology, person, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Graham2000, author = {Graham, Peter-J}, title = {The Reliability of Testimony}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(3)}, pages = {695-709}, keywords = {epistemology, evidence, reliability, testimony}, abstract = {Are we entitled or justified in taking the word of others at face value? An affirmative answer to this question is associated with the views of Thomas Reid. Recently, C. A. J. Coady has defended a Reidian view in his impressive and influential book, Testimony: A Philosophical Study. His central and most original argument for his positions involves reflection upon the practice of giving and accepting reports, of making assertions and relying on the word of others. His argument purports to show that testimony is, by its very nature, a "reliable form of evidence about the way the world is." The argument moves from what we do to why we are justified in doing it. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GRAVE1962, author = {GRAVE, S-A}, title = {A NOTE ON BERKELEY'S CONCEPTION OF THE MIND.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {574-576}, keywords = {immaterialism, language, metaphor, metaphysics, mind, substance}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Greco2003, author = {Greco, John}, title = {Precis of Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {432-436}, keywords = {epistemology, externalism, knowledge, representation, scepticism, virtue}, abstract = {The book has three major theses. First, several skeptical arguments make no obvious mistake: an adequate response requires adopting substantive positions regarding the nature of knowledge. Second, skeptical arguments have methodological value: they serve as heuristic devices for highlighting plausible but mistaken assumptions about knowledge and evidence, thereby driving theory to more adequate accounts. Third, an analysis of skeptical arguments seriously motivates agent reliabilism. There is no logical or quasi-logical relation between empirical evidence and empirical belief. Accordingly, the notion of adequate evidence must be rethought along reliabilist lines.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Greco2003a, author = {Greco, John}, title = {Further Thoughts on Agent Reliabilism: Replies to Cohen, Geivett, Kvanvig, and Schmitt and Lahroodi}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {466-480}, keywords = {epistemology, reliabilism}, abstract = {This is the author's contribution to a symposium on Putting Skeptics in Their Place (Cambridge 2000). The paper clarifies how traditional skeptical arguments motivate reliabilism in epistemology. A solution to "the problem of strange and fleeting processes" is developed beyond that defended in the book. A reliabilist account of defeating evidence is outlined and defended. Finally, some methodological questions are addressed. A recurring theme of the paper is that knowledge is true belief grounded in reliable cognitive character, where character is understood in terms of (a) stability through relevantly close worlds and (b) integration with other cognitive dispositions.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Greco1995, author = {Greco, John}, title = {Reid's Critique of Berkeley and Hume: What's the Big Idea?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(2)}, pages = {279-296}, keywords = {epistemology, idea, knowledge}, abstract = {Reid thought that the linchpin of his response to skepticism was his rejection of the theory of ideas. I argue that Reid's assessment of his own work is incorrect; the theory of ideas plays no important role in at least one of Berkeley's and Hume's arguments for skepticism, and rejecting the theory is therefore neither necessary nor sufficient as a reply to that argument. Reid does in fact answer the argument, but with his theory of evidence rather than his rejection of the theory of ideas.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Greco2000, author = {Greco, John}, title = {Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {179-184}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, intellectual-virtue; knowledge}, abstract = {It is argued that the epistemologies of Goldman, Sosa and Zagzebski fall into the same broad camp; one which can appropriately be labelled "virtue epistemology." The real disagreement among these authors is over the nature of the intellectual virtues. Second, it is argued that Sosa and Goldman are correct in rejecting Aristotle's account of the moral virtues as the model for understanding intellectual virtues. Contra Zagzebski, the cognitive character that grounds knowledge, need not be acquired and need not include the strong motivational component of an Aristotelean moral virtue. Rather, the essential aspect of an intellectual virtue is its reliability.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Greco2000a, author = {Greco, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {437-443}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry}, volume = {66(2)}, year = {2000} } @other{Greco2000b, author = {Greco, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {444-450}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry}, volume = {66(2)}, year = {2000} } @other{Greco2000c, author = {Greco, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {451-456}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry}, volume = {66(2)}, year = {2000} } @other{Greco2000d, author = {Greco, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {457-465}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry}, volume = {66(2)}, year = {2000} } @other{Greco2000e, author = {Greco, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {466-480}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry}, volume = {66(2)}, year = {2000} } @article{GREEN1982, author = {GREEN, O-HARVEY}, title = {FEAR OF DEATH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {99-105}, keywords = {death, fear, metaphysics}, abstract = {THE EPICUREAN ARGUMENT THAT THE WISE MAN WILL NOT FEAR DEATH IS CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF A NUMBER OF RECENT CRITICISMS. THE CONTENTION OF THE PAPER IS THAT, THOUGH EPICURUS WAS RIGHT IN HOLDING THAT DEATH IS NO EVIL FOR ONE WHO DIES, IT IS NEVERTHELESS REASONABLE TO FEAR DEATH. AT ISSUE ARE BASIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE OCCURRENCE OF EVIL AND GOOD.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GREENHUT1960, author = {GREENHUT, MELVIN-L}, title = {SCIENCE, ART, AND NORMS IN ECONOMICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {159-172}, keywords = {art, economics, forecasting, laws, norm, science, social-sciences; social-theor}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE IS TO ESTABLISH AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ART-LIKE ASPECTS OF ECONOMICS. THE ARTICLE INQUIRES INTO THE CAPACITY OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE TO FORECAST FUTURE STATES, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE AUTHOR INVESTIGATES THE FACTORS THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED IN FORMULATING A NORMATIVE SOCIAL THEORY. WHAT IS NEEDED IN AN ADVANCE VERIFICATION IN DYNAMIC AND NORMATIVE SOCIAL THEORIES, AND NOT JUST AN INDUCTIVE TEST OF CONSEQUENCES; RATHER, A TEST OF THE THEORIES ASSUMPTIONS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ECONOMICS IS BOTH A SCIENCE AND AN ART. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GREENLEE1973, author = {GREENLEE, DOUGLAS}, title = {RELATIVITY WITHOUT INSCRUTABILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {574-578}, keywords = {metaphysics, ontology, relativity}, abstract = {THREE MODIFICATIONS OF W V O QUINE'S THESIS ABOUT THE LIMITS OF RADICAL TRANSLATION ARE OFFERED WITH THE AIM OF PRESERVING THAT THESIS FROM THE TRAP OF A PRIVATE LANGUAGE ISSUE WITH WHICH IT IS THREATENED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Greenspan1995, author = {Greenspan, P-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {730-732}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms}, volume = {58(3)}, year = {1995} } @article{GREENSTEIN1971, author = {GREENSTEIN, HAROLD}, title = {CAN MAN BE A SUBJECT FOR SCIENCE?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {585-596}, keywords = {action, motive, science, social-science}, abstract = {IT IS ARGUED THAT INSOFAR AS STATEMENTS OF LAWFUL CONNECTION ARE EMPIRICAL, ANY ARGUMENT WHICH PURPORTS TO SHOW THAT THERE MUST BE BEHAVIORAL LAWS THAT IS BASED UPON ANALYSIS OF EITHER THEIR CONCEPTS OF 'EXPLANATION' OR 'CAUSATION' MUST BE AN 'IGNORATIO ELENCHI'. FURTHER, IF THERE WERE SUCH LAWS, THEIR EXISTENCE COULD NOT BE A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE ADEQUACY OF MOTIVATIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR, E.G., IF IT WERE THE CASE THAT ALL SOLDIERS WHO ENTER BATTLE ARE FRIGHTENED, IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THEY ENTER BATTLE OUT OF, OR FOR THE SAKE OF FEAR. THAT THEIR EXISTENCE CANNOT BE A NECESSARY CONDITION OF THE ADEQUACY OF MOTIVATIONAL EXPLANATIONS CAN BE GRASPED FROM THE FACT THAT THE INABILITY TO GENERALIZE A PARTICULAR MOTIVATIONAL EXPLANATION IS NEVER A GROUND FOR ITS REJECTION. I CONCLUDE THAT MOTIVATIONAL AND COVERING LAW EXPLANATIONS ARE 'SUI GENERIS'.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GREGOR1968, author = {GREGOR, A-JAMES}, title = {MARXISM AND ETHICS: A METHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {368-384}, keywords = {ethics, marxism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gregory2004, author = {Gregory, Dominic}, title = {Imagining Possibilities}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {327-348}, keywords = {epistemology, imagination, modal, possibility, proposition}, abstract = {This paper argues that the imaginability of propositions of a certain kind under certain special circumstances implies their possibility. It then attempts to use that conclusion is doing some modal epistemology. In particular, the paper argues that the conclusion justifies some ascriptions of possibility and that it promises to justify some ascriptions of impossibility.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gregory2003, author = {Gregory, Paul-A}, title = {'Two Dogmas'--All Bark and No Bite? Carnap and Quine on Analyticity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {633-648}, keywords = {analyticity, deflationism, epistemology}, abstract = {Recently O'Grady argued that Quine's "Two Dogmas" misses its mark when Carnap's use of the analyticity distinction is understood in the light of his deflationism. While in substantial agreement with the stress on Carnap's deflationism, I argue that O'Grady is not sufficiently sensitive to the difference between using the analyticity distinction to support deflationism, and taking a deflationary attitude towards the distinction itself; the latter being much more controversial. Being sensitive to this difference, and viewing Quine as having reason to insist on a nonarbitrary analyticity distinction, we see that "Two Dogmas" makes direct contact with Carnap's deflationism. We must look beyond "Two Dogmas" to Quine's other critiques of analyticity to understand why the arbitrariness of the distinction threatens to undermine or overextend Carnap's deflationism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Griffin1996, author = {Griffin, James}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {237-240}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs}, volume = {60(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{GRIFFITH1962, author = {GRIFFITH, RICHARD-M}, title = {THE REALITY OF AN ILLUSION: A PSYCHOLOGY OF "AS-IF" FREE WILL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {232-242}, keywords = {as-if; determinism, experience, free-will; illusion, metaphysics, psychology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Grim1998, author = {Grim, Patrick and Mar, Gary and St.-Denis, Paul}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {489-492}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Philosophical Computer: Exploratory Essays in Philosophical Computer Modeling}, volume = {63(2)}, year = {1998} } @other{Griswold-Jr1999, author = {Griswold-Jr, Charles-L}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {714-718}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment}, volume = {61(3)}, year = {1999} } @article{GRUENDER1989, author = {GRUENDER, DAVID}, title = {INSTRUMENTALLY AIDED PERCEPTION AND ANCIENT GHOSTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {477-485}, keywords = {epistemology, instrument, observation, perception}, abstract = {ARGUMENTS FOR REALISM WHICH RELY ON OUR ABILITY TO SEE "THEORETICAL ENTITIES" THROUGH INSTRUMENTS ARE CONTRASTED WITH THOSE FOR CONSTRUCTIVISM WHICH DENY THAT WE SEE ANYTHING WITH THE UNAIDED EYE. INSTRUMENTALLY AIDED VISION IS COMPARED TO UNAIDED VISION, REASONS ARE FOUND TO CALL THE RESULTS OF BOTH "SEEING," AND TO BEWARE THE FAILINGS OF EACH. EXORCISM IS RECOMMENDED FOR ANY FORM OF THE DOCTRINE THAT SEEING IS BELIEVING, AND IT IS URGED THAT NO ONTOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS FOLLOW REGARDLESS OF WHETHER WE AFFIRM OR DENY THAT WE SEE OBJECTS WITH THE AID OF INSTRUMENTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Grunbaum2001, author = {Grunbaum, Adolf}, title = {Does Freudian Theory Resolve "The Paradoxes of Irrationality"?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {129-143}, keywords = {epistemology, irrationality, paradox}, abstract = {This paper consists of two related parts: I. A detailed critique of Donald Davidson's thesis--in his "The Paradoxes of Irrationality"--that "any satisfactory (explanatory) view (of irrationality) must embrace some of Freud's most important theses" (p. 290). II. Relatedly, in the second part, I confute the recent arguments given by Marcia Cavell, Thomas Nagel, et al., to establish that psychoanalytic causal explanations of irrationality are epistemically justified, because they are extensions of the desire-cum-belief pattern of accounting for intentional actions. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GRUNEBERG1969, author = {GRUNEBERG, R}, title = {HUMOR IN MUSIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {122-125}, keywords = {aesthetics, humor, music}, abstract = {THE PAPER ARGUES FOR THE LEGITIMACY OF THE TERM "HUMOR" AS APPLIED TO MUSIC. FOLLOWING N. HARTMANN'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE COMIC AS AN OBJECTIVE PHENOMENON AND HUMOR AS ONE OF SEVERAL POSSIBLE SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE COMIC, THE DEFINITION OF THE HUMOROUS ATTITUDE IS ADOPTED FROM THE FIELD OF LITERARY CRITICISM. IT IS ADMITTED THAT THE CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH HUMOROUS MUSIC OCCURS IS OFTEN DETERMINED BY LITERARY ASSOCIATIONS, E.G. A TITLE (SUCH AS "HUMORESKE"). YET THE HUMOR IS STILL WITHIN THE MUSIC SINCE ONE WOULD NOT SMILE AT THE TITLE ALONE. EVEN WITHIN LITERATURE, HUMOR IS DEPENDENT ON APPRECIATION OF CONTEXT. THE TERM "HUMOR" CAN CLAIM ACCEPTANCE IN THE AESTHETICS OF MUSIC.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Guevara1999, author = {Guevara, Daniel}, title = {The Impossibility of Supererogation in Kant's Moral Theory}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {593-624}, keywords = {ethics, moral-theory; supererogation}, abstract = {It is common to think that certain acts are supererogatory, especially certain heroic or saintly self-sacrifices for the good. The idea seems to have an ordinary and clear application. Nothing shows this better than the well-known cases which J.O. Urmson adduced. Urmson argued that no major moral theory could give a proper account of the supererogatory character of such acts, and that, therefore, none could account for "all the facts of morality," as he put it. But his arguments were sketchy. This paper shall show, in some detail, that he was essentially right about Kant's moral theory, and that the criticism goes deep and holds up against recent sympathetic interpretation of Kant's views of duty and worth.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GUIGNON1986, author = {GUIGNON, CHARLES-B}, title = {ON SAVING HEIDEGGER FROM RORTY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {401-417}, keywords = {existence, historicism, language, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GUIGNON1990, author = {GUIGNON, CHARLES}, title = {Philosophy after Wittgenstein and Heidegger.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {649-672}, keywords = {meaning, philosophy, truth}, abstract = {The question is: how does the thought of Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein lead to such different postfoundationalist views as those of Charles Taylor and Richard Rorty? I consider how the "phenomenology of everyday life" in Heidegger and Wittgenstein shows (1) that understanding is dependent on a social background of meanings, and (2) that the sense of reality embodied in our actions is prestructured by language. This picture of everydayness is holistic, antidualistic and nonfoundationalist. I conclude by focusing the debate between Taylor and Rorty, suggesting that Taylor's reading of our current philosophical situation is more viable.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GULESERIAN1985, author = {GULESERIAN, THEODORE}, title = {CAN MORAL PERFECTION BE AN ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTE?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {219-241}, keywords = {god, perfection, religion}, abstract = {CONTRARY TO THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF DIVINITY, NOTHING--INCLUDING GOD--CAN BE MORALLY PERFECT ESSENTIALLY, BECAUSE THE KIND OF FREEDOM REQUIRED FOR BEING A MORAL BEING ENTAILS THE POSSIBILITY OF WRONG-DOING. THE ARGUMENT SHOWS THAT THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLE, OFTEN TACITLY USED, IS FALSE: FOR EVERY EXCELLENCE "P", THE PROPERTY OF HAVING "P" ESSENTIALLY IS BETTER THAN THE PROPERTY OF HAVING "P" CONTINGENTLY. HENCE, ANY ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT THAT ENTAILS THAT GOD HAS ESSENTIAL MORAL PERFECTION IS DEFECTIVE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GULESERIAN1971, author = {GULESERIAN, THEODORE}, title = {FACTUAL NECESSITY AND THE LIBERTARIAN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {32}, pages = {188-204}, keywords = {libertarianism, logic, modal-logic; necessity}, abstract = {THE WORK PERFORMED BY THE NOTION OF FACTUAL NECESSITY IN THE LIBERTARIAN'S POSITION IS PRECISELY DESCRIBED. A PORTION OF A FORMAL SYSTEM OF FACTUAL NECESSITY IS PRESENTED WHEREIN THE CONCEPT OF FACTUAL NECESSITY APPEARS AS A PRIMITIVE MODAL OPERATOR. THE PARTIAL SYSTEM (OR CHARACTERIZATION) INCLUDES A SPECIAL FORM OF THE FOLLOWING CONTROVERSIAL RULE OF INFERENCE: FROM, IT IS CONTINGENTLY TRUE THAT P AND IT IS FACTUALLY NECESSARY THAT IF P THEN Q, TO INFER THAT IT IS FACTUALLY NECESSARY THAT Q. THE CONCEPT OF FACTUAL NECESSITY AS THUS CHARACTERIZED IS DEFENDED FROM SEVERAL OBJECTIONS, INCLUDING THE STANDARD CHARGE OF CONFUSION WITH THE CONCEPT OF LOGICAL NECESSITY OR LOGICAL INFERENCE. BRUCE AUNE'S TREATMENT OF FACTUAL NECESSITY, WHICH LEADS HIM TO CONCLUDE THAT THE CONCEPT IS USELESS, IS SHOWN TO BE FUNDAMENTALLY DEFECTIVE. THE UPSHOT IS THAT REGARDING FACTUAL NECESSITY THE LIBERTARIAN CAN CLEAR HIMSELF OF THE POPULAR CHARGE OF 'CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION.'}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gupta2002, author = {Gupta, Anil}, title = {Partially Defined Predicates and Semantic Pathology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {402-409}, keywords = {language, predicate, semantics}, abstract = {Scott Soames's book Understanding Truth illuminates many logical and philosophical issues surrounding the concept of truth. I will focus in this note on Soames's illumination of semantic pathologies and, more particularly, of Saul Kripke's theory of truth. Soames develops a new philosophical interpretation of Kripke's theory--an interpretation that is superior to the one provided by Kripke himself. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gupta2003, author = {Gupta, Anil}, title = {Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich's Use Theory of Meaning}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {654-666}, keywords = {deflationism, epistemology, meaning, representation}, abstract = {This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich's use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles that are fundamental to an explanation of the acceptance of sentences with principles that are fundamental to meaning.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Gupta2006, author = {Gupta, Anil}, title = {Remarks on Christopher Hill's Thought and World}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {72(1)}, pages = {190-195}, keywords = {correspondence, epistemology, minimalism, proposition}, abstract = {Hill aims to bring about a union of deflationism with the correspondence theory of truth. I argue that Hill's proposed union is perfectly acceptable to a correspondence theorist. It is the deflationist who will resist it. I draw attention to three features of Hill's treatment of substitutional quantifiers that are likely to be problematic for the deflationist.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Gupta1993, author = {Gupta, Anil and Belnap, Nuel}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {727-730}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Revision Theory of Truth}, volume = {56(3)}, year = {1993} } @article{GURWITSCH1970, author = {GURWITSCH, ARON}, title = {TOWARDS A THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {354-367}, keywords = {consciousness, epistemology, idea, intentionality, perception}, abstract = {MODERN PHILOSOPHY WAS DOMINATED BY THE THEORY OF IDEAS, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE ONLY DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE ARE OUR OWN MENTAL STATES. AN EXAMINATION OF THIS THEORY IN BOTH ITS REPRESENTATIVE (DESCARTES) AND NON-REPRESENTATIVE (HUME) VERSIONS MAKES APPEAR THE INSUPERABLE DIFFICULTIES BY WHICH IT IS BESET. THUS THE COGENCY OF HUSSERL'S CONCEPTION OF THE INTENTIONALITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS - INTERPRETED AS NOETICO-NOEMATIC CORRELATION - IS SET FORTH.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GUSTAFSON1966, author = {GUSTAFSON, DONALD-F}, title = {ASSERTIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {421-426}, keywords = {assertion, fatalism, future, generality, language, singulars}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GUSTAFSON1964, author = {GUSTAFSON, DON-F}, title = {VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {493-501}, keywords = {causation, choice, could-have; decision, excuses, free-will; intention, philosophical-anthropology; volition, voluntary-actio}, abstract = {THIS PAPER EXAMINES THE USES OF THE WORDS VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY AS ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE QUESTIONS ASKED BY MEANS OF "VOLUNTARY OR INVOLUNTARY?" A VARIATION OF RYLE'S THESIS ABOUT THIS QUESTION IS DEFENDED. THE PAPER CONTAINS A CRITICISM OF THE VIEW THAT A VOLUNTARY ACTION IS A SET OF MOVEMENTS CAUSED BY AN ACT OF VOLITION AND THE VIEW THAT THERE IS A LOGICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN CHOOSING, OR DECIDING, OR INTENDING AND AN ACT'S BEING VOLUNTARY. I DISCUSS "COULD HAVE" IN RELATION TO THE NOTIONS OF ABILITY TO DO SOMETHING, CAPACITY NOW TO DO SOMETHING, SKILL IN DOING SOMETHING, OPPORTUNITY TO DO SOMETHING, AUTHORITY TO DO SOMETHING, AND RIGHT TO DO SOMETHING. THERE IS A SHORT DISCUSSION OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ANSWER TO "VOLUNTARY OR INVOLUNTARY?" AND THE GIVING AND RECEIVING OF EXCUSES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GUSTAFSON1967, author = {GUSTAFSON, DONALD}, title = {ON PITCHER'S ACCOUNT OF INVESTIGATION 43.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {252-258}, keywords = {language, meaning}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GUTTING1978, author = {GUTTING, GARY}, title = {HUSSERL AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {39}, pages = {42-56}, keywords = {experience, idealization, realism, science, scientific-method; world}, abstract = {THE GOAL OF THIS PAPER IS TO DEFEND SCIENTIFIC REALISM (OF THE SORT PROPOSED BY WILFRID SELLARS) AGAINST THE ATTACK ON IT IMPLICIT IN HUSSERL'S "CRISIS". IN PARTICULAR, I DISCUSS THREE ANTI-REALIST HUSSERLIAN THESES: (1) THAT THE METHOD OF SCIENCE IS IN ESSENCE ONE OF THE IDEALIZATION; (2) THAT ALL SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS CAN BE TRACED BACK TO OUR LIFE-WORLD EXPERIENCE; (3) THAT ANY SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THE WORLD NECESSARILY OMITS MAJOR DIMENSIONS OF OUR LIFE-WORLD EXPERIENCES. I ARGUE THAT EACH OF THESE THESES IS INCONSISTENT WITH A CORRECT UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY. I FURTHER ARGUE THAT THESE THESES DERIVE ONLY FROM HUSSERL'S FAULTY EXPLICATION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD; THERE IS NOTHING IN HUSSERL'S BASIC EPISTEMOLOGICAL POSITION THAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH (A PROPERLY CONSTRUED) SCIENTIFIC REALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GUYER1979, author = {GUYER, PAUL}, title = {HEGEL, LEIBNIZ, AND THE CONTRADICTION IN THE FINITE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {75-98}, keywords = {contradiction, determination, dialectic, finite, metaphysics, semantics, substance}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{GYEKYE1973, author = {GYEKYE, KWAME}, title = {AN EXAMINATION OF THE BUNDLE-THEORY OF SUBSTANCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {51-61}, keywords = {metaphysics, phenomenalism, quality, substance}, abstract = {IN THIS PAPER I ARGUE THAT THE BUNDLE-THEORY, THE THEORY THAT SUBSTANCE IS NOTHING BUT A COLLECTION OF QUALITIES, BRISTLES WITH DIFFICULTIES. I SHOW THAT A CONJUNCTION OF THE SO-CALLED ESSENTIAL QUALITIES WOULD PRIMARILY YIELD A CONCEPTION NOT OF AN INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE SOCRATES, FOR INSTANCE, BUT OF A SPECIES, I.E., THE CONCEPT 'MAN', AND THAT ONLY THE ADDITION OF SOME UNIQUELY DETERMINING ACCIDENTAL QUALITIES TO THE ESSENTIAL ONES WOULD YIELD AN INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE. BUT, THEN, THESE ACCIDENTAL QUALITIES AND INFINITE IN NUMBER AND ARE THEREFORE ONLY POTENTIAL AND UNKNOWABLE. THUS, THE "BUNDLE" CAN NEVER BE 'ACTUALIZED'. NOR CAN THE NOTION OF SUBSTANCE BE ELIMINATED IN FAVOR OF DESCRIPTIONS, SINCE THESE SHOULD INCLUDE NEGATIVE DESCRIPTIONS WHICH ARE INFINITE IN NUMBER BECAUSE EXPRESSIBLE IN TERMS OF THE WHOLE UNIVERSE. SINCE NOT ALL DESCRIPTIONS APPLY TO A THING, WHERE THEY DO, THEY MUST HAVE BEEN ANTECEDENTLY 'DERIVED' FROM THAT THING. HENCE, I CONCLUDE THAT THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR AT LEAST A LIMITED DEFENSE OF A SUBSTANCE ONTOLOGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Haack1996, author = {Haack, Susan}, title = {Precis of Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {611-614}, keywords = {cognitive-science; epistemology, evidence, knowledge, reconstruction}, abstract = {Summarizes key themes, including: the gradational character of justification; foundherentism; state versus content senses of "belief" and "evidence," causal and evaluative elements in the concept of justification; perception as at once direct and interpretive; the crossword analogy for the structure of justification; supportiveness, comprehensiveness and independent security as determinants of degree of justification. Sketches my disambiguation of Quine's "epistemology naturalized" and my critique of Rorty's reasons for repudiating epistemology. Comments on what contemporary epistemology has to learn from the tradition of classical pragmatism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Haack1996a, author = {Haack, Susan}, title = {Reply to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {641-656}, keywords = {epistemology, evidence}, abstract = {Reply to Thayer: clarifies the distinction between criteria of evidence and guidelines for the conduct of inquiry and my understanding of the contrasts personal/impersonal, individual/social, objective/subjective/relative. Reply to Cargile: clarifies issues concerning inconsistent evidence, defends my response to the lottery paradox, modifies my proposal to accommodate degrees of belief as well as justification; Reply to Aune: explains why the mathematical theory of probability cannot, as he hopes, resolve epistemological issues. Reply to Floridi: shows that I can offer a better account of "objective knowledge" than Popper, explains why my approach is irreconcilable with Rorty-esque conversationalism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Haack1993, author = {Haack, Susan}, title = {Double-Aspect Foundherentism: A New Theory of Empirical Justification}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {113-128}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, justification, language, semantics}, abstract = {This paper develops a theory of justification which, like foundationalism and unlike coherentism, allows the relevance of experience to the justification of empirical beliefs, and, like coherentism and unlike foundationalism, requires neither beliefs justified exclusively by experience, nor exclusively one-directional relations of evidential support. To explicate the role of experience, the theory combines causal and evaluative elements. The causal element makes the theory consonant with a very modest style of epistemological naturalism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HACKER1972, author = {HACKER, EDWARD-A}, title = {RATIONALITY VERSUS DEHUMANIZATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {259-267}, keywords = {dehumanization, rationality, social-philosoph}, abstract = {DESCRIBES TWO CURRENT WORLD VIEWS: MECHANISM AND NEOROMANTICISM. PURPOSE IS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT BOTH VIEWS DEHUMANIZE MAN. SOLUTION IS TO INTEGRATE BOTH VIEWS: TO MEANINGFULLY COMBINE MEANS AND ENDS. SUCH A WORLD VIEW IS A RATIONAL VIEW.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HACKER1972a, author = {HACKER, P-M}, title = {OTHER MINDS AND PROFESSOR AYER'S CONCEPT OF A PERSON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {341-354}, keywords = {metaphysics, minds, person}, abstract = {AYER'S FOUR STAGE ARGUMENT AGAINST STRAWSON IS ANALYZED. IT IS ARGUED THAT 1) AYER MISINTERPRETS THE NOTION OF A CRITERION AND THE THRUST OF THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT. 2) AYER FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE STRAWSONIAN/WITTGENSTEINIAN ARGUMENT DOES NOT REFUTE SCEPTICISM ABOUT OTHER MINDS. 3) AYER'S DEFENCE OF THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY IS DEFECTIVE. THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY, IF NEEDED, IS USELESS, AND IF EMPLOYABLE IS REDUNDANT. 4) AYER'S VERSION OF THE NO-OWNERSHIP THEORY IS INCOHERENT. IT PRESUPPOSES THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING THE CONTENT OF AN EXPERIENCE WITHOUT IDENTIFYING WHOSE EXPERIENCE IT IS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HADDOX1964, author = {HADDOX, JOHN-H}, title = {PHILOSOPHY WITH A MEXICAN PERSPECTIVE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {580-586}, keywords = {culture, mexican, philosopher, philosophy, text, twentieth}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE SUMMARIZES THE ATTEMPTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE AT A MEXICAN PHILOSOPHY AND ASKS WHAT MAKES PHILOSOPHY MEXICAN. THE WORK OF VASCONCELOS AND CASO IS DISCUSSED. THEN ORTEGA'S DOCTRINE OF THE POINT OF VIEW OR "PERSPECTIVE" IS DISCUSSED AND HIS INFLUENCE ON RAMOS AND ZEA IS NOTED. THESE LATTER TWO DEVELOPED EXISTENTIALISM AND PERSPECTIVISM. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HADGOPOULOS1974, author = {HADGOPOULOS, DEMETRIUS-J}, title = {A NOTE ON ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF IDENTITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {113-114}, keywords = {identity, metaphysics}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THIS NOTE IS TO SHOW THAT BOCHENSKI'S BELIEF THAT WE DO NOT FIND IN ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL WORKS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE TRANSITIVITY OF IDENTITY IS MISTAKEN. A PASSAGE IS CITED FROM THE SECOND BOOK, CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE OF THE "PRIOR ANALYTICS" WHERE ARISTOTLE EXPLICITLY STATES THE LOGICAL PRINCIPLE WHICH BOCHENSKI THINKS IS MISSING FROM THE "ORGANON."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HAHN1961, author = {HAHN, LEWIS-E}, title = {PHILOSOPHY AS COMPREHENSIVE VISION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {16-25}, keywords = {comprehension, method, perception, philosophy, problem, psychology, specialization, vision}, abstract = {AN APPEAL IS MADE HERE FOR A BROAD PERSPECTIVE IN PHILOSOPHY. THE AUTHOR WANTS TO SEE CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY. ONE SHOULD BE SUSPICIOUS OF PHILOSOPHIC CONCLUSIONS IF THEY ARE IN CONFLICT WITH SCIENTIFIC ONES. THERE SHOULD BE COOPERATION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HAIGHT1976, author = {HAIGHT, DAVID}, title = {THE SOURCE OF LINGUISTIC MEANING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {239-247}, keywords = {intersubjectivity, language, meaning, speech}, abstract = {IN OPPOSITION TO MERLEAU-PONTY'S "LEBENSWELT" AND WITTGENSTEIN'S "LEBENSFORM" AS THE SOURCE OF LINGUISTIC MEANING, IT IS ARGUED THAT ONLY A TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVITY CAN ACCOUNT FOR THE FACTS OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SPEAKING SITUATION. INTER-SUBJECTIVITY MUST BE ROOTED IN TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVITY IN ORDER TO AVOID THE CIRCULARITY OF BOTH THINKERS WHEN THEY SAY THAT NEW LINGUISTIC MEANINGS ARE ANCHORED IN ALREADY AVAILABLE ONES AND THAT ALREADY SEDIMENTED MEANINGS APPEAR THROUGH NEW SENSE-GIVING INTENTIONS. IF PRIMORDIAL SPEECH HAD TO WAIT FOR ALREADY SEDIMENTED EXPRESSIONS, THERE WOULD BE NO SPEECH AT ALL!}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Haji1997, author = {Haji, Ishtiyaque}, title = {An Epistemic Dimension of Blameworthiness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {523-544}, keywords = {action, blameworthiness, epistemology, ethics, knowledge}, abstract = {The author first argues against the view that an agent is morally blameworthy for performing an action only if it is morally wrong for that agent to perform that action. The author then proposes a replacement for this view whose gist is summarized in the principle: an agent S is morally blameworthy for performing action A only if S has the belief that it is wrong for her to do A and this belief plays an appropriate role in S's A-ing. He focuses on explicating the role an agent's belief that a prospective action, A, of hers is wrong must play in the production of her A-ing in order that she be blameworthy for A-ing. Towards this end, the author makes use of cases involving akrasia and self-deception.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HAJI1991, author = {HAJI, Ishtiyaque}, title = {Hampton on Hobbes on State-of-Nature Cooperation.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {contractarianism, social-philosophy; state-of-natur}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Haji2002, author = {Haji, Ishtiyaque}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {492-495}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Deontic Morality and Control}, volume = {70(2)}, year = {2002} } @other{Haji1998, author = {Haji, Ishtiyaque}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {711-715}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals and Perplexities}, volume = {63(3)}, year = {1998} } @article{Haldane1992, author = {Haldane, John}, title = {Putnam on Intentionality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {671-682}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, language, semantics}, abstract = {In recent publications Hilary Putnam has criticised realist and reductionist accounts of intentionality. He argues that the claim that intentionality is an objective, primitive mind/world relation is demonstrably incoherent. The resent paper identifies several distinct charges in Putnam's writings and in examining them and their presuppositions it argues that the case against intentionalism is not made out. At least one version of realism about intentional content and reference escapes conviction.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hale2002, author = {Hale, Bob}, title = {Can Arboreal Knotwork Help Blackburn Out of Frege's Abyss?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {144-149}, keywords = {conditional, desire, ethics, expressivism, passion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hale2006, author = {Hale, Bob}, title = {The Limits of Abstraction}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {72(1)}, pages = {223-232}, keywords = {abstraction, logic, number, object}, abstract = {Kit Fine's book The Limits of Abstraction divides into two parts: (i) a philosophical critique of attempts to employ abstraction principles (e.g., Hume's principle: The number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs if and only if the Fs and Gs correspond one-one) as definitions, and (ii) a formal theory of abstraction in which, under a substantial assumption about the size of the universe of objects, arithmetic and analysis can be derived. This review briefly outlines the main ideas of the first part and sketches responses to Fine's main criticisms of abstraction principles as implicit definitions.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hales2001, author = {Hales, Steven-D}, title = {Lynch's Metaphysical Pluralism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {699-709}, keywords = {metaphysics, pluralism, preference, proposition, truth}, abstract = {This review essay is an in-depth evaluation of Michael P. Lynch's book Truth in Context. Lynch argues that metaphysical pluralism--the idea that truth propositions and facts concerning the nature of reality are relative to conceptual schemes or worldviews--is compatible with realism about truth. It is argued that Lynch is correct that there are consistent, interesting, and nontrivial forms of pluralism. However, much needs to be done to think that pluralism is the correct theory of truth.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hales1996, author = {Hales, Steven-D}, title = {Nietzsche on Logic}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {819-835}, keywords = {criticism, history, logic, philosophy}, abstract = {Nietzsche is infamous for denouncing logic, but despite the importance of logic in contemporary philosophy, there has been very little scholarly attention paid to his criticisms. This paper argues that Nietzsche's antilogic polemics are directed against semantics, which he regards as being committed to a realist metaphysics. It is this metaphysical realism that Nietzsche abhors, not logical syntax or proof theory. Nietzsche is also at pains to critique logicians who naively accept realist semantics. Other interpreters who cast Nietzsche as a logical nihilist are criticized as unjustly neglecting key prologic texts.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HALL1961, author = {HALL, EVERETT-W}, title = {ON EXORCISING MENTAL GHOSTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {572-574}, keywords = {epistemology, intention, mental-act; neurophysiology, perception}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HALL1989, author = {HALL, RICHARD-J}, title = {ARE PAINS NECESSARILY UNPLEASANT?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {643-659}, keywords = {metaphysics, nature, necessary-condition; pain, perception}, abstract = {PAIN SENSATIONS SEEM NECESSARILY UNPLEASANT OR EVEN AWFUL. BUT THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT THEY AREN'T. PAIN SENSATIONS ARE THE SENSATIONS WHICH ACCOMPANY CERTAIN OF OUR PERCEPTIONS OF BODILY DAMAGE, NAMELY THOSE PRODUCED BY OUR NOCICEPTORS. UNPLEASANTNESS OR AWFULNESS IS NOT AN INHERENT PHENOMENAL QUALITY OF THESE SENSATIONS. RATHER IT IS A SEPARATE MENTAL STATE, A STATE OF DISLIKE, PROBABLY ASSOCIATED WITH THESE SENSATIONS THROUGH LEARNING OR EVOLUTION, BUT IN ANY CASE ONLY CONTINGENTLY CONNECTED WITH THEM. IF PAIN SENSATIONS ARE ONLY CONTINGENTLY UNPLEASANT, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DISASSOCIATE THE UNPLEASANTNESS FROM THE PAIN. SEVERAL EMPIRICAL STUDIES ARE DESCRIBED WHICH SUGGEST THAT THIS ACTUALLY HAPPENS IN CERTAIN CASES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HALL1980, author = {HALL, RICHARD-B}, title = {DOES ANTINATURALISM IMPLY RELATIVISM?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {225-227}, keywords = {ethics, naturalism, relativism}, abstract = {THIS DISCUSSION NOTE CRITICIZES AN ARGUMENT BY DAVID BLUMBERG PURPORTING TO PROVE THAT, NONNATURALISM ASIDE, A MORAL RELATIVISM DESTRUCTIVE OF ETHICAL KNOWLEDGE WOULD NOT FOLLOW FROM THE ABANDONMENT OF ETHICAL NATURALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hallett2000, author = {Hallett, Garth-L}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {242-244}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A Middle Way to God}, volume = {67(1)}, year = {2000} } @article{HAMBOURGER1987, author = {HAMBOURGER, ROBERT}, title = {NEED MIRACLES BE EXTRAORDINARY?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {435-449}, keywords = {miracle, nature, religion}, abstract = {CRITICS FOLLOWING HUME ARGUE THAT MIRACLES BY NATURE VIOLATE REGULARITIES WHICH ARE AS WELL ESTABLISHED AS ANY AND WHICH THEREFORE CANNOT BE OVERTHROWN BY TESTIMONY. IT IS ARGUED HERE, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH CRITICISMS INVOLVE ERRORS OF INDUCTIVE REASONING AND THAT IF THERE IS EVEN A REMOTE CHANCE THAT A NON-DEISTIC GOD EXISTS, MIRACLES SIMPLY WOULD NOT BE THAT EXTRAORDINARY, SO THAT OFTEN STRONG TESTIMONY WILL PROVIDE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THEM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HAMBURG1964, author = {HAMBURG, CARL-H}, title = {A CASSIRER-HEIDEGGER SEMINAR.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {208-222}, keywords = {being, nature, neo-kantianism; philosophy, science, text, translation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HAMPTON1991, author = {HAMPTON, Jean}, title = {Cooperating and Contracting: A Reply to I Haji's "Hampton on Hobbes on State-of- Nature Cooperation".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {contractarianism, cooperation, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HANDY1967, author = {HANDY, ROLLO}, title = {COMMENTS ON ASHER MOORE'S EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {415-417}, keywords = {epistemology, phenomenology}, abstract = {MOORE IS CRITICIZED AS OVERLY ROMANTIC, AS PUTTING TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON HIMSELF, AND AS INCONSISTENT. HIS CLAIM THAT A HUMAN IS UNIQUE, UNREPEATABLE, AND ENTIRELY PARTICULAR IS CHALLENGED. IN GENERAL, I ARGUE THAT MOORE'S ROMANTIC EXISTENTIALISM IS LESS SUCCESSFUL THAN A SCIENTIFIC VIEW EMPHASIZING THE BIOSOCIAL NATURE OF MAN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HANDY1960, author = {HANDY, ROLLO}, title = {DETERMINISM, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE SOCIAL SETTING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {469-476}, keywords = {causality, determinism, ethics, freedom, ordinary-language; responsibility}, abstract = {THE COMPLEX OF PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE DETERMINISM-LIBERTARIANISM CONTROVERSY HAS BEEN DISCUSSED FROM MANY THEORETICAL POINTS OF VIEW. VARIOUS FORMS OF DETERMINISM AND LIBERTARIANISM HAVE BEEN HELD TO BE INIMICAL TO ETHICS; BOTH HAVE BEEN DECLARED TO BE EITHER MEANINGLESS OR USELESS; AND RESPONSIBILITY HAS BEEN SAID BY SOME TO DEPEND ON LIBERTARIANISM, AND BY OTHERS TO DEPEND UPON DETERMINISM. IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ACCEPTANCE OF DETERMINISM, THE AUTHOR EXAMINES AND DEFENDS A DETERMINISTIC VIEW OF RESPONSIBILITY, AND REJECTS CRITICISM OF THAT VIEW BASED ON ORDINARY LANGUAGE CONSIDERATIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HANDY1963, author = {HANDY, ROLLO}, title = {EXISTENTIAL VS BIOSOCIAL THEORIES OF MAN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {244-246}, keywords = {existentialism, man, philosophical-anthropology; psychotherapy, subjectivism}, abstract = {EXISTENTIAL THEORIES OF HUMAN NATURE ARE CRITICIZED AS IGNORING WELL-FOUNDED EVIDENCE FROM THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES. THE PAPER ARGUES THAT HUMANS ARE BIOSOCIAL ORGANISMS OPERATING IN, AND BY MEANS OF, THEIR ENVIRONMENT; TO IGNORE SUCH DATA TO THE DEGREE EXISTENTIALISTS USUALLY DO IS TO MAKE "EXISTENCE" MORE PRECARIOUS THAN IS NECESSARY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hankinson1998, author = {Hankinson, R-J}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {481-484}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought}, volume = {65(2)}, year = {1998} } @article{Hanna1998, author = {Hanna, Robert}, title = {A Kantian Critique of Scientific Essentialism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {497-528}, keywords = {epistemology, essentialism, kantianism, knowledge, science}, abstract = {According to Kant in the Prolegomena, the natural kind proposition, (GYM) "Gold is a yellow metal" is analytically true, necessary, and a priori. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam have argued that on the contrary, propositions such as (GYM) are neither analytic, nor necessary, nor a priori. The Kripke-Putnam view is based on the doctrine of "scientific essentialism" (SE). It is a direct consequence of SE that propositions such as (GE) "Gold is the element with atomic number 79" are metaphysically necessary and a posteriori. Were Kant to travel by time machine to the present and to consider (GE), however, he would regard it as metaphysically contingent; and even if he were able to admit it as necessary, it would be synthetic a priori, and not a posteriori. In these ways, the conflict between Kant and the scientific essentialists is a sharply-defined one.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HANNA1984, author = {HANNA, ROBERT}, title = {THE RELATION OF FORM AND STUFF IN HUSSERL'S GRAMMAR OF PURE LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {323-342}, keywords = {form, logic, proposition, syntactics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hanna1993, author = {Hanna, Robert}, title = {Logical Cognition: Husserl's "Prolegomena" and the Truth in Psychologism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {251-275}, keywords = {cognition, epistemology, logic, psychologism, truth}, abstract = {Frege's devastating attack on logical psychologism leaves philosophers of logic in a quandary: If logical propositions exist altogether independently of human acts of thinking, then "how" can they be grasped by thinkers? Husserl's "Prolegomena to Pure Logic" contains a thorough critique of psychologism, but manages to avoid Frege's problem by developing a plausible theory of logical cognition. Husserl's account entails that (a) logical propositions are essentially knowable by finite rational minds, but also (b) those propositions are irreducible to individual human minds. Hence Husserl shows that there can be a weak form of psychologism that is perfectly consistent with anti-psychologism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HAQUE1970, author = {HAQUE, INTISAR-UL}, title = {THE PERSON AND PERSONAL IDENTITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {60-72}, keywords = {identity, metaphysics, person, self}, abstract = {PERSONAL IDENTITY LINKED WITH CONCEPTS OF PERSON AND INDIVIDUATION. DEFECTS OF DUALISM IN CONCEPT OF PERSON AS DISEMBODIED EGO. ARGUMENT OF ANALOGY PRESUPPOSES EXISTENCE OF OTHER EGO. PERSONAL IDENTITY IN TERMS OF BODILY IDENTITY ALSO UNACCEPTABLE FOR WANT OF HARMONY BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CHARACTERISTICS. CONCEPT OF PERSON INTEGRATES CONCEPTUALLY SEPARATED BODILY AND MENTAL CHARACTERISTICS. SPATIO-TEMPORAL CONTINUITY NECESSARY FOR INDIVIDUATION BUT PERSON IS NOT MERE MATERIAL. OLD CONCEPTS OF SPACE, TIME AND MATTER MISLEADING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hardcastle1998, author = {Hardcastle, Gary-L}, title = {On the Matter of Minds and Mental Causation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {1-25}, keywords = {causation, matter, mental, metaphysics, mind}, abstract = {There is a difference between someone breaking a glass by accidentally brushing up against it and smashing a glass in a fit of anger. In the first case, the person's cognitive state has little to do with the event, but in the second, the mental state qua anger is quite relevant. How are we to understand this difference? What is the proper way to understand the relation between the mind, the brain, and the resultant behavior? This paper explores the popular "middle ground" reply in which mental phenomena are claimed to be "as real as" other higher level properties. It argues that this solution fails to answer epistemological difficulties surrounding how to chose the appropriate factors in an explanation. A more sophisticated understanding of scientific theorizing and of the relation between ontology and explanation give us a framework in which we can determine when we should refer to mental states as being the causally efficacious agents for some behavior.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hardcastle1996, author = {Hardcastle, Valerie-Gray}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {221-224}, publisher = {SUNY Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {How to Build a Theory in Cognitive Science}, volume = {60(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{HARDIN1987, author = {HARDIN, CLYDE-L}, title = {QUALIA AND MATERIALISM: CLOSING THE EXPLANATORY GAP.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {281-298}, keywords = {materialism, metaphysics, mind, quality, sense}, abstract = {MATERIALIST PROPOSALS TO LOCATE QUALIA OUTSIDE THE HEAD ARE UNCONVINCING. IT HAS BEEN OBJECTED THAT QUALIA CANNOT BE IN THE HEAD EITHER, SINCE SENSORY EXPERIENCES CANNOT BE MAPPED ONTO NEURAL PROCESSES BY ANY RELATION STRONGER THAN "DE FACTO" NONCOMITANCE. THE OBJECTION IS MISPLACED. A HYPOTHETICAL NEURAL PROCESS IS SKETCHED TO ILLUSTRATE HOW THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXPERIENCES OF RED AND EXPERIENCES OF GREEN MIGHT BE REPRESENTED AND EXPLAINED. THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF A PROGRAM TO IDENTIFY THE QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPERIENCE WITH NEURAL CODINGS IS TO BE JUDGED ON EMPIRICAL RATHER THAN "A PRIORI" GROUNDS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARE1968, author = {HARE, PETER and KOEHL, RICHARD}, title = {MOORE AND DUCASSE ON THE SENSE DATA ISSUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {313-331}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, sense-dat}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Harman2001, author = {Harman, Gilbert}, title = {General Foundations versus Rational Insight}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {657-663}, keywords = {coherence, epistemology, justification, knowledge, rationality}, abstract = {BonJour offers two main reasons for supposing that there is such a thing as rational insight into necessity. First, he says there are many examples in which it clearly seems that one has such insight. Second, he argues that any epistemology denying the existence of rational insight into necessity is committed to a narrow skepticism. After commenting about possible frameworks for epistemological justification, I argue against these two claims in reverse order.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Harman1998, author = {Harman, Gilbert}, title = {Precis of Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity: Precis of Part One}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {161-169}, keywords = {absolutism, ethics, moral-theory; objectivity, relativism}, abstract = {The book, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, contains an argument for moral relativism by Gilbert Harman, followed by an argument for a nonrelativistic form of moral objectivity by Judith Jarvis Thomson. Then Harman and Thomson each reply to the other's argument. Harman's Precis summarizes his argument. Moral relativism is a thesis about the world, not a thesis about what people mean by moral terminology. It provides the most plausible account of intractable moral disagreement. Moral relativism may allow for a quasi-absolutist usage which would make moral relativism difficult but not impossible to formulate. That usage would influence what can be said about reasons other people have to do things.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Harman1998a, author = {Harman, Gilbert}, title = {Responses to Critics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {207-213}, keywords = {ethics, objectivity}, abstract = {This response to critics discusses the following issues: the intelligibility of the issue between moral absolutism and moral relativism; what the issue about moral explanations is: how moral relativism can allow for some universal moral principles that hold in all moral frameworks; what it is for moral relativists to accept norms; why I discuss a quasi-absolutist use of moral terms; why that use has to presuppose moral relativism; why the full acceptance of moral principles can arise from moral bargaining; and how certain moral judgments may be made in relation to the moral framework of the agent being judged.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Harman1993, author = {Harman, Gilbert}, title = {Stringency of Rights and "Ought"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {181-185}, keywords = {epistemology, legal, rights, transplantation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARMAN1991, author = {HARMAN, Gilbert}, title = {Justification, Truth, Goals, and Pragmatism: Comments on Stich's "Fragmentation of Reason".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {epistemology, justification, pragmatism, truth}, abstract = {If we distinguish advocating the method of reflective equilibrium from trying to define "justified" in terms of that method, we see that Stich's objections to any such definition are not objections to using the method. Stich's worries about truth are really worries about indeterminacy of translation or interpretation and can be avoided either by appealing to an immanent rather than a transcendent notion of truth ("P" is true if and only if P) or by fixing on the same interpretative scheme for beliefs and desires (I want my beliefs to be true so that my desires will be more likely to come true.)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARRINGTON1977, author = {HARRINGTON, KATHLEEN-W}, title = {SANTAYANA AND THE HUMANISTS ON PLATO.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {66-81}, keywords = {ancient, dualism, humanism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARRIS1965, author = {HARRIS, CATHERINE}, title = {ON PROFESSOR NICOL'S REJOINDER, "SOME INDICATIONS ABOUT THE METAPHYSICS OF EXPRESSION".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {588-589}, keywords = {communication, expression, metaphysics, ontology, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARRIS1963, author = {HARRIS, CATHERINE}, title = {THE METAPHYSICS OF EXPRESSION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {268-277}, keywords = {expression, metaphysics, methodology, positivism, science, social-science}, abstract = {HARRIS TAKES ISSUE WITH NICOL'S VARIETY OF SOCIAL POSITIVISM, AND CLAIMS THAT IT WOULD HAVE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS ON SOCIOLOGY. IT IS THOUGHT THAT NICOL'S METAPHYSICS IS A VALUE ONTOLOGY, AND THAT HIS VIEWS BOTH METAPHYSICALLY AND LOGICALLY ARE INADEQUATE AS A FOUNDATION FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIETY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Harris1999, author = {Harris, George-W}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {730-733}, publisher = {Univ California Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism}, volume = {65(3)}, year = {1999} } @other{Harris1997, author = {Harris, George-W}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {246-248}, publisher = {Univ of Calif Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Dignity and Vulnerability: Strength and Quality of Character}, volume = {63(1)}, year = {1997} } @article{HARRIS1967, author = {HARRIS, MARJORIE-S}, title = {FOR SUCH A TIME AS THIS: ROMERO ON CULTURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {517-526}, keywords = {culture, social-philosoph}, abstract = {ROMERO THOUGHT THAT AN ADEQUATE PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE HAD NOT BEEN ACHIEVED. HENCE HE UNDERTOOK THIS PROJECT BUT DEATH PREVENTED ITS COMPLETION. AMONG POINTS HE HAD PRESENTED ON THE SUBJECT ARE THE FOLLOWING. SPECIAL CULTURAL OBJECTS HAVE A PROFOUND AFFECT ON MAN. HENCE IT IS A MISTAKE TO ASSUME THAT ART'S MAIN FUNCTION IS TO ENTERTAIN. CULTURE IS RESTRICTED BY COMMUNISM FOR, IF A MAN IS TO CREATE, HE MUST HAVE LIBERTY. OTHERS SHARED ROMERO'S VIEW AND THE 'ASOCIACION ARGENTINA POR LA LIBERTAD DE LA CULTURA' WAS FORMED. AT ITS INAUGURATION "THE MANIFESTO OF FREE MEN" WAS VOTED UNANIMOUSLY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARRIS1964, author = {HARRIS, MARJORIE-S}, title = {PHILOSOPHY FOR TOMORROW.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {573-579}, keywords = {humanism, objectivity, philosophy, spirit, transcendence, universality}, abstract = {THE WORK OF FRANCISCO ROMERO IS NOTED, ESPECIALLY HIS THOUGHT THAT PHILOSOPHY WILL BE ORIENTED IN THE DIRECTION OF TRANSCENDENCE. CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSCENDENCE ARE OBJECTIVITY AND UNIVERSALITY AND SPIRIT. THE ARTICLE ENDS BY ADVOCATING HUMANISM, WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF MAN. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARRIS1981, author = {HARRIS, N-G-E}, title = {CAUSES AND EVENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {236-253}, keywords = {causation, concept, epistemology, event, physical-objec}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR CLAIMS THAT TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF CAUSATION, SUCH AS THE "CONSTANT CONJUNCTION" THEORY, REST ON A MISTAKEN ASSUMPTION THAT THE SENSIBLE WORLD CAN BE DESCRIBED IN ONLY ONE KIND OF WAY, AS A SUCCESSION OF SPATIAL MANIFOLDS DIVISIBLE INTO DISCRETE OBJECTS AND, PERHAPS, VOIDS. BUT THE SENSIBLE WORLD MAY EQUALLY WELL BE CONSIDERED AS A SINGLE SPATIO-TEMPORAL MANIFOLD WHICH CAN BE CUT UP INTO EVENTS AND OTHER SEGMENTS WHICH INVOLVE ONLY TEMPORAL CHANGE. MOST OF THE ARTICLE IS DEVOTED TO SHOWING HOW A SATISFACTORY ACCOUNT OF CAUSATION CAN BE GIVEN IF A WAY OF DESCRIBING THE WORLD IS ADOPTED THAT TAKES "TEMPORALLY EXTENDED EVENT" AS ITS KEY TERM. UNLIKE TRADITIONAL THEORIES, SUCH AN ACCOUNT TAKES NOTE OF THE CONTINUITY THAT EXISTS BETWEEN CONTIGUOUS EVENTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARRIS-JR1976, author = {HARRIS-JR, JAMES-F}, title = {A NEW LOOK AT AUSTIN'S LINGUISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {384-390}, keywords = {language, ordinary-language; phenomenology, speech-ac}, abstract = {TRADITIONALLY, PHILOSOPHERS OF LANGUAGE HAVE BEEN IN THE DIFFICULT POSITION OF TRYING TO JUSTIFY WHAT CLAIMS ABOUT LANGUAGE HAVE TO DO WITH SUCH "PHILOSOPHICAL" PROBLEMS AS EPISTEMOLOGY, ONTOLOGY AND VALUE THEORY. I ARGUE THAT SUCH TRADITIONAL CLAIMS, WHICH TRADE UPON A WORD/FACT DICHOTOMY AND AN INFERENCE FROM LINGUISTIC DATA TO "FACTS" IN THE WORLD, ARE VULNERABLE TO A TYPE OF THIRD-MAN ARGUMENT AND ARE HENCE INADEQUATE. I SUGGEST THAT J L AUSTIN'S LINGUISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY, PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD, OFFERS A NEW APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM OF RELATING WORDS TO THE WORLD. THE UNIQUENESS OF AUSTIN'S CONTRIBUTION LIES IN HIS CLAIM THAT SOMETIMES "WHEN WE EXAMINE WHAT WE OUGHT TO SAY WHEN... WE ARE LOOKING... NOT "MERELY" AT THE WORDS... BUT ALSO AT THE REALITIES...." AUSTIN'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION IS NOT SIMPLY OF WORDS OR LANGUAGE, BUT OF WHAT WE SAY "WHEN"; AND WHEN WE EXAMINE WHAT WE OUGHT TO SAY "WHEN", WE ARE LOOKING AT BOTH THE UTTERANCES AND THE CONDITIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THOSE UTTERANCES OCCUR, I.E., THE WORLD. LINGUISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY AMOUNTS TO A REVOLUTIONARY WAY OF DOING PHILOSOPHY IN WHICH THE LANGUAGE/REALITY DICHOTOMY IS BROKEN DOWN AND THE TWO ARE INDISTINGUISHABLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARRISON1974, author = {HARRISON, CRAIG}, title = {TOTALITIES AND THE LOGIC OF FIRST CAUSE ARGUMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {1-19}, keywords = {cosmological-proof; metaphysics, totality}, abstract = {COPLESTON HAS INSISTED THAT THE TOTALITY OF ALL PHENOMENAL CAUSES MUST ITSELF HAVE A CAUSE, WHICH CAUSES ALL PHENOMENAL CAUSES, BUT WHICH IS NOT A PHENOMENAL CAUSE BUT A 'TRANSCENDENT' CAUSE. THERE IS A STRIKING PARALLEL BETWEEN HIS REASONING AND ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE NATURE OF TOTALITIES WHICH MOTIVATE VARIOUS VERSIONS OF SET THEORY, AND ALSO BETWEEN RUSSELL'S OBJECTIONS TO COPLESTON'S ARGUMENT AND HIS OWN SET-THEORETICAL PARADOX. BY TRANSLATING 'Y CAUSES X' BY 'X IS A MEMBER OF Y', WE SHOW THAT COPLESTON'S ASSUMPTIONS BECOME PROVABLE IN VON NEUMANN SET THEORY, AND HENCE RELATIVELY CONSISTENT TO IT, AND THAT HIS CONCLUSION FOLLOWS FROM HIS ASSUMPTIONS WITHOUT THE ADDED STRICTURE AGAINST PROCEEDING TO INFINITY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HART1970, author = {HART, ALAN}, title = {DESCARTES' NOTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {114-122}, keywords = {idea, innate-idea; modern, notion}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE DEMONSTRATES THE CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DESCARTES' THEORY OF NOTIONS. 'NOTIONS' ARE THE SIMPLE IDEAS AND COMMON AXIOMS WHICH ARE SOMETIMES TERMED INNATE IDEAS. NOTIONS ARE DISPOSITIONS OR CAPACITIES OF AN ACTIVE MIND. THE 'NOTIONS' OF DESCARTES ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF SPINOZA, LEIBNIZ, AND LOCKE, AND ARE TO BE FOUND IN EMPIRICAL AS WELL AS RATIONAL PHILOSOPHERS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HART1971, author = {HART, SAMUEL-L}, title = {AXIOLOGY-THEORY OF VALUES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {29-41}, keywords = {axiology, value}, abstract = {AXIOLOGY OR THEORY OF VALUES IS A RELATIVELY NEW DISCIPLINE ALTHOUGH VALUATIONAL ISSUES HAVE BEEN WITH US THE MOMENT MAN BEGAN TO REFLECT UPON CONDITIONS OF HIS LIFE, THE STRUCTURE AND UNIFORMITY OF NATURE, AND THE QUEST FOR THE GOOD LIFE. VALUATIONAL PREFERENCES ARE NOT ARTIFACTS ONE CAN DISPENSE WITH. INQUIRIES INTO THEIR GENETIC CONDITIONS, THEIR TRUTH AND VALIDITY CLAIMS ARE ESSENTIAL FOR ANY, REFLECTIVE, PRINCIPLED CONDUCT. MAN NOT ONLY IS ENGAGED IN VALUATIONAL PREFERENCES, BUT HE IS ALSO CONSCIOUS OF A SCALE OF VALUES, WHICH SCALE RESTS WITH THE DEGREE AND QUALITY OF SATISFACTIONS. THE GREAT INTEREST IN AXIOLOGY AT PRESENT HAS MANY REASONS: THE DIVORCE OF ONTOLOGICAL AND VALUATIONAL QUESTIONS, THE CULTURAL GAP, THE GAP BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND HUMANISTIC STUDIES, AND THE LITERARY INFLUENCE OF BRENTANO, EHRENFELS, AND MEINONG. THE ARTICLE ON "AXIOLOGY" DEALS WITH THE MAJOR AXIOLOGICAL SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT: PLATONISM, INTUITIONISM, EMOTIVISM, AND NATURALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARTMAN1968, author = {HARTMAN, ROBERT-S}, title = {SPARSHOTT'S ENQUIRY INTO GOODNESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {97-104}, keywords = {axiology, good, value}, abstract = {SPARSHOTT'S VALUE THEORY IS AT THE BORDERLINE OF AXIOLOGICAL NATURALISM AND NON-NATURALISTIC FORMALISM. HE DEVELOPS AN ANALYTIC CONCEPT OF 'GOOD' AND ELABORATES IT BY HIS INGENUITY RATHER THAN THE APTNESS OF THE CONCEPT. ONLY A SYNTHETIC CONCEPT OF 'GOOD' CAN ORIGINATE A VALUE SYSTEM THAT IS INDEFINITELY REFINABLE. THOUGH, HALF-HEARTEDLY, HE MAKES USE OF THE WITTGENSTEINIAN NOTION OF 'USE' HE DOES NOT CONFUSE IT WITH MEANING. HE HOLDS ETHICS--MEANING AXIOLOGY--TO BE AN AUTONOMOUS SCIENCE AND NOT A DEPARTMENT OR APPLICATION OF NATURAL OR HISTORICAL SCIENCES, BUT HIS ATTACHMENT TO THE OBSCURITIES OF OXFORD ANALYSIS DOES NOT ALLOW HIM TO BREAK AWAY FROM VALUE PHILOSOPHY INTO VALUE SCIENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARTMAN1963, author = {HARTMAN, ROBERT-S}, title = {THE LOGICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {353-379}, keywords = {analytic, concept, logic, philosophy, science, synthetic, system}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE IS TO DETERMINE LOGICALLY THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL LOGICAL DIFFERENCE IS: IN THE ANALYTIC CONCEPTS OF PHILOSOPHY INTENSION AND EXTENSION VARY INVERSELY WHEREAS IN THE SYNTHETIC CONCEPTS OF SCIENCE THEY VARY DIRECTLY. THE SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT IS THE IDEAL LIMIT OF THE MORE AND MORE INTENSIVE SPECIFICATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARTMAN1961, author = {HARTMAN, ROBERT-S}, title = {RISIERI FRONDIZI ON THE NATURE OF VALUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {223-232}, keywords = {axiology, fact, objectivity, quality, subjectivity, value}, abstract = {IN FRONDIZI'S THOUGHT, THE DISCOVERY OF VALUE IS EQUAL TO THE DISCOVERY OF BEING. VALUES ARE NOT MATERIAL, IDEAL, THINGS, INSIGHTS, ESSENCES; THEY ARE NON-REAL QUALITIES. VALUES DO NOT EXIST; THEY HOLD GOOD OR ARE WORTH. THEY INVOLVE POLARITY AND HIERARCHY. IT IS POINTED OUT THAT FRONDIZI MUST OVERCOME THE ANTITHESIS BETWEEN SUBJECTIVISM AND OBJECTIVISM. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT PHILOSOPHY MUST FURTHER DO FORMAL AXIOLOGY (HUSSERL) OR DEAL WITH THE RELATION BETWEEN DESCRIPTION AND VALUE (G E MOORE). THERE MUST BE AN INVESTIGATION OF FORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SETS OF QUALITIES DESCRIBING FACTS AND SETS OF QUALITIES CONSTITUTING VALUES. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARTNACK1977, author = {HARTNACK, JUSTUS}, title = {LANGUAGE AND ITS OBJECT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {239-246}, keywords = {conceptualization, language, naive-realism; object, perception}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARTSHORNE1963, author = {HARTSHORNE, CHARLES}, title = {FINITE OR FINITE-INFINITE?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {149-151}, keywords = {finite, god, infinite, metaphysics, religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARTSHORNE1961, author = {HARTSHORNE, CHARLES}, title = {PROFESSOR HALL ON PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {563-571}, keywords = {behaviorism, epistemology, intentionality, neurophysiology, perception, realism, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HARTSHORNE1962, author = {HARTSHORNE, CHARLES}, title = {HOW SOME SPEAK AND YET DO NOT SPEAK OF GOD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {274-276}, keywords = {existence, god, language, necessity, ontological-proof; religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Harvey2000, author = {Harvey, J}, title = {Colour-Dispositionalism and Its Recent Critics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {137-155}, keywords = {color, disposition, epistemology, perception, vision}, abstract = {Dispositionalist accounts of color concepts are now largely discarded. But a number of recent and influential objections to this type of theory can be readily answered providing the dispositionalist account contains the key elements it should--which actual versions in the literature do not. I explicate some of the conceptual components needed in such an account once we correctly understand the anthropocentricity of the color concepts involved. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hasker1997, author = {Hasker, William}, title = {Explanatory Priority: Transitive and Unequivocal, A Reply to William Craig}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {389-393}, keywords = {explanation, logic, molinism}, abstract = {According to William Craig, the notion of explanatory priority is the Achilles's heel of Robert Adams's argument against Molinism. Specifically, Craig contends that 1) the notion of explanatory priority is employed equivocally in the argument; 2) Adams is guilty of conflating reasons and causes; and 3) one of the intermediate conclusions of the argument is invalidly inferred, as can be seen by a counterexample. I argue that Craig is mistaken on all counts and that Adams's argument emerges unscathed.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hasker1999, author = {Hasker, William}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {734-736}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Emergent Self}, volume = {65(3)}, year = {1999} } @article{Hattiangadi2003, author = {Hattiangadi, Anandi}, title = {Making It Implicit: Brandom on Rule Following}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {419-431}, keywords = {content, epistemology, normativity}, abstract = {It is widely held that the normativity requirement cannot be met, or at least not with ease, because theories of content face an intractable dilemma. Brandom proposes to evade the dilemma by adopting a middle road--one that uses normative vocabulary, but treats norms as implicit in practices. I argue that this proposal fails to evade the dilemma, as Brandom himself understands it. Despite his use of normative vocabulary, Brandom's theory fares no better than the reductionist theories he criticizes. I consider some responses that Brandom might make to my charges, and finally conclude that his proposal founders on his own criteria. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HAUSMAN1979, author = {HAUSMAN, CARL-R}, title = {CRITERIA OF CREATIVITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {237-249}, keywords = {aesthetics, creativity, intelligibility, newness, uniqueness}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THE ARTICLE IS TO PROPOSE A SET OF CRITERIA FOR CREATIVE ACTS. IT IS ARGUED THAT OUTCOMES OF CREATIVE PROCESSES MUST BE NEW NOT ONLY AS UNIQUE INDIVIDUALS BUT ALSO AS STRUCTURES THAT ARE INTELLIGIBLE IN UNPREDICTABLE WAYS. AS SUCH, THEY ARE INSTANCES OF "NOVELTY PROPER." MOREOVER, THEY MUST BE INTRINSICALLY VALUABLE AND, INSOFAR AS THEY CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR TRADITIONS, INSTRUMENTALLY VALUABLE. THE PROPOSED CRITERIA ARE THEN "TESTED" AGAINST POSSIBLE COUNTER-EXAMPLES. FINALLY, PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THIS VIEW OF CREATIVITY ARE CONSIDERED, INCLUDING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF EXPLANATION AND THE ROLE OF METAPHOR IN UNDERSTANDING CREATIVITY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hausman1998, author = {Hausman, Daniel-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {243-246}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Causal Asymmetries}, volume = {62(1)}, year = {1998} } @article{Hawley2005, author = {Hawley, Katherine}, title = {Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {602-621}, keywords = {epistemology, fact, fission, fusion, persistence, supervenience}, abstract = {Closest-continuer or best-candidate accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it is hard to say why. The standard criticism is that such accounts violate the 'only a and b' rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, again, we do not seem to have an independent justification for this supervenience claim. Instead, I argue that closest continuer accounts are committed to unexplained correlations between distinct existences, and that this is their fundamental flaw. We can have independent justification for rejecting such correlations, but what the justification is depends upon much broader issues in ontology. There is no one-size-fits all objection to closest-continuer accounts of persistence.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hawley2001, author = {Hawley, Katherine}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {230-233}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {How Things Persist}, volume = {69(1)}, year = {2001} } @article{Hawthorne2002, author = {Hawthorne, John}, title = {Deeply Contingent A Priori Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {247-269}, keywords = {a-priori; contingent, epistemology, knowledge, language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hawthorne2001, author = {Hawthorne, John}, title = {Intrinsic Properties and Natural Relations}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {399-403}, keywords = {intrinsic, metaphysics, natural, properties, relation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hawthorne2002a, author = {Hawthorne, John}, title = {Practical Realism?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {169-178}, keywords = {concept, ethics, logical-connective; property, realism, recognition}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hawthorne2005, author = {Hawthorne, John}, title = {Chance and Counterfactuals}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {396-405}, keywords = {chance, counterfactual, epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {Suppose the world is chancy. The worry arises that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. This paper examines David Lewis's strategy for rescuing such counterfactuals, and argues that it is highly problematic.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hawthorne2005a, author = {Hawthorne, John}, title = {Knowledge and Evidence}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {452-458}, keywords = {epistemology, evidence, knowledge, phenomenon}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hawthorne2000, author = {Hawthorne, John and Scala, Mark}, title = {Seeing and Demonstration}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {199-206}, keywords = {demonstration, metaphysics, perception, phenomenon, seeing, vision}, abstract = {Does seeing a thing (in the success sense of seeing) inevitably bring with it the capacity for perceptually demonstrating it? In what follows, we argue for a negative answer to this question. In so doing, we hope to shed some light on the phenomenon of perceptual demonstration. After presenting the main argument in section one, we go on in section two to consider a series of objections and replies. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Haybron2001, author = {Haybron, Daniel-M}, title = {Happiness and Pleasure}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {501-528}, keywords = {ethics, happiness, hedonism, pleasant, pleasure}, abstract = {This paper argues against hedonistic theories of happiness. First, hedonism is too inclusive: many pleasures cannot plausibly be construed as constitutive of happiness. Second, any credible theory must count either attitudes of life satisfaction, affective states, such as mood, or both as constituents of happiness; yet neither sort of state reduces to pleasure. Hedonism errs in its attempt to reduce happiness, which is at least partly dispositional, to purely episodic experiential states. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Haybron2005, author = {Haybron, Daniel-M}, title = {On Being Happy or Unhappy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {287-317}, keywords = {affect, epistemology, happiness, hedonism, mood, unhappiness}, abstract = {The psychological condition of being happy is best understood as a matter of a person's emotional condition. I elucidate the notion of an emotional condition by introducing two distinctions concerning affect, and argue that this "emotional state" view is probably superior on intuitive and substantive grounds to theories that identify happiness with pleasure or life satisfaction. Life satisfaction views, for example, appear to have deflationary consequences for happiness' value. This would make happiness an unpromising candidate for the central element in a theory of well-being, as it is in L. W. Sumner's work. Yet on an emotional state conception, happiness may prove to be a key constituent of well-being. The emotional state view also makes happiness less vulnerable to common doubts about the importance of happiness, and indicates that mood states are more important for well-being than is generally recognized.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HAYNER1969, author = {HAYNER, PAUL}, title = {KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {423-431}, keywords = {acquaintance, epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE, OR EXPERIENT KNOWLEDGE, AS DELINEATED ORIGINALLY BY BERTRAND RUSSELL, IS NOT ONLY THE BASIC KIND OF KNOWLEDGE, ACCORDING TO MANY CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHERS, EAST AND WEST, BUT ALSO THAT WHICH, BECAUSE OF ITS IMPORTANCE IN AESTHETIC AND MYSTICAL AWARENESS, DESERVES TO BE GIVEN A POSITION AT LEAST EQUAL TO THAT WHICH HAS BEEN GRANTED TO KNOWLEDGE BY DESCRIPTION. THE PROVINCIALISM OF MUCH BRITISH AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF RECENT YEARS CAN BE MITIGATED BY RECOGNIZING THAT KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE IS A DISTINCTIVE AND IMPORTANT KIND OF KNOWLEDGE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HAYNER1961, author = {HAYNER, PAUL-C}, title = {EXPRESSIVE MEANING IN ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {543-551}, keywords = {aesthetic-experience; aesthetic-object; aesthetics, art, expression, meaning, objectivity, subjectivity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HAYNER1970, author = {HAYNER, PAUL-C}, title = {MEYERS ON KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE: A REJOINDER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {297-298}, keywords = {acquaintance, epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {IN DEFENSE OF RUSSELL'S CLAIM THAT ACQUAINTANCE IS A DISTINCTIVE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE, IT IS MAINTAINED THAT THE CRITICISMS OF THIS DOCTRINE BY BROAD, MOORE, HICKS AND OTHERS CITED BY MEYERS INVOLVE A CONFUSION AS TO WHAT ACQUAINTANCE INVOLVES. NOT ONLY DOES DESCRIPTION PRESUPPOSE ACQUAINTANCE, BUT ACQUAINTANCE WITH UNIVERSALS IS FUNDAMENTAL EVEN TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF PARTICULARS. WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE THERE IS NO KNOWLEDGE AT ALL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Heal2004, author = {Heal, Jane}, title = {Moran's Authority and Estrangement}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {427-432}, keywords = {authority, epistemology, estrangement, self-knowledg}, abstract = {What I think and do are my business in the sense that it is my responsibility to form beliefs and intentions under the guidance of reason and to declare what conclusions I have reached. Moran urges that we shall understand first person authority better if we start from this idea than if we start from ideas about privileged observation of some inner realm. His approach is extremely illuminating. But his picture needs extension to accommodate the facts of our finitude, our cognitive limitations, since these set limits to the extent and nature of the responsibility which we can take for our attitudes.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Heal1996, author = {Heal, Jane}, title = {Belief, Simulation and the First Person: Comments on A Study of Concepts by Christopher Peacocke}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {413-417}, keywords = {concept, conditionality, epistemology, form}, abstract = {The comments deal with Peacocke's suggestion that 'belief' is a 'first person concept', i.e., to possess it I require to be able a) to judge 'I believe that p' appropriately and b) to think that another believes that p iff she is in a state with the same role (whatever that is) in making her behaviour intelligible. This proposal is of interest but it is more at home in the simulationist framework (which Peacocke criticises) than it is in the broadly functionalist outlook to which Peacocke himself subscribes.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Heath2003, author = {Heath, Joseph}, title = {The Transcendental Necessity of Morality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {378-395}, keywords = {choice, ethics, morality, socialization, transcendental-argumen}, abstract = {David Gauthier tries to defend morality by showing that rational agents would choose to adopt a fundamental choice disposition that permits them to cooperate in prisoner's dilemmas. In this paper, I argue that Gauthier, rather than trying to work out a prudential justification for his favored choice disposition, should opt for a transcendental justification. I argue that the disposition in question is the product of socialization, not rational choice. However, only agents who are socialized in such a way that they acquire a disposition of this type could acquire the capacity to use language. Given the internal connection between language and thought, this means that no agent endowed with such a disposition could rationally choose to adopt another. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HEIDELBERGER1982, author = {HEIDELBERGER, HERBERT}, title = {WHAT IS IT TO UNDERSTAND A SENTENCE THAT CONTAINS AN INDEXICAL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {21-34}, keywords = {indexical-sentence; language, sentence}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HEIDELBERGER1966, author = {HEIDELBERGER, HERBERT}, title = {ON CHARACTERIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {529-536}, keywords = {criteria, epistemology, immediacy, intentionality, mind, statement}, abstract = {TWO SUGGESTIONS OF BRENTANO, ON CHARACTERIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL, ARE EXPLORED: (1) THE PROPERTY OF INTENTIONALITY (WHICH MARKS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SETS IT OFF FROM THE PHYSICAL), AND (2) THAT PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA ARE CHARACTERIZED BY AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMMEDIACY (WHICH IS PECULIAR TO THEM). THE AUTHOR CONCLUDES THAT THE SECOND IS SATISFACTORY, BUT THE FIRST IS NOT, AT LEAST AS IT IS USUALLY INTERPRETED. HE ARGUES THAT CRITERIA OF INTENTIONALITY DO NOT PROVIDE US WITH AN ADEQUATE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL. NEVERTHELESS, HE PROPOSES CRITERIA, ADEQUATE TO ALL SINGULAR PSYCHOLOGICAL STATEMENTS, BASED UPON PRIVILEGED ACCESS AND SELF-AUTHENTICATION (KNOWING A STATEMENT WITHOUT EVIDENCE). (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HEIDELBERGER1978, author = {HEIDELBERGER, HERBERT and STEPHENS, G-LYNN}, title = {TRANSPARENCY AND MODALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {549}, keywords = {language, modality, reference, rigid-designato}, abstract = {HAROLD MORICK CLAIMS THAT SENTENCES OF NECESSITY AND POSSIBILITY "DE RE" ARE REFERENTIALLY TRANSPARENT IN THE SENSE THAT REPLACEMENT OF RIGID DESIGNATORS BY CO-DESIGNATIVE RIGID DESIGNATORS AND NON-RIGID DESIGNATORS BY CO-DESIGNATIVE NON-RIGID DESIGNATORS PRESERVES TRUTH VALUE IN EVERY CASE. WE OFFER A COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO THE CLAIM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Heil1994, author = {Heil, John}, title = {Les Liaisons Dangereuses}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {215-224}, keywords = {cognitivism, metaphysics, mind, social-science}, abstract = {Alvin Goldman is noted for contributions to action theory, epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. I discuss papers on these optics collected in "Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences", arguing that Goldman is on the right track in taking philosophy to be continuous with, without being reducible to, the sciences and that these papers might serve as a model for anyone who thinks that philosophy should be naturalized.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HEIL1982, author = {HEIL, JOHN}, title = {SPEECHLESS BRUTES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {400-406}, keywords = {animal, behavior, linguistics, science}, abstract = {RECENT ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE ANIMALS WITH LANGUAGES COMPARABLE TO THOSE EMPLOYED BY HUMAN BEINGS SUFFER FROM A NUMBER OF DEFECTS. (1) THEY MOVE TOO QUICKLY FROM THE CLAIM THAT BEHAVIOR IS COMMUNICATIVE TO THE CLAIM THAT IT IS LINGUISTIC; (2) THEY CONFLATE LANGUAGE-LIKE AND LINGUISTIC BEHAVIOR; (3) THEY ASSUME THAT IF A CERTAIN ACTIVITY IS PART OF THE REPERTOIRE OF A LANGUAGE-USER, ANY CREATURE ENGAGING IN THAT ACTIVITY IS THEREBY USING LANGUAGE. WITHOUT WISHING TO CLAIM THAT LANGUAGE HAS AN ESSENCE, THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT LINGUISTIC BEHAVIOR DIFFERS INTERESTINGLY FROM NON-LINGUISTIC BEHAVIOR IN THE POSSESSION OF CERTAIN FEATURES THAT ARE, HE CONTENDS, NECESSARILY LINGUISTIC. IF THE COMMUNICATIVE ACTIVITIES OF ANIMALS COULD BE SHOWN TO POSSESS ANY OF THESE FEATURES, IT MIGHT BEGIN TO LOOK AS THOUGH THOSE ACTIVITIES WERE GENUINELY LINGUISTIC.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HEIL1978, author = {HEIL, JOHN}, title = {TRACTATUS 4:0141.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {545-548}, keywords = {isomorphism, language, projection-rule; similarity}, abstract = {THE PICTURE THEORY IS WITTGENSTEIN'S ATTEMPT TO ACCOUNT FOR PHENOMENA OF REPRESENTATION. IF "P" REPRESENTS (I.E., PICTURES) SOME STATE OF AFFAIRS, "S", THEN "P" MUST BE ISOMORPHIC WITH "S". THE HOLDING OF AN ISOMORPHISM, HOWEVER, IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR PICTURING TO OCCUR. IN THE 4.01'S WITTGENSTEIN ALLUDES TO FURTHER, PERHAPS PSYCHOLOGICAL, CONDITIONS ON PICTURING. IN SO DOING HE COMPARES THE PICTURING RELATION TO THE NATURAL RELATION HOLDING BETWEEN DEFLECTIONS IN THE GROOVES OF PHONOGRAPH RECORDS AND THE TUNES WHICH THESE DEFLECTIONS PRODUCE. I ARGUE THAT SUCH ANALOGIES ARE UNHELPFUL, THAT THEY GLOSS OVER A CENTRAL DIFFICULTY IN ANY VERSION OF THE PICTURE THEORY, AND THAT SUCH THEORIES TYPICALLY FAIL TO ACCOUNT FOR THE THINGS THEY ARE CONSTRUCTED TO EXPLAIN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HEIM1983, author = {HEIM, MICHAEL}, title = {THE REALIZATION OF INFINITY: ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN M ANDERSON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {541-550}, keywords = {infinity, metaphysics}, abstract = {IN ITS EARLY IMAGES IN GREEK MYTH, "INFINITY" APPEARS ABHORRENT AND OPPRESSIVE; WITH CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY THE "INFINITE" OR "APEIRON" CAN NULLIFY A THEORETICAL POSITION BY "REGRESSUS AD INFINITUM" ARGUMENTS. YET ANAXIMANDER, CONSIDERED BY SOME TO BE THE ORIGINATOR OF PHILOSOPHY, CONTENDS THE "APEIRON" IS THE "ARCHE" OR ORIGIN OF ALL THINGS. I ARGUE IN THIS PAPER FOR A POST-METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION OF ANAXIMANDER'S "INFINITY" AND CONTRAST HIS "REALIZATION OF INFINITY" WITH TWO DISTINCT METAPHYSICAL "INFINITUDES": THE THEOLOGICAL INFINITE OF PERMANENT BEING AND THE PHYSICAL-SPATIAL INFINITE OF RENAISSANCE SPACE. I CHARACTERIZE THE LATTER IN ITS CONTEMPORARY PSEUDO-COSMOLOGICAL FORM AS THE "CONQUEST OF SPACE." INFINITY IS FURTHER DESCRIBED AS A "REALIZATION" OR "GNOSIS" WHICH ORIGINATES BUT IS NOT CONTAINED BY THE CONCEPTS OF SYSTEMATIC THOUGHT. ONE SECTION OF THE PAPER PRESENTS AN EXAMPLE OF A POSTMODERN REALIZATION OF INFINITY AS IT IS TO BE FOUND IN THE WORK OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHER JOHN M ANDERSON.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Held1997, author = {Held, Virginia}, title = {Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {703-707}, keywords = {ethics, prejudice, responsibility, rights}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HELD1990, author = {HELD, Virginia}, title = {Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {axiology, feminism, moral-theor}, abstract = {This article examines how feminist critiques and reconceptualizations are transforming moral theory. The history of ethics can be shown to be gender biased. Such currently dominant moral theories as Kantian ethics and utilitarianism are especially unsatisfactory when considered from the points of view of women's experience. The article focuses on three positions in ethics which feminists are rethinking: the split between reason and emotion and the denigration of emotion; the conceptions of the public and the private and the assumption that the public is more relevant to moral theory; and the concept of the self as autonomous individual. Feminist work in ethics often values the caring emotions and the sensitivity and responsiveness involved in nurturance; it often claims that the household is as relevant to morality and to moral theory as is the polis; and it is developing concepts of the self as relational rather than as either atomistic or communal.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Heller1992, author = {Heller, Mark}, title = {Things Change}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {695-704}, keywords = {causality, change, epistemology, temporality}, abstract = {A common objection to the temporal parts ontology is that such an ontology is inconsistent with the fact that things survive change. I consider various versions of the objection and argue that they all depend on misunderstanding the temporal parts ontology.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Heller1996, author = {Heller, Mark}, title = {Practically Strange}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {203-207}, keywords = {epistemology, language, reality, similarity}, abstract = {Eli Hirsch's "Dividing Reality" considers languages that divide reality in ways radically different from our own. We have a strong intuition that such languages are "strange", but it is surprisingly difficult to pinpoint the basis for these intuitions. My contribution to the symposium on Hirsch's book attempts to defend a proposal that Hirsch rejects: the languages are strange because they are impractical.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Heller1996a, author = {Heller, Mark}, title = {The Mad Scientist Meets the Robot Cats: Compatibilism, Kinds, and Counterexamples}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {333-337}, keywords = {compatibilism, epistemology, knowledge, logic}, abstract = {This short paper suggests significant consequences for the free will debate if we deny that the concept associated with our term "free will" determines the extension of that term. This move would undermine traditional counterexamples to compatibilist analyses of freedom and arguments directly in support of incompatibilism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hellman2001, author = {Hellman, Geoffrey}, title = {On Nominalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {691-705}, keywords = {epistemology, logic, nominalism, set-theor}, abstract = {Nelson Goodman's objections to set theory rest on a conception of sets as "constructed," but leading notions of "constructible sets" do not comport with his nominalism. Nevertheless, recent developments warrant reexamining the case for nominalism, and an epistemological argument on behalf of nominalism is sketched. Mathematical axioms of infinity are not analytic, and evidence for them, on a face-value Platonistic reading, is at best indirect. Scientific indispensability arguments fail to provide such evidence, and this motivates taking seriously nominalist alternatives. A response to Burgess and Rosen's recent critique of nominalism is sketched.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HELLMAN1983, author = {HELLMAN, NATHAN}, title = {BACH ON SELF-DECEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {113-120}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, self-deceptio}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Helm2000, author = {Helm, Paul}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {740-742}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Faith with Reason}, volume = {66(3)}, year = {2000} } @article{HEMS1961, author = {HEMS, JOHN-M}, title = {WHAT IS WRONG WITH OBLIGATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {50-60}, keywords = {agent, beneficiary, desire, duty, ethics, love, obligation}, abstract = {IT IS ARGUED HERE THAT SOMETHING IS WRONG WITH MORAL OBLIGATION, BOTH THEORETICALLY AND PRACTICALLY. OBLIGATION REPRESENTS A FAILURE IN LOVE. WE CANNOT HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO LOVE, FOR OBLIGATION IS GROUNDED IN A FAILURE TO LOVE, SO THAT TO SAY THAT ONE OUGHT TO LOVE WOULD BE TO SAY THAT ONE OUGHT TO HAVE NO OBLIGATIONS--BUT THEN THIS IS AN OBLIGATION. IT IS SELF-CONTRADICTORY TO SAY THAT ONE OUGHT TO HAVE NO OBLIGATIONS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT HERE, THE LANGUAGE OF OBLIGATION BREAKS DOWN. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HEMS1971, author = {HEMS, JOHN-M}, title = {THE LIMITS OF DECISION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {527-539}, keywords = {decision, ethics, obligation}, abstract = {THE CRUCIAL POINT TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THIS ARTICLE IS THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DECIDE THAT YOU OUGHT TO DO ANYTHING IN THE MORAL SENSE. NIETZSCHE'S FULMINATIONS AGAINST THE "RESPECTABLE" ANTI-CHRISTIAN SENTIMENTS OF DAVID STRAUSS ARE CITED WITH APPROVAL, AND THE AUTHOR PROCEEDS TO DEVELOP THIS ATTACK UPON SECULAR ETHICS WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO THE WORK OF KANT. IT IS ARGUED THAT KANT'S NOTION OF "THE AUTONOMY OF THE WILL" IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH HIS CONCEPT OF "THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE", AND THAT THE LATTER IS MERELY A FORMALIZED VERSION OF THE CHRISTIAN "GOLDEN RULE". THE AUTHOR ALSO ARGUES THAT THE NATURAL RELATION BETWEEN CONSCIOUSNESSES IS THAT OF COMPASSION, AS WITNESS THE SPECULATIONS OF ROUSSEAU AND THE INVESTIGATIONS OF SUCH CONTEMPORARY ANTHROPOLOGISTS AS LEVI-STRAUSS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HEMS1966, author = {HEMS, JOHN-M}, title = {LEARNING THE LANGUAGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {561-577}, keywords = {children, conceptualization, development, education, language, learning, methodology, psychology}, abstract = {A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE PROCESS OF LEARNING A LANGUAGE MAY HELP TO CLARIFY OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE ITSELF, WHICH IN TURN SHOULD HAVE SOME PRACTICAL BEARING UPON THE MANNER IN WHICH A LANGUAGE OUGHT TO BE TAUGHT. FURTHER INQUIRY INTO THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH HOLDS BETWEEN THESE SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE ASPECTS OF THE LEARNING PROCESS LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT INTENTIONAL MEANING ANTEDATES LINGUISTIC MEANING. IN PRACTICAL TERMS THIS SHOWS ITSELF IN THE FACT THAT MANY SUPPOSED GRAMMATICAL ERRORS ARE ORIGINALLY PSYCHOLOGICAL. ON THE BASIS OF SUCH FINDINGS AS THESE, THE AUTHOR ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY THE ADOPTION OF A MUCH MORE "DIRECT" METHOD IN THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Henderson2000, author = {Henderson, David and Horgan, Terrence}, title = {Iceberg Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(3)}, pages = {497-535}, keywords = {belief, cognition, epistemology, knowledge, mental}, abstract = {The accessible and articulable states that have been the exclusive focus of much epistemology must constitute only a proper subset of epistemologically relevant processing. The interaction of such states looks rather contextualist. It might also be called quasi-foundationalist. However, in attending to our epistemological tasks we must rely on processing that is sensitive to information that we could not articulate that is not accessible in the standard internalist sense. When focusing on the full range of epistemologically important processes, the structure of what makes for justification is rather more like that envisioned by some coherentists. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HENLEY1977, author = {HENLEY, KENNETH}, title = {THE VALUE OF INDIVIDUALS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {345-352}, keywords = {dignity, ethics, individual, uniqueness, value}, abstract = {WHAT SENSE CAN BE MADE OF ASCRIBING IRREPLACEABLE VALUE TO INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEINGS? ANY ATTEMPT TO GIVE REASONS FOR SUCH ASCRIPTIONS CONVERTS THE OBJECT OF VALUATION INTO GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS RATHER THAN INDIVIDUALS. KANT'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIGNITY AND PRICE IS CRITICIZED AS INVOLVING A CONFUSION BETWEEN THE VALUE OF INDIVIDUALS AND THE VALUE OF THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC OF OBEDIENCE TO THE MORAL LAW. THE VIEW THAT VALUING INDIVIDUALS IS IRRATIONAL RESTS ON THE INAPPROPRIATE APPLICATION OF CRITERIA OF RATIONALITY TO ONE OF THOSE NATURAL, UNREASONED HUMAN TENDENCIES WHICH UNDERLIE OUR VARIOUS PRACTICES OF REASON-GIVING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HENLEY1977a, author = {HENLEY, KENNETH}, title = {THE VALUE OF INDIVIDUALS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {345-352}, keywords = {dignity, ethics, individual, uniqueness, value}, abstract = {WHAT SENSE CAN BE MADE OF ASCRIBING IRREPLACEABLE VALUE TO INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEINGS? ANY ATTEMPT TO GIVE REASONS FOR SUCH ASCRIPTIONS CONVERTS THE OBJECT OF VALUATION INTO GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS RATHER THAN INDIVIDUALS. KANT'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIGNITY AND PRICE IS CRITICIZED AS INVOLVING A CONFUSION BETWEEN THE VALUE OF INDIVIDUALS AND THE VALUE OF THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC OF OBEDIENCE TO THE MORAL LAW. THE VIEW THAT VALUING INDIVIDUALS IS IRRATIONAL RESTS ON THE INAPPROPRIATE APPLICATION OF CRITERIA OF RATIONALITY TO ONE OF THOSE NATURAL, UNREASONED HUMAN TENDENCIES WHICH UNDERLIE OUR VARIOUS PRACTICES OF REASON-GIVING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HENSON1988, author = {HENSON, RICHARD-G}, title = {BUTLER ON SELFISHNESS AND SELF-LOVE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {31-57}, keywords = {metaphysics, motivation, psychological-egoism; self-lov}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR EXPLAINS JOSEPH BUTLER'S TERMINOLOGY AND HIS BASIC ACCOUNT OF THE "INWARD FRAME OF MAN." BUTLER ARGUES FOR THE PROPOSITION (1) THAT WE ARE NOT MOTIVATED BY SELF-LOVE ALONE, AND FOR A PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT TO THE CONCLUSION (2) THAT THERE IS NO NECESSARY CLASH, NO "PECULIAR CONTRARIETY," BETWEEN SELF-LOVE AND BENEVOLENCE. HOWEVER, HE FALLS FAR SHORT OF PROVING THAT HUMAN CONDUCT IS NOT ALWAYS SELFISH. HE HAS, IN UNDERMINING SEVERAL PREJUDICES WHICH MAKE THAT PROPOSITION EASY TO DOUBT, DONE AS MUCH AS A PHILOSOPHER MIGHT REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO DO IN ITS DEFENSE. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HENZE1960, author = {HENZE, DONALD-F}, title = {ARE LEXICAL DEFINITIONS TRUE?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {383-388}, keywords = {assertion, definition, logic, proposition, rule, truth, use, word}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HERMAN1973, author = {HERMAN, A-L}, title = {C I LEWIS AND THE SIMILETIC USE OF LANGUAGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {349-365}, keywords = {expressives, language}, abstract = {THE PAPER ATTEMPTS TO RESCUE LEWIS'S DOCTRINE OF EXPRESSIVE LANGUAGE FROM THE SLOUGH INTO WHICH IT HAS LATELY BEEN FLUNG. THE PAPER DOES FOUR THINGS: PART I RECALLS LEWIS'S DOCTRINE OF EXPRESSIVE STATEMENTS ('EXPRESSIVES'); PART II STATES THE VARIOUS CRITICISMS THAT HAVE BEEN SENT AGAINST THEM TOGETHER WITH CRITICISMS OF LEWIS'S CLAIMS THAT EXPRESSIVES WERE BOTH EMPIRICAL AND CERTAIN AND THAT THEY COULD SERVE AS ATOMS FOR HIS MOLECULAR 'TERMINATING JUDGMENTS', PART III DEMONSTRATES THAT LEWIS'S EXPRESSIVES ARE REALLY SIMILES, SHARING ALL THE PROPERTIES ATTRIBUTED TO SIMILES INCLUDING BEING CERTAIN, IN A SIMILETIC WAY, AS WELL AS BEING EMPIRICAL; PART IV SHOWS THAT THE CRITICISMS STATED IN PART II SEEM TO REST ON A MISUNDERSTANDING OF EXPRESSIVES AND EXPRESSIVE LANGUAGE BUT THAT THEY CAN ALL BE MET BY EMPLOYING THE LANGUAGE MODEL OF SIMILE DEMONSTRATED IN PART III.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HERON1970, author = {HERON, JOHN}, title = {THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOCIAL ENCOUNTER: THE GAZE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {243-264}, keywords = {gaze, perceiving, phenomenology, social-philosoph}, abstract = {STRICT ENCOUNTER OCCURS ONLY IN MUTUAL GAZING AND MUTUAL TOUCHING. PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION ESTABLISHES THE CONCEPT OF THE GAZE AS DISTINCT FROM THE EYES. DISTINGUISHED BY ITS LUMINOSITY, ITS STREAMING QUALITY AND ITS MEANING, THE GAZE IS A CENTRAL FEATURE IN THE NATURAL LANGUAGE PRESUPPOSED BY SPEECH, AND IS CHARACTERISED BY THE THREEFOLD DIRECTEDNESS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. MUTUAL GAZING ESTABLISHES A DIPOLAR FIELD OF UNIFIED CONSCIOUSNESS. A MATTER NEITHER OF INTROSPECTION NOR OF PROJECTION, THE GAZE IS AN EMPIRICAL CATEGORY FOUND BY THE WHOLE MAN IN MUTUAL ENCOUNTER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HESTER1975, author = {HESTER, P-R}, title = {SUBJECTIVE COMMITMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF MORAL OBJECTIVITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {534-539}, keywords = {commitment, ethics, morality}, abstract = {THERE CANNOT BE TOTAL OBJECTIVITY IN MORALITY FOR A MORAL SYSTEM NECESSARILY INVOLVES THE INTERESTS, DESIRES, AND EMOTIONS OF ITS ADHERENTS. BUT THERE CAN BE MORE THAN A MODEST ELEMENT OF RATIONALITY IN MORALITY IF A PERSON HAS MADE THREE MINIMAL COMMITMENTS: (1) TO BE RATIONAL, (2) TO MAKE PRUDENTIAL JUDGMENTS, AND (3) TO HAVE SOME MINIMAL CONCERN FOR OTHER SENTIENT BEINGS. THIS LAST COMMITMENT IS NOT A MORAL COMMITMENT FOR THE LATTER WOULD INVOLVE UNIVERSAL PRESCRIPTIONS. THESE ARE SIMPLY THREE BASIC COMMITMENTS WHICH CAN SERVE TO ELEVATE A MORAL SYSTEM FROM THE BONDS OF COMPLETE ARBITRARINESS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HESTEVOLD1990, author = {HESTEVOLD, H-SCOTT}, title = {Passage and the Presence of Experience.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(3)}, pages = {537-552}, keywords = {event, experience, metaphysics, presence, time}, abstract = {After objecting to a defense of "transitory time" (TT)--the view that events undergo "passage"--offered by M M Schuster, TT is defended by appealing to (a) the doctrine that experiences, necessarily, may be known to be present and (b) A N Prior's argument involving the appropriateness of certain attitudes toward future and past events. It is argued that D H Mellor's tenseless analysis of the presence of experience offers no reason to abandon either defense of TT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HESTEVOLD1981, author = {HESTEVOLD, H-SCOTT}, title = {CONJOINING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {371-385}, keywords = {conjunction, metaphysics, part}, abstract = {PRESUPPOSING THE PROPER-PART RELATION, ROERICK CHISHOLM DEFINES THE CONCEPT OF "DISCRETE" PROPER-PARTS, ENABLING HIM TO CHARACTERIZE THE MEREOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH OBTAINS BETWEEN A WHOLE AND THE PARTS MAKING UP THAT WHOLE. THIS ESSAY, HOWEVER, OFFERS A CRITERION EXPLAINING WHEN IT IS THAT TWO OBJECTS "DO" MAKE UP A LARGER OBJECT. BRIEFLY, THE VIEW DEFENDED IS THAT TWO OBJECTS MAKE UP A WHOLE WHEN NO THIRD OBJECT LIES BETWEEN THEM. NOT ONLY DOES THIS VIEW ALLOW FOR "CONTINUOUS" WHOLES, BUT IT ALLOWS FOR CERTAIN "SCATTERED" OBJECTS AS WELL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HESTEVOLD1985, author = {HESTEVOLD, H-SCOTT}, title = {JUSTICE TO MERCY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {281-291}, keywords = {ethics, justice, mercy}, abstract = {JUSTICE REQUIRES GIVING SOMEONE WHAT IS DESERVED. REGARDING PUNISHMENT, JUSTICE INVOLVES THE OBLIGATORY ADMINISTERING OF DESERVED SUFFERING. MERCY, HOWEVER, INVOLVES THE SUPEREROGATORY TEMPERING OF DESERVED SUFFERING. APPARENTLY, THEN, FAILING TO GIVE SOMEONE ALL THAT IS DESERVED IS BOTH IMMORAL AND SUPEREROGATORY WHICH IS ABSURD. AFTER SKETCHING A SOLUTION TO THE PUZZLE, OTHER SOLUTIONS ARE SHOWN TO BE INADEQUATE AND THE PROPOSED SOLUTION IS RENDERED COMPATIBLE WITH SEVERAL ETHICAL THEORIES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HETHERINGTON1991, author = {HETHERINGTON, Stephen-Cade}, title = {On Being Epistemically Internal.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {epistemic, epistemology, internalism, justification, transparency}, abstract = {I argue that epistemic internalism has no coherent contribution to make to our understanding of epistemic justification. I compare the internalist's views of justification with J L Austin's view of "I know" as a performative. And I diagnose why internalism is so appealing in the first place.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hetherington1992, author = {Hetherington, Stephen-Cade}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {976-979}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Epistemology's Paradox}, volume = {54(4)}, year = {1992} } @article{Hieronymi2001, author = {Hieronymi, Pamela}, title = {Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {529-554}, keywords = {ethics, forgiveness, resentment}, abstract = {I first pose a challenge which, it seems to me, any philosophical account of forgiveness must meet: the account must be articulate and it must allow for forgiveness that is uncompromising. I then examine an account of forgiveness (proposed by David Novitz in the June 1998 issue of this journal) which appears to meet this challenge. Upon closer examination we discover that this account actually fails to meet the challenge--but it fails in very instructive ways. The account takes two missteps which seem to be taken by almost everyone discussing forgiveness. At the end, I sketch an alternative account of forgiveness, one that I think meets the challenge and avoids the missteps.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HILEY1978, author = {HILEY, DAVID-R}, title = {IS ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM MATERIALISTIC?.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {325-337}, keywords = {denotation, description, epistemology, materialism, sensation}, abstract = {RORTY'S INITIAL VERSION OF MATERIALISM HAS RECEIVED TWO LINES OF CRITICISM. ONE HAS BEEN THE CHARGE BY LYCAN AND PAPAS THAT HIS FORM OF ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM IS INCOHERENT. THE OTHER, PRESSED BY BERNSTEIN AND CORNMAN, MAINTAINS THAT IT IS INADEQUATE. I SHOW THAT RORTY CAN MEET BOTH CRITICISMS BUT IN MEETING THEM THE PLAUSIBILITY OF HIS POSITION BECOMES DETACHED FROM ANY SPECIFICALLY MATERIALISTIC CLAIMS. RATHER, IT SIMPLY BECOMES A NIHILISTIC CLAIM ABOUT DESCRIPTIVE VOCABULARIES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hill1996, author = {Hill, Christopher-S}, title = {Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Scepticism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {567-581}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, reliabilism, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HILL1977, author = {HILL, CHRISTOPHER-S}, title = {OF BATS, BRAINS, AND MINDS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {100-106}, keywords = {epistemology, materialism, other-mind}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HILL1981, author = {HILL, CHRISTOPHER-S}, title = {WHY CARTESIAN INTUITIONS ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THE IDENTITY THESIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {254-265}, keywords = {brain-processes; identity-theory; intuition, metaphysics, pain}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hill2006, author = {Hill, Christopher-S}, title = {Precis of Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {72(1)}, pages = {174-181}, keywords = {belief, correspondence, deflationism, epistemology, proposition, reference, thought}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hill2006a, author = {Hill, Christopher-S}, title = {Replies to Marian David, Anil Gupta, and Keith Simmons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {72(1)}, pages = {205-222}, keywords = {deflationism, epistemology, quantification, substitution}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hill2005, author = {Hill, Christopher-S}, title = {Remarks on David Papineau's Thinking about Consciousness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {147-154}, keywords = {consciousness, distinctness, materialism, metaphysics, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hill2002, author = {Hill, Christopher-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {174-181}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence}, volume = {72(1)}, year = {2002} } @other{Hill2002a, author = {Hill, Christopher-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {182-189}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence}, volume = {72(1)}, year = {2002} } @other{Hill2002b, author = {Hill, Christopher-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {190-195}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence}, volume = {72(1)}, year = {2002} } @other{Hill2002c, author = {Hill, Christopher-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {196-204}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence}, volume = {72(1)}, year = {2002} } @other{Hill2002d, author = {Hill, Christopher-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {205-222}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence}, volume = {72(1)}, year = {2002} } @other{Hill1991, author = {Hill, Christopher-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {237-239}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism}, volume = {54(1)}, year = {1991} } @article{Hill1999, author = {Hill, Christopher-S and Mclaughlin, Brian-P}, title = {There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {445-454}, keywords = {consciousness, materialism, metaphysics, mind, reality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hill2000, author = {Hill, Claire-Ortiz and Rosado-Haddock, Guillermo-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {501-504}, publisher = {Open Court}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Husserl or Frege? Meaning, Objectivity, and Mathematics}, volume = {66(2)}, year = {2000} } @article{Hill-Jr1992, author = {Hill-Jr, Thomas-E}, title = {Gibbard on Morality and Sentiment}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {957-960}, keywords = {ethics, morality, sentiment}, abstract = {Some questions are raised regarding Gibbard's subtle and important defense of noncognitivism. Is our concept of a moral judgment as inclusive as Gibbard's? On Gibbard's analysis, how different are the best objective normative judgments (which supposedly "mimic facts") from other judgments we count as factual? How are we to understand simple moral utterances as expressing endorsement of the agent's whole complex system or norms? Are not norms for feelings too peripheral and problematic for the central role in ethics that Gibbard proposes for them? Are feelings of guilt, as distinct from judgments of guilt, as crucial to morality as Gibbard suggests?}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hinchman2005, author = {Hinchman, Edward-S}, title = {Telling as Inviting to Trust}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {562-587}, keywords = {epistemology, intuition, telling, testimony, trust, warrant}, abstract = {How can I give you a reason to believe what I tell you? I can influence the evidence available to you. Or I can simply invite your trust. These two ways of giving reasons work very differently. When a speaker tells her hearer that p, I argue, she intends that he gain access to a prima facie reason to believe that p that derives not from evidence but from his mere understanding of her act. Unlike mere assertions, acts of telling give reasons directly. They give reasons by inviting the hearer's trust. This yields a novel form of antireductionism in the epistemology of testimony. The status of testimony as a sui generis source of epistemic warrant is entailed by the nature of the act of telling. We can discover the nature of this illocution, and its epistemic role, by examining how it functions in the real world of human relations.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HINMAN1980, author = {HINMAN, LAWRENCE-M}, title = {GADAMER'S UNDERSTANDING OF HERMENEUTICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {512-535}, keywords = {criteria, epistemology, hermeneutics, justification, tradition, truth, will}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HINMAN1982, author = {HINMAN, LAWRENCE-M}, title = {NIETZSCHE, METAPHOR, AND TRUTH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {179-200}, keywords = {concept, language, metaphor, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hintikka1996, author = {Hintikka, Jaakko}, title = {Knowledge Acknowledged: Knowledge of Propositions vs. Knowledge of Objects}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {251-275}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, logic, object, proposition}, abstract = {By allowing a concept to be informationally independent of another one even when it is within its syntactical scope, the first adequate epistemic logic can be formulated, with knows that as the only irreducible kind of knowledge. In this logic, two largely independent derivative concepts of knowledge are distinguished: knowledge of propositions and knowledge of objects. (In the former, an existential quantifier is independent of a sentence-initial knowledge operator; in the latter, a disjunction.) Distinctions like de dicto vs. de re or attributive vs. referential are derivative scope distinctions. There is no unanalyzable knowledge de re.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hirsch1993, author = {Hirsch, Eli}, title = {Peter Van Inwagen's "Material Beings"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {687-691}, keywords = {being, epistemology, material}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hirsch2004, author = {Hirsch, Eli}, title = {Comments on Theodore Sider's Four Dimensionalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {658-664}, keywords = {mereology, metaphysics, perdurance, quantifier}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hirsch1996, author = {Hirsch, Eli}, title = {Precis of Dividing Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {199-202}, keywords = {division, epistemology, language, reality, similarity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hirsch1996a, author = {Hirsch, Eli}, title = {Reply to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {223-234}, keywords = {division, epistemology, language, reality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hirsch2005, author = {Hirsch, Eli}, title = {Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(1)}, pages = {67-97}, keywords = {common-sense; metaphysics, ontology, physical-object; verbal}, abstract = {Two main claims are defended in this paper: first, that typical disputes in the literature about the ontology of physical objects are merely verbal; second, that the proper way to resolve these disputes is by appealing to common sense or ordinary language. A verbal dispute is characterized not in terms of private idiolects, but in terms of different linguistic communities representing different positions. If we imagine a community that makes Chisholm's mereological essentialist assertions, and another community that makes Lewis's four-dimensionalist assertions, the members of each community speak the truth in their respective languages. This follows from an application of the principle of interpretive charity to the two communities.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOCHBERG1979, author = {HOCHBERG, HERBERT}, title = {BELIEF AND INTENTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {1-18}, keywords = {belief, intention, metaphysics, predicate, property, relation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hochberg1996, author = {Hochberg, Herbert}, title = {New Foundations of Ontology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {469-476}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOCHBERG1989, author = {HOCHBERG, HERBERT}, title = {DESCRIPTIONS, SITUATIONS, AND RUSSELL'S EXTENSIONAL ANALYSIS OF INTENTIONALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {555-581}, keywords = {description, intentionality, logic, situation}, abstract = {THE PAPER FOCUSES ON AN ASPECT OF RUSSELL'S CLASSIC "ON DENOTING" THAT HAS BEEN OVERLOOKED: THE ATTEMPT TO USE HIS THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS TO AVOID RECOGNIZING NONOBTAINING SITUATIONS IN THE SPECIFICATION OF TRUTH CONDITIONS FOR ATOMIC SENTENCES. THE CONNECTION OF RUSSELL'S THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS TO THE SUBSEQUENT FORMULATION OF HIS RELATIONAL THEORY OF JUDGMENT IS EXPLORED, AS ARE MODIFICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THAT THEORY. PROBLEMS WITH RUSSELL'S ATTEMPT TO AVOID SITUATIONS AND DEAL WITH INTENTIONAL CONTEXTS LEAD TO PROPOSED ANALYSES, DERIVED FROM RUSSELL'S, THAT (1) SPECIFY TRUTH CONDITIONS FOR ATOMIC SENTENCES WHILE AVOIDING SITUATIONS, POSSIBLE FACTS, FREGEAN PROPOSITIONS, AND ANY OTHER CORRELATE OF FALSE SENTENCES; (2) HANDLE INTENTIONAL CONTEXTS IN AN EXTENSIONAL MANNER, WHILE DEALING WITH THE FAMILIAR PUZZLES CONCERNING SUBSTITUTION, "QUANTIFYING IN," ETC. IT IS THUS ARGUED THAT EARLY VIEWS OF RUSSELL'S, SOME MISUNDERSTOOD, SOME IGNORED, PROVIDE A BASIS FOR VIABLE RESOLUTIONS OF TWO FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS: THE PROBLEMS POSED BY THE APPARENT REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE OF FALSE ATOMIC SENTENCES AND THE PROBLEMS POSED BY INTENTIONAL CONTEXTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOCUTT1974, author = {HOCUTT, MAX}, title = {ARMSTRONG AND STRAWSON ON 'DISEMBODIED EXISTENCE'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {46-59}, keywords = {embodiment, existence, metaphysics}, abstract = {ARMSTRONG SAYS THAT 'DISEMBODIED EXISTENCE' IS INTELLIGIBLE BECAUSE NOT SELF-CONTRADICTORY. BUT NONSENSE NEED NOT BE SELF-CONTRADICTORY. STRAWSON SAYS THAT DISEMBODIED EXISTENCE IS CONCEIVABLE BECAUSE IMAGINABLE. BUT I CAN'T IMAGINE IT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOCUTT1967, author = {HOCUTT, MAX}, title = {IN DEFENSE OF MATERIALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {366-385}, keywords = {identity, materialism, metaphysics, mind}, abstract = {THIS PAPER IS A SOMEWHAT TURGID ATTEMPT TO DEFEND THE 'IDENTITY THEORY', REFORMULATED AS THE 'INCLUSION THEORY' (ALL MENTAL EVENTS ARE PHYSICAL) AGAINST THE STANDARD OBJECTIONS. IT ARGUES THAT THESE OBJECTIONS ARE EITHER VITIATED BY THE REFERENTIAL OPACITY OF SENTENCES ABOUT MENTAL EVENTS (SENSATIONS) OR ELSE BY CONFUSED NOTIONS ABOUT THE 'PRIVACY' OF MENTAL EVENTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hodes2002, author = {Hodes, Harold}, title = {Stewart Shapiro's Philosophy of Mathematics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {467-475}, keywords = {logic, mathematics, structuralism}, abstract = {This review essay presents and criticizes the central part of a realistic structuralist account of the subject matter of contemporary mathematics, the view that Shapiro articulates in Philosophy of Mathematics. It considers the thesis that "a structure is the abstract form of a system", Shapiro's distinction between the "places-as-offices" and the "places-as-objects" perspectives, his account of the distinctive features of mathematical structures (formality and freestandingness), his analysis of what it is for systems to have the same structure, his (informal) axiom of coherence, his attempt to dissolve the question "How can we know about, or even refer to, places in a structure?", and his version of ontological relativity.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HODGES1962, author = {HODGES, DONALD-CLARK}, title = {HISTORICAL MATERIALISM IN ETHICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {1-22}, keywords = {ethics, historical-materialism; marxism, normative-judgment; science, sociology, truth, universality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HODGES1971, author = {HODGES, DONALD-CLARK}, title = {PRESUPPOSITION OF A DEFINITION AS 'MORAL PROGRESS'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {440-443}, keywords = {moral, progress, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HODGES1970, author = {HODGES, DONALD-CLARK}, title = {THE PROVISIONAL ETHICS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {394-402}, keywords = {morality, social-philosophy; socialism}, abstract = {MARX'S USE OF MORAL LANGUAGE IN THE GENERAL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND RULES ADOPTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION IN 1864 IS SHOWN TO HAVE STEMMED NOT FROM HIS YOUTHFUL PHILOSOPHICAL HUMANISM BUT RATHER FROM A STRATEGICAL CONCERN TO BUTTRESS THE WORKERS' MATERIAL INTERESTS BY AN IDEOLOGICAL APPEAL TO THEIR MORAL CONVICTIONS, AND TO PROVIDE A MORAL JUSTIFICATION FOR SOCIALISM FOR OTHER SOCIAL CLASSES WHOSE ECONOMIC INTERESTS WERE TIED TO THE STATUS QUO.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HODGES1969, author = {HODGES, DONALD-CLARK}, title = {THE FOURTH EPOCH: EPILOGUE TO THE UNFINISHED SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF C WRIGHT MILLS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {327-350}, keywords = {social-philosophy; sociology}, abstract = {THIS ESSAY IS A CRITIQUE OF MILLS' THESIS OF A FOURTH EPOCH FOLLOWING THE ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL, AND MODERN PERIODS. EXAMPLES ARE ADVANCED COUNTERING MILLS' THESIS, AND ARGUMENTS OFFERED SUPPORTING THE FOLLOWING ANTITHESES: THE OVERRIDING TENDENCY OF OUR TIMES IS NOT BUREAUCRACY IN GENERAL BUT THE DISPLACEMENT OF CAPITALIST BY SOCIALIST BUREAUCRACIES; THE TENDENCY FOR MILITARY ELITES TO DICTATE POLICY TO POLITICAL AND INDUSTRIAL ELITES IS ATYPICAL OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES; A THREE-WORLD FRAMEWORK IS MISLEADING BECAUSE THERE ARE ONLY TWO COMPETING SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND CORRESPONDING MILITARY BLOCS; THE CRISIS OF CONTEMPORARY HUMANISM HAS UNDERMINED NINETEENTH-CENTURY LIBERALISM TO THE ADVANTAGE OF SOCIALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HODGES1968, author = {HODGES, DONALD-CLARK}, title = {MORAL PROGRESS FROM PHILOSOPHY TO TECHNOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {430-436}, keywords = {ethics, marxism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HODGES1965, author = {HODGES, DONALD-C}, title = {ON THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {416-418}, keywords = {description, ethics, norm, political-science; science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HODGES1964, author = {HODGES, DONALD-CLARK}, title = {THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE AND THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {366-374}, keywords = {controls, explanation, justification, language, methodology, neutrality, political-science; prediction, science}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR QUESTIONS THE WIDELY SHARED CONVICTION THAT POLITICAL SCIENCE CAN BE POLITICALLY NEUTRAL. HE EXPLORES THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NORMATIVE PRESUPPOSITIONS IN THE SCIENTIFIC THEORIES OF POLITICS, AND CONCLUDES THAT POLITICAL SCIENCE HAS DISGUISED NORMATIVE STATEMENTS AND PRESUPPOSITIONS. THE DESCRIPTIVE AND EXPLANATORY SHOULD BE SEPARATED AND DISTINGUISHED FROM THE PARTLY NORMATIVE COLLECTION OF PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE FREQUENTLY TACIT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HODGES1965a, author = {HODGES, DONALD-CLARK}, title = {AND THE WITHERING AWAY OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {463-476}, keywords = {empiricism, methodology, political-science; problem, social-philosophy; social-sciences; sociology}, abstract = {FOUR PROBLEMS ARE RAISED IN THIS ESSAY: WHY HAS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY BECOME IMPOVERISHED? IN WHAT RESPECTS IS IT WITHERING AWAY? DOES ITS DISSOLUTION CONTRIBUTE TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES? WHAT EFFECT HAS ITS ECLIPSE HAD UPON THE HUMANIZATION OR DEHUMANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE? THE FOLLOWING ANSWERS ARE OFFERED: (1) SOCIAL SCIENTISTS HAVE APPROPRIATED EVERYTHING OF SCIENTIFIC INTEREST IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY WHILE PHILOSOPHERS HAVE REDUCED IT TO A BRANCH OF LOGICAL AND LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS; (2) SOCIAL SCIENTISTS HAVE MADE PHILOSOPHERS SUPERFLUOUS AS LIAISON AGENTS BETWEEN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, AS ANALYZERS OF THE GENERIC TRAITS OF GROUP LIFE, AS METHODOLOGISTS AND SOCIAL THEORISTS; (3) THE ELIMINATION OF NORMATIVE AND METAPHYSICAL SUBJECT MATTER HAS CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASING SPECIALIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE; AND (4) SOCIAL SCIENTISTS HAVE YET TO DEVELOP A SCIENCE OF HUMAN WANTS OR A CONCERN FOR SOCIALLY SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS TO TAKE THE PLACE OF NOW OBSOLETE NORMATIVE THEORIES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HODGES1972, author = {HODGES, DONALD-C}, title = {MARX'S THEORY OF VALUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {249-258}, keywords = {social-philosophy; value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HODGES1970a, author = {HODGES, DONALD-CLARK}, title = {A SPECTER IS HAUNTING THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {289-292}, keywords = {social-philosophy; sociology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HODGES1966, author = {HODGES, DONALD-CLARK}, title = {THE YOUNG MARX: A REAPPRAISAL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {216-229}, keywords = {alienation, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HODGES1961, author = {HODGES, DONALD-CALRK}, title = {PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM: A NOTE ON PROFESSOR LEMOS' DISCUSSION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {246-248}, keywords = {conscious, motivation, philosophical-anthropology; psychological-egoism; subconscious, unconscious}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HODGES1960, author = {HODGES, DONALD-CLARK}, title = {THE RELEVANCE OF HISTORY TO MORAL DISCOURSE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {199-206}, keywords = {ethics, history, language, meaning, methodology, objectivity, term}, abstract = {THIS STUDY CENTERS AROUND OBJECTIVELY IN THE USE OF ETHICAL LANGUAGE. A DISTINCTION IS DRAWN BETWEEN ORDINARY AND REFINED USES OF ETHICAL TERMS. PHILOSOPHY MUST ABANDON, IF IT WISHES TO DEFINE MORAL TERMS OBJECTIVELY, ITS EFFORT TO PROVIDE A UNITARY BASIS FOR MORALITY. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT NEITHER THE ORDINARY NOR THE REFINED USE OF ETHICAL TERMS IS SUFFICIENT TO INTRODUCE OBJECTIVITY INTO ETHICAL LANGUAGE. ANOTHER METHOD IS REQUIRED--THE HISTORICAL METHOD, WHICH IS A STUDY OF CULTURES. THE EXAMPLE GIVEN IS THAT OF "EVIL" AND HOW IT IS CORRELATED HISTORICALLY WITH MORAL VALUES OF A PARTICULAR CLASS AND CULTURE. IT IS URGED THAT CULTURAL HISTORY BE FIRST, AND THEN PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS SECOND. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOENIG1965, author = {HOENIG, J}, title = {KARL JASPERS AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {216-229}, keywords = {explanation, phenomenology, philosophical-anthropology; psychiatry, psychoanalysis, psychopathology, textual-criticism; understanding}, abstract = {IN HIS "ALLGEMEINE PSYCHOPATHOLOGIE" JASPERS HAS MANAGED TO SURVEY ALMOST THE ENTIRE PSYCHIATRIC LITERATURE OF HIS TIME. THE AIM OF THE BOOK IS TO MAKE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY CRITICALLY SELF-AWARE OF ITS OWN METHODS. THE TWO MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE BOOK ARE THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "UNDERSTANDING" AND "EXPLAINING," "PHENOMENOLOGY": JASPERS USES THIS PURELY AS AN EMPIRICAL METHOD TO BRING BEFORE OUR EYES WHAT THE PATIENT ACTUALLY EXPERIENCES. THUS WE COME TO RECOGNIZE SUCH PHENOMENA AS HALLUCINATIONS, PHOBIAS, THOUGHT DISORDER, ETC. "MEANING AND CAUSE". THERE ARE TWO MODES OF APPREHENSION OF PSYCHIC PHENOMENA: (A) THE EMPATHIC UNDERSTANDING OF MEANING, (B) THE EXPLAINING OF CAUSAL CONNECTIONS. CAUSAL CONNECTIONS ARE UNIVERSAL, MEANING IS NOT. "PSYCHOANALYSIS": WHAT FREUD DESCRIBED AS CAUSAL CONNECTIONS ARE REALLY MEANINGFUL CONNECTIONS--THE MODE IN WHICH THERAPY BECOMES EFFECTIVE IS QUESTIONABLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOFFMAN1988, author = {HOFFMAN, JOSHUA and ROSENKRANTZ, GARY}, title = {OMNIPOTENCE REDUX.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {283-301}, keywords = {metaphysics, omnipotence}, abstract = {IN 1980 THE AUTHORS PUBLISHED "WHAT AN OMNIPOTENT AGENT CAN DO" ("INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION" 11, 1980, PP 1-19), AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF OMNIPOTENCE. IN RECENT YEARS, THOMAS FLINT AND ALFRED FREDDOSO AND EDWARD WIERENGA HAVE PROPOSED COUNTEREXAMPLES TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF OMNIPOTENCE. IN BOTH INSTANCES, THESE CRITICISMS OF THE ANALYSIS HAVE BEEN BASED ON A LIBERTARIAN VIEW OF HUMAN FREEDOM TOGETHER WITH THE CLAIM THAT EVEN AN OMNIPOTENT AGENT CANNOT ALWAYS BRING IT ABOUT THAT ANOTHER AGENT DOES SOMETHING "FREELY". THIS PAPER DEFENDS THE ANALYSIS AGAINST THESE CRITICISMS, AND ALSO DEFENDS IT AGAINST OTHER MORE COGENT CRITICISMS WHICH THEIRS SUGGEST, DEFENSES WHICH CAN BE CARRIED OUT BY MEANS OF A SLIGHT ADJUSTMENT TO THE ORIGINAL ACCOUNT. FOLLOWING THIS, IT IS ARGUED THAT THE ACCOUNTS WHICH FLINT AND FREDDOSO AND WIERENGA GIVE OF OMNIPOTENCE SUFFER FROM DEFECTS OF THEIR OWN OF WHICH THE OTHER ANALYSIS IS FREE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hoffman2002, author = {Hoffman, Joshua and Rosenkrantz, Gary-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {742-745}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishers}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Divine Attributes}, volume = {70(3)}, year = {2002} } @other{Hoffman1994, author = {Hoffman, Joshua and Rosenkrantz, Gary-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {480-482}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Substance Among Other Categories}, volume = {57(2)}, year = {1994} } @article{Hoffman2002a, author = {Hoffman, Paul}, title = {Descartes's Theory of Distinction}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {57-78}, keywords = {distinction, dualism, metaphysics, nonidentity, number, separability, thing}, abstract = {In the first part of this paper I explore the relations among distinctness, separability, number, and nonidentity. I argue that Descartes believes plurality in things themselves arises from distinction, so that things distinct in any of the three ways are not identical. The second part I argue that the notion of separability in Descartes's account of real distinction between mind and body is subject to five different interpretations. I claim that the heart of Cartesian dualism concerns the separability of the attributes thought and extension. It does not require that mind and body are separable in the sense that each can exist without the other existing. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOFFMAN1984, author = {HOFFMAN, ROBERT}, title = {INTENTION, DOUBLE EFFECT, AND SINGLE RESULT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {389-394}, keywords = {choosing, double-effect; ethics, intention, means}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOFFMAN1967, author = {HOFFMAN, ROBERT}, title = {MR MALINOVICH ON SEEING AS AN ACHIEVEMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {439-440}, keywords = {epistemology, perceiving, seeing}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOFFMAN1960, author = {HOFFMAN, ROBERT}, title = {THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS--GENUINE OR PSEUDO?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {503-512}, keywords = {analogy, certainty, criteria, epistemology, inference, knowledge, other-minds; self-knowledg}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR CLAIMS THAT ONE KNOWS OTHER MINDS THROUGH AN ANALOGICAL INFERENCE, THE PROCEDURE OF WHICH CANNOT HAVE A PROOF OF ITS VALIDITY. IF BY "KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER MINDS" IS MEANT A KIND OF KNOWLEDGE THE CRITERION FOR WHICH IS THE CERTAINTY OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE, THEN THERE CANNOT BE KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER MINDS. THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH KNOWLEDGE WOULD BE A LOGICAL CONTRADICTION. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS MEANINGFUL TO SPEAK OF OTHER PERSONS' EXPERIENCES. IT MAY BE THAT ONE IS NEVER ABLE TO KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THE FEELINGS OR SENSATIONS OF ANOTHER PERSON; BUT, IT IS NOT MEANINGLESS, THAT ONE IS SOMETIMES ABLE TO MAKE TRUE STATEMENTS ABOUT THE CONTENT OF OTHER MINDS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOLLINGER1976, author = {HOLLINGER, ROBERT}, title = {ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF CLASSIFICATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {319-338}, keywords = {abstraction, classification, conventionalism, naturalism, science}, abstract = {THREE APPROACHES TO THE THEORY OF CLASSIFICATION ARE DISCUSSED: RADICAL CONVENTIONALISM, MODIFIED CONVENTIONALISM, NATURALISM (WITH ESSENTIALISM A LIMITING CASE). TWO ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF CONVENTIONALISM ARE EVALUATED: THE ARGUMENT FROM ALTERNATIVE DESCRIPTIONS, AND THAT BASED UPON THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN HUMAN INTERESTS AND CLASSIFICATION. IT IS SHOWN THAT NEITHER ARGUMENT SUSTAINS CONVENTIONALISM, NOR UNDERMINES THE IDEA OF A NATURAL CLASSIFICATION, I.E., ONE WHICH DIVIDES NATURE AT ITS JOINTS. I SKETCH A THEORY OF ESSENTIALISM, BASED UPON A DOCTRINE OF NATURAL KINDS AND A REALISTIC META-THEORY OF SCIENCE. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT SUCH A THEORY CAN PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONVENTIONALISM AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL. MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE ARISTOTELIAN IDEAL OF A NATURAL CLASSIFICATION IS COMBINED WITH THE PEIRCEAN CONCEPTION OF AN IDEAL SCIENCE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO VINDICATE BOTH THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ESSENTIALISM AND THE HEURISTIC VALUE OF THE NATURALIST'S PROGRAM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hollis1998, author = {Hollis, Martin}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {487-490}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Trust within Reason}, volume = {62(2)}, year = {1998} } @article{HOLMES1963, author = {HOLMES, ARTHUR-F}, title = {MARTIAN UNICORNS OR BLUE CATS: AN ESSAY ON PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {135-142}, keywords = {appearance, common-sense; experience, methodology, perception, philosophy, reality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOLMES1961, author = {HOLMES, ROBERT-L}, title = {ULTIMATE RULES IN ETHICS: A REPLY TO MR SCHON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {384-387}, keywords = {conflict, ethics, rationality, resolution, rule, ultimate}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Honderich1996, author = {Honderich, Ted}, title = {Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and the Smart Aleck}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {855-862}, keywords = {compatibilism, definition, epistemology, knowledge, realism}, abstract = {Richard Double's discussions of my view of determinism and freedom rest on mistakes. (1) The resolution of the problem depends on seeing we have two sets of attitudes involving two ideas of freedom. (2) My view is neither compatibilism nor incompatibilism. (3) That facts do not entail values should not lead us to forget that attitudes have propositional contents, and that the attitudes are based on them. (4) Determinism does indeed have consequences for our attitudes. (5) We cannot give up the thought that we originate actions but persist in, say, the kind of moral disapproval that includes retributive desires. (6) One of three responses to determinism, affirmation, is an objective resolution of the problem.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Honderich2002, author = {Honderich, Ted}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {244-246}, publisher = {Edinburgh Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {After the Terror}, volume = {69(1)}, year = {2002} } @article{Hooker1999, author = {Hooker, Brad}, title = {Sacrificing for the Good of Strangers--Repeatedly}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {177-181}, keywords = {action, death, ethics, sacrifice}, abstract = {Peter Unger's book Living High and Letting Die carefully considers how much you are morally required to sacrifice for the sake of helping strangers (by which I merely mean other people to whom you have no special connection). Unger's brilliant discussion of this question ends up with extremely demanding requirements on us to make sacrifices for the desperately needy. My critical discussion summarizes Unger's arguments but then proposes that the degree of sacrifice required in an isolated case is different from that required in a case that will reoccur over an over again.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hooker2000, author = {Hooker, Brad}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {240-244}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality}, volume = {69(1)}, year = {2000} } @article{HOOKER1975, author = {HOOKER, C-A}, title = {THE INFORMATION-PROCESSING APPROACH TO THE BRAIN-MIND AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL RAMIFICATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {1-15}, keywords = {concept, epistemology, information-theory; knowledge, language, minds, process}, abstract = {CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTIONS OF THE BRAIN AS A RICH INFORMATION PROCESSING STRUCTURE STRONGLY SUGGEST THE PERIPHERALITY OF LANGUAGE, CONSCIOUSNESS AND UNITY OF THE SELF AS THESE HAVE BEEN TRADITIONALLY UNDERSTOOD PHILOSOPHICALLY. THIS PAPER, IN THE FORM OF AN EXTENDED DISCUSSION, EXAMINES SOME OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE FIRST OF THESE VIEWS ESPECIALLY. I DISCUSS ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE NATURE OF CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURES, RATIONALITY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND LANGUAGE ITSELF. THE ARTICLE IS INTENDED TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS RATHER THAN PROVIDE ANSWERS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hooker1995, author = {Hooker, Clifford-A}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {541-544}, publisher = {SUNY Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Reason, Regulation, and Realism: Towards a Regulatory Systems Theory of Reason and Evolutionary Epistemology}, volume = {59(2)}, year = {1995} } @article{Hookway1998, author = {Hookway, Christopher}, title = {Normative Concepts and Epistemological Internalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {907-912}, keywords = {epistemology, externalism, internalism, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Horgan1993, author = {Horgan, Terence}, title = {On What There Isn't}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {693-700}, keywords = {being, epistemology, material}, abstract = {Peter van Inwagen, in his book "Material Beings", argues that the only real material entities are physical simples and living organisms. In this symposium paper on "Material Beings", I first articulate a metaphysical principle which plausibly underwrites van Inwagen's argument; I call it "the non-arbitrariness of composition". I then argue that this principle generates heavy dialectical pressure against van Inwagen's preferred ontology -- and toward an ontological position that repudiates not only the tables, chairs, and other dry goods both natural and artifactual, but also persons and other living organisms. Arguably, even more isn't than van Inwagen claims isn't.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Horgan1992, author = {Horgan, Terence}, title = {From Cognitive Science to Folk Psychology: Computation, Mental Representation, and Belief}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {449-484}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, folk-psychology; representation}, abstract = {This paper is a critical study of Lynne Rudder Baker's "Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism"; Jay Garfield's "Belief in Psychology: A Study in the Ontology of Mind"; and Robert Cummins's "Meaning and Mental Representation". All three books discuss interconnections between computational cognitive science and common-sense intentional psychology. The paper includes, as groundwork, a critical examination of certain influential views of Jerry Fodor about these matters. One of my central claims is that the relation between the state-types of intentional psychology and those of computational cognitive science is best viewed as realization, not (contra Fodor) as type-identity.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HORGAN1984, author = {HORGAN, TERENCE}, title = {FUNCTIONALISM, QUALIA, AND THE INVERTED SPECTRUM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {453-470}, keywords = {functionalism, mental-states; metaphysics}, abstract = {I ARGUE THE INADEQUACY OF A RECENT ATTEMPT BY DAVID LEWIS TO SHOW THAT FUNCTIONALISM CAN ACCOMMODATE INVERTED-QUALIA THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS. I THEN PROPOSE A HYBRID THEORY OF MIND, WHICH COMBINES FUNCTIONALISM (FOR THE NON-QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF MENTALITY) WITH A TYPE-TYPE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL IDENTITY THEORY (FOR QUALIA).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Horgan1996, author = {Horgan, Terence}, title = {The Perils of Epistemic Reductionism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {891-897}, keywords = {epistemology, objectivity, reductionism, truth}, abstract = {This is a contribution to a symposium on Crispin Wright's Truth and Objectivity. I distinguish between 1) Wright's generic approach to truth and to realism/antirealism debates about various kinds of discourse (e.g., humor discourse, moral discourse, mathematical discourse) and 2) an epistemically reductionist implementation of the generic view that he apparently favors. I sketch an alternative, nonepistemic, implementation and I argue against epistemically reductive versions. According to the view I sketch, truth is correct assertibility. Unlike Putnam's "ideal warranted assertibility" or Wright's "superassertibility," correct assertibility is not a concept constructible from the notion of epistemic warrant.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Horgan2002, author = {Horgan, Terry and Tammelleo, Steve}, title = {The Salem Witch Project}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {193-200}, keywords = {epistemology, meaning, normativity, prescriptivism, semantics}, abstract = {This is a contribution to a symposium on Lance and Hawthorne, The Grammar of Meaning. We focus on a key thought experiment the authors introduce, involving the term 'witch', that appears to be dialectically central in their argument that meaning discourse is radically normative rather than descriptive. The thought experiment illustrates a phenomenon we call "the indexicality of translation". We argue that this phenomenon can be naturally accommodated by someone who denies Lance and Hawthorne's claim that meaning discourse is radically normative.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HORN1984, author = {HORN, WALTER}, title = {A NEW PROOF FOR THE PHYSICAL WORLD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {531-538}, keywords = {epistemology, existence, metaphysics, physical-objec}, abstract = {SUCH PHILOSOPHERS AS SPINOZA, JAMES AND GEACH HAVE HELD THAT IT'S A NECESSARY TRUTH THAT IF ONE REPRESENTS A PARTICULAR PROPERTY AND ONE DOESN'T REPRESENT ANYTHING THAT WOULD PREVENT THAT PROPERTY FROM BEING EXEMPLIFIED, ONE WILL BELIEVE THAT PROPERTY IS EXEMPLIFIED. IT FOLLOWS FROM THIS PURELY PSYCHOLOGICAL CLAIM THAT THERE ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS IN EVERY POSSIBLE WORLD.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hornsby1997, author = {Hornsby, Jennifer}, title = {Collectives and Intentionality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {429-434}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, knowledge, social}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HORNSBY1988, author = {HORNSBY, JENNIFER}, title = {SARTRE AND ACTION THEORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {745-751}, keywords = {action-theory; cause, event, metaphysics}, abstract = {IT IS ARGUED THAT SARTREAN INSIGHTS ABOUT HUMAN BEINGS DO NOT CONFLICT WITH THE "ACTION THEORETIC" ACCOUNT OF JENNIFER HORNSBY'S "ACTIONS" (RKP 1980). THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE RAISED, AND THE NEGATIVE ANSWERS OFFERED REPLY TO KATHERINE MORRIS ("PHIL PHENOMENOL RES", 48, MARCH 1988): (1) SHOULD WE STOP THINKING OF ACTIONS AS EVENTS? (2) DOES A DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTIONS AND PEOPLE'S BODIES' MOVINGS (A) LEAD TO SCEPTICISM ABOUT OTHER MINDS; (B) DISTORT THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE AGENT'S PERSPECTIVE?}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOROSZ1962, author = {HOROSZ, WILLIAM}, title = {IDIOMS, OLD AND NEW, OF CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {393-404}, keywords = {culture, idiom, religion, science, text, transcendentalism, twentieth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOROSZ1960, author = {HOROSZ, WILLIAM}, title = {SOME REFLECTIONS IN RECENT PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {397-408}, keywords = {culture, god, man, nature, religion, text, twentieth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOROSZ1970, author = {HOROSZ, WILLIAM}, title = {IS THERE A THIRD ALTERNATIVE TO KNOWLEDGE?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {273-281}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO EXPAND THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE PROBLEM OF METHOD AND STRUCTURE ARE DISCUSSED IN EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE. THERE IS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF ABSTRACTIONISM THAT GOES INTO ASSUMED GIVEN STRUCTURES OF EXPERIENCE OF WHICH THE STRUCTURALIST IS NOT COGNIZANT. SINCE HUMAN ACTION IS PERSPECTIVAL IT IS LIKELY THAT ASSUMED GIVEN STRUCTURES OF MEANING AND EXPERIENCE ARE ABSTRACTIONS BY PARTICIPATION RATHER THAN ABSTRACTIONS BY THE MIND. THE STRUCTUALIST'S APPROACH TO KNOWLEDGE MAY SIMPLY BE A WAY OF REGISTERING OUR DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION IN EXPERIENCE BY MODES OF ELEMENTAL RESPONSE. THE APPARENT IMPASSE BETWEEN STRUCTURALISTS AND METHODOLOGISTS NEEDS CLARIFICATION BY EXTENDING THE FRAMEWORK IN WHICH GIVEN MEANINGS IN EXPERIENCE ARE RELATED TO PARTICIPATION AND DIRECTIVE AGENCY. THE VARIETY OF MEANINGS ATTRIBUTED TO STRUCTURES SUGGESTS THAT DIRECT EXPERIENCE, ON WHICH THE STRUCTURALIST RELIES, MAY ITSELF BE A MODEL OF EXPERIENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Horowitz1999, author = {Horowitz, Amir}, title = {Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {421-434}, keywords = {epiphenomenalism, mental-event; metaphysics, physicalism}, abstract = {Physicalist epiphenomenalism is the conjunction of the doctrine that tokens of mental events are tokens of physical events and the doctrine that mental events do not exert causal powers by virtue of falling under mental types. The purpose of the paper is to show that physicalist epiphenomenalism, contrary to what many have thought, is not subject to the objections that have been raised against classic epiphenomenalism. This is argued with respect to five such objections. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOROWITZ1964, author = {HOROWITZ, IRVING-LOUIS}, title = {MARXISM ACCORDING TO C WRIGHT MILLS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {402-405}, keywords = {future, history, liberalism, pluralism, social-philosophy; social-sciences; textual-criticis}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOROWITZ1970, author = {HOROWITZ, IRVING-LOUIS}, title = {THE FIFTH EPOCH: POSTSCRIPT TO AN EPILOGUE TO AN UNFINISHED SOCIAL THEORY OF THE LIVING AND THE DEAD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {282-288}, keywords = {social-philosophy; sociology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOROWITZ1966, author = {HOROWITZ, IRVING-LOUIS}, title = {ON ALIENATION AND THE SOCIAL ORDER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {230-237}, keywords = {alienation, social-philosophy; society}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOROWITZ1962, author = {HOROWITZ, IRVING-LOUIS}, title = {ON THE SOCIAL THEORIES OF GIOVANNI GENTILE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {263-268}, keywords = {fascism, italian, social-philosophy; social-theory; textual-criticism; twentieth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOROWITZ1960, author = {HOROWITZ, IRVING-L}, title = {SCIENCE, CRITICISM, AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {173-186}, keywords = {criticism, epistemology, ideology, knowledge, methodology, science, social-sciences; sociology, value-judgmen}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOROWITZ1977, author = {HOROWITZ, RUTH-L}, title = {PHENOMENOLOGY AND CITIZENSHIP: A CONTRIBUTION BY ALFRED SCHUTZ.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {293-311}, keywords = {citizenship, consciousness, knowledge, person, phenomenology, politics, social-philosoph}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE CLAIMS THAT SCHUTZ'S CONCEPT OF THE "WELL INFORMED" CITIZEN CONTRIBUTES MEANINGFULLY TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW "CITIZENSHIP" PRACTICED ON A BROAD BASIS STRENGTHENS SOCIAL INTEGRATION. THIS IS SHOWN BY IDENTIFYING DIFFERENT ORDERS OF KNOWLEDGE SCHUTZ CONSIDERS ESSENTIAL FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF SOCIETIES ("RECIPE," "TECHNICAL," "PHILOSOPHIC," "WELL INFORMED") AND THE WAY IN WHICH EACH CONTRIBUTES TO SOCIAL ORDER. IT CONCLUDES THAT THE "WELL INFORMED" LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE IS UNIQUE TO "CITIZENSHIP" AND THE BASIS OF PUBLIC RULES ISSUING FROM THE CITIZENSHIP PRACTICE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Horst1996, author = {Horst, Steven-W}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {832-835}, publisher = {Univ of Calif Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind}, volume = {59(3)}, year = {1996} } @article{Horwich1994, author = {Horwich, Paul}, title = {Meaning and Metaphilosophy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {145-149}, keywords = {epistemology, language, meaning, rule}, abstract = {This sketches an interpretation of Wittgenstein's later writings, suggesting that it is his meta-philosophical views that lie at the foundation of his treatment of specific philosophical issues, and not (as is often supposed) his account of meaning as use. This reading is presented as a critique of Jerrold Katz's contrary interpretation given in his book "The Metaphysics of Meaning".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Horwich2004, author = {Horwich, Paul}, title = {A Use Theory of Meaning}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {351-372}, keywords = {deference, language, meaning, property, semantics, use}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Horwich1997, author = {Horwich, Paul}, title = {The Nature of Vagueness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {929-935}, keywords = {epistemology, falsity, meaning, truth, vagueness}, abstract = {This paper is a response to Tim Williamson's Vagueness. It endorses Williamson's view that the law of excluded middle and the principle of bivalence should be maintained even for propositions that attribute vague predicates to border-line cases. However, it raises several objections to his 'epistemic' account of the underlying cause of vagueness, and sketches an alternative account, based on a use-theory of meaning.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Horwich1996, author = {Horwich, Paul}, title = {Realism Minus Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {877-881}, keywords = {epistemology, objectivity, realism, truth}, abstract = {This essay is a critique of the account of truth given by Crispin Wright in his book, Truth and Objectivity (Harvard University Press, 1992). It combats Wright's allegation that the deflationary view of truth (presented in Paul Horwich's Truth (Blackwell, 1990) is incoherent. And it takes issue with Wright's pluralistic thesis that we employ different conceptions of truth in different domains of discourse.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HOUTS1980, author = {HOUTS, RONALD-W}, title = {SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE TIME-LAG ARGUMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {150-157}, keywords = {metaphysics, perception, spatiality, time-lag-argumen}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Howard-Snyder1993, author = {Howard-Snyder, Daniel and O'Leary-Hawthorne, John}, title = {God, Schmod and Gratuitous Evil}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {861-874}, keywords = {atheism, evil, god, physics, religion}, abstract = {We explore an analogy between the physicist who believes there are no causally sufficient reasons for some events and the atheist who believes that there are no morally sufficient reasons for some evils. In Part I we use the analogy to show defective three objections to justified belief in gratuitous evils. In Part II we use the analogy -- along with the basic idea underlying Glymour's bootstrapping strategy' for confirmation -- to explore three related but very different questions: Can the atheist provide the theist with a convincing argument that concludes that atheism is more likely than theism, given certain facts about evil both accept? Can someone be justified in believing in gratuitous evil? Can facts about evil form the rational basis for atheism? Our answers are: no, yes, and just a little bit.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Howell2006, author = {Howell, Robert-J}, title = {Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {72(1)}, pages = {44-70}, keywords = {descriptivism, epistemology, individual, self, self-knowledge; self-referenc}, abstract = {Self-knowledge and self-reference is a defense and reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting theses that the self is peculiarly elusive and that our basic, cogito-judgments are certain. On the one hand, Descartes seems to be correct that nothing is more certain than basic statements of self-knowledge, such as "I am thinking." On the other hand, there is the compelling Humean observation that when we introspect, nothing is found except for various "impressions." The problem, then, is that the Humean and Cartesian insights are both initially appealing, yet they appear to be in tension with one another. In this paper I attempt to satisfy both intuitions by developing a roughly descriptivist account of self-reference according to which our certainty in basic beliefs stems precisely from our needing to know so little in order to have them.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hoy1994, author = {Hoy, David-Couzens and McCarthy, Thomas}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {485-487}, publisher = {Blackwell}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Critical Theory}, volume = {57(2)}, year = {1994} } @article{HOY1973, author = {HOY, RONALD-C}, title = {THE UNVERIFIABILITY OF UNVERIFIABILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {393-398}, keywords = {epistemology, verifiability}, abstract = {A VERSION OF RUSSELL'S COMPLAINT THAT THE VERIFIABILITY OF SOME PROPOSITIONS IS UNVERIFIABLE IS DEFENDED AGAINST HEMPEL'S REJOINDER THAT THE IN PRINCIPLE VERIFIABILITY OF PROPOSITIONS IS A PURELY LOGICAL MATTER. DIFFERENT SOURCES OF OUR INABILITY TO DECIDE THE VERIFIABILITY OF SOME PROPOSITIONS ARE IDENTIFIED, AND IT IS ARGUED THAT WHAT APPEARS TO HEMPEL TO BE A LOGICAL MATTER IS REALLY AN EMPIRICAL MATTER. SO, DUE TO LACK OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE, WE MAY BE UNABLE TO VERIFY THAT A PROPOSITION IS UNVERIFIABLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hudson2004, author = {Hudson, Hud}, title = {Temporally Incongruent Counterparts}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {337-343}, keywords = {counterpart, fourth-dimension; incongruence, metaphysics, time}, abstract = {Despite its first page this paper is not yet another piece on Kant! Rather, the paper is a contribution to the literature on incongruent counterparts. Specifically, it concerns the question of whether we can construct a temporal version of the puzzle of incongruent counterparts--a question which (as far as I can tell) has been thoroughly neglected. I maintain that we can construct such a version of the puzzle, and that this temporal variant on the phenomenon has something to teach us about popular arguments for the possibility (or even actuality) of four-dimensional space.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hudson2001, author = {Hudson, Hud}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {713-723}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person}, volume = {68(3)}, year = {2001} } @article{Huemer2000, author = {Huemer, Michael}, title = {Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {397-413}, keywords = {brain, epistemology, knowledge, realism, scepticism}, abstract = {The brain-in-a-vat argument for skepticism is best formulated, not using the closure principle, but using the "Preference Principle," which states that in order to be justified in believing H on the basis of E, one must have grounds for preferring H over each alternative explanation of E. When the argument is formulated this way, Dretske's and Klein's responses to it fail. However, the strengthened argument can be refuted using a direct realist account of perception. For the direct realist, refuting the BIV scenario is not a precondition on knowledge of the external world, and only the direct realist can give a noncircular account of how we know we're not brains in vats.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Huemer2001, author = {Huemer, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {234-237}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Skepticism and the Veil of Perception}, volume = {69(1)}, year = {2001} } @article{HULL1974, author = {HULL, RICHARD-T}, title = {SOME REFLECTIONS OCCASIONED BY CLACK AND CHISHOLM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {257-260}, keywords = {metaphysics, self}, abstract = {I DISTINGUISH THREE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SELF WHICH HAVE BEEN CONFLATED BY RECENT AUTHORS ARGUING AGAINST "BUNDLE" ANALYSES OF THE SELF: (1) IN SOME ACT, SUCH AS IS EXPRESSED BY 'I SEE THAT THIS IS RED', WHAT DOES THE 'I' REFER TO? (2) WHEN I SAY 'I THOUGHT SO AND SO YESTERDAY; I AM UNCERTAIN OF IT TODAY, BUT I WILL DECIDE IT TOMORROW', WHAT DOES THIS RECURRING 'I' REFER TO? (3) IF EACH OF US IS A BUNDLE OF ACTS OR PERCEPTIONS, WHAT IS IT THAT CONSTITUTES A GIVEN SET OF ELEMENTS INTO A DISCRETE BUNDLE? I SKETCH A VERSION OF A BUNDLE THEORY WHICH ANSWERS EACH OF THESE QUESTIONS WITHOUT RESORTING TO NOTIONS OF A TRANSCENDENT, SUBSTANTIAL SELF.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HUMBER1981, author = {HUMBER, JAMES-M}, title = {RECOGNIZING CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {487-507}, keywords = {clarity, distinctness, epistemology, perception}, abstract = {DESCARTES REPEATEDLY HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH FAILING TO PROVIDE A CRITERION FOR DISTINGUISHING GENUINE CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTIONS FROM THOSE WHICH ONLY APPEAR TO BE CLEAR AND DISTINCT. IN THIS ESSAY THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT DESCARTES IS NOT GUILTY OF THIS CHARGE, AND THAT IT HAS BEEN BROUGHT ONLY BECAUSE DESCARTES' CRITICS HAVE FAILED TO UNDERSTAND WHAT DESCARTES MEANS BY 'CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTION'. THE ESSAY IS DIVIDED INTO THREE PARTS. FIRST, THE AUTHOR ANALYZES 'CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTION'. NEXT, THE AUTHOR USES HIS ANALYSIS OF 'CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTION' TO SHOW: A) THAT DESCARTES DOES HAVE A CRITERION FOR DISTINGUISHING GENUINE FROM ILLUSORY CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTIONS, AND B) THAT THIS CRITERION IS THE METHOD DESCARTES EMPLOYS IN ORDER TO PERCEIVE CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY. FINALLY, THE AUTHOR OUTLINES DESCARTES' METHOD FOR INSURING CLARITY AND DISTINCTNESS OF PERCEPTION, AND SHOW HOW AN UNDERSTANDING OF THIS METHOD IS USEFUL IN CLARIFYING RELATED ASPECTS OF DESCARTES' THOUGHT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Humberstone1997, author = {Humberstone, I-Lloyd}, title = {Two Types of Circularity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {249-280}, keywords = {circularity, condition, epistemology, knowledge, logic}, abstract = {For the claim that the satisfaction of certain conditions is sufficient for the application of some concept to serve as part of the ('reductive') analysis of that concept, we require the conditions to be specified without employing that very concept. An account of the application conditions of a concept not meeting this requirement, we call analytically circular. For such a claim to be usable in determining the extension of the concept, however, such circularity may not matter, since if the concept figures in a certain kind of intensional context in the specification of the conditions, the satisfaction of those conditions may not itself depend on the extension of the concept. We put this by saying that although analytically circular, the account may yet not be inferentially circular.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Humphreys1995, author = {Humphreys, Paul}, title = {Abstract and Concrete}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {157-161}, keywords = {aristotelians, causality, epistemology, measurement, nature}, abstract = {I argue that Nancy Cartwright's account of abstraction in her "Nature Capacities and their Measurement" is incoherent and cannot provide, as she claims, an argument for capacities.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hunter1999, author = {Hunter, Bruce}, title = {Knowledge and Design}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {309-334}, keywords = {design, epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {Ruth Milikan and Alvin Plantinga claim, roughly, that knowledge is true belief produced by processes in circumstances for which they are (successfully) designed to yield truth. Neither offers the account as a conceptual analysis of knowledge. Instead, for Plantinga it represents the core concept of knowledge characterizing central cases, and for Milikan an empirically warranted theoretical definition of knowledge as a natural phenomenon. Counterexamples are then dismissed as appropriately called "knowledge" only in some analogically extended sense. I argue instead that a definition of knowledge is better thought of, like an account of justice, as an explication, or a decision about what normative constraints to adopt. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hunter1998, author = {Hunter, David}, title = {Understanding and Belief}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {559-580}, keywords = {belief, memory, metaphysics, perception, understanding}, abstract = {A natural view is that linguistic understanding is a source of justification or evidence: that beliefs about the meaning of a text or speech act are prima facie justified when based on states of understanding. Neglect of this view is largely due to the widely held assumption that understanding a text or speech act consists in knowledge or belief. It is argued that this assumption rests, in part, on confusing occurrent states of understanding and dispositions to understand. It is then argued that occurrent states of understanding are not states of belief of knowledge since a subject may fail to believe that a text or speech act means what she understands it to mean if she doubts the reliability or truthfulness of that understanding. States of understanding, it is maintained, belong in the same epistemic category as states of perception and memory.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hurka1993, author = {Hurka, Thomas}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {719-723}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Perfectionism}, volume = {55(3)}, year = {1993} } @article{Hurley2001, author = {Hurley, S-L}, title = {Overintellectualizing the Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {423-431}, keywords = {epistemology, intellectual, metaphysics, mind}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HUSSERL1975, author = {HUSSERL, EDMUND}, title = {ADOLF REINACH (TRANSLATED BY LUCINA V BRETTLER).}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {571-574}, keywords = {biography, twentieth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HUTCHESON1986, author = {HUTCHESON, PETER}, title = {HUSSERL'S ALLEGED PRIVATE LANGUAGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {133-136}, keywords = {epoche, metaphysics, private-languag}, abstract = {IN A RECENT ISSUE OF "PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH" IT IS CLAIMED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HUSSERL TO REMAIN NEUTRAL ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF OTHERS. THIS PAPER IS AN ARGUMENT FOR THE CONCLUSION THAT SUCH NEUTRALITY IS POSSIBLE. THUS, THE WITTGENSTEIN-INSPIRED OBJECTION PRESENTS NO THREAT TO HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HUTCHESON1981, author = {HUTCHESON, PETER}, title = {HUSSERL AND PRIVATE LANGUAGES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {111-118}, keywords = {intentionality, language, phenomenology, private-language; reductionism}, abstract = {SOME PHILOSOPHERS BELIEVE THAT PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION, THE METHODOLOGICAL DEVICE WITH WHICH HUSSERL BEGINS PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS, REQUIRES SOME SORT OF PRIVATE LANGUAGE, RENDERING PHENOMENOLOGY VULNERABLE TO WITTGENSTEINIAN ATTACKS. UNFORTUNATELY, THAT THESIS HAS BEEN DEFENDED ONLY RARELY. IT IS ARGUED THAT A RECENT ATTEMPT TO DEFEND THAT POSITION FAILS, AND THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY IT MUST BE BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE REDUCTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Hutto1999, author = {Hutto, Daniel-D}, title = {A Cause for Concern: Reasons, Causes and Explanations}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {381-401}, keywords = {causation, epistemology, explanation, psychology, reasons}, abstract = {This paper argues against causalism about reasons in three stages. First, the paper investigates Professor Davidson's sophisticated version of the claim that we must understand reason-explanations as a kind of causal explanation to highlight the fact that this move does no explanatory work in telling us how we determine for which reasons we act. Second, the paper considers Davidson's true motivation for regarding reasons-explanations as causal which connects with his claim that reasons are causes. Finally, the paper considers a possible way of recasting our understanding of causation so that the mysterious connection problem disappears. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{HYDE1978, author = {HYDE, WILLIAM-H}, title = {WHAT "ELSE" MAKES AESTHETIC TERMS "AESTHETIC"?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {39}, pages = {124-130}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, criticism, perception, term}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE IS A RESPONSE TO PETER KIVY'S CLAIM THAT AESTHETIC TERMS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY THEIR TYPICAL USE IN JUDGMENTS WHICH ARE "TERMINAL" IN THE SENSE OF BEING "NEITHER PREMISES TO ARGUMENTS NOR CALLS TO ACTION." I ARGUE THAT KIVY'S ACCOUNT IS DEFECTIVE IN NOT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VERY IMPORTANT NON-TERMINAL USE OF AESTHETIC TERMS IN CRITICISM. THIS ARGUMENT ENTAILS A LIMITED DISCUSSION OF THE NATURE OF CRITICISM AND A DISCUSSION OF THE KIND OF APPLICABILITY AESTHETIC TERMS HAVE TO THEIR TYPICAL OBJECTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Hymers2000, author = {Hymers, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {239-242}, publisher = {Westview Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses}, volume = {67(1)}, year = {2000} } @article{HYSLOP1983, author = {HYSLOP, ALEC}, title = {ON 'SEEING-AS'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {533-540}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, representation, will}, abstract = {NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR 'SEEING-AS' ARE PROVIDED. ORDINARY CASES OF PERCEPTION ARE COVERED AND, ALSO, REPRESENTATIONAL PAINTINGS AND THE DUCK-RABBIT FIGURE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ICHHEISER1969, author = {ICHHEISER, GUSTAV}, title = {ON "TOLERANCE" AND "FANATICISM": A DILEMMA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {446-450}, keywords = {epistemology, fanaticism, tolerance}, abstract = {TOLERANCE IS NOT THE SUPREME VIRTUE AND FANATICISM IS NOT THE SUPREME EVIL AS WHICH THEY ARE OFTEN PRESENTED TO US BY PEOPLE WHO HAVE OFTEN MORE GOOD WILL THAN GOOD INSIGHT. AS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF "TOLERANCE", IT BELONGS TO THOSE SELF-CONTRADICTORY ABSTRACT IDEAS AND IDEALS WHICH EITHER CANNOT BE CONSISTENTLY APPLIED IN EVERYDAY LIFE; OR IF CONSISTENTLY APPLIED WOULD PARADOXICALLY LEAD TO CONSEQUENCES WHICH ARE THE VERY OPPOSITE OF WHAT WAS ORIGINALLY INTENDED. AND AS TO THE IDEA OF "FANATICISM", IT IS BY NO MEANS THAT UNMITIGATED EVIL AS WHICH IT IS OFTEN DENOUNCED. FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE DEEP CONVICTIONS LOOK OFTEN LIKE "FANATICS" TO THOSE WHO DO NOT SHARE THEIR CONVICTIONS. THIS CONFIRMS THE OLD EXPERIENCE THAT WHEREVER WE TURN IN LIFE WE ARE CONFRONTED NOT BY CLEAR-CUT ALTERNATIVES BUT BY PARADOXES, AMBIGUITIES AND DILEMMAS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ICHHEISSER1966, author = {ICHHEISSER, GUSTAV}, title = {SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND MORAL JUDGMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {546-560}, keywords = {ethics, interpersonal, moral-judgment; paradox, perception, person, relation, social}, abstract = {WHATEVER, IN ABSTRACT, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN "VALUES" AND "FACTS," IT IS INDUBITABLE THAT "CONCRETE" MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE BASED ON FACTS AS THEY ARE PRESENTED TO US BY OUR SOCIAL PERCEPTION. THE SO-CALLED MORAL JUDGMENTS, THEREFORE, ARE A COMPOUND, THE DUALITY OF WHICH IS CONFUSED BY THEIR EVALUATIVE ASPECTS BEING OFTEN EXPLICIT, WHILE THE UNDERLYING FACTUAL ASSERTIONS (OR ASSUMPTIONS) ARE ONLY IMPLICIT. HENCE MANY "SEEMINGLY" MORAL DISAGREEMENTS ARE ACTUALLY NOT MORAL BUT FACTUAL IN THEIR NATURE. WE DISAGREE WITH EACH OTHER ABOUT SEEMINGLY MORAL ISSUES BECAUSE WE PERCEIVE THE UNDERLYING FACTS IN DIFFERENT WAYS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{IHDE1967, author = {IHDE, DON}, title = {SOME PARALLELS BETWEEN ANALYSIS AND PHENOMENOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {577-586}, keywords = {analysis, phenomenology, twentieth}, abstract = {THE MAIN CONCERN OF THE DISCUSSION IS TO PARALLEL CERTAIN FEATURES OF W V QUINE'S AND P RICOEUR'S THEORIES OF LANGUAGE. BY ABSTRACTING OUT THEIR PARTICULAR CONTENT ISSUES I SHOW THAT STRONG SIMILARITIES EMERGE. THUS ANALYTIC AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODOLOGIES MAY NOT BE AS DIVERSE AS IS OFTEN THOUGHT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{IMLAY1969, author = {IMLAY, R-A}, title = {CHISHOLM'S EPISTEMIC LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {290-293}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, logic}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{INGARDEN1961, author = {INGARDEN, ROMAN}, title = {AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND AESTHETIC OBJECT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {289-313}, keywords = {aesthetic-experience; aesthetic-object; aesthetics, cognition, constitution, emotion}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE HERE IS TO GIVE A THOROUGH PHENOMENOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COGNITIVE PERCEPTION OF A REAL OBJECT AND THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE OF AN ESTHETIC OBJECT IS DISCUSSED AT LENGTH. ELEMENTS AND PHASES OF AN ESTHETIC EXPERIENCE ARE DELINEATED; ILLUSTRATIONS OF A PRELIMINARY EMOTION OF ESTHETIC EXPERIENCE ARE GIVEN, ALL OF WHICH SUGGEST A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE OF ATTITUDE. FROM NORMAL PERCEIVING TO ESTHETIC PERCEIVING THERE IS A CHANGE FROM CATEGORICAL STRUCTURES TO QUALITATIVE HARMONY STRUCTURES, PRODUCING PLEASURE IN THE PRESENCE OF AN ESTHETIC OBJECT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{INGARDEN1962, author = {INGARDEN, ROMAN}, title = {EDITH STEIN ON HER ACTIVITY AS AN ASSISTANT OF EDMUND HUSSERL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {155-175}, keywords = {letter, phenomenology, publication, text, twentieth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Inness1992, author = {Inness, Julie-C}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {242-246}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation}, volume = {55(1)}, year = {1992} } @article{Inwood1999, author = {Inwood, Brad}, title = {Truth in Moral Medicine}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {805-810}, keywords = {epistemology, moral-theory; truth}, abstract = {In The Therapy of Desire Martha Nussbaum not only outlines the nature of ethics in the Hellenistic period and demonstrates its vital therapeutic character, but she also develops an appealing internalist moral epistemology. In my discussion, I challenge the applicability of this epistemology to ancient stoicism and raise particular challenges to her explication of medial and therapeutic language in Chrysippus and Seneca.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{IRIBADJAKOV1974, author = {IRIBADJAKOV, NIKOLAI}, title = {PHILOSOPHY AND ANTIPHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {181-200}, keywords = {philosophy, twentieth}, abstract = {AS THE SPECIAL SCIENCES MADE ENORMOUS ACHIEVEMENTS IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT, MODERN PHILOSOPHY POLARIZED INTO TWO FUNDAMENTAL AND OPPOSITE CONCEPTS. ONE IS REPRESENTED BY MARXISTS, WHO REGARD IT AS A SCIENTIFIC, POWERFUL INSTRUMENT FOR COGNITION AND REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION; THE OTHER, SUPPORTED BY IDEALIST PHILOSOPHERS AND NOT PHILOSOPHICALLY ORIENTED SCIENTISTS, "ANTIPHILOSOPHY" REJECTS ITS SCIENTIFIC NATURE, PROCLAIMS ITS BARREN VERBAL SCHOLASTICISM. PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS ARE TOO GENERAL TO BE INCLUDED IN THE AREAS OF SCIENCES, SO THEIR DIFFERENTIATION IS NOT GOING TO DEPRIVE IT FROM ITS PROBLEMATICS. AS SCIENTIFIC WELTANSCHAUUNG, MARXIST PHILOSOPHY IS THE ESSENTIAL METHODOLOGICAL BASIS OF ALL SCIENCES, OF ALL MENTAL AND PRACTICAL ACTIVITIES. THIS DISTINGUISHES IT FROM ALL IDEALISTIC AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ISEMINGER1973, author = {ISEMINGER, GARY}, title = {ROMAN INGARDEN AND THE AESTHETIC OBJECT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {417-420}, keywords = {aesthetics, object}, abstract = {I CONSIDER AN ARGUMENT WHICH SEEMS TO BE IMPLICIT IN INGARDEN'S "AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND AESTHETIC OBJECT" (PHIL PHENOMENOL RES, 21) FOR THE VIEW THAT THERE ARE AESTHETIC OBJECTS AS DISTINCT FROM PHYSICAL OBJECTS. I ARGUE THAT THE PREMISES OF THE ARGUMENT, CHIEFLY THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND "COGNITIVE PERCEPTION" AND THE VIEW THAT EXPERIENCE IS INTENTIONAL, CAN BE MAINTAINED WITHOUT COMMITMENT TO THIS CONCLUSION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ISENBERG1964, author = {ISENBERG, ARNOLD}, title = {DEONTOLOGY AND THE ETHICS OF LYING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {463-480}, keywords = {consequence, deontology, ethics, intrinsic-value; lying, utilitarianism}, abstract = {A DEONTOLOGICAL THEORY MUST DISCOVER THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF LYING AMONG THE INTERNAL COMPONENTS OF THE ACT OF LYING. BUT THE DIFFERENCE IN MORAL SIGNIFICANCE ACCORDED TO VARIOUS LIES CANNOT BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON THE BASIS OF INTERNAL COMPONENTS. THOSE COMPONENTS DO ESTABLISH A SLIGHT INHERENT DISVALUE OF LYING. ON THE OTHER HAND, CONSEQUENCES CONSTITUTE THE BASIS OF DIFFERENCES IN MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF VARIOUS LIES; BUT WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE ACT ITSELF, MORAL SIGNIFICANCE IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JACK1965, author = {JACK, HENRY}, title = {A RECENT ATTEMPT TO PROVE GOD'S EXISTENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {575-579}, keywords = {chance, existence, god, intelligence, probability, proof, religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Jackson1998, author = {Jackson, Frank}, title = {Causal Roles and Higher-Order Properties}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {657-661}, keywords = {causation, consciousness, metaphysics, mind, neurological, properties}, abstract = {I discuss whether Michael Tye, in Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1966, holds that phenomenal properties are neurological properties, but that what gives them their phenomenal property names are their highly complex interconnections with other neurological properties and, most especially, subjects' surroundings. Or, alternatively, whether he holds that they are higher-level, wide functional properties in the sense of being properties of having properties that fill some specified wide or distal roles.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Jackson2002, author = {Jackson, Frank}, title = {From Reduction to Type-Type Identity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {644-647}, keywords = {identity, metaphysics, physicalism, reduction}, abstract = {In chapter four, "Reduction and Reductionism: A New Look", Jaegwon Kim offers an account of reduction distinct from the familiar Nagel model. I argue, first, that there is a problem for his account of reduction as it stands; second, that the change that needs to be made is relatively clear (and is suggested by some things Kim himself says); but, third, that when the needed change is made, his claim that the best form of physicalism is a reductive one amounts to the claim that the best form of physicalism is the 'Australian' type-type identity version. I do not see this as an objection. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Jackson2001, author = {Jackson, Frank}, title = {Precis of From Metaphysics to Ethics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {617-624}, keywords = {conceptual-analysis; ethics, metaphysics, supervenience}, abstract = {This is a precis of my book From Metaphysic to Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1998, that precedes a panel discussion of the book in Philosophy and Phenomenal Research by Timothy Williamson, Robert Stalnaker, Stephen Stich and Joseph Weinberg, and Katalin Balog.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Jackson2001a, author = {Jackson, Frank}, title = {Responses}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {653-664}, keywords = {epistemology, metaphysics}, abstract = {These are my responses to the panel discussion of my book From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford University Press, by Timothy Williamson, Robert Stalnaker, Stephen Stich and Joseph Weinberg, and Katalin Balog.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JACKSON1990, author = {JACKSON, Frank}, title = {Causation in the Philosophy of Mind.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {causation, identity, metaphysics, mind, supervenience}, abstract = {Causation has come to play an increasingly important role in the philosophy of mind, reaching its apotheosis in the doctrine that to be a mental state of kind K is to fill the causal role definitive of that kind of mental state. Ironically, there is, from this very functionalist perspective, a problem about how to understand the causal role of mental properties. This problem surfaces in the debates over the language of thought, over broad content, and over the eliminativist implications of connectionism. We offer a solution to the problem, and then apply it to the debate over connectionism and eliminativism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Jackson1993, author = {Jackson, Frank}, title = {Appendix A (For Philosophers)}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {899-903}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, mind}, abstract = {Dennett has argued that he does not need to play the philosopher's game of saying whether he is a behaviorist, a functionalist, an eliminativist, or whatever. In this discussion of his "Consciousness Explained" I argue that he does.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Jacob2002, author = {Jacob, Pierre}, title = {Some Problems for Reductive Physicalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {648-654}, keywords = {metaphysics, physicalism, reduction, supervenience}, abstract = {In this paper, I discuss Kim's criticism of nonreductive physicalism in his (1998) book, Mind in a Physical World. I first examine his "supervenience argument". Second, I examine his rejection of the antireductionist conclusion of the multiple realizability argument. Finally, I question Kim's recommendation that we give up second-order properties in favor of second-order concepts on the grounds that if there are no second-order properties for second-order concepts to be concepts of, then the problem of causal exclusion will not arise and Kim's supervenience argument will be undermined.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Jacob1995, author = {Jacob, Pierre}, title = {Consciousness, Intentionality and Function: What Is the Right Order of Explanation?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {195-200}, keywords = {biology, body, consciousness, mind, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Jacob1998, author = {Jacob, Pierre}, title = {What Is the Phenomenology of Thought?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {443-448}, keywords = {mental, metaphysics, phenomenology, reality, thought}, abstract = {This paper is part of a symposium on Galen Strawson's book, Mental Reality. Strawson argues that experience--phenomenology or what it is like, not intentionality, is the main problem for physicalism in the philosophy of mind. I discuss his claim by arguing that there is no phenomenology to abstract theoretical thoughts.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Jacobsen1993, author = {Jacobsen, Rockney}, title = {Arousal and the Ends of Desire}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {617-632}, keywords = {desire, epistemology, love, perversion, sex}, abstract = {Usual classifications of desires into kinds derive from a prior classification of objects of desire. When this strategy is employed, sexual perversions prevent the recognition of sexual desire as one kind of desire. An alternative classificatory strategy for desires is defended, together with a distinction between desires and (aroused states of) appetites. The definition of sexual desire that results enables us to accommodate two otherwise dubious distinctions from our sexual folklore: a distinction between perverse and nonperverse sex, and a distinction between mutual masturbation and making love.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JACQUETTE1989, author = {JACQUETTE, DALE}, title = {ADVENTURES IN THE CHINESE ROOM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {605-623}, keywords = {artificial-intelligence; metaphysics, mind, turing-machine}, abstract = {JOHN R SEARLE'S PROBLEM OF THE CHINESE ROOM IS CRITICIZED FOR FAILING TO ADDRESS MICROLEVEL FUNCTIONAL ISOMORPHISMS BETWEEN INTELLIGENT SUBJECTS AND ARTIFICIAL COGNITIVE SIMULATIONS IN HYPOTHETICAL TURING TEST EVALUATIONS. SEARLE'S ARGUMENT THAT THE MAMMALIAN BRAIN IS THE ONLY KNOWN MATERIAL OBJECT WITH THE 'RIGHT CAUSAL POWERS' TO SUPPORT INTRINSIC INTENTIONAL STATES IN A SCIENTIFIC CAUSAL-BIOLOGICAL 'NATURALIZATION' OF INTENTIONALITY IS REFUTED AS INCONSISTENT IN OBJECTIVE AND INADEQUATELY MOTIVATED. SEARLE'S EXAMPLES OF WETNESS AND ELASTICITY AS INSTANCES OF THE CAUSATION AND REALIZATION OF MACROSTRUCTURE IN MICROSTRUCTURE ARE REJECTED AS UNSATISFACTORY ANALOGIES FOR THE WAY IN WHICH INTENTIONALITY IS SUPPOSED TO BE CAUSED BY AND REALIZED IN THE MICROSTRUCTURE OF THE BRAIN. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE SCIENTIFIC DEMYSTIFICATION OF INTENTIONALITY IS PROPOSED IN ACCORD WITH A FOUNDATIONAL MODEL OF CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS, IN WHICH INTENTIONALITY IS SEEN AS A PRIMITIVE ABSTRACT RELATION RATHER THAN A CAUSAL-BIOLOGICAL PRODUCT OR PROCESS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Jacquette1998, author = {Jacquette, Dale}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {727-730}, publisher = {Purdue Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Wittgenstein's Thought in Transition}, volume = {62(3)}, year = {1998} } @article{JAGGAR1973, author = {JAGGAR, ALISON}, title = {ON ONE OF THE REASONS FOR THE INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {257-265}, keywords = {indeterminacy, language, linguistics, translation}, abstract = {QUINE'S CLAIM FOR THE UNAVOIDABLE INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION IS PARTIALLY SUPPORTED BY AN ARGUMENT BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT THE ANALYTICAL HYPOTHESES OF THE TRANSLATOR ARE UNDERDETERMINED BY THE BEHAVIOURAL EVIDENCE ON THE STRENGTH OF WHICH THEY ARE ASSERTED. I MAKE THREE POINTS ABOUT THIS ARGUMENT. FIRST, I SHOW THAT QUINE'S TREATMENT OF ANALYTICAL HYPOTHESES IS INCONSISTENT WITH HIS TREATMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE. SECONDLY, I ARGUE THAT, SINCE NO REASON FOR THIS DIFFERENCE IN TREATMENT IS GIVEN, QUINE'S ARGUMENT FAILS TO SHOW WHY TRANSLATION SHOULD BE REGARDED AS INDETERMINATE BUT NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, PHYSICAL SCIENCE. THIRDLY, I CLAIM THAT QUINE'S ARGUMENT SHOULD BE REJECTED IN ANY CASE SINCE IT DEPENDS ON A SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN THEORY AND OBSERVATION WHICH CANNOT BE SUBSTANTIATED. I CONCLUDE THAT THE ARGUMENT FROM UNDERDETERMINATION PROVIDES NO SUPPORT FOR TRANSLATIONAL INDETERMINACY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{James1997, author = {James, Susan}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {723-726}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy}, volume = {61(3)}, year = {1997} } @article{Jamieson2002, author = {Jamieson, Dale}, title = {Sober and Wilson on Psychological Altruism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {702-710}, keywords = {altruism, ethics, evolution, psychology}, abstract = {The problem of Evolutionary Altruism (EA) "is to show how behaviors that benefit others at the expense of self can evolve;" group selection is the key to the solution of this problem. The problem of Psychological Altruism (PA) is to determine whether people "have altruistic desires that are psychologically ultimate." After carefully considering the arguments of both psychologists and philosophers, Sober and Wilson render the verdict "not proven." But just in the nick of time, evolutionary biology rides to the rescue; it succeeds where psychology and philosophy fail in vindicating our good nature. In this paper, I will discuss Sober and Wilson's treatment of PA. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Jeshion2002, author = {Jeshion, Robin}, title = {The Epistemological Argument Against Descriptivism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {325-345}, keywords = {descriptivism, epistemology, knowledge, proper-nam}, abstract = {The epistemological argument against descriptivism about proper names is extremely simple. For a proper name 'N' and definite description 'F', the proposition expressed by "If N exists, then N if F" is not normally known a priori. But descriptivism about proper names entails otherwise. So descriptivism is false. The argument is widely regarded as sound. This paper aims to establish that the epistemological argument is highly unstable. The problem with the argument is that there seems to be no convincing rationale for the first premise that is independent of a view about the nature of the proposition expressed by the sentence "If N exists, then N is F".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Jeshion2000, author = {Jeshion, Robin}, title = {On the Obvious}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {333-355}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology, fallibilism, knowledge, logic, obvious}, abstract = {Infallibilism about a priori justification is the thesis that for an agent A to be a priori justified in believing p, that which justifies A's belief that p must guarantee the truth of p. No analogous thesis is thought to obtain for empirically justified beliefs. The aim of this article is to argue that infallibilism about the a priori is an untenable philosophical position and to provide theoretical understanding why we not only can be, but rather must be, a priori justified in believing some false propositions. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Jeshion2001, author = {Jeshion, Robin}, title = {Donnellan on Neptune}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(1)}, pages = {111-135}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, reference, scepticism}, abstract = {This article aims to show that Donnellan's argument is unsound, and that the Millian who embraces Donnellan's skepticism that the reference-fixer cannot secure the relevant de re belief faces a serious problem: Millianism about names plus skepticism about the reference-fixer's de re belief conflicts with what seems to be an analytical thesis about the relationship between semantic content and understanding. The upshot is that the Millian has good reason to seek an alternative to skepticism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Jeske2001, author = {Jeske, Diane}, title = {Friendship and Reasons of Intimacy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {329-346}, keywords = {ethics, friendship, intimacy, reasons}, abstract = {Reasons of intimacy, i.e., reasons to care for friends and other intimates, resist categorization as either subjective Humean reasons or as objective consequentialist reasons. Reasons of intimacy are grounded in the friendship relation itself, not in the psychological attitudes of the agent or in the objective intrinsic value of the friend or the friendship. So reasons of intimacy are objective and agent-relative and can be understood by analogy with reasons of fidelity and reasons of prudence. Such an analogy can help us to understand which objective agent-relative reasons we have and which, such as deontological constraints, we do not have.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Jeske1997, author = {Jeske, Diane}, title = {Friedship, Virtue, and Impartiality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {51-72}, keywords = {ethics, friendship, justice, virtue}, abstract = {The two dominant contemporary moral theories, Kantianism and utilitarianism, have difficulty accommodating our commonsense understanding of friendship as a relationship with significant moral implications. The difficulty seems to arise from their underlying commitment to impartiality, to the claim that all persons are equally worthy of concern. Aristotelian accounts of friendship are partialist in so far as they defend certain types of friendship by appeal to the claim that some persons, the virtuous, are in fact more worthy of concern than are other persons. This article argues that we can preserve the underlying impartiality of Kantianism and utilitarianism, while also preserving a certain partiality with respect to our friends: the partiality of commonsense only seems objectionable if we fail to understand the true grounds, nature and implications of such partiality. Neo-Aristotelian partiality should be rejected in favor of commonsense partiality.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JESSUP1966, author = {JESSUP, BERTRAM}, title = {R B PERRY ON VALUE AND EXISTENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {281-290}, keywords = {axiology, existence, metaphysics, value}, abstract = {PERRY IN "GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE" DEFINES VALUE AS "ANY OBJECT OF ANY INTEREST". HE CONTENDS THAT EXISTENCE IS NOT A DEFINING CHARACTERISTIC OF VALUE, THAT AN INTEREST IN SOMETHING IS NOT AN INTEREST IN ITS EXISTENCE. HIS ARGUMENT IS FAULTY IN THAT IT RESTS ON AN AMBIGUITY. VALUE MEANS (1) THE IDEA OF VALUE AND (2) AN OBJECT OR STATE OF AFFAIRS WHICH HAS VALUE. THE FORMER DOES NOT, PERRY RIGHTLY HOLDS, IMPLY EXISTENCE; BUT THE LATTER DOES. INTEREST IN PEACE (PERRY'S EXAMPLE) ENVISAGES A DESIRABLE STATE OF AFFAIRS. THE IDEA HAS REFERENCE TO EXISTENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Johnsen2001, author = {Johnsen, Bredo-C}, title = {Contextualist Swords, Skeptical Plowshares}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {385-406}, keywords = {contextualism, external-world; metaphysics, scepticism}, abstract = {Suppose, with contextualists, that "Jones knows p" and "Jones does not know p" may both be true if said by different speakers in different contexts. Does Jones know p or not? Contextualists don't say; their concern is with knowledge claims, not knowledge. I develop a Dretske-inspired contextualism which addresses both matters. I argue that it has great strength relative to numerous epistemological problems, but lacks antiskeptical import, and suggest that it is unlikely that any contextualist view will have such import. Along the way, I defend radical skepticism against numerous objections and misconceptions.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JOHNSEN1986, author = {JOHNSEN, BREDO-C}, title = {THE GIVEN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {597-613}, keywords = {epistemology, given, scepticism, sentence}, abstract = {I ARGUE THAT QUINE'S, GOODMAN'S AND SELLAR'S ATTACKS ON THE GIVEN LEAVE IT UNSCATHED, THAT QUINE IS ACTUALLY COMMITTED TO SOMETHING LIKE THE GIVEN, AND THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THE GIVEN IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE THESIS OF THE UNIVERSAL REVISABILITY OF JUDGMENTS. I PRESENT A VIEW OF THE GIVEN WHICH AVOIDS EARLIER CONFUSIONS AND CAPTURES WHAT IS CLEARLY THE HEART OF THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION, FROM SEXTUS TO C I LEWIS. FINALLY, I SHOW THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THE GIVEN IS OF NO HELP WITH THE PROBLEM OF SCEPTICISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JOHNSON1964, author = {JOHNSON, A-H}, title = {ORDINARY EXPERIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {96-107}, keywords = {causation, experience, god, good, meaning, object, philosophy, truth}, abstract = {SOME PHILOSOPHERS CAST ASPERSIONS ON ORDINARY EXPERIENCE BECAUSE OF ITS REPUTED CONTRADICTORY AND SUPERFICIAL CHARACTERISTICS. THIS PAPER IS A GENERAL EXAMINATION OF SOME PHASES OF ORDINARY EXPERIENCE AT ITS BEST, NAMELY THE EXPERIENCE OF ENLIGHTENED, ADULT, NORMAL, HUMAN BEINGS. "ADULT" AND "NORMAL" HAVE THEIR OBVIOUS MEANINGS. BY "EXPERIENCE" IS MEANT AWARENESS OF AN ENTITY. "ENLIGHTENED" EXPERIENCE IS CHARACTERIZED BY COMPREHENSIVENESS AND BALANCE, IN PARTICULAR THE RECOGNITION OF GENUINE DISTINCTIONS AND THE AVOIDANCE OF THE ARTIFICIAL AND OVERSIMPLIFICATION. IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS TYPE OF EXPERIENCE, THE FOLLOWING TOPICS ARE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED: THE PERCEPTION OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS, MEANING, TRUTH, CAUSATION, GOOD, GOD. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT SOME PHILOSOPHERS HAVE INADEQUATELY OBSERVED AND INTERPRETED THIS TYPE OF EXPERIENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JOHNSON1963, author = {JOHNSON, A-H}, title = {SOME ASPECTS OF WHITEHEAD'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {61-72}, keywords = {civilization, education, individual, metaphysics, politics, religion, social-philosophy; society, value}, abstract = {IT IS ARGUED HERE, THAT FORMULATING HIS METAPHYSICS, WHITEHEAD REGARDS THE FINDINGS OF HIS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE. HIS METAPHYSICS IS BASED NOT ONLY ON THE DATA OF NATURAL SCIENCE MATHEMATICS, BUT ALSO ON A SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF THE SOCIAL LIFE OF HUMAN BEINGS. MANY COMMENTS ARE GIVEN WHICH INDICATE WHITEHEAD'S ATTITUDES TOWARDS PHILOSOPHY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JOHNSON1960, author = {JOHNSON, A-H}, title = {MODES OF BEING ACCORDING TO PAUL WEISS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {114-131}, keywords = {actuality, being, existence, experience, god, ideality, metaphysics, mode, textual-criticis}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JOHNSON1980, author = {JOHNSON, A-H}, title = {THE STATUS OF WHITEHEAD'S 'PROCESS AND REALITY' CATEGORIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {313-323}, keywords = {aspect, category, entity, metaphysics}, abstract = {THE CATEGORIAL SCHEME OF "PROCESS AND REALITY" AS OUTLINED ON PAGES 27-42, IS OF "SECONDARY IMPORTANCE" IN THE SENSE THAT IT IS A TENTATIVE ATTEMPT TO EXPRESS (STATE) ULTIMATE PRINCIPLES (FACTORS), AND TO INTERPRET WHATEVER IS EXPERIENCED. THIS CATEGORIAL SCHEME HAS A NUMBER OF DEFECTS. A CAREFUL INVESTIGATION OF WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY REVEALS THAT IN ADDITION TO THE HIGHLY "TECHNICAL" CATEGORIAL SCHEME (ACTUAL ENTITY, PREHENSION, NEXUS, ETERNAL OBJECT, ETC.) THERE IS AN ALTERNATE "NON-TECHNICAL" ONE (INDIVIDUAL, CHANGE, ENDURANCE, VALUE, INTER-RELATION, ETC.). THE LATTER IS SUPERIOR, IN SOME IMPORTANT RESPECTS, TO THE FORMER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JOHNSON1969, author = {JOHNSON, A.H}, title = {WHITEHEAD AS TEACHER AND PHILOSOPHER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {351-376}, keywords = {creativity, eternal-object; god, objectivism, religion}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE DESCRIBES THE TUTORIAL METHOD USED BY A.N. WHITEHEAD, IN DEALING WITH GRADUATE STUDENTS, AND CLARIFIES SOME OF THE BASIC ASPECTS OF HIS THEORY OF ACTUAL ENTITIES. (A) THE FOLLOWING TOPICS ARE DISCUSSED: WHITEHEAD'S GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION, ETERNAL OBJECTS, OBJECTIFICATION, GOD, CREATIVITY. (B) THIS ARTICLE REPORTS A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ASKED BY THE AUTHOR, AND WHITEHEAD'S REPLIES. (C) THESE REPORTS SHOULD "CLEAR UP" SOME WIDESPREAD MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF WHITEHEAD'S METAPHYSICS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Johnson1992, author = {Johnson, Lawrence-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {728-731}, publisher = {Routledge}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Focusing on Truth}, volume = {54(3)}, year = {1992} } @article{JOHNSON1985, author = {JOHNSON, MARK}, title = {IMAGINATION IN MORAL JUDGMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {265-280}, keywords = {ethics, imagination, moral-judgmen}, abstract = {KANT'S THEORY OF MORALITY MUST EXPLAIN HOW IT IS POSSIBLE TO APPLY MORAL RULES, DETERMINED BY REASON "A PRIORI", TO SPECIFIC CASES. KANT IS SENSITIVE TO THE COMPLEXITIES OF MORAL JUDGMENT, BUT DOES NOT GIVE SUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO THE ROLE OF IMAGINATION. THE "CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT", HOWEVER, PROVIDES A THEORY OF IMAGINATION THAT WOULD BE ADEQUATE. KANT'S ACCOUNT OF THE "TYPIK" OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE REVEALS THE PRESENCE OF AN IMAGINATIVE METAPHORICAL PROCESS OF UNDERSTANDING NECESSARY FOR APPLYING MORAL RULES TO CONCRETE CASES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Johnson1997, author = {Johnson, Robert-Neal}, title = {Reasons and Advice for the Practically Rational}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {619-625}, keywords = {advice, epistemology, knowledge, rationality, reason}, abstract = {This paper defends a model of the internalism requirement against Michael Smith's recent criticisms of it. On this "example model," what we have reason to do is what we would be motivated to do were we rational. After criticizing the example model, Smith argues that his "advice model," that what we have reason to do is what we would advise ourselves to do were we rational, is obviously preferable. The author argues that Smith's criticisms can quite easily be accommodated by the example model. Moreover, to the extent that his model connects reasons to advice, it is not a model of the internalism requirement at all. Yet, to the extent that it connects reasons to motivation, his model collapses into the example model. The author ends by arguing that Smith's view simply proposes an unambitious conception of practical rationality, not an alternative construal of the internalism requirement.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Johnston2004, author = {Johnston, Mark}, title = {Subjectivism and "Unmasking"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(1)}, pages = {187-201}, keywords = {color, metaphysics, reality, subjectivism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Johnston2001, author = {Johnston, Mark}, title = {The Authority of Affect}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(1)}, pages = {181-214}, keywords = {affect, authority, belief, ethics, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Johnston2001a, author = {Johnston, Mark}, title = {Is Affect Always Mere Effect?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(1)}, pages = {225-228}, keywords = {affect, effect, epistemology, sense, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JOHNSTONE1991, author = {JOHNSTONE, Albert-A}, title = {The Need for Warrant.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {epistemology, language, metaphysics, scepticism, warrant}, abstract = {This article contends that present-day Analytic epistemology fails to address Cartesian skepticism. On examination, Cartesian scenarios turn out to be not only consistent with the perceptual evidence, but unfalsified and unchallenged by it. Dismissal of such scenarios as irrelevant is shown to be without rational basis, while construal of common sense knowledge claims as either confirmationally autonomous or nonclosed under logical entailment is found equally fallacious. Additional red-herrings are identified (certainty, semantics of certain'). It is concluded that present-day investigations leave common sense claims and their skeptical rivals on an evidential par, each devoid of warrant.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JOHNSTONE1986, author = {JOHNSTONE, ALBERT-A}, title = {THE ROLE OF "ICH KANN" IN HUSSERL'S ANSWER TO HUMEAN SKEPTICISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {577-595}, keywords = {experience, justification, metaphysics, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JOHNSTONE1971, author = {JOHNSTONE, HENRY-W}, title = {REPLY TO MR BENFIELD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {103-104}, keywords = {language, philosophy, statement}, abstract = {WHAT I WAS TRYING TO SAY IN THE ARTICLE SO COGENTLY CRITICIZED BY MR. BENFIELD WAS THAT PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS, UNLIKE STATEMENTS OF AT LEAST SOME OTHER KINDS, NECESSARILY HAVE AN ARGUMENTATIVE VECTOR. UNLIKE A STATEMENT OF THE SORT WHICH CAN BE TRUE OR FALSE SIMPLICITER, A PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENT IS SUCH THAT ITS TRUTH OR FALSITY IS NEVER BEYOND ARGUMENT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JOHNSTONE1967, author = {JOHNSTONE, HENRY-W, JR}, title = {PERSONS AND SELVES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {205-212}, keywords = {metaphysics, person, self}, abstract = {SOME ONTOLOGIES EMPHASIZE THE SELF TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE PERSON (E.G., DESCARTES), AND SOME EMPHASIZE THE PERSON TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE SELF (E.G., HUME), BUT FEW ONTOLOGIES HAVE MAINTAINED BOTH PERSON AND SELF. YET THERE IS NO REASON WHY BOTH SHOULD NOT BE SIMULTANEOUSLY MAINTAINED. THE PERSON IS LOGICALLY PRIMITIVE AND SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION; THE SELF IS DERIVATIVE AND NOT OBSERVABLE. THE LATTER ARISES ONLY IN MOMENTS OF TENSION, WHEN THE PERSON IS CHARACTERIZED BY INCONSISTENT PREDICATES. AT SUCH MOMENTS, THE SELF BRINGS TOGETHER WITHIN A SINGLE PERSPECTIVE THE POLES OF THE CONTRADICTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JOHNSTONE-JR1977, author = {JOHNSTONE-JR, HENRY-W}, title = {REPLY TO MR GALLOWAY'S "ON JOHNSTONE'S 'PHENOMENOLOGY OF DEATH' AND 'PHILOSOPHY OF SLEEP'".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {114-118}, keywords = {death, philosophical-anthropology; sleep}, abstract = {I USE THIS REPLY AS AN OCCASION TO EXPRESS DOUBTS CONCERNING MY OWN USE OF THE WORD "PHENOMENOLOGY" AND TO EXAMINE FURTHER THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. I DEFEND MY CLAIM THAT WE ARE CONSCIOUS, AND UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS, ONLY AS THE RESULT OF HAVING EXPERIENCED A GAP IN OUR CONSCIOUSNESS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JOHNSTONE-JR1973, author = {JOHNSTONE-JR, HENRY-W}, title = {TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF SLEEP.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {73-81}, keywords = {consciousness, philosophical-anthropology; sleep}, abstract = {MY CHIEF CLAIM IS THAT NO ONE COULD UNDERSTAND THE MEANING OF EITHER 'CONSCIOUSNESS' OR 'UNCONSCIOUSNESS' UNLESS HIS CONSCIOUSNESS HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION. I CONSIDER VARIOUS ATTEMPTS THAT MIGHT BE MADE TO TEACH THE MEANINGS OF THESE TERMS TO A PERSON WHO HAD NEVER LOST CONSCIOUSNESS, AND I SHOW HOW THESE ATTEMPTS FAIL. THE IDEAS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND UNCONSCIOUSNESS CAN OCCUR ONLY TO A PERSON IN WHOSE EXPERIENCE THERE HAS BEEN A GAP.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JOHNSTONE-JR1975, author = {JOHNSTONE-JR, HENRY-W}, title = {TOWARD A PHENOMENOLOGY OF DEATH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {396-397}, keywords = {death, metaphysics, phenomenology}, abstract = {AN EXTRAPOLATION FROM EXPERIENCE IS NOT AN EXPERIENCE, BUT AN EXTRAPOLATION FROM PHENOMENOLOGY CAN BE PHENOMENOLOGICAL. A PHENOMENOLOGICAL FEATURE OF SLEEP--VERIFIED BY EXPERIENCE--IS THAT IT IS GATELESS: ONE IS JUST SUDDENLY "THERE". THIS CAN BE EXTRAPOLATED TO THE EXPERIENTIALLY UNVERIFIABLE BUT PHENOMENOLOGICALLY SOUND REPORT THAT DEATH, TOO, IS GATELESS; ONE DOES NOT CROSS OVER INTO IT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JOHNSTONE-JR1962, author = {JOHNSTONE-JR, HENRY-W and MARIENTHAL-MASCHLER, CHANINAH}, title = {SKEPTICISM AND INFERIOR KNOWLEDGE: A NOTE ON ARISTOTLE'S PLURALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {472-480}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, pluralism, scepticism, type}, abstract = {THE FUNCTION AND PECULIAR CHARACTER OF ARISTOTLE'S PLURALISM IS EXPLAINED. IT IS MAINTAINED THAT THE PLURALISM SERVES AS A REJOINDER TO SCEPTICISM; FOR INSTANCE, THE SCEPTIC IGNORES THE PECULIARITY OF THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE IN POLITICAL LIFE. THE PLURALITY OF TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE IS SHOWN ALSO AS NOT MERELY A REPLY TO SCEPTICISM, BUT AS ATTENDED TO BY ARISTOTLE INDEPENDENTLY. THE LAST HALF OF THE ARTICLE INTENDS TO SHOW THAT ARISTOTLE ENVISAGED AN ORDERED PLURALITY OF PRIOR AND POSTERIOR WITH DEPENDENCY AS THE ORDERING PRINCIPLE, AND THAT, THEREFORE, "INFERIOR KNOWLEDGE" NEED NOT FORM A BASIS FOR DOUBT; ARISTOTLE RETAINS BOTH VARIETY AND EXCELLENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JONES1980, author = {JONES, GARY-E}, title = {SARTRE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND RESPONSIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {234-237}, keywords = {consciousness, ethics, responsibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JONES1978, author = {JONES, HARDY}, title = {MILL'S ARGUMENT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {338-354}, keywords = {action, desire, end, ethics, evidence, happiness, utilitarianism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{JOSKE1961, author = {JOSKE, W-D}, title = {BEHAVIORISM AS A SCIENTIFIC THEORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {61-68}, keywords = {behaviorism, criticism, dualism, metaphysics, mind, observation, science}, abstract = {IT IS STATED THAT PHILOSOPHICAL BEHAVIORISTS ARE NOT DOING SCIENCE, BUT BELIEVE THEY ARE HELPING SCIENCE, BY OPPOSING PRIVATE MENTAL STATES AND IRREDUCIBLE PSYCHIC OCCURRENCES. IT IS ARGUED THAT THE DOCTRINES OF SUCH BEHAVIORISTS ARE NOT IN ANY SENSE A SCIENTIFIC DOCTRINE AND THAT THEY ARE DANGEROUSLY UNSCIENTIFIC. IN ATTACKING THE METAPHYSICS OF DUALISM, IT IS UNCRITICALLY ASSUMED THAT ACTIVITIES CANNOT HAVE BOTH A MENTAL AND PHYSICAL ASPECT. DUALISM HAS NOT BEEN DEMOLISHED; ALL THAT HAS BEEN SHOWN IS THAT THERE IS A NEED TO RE-EXAMINE THOSE MENTAL TERMS WHICH TRADITIONALLY STOOD FOR NON-PHYSICAL STATEMENTS AND EVENTS. THE USE OF SUCH TERMS MUST BE EXPLORED, AS WELL AS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MENTAL AND BEHAVIORAL ASPECTS OF THEIR USE. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Juarrero1999, author = {Juarrero, Alicia}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {494-498}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System}, volume = {66(2)}, year = {1999} } @article{JUNG1969, author = {JUNG, HWA-YOL}, title = {CONFUCIANISM AND EXISTENTIALISM: INTERSUBJECTIVITY AS THE WAY OF MAN}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {186-202}, keywords = {confucianism, existentialism, religion, subjectivity}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE IS AN ESSAY IN COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY. IT ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH AN ESSENTIAL AFFINITY BETWEEN CONFUCIANISM AND EXISTENTIALISM. IT IS DEVOTED TO A COMPARISON OF THE SOCIAL WAY OF MAN IN CONFUCIAN PHILOSOPHY WITH KIERKEGAARD'S INWARD WAY OF MAN ON THE ONE HAND AND JASPER'S COMMUNICABLE WAY OF MAN ON THE OTHER IN ORDER TO SHOW THAT CONFUCIAN PHILOSOPHY IS FREE OF AN EGOCENTRIC TENDENCY. THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS ESSAY IS CONTAINED IN ITS INSISTENCE THAT MAN IS HUMAN BY VIRTUE OF HIS SOCIAL EXISTENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KADING1965, author = {KADING, DANIEL}, title = {MORAL ACTION, IGNORANCE OF FACT, AND INABILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {333-355}, keywords = {ability, action, conflict, duty, ethics, fact, ignorance, obligation, prescription}, abstract = {I TRY TO SHOW THAT CONTRARY TO PRICHARD IN "DUTY AND IGNORANCE OF FACT" THERE ARE GOOD REASONS FOR MAINTAINING THAT IN CERTAIN RESPECTS AT LEAST WE MAY BE UNAVOIDABLY IGNORANT OF OUR DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS, AND OF WHAT IS RIGHT AND WRONG GENERALLY. WHY DID PRICHARD STAND SO FIRMLY AGAINST UNAVOIDABLE IGNORANCE OF OUR DUTY? I SUGGEST THAT HE IS REALLY THINKING ABOUT ONE OF THE CONDITIONS FOR BEING BLAMEWORTHY, FOR CERTAINLY IT WOULD BE CONTRADICTORY TO SPEAK OF SOMEONE'S BEING BLAMEWORTHY BY VIRTUE OF UNAVOIDABLE IGNORANCE. I ALSO RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MORAL ACTION AND ABILITY, AND I TRY TO SHOW THAT THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID AGAINST THE USUAL VIEW THAT "DUTY TO," "WRONG NOT TO," ETC., ENTAIL "ABLE TO."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KAGAN1991, author = {KAGAN, Shelly}, title = {Precis of "The Limits of Morality".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {decision-theory; ethics, morality, sacrifice}, abstract = {My book, The Limits of Morality, offers a sustained attack on two central beliefs of commonsense morality: first, that there are limits to the sacrifices we are morally required to make for others; and second, that certain acts are morally forbidden, even if performing them would promote the overall good. I here summarize the main line of argument of the book, so as to situate the critical comments written by others that follow. (These critical comments are in turn followed by my own replies).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kalderon2004, author = {Kalderon, Mark-Eli}, title = {Open Questions and the Manifest Image}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {251-289}, keywords = {descriptivism, ethics, meaning, non-naturalism; open-question-argumen}, abstract = {The essay argues that, on their usual metalinguistic reconstructions, the open question argument and Frege's puzzle are variants of the same argument. Each are arguments to a conclusion about a difference in meaning; each deploy compositionality as a premise; and each deploy a premise linking epistemic features of sentences with their meaning (which, given certain meaning-Platonist assumptions, can be interpreted as a universal instantiation of Leibniz's law). Given these parallels, each is sound just in case the other is. They are, in fact, unsound. The essay first argues that reformulations of these arguments directly in terms of Leibniz's law are unsound and then that subarguments of the metalinguistic versions are unsound for structurally similar reasons. Finally, given how the theory/observation distinction is deployed in linguistic practice, the meaning-Platonist assumptions are shown to be optional.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KALLEN1965, author = {KALLEN, HORACE-M}, title = {OLD MYSTICISM AND NEW KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {18-34}, keywords = {becoming, god, knowledge, mysticism, religion, religious-experience; twentieth}, abstract = {BASICALLY MYSTICISM IS JUSTIFIED, AS LIBERATING THE FACULTIES OF EXPERIENCE WHICH NORMALLY ARE HELD IN ABEYANCE. THE AUTHOR CONCLUDES THAT AUTHENTIC MYSTICAL EXPERIENCES HAVE A SURVIVAL FUNCTION AND NOETIC CHARACTER, IN THIS WORLD, EVEN THOUGH THEY APPEAR OTHER-WORLDLY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KALLEN1970, author = {KALLEN, H-M}, title = {"CREATIVITY" TODAY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {428-435}, keywords = {creativity, originality, social-philosophy; technology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KAMINSKY1969, author = {KAMINSKY, JACK}, title = {ESSENCE REVISITED.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {1-6}, keywords = {essence, man, metaphysics}, abstract = {THE FRENCH PHILOSOPHER, PROFESSOR RAYMOND POLIN, HAS ARGUED THAT MAN'S ESSENCE OUGHT NOT TO BE DEFINED IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE OF A SET OF A PRIORI MORAL CONCEPTS THAT OUGHT TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED BY HUMAN BEINGS AND INCORPORATED INTO THEIR ACTIONS. THE ESSENCE OF MAN CONSISTS IN BEING CREATIVE, I.E. IN CONSTANTLY CREATING NEW AND MORE BENEFICIAL ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND MORAL STANDARDS. THESE STANDARDS ARE CHOSEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CRITERIA OF INTELLIGIBILITY, ORDERLINESS, AND RATIONALITY. BUT SINCE THESE CRITERIA ARE NOT ADEQUATELY DEFINED BY POLIN, HIS VIEW OF ESSENCE IS UNSATISFACTORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KAMINSKY1962, author = {KAMINSKY, JACK}, title = {ONTOLOGY AND LANGUAGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {176-191}, keywords = {class, commitment, formal-system; interpretation, language, ontology, property, thing}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE HERE IS: (1) TO INDICATE HOW THE QUESTION OF ONTOLOGY ENTERS INTO THE CONSTRUCTION OF FORMAL SYSTEMS; (2) TO SHOW WHY SOME OF THE IMPORTANT ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE THE ONTOLOGICAL QUESTION HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL; AND (3) SUGGEST A WAY OF VIEWING ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS THAT WILL MAKE THEM SEEM LESS SERIOUS THAN THEY ARE USUALLY TAKEN TO BE. IT IS CONCLUDED, THAT IN CONSTRUCTING A FORMAL LANGUAGE WE ARE COMMITTED TO AN ONTOLOGY IN THE MINIMAL SENSE, INSOFAR AS EXTENSIONS SUCH AS CLASSES OR INTENSIONS SUCH AS PROPERTIES, COMMIT US TO ANYTHING. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kamm1998, author = {Kamm, Frances-Myrna}, title = {Precis of Morality, Mortality, Vol. 1: Death and Whom to Save from It}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {939-945}, keywords = {consequentialism, death, ethics, metaphysics, morality, mortality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kamm1998a, author = {Kamm, Frances-Myrna}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {969-974}, keywords = {ethics, morality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kane2002, author = {Kane, Robert}, title = {Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will: Reflections on Wallace's Theory}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {693-698}, keywords = {ethics, free-will; morality, responsibility}, abstract = {In this symposium contribution, I argue against two theses of R. Jay Wallace's Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. The first of these theses is that responsibility for being the sorts of persons we are does not require the power ever to have done otherwise to make ourselves different from what we are, now are in the past. The second thesis argued against is that it is fair to blame persons for not doing what it was physically impossible for them to do (where "physically impossible" means "not possible given the laws of nature and antecedent circumstances").}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KANE1989, author = {KANE, ROBERT}, title = {TWO KINDS OF INCOMPATIBILISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {219-254}, keywords = {determinism, freedom, incompatibilism, metaphysics}, abstract = {TWO KINDS OF INCOMPATIBILIST THEORIES OF FREEDOM (THEORIES DENYING THAT FREEDOM IS COMPATIBLE WITH DETERMINISM) ARE DISTINGUISHED, AGENT CAUSE (AC) THEORIES AND TELEOLOGICAL INTELLIGIBILITY (TI) THEORIES. THE FORMER POSTULATE SOME KIND OF NONEVENT (OR NONOCCURRENT) CAUSATION TO ACCOUNT FOR FREE AGENCY, THE LATTER DO NOT. AC THEORIES ARE THE MOST COMMON ONES IN TRADITIONAL AND CONTEMPORARY DISCUSSIONS OF FREE WILL, BUT THEY ARE FLAWED. BY CONTRAST, TRADITIONAL WRITING GIVES ONLY THE BAREST HINTS ABOUT WHAT TI THEORIES MIGHT LOOK LIKE. AFTER DISCUSSING THE DIFFICULTIES OF AC THEORIES, THE PAPER DEVELOPS AND DEFENDS A TI THEORY IN SOME DETAIL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kane2000, author = {Kane, Robert}, title = {Precis of The Significance of Free Will}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {129-134}, keywords = {compatibility, epistemology, free-will; power}, abstract = {The Significance of Free Will (Oxford, 1996) has two broad aims. The first is to survey and critically examine recent debates about free will over the past half century, relating these debates to the long history of the free will issue and to other currents of twentieth-century thought. The second aim is to defend a traditional incompatibilist or libertarian view of free will in ways that respond to twentieth century developments in philosophy and the sciences--physical, biological, psychological, cognitive and neuro-sciences--without the usual appeals to obscure or mysterious forms of agency or causation.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kane2000a, author = {Kane, Robert}, title = {Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {157-167}, keywords = {determinism, freedom, metaphysics}, abstract = {Central theses of the The Significance of Free Will (Oxford, 1996) are defended in response to symposium papers by Berofsky, Fischer and Strawson. These theses include, among others, that incompatibilism of free will and determinism can be defended by appealing to a condition of ultimate responsibility rather than (as is usually done) by appealing to alternative possibilities alone, and that an incompatibilist or libertarian free will can be made intelligible without appealing (as is usually done) to special forms of agency or causation not countenanced by the natural and behavioral sciences.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Kane1994, author = {Kane, Robert}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {482-485}, publisher = {Paragon House}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Through the Moral Maze}, volume = {57(2)}, year = {1994} } @article{Kapitan1992, author = {Kapitan, Tomis}, title = {Review Essay: "Thinking, Language and Experience"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {203-214}, keywords = {experience, language, metaphysics, thinking}, abstract = {"Thinking, Language, and Experience" contains some of Hector-Neri Castaneda's most important work in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and metaphysics, with special emphasis upon the structure of attitudinal content and, thus, on the world "as" experienced. This review essay discusses Castaneda's accounts of singular reference (by means of proper names, definite descriptions, and indexicals), attributions of reference, and the 'theory of guises'. While mainly expository, the essay furthers Castaneda's analysis of anaphors within attitudinal scope while suggesting a constructivist approach to guises.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KAPLAN1972, author = {KAPLAN, EDWARD-K}, title = {GASTON BACHELARD'S PHILOSOPHY OF IMAGINATION: AN INTRODUCTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {1-24}, keywords = {aesthetics, image, imagination, poetry, will}, abstract = {A PSYCHOLOGY, PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY OF CREATIVITY DEVELOPED BY THIS FRENCH EPISTEMOLOGIST AND HISTORIAN OF SCIENCE (1884-1962) ARE SYSTEMATICALLY DESCRIBED. STARTING FROM ANALYSIS OF IMAGE NETWORKS IN LITERATURE, BACHELARD PRESENTS IMAGINATION AS AUTONOMOUS, A POWER OF HUMAN TRANSCENDENCE, A FORCE PRECEDING PERCEPTION AND MEMORY. HE ULTIMATELY SURPASSES PSYCHOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM. IMAGINATION OF FORM IS INFERIOR TO IMAGINATION OF MATTER (DEPTH); YET THEY BOTH ARE SECONDARY TO DYNAMIC IMAGINATION. BACHELARD'S FUNDAMENTAL METHOD IS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDY OF IMAGES AS ORIGINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS; A PHENOMENOLOGY OF REVERIE AND WRITING UNDERLIES HIS ONTOLOGY. REVERIE IS THE MODEL UPON WHICH IMAGINATIVE CONSCIOUSNESS IS JUDGED. MAN SHOULD EXTEND THE FREEDOM AND BEAUTY OF HIS INNER COSMOS TO ENHANCE RELATION WITH THE WORLD.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kaplan2000, author = {Kaplan, Mark}, title = {To What Must an Epistemology Be True?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {279-304}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, scepticism, truth}, abstract = {In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud argues that Austin was misguided: it is one thing for it to be inappropriate under ordinary circumstances to (say) deny that someone knows that P, another thing for it to be true that she knows that P. Thus, to the philosophical enterprise of determining which knowledge attributions are true, Austin's form of criticism is beside the point. I argue that, attractive though it may be, this response to Austin badly underestimates the force of his sort of criticism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KATTSOFF1968, author = {KATTSOFF, L-O}, title = {THE DISCERNMENT OF MORAL ATTRIBUTES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {68-83}, keywords = {ethics, intuitionism, language}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ANALYZES THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR AN EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION OF MORAL STATEMENTS. IT IS ARGUED THAT MORAL QUALITIES ARE REAL AND CAN BE DISCERNED BY ANYONE WHO SATISFIES THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS, (STANCE, 'STELLUNG,' ETC.) APPROPRIATE FOR SUCH DISCERNMENT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KATTSOFF1960, author = {KATTSOFF, LOUIS-O}, title = {WHAT MAKES YOU SAY THAT: OR THE JUSTIFICATION OF JUSTIFICATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {102-109}, keywords = {ethics, god, human-nature; justification, metaphysics, nature, principle}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KATTSOFF1965, author = {KATTSOFF, LOUIS-O}, title = {MALCOLM ON KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {263-267}, keywords = {certainty, epistemology, knowledge, linguistic-analysis; methodology, ordinary-language; textual-criticis}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Katz1997, author = {Katz, Jerrold-J}, title = {Analyticity, Necessity, and the Epistemology of Semantics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {1-28}, keywords = {analysis, epistemology, knowledge, meaning, semantics}, abstract = {Contemporary philosophy standardly accepts Frege's conceptions of sense as the determiner of reference and of analyticity as (necessary) truth in virtue of meaning. This paper argues that those conceptions are mistaken. It develops referentially autonomous notions of sense and analyticity and applies them to the semantics of natural kind terms. The arguments of Donnellan, Putnam and Kripke concerning natural kind terms are widely taken to refute internalist and rationalist theories of meaning. This paper shows that the counter-intuitive consequences about the reference of natural kind terms depend as much on Frege's conceptions of sense and analyticity as on what such theories of meaning say about the senses of natural kind terms. Rather than refuting the internalist and rationalist theories of meaning, the arguments of Donnellan, Putnam and Kripke are best recast as refutations of their own Fregean assumptions. The paper also shows how autonomous notions of sense and analyticity enable us to reconstruct such theories, formulate an internalist/rationalist account of semantic knowledge and preserve Donnellan's, Putnam's and Kripke's insights about reference.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Katz1994, author = {Katz, Jerrold}, title = {Precis of "The Metaphysics of Meaning"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {127-132}, keywords = {epistemology, meaning, naturalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Katz1994a, author = {Katz, Jerrold}, title = {Replies to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {157-183}, keywords = {epistemology, indeterminacy, language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KEARNS1976, author = {KEARNS, JOHN-T}, title = {DENOTING AND REFERRING, SOME STEPS TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {79-100}, keywords = {denoting, language, referring, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KEARNS1968, author = {KEARNS, JOHN-T}, title = {SAMENESS OR SIMILARITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {105-115}, keywords = {epistemology, universal}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE INVESTIGATES BRAND BLANSHARD'S THEORY OF UNIVERSALS. ACCORDING TO BLANSHARD, FOR EACH DEGREE OF SIMILARITY BETWEEN TWO THINGS, THERE IS A DISTINCT UNIVERSAL. I ARGUE THAT BLANSHARD'S THEORY IS UNTENABLE BECAUSE IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR A PERSON TO RECOGNIZE THAT TWO THINGS ARE SIMILAR, OR TO COMPARE THE SIMILARITIES LINKING TWO PAIRS, WITHOUT A PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF SIMILARITY. BUT THIS PRIOR KNOWLEDGE ITSELF REQUIRES A PRIOR KNOWLEDGE. AND SO ON.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Keefe2000, author = {Keefe, Rosanna}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {491-494}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Theories of Vagueness}, volume = {67(2)}, year = {2000} } @article{KEEHLY1979, author = {KEEHLY, JAY-T}, title = {METAPHOR THEORIES AND THEORETICAL METAPHORS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {582-588}, keywords = {comparison, ellipsis, language, metaphor}, abstract = {THERE ARE TWO TYPES OF METAPHOR THEORY: (1) THOSE WHICH CLAIM THAT A METAPHOR IS TRANSLATABLE WITHOUT LOSS OF MEANING INTO A LITERAL COMPARISON OF THE TWO ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN A METAPHOR AND, (2) THOSE CLAIMING THAT THE METAPHOR-IS-THE-MESSAGE; ITS MEANING CANNOT BE CAPTURED IN A LITERAL FORMULATION. METAPHORICIANS FREQUENTLY SUGGEST THAT THEORETICAL MODELS IN SCIENCE DISCOURSE ARE METAPHORS, BUT NEITHER TYPE OF THEORY WILL SUSTAIN THIS ANALYSIS. THE FIRST IS RULED OUT BECAUSE NO PROPERTIES ARE AVAILABLE FROM THE SIDE OF THE MODELLED ENTITY TO COMPARE WITH THOSE OF THE MODEL, WHILE THE SECOND IS ELIMINATED BY THE REQUIREMENT THAT THEORETICAL MODELS MUST HAVE IMPLICATIONS THAT ARE LITERALLY EXPRESSIBLE IF THEY ARE TO ARTICULATE THEIR RESPECTIVE THEORIES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KEKES1986, author = {KEKES, JOHN}, title = {THE INFORMED WILL AND THE MEANING OF LIFE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {75-90}, keywords = {meaning-of-life; metaphysics, will}, abstract = {WHEN WE ENDOW SOME EXTERNAL OBJECTS WITH LASTING SIGNIFICANCE FOR OUR LIVES, WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CONFERRING MEANING ON THEM. SUCCESS REQUIRES ACTS OF WILL, AND IF THESE ACTS COHERE AND FORM A PATTERN PERMEATING A LIFE, THEN THE LIFE AS A WHOLE HAS MEANING. HOWEVER, THE WILL BY ITSELF IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF MEANING, FOR THE OBJECTS UPON WHICH IT CONFERS SIGNIFICANCE MUST BE APPROPRIATE AND IT MUST BE GUIDED REASONABLY AND BY APPROPRIATE FEELINGS. IF THESE CONDITIONS ARE MET, THEN THE WILL IS INFORMED. AND THE INFORMED WILL IS THE KEY TO THE MEANING OF LIFE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KEKES1973, author = {KEKES, JOHN}, title = {THE EXISTENCE OF PROPOSITIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {109-111}, keywords = {existence, metaphysics, proposition}, abstract = {FORMALISTIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF PROPOSITIONS FACE THE FOLLOWING DILEMMA: IF THE VERIFIABILITY PRINCIPLE IS ACCEPTABLE SUCH ARGUMENTS ARE UNNECESSARY, WHILE IF THE VERIFIABILITY PRINCIPLE IS UNACCEPTABLE SUCH ARGUMENTS ARE DOOMED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kekes1994, author = {Kekes, John}, title = {The Pragmatic Idealism of Nicholas Rescher}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {391-394}, keywords = {epistemology, idealism, knowledge, pragmatism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kekes1994a, author = {Kekes, John}, title = {Rescher on Rationality and Morality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {415-420}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, knowledge, morality, rationality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KEKES1988, author = {KEKES, JOHN}, title = {WHAT MAKES LIVES GOOD?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {655-668}, keywords = {ethics, good, life, satisfaction, value}, abstract = {THE GOODNESS OF LIVES MAY BE THOUGHT TO DEPEND ON THE PERSONAL SATISFACTION THEY PROVIDE OR ON THE MORAL MERIT THEY POSSESS. THE POSSIBILITY EXPLORED IN THIS PAPER IS THAT IN GOOD LIVES THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN PERSONAL SATISFACTION AND MORAL MERIT, BECAUSE THEY COINCIDE. ACCORDING TO THIS VIEW, LIVES ARE GOOD PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE COINCIDENCE OF THESE TWO ASPECTS. THIS IS THE ANCIENT IDEAL OF EUDAIMONISM, AND IT PROVIDES THE CONTEXT OF THE ARGUMENT. THE KEY TO SEEING THAT PERSONAL SATISFACTION AND MORAL MERIT NEED NOT CONFLICT IS UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF THE GOODS WHOSE POSSESSION MAKES LIVES GOOD. THESE GOODS ARE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL, AND THE DISCUSSION CONCERNS THEIR NATURE, SIMILARITY, AND DIFFERENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KEKES1977, author = {KEKES, JOHN}, title = {PHYSICALISM AND SUBJECTIVITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {533-536}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, physicalism, subjectivity}, abstract = {THIS NOTE IS A REPLY TO NAGEL'S "WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A BAT?" I ARGUE THAT NAGEL IS RIGHT IN CLAIMING THAT MEMBERS OF EACH SPECIES HAVE A UNIQUE POINT OF VIEW DUE TO PHYSIOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES; NO MEMBER OF ANOTHER SPECIES CAN HAVE THE SAME EXPERIENCES. NAGEL IS WRONG, HOWEVER, IN CONCLUDING FROM THIS TRUISM THAT NO OBJECTIVE ACCOUNT OF EXPERIENCES IS POSSIBLE. SUCH AN ACCOUNT CAN GIVE EVERYTHING PHYSICALISM NEEDS. WHAT IT CANNOT GIVE, AND WHAT IT WAS NOT MEANT TO GIVE, IS THE EXPERIENCE OF LIVING THROUGH THE EXPERIENCE IT EXPLAINS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Kekes1997, author = {Kekes, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {1096-1098}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Against Liberalism}, volume = {49(4)}, year = {1997} } @other{Kekes1993, author = {Kekes, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {235-239}, publisher = {Princeton Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Morality of Pluralism}, volume = {57(1)}, year = {1993} } @article{KEKES-JOHN1971, author = {KEKES-JOHN}, title = {SKEPTICISM AND EXTERNAL QUESTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {325-340}, keywords = {epistemology, language, question, scepticism}, abstract = {THIS IS AN ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT CARNAP'S PRAGMATIC REFUTATION OF SKEPTICISM FAILS BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE SO TO EXPLICATE THE NOTION OF LINGUISTIC FRAMEWORK AS TO EXCLUDE BOTH COGNITIVELY SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL QUESTIONS AND EXISTENTIAL COMMITMENTS IN ACCEPTING A LINGUISTIC FRAMEWORK. HENCE, CARNAP'S ARGUMENTS NOTWITHSTANDING, THE SCEPTIC CAN ASK COGNITIVELY SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL QUESTIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Keller1998, author = {Keller, Pierre}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {733-736}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness}, volume = {63(3)}, year = {1998} } @article{KELLEY1980, author = {KELLEY, DAVID}, title = {THE SPECIFICITY OF PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {401-405}, keywords = {belief, concept, epistemology, perception}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE PRESENTS AN OBJECTION TO THE VIEW THAT PERCEPTION IS NOTHING BUT THE ACQUISITION OF BELIEFS ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT, A CAUSAL PROCESS WHOSE ONLY COGNITIVE CONTENT IS THAT OF THE BELIEFS ACQUIRED. THE ARGUMENT SHOWS, IN VARIOUS WAYS, THAT THE PERCEPTUAL AWARENESS OF AN OBJECT'S ATTRIBUTE IS MORE "SPECIFIC"--DISCRIMINATING MORE FINELY AMONG DEGREES OF THE ATTRIBUTE--THAN IS THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT OF ANY BELIEFS THAT MIGHT BE ASCRIBED TO THE PERCEIVER. HENCE PERCEPTION IS A DISTINCTIVE MODE OF AWARENESS, POSSESSING A COGNITIVE CONTENT NOT REDUCIBLE TO THAT OF PERCEPTUAL BELIEFS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KELLEY1991, author = {KELLEY, Leigh-B}, title = {Normativity and Motivation.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {ethics, motivation, naturalism, normative}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KELLY1977, author = {KELLY, DEREK-A}, title = {THE CATEGORICAL STRUCTURE OF POPPER'S METAPHYSICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {82-99}, keywords = {category, metaphysics, ontology, person, world}, abstract = {SINCE POPPER'S SYSTEM, METAPHYSICAL WRITINGS, ARE UNINTELLIGIBLE FROM WITHIN THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE TWO ORTHODOX SCHOOLS OF ANALYSIS AND PHENOMENOLOGY, THIS ARTICLE INTERPRETS POPPER IN TERMS OF THE AMERICAN METAPHYSICAL-NATURALISTIC TRADITION. POPPER IS TREATED AS AN ARISTOTELIAN, AND HIS CATEGORICAL SYSTEM IS EXHIBITED AS A COHERENT AND CONSISTENT STRUCTURE. SOME CRITICAL QUESTIONS ARE POSED AT THE END.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KELLY1968, author = {KELLY, DEREK-A}, title = {RICHARD M ZANER ON PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {123-124}, keywords = {anthropology, metaphysics, phenomenology}, abstract = {CRITICIZES AN ARTICLE BY ZANER ON PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY. RAISES BUT DOES NOT EVEN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION: CAN PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY BE DONE FROM A PHENOMENOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW?}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kelly2001, author = {Kelly, Sean}, title = {The Non-conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {601-608}, keywords = {content, dependence, experience, metaphysics, perception}, abstract = {I begin by examining a recent debate between John McDowell and Christopher Peacocke over whether the content of perceptual experience is nonconceptual. Although I am sympathetic to Peacocke's claim that perceptual content is nonconceptual, I suggest a number of ways in which his arguments fail to make that case. This failure stems from an overemphasis on the "fine-grainedness" of perceptual content--a feature that is relatively unimportant to its nonconceptual structure. I go on to describe two other features of perceptual experience that are more likely to be relevant to the claim that perceptual content is nonconceptual. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kelly2003, author = {Kelly, Thomas}, title = {Epistemic Rationality As Instrumental Rationality: A Critique}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(3)}, pages = {612-640}, keywords = {epistemology, incommensurability, instrumental, knowledge, rationality}, abstract = {In this paper, I explore the relationship between epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality, and I attempt to delineate their respective roles in typical instances of theoretical reasoning. My primary concern is with the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality: the view that epistemic rationality is simply a species of instrumental rationality, viz. instrumental rationality in the service of one's cognitive or epistemic goals. After sketching the relevance of the instrumentalist conception to debates over naturalism and "the ethics of belief", I argue that, despite enjoying considerable popularity among both epistemologists and philosophers of science, it is ultimately indefensible. Having thus argued for the distinctness of epistemic and instrumental rationality, I attempt to clarify the role played by each in typical instances of theoretical reasoning. I suggest that being theoretically rational--that is, being proficient with respect to theoretical reasoning--is best construed as a hybrid virtue, inasmuch as it involves manifesting sensitivity to two very different kinds of reasons.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KEMP-PRITCHARD1981, author = {KEMP-PRITCHARD, ILONA}, title = {PEIRCE ON PHILOSOPHICAL HOPE AND LOGICAL SENTIMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {75-90}, keywords = {agape, emotion, metaphysics, normative-science; reasoning}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Kenny1992, author = {Kenny, Anthony}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {731-734}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Aristotle on the Perfect Life}, volume = {55(3)}, year = {1992} } @article{KERNER1970, author = {KERNER, GEORGE-C}, title = {PASSIONS AND THE COGNITIVE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {177-192}, keywords = {cognition, ethics, passion, perception}, abstract = {MORAL KNOWLEDGE, IF IT EXISTS, MUST BE CAPABLE OF DETERMINING NOT ONLY THE INTELLECT BUT ALSO THE WILL. THUS, IT WOULD SEEM, IT MUST BE CONNECTED WITH THE PASSIONS. BUT, IT IS OFTEN CLAIMED, THE PASSIONS LACK COGNITIVE POWER. IN THE ARTICLE IT IS ARGUED THAT THIS CLAIM IS UNWARRANTED, THAT THE PASSIONS DO POSSESS COGNITIVE POWER. AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO SHOW THAT THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT ANALOGY BETWEEN EMOTION AND SENSE PERCEPTION. THE CONCLUSION DRAWN IS THAT WITH REGARD TO ONE CRITERION OF OBJECTIVITY - THE CONDITION OF THE SUBJECT - EMOTIONS AND SENSE PERCEPTIONS ARE ON A PAR. A SECOND CRITERION - SYSTEMATIC COHERENCE - IS SEEN TO FAVOR THE LATTER. HOWEVER, THIS MATTERS LESS THAN ONE MIGHT BE INCLINED TO THINK. FOR, IT IS SUGGESTED, AS A CRITERION OF OBJECTIVITY THE CONDITION OF THE SUBJECT IS MORE BASIC THAN SYSTEMATIC COHERENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KERSTEN1974, author = {KERSTEN, FRED}, title = {CAN SARTRE COUNT?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {34}, pages = {339-354}, keywords = {consciousness, counting, epistemology, knowing, phenomenology}, abstract = {I ARGUE THAT SARTRE'S THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS UNTRUE BECAUSE IT IS BASED UPON A SET OF CONFUSIONS HAVING THEIR ORIGIN IN THE FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN APPREHENDING THE 'PROPERTIES' OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND APPREHENDING THE FORM CONFERRED ON CONSCIOUSNESS BY ITSELF. REHEARSING SARTRE'S EXAMPLE OF COUNTING, WHICH ILLUSTRATES HIS THEORY, LEADS INEVITABLY TO THAT DISTINCTION, THEREBY BRINGING TO LIGHT THE INSIGHT THAT 'PASSIVELY' CONSTITUTED SELF-IDENTITY AND NON-RECURRENCE FOUND SYNTHESES, ALSO 'PASSIVE', IN WHICH MUTUAL TRANSFER OF SENSE PROCEEDS SUCH THAT THE EIDOS 'CONSCIOUSNESS', PASSIVELY MEANT AND BELIEVED IN, STANDS OUT READY TO BE ADVERTED TO IN ACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. THE REJECTION OF SARTRE'S THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS ALONG THESE LINES OPENS UP NEW AREAS OF INQUIRY, MOST NOTABLY WITH RESPECT TO THE DIFFERENCE IN THE WAY IN WHICH FORMAL AND MATERIAL 'UNIVERSALS' ARE CONSTITUTED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KERSZBERG1987, author = {KERSZBERG, PIERRE}, title = {THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EARTH'S MOTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {177-208}, keywords = {earth, motion, phenomenology, physics, relativism, science}, abstract = {IN 1940, MARVIN FARBER PUBLISHED AN IMPORTANT MANUSCRIPT BY HUSSERL DEALING WITH THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE COPERNICAN MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY. HUSSERL DEFINED HIS AIM AS THE "OVERTHROW OF THE COPERNICAN THEORY." "THE ORIGINAL ARK, EARTH," HE CLAIMED, "DOES NOT MOVE." THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT HUSSERL'S MANUSCRIPT OFFERS A BASIS FOR A PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION OF EINSTEIN'S THEORY OF GENERAL RELATIVITY. FOLLOWING HUSSERL'S ARGUMENT, IT TRIES TO DEVELOP THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RELATIVISTIC WORLD PICTURE, BY SHOWING HOW ANALYSIS OF THE EARTH'S MOTION EMBODIES BOTH THE MOTIVATIONS AND THE LIMITS OF THAT WORLD PICTURE. IN FACT, THIS PHENOMENOLOGICAL QUESTIONING ADDRESSES SOME CENTRAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF RELATIVITY; THE RESIDUAL CONFLICT BETWEEN COPERNICUS' EARTH AND HUSSERL'S ARK MAY BE TAKEN AS REINSTATING IN APPROPRIATE TERMS THE CLASSICAL, ANTINOMICAL FORM OF CONFLICT WITHIN THE RELATIVISTIC WORLD PICTURE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KESARCODI-WATSON1981, author = {KESARCODI-WATSON, IAN}, title = {KESARCODI-WATSON ON DIGBY ON "KESARCODI-WATSON ON ATMA-VIDYA AND 'EGO'".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {125-127}, keywords = {ego, metaphysics, self-knowledg}, abstract = {THIS IS A RESPONSE TO A CRITICAL NOTE BY TOM F DIGBY, ADDRESSING AN EARLIER PIECE OF MIND, "ATMA-VIDYA & 'EGO'" ("PHILOSOPHY & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH"; SEPT., 1979). IT ENDEAVORS TO RECTIFY ONE OR TWO MISCONCEPTIONS BURIED IN DIGBY'S NOTE. FOR ITS CONTEXT, SEE THE EARLIER PIECE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KESRACODI-WATSON1979, author = {KESRACODI-WATSON, IAN}, title = {ATMA-VIDYA AND "EGO".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {130-134}, keywords = {ego, experience, metaphysics, self-knowledge; transcendence}, abstract = {"ATMA-VIDYA" IS THE TERM, OR ONE HIGHLY COMMON TERM, USED IN HINDUISM TO ADVERT TO KNOWLEDGE OF "SELF." IT REFERS TO KNOWING WHAT I INWARDLY AM, BEHIND ALL THE SHAM AND FALSE IMAGE I OFTEN APPEAR TO BE. HOWEVER THIS MAY DIFFER FROM "THE PERSON" NORMALLY SPOKEN OF IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN APPROACHES TO SELF-UNDERSTANDING, CLEARLY IT BEARS VERY CLOSELY UPON IT, SO THAT ANY LIGHT IT MIGHT CAST WOULD LIKELY BE LIGHT CAST HERE ALSO. BUT THERE IS ONE KIND OF SELF-UNDERSTANDING THIS TERM, "ATMA-VIDYA", CLEARLY IS NOT REFERRING TO--THE SENSE IN WHICH I AM OFTEN SAID, AND, INDEED, THINK MYSELF TO BE A QUITE DISTINCT "EGO" (SNKT: "AHAM-KARA"; LIT "EGO"-MAKER), SET AMONG OTHERS. MY AIM IN THIS PIECE IS, IN THE SIMPLEST OF WAYS, TO ARGUE A CASE FOR "ATMA-VIDYA" AGAINST ANY SUGGESTION THAT "EGO"-SENSE COULD PRESENT ME WITH AN EVEN REMOTELY PROPER KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT I AM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KHATCHADOURIAN1973, author = {KHATCHADOURIAN, HAIG}, title = {DO ORDINARY SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL EXPRESSIONS DESIGNATE RELATIONS?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {82-94}, keywords = {language, relation, space, time}, abstract = {PHILOSOPHERS HAVE TRADITIONALLY REGARDED SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL EXPRESSIONS AS NAMES OF CERTAIN RELATIONS. THE ARTICLE'S MAIN AIM IS TO HOW, BY ANALYSING THE ORDINARY USES OF THESE EXPRESSIONS, THAT THIS SUPPOSITION IS FALSE. SINCE THEY ARE NOT NAMES OF CHARACTERISTICS EITHER, IT FOLLOWS THAT THE TRADITIONAL ONTOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION OF THINGS INTO OBJECTS OR 'CONTINUANTS', CHARACTERISTICS OF THINGS AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THINGS IS NONEXHAUSTIVE OR INCOMPLETE. THE REST OF THE PAPER ARGUES THAT THE PHILOSOPHER'S MISCONCEPTION OF WHAT SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL EXPRESSIONS DESIGNATE, OR HIS MODIFICATION OF THE ORDINARY USES OF 'RELATION', IS THE SOURCE OF VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFICULTIES OR CONFUSIONS. A CASE IN POINT IS ONE OF MCTAGGART'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE UNREALITY OF TIME, WHICH IS BRIEFLY DISCUSSED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KHATCHADOURIAN1961, author = {KHATCHADOURIAN, HAIG}, title = {ON TIME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {456-466}, keywords = {change, mathematics, metaphysics, objective, ordinary-language; passing, subjective, time}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KIELDOPF1968, author = {KIELDOPF, CHARLES-F}, title = {THE PICTURES IN THE HEAD OF A MAN BORN BLIND.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {501-513}, keywords = {epistemology, image}, abstract = {IT IS OBSERVED THAT IF WE TALK OF IMAGERY AS RYLE DOES IN THE "CONCEPT OF MIND," THERE IS NO REASON WHY IT COULD NOT COME ABOUT THAT WE SHOULD SAY THAT A CONGENITALLY BLIND MAN HAS IMAGERY OF A BRIGHT RED CAR ON A WHITE BEACH. IT IS ARGUED THAT THIS POSSIBILITY SHOWS THAT A CONGENITALLY BLIND MAN CAN HAVE SUCH IMAGERY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KIELKOPF1966, author = {KIELKOPF, CHARLES-F}, title = {DEDUCTION AND INTUITIVE INDUCTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {379-390}, keywords = {deduction, induction, inference, intuition, logic, necessary, synthetic-a-priori; truth}, abstract = {THE GOAL OF THIS PAPER IS TO PRESENT A CONJECTURE ON HOW WE CAN ESTABLISH SYNTHETIC BUT NECESSARY TRUTHS ON WHICH NON-DEDUCTIVE LOGIC CAN BE BUILT. I GIVE EXAMPLES OF A KIND OF TRUTH WHICH WERE CALLED "SYNTHETIC A PRIORI" BY WITTGENSTEIN IN HIS "REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS". A TYPICAL EXAMPLE IS: THERE IS AN E IN RVER. I ANALYZE THE NECESSITY OF "THERE IS AN E IN RVER." MY CONJECTURE IS THAT WE CAN ESTABLISH A NON-DEDUCTIVE INFERENCE FROM "IT IS AN A" TO "IT IS A B" UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS. THERE IS AN EMPIRICAL SITUATION WHICH HAS PROPERTIES A AND B AND WE CAN SAY THAT THIS SITUATION WOULD NOT BE WHAT IT IS IF IT HAD A WITHOUT B WITH THE SAME CERTAINTY THAT WE CAN SAY THAT RVER WOULD NOT BE WHAT IT IS IF IT DID NOT CONTAIN AN E. FINALLY, I SHOW THAT THESE "SYNTHETIC A PRIORI" JUDGMENTS ALSO JUSTIFY DEDUCTIVE INFERENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kieran2002, author = {Kieran, Matthew}, title = {On Obscenity: The Thrill and Repulsion of the Morally Prohibited}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {31-55}, keywords = {desire, ethics, obscenity, prohibition}, abstract = {The paper proceeds by criticizing the central accounts of obscenity proffered by Feinberg, Scruton and the suggestive remarks of Nussbaum and goes on to argue for a formal characterization of obscenity. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kierl2005, author = {Kierland, Brian and Monton, Bradley}, title = {Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {384-395}, keywords = {bayesianism, belief, epistemology, inaccuracy, minimizing}, abstract = {One's inaccuracy for a proposition is defined as the squared difference between the truth value (1 or 0) of the proposition and the credence (or subjective probability, or degree of belief) assigned to the proposition. One should have the epistemic goal of minimizing the expected inaccuracies of one's credences. We show that the method of minimizing expected inaccuracy can be used to solve certain probability problems involving information loss and self-locating beliefs (where a self-locating belief of a temporal part of an individual is a belief about where or when that temporal part is located). We analyze the Sleeping Beauty problem, the duplication version of the Sleeping Beauty problem, and various related problems.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kim2002, author = {Kim, Jaegwon}, title = {Precis of Mind in a Physical World}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {640-643}, keywords = {epiphenomenalism, metaphysics, mind, physicalism, reduction}, abstract = {This is a brief summary of the claims and arguments presented in the book Mind in a Physical World (MIT Press, 1998) as part of a book symposium in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kim2002a, author = {Kim, Jaegwon}, title = {Responses}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {671-680}, keywords = {metaphysics, physicalism}, abstract = {This article contains the author's responses to the critical comments by Frank Jackson, Pierre Jacob, Marcelo Sabates, and Barry Loewer, in a book symposium on Mind in a Physical World (1998).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kim1995, author = {Kim, Jaegwon}, title = {Mental Causation in Searle's "Biological Naturalism"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {189-194}, keywords = {biology, body, mind, naturalism, science, supervenience}, abstract = {In this short discussion of John Searle's "The Rediscovery of the Mind" (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), I express agreement and sympathy with Searle's stance against the prevailing views concerning the status of "cognitive science" --in particular, the view that there is a class of special "computational" or abstract "cognitive" properties investigated by psychology -- but I draw what appear to be some very peculiar and unacceptable consequences concerning mental causation, from Searle's claim that mental phenomena are "caused" by their underlying neural processes. It is doubtful that a viable account of mental causation could be developed within the framework of Searle's "biological naturalism".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kim1992, author = {Kim, Jaegwon}, title = {Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {1-26}, keywords = {metaphysics, minds, psychology, reductionism, sensation}, abstract = {This paper examines the metaphysical implications of the claim that a property is "multiply realizable" by a set of other properties. A new argument is offered against taking such a property to be a disjunction of its realizers. Various causal considerations are advanced for the thesis that a multiply realizable property lacks unity as a nomic property and becomes fragmented into its realizing properties. Finally, the ontological status of multiply realizable properties is discussed. Throughout, various issues concerning the functionalist conception of mental properties are discussed.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kim2003, author = {Kim, Jaegwon}, title = {Blocking Causal Drainage and Other Maintenance Chores with Mental Causation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {151-176}, keywords = {causation, generalization, metaphysics, properties, supervenience}, abstract = {In this paper I will revisit an argument that I have called "the supervenience argument"; it is sometimes called "the exclusion argument" in the literature. I want to reconsider several aspects of this argument in light of some of the criticisms and comments it has elicited, clarifying some points and offering a slightly reformulated--and improved--version of the argument. My primary aim, however, is to discuss and respond to Ned Block's edifying and challenging critique of the argument in his "Do Causal Powers Drain Away?", in particular, his claim that the argument has the consequence that if there is no bottom microphysical level, causal powers will "drain away", leaving us with no causation anywhere. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KIM1987, author = {KIM, JAEGWON}, title = {"STRONG" AND "GLOBAL" SUPERVENIENCE REVISITED.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {315-326}, keywords = {materialism, mental, metaphysics, physical, supervenience}, abstract = {THIS PAPER CORRECTS AN ERROR IN MY EARLIER PAPER, "CONCEPTS OF SUPERVENIENCE" ("PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH", VOLUME 45, 1984), AND PRESENTS FURTHER MATERIAL ON SUPERVENIENCE. THE ERROR IS THE CLAIM THAT "GLOBAL" SUPERVENIENCE ENTAILS "STRONG" SUPERVENIENCE. HOWEVER, IT IS ARGUED THAT THIS FAILURE OF ENTAILMENT ONLY GOES TO SHOW THE INADEQUACY OF GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE AS AN EXPLICATION OF "DEPENDENCY" OR "DETERMINATION" RELATION, AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT MATERIALISM FORMULATED IN TERMS OF GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE APPEARS TOO WEAK. (IT IS POINTED OUT, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE DOES NOT ENTAIL "WEAK" SUPERVENIENCE). A STRONGER FORM OF GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE, BASED ON "SIMILARITY" RATHER THAN "INDISCERNIBILITY" BETWEEN WORLDS, IS FORMULATED AND BRIEFLY DISCUSSED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KIM1984, author = {KIM, JAEGWON}, title = {CONCEPTS OF SUPERVENIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {153-176}, keywords = {connection, determinism, epistemology, property, supervenience}, abstract = {TWO RELATIONS OF SUPERVENIENCE, "WEAK" AND "STRONG SUPERVENIENCE," ARE DISTINGUISHED AND THEIR STRENGTHS COMPARED. WHAT SUPERVENIENCE BETWEEN TWO FAMILIES OF PROPERTIES ENTAILS ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF PROPERTY-TO-PROPERTY CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE FAMILIES IS CONSIDERED IN DETAIL, AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS DISCUSSED. IT IS SHOWN THAT "GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE," I.E., THE SUPERVENIENCE RELATION DEFINED IN TERMS OF "POSSIBLE WORLDS," IS EQUIVALENT TO "STRONG SUPERVENIENCE." SOME APPLICATIONS OF THE SUPERVENIENCE CONCEPTS ARE CONSIDERED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Kim1993, author = {Kim, Jaegwon}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {730-733}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Supervenience and Mind}, volume = {56(3)}, year = {1993} } @other{Kincaid1996, author = {Kincaid, Harold}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {1086-1090}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences: Analyzing Controversies in Social Research}, volume = {49(4)}, year = {1996} } @article{Kind2001, author = {Kind, Amy}, title = {Putting the Image Back in Imagination}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {85-109}, keywords = {epistemology, imagination, memory, model}, abstract = {Despite their intuitive appeal and a long philosophical history, imagery-based accounts of the imagination have fallen into disfavor in contemporary discussions. The philosophical pressure to reject such accounts seems to derive from two distinct sources. First, the fact that mental images have proved difficult to accommodate within a scientific conception of mind has led to numerous attempts to explain away their existence, and this in turn has led to attempts to explain the phenomenon of imagining without reference to such ontologically dubious entities as mental images. Second, even those philosophers who accept mental images in their ontology have worried about what seem to be fairly obvious examples of imaginings that occur without imagery. In this paper, I aim to relieve both these points of philosophical pressure and, in the process, develop a new imagery-based account of the imagination: the imagery model.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KING-FARLOW1969, author = {KING-FARLOW, JOHN}, title = {MUST GODS MADDEN MADDEN?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {451-455}, keywords = {god, religion, theism}, abstract = {THIS NOTE CRITICISES TWO PAPERS OF THE NATURALIST EDWARD MADDEN ON GOD AND EVIL. (SEE "PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH," 1964 AND 1967.) TWO MAIN LINES OF CRITICISM ARE STRESSED. FIRST, MADDEN TENDS TO STATE MATTERS IN SUCH AN EMOTIONALLY CHARGED WAY THAT DETACHED, RATIONAL DISCUSSION OF THEODICY BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE. SECOND, MADDEN TALKS AS IF HE HAS PROVED THAT A FORMAL INCONSISTENCY ARISES BETWEEN CRUCIAL THEIST BELIEFS ON GOD AND EVIL. BUT WE ARE NOT IN FACT GIVEN SUCH A PROOF. (COMPARE NELSON PIKE'S FINE "HUME ON EVIL", IN 'PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW', 1963).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Kirk1994, author = {Kirk, Robert}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {968-971}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness}, volume = {57(4)}, year = {1994} } @other{Kirkham1992, author = {Kirkham, Richard-L}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {706-711}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Theories of Truth}, volume = {55(3)}, year = {1992} } @article{KIRKLAND1989, author = {KIRKLAND, FRANK-M}, title = {APPERCEPTION AND COMBINATION: SOME KANTIAN PROBLEMS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {447-461}, keywords = {cognitive, dualism, experience, transcendental-deduction; twentieth}, abstract = {THIS ESSAY IS CONCERNED WITH A PARTICULAR PROBLEM ARISING FROM NUMBERS 15 AND 16 OF KANT'S 1787 "TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION." THAT PROBLEM IS KANT'S CONFLATION OF REFLECTION AND COMBINATION. LEFT UNCONSIDERED IT HAS THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCE OF FRUSTRATING RATHER THAN FULFILLING THE TASK OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION (TD)--A TASK WHICH CAN BE SUCCINCTLY CHARACTERIZED AS DEMONSTRATING THE RECIPROCAL IMPLICATION OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND OBJECTIVITY. THIS CONFLATION ALSO YIELDS AN EQUIVOCATION IN THE SENSE OF "MINE" IN KANT'S CLAIM THAT ALL REPRESENTATIONS COMBINED BY SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS ARE "MY" OWN. VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THIS CONFLATION ARE EXPLAINED, AND IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THIS PROBLEM AND ITS ENSUING CONSEQUENCES EMERGE ONLY IF ONE SUBSCRIBES TO THE VIEW THAT THE TD IS ESSENTIALLY COMPLETED AT NUMBER 16.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kitcher1995, author = {Kitcher, Philip}, title = {Precis of "The Advancement of Science"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {611-617}, keywords = {advancement, biology, model, progress, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kitcher1995a, author = {Kitcher, Philip}, title = {Author's Response}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {653-673}, keywords = {advancement, knowledge, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kitcher1999, author = {Kitcher, Philip}, title = {Games Social Animals Play: Commentary on Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {221-228}, keywords = {behavior, culture, epistemology, evolution, game-theor}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kitcher2002, author = {Kitcher, Philip}, title = {On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {346-364}, keywords = {correspondence, epistemology, explanation, realism, truth}, abstract = {The focal criticism alleges that appeals to success cannot deliver conclusions that parts of science are true in the sense of truth-as-correspondence that realists prefer. The paper responds to that criticism, in versions proposed by Michael Williams, Michael Levin, and, especially, Paul Horwich, by arguing that critics typically stop at a shallow level of psychological explanation. If we prove more deeply we discover a genuine explanatory role for correspondence truth. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kitcher2000, author = {Kitcher, Patricia}, title = {On Interpreting Kant's Thinker As Wittgenstein's 'I'}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {33-63}, keywords = {causation, cognition, metaphysics, self}, abstract = {Although both Kant and Wittgenstein made claims about the "unknowability" of cognitive subjects, the current practice of assimilating their positions is mistaken. I argue that Allison's attempt to understand the Kantian self through the early Wittgenstein and McDowell's linking of Kant and the later Wittgenstein distort rather than illuminate. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kitcher2002a, author = {Kitcher, Philip}, title = {Veritistic Value and the Project of Social Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {191-198}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, social, truth, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KIVY1978, author = {KIVY, PETER}, title = {THE POINT OF IT ALL: AN ANSWER TO PROFESSOR HYDE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {39}, pages = {131-134}, keywords = {aesthetics, criticism, description, term}, abstract = {IN A PREVIOUS ARTICLE ("WHAT MAKES "AESTHETIC" TERMS "AESTHETIC"?," "PHILOSOPHY" AND "PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH", XXXVI (1975)), I ARGUED THAT WHAT MAKES AESTHETIC TERMS AESTHETIC IS THAT THEY ARE WHAT I CALLED "TERMINAL": THAT IS, END-POINTS--NOT CHARACTERISTICALLY THE BEGINNINGS OF ARGUMENTS BUT THE ENDS OF THEM. IN THE PRESENT NOTE I DEFEND MY POSITION AGAINST THE CHARGE THAT THIS IMPLIES CRITICISM MUST BE "POINTLESS" OR WITHOUT PURPOSE. MY VIEW OF AESTHETIC TERMS, I ARGUE, IS PERFECTLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE POPULAR NOTION THAT THE POINT OF CRITICISM IS "TO GET US TO SEE" THINGS IN WORKS OF ART. I ALSO SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT, ON MY OWN VIEW OF CRITICISM, IT IS NOT SO MUCH "UTILITARIAN" AS (IN SOME SENSE OR OTHER) AN "END IN ITSELF."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KIVY1975, author = {KIVY, PETER}, title = {WHAT MAKES 'AESTHETIC' TERMS AESTHETIC?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {197-211}, keywords = {aesthetics, taste}, abstract = {I SURVEY, IN "WHAT MAKES 'AESTHETIC' TERMS "AESTHETIC"?," VARIOUS RECENT ATTEMPTS (BEGINNING WITH FRANK SIBLEY'S) TO UNIQUELY CHARACTERIZE "AESTHETIC" TERMS: "GARISH," "UNIFIED," AND THE LIKE. AFTER REJECTING THESE ATTEMPTS, FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER, I SKETCH A CHARACTERIZATION OF MY OWN, GOING BACK TO THE WORK OF FRANCIS HUTCHESON FOR MY KEY IDEA. I ARGUE THAT, AS AESTHETIC PERCEPTION WAS, FOR HUTCHESON, PERCEPTION FOR ITS OWN SAKE, AESTHETIC DESCRIPTION, ALTHOUGH "DESCRIPTION", IS DESCRIPTION FOR ITS OWN SAKE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Kivy1997, author = {Kivy, Peter}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {726-729}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Philosophies of Arts: An Essay in Differences}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1997} } @other{Kivy1993, author = {Kivy, Peter}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {962-965}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Fine Art of Repetition}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1993} } @article{KLAGGE1988, author = {KLAGGE, JAMES-C}, title = {MORAL REALISM AND DUMMETT'S CHALLENGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {545-551}, keywords = {ethics, moral, realism}, abstract = {IF THE TRUTH-VALUES OF CERTAIN SENTENCES FROM A DISPUTED REALM CAN ONLY BE DECIDED ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE, AND SUCH EVIDENCE DOES NOT EXIST, BECAUSE OF GAPS IN THE AUXILIARY CLASS OF SENTENCES, THEN WE CANNOT, EVEN IN PRINCIPLE, BE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE THE TRUTH-VALUES OF THOSE DISPUTED SENTENCES. BECAUSE OF EVIDENTIAL GAPS, SOME SENTENCES ABOUT MATHEMATICS, CHARACTER TRAITS, FICTIONAL CHARACTERS, AND SO FORTH, ARE UNDECIDABLE IN PRINCIPLE. MICHAEL DUMMETT HAS CHALLENGED REALISTS ABOUT SUCH REALMS TO EXPLAIN HOW WE ARE SUPPOSED TO HAVE SO MUCH AS A CONCEPTION OF A STATEMENT'S HAVING A DETERMINATE TRUTH-VALUE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EVIDENCE THAT WOULD HELP DECIDE THE MATTER. BUT THIS CHALLENGE CANNOT BE BROUGHT AGAINST ALL FORMS OF REALISM. IN PARTICULAR, IT CANNOT BE BROUGHT AGAINST MORAL REALISM, BECAUSE NO PARTICULAR MORAL JUDGMENTS (ABOUT ACTIONS OR STATES OF AFFAIRS) CAN BE SHOWN TO BE UNDECIDABLE IN PRINCIPLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Klein2004, author = {Klein, Peter-D}, title = {What IS Wrong with Foundationalism Is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {166-171}, keywords = {epistemic, epistemology, foundationalism, justification, regress}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Klein1998, author = {Klein, Peter}, title = {Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {919-925}, keywords = {epistemology, foundationalism, knowledge, reason, scepticism}, abstract = {In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield: 1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of the defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that the solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory reasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and nonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt to show that they are not really telling against (at least some versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some objections to his account of inferential justification.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Klein2003, author = {Klein, Peter}, title = {When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(3)}, pages = {718-729}, keywords = {infinite-regress; metaphysics}, abstract = {Carl Gillett claims in "Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein," Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, 66(3), My 2003, 709-717, that my account of the structure of justificatory reasons--what I call "infinitism"--is subject to a general "structural objection." Roughly, that objection is this: If some member in an infinite series gains a property by inheriting it from a previous member, there will be no way to account for the property having arisen. I argue (1) that, even if the structural objection were sound, the regress proposed by infinitism is not subject to it, and (2) that the structural objection does not pose a real problem for any infinite regress.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KLEIN1987, author = {KLEIN, ROBERTA-CUTLER}, title = {ARE WE MORALLY OBLIGATED TO BE INTELLECTUALLY RESPONSIBLE?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {79-92}, keywords = {epistemology, morality, obligation, rationality}, abstract = {IN "THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE", RODERICK CHISHOLM CLAIMS, WITHOUT ARGUMENT, THAT PERSONS ARE SUBJECT TO AN INTELLECTUAL REQUIREMENT TO BELIEVE THE TRUTH AND AVOID ERROR. AFTER EXAMINING IN SOME DETAIL THE NOTION OF SUCH A REQUIREMENT, THE AUTHOR CLAIMS THAT "IF" ANY LEADING THEORY OF MORAL OBLIGATION IS CORRECT, "THEN" PERSONS ARE SUBJECT TO THE INTELLECTUAL REQUIREMENT FORMULATED. FURTHERMORE, THE MANNER IN WHICH AN INTELLECTUAL REQUIREMENT IS GROUNDED HAS IMPLICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THOSE MATTERS LEFT OPEN BY THE NOTION OF AN INTELLECTUAL REQUIREMENT AS SUCH--MATTERS WHICH INCLUDE THE IMPORTANCE OF ONE'S ATTAINING A HIGH TRUTH-RATIO VS. A HIGH NUMBER OF TRUE BELIEFS. FINALLY, IMPLICATIONS OF THE AUTHOR'S CLAIMS FOR A LEADING THEORY OF RATIONALITY ARE DISCUSSED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Knapp2003, author = {Knapp, Christopher}, title = {De-Moralizing Disgustingness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {253-278}, keywords = {disgust, emotion, ethics, morality, value}, abstract = {Understanding disgustingness is philosophically important partly because claims about disgustingness play a prominent role in moral discourse and practice. It is also important because disgustingness has been used to illustrate the promise of "neosentimentalism." Recently developed by moral philosophers, such as David Wiggins, John McDowell, Simmon Blackburn, Justin D'Arms and Dan Jacobson, neosentimentalism holds that for a thing to be disgusting is for it to be "appropriate" to respond to it with disgust. In this paper, I argue that from what we currently know about the disgust response, these accounts are mistaken. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KNIGHT1967, author = {KNIGHT, THOMAS-S}, title = {QUESTIONS AND UNIVERSALS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {564-576}, keywords = {epistemology, question, universal}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KNOWLES1981, author = {KNOWLES, MARION-C}, title = {SOME REMARKS ON THE INTENTIONALITY OF THOUGHT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {267-279}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, thought}, abstract = {IN PART I IT IS ARGUED THAT INTENTIONALITY IS AN INTRINSIC FEATURE OF CONSCIOUS THOUGHT. SPECIFICALLY, ARGUMENTS ARE PRESENTED IN SUPPORT OF THE CLAIMS THAT (I) SUCH THOUGHT IS NECESSARILY INTENTIONAL, (II) THE CRITERIA BY WHICH IT IS INDIVIDUATED MUST INCLUDE ITS INTENTIONAL OBJECT, (III) ITS INTENTIONALITY IS NOT A RELATION BETWEEN THE THINKER OR THOUGHT AND SOMETHING EXTERNAL TO THE THOUGHT AND (IV) ITS INTENTIONALITY IS NOT ULTIMATELY DEPENDENT ON ITS BEING NECESSARY THAT SOMEONE HAS OR COULD PERFORM ANY MENTAL ACT WITH RESPECT TO IT. IN PART II CONSIDERATION IS GIVEN TO SOME CHALLENGES TO THESE CLAIMS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KOCH1987, author = {KOCH, PHILIP-J}, title = {EMOTIONAL AMBIVALENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {257-279}, keywords = {action, ambivalence, emotion, metaphysics, self}, abstract = {THIS STUDY SEEKS TO UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEX NATURE AND BROADER SIGNIFICANCE OF EMOTIONAL AMBIVALENCE (CONFLICTING FEELINGS). THIS CONCEPT INCLUDES CONFLICT OF JUDGMENT, THE CONFLICTED ACT, AND HOW OBJECTIVITY AND EMPATHY MAKE A TRULY MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS POSSIBLE. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KOCHLER1982, author = {KOCHLER, HANS}, title = {THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF KAROL WOJTYLA: ON THE PROBLEM OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF ANTHROPOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {326-334}, keywords = {consciousness, experience, knowledge, philosophical-anthropolog}, abstract = {AS WOJTYLA GOES BEYOND THE ARISTOTELIAN-SCHOLASTIC CONCEPTION OF MAN--BY EMPHASIZING THE "IRREDUCIBILITY" OF THE SUBJECT--AND, AT THE SAME TIME, BROADENS IT BY HIS PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD BASED ON THE "EXPERIENCE" ("ERLEBNIS"), SO HE TRIES ALSO--WHEN CLAIMING TO FORMULATE PHENOMENOLOGICALLY FOUNDED "TRANSPHENOMENOLOGICAL COGNITION"--TO TRANSCEND PHENOMENOLOGY AS UNDERSTOOD AS A SYSTEM OF IMMANENT STRUCTURES OF EXPERIENCE. HIS PHENOMENOLOGY ARISES FROM HIS EFFORT TO ELUCIDATE THE REAL NATURE OF MAN AS A PERSON, AND HE TRIES TO DESCRIBE THE SELF-AWARENESS AND SELF-COMPREHENSION OF THE PERSON IN THE PROCESS OF CONCRETE ACTING, KEEPING CRITICAL DISTANCE IN THE SAME TIME TO THE "METAPHYSICAL" TRADITION AND TO AN IDEALISTIC (SUBJECTIVISTIC) REIFICATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS SOMETHING ABSOLUTE AS WELL. PHENOMENOLOGY, UNDERSTOOD IN THIS SENSE, IS A PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD, DETERMINED IN ITS STRUCTURE BY THE SPECIFIC REALM IT IS DEALING WITH (I.E., BY THE TASK OF ANALYZING CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONCRETE ACTING), IT IS NOT A METAPHYSICAL-TRANSCENDENTAL SYSTEM OF "PURE" CONSCIOUSNESS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KOEHL1967, author = {KOEHL, RICHARD}, title = {THE NATURAL LANGUAGE FALLACY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {610-614}, keywords = {fallacy, language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Koethe1996, author = {Koethe, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {240-242}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Continuity of Wittgenstein's Thought}, volume = {60(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{KOGAN1975, author = {KOGAN, JACOBO}, title = {DIALECTICS OF THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {385-390}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, communication, expression}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THE ARTICLE IS TO SHOW THAT AESTHETIC ENJOYMENT IS THE FEELING OR EXPERIENCE OF THE FREE LIFE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. GENERALLY, CONSCIOUSNESS ACCOMPANIES OUR PSYCHIC ACTIVITIES ONLY AS A WITNESS, WHILE IN THE CONTEMPLATIVE ATTITUDE IT AFFIRMS ITSELF INDEPENDENTLY; BUT INSOFAR AS IT LIMITS ITSELF TO PERCEPTION, CONSCIOUSNESS ONLY REFLECTS THE REAL. PSYCHIC DISTANCE IS THE FIRST STEP TOWARD ITS INDEPENDENT LIFE, BUT IT IS YET FREEDOM FROM, NOT NECESSARILY FREEDOM TO. IT IS ONLY WHEN THE ARTIST BEGINS TO MASTER IMAGES WITH THE AIM TO CREATE THAT CONSCIOUSNESS DYNAMISES ITSELF INTO AUTONOMOUS ACTIVITY. THE AUTHOR EMPLOYS THE DIALECTIC METHOD IN ORDER TO PROVE THAT THE MULTIPLE OPPOSITIONS IN AESTHETICAL THEORIES FIND THEIR SYNTHESIS IN HIS INTERPRETATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Koistinen2003, author = {Koistinen, Olli}, title = {Spinoza's Proof of Necessitarianism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {283-310}, keywords = {metaphysics, necessitarianism, properties, substance}, abstract = {This paper consists of four sections. The first section considers what the proof of necessitarianism in Spinoza's system requires. Also in the first section, Jonathan Bennett's (1984) reading of 1p16 as involving a commitment to necessitarianism is presented and accepted. The second section evaluates Bennett's suggestion how Spinoza might have been led to conclude necessitarianism from his basic assumptions. The third section of the paper is devoted to Don Garrett's (1991) interpretation of Spinoza's proof. In the proof given in the fourth section, it is argued that Spinoza derived necessitarianism from the conjunction of the following principles: (i) necessary existence of the substances; (ii) substance-property ontology; (iii) superessentialism; and (iv) the 'no shared attribute' thesis. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kolb1992, author = {Kolb, David}, title = {Heidegger and Habermas on Criticism and Totality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {683-693}, keywords = {criticism, epistemology, totality}, abstract = {Habermas's criticizes Heidegger for insulating totalities of meaning form possible overturning by attempts to validate individual claims. This essay first states Habermas's criticism, then elaborates an example from Heidegger concerning Aristotle's physics that supports Habermas's attack. Then the essay defends Heidegger by distinguishing levels of meaning and Heidegger's "world" from Habermas's more propositional "lifeworld." The essay concludes by accepting Habermas's objection restated in terms of the contrast between transcendental and local conditions. If Heidegger is unwilling to pay the price of either Kantian generality or Hegelian unity, he should give up the simple priority of the epochal understandings of being.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Kolbel2002, author = {Kolbel, Max}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {491-494}, publisher = {Routledge}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Truth without Objectivity}, volume = {71(2)}, year = {2002} } @article{KORDIG1982, author = {KORDIG, CARL-R}, title = {EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY IS SELF-REFERENTIALLY INCONSISTENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {449-450}, keywords = {epistemology, evolution, ideal, inconsistency}, abstract = {EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY DENIES THAT THERE ARE INVARIANT AND FINAL META-SCIENTIFIC TRUTHS IMMUNE TO REVISION. THIS DENIAL IS SELF-REFERENTIALLY INCONSISTENT. THE CLAIM THAT THERE ARE NO INVARIANT AND FINAL META-SCIENTIFIC TRUTHS IMMUNE TO REVISION IS, IF TRUE, ITSELF A FINAL AND INVARIANT META-SCIENTIFIC TRUTH IMMUNE TO REVISION. IT IS BELIEVED TO APPLY UNIVERSALLY TO ALL SCIENCES AT ALL TIMES. IF IT WERE TRUE, WE WOULD THEREFORE HAVE IT ITSELF AS AN EXAMPLE OF A STANDARD WHOSE TRUTH AND MEANING STAYS THE SAME NO MATTER WHAT DIFFERENT THEORIES WE MAY HOLD. THUS, "BY ITS VERY STATEMENT", IT WOULD BE FALSE. HENCE, IT "CANNOT" BE TRUE. IT IS SELF-REFERENTIALLY INCONSISTENT AND THEREFORE UNTENABLE. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kornblith1992, author = {Kornblith, Hilary}, title = {The Laws of Thought}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {895-911}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, inference, thought}, abstract = {The psychological literature on human inference, if taken at face value, seems to suggest that human beings reason very badly. This body of literature is examined, and it is argued that this pessimistic picture of our inferential abilities is not supported by the data.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kornblith2005, author = {Kornblith, Hilary}, title = {Precis of Knowledge and Its Place in Nature}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {399-402}, keywords = {epistemology, ethology, knowledge, language, nature}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kornblith2005a, author = {Kornblith, Hilary}, title = {Replies to Alvin Goldman, Martin Kusch and William Talbott}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {427-441}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, nature}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kornblith2000, author = {Kornblith, Hilary}, title = {Linda Zagzebski's Virtues of the Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {197-201}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, mind, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Kornblith1993, author = {Kornblith, Hilary}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {492-494}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground}, volume = {56(2)}, year = {1993} } @article{Koslicki2005, author = {Koslicki, Kathrin}, title = {On the Substantive Nature of Disagreements in Ontology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {85-105}, keywords = {metaphysics, nature, nihilism, ontology, scepticism, substantive}, abstract = {I examine in detail an intriguing recent proposal in Dorr (2005), which promises to yield (i) a way of interpreting the skeptic by means of a counterfactual semantics; and (ii) a way of converting the skeptic to a position within foundational ontology, viz., that of nihilism (according to which nothing composes anything and the world consists of mereological simples); this alleged conversion crucially turns on a novel notion of "metaphysical analyticity". I argue that both components of Dorr's proposal are problematic in central ways: as a result, the foundational ontologist gains an indirect argument against the coherence of the Skeptic's position; and the non-nihilist foundational ontologist may feel confirmed in his doubts towards the nihilist outlook. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KRAEMER1984, author = {KRAEMER, ERIC-R}, title = {DIVINE OMNISCIENCE AND CRITERIA OF INTENTIONALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {131-136}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, omniscience}, abstract = {THE PROJECT OF FINDING A CRITERION OF INTENTIONALITY HAS GIVEN RISE TO VARIOUS INTRIGUING PROPOSALS. I HERE CONSIDER TWO RECENT CRITERIA BASED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ERROR. I ARGUE THAT, ALTHOUGH THESE CRITERIA DO SUCCEED IN MARKING OFF PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES FROM NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL ONES, THEY ARE TO BE CRITICIZED ON ANOTHER SCORE: FOR NOT BEING APPLICABLE TO CERTAIN MENTAL STATES OF A NECESSARILY OMNISCIENT BEING. I ARGUE THAT OBVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT THE PROBLEM DO NOT SUCCEED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KRANTZ1990, author = {KRANTZ, SUSAN}, title = {Brentano on 'Unconscious Consciousness'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {745-753}, keywords = {consciousness, mental-act; metaphysics, unconscious}, abstract = {In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano argues that an 'unconscious consciousness' is not possible. I focus on his use in this argument of the principle of the infallibility of inner perception. By contrast with the view he argues against, it becomes plain that Brentano discusses sense perception in an idealistic or subjectivist mode. Yet Brentano insists that he is a realist, and not guilty of 'psychologism', precisely because he adheres to the infallibility of inner perception and denies unconscious consciousness. Thus we encounter in Brentano a version of what may be called phenomenological realism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Krausz1993, author = {Krausz, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {711-715}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Rightness and Reasons}, volume = {55(3)}, year = {1993} } @article{KRECZ1986, author = {KRECZ, CHARLES-A}, title = {PARTS AND PIECES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {381-400}, keywords = {identity, metaphysics, part, whole}, abstract = {"PARTS AND PIECES" PRESENTS AND ARGUES FOR A DISTINCTION BETWEEN TWO TYPES OF DIVISIONS IN WHOLES, PARTS AND PIECES. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PART/PIECE DISTINCTION LEADS TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE PART/WHOLE RELATION WHICH REJECTS CHISHOLM'S MEREOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE, WHILE PROVIDING AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS THAT PRINCIPLE IS DESIGNED TO SOLVE, E.G., THE IDENTITY PROBLEM REGARDING THESEUS' SHIP.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KRECZ1981, author = {KRECZ, CHARLES-A}, title = {THE SPECIFICATION OF FACTS IN LINGUISTIC CONTEXTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {524-531}, keywords = {correspondence, fact, metaphysics}, abstract = {A CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY SEEN AS DECISIVE IN THE REJECTION OF THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY HAS IT THAT THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY IS COMMITTED TO CERTAIN ENTITIES, NAMELY, FACTS, WHICH CANNOT BE SPECIFIED IN DISCOURSE. AGAINST QUINE, DAVIDSON AND OTHERS, KRECZ ARGUES THAT ALTHOUGH FACTS CANNOT BE SPECIFIED BY IDENTIFYING PREDICATES OR PREDICATE SETS, NONETHELESS THERE IS A SENSE IN WHICH THEY ARE SPECIFIED IN DISCOURSE. IT IS ARGUED THAT SUCH SPECIFICATION IS RENDERED BY THE CONSTRUCTION OF LINGUISTIC CONTEXTS IN WHICH REFERENCE TO FACT IS LOCATED. THIS FORM OF SPECIFICATION IS TERMED "ADUMBRATION". THE NOTION OF ADUMBRATION BY CONTEXT IS ELABORATED TO SHOW HOW THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY CAN BE INSULATED FROM VARIOUS OBJECTIONS REGARDING THE SPECIFICATION OF FACTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KRELL1982, author = {KRELL, DAVID-FARRELL}, title = {PHENOMENOLOGY OF MEMORY FROM HUSSERL TO MERLEAU-PONTY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {492-505}, keywords = {memory, metaphysics, time}, abstract = {A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF HUSSERL'S LECTURES ON INTERNAL TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS AND PASSIVE SYNTHESIS (TOUCHING THE THEME OF MEMORY) IS FOLLOWED BY AN APPRECIATION OF MERLEAU-PONTY'S "PROBLEM OF PASSIVITY". I ARGUE THAT HUSSERL'S DESCRIPTIONS OF MEMORY PROCESSES EMBODY PREJUDICES STEMMING FROM THE 'OBJECTIVE TIME' HE CLAIMS TO HAVE BRACKETED OUT AND THAT HIS PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD IS ITSELF A PHENOMENON OF THE MATHEMATICAL IMAGINATION. THE LATTER PURSUES INHERITED IDEALS OF CLARITY, EVIDENCE, IMMANENCE AND PRESENCE WHICH DISTORT ALL MNEMONIC PHENOMENA. MERLEAU-PONTY ESCHEWS THE REPRESENTATIONAL THOUGHT, OBJECTIVE-LINEAR TIME, EVIDENCE AND IMMANENCE OF HUSSERLIAN EPISTEMOLOGY. MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF AMBIGUITY RESPONDS WITH GREATER SUPPLENESS AND SUBTLETY TO THE MOST AMBIGUOUS OF PHENOMENA--MEMORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kremer2000, author = {Kremer, Michael}, title = {Wilson on Kripke's Wittgenstein}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {571-584}, keywords = {criticism, epistemology, scepticism}, abstract = {George Wilson has recently defended Kripke's well-known interpretation of Wittgenstein against the criticisms of John McDowell. Wilson claims that these criticisms rest on misunderstandings of Kripke and that, when correctly understood, Kripke's interpretation stands up to them well. In particular, Wilson defends Kripke's Wittgenstein against the charge of "nonfactualism" about meaning. I use a brief exploration of Kripke's analogy between Wittgenstein and Hume to put this significance in sharp relief. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KRETZMANN1965, author = {KRETZMANN, NORMAN}, title = {ON ROSE'S "CARTESIAN CIRCLE".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {90-92}, keywords = {certainty, circularity, clarity, distinctness, doubt, epistemology, god, idea, proof}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kriegel2005, author = {Kriegel, Uriah}, title = {Naturalizing Subjective Character}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {23-57}, keywords = {character, conscious, experience, metaphysics, subjective}, abstract = {When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this "bluish way it is like for me": (i) the bluish aspect and (ii) the for-me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for-me aspect its subjective character. What is this elusive for-me-ness, or subjective character, of conscious experience? In this paper, I examine six different attempts to account for subjective character in terms of the functional and representational properties of conscious experiences. After arguing against the first five, I defend the sixth.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KRIKORIAN1962, author = {KRIKORIAN, Y-H}, title = {THE PUBLICITY OF MIND.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {317-325}, keywords = {behaviorism, communication, epistemology, mind, other-minds; privacy, public}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE OPPOSES THE TRADITION THAT CONSIDERS MIND AS INACCESSIBLE EXCEPT TO ITS POSSESSORS, AND IDEAS OR FEELINGS AS PRIVATE EXPERIENCES, EXCLUSIVELY ONE'S OWN AND NOT KNOWN OR SHARED BY OTHERS. THIS TYPE OF VIEW NEEDS TO BE RE-EXAMINED, FOR IT GOES COUNTER TO OUR NORMAL SHARED EXPERIENCES AND COMMUNICATIONS AND TENDS TO CHECK OUR PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT MIND IS OPEN TO PUBLIC OBSERVATION, THAT ALL ASPECTS OF MIND ARE POTENTIALLY OBSERVABLE AND THAT THERE ARE NO "PERMANENT UNKNOWABLES." THE ARTICLE PROCEEDS TO DISCUSS: A BEHAVIORISTIC ACCOUNT OF MIND, KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER MINDS, AND COMMUNICATION. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KRIKORIAN1968, author = {KRIKORIAN, Y-H}, title = {COHEN'S RATIONALISTIC NATURALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {264-273}, keywords = {ethics, metaphysics, naturalism, rationality}, abstract = {A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF MORRIS R. COHEN'S GENERAL VIEW OF NATURE WITH SOME REFERENCE TO HIS ETHICAL THEORY. COHEN'S UNIVERSE IS A RATIONAL SYSTEM, YET IT IS A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE WITH THE UNELIMINABLE ELEMENT OF CONTINGENCY. THE ROAD TO KNOWLEDGE IS THROUGH THE DISCOVERY OF THE INVARIANT RELATION BETWEEN PARTICULAR EVENTS. THE PRINCIPLE OF POLARITY HAS A METHODOLOGICAL USE, WHICH HE FRUITFULLY APPLIES TO METAPHYSICAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES, AND ONTOLOGICAL STATUS. WHAT IS BASICALLY QUESTIONED IS HIS FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH THE FUNCTIONAL ROLE OF REASON IN SCIENCE AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ASSERTION ABOUT IT, AND HIS FURTHER ASSERTION THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF POLARITY IS A PERVASIVE TRAIT OF EXISTENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KRISHNA1969, author = {KRISHNA, DAYA}, title = {THE ACTIVE AND THE CONTEMPLATIVE VALUES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {414-422}, keywords = {action, axiology, contemplation, value}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE CLARIFIES THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN VALUES THAT ARE CONCERNED WITH SEEKING A STATE OF ONE'S OWN BEING AND THOSE WHICH ARE CONCERNED WITH THE REALISATION OF AN EXTERNAL STATE OF AFFAIRS. THE TOPICS INCLUDE THE ROLE OF ACTION IN INSTITUTIONALISED CONTEXT AND THE WAY IT MAKES ONE DEPENDENT ON OTHERS AND INVOLVES ONE IN TIME, CAUSALITY, SOCIETY AND HISTORY. CONTRARIWISE, THE SEEKING FOR CONTEMPLATIVE VALUES MAKES ONE INDIFFERENT TO OTHERS AND WEAKENS THE COMMITMENT TO MORALITY. THE METHOD USED IS CRITICAL-REFLECTIVE AND THE CONCLUSION IS THAT PERSONALITY AND CULTURE MAY BE UNDERSTOOD BETTER IN TERMS OF THE DICHOTOMY DELINEATED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KRISHNA1971, author = {KRISHNA, DAYA}, title = {REPLY TO PROFESSOR SOGANI.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {32}, pages = {267-268}, keywords = {action, contemplation, religion, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Kristjansson1996, author = {Kristjansson, Kristjan}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {1101-1103}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Social Freedom: The Responsibility View}, volume = {49(4)}, year = {1996} } @article{Kroon1992, author = {Kroon, Frederick-W}, title = {Was Meinong Only Pretending?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {499-527}, keywords = {language, linguistics, sentence, truth}, abstract = {In this paper I argue against the usual interpretation of Meinong's argument for nonexistent objects, an interpretation according to which Meinong imported nonexistent objects like "the golden mountain" to account directly for the truth of statements like the golden mountain is golden'. I claim instead (using evidence from Meinong's "On Assumptions") that his argument really involves an ineliminable appeal to the notion of pretense. This appeal nearly convinced Meinong at one stage that he could do without nonexistent objects. The reason, I argue, why he nonetheless embraced an ontology of nonexistents has to do with the phenomenology of representation, and not with semantics.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kroon2001, author = {Kroon, Frederick-W}, title = {Parts and Pretense}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {543-560}, keywords = {grammar, language, part, pretense, temporal}, abstract = {This paper begins with a puzzle about certain temporal expressions: phrases like 'Jones as he was ten years ago' and 'the Jones of ten years ago'. There are reasons to take these as substantival, to be interpreted as terms for temporal parts. But it seems that the same reifying strategy would also force us to countenance a host of less attractive posits, among them fictional counterparts of real things (to correspond to such phrases as 'Garrison as he was in the movie JFK') and much more. I argue that there is a better way: we need only the idea of pretense or make-believe to make sense of claims embedding such phrases, leaving us with no reason, so far, to accept an ontology of temporal parts.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KRUKS1977, author = {KRUKS, SONIA}, title = {MERLEAU-PONTY: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {394-407}, keywords = {action, historicity, ideology, liberalism, phenomenology, politics, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KUBITZ1960, author = {KUBITZ, O-A}, title = {FRANCISCO BILBAO'S "LEY DE HISTORIA" IN RELATION TO THE DOCTRINES OF SARMIENTO AND LAMENNAIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {487-502}, keywords = {fatalism, freedom, history, latin-american; laws, metaphysics, nineteenth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KUEHL1970, author = {KUEHL, JAMES-R}, title = {PERCEIVING AND IMAGING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {212-224}, keywords = {epistemology, imaging, object, perceiving}, abstract = {A PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXPLORATION OF THE INNER HORIZON OF THE OBJECT-AS-IMAGED REVEALS THE DIFFERENT SENSE IN WHICH THAT OBJECT IS GIVEN TO CONSCIOUSNESS IN CONTRAST TO THE OBJECT-AS-PERCEIVED. CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION CANNOT BE MET IN CASES OF IMAGING, FOR IN IMAGING, REFERENCES TO FURTHER APPEARANCES OF THE OBJECT ARE "FROZEN" AND ANTICIPATIONS OF FURTHER ACTS OF AWARENESS ARE SUSPENDED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KULLMANN1960, author = {KULLMANN, MICHAEL}, title = {IS IDEALISM REALLY NONSENSE?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {535-539}, keywords = {idealism, metaphysics, mind, presupposition, universe-of-discourse; world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KULTGEN1981, author = {KULTGEN, JOHN}, title = {DEVELOPMENT AND CRITICISM OF A BEHAVIORIST ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {465-486}, keywords = {behaviorism, epistemology, mental, perception}, abstract = {A RECONSTRUCTION OF A SYSTEMATIC BEHAVIORIST ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION FROM SCATTERED REMARKS OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND PHILOSOPHERS AND A CRITICISM OF IT FROM A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KULTGEN1973, author = {KULTGEN, JOHN}, title = {INTENTIONALITY AND THE PUBLICITY OF PERCEPTUAL WORLD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {503-513}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, perception, privacy}, abstract = {I DEVELOP AND DEFEND A REALISTIC THEORY OF PERCEPTION. I ARGUE THAT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DIMENSIONS OF PERCEPTION CANNOT BE MAINTAINED EXCEPT BY VIEWING PERCEPTION AS AN INTENTIONAL MENTAL ACT THAT DISCLOSES TRANSCENDENT OBJECTS AS THEY REALLY ARE, AND I TRY TO SPECIFY THE ASPECTS OF THE PERCEPTUAL FIELD THAT ARE PUBLIC AND THOSE THAT ARE PRIVATE. I DEFEND MY VIEW BY SHOWING THAT SENSE DATA, CAUSAL, AND KANTIAN VIEWS OF PERCEPTION LEAD TO 'CUL DE SACS' ON THE QUESTION OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KUMAR1968, author = {KUMAR, JITENDRA}, title = {CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS CORRELATIVES, ELIOT AND HUSSERL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {332-352}, keywords = {consciousness, epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KUPPERMAN1982, author = {KUPPERMAN, JOEL-J}, title = {VALUE JUDGMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {506-518}, keywords = {axiology, value-judgmen}, abstract = {THE CENTRAL QUESTION ADDRESSED IS "HOW CAN ONE TELL WHAT IS OF VALUE?" MY ANSWER HAS A GOOD DEAL IN COMMON WITH THE ONE THAT I THINK IS IMPLICIT IN ARISTOTLE. IN THE COURSE OF PRESENTING IT, I (1) CRITICIZE RECENT ETHICAL PHILOSOPHERS WHO HAVE LARGELY IGNORED OR HAVE SOUGHT TO FINESSE QUESTIONS OF VALUE, (2) ARGUE THAT THERE IS A GENUINE EPISTEMOLOGY OF VALUE--THAT IN CASES WITH CERTAIN GENERAL FEATURES ONE CAN BE IN A POSITION TO BE CONFIDENT OF A VALUE JUDGEMENT, AND THAT IN CASES THAT LACK THESE FEATURES ONE CANNOT, AND (3) ARGUE THAT, BECAUSE OF LIMITATIONS ON GENERALIZATION THAT ARE INHERENT IN THE SUBJECT MATTER, ANYTHING LIKE A SCIENCE OF VALUES IS IMPOSSIBLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kupperman2005, author = {Kupperman, Joel-J}, title = {The Epistemology of Non-Instrumental Value}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {659-680}, keywords = {epistemology, indeterminacy, knowing-how; knowledge, value}, abstract = {Might there be knowledge of noninstrumental values? Arguments are given for two principal claims. One is that if there is such knowledge, it typically will have features that do not entirely match those of other kinds of knowledge. It will have a closer relation to the kind of person one is or becomes, and in the way it combines features of knowing-how with knowing-that. There also are problems of indeterminacy of noninstrumental value which are not commonly found in other things that we can know about. The second claim is that there is a strong prima-facie case for holding that there is such knowledge, and that the usual arguments against this are all faulty.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Kupperman1999, author = {Kupperman, Joel-J}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {492-495}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Value... and What Follows}, volume = {63(2)}, year = {1999} } @article{KURTZMAN1983, author = {KURTZMAN, HOWARD-S}, title = {MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF MEMORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {1-20}, keywords = {cognitivism, functionalism, memory, metaphysics}, abstract = {LITTLE TREATMENT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE POSITION OF THE FUNCTIONALIST/COGNITIVIST APPROACH TO MIND WITHIN THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF THE PAST SEVERAL CENTURIES. AS A HINT OF WHAT THE NATURE OF SUCH A PROJECT WOULD BE LIKE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPTIONS OF MEMORY IS EXPLORED. BRITISH EMPIRICIST, WUNDTIAN, BEHAVIORIST, AND WITTGENSTEINIAN NOTIONS ARE SURVEYED. THE COGNITIVIST CONCEPTION IS THEN EXPLICATED AND SHOWN TO COMPARE FAVORABLY WITH ITS PREDECESSORS. THE SUCCESS OF THE COGNITIVIST CONCEPTION IS CLAIMED TO ARISE FROM ITS REJECTION OF ANY "METAPHYSICS OF PRESENCE," AS THAT IDEA HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD BY DERRIDA. THIS FEATURE ALIGNS COGNITIVISM WITH OTHER PROGRESSIVE ELEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL HISTORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kusch2005, author = {Kusch, Martin}, title = {Beliefs, Kinds and Rules: A Comment on Kornblith's Knowledge and Its Place in Nature}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {411-419}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, knowledge, nature}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Kusch2002, author = {Kusch, Martin}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {235-238}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology}, volume = {72(1)}, year = {2002} } @other{Kusch1995, author = {Kusch, Martin}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {961-964}, publisher = {Routledge}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge}, volume = {57(4)}, year = {1995} } @article{KUSPIT1968, author = {KUSPIT, DONALD-B}, title = {FICTION AND PHENOMENOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {16-33}, keywords = {aesthetics, imagination, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KUSPIT1964, author = {KUSPIT, DONALD-B}, title = {EPOCHE AND FABLE IN DESCARTES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {30-51}, keywords = {attitude, doubt, epistemology, epoche, methodology, radicalism}, abstract = {THE PAPER DEALS WITH DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DESCARTES' DISCOVERY OF THE "COGITO EGO" AS SCIENCE'S GROUND OF CERTAINTY AND HUSSERL'S DECIPHERING OF THE "COGITO EGO" AS THE FIRST INTIMATION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO. HUSSERL'S EPOCHE IS USED TO EXPLICATE DESCARTES' DOUBT VIA A DISCUSSION OF DESCARTES' USAGE OF FABLE. THE FOLLOWING GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ARE MADE: (1) DESCARTES COULD NOT POSSIBLY HAVE CONCEIVED OF INTENTIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS BECAUSE HE WAS MORE INTERESTED IN ASCERTAINING SCIENCE; (2) A DISTINCTION IS MADE BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DOUBT IN DESCARTES, THE FORMER EXTRACTING THE CLEAR AND DISTINCT, FOR SANITY'S SAKE, FROM THE CONFUSED WORLD, THE LATTER CONSTRUCTING SCIENCE SEPARATE FROM THE WORLD AS A REALM CONSTITUTED BY THE EXTRACTED CLEAR AND DISTINCT; (3) THE "COGITO EGO" AND SCIENCE ARE NEVER MORE THAN PROBLEMATIC, FOR DESCARTES IS LESS CERTAIN ABOUT WHAT THEY ARE THAN ABOUT THE FACT OF HIS UNCLARITY AND INDISTINCTNESS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kutz2000, author = {Kutz, Christopher}, title = {Acting Together}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {1-31}, keywords = {action, collectivism, ethics, intention, society}, abstract = {I argue here instead for a minimalist account of collective action, which explains collective action across a broad range of contexts by reference to individuals' overlapping "participatory intentions," i.e., intentions to do one's part in a collective act. Participatory intentions are, formally, simply species of individual instrumental intentions, although their objects make irreducible reference to collective acts. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Kutz2000a, author = {Kutz, Christopher}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {236-239}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age}, volume = {67(1)}, year = {2000} } @article{KUVAKIN1976, author = {KUVAKIN, VALERII}, title = {THE PHENOMENON OF PARTIINOST: STRUCTURE, DYNAMICS, AND DIALECTICS: AN EXPOSITION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {25-45}, keywords = {capitalism, marxism, partisanship, social-philosoph}, abstract = {PARTISANSHIP ('PARTIINOST') IS UNIVERSAL--AN ORIENTATION AND DIRECTION OF INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AND ACTIVITY. UNDER CAPITALISM CLASS-PARTIAL NEEDS AND INTERESTS ARISE IN CAPITALISTS AND WORKERS. WORKERS' CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS IS OBSTRUCTED BY ALIENATION, POVERTY, AND BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY--THOUGH EDUCATED WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS CAN GUIDE THEM IN PARTIINOST. THE CAPITALIST CLASS DEVELOPS BY PARTIINOST LAWS BUT DISTORTS PARTIINOST AND DENIES ITS OWN CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS. CONSERVATISM IS CRUDE AND LIBERALISM IS VEILED PARTIINOST. UNDER MARXISM PARTIINOST APPEARS AS THE DIRECTION OF PEOPLE'S MATERIAL NEEDS IN THE PRODUCTION OF MATERIAL-SPIRITUAL LIFE, AS A FORMING AND SPECIFYING MOTIVE, AND AS MARXIST TEACHING ABOUT CLASS STRUGGLES. ALSO DISCUSSED ARE METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MARXIST THEORY OF PARTIINOST, FREEDOM, PARTIINOST AS METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURE, SERVICE AND RESPONSIBILITY, AND MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PARTIINOST.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KUYPERS1974, author = {KUYPERS, K}, title = {THE RELATION BETWEEN KNOWING AND MAKING AS AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {60-78}, keywords = {automata, doing, epistemology, knowing, mechanism}, abstract = {AN ACCOUNT AND ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPLE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE THAT THE UNDERSTANDING OF SOMETHING IS ONLY THEN COMPLETED IF ONE IS ABLE TO MAKE IT HIMSELF. IN CONNECTION WITH THE IDEA OF THE MAN-MADE MACHINE AND THE NOTION OF TECHNOLOGY APPLIED TO NATURE AND MAN HIMSELF IN EUROPEAN THOUGHT (DESCARTES, HOBBES, KANT, VICO, MARX) THIS PRINCIPLE HAS BECOME A CRITERION OF THE LEVEL OF OUR KNOWLEDGE IN ANY SCIENCE. FINALLY A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE ARGUMENTS BORROWED FROM THIS PRINCIPLE WITH REGARD TO THE DIFFERENCE IN AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (HUMANITIES) AND THE SCIENCES OF NATURE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kvanvig1999, author = {Kvanvig, Jonathan-L}, title = {Lewis on Finkish Dispositions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {703-710}, keywords = {causation, counterfactual, disposition, epistemology}, abstract = {Finkish dispositions, those dispositions that are lost when their conditions of realization occur, pose deep problems for counterfactual accounts of dispositions. David Lewis has argued that the counterfactual approach can be rescued, offering such an account that purports to handle finkish as well as other dispositions. The paper argues that Lewis's account fails to account for several kinds of dispositions, one of which involves failure to distinguish parallel processes from unitary processes.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kvanvig2003, author = {Kvanvig, Jonathan}, title = {Simple Reliabilism and Agent Reliabilism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {451-456}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, reference, reliabilism, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KVANVIG1989, author = {KVANVIG, JONATHAN-L}, title = {ADAMS ON ACTUALISM AND PRESENTISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {289-298}, keywords = {actualism, future, metaphysics, present, proposition}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Kvanvig2000, author = {Kvanvig, Jonathan-L}, title = {Zagzebski on Justification}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {191-196}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, justification, knowledge, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Kvanvig1992, author = {Kvanvig, Jonathan-L}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {973-976}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind}, volume = {54(4)}, year = {1992} } @article{Kvart2006, author = {Kvart, Igal}, title = {A Probabilistic Theory of Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {72(1)}, pages = {1-43}, keywords = {causation, chance, circumstance, epistemology, knowledge, probability}, abstract = {In this paper I provide a probabilistic account of factual knowledge, based on the notion of chance. This account has some affinity with my chance account of token causation, but it neither relies on it nor presupposes it. Here I concentrate on the core cases of perceptual knowledge and of knowledge by memory (based on perception). The analysis of knowledge presented below is externalist; but pursuing such an analysis need not detract from the significance of attempts to flesh out justification analyses of knowledge; indeed, I have pursued such an analysis in great detail myself. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{KYBURG-JR1960, author = {KYBURG-JR, HENRY-E}, title = {DEMONSTRATIVE INDUCTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {80-92}, keywords = {analogy, demonstration, form, induction, inference, justification, logic, validity}, abstract = {ARGUMENTS ENCOUNTERED IN SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE ARE SUPPORTED BY REFERENCE TO GENERAL EMPIRICAL PREMISES AND PARTICULAR STATEMENTS OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE. THE REASONING WHICH PROCEEDS FROM THESE TO THE INDUCTIVE CONCLUSIONS IS OFTEN DEMONSTRATIVE. THE PURPOSE HERE IS TO SEE WHETHER OR NOT SUCH DEMONSTRATIVE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CAN EVER LEAD TO A COMPLETE JUSTIFICATION OR ELUCIDATION OF INDUCTION. THE FORMS OF DEMONSTRATIVE INDUCTIVE INFERENCE CONSIDERED BY KEYNES, NICOD, BROAD, AND VON WRIGHT ARE DISCUSSED. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT SUCH ARGUMENTS CANNOT LEAD BY THEMSELVES TO A JUSTIFICATION OF INDUCTION. NO GENUINELY INDUCTIVE CONCLUSION CAN BE LOGICALLY CERTAIN, AND THEREFORE IT CANNOT OCCUR AS THE CONCLUSION IN A DEMONSTRATIVE ARGUMENT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LA-CROIX1977, author = {LA-CROIX, RICHARD-R}, title = {THE HIDDEN ASSUMPTION IN THE PARADOX OF OMNIPOTENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {125-127}, keywords = {god, metaphysics, omnipotence}, abstract = {I ARGUE THAT THE PARADOX OF OMNIPOTENCE, OR THE PARADOX OF THE STONE, RESTS ON AN ASSUMPTION THAT THE THEIST NEED NOT ACCEPT AND THAT IF THE PARADOX IS REFORMULATED TO REST ON AN ASSUMPTION THAT THE THEIST MUST ACCEPT, THEN THE PARADOX DOES NOT GO THROUGH. SINCE THE PARADOX MUST REST ON ONE OR THE OTHER OF THOSE TWO ASSUMPTIONS, I CONCLUDE THAT THE PARADOX POSES NO PROBLEM FOR THE THEIST.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LA-CROIX1982, author = {LA-CROIX, RICHARD-R}, title = {AQUINAS ON GOD'S OMNIPRESENCE AND TIMELESSNESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {391-399}, keywords = {god, omnipresence, religion, timelessness}, abstract = {AQUINAS HOLDS THE VIEW THAT GOD IS BOTH OMNIPRESENT AND TIMELESS. BUT IF GOD IS OMNIPRESENT THEN IT WOULD APPEAR THAT HE MUST HAVE BEEN IN THE UNITED NATIONS BUILDING "YESTERDAY" AS WELL AS THE DAY "BEFORE" YESTERDAY. AND IF GOD WAS IN THE UNITED NATIONS BUILDING "BOTH" YESTERDAY "AND" THE DAY BEFORE, THEN IT WOULD APPEAR THAT HE IS IN TIME AND THAT TEMPORAL PREDICATIONS DO ACTUALLY APPLY TO HIM. SO, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT GOD IS "NOT" A TIMELESS BEING IF HE IS OMNIPRESENT. THE AUTHOR SHOWS THAT THIS ARGUMENT HOLDS AGAINST AQUINAS' WAY OF UNDERSTANDING THE DOCTRINES OF DIVINE OMNIPRESENCE AND DIVINE TIMELESSNESS AND, HENCE, THAT TWO DOCTRINES CRUCIAL TO THE THEOLOGY OF AQUINAS ARE LOGICALLY INCOMPATIBLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lackey2005, author = {Lackey, Jennifer}, title = {Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {636-658}, keywords = {epistemology, information, justification, knowledge, memory}, abstract = {It is widely assumed that memory has only the capacity to preserve epistemic features that have been generated by other sources. Specifically, if S knows that p via memory at T2, then it is argued that (i) S must have known that p when it was originally acquired at T1, and (ii) S must have acquired knowledge that p at T1 via a nonmemorial source. Thus, according to this view, memory cannot make an unknown proposition known, an unjustified belief justified, or an irrational belief rational -- it can only preserve what is already known, justified, or rational. In this paper, I argue that condition (i) is false and, a fortiori, that condition (ii) is false. Hence, I show that, contrary to received wisdom in contemporary epistemology, memory can function as a generative epistemic source. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Lafont2000, author = {Lafont, Cristina and Harman, Graham (trans)}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {489-491}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure}, volume = {66(2)}, year = {2000} } @article{LAHAV1990, author = {LAHAV, RAN}, title = {An Alternative to the Adverbial Theory: Dis-Phenomenalism.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(3)}, pages = {553-568}, keywords = {experiment, metaphysics, object, phenomenalism, visual}, abstract = {I offer an alternative to the prevalent adverbial account of what is traditionally described (misleadingly, as I argue) as objects of experience. I start by rejecting the adverbial theory on the ground that despite its ontological elegance, it violates the phenomenological facts. I then present a picture which is no less ontologically elegant, but at the same time is faithful to phenomenological considerations. The theory consists of two parts: a phenomenological thesis about the inner structure of "objects of experience," and an ontological thesis which identifies "objects of experience" with physical events undergone by cognizers.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lahroodi2003, author = {Lahroodi, Reza and Schmitt, Frederick-F}, title = {Comment on John Greco's Putting Skeptics in Their Place}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {457-465}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, reference, scepticism}, abstract = {In Putting Skeptics in Their Place, John Greco argues persuasively that skepticism can be avoided only by embracing reliabilism. He then develops his own version of reliabilism, 'agent reliabilism,' and uses it to make sense of a relevant contraries argument for skepticism while avoiding its conclusion. In this paper, we focus on Greco's brief for agent reliabilism in preference to simple reliabilism. Agent reliabilism differs from simple reliabilism primarily in requiring, not merely belief that results from a reliable process, but belief grounded in stable dispositions. We consider different readings of agent reliabilism and argue that it does not make an advance over simple reliabilism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Lamarque1996, author = {Lamarque, Peter}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {1098-1100}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Fictional Points of View}, volume = {49(4)}, year = {1996} } @other{Lamarque1994, author = {Lamarque, Peter and Olsen, Stein-Haugom}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {964-968}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective}, volume = {57(4)}, year = {1994} } @article{LAMB1987, author = {LAMB, ROGER}, title = {OBJECTLESS EMOTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {107-117}, keywords = {emotion, metaphysics, object}, abstract = {THIS PAPER DISCUSSES THE KINDS OF EMOTIONS THERE ARE, WHERE KINDS ARE DETERMINED BY REFERENCE TO THE VARIOUS RELATIONS EMOTIONS MAY BE THOUGHT TO HAVE TO INTENTIONALITY. IT THEN TURNS TO A DISCUSSION OF ONE OF THOSE KINDS AND SUGGESTS THAT SOME OF ITS MEMBERS HAVE A CURIOUS METAPHYSICAL STATUS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LAMB1983, author = {LAMB, R-E}, title = {GUILT, SHAME, AND MORALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {329-346}, keywords = {ethics, guilt, shame}, abstract = {I INDICATE, SYSTEMATICALLY, THE NATURE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GUILT AND SHAME IN TERMS OF THEIR VARIANT RELATIONSHIPS TO MORALITY, ARGUING THAT WHILE GUILT IS CENTRAL TO THE MORAL ENTERPRISE, SHAME IS NOT. CERTAIN COROLLARIES ARE DRAWN FROM THIS CONCLUSION, ONE A PRACTICAL COROLLARY BEARING ON THE ACTIVITY OF SHAMING, AND THE OTHER A CRITICAL COROLLARY WITH RESPECT TO AN ASSUMPTION MADE BY HERBERT MORRIS IN HIS DISCUSSIONS OF GUILT AND SHAME.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Lamberth1999, author = {Lamberth, David-C}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {244-246}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {William James and the Metaphysics of Experience}, volume = {64(1)}, year = {1999} } @article{LAMBROS1975, author = {LAMBROS, CHARLES-H}, title = {FOUR VARIETIES OF THE LOGICAL POSITIVISTS' DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY TRUTH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {512-533}, keywords = {epistemology, logical-positivism; necessary, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lammenranta1996, author = {Lammenranta, Markus}, title = {Reliabilism and Circularity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {111-124}, keywords = {belief, circularity, epistemology, equilibrium, perception, reliabilism}, abstract = {It is argued that the way reliabilists, like Alvin Goldman, establish their reliability principle and apply it leads into circularity. The problem lies in their general approach to epistemology that is methodistic, in Chisholm's sense. The only alternative that would not cause serious problems for reliabilism is to accept the method of wide reflective equilibrium due to John Rawls. The cost of accepting this method, however, is that the reliability principle becomes revisable. We can't take it to be an "a priori" conceptual truth any more. So reliabilism cannot be built into the very content of our concept of justification.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LAMONT1971, author = {LAMONT, CORLISS}, title = {REPLY TO SOMERVILLE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {108-109}, keywords = {causation, freedom, metaphysics}, abstract = {DR. LAMONT REPLIES TO SOMERVILLE'S HOSTILE REVIEW OF HIS BOOK "FREEDOM OF CHOICE AFFIRMED" THAT IT IS AN EMOTIONAL POLEMIC RATHER THAN AN OBJECTIVE COMMENT. LAMONT STATES THAT THE REVIEWER MENTIONS ONLY TWO OUT OF THE BOOK'S TEN MAIN ARGUMENTS, AND COMPLETELY BY-PASSES THE CRUCIAL ISSUE FOR FREE WILL OF THE COEXISTENCE OF CONTINGENCY WITH ITS METAPHYSICAL CORRELATIVE, DETERMINISM. LAMONT REITERATES HIS CLAIM, DENOUNCED BY SOMERVILLE AS "ABSURD," THAT A MAN WHO MAKES A DECISION COULD HAVE CHOSEN OTHERWISE, EVEN UNDER ALL THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LAMPRECHT1971, author = {LAMPRECHT, STERLING-P}, title = {CONTINGENCY IN NATURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {1-14}, keywords = {contingency, metaphysics, nature}, abstract = {AFTER ATTENDING TO INSTANCES OF CONTINGENCY, A DEFINITION IS REACHED. CONTINGENCY IS A LACK OF CAUSAL DETERMINATION IN THE COMING TOGETHER OF TWO OR MORE PREVIOUSLY UNRELATED STRANDS IN NATURE'S COMPLEX OCCURRENCES. PRESSURE OF CAUSALLY EFFICACIOUS FORCES AND LACK OF DETERMINATION IN THE JUNCTION OF THESE FORCES ARE EQUALLY OBVIOUS TRAITS OF NATURAL EVENTS. THUS MEN NEED TWO DISTINGUISHABLE TYPES OF SKILL TO DEAL COMPETENTLY WITH NATURE: (1) INVENTIVE SKILL TO FASHION MORE OR LESS STABLE ORGANIZATIONS OF FORCES INTO MACHINES OR INSTITUTIONS, AND (2) EXECUTIVE SKILL TO HANDLE ALERTLY THE INTRUSION OF NEW FORCES INTO THESE OTHERWISE STABLE ORGANIZATIONS. CONTINGENCY MAY BE CHARACTERIZED AS SOMETIMES POSITIVE AND SOMETIMES NEGATIVE. CAUSAL LAWS MAY BE SAID TO REVEAL THE PRESENCE OF NECESSITY, WHEREAS CAUSAL AGENTS OFTEN REVEAL CONTINGENCY. FINALLY THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF METAPHYSICAL CONTINGENCY ARE NOTED: NATURAL CONTINGENCY, HUMAN CHOICE, AND MORAL FREEDOM ARE RELATED AS GENUS, SPECIES AND SUB-SPECIES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lance2002, author = {Lance, Mark-Norris and O'Leary-Hawthorne, John}, title = {Precis of The Grammar of Meaning: Normativity and Semantic Content}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {177-185}, keywords = {epistemology, grammar, language, meaning, normativity, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lance2002a, author = {Lance, Mark-Norris and O'Leary-Hawthorne, John}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {208-217}, keywords = {language, meaning, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LANDESMAN1973, author = {LANDESMAN, CHARLES}, title = {ABSTRACT PARTICULARS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {323-337}, keywords = {epistemology, particulars, universal}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LANDESMAN1965, author = {LANDESMAN, CHARLES}, title = {REPLY TO PROFESSOR WHALLON'S "UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL EVENTS".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {404-405}, keywords = {event, evidence, mental, metaphysics, unconscious}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LANDESMAN1964, author = {LANDESMAN, CHARLES}, title = {MENTAL EVENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {307-317}, keywords = {criteria, epistemology, event, knowledge, mental, mind, perception, privacy}, abstract = {THE PROPERTY OF "PRIVACY" CAN, SOMETIMES, DISTINGUISH MENTAL FROM OTHER SORTS OF EVENTS. IT IS MAINTAINED THAT ONE'S OWN SENSATIONS, FEELINGS AND THOUGHTS ARE PRIVATE WHEN: (1) THEY ARE NOT THE SORT OF THINGS OTHERS CAN DIRECTLY PERCEIVE, AND (2) ONE CAN COME TO KNOW ABOUT THESE WITHOUT THE USE OF HIS SENSES. IT IS CLAIMED THAT PERSONS DO HAVE PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO PRIVATE EVENTS, EVEN THOUGH THIS ACCESS MEANS ONLY THAT ONE HAS A WAY OF GETTING KNOWLEDGE ABOUT SUCH EVENTS THAT IS CLOSED TO OTHERS. THE AUTHOR TRIES TO SHOW, THAT EVEN IF SOME MENTAL EVENTS ARE PRIVATE, THIS DOES NOT LEAD TO SKEPTICISM. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LANDGREBE1973, author = {LANDGREBE, LUDWIG}, title = {THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {1-13}, keywords = {epistemology, experience, phenomenology}, abstract = {THE CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE, GUIDING MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE IS A TRUNCATED ONE. IT DOESN'T INCLUDE ALL THE CONSTITUENTS OF MAN'S RELATIONSHIP TO HIS WORLD. THIS TRUNCATION IS A POINTER TO THE ROOTS OF THE CRISIS OF MODERN WORLD. HUSSERL HAS SHOWN THAT THIS TRUNCATION HAS ITS ORIGIN IN THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUTER AND INNER EXPERIENCE, ACCEPTED BY MODERN PHILOSOPHY AS A SELF-EVIDENT ONE. BUT THIS DISTINCTION IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR CONCEIVING THE MOST ORIGINAL EXPERIENCE BY WHICH THE WORLD IS OPENED TO US. THE ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE KINESTHETIC MOVEMENTS OF OUR CORPOREAL SENSE-ORGANS--THIS ACTIVITY WHETHER MERE CORPOREAL NOR MERE SPIRITUAL--IS FOREGOING TO ALL THE ACTIVITIES OF OUR MIND. THE AWARENESS THAT "I CAN MOVE MYSELF" IS FOREGOING TO THE CONSCIOUSNESS "I AM".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LANG1973, author = {LANG, BEREL}, title = {"WHAT IS ART": QUESTIONS (AND ANSWERS) ABOUT THE QUESTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {524-530}, keywords = {aesthetics, art}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LANG1968, author = {LANG, BEREL}, title = {THE NEUROTIC AS MORAL AGENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {216-231}, keywords = {ethics, morality, neurotics, responsibility}, abstract = {I EXAMINE THE QUESTION OF THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NEUROTIC FOR EVEN THOSE ACTIONS WHICH COUNT AS EVIDENCE THAT HE IS NEUROTIC. CONTRASTING HIS STATUS WITH THAT OF AGENTS WHO BY COMMON AGREEMENT ARE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR ACTIONS, I FIND THAT THE NEUROTIC DIFFERS FROM THEM INSOFAR AS AT LEAST SOMETIMES HE HAS KNOWLEDGE OF HIMSELF AS AGENT. I ARGUE FROM THE NATURE OF THIS KNOWLEDGE THAT IT MUST BE CONSTANT AND DISPOSITIONAL, AND THUS THAT IT IS PLAUSIBLE IN THE CASE OF NEUROTIC ACTIONS TO REGARD THE AGENT AS HAVING CHOSEN THEM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LANG1969, author = {LANG, BEREL and STAHL, GARY}, title = {MILL'S 'HOWLERS' AND THE LOGIC OF NATURALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {562-574}, keywords = {ethics, naturalism}, abstract = {THE CONTEMPORARY SEARCH FOR SOME PLAUSIBLE CONCEPTION OF MORAL EVALUATIONS AS IMPERATIVES OR DISPOSITIONAL SIGNS OR EMOTIVE EXCLAMATIONS OR PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES OR WHATEVER ELSE--SO LONG AS IT IS NOT WHAT WE USUALLY THINK AN EVALUATION IS--IS PREDICATED TO A LARGE EXTENT ON THE BELIEF THAT NATURALISTIC ETHICS FOUND ITS LAST RESTING PLACE IN THE WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL. BUT THIS PREMATURE OBITUARY IS BASED ON A FAILURE TO PAY CAREFUL ATTENTION EITHER TO THE LOGICAL STATUS OF MILL'S ARGUMENT OR THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF NATURALISM. THUS WE SHOW THAT THE VERSION OF MILL NOW STANDARD IN ANGLO-AMERICAN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY ALMOST COMPLETELY MISREADS THE DETAIL OF HIS ARGUMENT; AND SECONDLY, THAT THIS MISREADING IS DUE, IN LARGE PART AT LEAST, TO THE FAILURE OF MILL'S CRITICS (IN CONTRAST TO MILL HIMSELF) TO MAKE A NUMBER OF CENTRAL DISTINCTIONS CONCERNING TYPES OF MEANING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lange1999, author = {Lange, Marc}, title = {Why Are the Laws of Nature So Important to Science?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {625-652}, keywords = {knowledge, laws, nature, necessity, science}, abstract = {Why should science by so interested in discovering whether p is a law over and above whether p is true? The answer may involve the laws' relation to counterfactuals: p is a law iff p would still have obtained under any counterfactual supposition that is consistent with the laws. But unless we already understand why science is especially concerned with the laws, we cannot explain why science is especially interested in what would have happened under those counterfactual suppositions consistent with the laws. It is argued that the laws form the only nontrivially "stable" set, where "stability" is invariance under a certain range of counterfactual suppositions not itself defined by reference to the laws. It is then explained why science should be so interested in identifying a nontrivially "stable" set: because of stability's relation to the best set of "inductive strategies."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lange2004, author = {Lange, Marc}, title = {Review Essay on Dynamics of Reason by Michael Friedman}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {702-712}, keywords = {a-priori; neo-kantianism; rationality, science, scientific-revolutio}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Lange2000, author = {Lange, Marc}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {240-245}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Natural Laws in Scientific Practice}, volume = {71(1)}, year = {2000} } @article{LANGER1963, author = {LANGER, SUSANNE-K}, title = {A FOOTNOTE TO PROFESSOR TEJERA'S PAPER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {432-433}, keywords = {form, logic, object, structure}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LANGFORD1964, author = {LANGFORD, C-H}, title = {ANALYSIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {117-121}, keywords = {analysis, empirical, expression, knowledge, language, object, property, proposition, synonymy, use}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LANGFORD1960, author = {LANGFORD, C-H and LANGFORD, MARION}, title = {THE LOGICAL PARADOXES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {110-113}, keywords = {appearance, content, incompatibility, logic, paradox, proposition, structure}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LANGFORD1960a, author = {LANGFORD, C-H and LANGFORD, MARION}, title = {APPEARANCE AND REALITY IN PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {532-534}, keywords = {appearance, epistemology, perception, reality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Langsam1994, author = {Langsam, Harold}, title = {Kant, Hume, and Our Ordinary Concept of Causation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {625-647}, keywords = {causation, effect, experience, metaphysics}, abstract = {Drawing on Hume's discussion of causation, I argue that our ordinary concept of causation is an a priori concept that is not fully captured by regularity analyses. Given that our concept of causation is "not" derived from experience, 1) "how" are we able to apply it to objects of experience, and 2) "why" do we apply it to objects of experience. I explain how Kant answers 1) in the Schematism and 2) in the Second Analogy. Through an account of the unschematized category of causation, I show that Kant's concept of causation just is the ordinary one.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Langton2003, author = {Langton, Rae}, title = {Problems from Kant by James Van Cleve}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {211-218}, keywords = {metaphysics, phenomena, quality}, abstract = {According to Van Cleve, Kant distinguishes phenomena from things in themselves, thereby distinguishing the virtual from the real; and Kant makes primary qualities merely spatial. However, phenomena are not the virtual, but the relational; things in themselves are not the real, but the intrinsic. Moreover, to make primary qualities merely spatial is to leave out force, and thereby leave out the feature that makes phenomena relational and real-not just virtual.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Langton2001, author = {Langton, Rae and Lewis, David}, title = {Marshall and Parsons on 'Intrinsic'}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {353-355}, keywords = {intrinsic, metaphysics, modality}, abstract = {Dan Marshall and Josh Parsons note, correctly, that the property of being either a cube or accompanied by a cube is incorrectly classified as intrinsic under the definition we have given unless it turns out to be disjunctive. Whether it is disjunctive, under the definition we gave, turns on certain judgments of the relative naturalness of properties. They doubt the judgments of relative naturalness that would classify their property as disjunctive. We disagree. They also suggest that the whole idea of judging relative naturalness is a dubious business. We reply that, like them or not, such judgments cannot easily be avoided.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Langton1998, author = {Langton, Rae and Lewis, David}, title = {Defining 'Intrinsic'}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {333-345}, keywords = {innateness, intrinsic, logic, metaphysics}, abstract = {Something could be round even if it were the only thing in the universe, unaccompanied by anything distinct from itself. Jaegwon Kim once suggested that we define an intrinsic property as one that can belong to something unaccompanied. Wrong: unaccompaniment itself is not intrinsic, yet it can belong to something unaccompanied. But there is a better Kim-style definition. Say that P is independent of accompaniment if four different cases are possible: something accompanied may have P or lack P, something unaccompanied may have P or lack P. P is basic intrinsic if (1) P and not-P are nondisjunctive and contingent, and (2) P is independent of accompaniment. Two things (actual or possible) are duplicates if they have exactly the same basic intrinsic properties. P is intrinsic if no two duplicates differ with respect to P.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LAPORTE1963, author = {LAPORTE, JEAN-MARK}, title = {HUSSERL'S CRITIQUE OF DESCARTES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {335-352}, keywords = {certitude, criticism, doubt, epistemology, epoche, method, philosophy, presupposition, radicalism, transcendence, transcendental-reductio}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE IS A SUMMARY OF THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HUSSERL AND DESCARTES, AS SEEN BY HUSSERL HIMSELF. BOTH ARE AFTER THE SAME APODICTIC SOURCE OF CERTITUDE, BUT THIS SOURCE IN HUSSERL'S ESTIMATION IS PRESENTED ON A DEEPER LEVEL. DESCARTES' METHOD IS DEEMED HORIZONTAL AND HUSSERL'S VERTICAL. FINALLY, DESCARTES ADVANCES OUTSIDE HIMSELF THROUGH GOD AND HUSSERL DOES SO THROUGH THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Larmore1996, author = {Larmore, Charles}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {228-231}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Morals of Modernity}, volume = {60(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{LARRABEE1989, author = {LARRABEE, MARY-JEANNE}, title = {TIME AND SPATIAL MODELS: TEMPORALITY IN HUSSERL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {373-392}, keywords = {metaphysics, perception, phenomenology, space, time}, abstract = {RECENT TREATMENTS OF TIME IN HUSSERL PURPORT TO GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF WHAT HUSSERL TERMS INNER TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS, THE IMMANENT TEMPORALITY THAT IS THE PRIMAL CONSTITUTIVE SOURCE OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE. A MAJOR DIFFICULTY WITH THESE PRESENTATIONS OF HUSSERL'S TIME-THEORY IS THAT THEY CONTINUE TO USE THEORETICALLY REDUCTIONIST MODELS FOR TIME, BASED ON A SENSE OF "FLOW" THAT IS DRAWN FROM OBJECTIVE-PHYSICAL SPACE AND OBJECTS EXTENDED THROUGH SUCH SPACE. SUCH TREATMENTS FAIL TO CAPTURE THE VERY HEART OF THE FLOWING-PROCESSING ITSELF. TO CLARIFY THIS POINT, THIS PAPER INVESTIGATES THE TWO-FOLD DESCRIPTION OF INNER TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS THAT GIVES THE PRIMARY SPATIAL MODEL OF FLOW--IN FACT, OF TWO INTERSECTING FLOWS. NEXT, IT CONSIDERS THE MANNER IN WHICH ASPECTS OF IMMANENT TEMPORALITY ARE OVERLOOKED IN THIS SPATIAL MODEL. FINALLY, ANOTHER SPATIAL MODEL IS PROPOSED, ONE THAT CAN HARNESS THE COMPLEXITY OF HUSSERL'S THEORY OF IMMANENT TEMPORALITY AND EXPLAIN THE VERY SOURCE OF PROCESS AS PROCESSING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Laurence2003, author = {Laurence, Stephen and Margolis, Eric}, title = {Concepts and Conceptual Analysis}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {253-282}, keywords = {categorization, concept, conceptual-analysis; intuition, metaphysics}, abstract = {Conceptual analysis is undergoing a revival in philosophy, and much of the credit goes to Frank Jackson. Jackson argues that conceptual analysis is needed as an integral component of so-called serious metaphysics and that it also does explanatory work in accounting for such phenomena as categorization, meaning change, communication, and linguistic understanding. He even goes so far as to argue that opponents of conceptual analysis are implicitly committed to it in practice. We show that he is wrong on all of these points and that his case for conceptual analysis doesn't succeed. At the same time, we argue that the sorts of intuitions that figure in conceptual analysis may still have a significant role to play in philosophy. So naturalists needn't disregard intuitions altogether.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LAVINE1981, author = {LAVINE, T-Z}, title = {INTERNALIZATION, SOCIALIZATION, AND DIALECTIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {91-110}, keywords = {internalization, metaphysics, oedipus-effect; socialization}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LAVINE1981a, author = {LAVINE, T-Z}, title = {C I LEWIS AND THE PROBLEM OF PHENOMENALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {386-395}, keywords = {epistemology, phenomenalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LAVINE1965, author = {LAVINE, T-Z}, title = {KARL MANNHEIM AND CONTEMPORARY FUNCTIONALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {560-571}, keywords = {functionalism, methodology, organic-unity; science, social-sciences; sociology, spiritual, structure}, abstract = {CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONALISM STEMS FROM TWO DISTINCT NINETEENTH CENTURY SOURCES: (1) BIOLOGISTIC ORGANICISM (CONVENTIONALLY ASSUMED TO BE THE SINGLE SOURCE), UTILIZED IN THE POSITIVISTIC SYSTEMS OF COMTE AND SPENCER; (2) THE RELATIVELY UNKNOWN ROMANTICIST-HISTORICIST CONCEPT OF THE UNITY AND UNIQUENESS OF SPIRIT OF A SOCIAL GROUP, UTILIZED IN THE DIALECTICAL, HISTORICIST, ANTI-POSITIVIST SYSTEMS OF HEGEL AND MARX. MANNHEIM IS SHOWN TO DERIVE FROM (2), AND THE HISTORICIST-ROMANTICIST MEANINGS HE GIVES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS THOUGHT TO STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION, THE KEY WORDS IN THE LANGUAGE OF CONTEMPORARY FUNCTIONALISM, ARE NOTED. MANNHEIM CONSEQUENTLY AVOIDS CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES OF BIOLOGISTIC FUNCTIONALISM BUT TAKES ON THE METAPHYSICAL DIFFICULTIES OF ROMANTICISM-HISTORICISM. HE ABSTRACTED THE SAME SET OF FORMAL CONCEPTS AS BIOLOGISTIC FUNCTIONALISM BUT HIS USE OF THESE CONCEPTS IS FOR THE MOST PART HISTORICIST, EVALUATIVE, AND DIAGNOSTIC IN SHARP DISTINCTION FROM THE FORMALISTIC NEUTRALISM WHICH PREVAILS IN CONTEMPORARY FUNCTIONALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LAWLER1975, author = {LAWLER, JAMES}, title = {HEIDEGGER'S THEORY OF METAPHYSICS AND DIALECTICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {363-375}, keywords = {dialectic, marxism, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LAWRIE1974, author = {LAWRIE, R}, title = {PERSONALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {34}, pages = {307-330}, keywords = {animal, appearance, metaphysics, person, personality, self-identity; uniqueness}, abstract = {THE AIM IS TO ANALYSE CERTAIN USES OF THE TERM 'PERSONALITY' WHICH APPEAR, PRIMA FACIE, TO BE MUTUALLY INCOMPATIBLE IN CERTAIN RESPECTS. THESE ARE, PERSONALITY AS (A) DISTINCT FROM ANIMALITY, (B) THE PERSONA(E), OR MASK(S), WHICH A PERSON HAS, (C) THE UNIQUE ELEMENT IN A PERSON, AND THEREFORE THAT WHICH HE IS. CENTRAL TO THE DISCUSSION IS AN ANALYSIS OF THE TERMS 'I' AND 'MYSELF' AS USED E.G., IN APPLYING THE CONCEPT OF SELF-POSSESSION. IT IS ARGUED THAT 'I' AND 'MYSELF' MEAN SOMETHING RESPECTIVELY DIFFERENT IN SUCH CONTEXTS. EXAMINATION OF THIS DIFFERENCE SUGGESTS THAT THE USES IN QUESTION OF THE TERM PERSONALITY ARE NOT IN FACT INCOMPATIBLE WITH ONE ANOTHER, AND HOW IT IS THAT A PERSON CAN HAVE NO PERSONALITY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LAWRIE1980, author = {LAWRIE, R}, title = {PASSION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {106-126}, keywords = {action, desire, feeling, object, passion, philosophical-anthropolog}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lear2004, author = {Lear, Jonathan}, title = {Avowal and Unfreedom}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {448-454}, keywords = {avowals, epistemology, self-knowledge; unfreedom}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEBLANC1961, author = {LEBLANC, HUGUES}, title = {A NEW INTERPRETATION OF "C (H, E)".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {373-376}, keywords = {confirmation, induction, interpretation, language, notation, probability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEE1966, author = {LEE, DONALD-S}, title = {THE CONSTRUCTION OF EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {183-198}, keywords = {concept, empirical, epistemology, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEE1979, author = {LEE, HAROLD-N}, title = {ARE THERE ANY ENTITIES?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {123-129}, keywords = {category, continuum, entity, metaphysics, pragmatism, reality}, abstract = {IF REALITY IS A CONTINUUM, IT CAN HAVE NO RIGID STRUCTURE. SUCH STRUCTURE REQUIRES FULLY DELINEATED PARTS WITH BOUNDARIES, BUT THERE ARE NO BOUNDARIES IN A CONTINUUM. THE CONTINUUM IS CUT INTO PARTS BY SELECTIVE, ORGANIC RESPONSES CALLED MIND. THERE ARE NO ENTITIES APART FROM MIND, WHICH IS ITSELF AN ORGANIC ACTIVITY. PROCESS PHILOSOPHY IS A PHILOSOPHY OF CONTINUITY AND YIELDS A PRAGMATIC THEORY OF ENTITIES. REACTIONS CUT THE CONTINUUM OF PROCESS INTO ENTITIES, AND FORMULATES STRUCTURES TO WHICH THE ORGANISM CAN SUCCESSFULLY RESPOND AND ADJUST ITSELF. SUCH PRAGMATIC ENTITIES DO NOT EXIST IN REALITY OR IN EXPERIENCE INDEPENDENT OF THE ACTIVITY MIND.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEE1985, author = {LEE, SANDER-H}, title = {THE CENTRAL ROLE OF UNIVERSALIZATION IN SARTREAN ETHICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {59-72}, keywords = {ethics, existentialism, freedom, universalization}, abstract = {VARIOUS ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE OVER THE YEARS TO SPECIFICALLY SPELL OUT EXACTLY HOW AN ETHICAL THEORY BASED ON THE WRITINGS OF SARTRE WOULD LOOK AND OPERATE. IN THIS PAPER, I CONCENTRATE ON THE FUNDAMENTALLY IMPORTANT ROLE OF A PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALIZATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SARTREAN ETHICS WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH HIS OTHER WRITINGS. THE NOTION OF UNIVERSALIZATION IS USUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH FORMALISTIC ETHICAL THEORIES SUCH AS KANT'S, YET ANY UNDERSTANDING OF HOW SARTREAN ETHICS WOULD OPERATE MUST EXPLICATE A KIND OF "NON-COGNITIVIST" NOTION OF UNIVERSALIZATION IF IT IS TO SUCCEED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEFEBVRE1969, author = {LEFEBVRE, HENRI}, title = {REPLY TO PROFESSOR RODERICK CHISHOLM AND COMMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {22-30}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Leftow1991, author = {Leftow, Brian}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {954-958}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Time and Eternity}, volume = {53(4)}, year = {1991} } @article{LEGENHAUSEN1989, author = {LEGENHAUSEN, GARY}, title = {MODERATE ANTI-HAECCEITISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {625-642}, keywords = {identity, individual, metaphysics, object, property}, abstract = {CONDITIONS FOR THE IDENTITY OF MATERIAL OBJECTS ARE PROPOSED WHICH AVOID BOTH EXTREME HAECCEITISM, THE VIEW THAT THE PROPERTY OF BEING IDENTICAL TO A GIVEN INDIVIDUAL IS PRIMITIVE AND INDEPENDENT OF ITS QUALITATIVE FEATURES, AND EXTREME ANTI-HAECCEITISM, OR THE VIEW THAT IDENTITY TO AN INDIVIDUAL IS THE EXEMPLIFICATION OF ITS QUALITIES. MODERATE ANTI-HAECCEITISM IS DEFENDED FROM ATTACKS BASED ON TWO KINDS OF COUNTEREXAMPLES TO THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES. FIRST, IT IS SHOWN HOW AN ANTI-HAECCEITIST ACCOUNT CAN BE GIVEN OF QUALITATIVELY INDISCERNIBLE MATERIAL OBJECTS WITHIN A WORLD. SECONDLY, IT IS ARGUED THAT THERE IS NO METAPHYSICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TRANSWORLD INDISCERNIBLES. DIFFICULTIES WITH MODERATE HAECCEITISM ARE PRESENTED, AND IT IS SHOWN HOW A MODERATE ANTI-HAECCEITISM CAN AVOID SUCH DIFFICULTIES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Legg2003, author = {Legg, Catherine}, title = {"This Is Simply What I Do"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {58-80}, keywords = {doing, epistemology, rule, scepticism, self}, abstract = {Rule-following skepticism, the paper suggests, results from running together two questions: "How is it that I can project rules?", and, "What is it for a given usage of a rule to be right?". In Peircean terms the former question, concerning the irreducibility of general predication (to singular reference), must be answered in phenomenology, while the latter, concerning the difference between true and false predication, is answered in logic. A failure to appreciate this distinction, it is argued, has led philosophers to focus exclusively on Wittgenstein's famous public account of rule-following rightness, thus overlooking a private, phenomenological dimension to Wittgenstein's remarks on following a rule which gives the lie to Kripke's reading of him as a skeptic. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lehrer2002, author = {Lehrer, Keith}, title = {Self-Presentation, Representation and the Self}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {412-430}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, self, self-representatio}, abstract = {Chisholm held that some states of ourselves are self-presenting and provide a stopping place in the quest for justification. The justification we have for accepting that we are in those states is transparent to us in a way that enables us to answer questions about justification. Representation enables us to apprehend such self-presenting states through themselves in a representational loop. It is a loop of exemplarization wherein the state is used as an exemplar to represent the kind of state it is. The result is that the representation of the state provides the subject with a kind of representation that loops back onto itself escaping the bondage of stratified mentality. This form of representation by exemplarization is shown to resolve problems and paradoxes concerning subjectivity, consciousness and the self raised by the writings of Hume, Kierkegaard, Ferrier, Sartre and Frank Jackson.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lehrer2002a, author = {Lehrer, Keith}, title = {Reply to Fumerton}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {436-438}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, self, state}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEHRER1990, author = {LEHRER, Keith}, title = {The Fallibility Paradox.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {epistemology, fallibility, justification, paradox}, abstract = {One doctrine of fallibilism, which is widely accepted, affirms that even the best justification we can have for most of what we believe leaves open the possibility of error. This doctrine and refinements thereof lead to paradox and inconsistency when combined with two plausible conditions of a criterion of justification. The first says that satisfaction of the criterion is a necessary condition of justification, and the second says that determination that the criterion is satisfied is a sufficient condition for justification. Solutions to the paradox suggest that we must give up either externalism, internalism or the doctrine of fallibilism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lehrer1999, author = {Lehrer, Keith}, title = {Precis of Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge and Autonomy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {1039-1041}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, knowledge, reason, self, trust}, abstract = {This is a brief summary of my book Self-Trust. The book contains discussions of reason, knowledge, wisdom, supervenience, autonomy, love, consensus, materialism and mathematical representation. It is here explained how these topics are related to loops of reason, justification, preference and evaluation. there is a looping structure that connects the internal and external, personal and social, static and dynamic, mind and body to yield knowledge, wisdom, autonomy and consensus. The keystone in the loop is our trustworthiness in what we accept, what we prefer, how we evaluate ourselves and others, and how we change the way we do all these things. It is keystone of trustworthiness that ties all the subjects of the book, up, down and together.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lehrer1999a, author = {Lehrer, Keith}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {1065-1074}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, self, trust}, abstract = {This is a reply to discussions by James Van Cleve, concerning my views on supervenience; to Steward Cohen, concerning my views on knowledge and the loop of trustworthiness; and to Laura Ekstrom concerning my views on autonomy.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lehrer2000, author = {Lehrer, Keith}, title = {Discursive Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {637-653}, keywords = {coherence, discourse, epistemology, knowledge, truth}, abstract = {There are two concepts of knowledge, primitive knowledge, resulting from sensory stimulation and the receiving of information, explicated most notably by Dretske, and discursive knowledge, resulting from coherence and the evaluation of information, explicated by Lehrer. Information must be evaluated to play the role in reasoning, confirmation and refutation, in what Sellars has called the game of justification. Discursive knowledge combines the appropriate internal and external features in a loop of trustworthiness and intellectual virtue to obtain the match between these features that ties them up, down and together to avoid skepticism and yield knowledge.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEIBER1971, author = {LEIBER, JUSTIN}, title = {LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS AND EXISTENTIALISM}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {47-56}, keywords = {existentialism, ordinary-language; philosophy}, abstract = {THIS PAPER GIVES CALLOW EXPRESSION TO NAIVE QUALMS ABOUT CURRENT ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHIZING. THESE WERE QUALMS ABOUT THE LACK OF COHERENCE BETWEEN WHAT PHILOSOPHY HAS BEEN IN THE PAST, AND THE PRACTICE AND PRECEPT OF CURRENT ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHERS. PAST PHILOSOPHERS FOLLOWED SPINOZA'S QUEST FOR HAPPINESS THROUGH RATIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF NATURE AND MAN'S PLACE IN IT; CURRENT ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, HOWEVER, WAS SUPPOSED A GREAT IMPROVEMENT ON THIS-WINDY TALK ABOUT 'BIG QUESTIONS' COULD NOW BE LEFT TO THE CONTINENT WHILE PROFESSIONALISM WOULD REIGN IN ENGLISH-SPEAKING ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY. BUT THIS NEW 'PROFESSIONALISM' SEEMS SO OPEN TO SIMPLE QUESTIONS: DID THE METHODS OF THE ANALYSTS REALLY DIFFER FROM THOSE OF THE CONTINENT? WERE THERE COMPELLING REASONS FOR CONFINING THESE METHODS TO DELIBERATELY TRIVIALIZED QUANDARIES, WAS THERE A CLEAR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PERFORMANCE OF EXEMPLARY ANALYSTS AND OLD-STYLE PHILOSOPHERS? THE ANSWER TO THESE QUESTIONS SEEMED NO AND STILL DOES. (EDITED).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Leite2005, author = {Leite, Adam}, title = {Epistemological Externalism and the Project of Traditional Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {505-533}, keywords = {epistemology, externalism, justification, knowledge, truth}, abstract = {Traditional epistemological reflection on our beliefs about the world attempts to proceed without presupposing or ineliminably depending upon any claims about the world. It has been argued that epistemological externalism fails to engage in the right way with the motivations for this project. I argue, however, that epistemological externalism satisfyingly undermines this project. If we accept the thesis that certain conditions other than the truth of one's belief must obtain in the world outside of one's mind in order for one to have knowledge (or justified belief) about the world, then there is no good intellectual motivation for taking up the traditional project. This result stands even if we accept the traditional theses that knowledge requires justified belief and that justified belief requires the ability to provide good reasons for one's belief.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Leiter2002, author = {Leiter, Brian}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {729-740}, publisher = {Routledge}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Nietzsche on Morality}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2002} } @article{LEMOS1989, author = {LEMOS, NOAH}, title = {HIGH ACCESSIBILITY AND JUSTIFICATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {463-476}, keywords = {epistemology, justification, knowledge, phenomenology}, abstract = {THIS PAPER DEFENDS THE THESIS OF HIGH ACCESSIBILITY AGAINST SOME RECENT CRITICISMS. THE THESIS OF HIGH ACCESSIBILITY IS ROUGHLY THE VIEW THAT IF A PERSON IS EPISTEMICALLY JUSTIFIED IN BELIEVING A PROPOSITION, P, AND IF HE CONSIDERS WHETHER HE IS JUSTIFIED IN BELIEVING P, THEN HE IS JUSTIFIED IN BELIEVING THAT HE IS JUSTIFIED IN BELIEVING P. THE FIRST SECTION CONSIDERS A VIEW SUGGESTED BY WILLIAM ALSTON CONCERNING WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR JUSTIFIED BELIEFS ABOUT EVALUATIVE STATES IN GENERAL. EPISTEMIC STATES ARE OFTEN TAKEN TO BE EVALUATIVE STATES, AND IF ALSTON'S VIEW IS CORRECT, THEN WE HAVE GOOD GROUND FOR DOUBTING THAT EPISTEMIC STATES ARE HIGHLY ACCESSIBLE. IT IS ARGUED, HOWEVER, THAT ALSTON'S VIEW PRESUPPOSES TWO THESES, NEITHER OF WHICH IS CLEARLY TRUE. IN THE SECOND SECTION, TWO ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE THESIS OF HIGH ACCESSIBILITY ARE CONSIDERED. ONE OF THESE ARGUMENTS HAS BEEN ADVANCED BY CARL GINET AND CRITICIZED BY ALSTON. WHILE ALSTON'S CRITICISMS CAN BE MET, IT IS HELD THAT GINET'S ARGUMENT FACES OTHER PROBLEMS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Lemos1994, author = {Lemos, Noah-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {829-832}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant}, volume = {59(3)}, year = {1994} } @article{LEMOS1965, author = {LEMOS, RAMON-M}, title = {IMMEDIACY, PRIVACY, AND INEFFABILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {500-515}, keywords = {behaviorism, experience, immediacy, inexpressible, language, privacy, solipsism}, abstract = {SINCE IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE IS NECESSARILY PRIVATE TO THE PERSON WHO HAS THE EXPERIENCE, A QUESTION ARISES AS TO WHETHER IT IS NECESSARILY INEFFABLE. TO SAY THAT AN EXPERIENCE IS INEFFABLE IS TO SAY EITHER THAT IT IS INDESCRIBABLE, THAT IT IS INEXPRESSIBLE, OR THAT IT IS INCOMMUNICABLE. WHETHER AN EXPERIENCE IS INDESCRIBABLE OR NOT DEPENDS UPON WHETHER IT IS SIMPLE OR UNANALYZABLE, NOT UPON WHETHER IT IS IMMEDIATE. SINCE SOME IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCES ARE SIMPLE AND SOME ARE NOT, SOME ARE INDESCRIBABLE AND SOME ARE NOT. WHETHER AN EXPERIENCE IS EXPRESSIBLE OR NOT NEVER DEPENDS UPON ITS INTRINSIC NATURE, BUT UPON ONE'S ABILITY TO TALK. THEREFORE NO IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE IS INTRINSICALLY INEXPRESSIBLE. AND SINCE THE COMMUNICABILITY OF AN EXPERIENCE NEVER DEPENDS UPON ITS INTRINSIC NATURE, BUT UPON THE APPROPRIATENESS AND CLARITY OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE SPEAKER AND THE EXPERIENCE AND INTELLIGENCE OF THE HEARER, NO IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE IS INTRINSICALLY INCOMMUNICABLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEMOS1960, author = {LEMOS, RAMON-M}, title = {PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {540-546}, keywords = {conscious, egoism, ethics, motivation, psychological-egoism; subconscious, unconscious}, abstract = {LEMOS DISTINGUISHES PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM FROM ETHICAL EGOISM, ETHICAL HEDONISM AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM. PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM PURPORTS TO BE A DESCRIPTION OF THE WAY IN WHICH ALL MEN ALWAYS DO BEHAVE; THIS CLAIM CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED. ALSO, THE VIEW PURPORTS TO DESCRIBE HUMAN ACTIONS OR MOTIVATIONS AT THREE LEVELS--CONSCIOUS, UNCONSCIOUS, SUBCONSCIOUS. IT IS ARGUED THAT EVEN IF THIS POSITION IS TRUE AT THE SUBCONSCIOUS LEVEL, IT IS FALSE AT THE OTHER TWO. MOREOVER, IF TRUE AT THE CONSCIOUS LEVEL, ONE CANNOT ACT ALTRUISTICALLY, BUT ONE CAN LIVE UP TO WHAT ETHICAL ALTRUISM DEMANDS, SO THE VIEW IS FALSE AT THE ONLY LEVEL THAT MATTERS. ALL OUR ACTS ARE NOT MOTIVATED BY CONSCIOUS DESIRES TO PROMOTE OUR INTERESTS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEMOS1991, author = {LEMOS, Ramon-M}, title = {Bearers of Value.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {axiology, fact, ontology, states-of-affairs; value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEMOS1961, author = {LEMOS, RAMON-M}, title = {A REPLY TO PROFESSOR HODGES'S "PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {249-250}, keywords = {conscious, motivation, philosophical-anthropology; psychological-egoism; subconscious, unconscious}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lenman2003, author = {Lenman, James}, title = {Disciplined Syntacticism and Moral Expressivism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {32-57}, keywords = {ethics, expressivism, language, morality, syntactics}, abstract = {Moral expressivists typically concede that, in some minimal sense, moral sentences are truth-apt but claim that in some more robust sense they are not. The Immodest Disciplined Syntacticist, a species of minimalist about truth, raises a doubt as to whether this contrast can be made out. I here address this challenge by motivating and describing a distinction between reducibly and irreducibly truth-apt sentences. In the light of this distinction the disciplined syntacticist must either adopt a more modest version of his theory, friendlier to expressivism, or substantially modify it, abandoning one of its central conditions on truth-aptness. One natural and promising such modification, the Pure Discipline View, is describe and its implications for an understanding of Expressivism briefly discussed.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LePore1993, author = {LePore, Ernest and Fodor, Jerry}, title = {"Precis of" Holism: A Shopper's Guide}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {637-640}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, holism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LePore1993a, author = {LePore, Ernest and Fodor, Jerry}, title = {Reply to Critics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {673-682}, keywords = {holism, language, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEUE1960, author = {LEUE, WILLIAM-H}, title = {PROCESS AND ESSENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {62-79}, keywords = {essence, eternal-object; eternity, metaphysics, process, temporality}, abstract = {WHITEHEAD'S "ETERNAL OBJECTS" CONSTITUTE A RECOGNITION OF "UNIVERSALS," AND SUCH AN ONTOLOGY SEEMS TO BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH HIS EMPHASIS ON THE PRIMACY OF INDIVIDUALS AND PROCESS. WHEN, HOWEVER, THE UBIQUITY AND SPECIFICITY OF ETERNAL OBJECTS--THE FUNCTIONING OF EVERY ETERNAL OBJECT IN EACH "ACTUAL OCCASION," AND THE AVAILABILITY OF ETERNAL OBJECTS FOR EVERY POSSIBLE NUANCE OF DEFINITENESS--ARE UNDERSTOOD, THEY NOT ONLY BECOME COMPATIBLE WITH HIS PROCESS METAPHYSICS, BUT ARE REQUIRED TO OVERCOME CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES THAT STAND IN THE WAY OF MAKING PROCESS THEORIES REASONABLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEVI1962, author = {LEVI, ALBERT-WILLIAM}, title = {PEIRCE AND PAINTING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {23-36}, keywords = {aesthetic-experience; aesthetics, art, meaning, movement, painting, perception, quality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEVI1964, author = {LEVI, ALBERT-WILLIAM}, title = {THE TWO IMAGINATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {188-200}, keywords = {existentialism, image, imagination, mediation, ontology, perception, phenomenology, philosophical-anthropology; synthesis, thought}, abstract = {LEVI ILLUSTRATES TWO VIEWS OF THE IMAGINATION IN WESTERN THOUGHT BY ALLUDING TO ARISTOTLE AND SHAKESPEARE; THE FORMER HOLDING THAT SENSATIONS ARE SYNTHESIZED IN THE VAT OF IMAGINATION AND PROCESSED INTO ESSENCES OR CONCEPTS BY ABSTRACTION, AND THE LATTER HOLDING IMAGINATION TO BE INSPIRATION AND CONCEPTUALIZING IS ESSENTIAL RATHER THAN EXISTENTIAL. HE CONSIDERS THE KANTIAN SOLUTION AND THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL-EXISTENTIAL SOLUTION; THE FORMER WHERE IMAGINATION MEDIATES BETWEEN SENSATION AND THOUGHT (THE SYNTHESIS BEING A MYSTERY) AND THE LATTER, WHICH HE ENDORSES, WHERE IMAGINATION IS CREATIVE OF ORGANIC WHOLES, IS TELEOLOGICAL AND DRAMATIC. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Levi1995, author = {Levi, Isaac}, title = {Cognitive Value and the Advancement of Science}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {619-628}, keywords = {advancement, biology, cognitive, darwinian, inquiry, progress, science, value}, abstract = {This essay participates in a symposium on Philip Kitcher's important book "The Advancement of Science". It considers critically the way in which Kitcher identifies autonomous goals for scientific inquiry that characterize scientific progress and worries, in particular, about Kitcher's emphasis on these values as goals of scientific institutions to whose interest the aims of individual inquirers appear to be subordinated.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Levi1991, author = {Levi, Isaac}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {721-725}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing}, volume = {54(3)}, year = {1991} } @article{LEVIN1968, author = {LEVIN, DAVID-MICHAEL}, title = {INDUCTION AND HUSSERL'S THEORY OF EIDETIC VARIATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {1-15}, keywords = {consciousness, induction, metaphysics, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEVIN1987, author = {LEVIN, JANET}, title = {SKEPTICISM, OBJECTIVITY, AND THE INVULNERABILITY OF KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {63-78}, keywords = {epistemology, objectivity, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Levin2002, author = {Levin, Janet}, title = {Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {571-591}, keywords = {conceptual-analysis; mental-states; metaphysics, reduction}, abstract = {In this paper I discuss the claim (advanced in various ways by Joseph Levine, Frank Jackson and David Chalmers) that the successful reduction of qualitative to physical states requires some sort of intelligible connection between our qualitative and physical concepts, which in turn requires a conceptual analysis of our qualitative concepts in causal-functional terms. While I defend this claim against some of its recent critics, I ultimately dispute it, and propose a different way to get the requisite intelligible connection between qualitative and physical concepts.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Levin1997, author = {Levin, Michael}, title = {You Can Always Count on Reliabilism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {607-617}, keywords = {epistemology, evidence, inquiry, reliabilism}, abstract = {This article considers some recent objections to reliabilism, particularly those of Susan Haack in Evidence and Inquiry. Haack complains that reliabilism solves the "ratification" problem trivially, making it analytic that evidence relates to truth; this paper defends an analytic solution to this problem. It argues as well that reliabilism is not tacitly committed to "evidentialism." Familiar counterexamples to and repairs of reliabilism are reviewed, with an eye to finding their rationale. Finally, it suggests that the underlying dispute between reliabilism and its critics is the existence of a priori relations between evidence and hypotheses.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEVIN1981, author = {LEVIN, MICHAEL-E}, title = {PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {42-58}, keywords = {body, materialism, metaphysics, mind, psychology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Levin2004, author = {Levin, Michael}, title = {Virtue Epistemology: No New Cures}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {397-410}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, gettier-cases; motive, truth}, abstract = {One version of virtue epistemology defines knowledge as belief whose truth arises from, or is explained by, the motives that produced it. This version is also intended to solve the Gettier problem, by shielding properly caused beliefs from double accidents. Unfortunately, there is no notion of "explains" or "arises from" which explains in the intended sense the truth of true beliefs.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEVIN1984, author = {LEVIN, MICHAEL}, title = {WHY WE BELIEVE IN OTHER MINDS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {343-360}, keywords = {mental-event; metaphysics, other-minds; phenomenology, physicalism}, abstract = {WE BELIEVE IN OTHER MINDS BECAUSE WE HAVE BEEN GENETICALLY PROGRAMMED TO. WE BELIEVE THAT OTHERS BEHAVING IN CERTAIN WAYS ARE FEELING ABOUT WHAT WE WOULD FEEL IF WE WERE SO BEHAVING. THIS BELIEF IS EVOLUTIONARILY ADVANTAGEOUS IN ALLOWING ECONOMICAL PREDICTIVE INFERENCES ABOUT THE BEHAVIOR OF OTHERS TOWARD OURSELVES. THE FIRST-PERSON APPROACH TO KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER MINDS, THEN, IS FUNDAMENTALLY WRONG, AND WE "KNOW" THERE ARE OTHER MINDS IF THERE ARE AND IF A CAUSAL-RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE HOLDS. ON BALANCE, THERE ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY OTHER MINDS (AND HENCE WE KNOW THERE ARE).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Levine2004, author = {Levine, James}, title = {On the "Gray's Elegy" Argument and Its Bearing on Frege's Theory of Sense}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {251-295}, keywords = {concept, denoting, language, sense}, abstract = {In his recent book, The Metaphysicians of Meaning (2000), Gideon Makin argues that in the so-called "Gray's Elegy" argument (the GEA) in "On Denoting", Russell provides decisive arguments against not only his own theory of denoting concepts but also Frege's theory of sense. I argue that by failing to recognize fundamental differences between the two theories, Makin fails to recognize that the GEA has less force against Frege's theory than against Russell's own earlier theory. While I agree with many aspects of Making's interpretation of the GEA, I differ with him regarding some significant details and present an interpretation according to which the GEA emerges as simpler, stronger, and more integrated.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEVINSON1978, author = {LEVINSON, JERROLD}, title = {PROPERTIES AND RELATED ENTITIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {39}, pages = {1-22}, keywords = {being, concept, entity, metaphysics, property, quality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEVISON1961, author = {LEVISON, ARNOLD-B}, title = {FREGE ON PROOF.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {40-49}, keywords = {arithmetic, laws, logic, metaphysics, proof, rationalism, self-evident; truth}, abstract = {FREGE PRESUPPOSED A CONNECTION BETWEEN PROOF AND METAPHYSICS. AN ACCEPTANCE OF HIS VIEW OF PROOF ENTAILS AN ACCEPTANCE OF A RATIONALISTIC METAPHYSICS, AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT ARITHMETIC STATEMENTS DEPEND ON "PRIMITIVE TRUTHS." THE AUTHOR COMPARES THIS WITH WITTGENSTEIN. BOTH THINKERS AGREE THAT MATHEMATICAL STATEMENTS ARE ESTABLISHED BY THOUGHT ALONE, BUT DISAGREE AS TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ESTABLISHING SOMETHING BY THOUGHT ALONE. FREGE EMPHASIZED THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE PROCESS OF PROVING A STATEMENT AND PROCESS OF COMING TO LEARN THE MEANING OF A STATEMENT, WHEREAS LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY EMPHASIZES THE SIMILARITY OF THE TWO PROCESSES. ALTHOUGH LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY DENIES SUCH THINGS AS SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS, THE AUTHOR THINKS THAT FREGE'S PLATONISM IS A BETTER ALTERNATIVE, SINCE LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY HAS NOT OFFERED A SATISFACTORY SUBSTITUTE WHICH CAN ACCOUNT FOR MATHEMATICAL KNOWLEDGE. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEVISON1965, author = {LEVISON, A-B}, title = {LOGIC, LANGUAGE, AND CONSISTENCY IN TARSKI'S THEORY OF TRUTH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {384-392}, keywords = {consistency, formalism, ideal-language; logic, ordinary-language; self-reference; truth}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR DIRECTS ATTENTION TO A CURIOUS DISCREPANCY IN THE USUAL WAYS OF INTERPRETING TARSKI'S THEORY OF TRUTH AND DISCUSSES HIS ALLEGED TEACHING THAT "ORDINARY LANGUAGE IS INCONSISTENT." THE CLAIM IS MADE THAT TARSKI DOES NOT ARGUE THAT A NATURAL LANGUAGE DOES NOT DIFFER IN PRINCIPLE FROM A FORMALIZED ONE, NOR THAT ORDINARY LANGUAGE IS INCONSISTENT, AS HIS CRITICS AVER. IT IS SHOWN THAT TARSKI BELIEVES WE HAVE NO CRITERIA FOR PRECISELY DISTINGUISHING WHAT IS TRUE OR FALSE FROM WHAT FAILS TO BE EITHER, OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF A FORMALIZED LANGUAGE. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ARE MADE ABOUT THE RELATION BETWEEN IDEAL OR FORMAL LOGIC AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE AND IT IS CONCLUDED THAT IN ORDINARY LANGUAGE THE IDEAL OF LOGICAL STRUCTURE IS INCOMPLETE OR UNFULFILLED. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEVISON1983, author = {LEVISON, ARNOLD}, title = {MIGHT EVENTS BE PROPOSITIONS?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {169-188}, keywords = {event, language, metaphysics, proposition}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEVY1967, author = {LEVY, ERWIN}, title = {ON THE PROBLEM OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A PERCEPTUAL WORLD-IN-COMMON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {48-57}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, psychology, world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEVY1971, author = {LEVY, SOLOMON-E}, title = {LOGICAL IMPOSSIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {32}, pages = {166-187}, keywords = {consistency, logical-impossibility; proposition}, abstract = {WHAT IS IMPOSSIBLE IS INVOLUNTARISTIC; IT IS EXPERIENCED BY LIMITATION. THE WHAT WHICH IS IMPOSSIBLE IS IN THE PHYSICAL-EMPIRICAL REALM, NOT IN A NOTATIONAL-VOLUNTARISTIC ONE. THE CONTRARY VIEW CONFUSES WHAT IS IMPOSSIBLE WITH ITS SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION; AND INCONSISTENT (NON-UNIFORM) USAGE (VACUOUS) WITH INCONSISTENCY OF EMPIRICAL MEANINGS. THESE AND OTHER CONFUSIONS LEAD TO THE TRADITIONAL BUT MISTAKEN CLAIM THAT A (VACUOUS) 'LOGICAL IMPOSSIBILITY' ENTAILS AN (EMPIRICAL) PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEWIS1983, author = {LEWIS, DELMAS}, title = {DUALISM AND THE CAUSAL THEORY OF MEMORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {21-30}, keywords = {dualism, memory, metaphysics, personal-identit}, abstract = {CAN A CORRECT ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF MEMORY BE PARLAYED INTO AN ARGUMENT FOR THE CONCEPTUAL INCOHERENCE OF DUALISM? BERNARD WILLIAMS, SYDNEY SHOEMAKER, AND DAVID WIGGINS THINK SO. THIS PAPER FORMULATES AND EVALUATES THEIR ARGUMENT, WHICH RESTS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT AN ESSENTIAL PROPERTY OF PERSONS IS THE CAPACITY TO REMEMBER, AND ON THE CLAIM THAT THE CONCEPT OF MEMORY DEMANDS A "CAUSAL" ANALYSIS IN TERMS OF A SPATIO-TEMPORALLY CONTINUOUS CAUSAL CHAIN CONNECTING GENUINE INSTANCES OF REMEMBERING WITH THE EXPERIENCES REMEMBERED. THE AUTHOR DISCUSSES MARTIN AND DEUTSCHER'S ARGUMENT FOR THE NECESSITY OF A CAUSAL THEORY OF MEMORY, AND ROGER SQUIRES' PROPOSAL OF AN ALTERNATIVE NONCAUSAL THEORY. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE CONCEPT OF MEMORY POSES NO THREAT TO THE COHERENCE OF DUALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lewis2001, author = {Lewis, David}, title = {Redefining 'Intrinsic'}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {381-398}, keywords = {disjunction, independence, intrinsic, metaphysics, properties}, abstract = {Several alleged counterexamples to the definition of 'intrinsic' proposed in Rae Langton and David Lewis, "Defining 'Intrinsic'", are unconvincing. Yet there are reasons for dissatisfaction, and room for improvement. One desirable change is to raise the standard of nondisjunctiveness, thereby putting less burden on contentious judgments of comparative naturalness. A second is to deal with spurious independence by throwing out just the disjunctive troublemakers, instead of throwing out disjunctive properties wholesale, and afterward reinstating those impeccably intrinsic disjunctive properties that are not troublemakers. (The second of these changes makes the first more affordable.) A third, suggested by Brian Weatherson, would be to invoke the general principle that the intrinsic and the extrinsic characters of things are independent, rather than relying just on one special case of this principle; but it is none too obvious how to do this.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LEWIS1986, author = {LEWIS, DELMAS}, title = {PERSONS, MORALITY, AND TENSELESSNESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {305-309}, keywords = {metaphysics, moral-agent; temporality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lewis2004, author = {Lewis, Frank-A}, title = {Aristotle on the Homonymy of Being}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {1-36}, keywords = {category, homonymy, metaphysics, substance}, abstract = {This paper offers (1) an outline of Aristotle's notion of homonymy, then takes up a single application, to the homonymy of being, first, (2) across the different categories and, finally, (3) within a single category, to the analysis of substance in the Metaphysics. The paper is in part a reaction to Shield's recent Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle (Oxford, 1999). It also discusses Aristotle's argument that being is not a genus, which employs the strategy of reducing an opponent to "babbling" or saying the same thing twice; babbling, I argue, has a genuine place in metaphysics.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LICHTENSTEIN1972, author = {LICHTENSTEIN, HEINZ}, title = {COMMUNICATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {412-413}, keywords = {consciousness, science}, abstract = {RE: RICOEUR, P., FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY, NEW HAVEN, YALE UNIV. PRESS, 1970. THE CENTRAL CONTRIBUTION OF FREUD IS, ACCORDING TO RICOEUR, HIS INSISTENCE THAT THERE ARE NO NON-COMMUNICATIVE MENTAL ACTS. DREAMS, NEUROTIC SYMPTOMS, SEEMINGLY INCOHERENT UTTERANCES OF PSYCHOTIC INDIVIDUALS ARE CONSIDERED EQUALLY COMMUNICATIVE AS LOGICAL THOUGHT. THE POSTULATED LAYERS OF COMMUNICATIVE PROCESSES WERE SEEN BY FREUD AS DEVELOPMENTALLY RELATED TO ONE ANOTHER, EXPRESSING MEANING IN A SEQUENCE FROM PRIMITIVE BODY LANGUAGE TO ABSTRACT THOUGHT. THE EXTENSION BY FREUD OF THE CONCEPT OF LANGUAGE IS SEEN BY RICOEUR AS CONSISTENTLY LEADING TO THE INTRODUCTION OF INTERPRETATION AS A BASIC APPROACH TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE AMBIGUITIES OF MEANING, WHICH ARE SEEN AS INTEGRAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS. THUS, FOR RICOEUR, FREUD'S SUSPICION OF THE HIDDEN MEANING OF COMMUNICATED CONSCIOUS THOUGHT PLACES HIM ALONGSIDE MARX AND NIETZSCHE, THE TWO GREAT DISTURBERS OF ANY COMPLACENCY REGARDING THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF OUR CONSCIOUSNESS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LICHTIGFELD1980, author = {LICHTIGFELD, A}, title = {JASPERS IN ENGLISH: A FAILURE NOT OF COMMUNICATION BUT RATHER OF INTERPRETATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {216-222}, keywords = {metaphysics, phenomenology}, abstract = {AS AGAINST PROFESSOR WALLRAFF ("PHIL PHEN RES", 1977, 537 FF.) IT IS ARGUED THAT THE NEGLECT OF JASPERS IS DUE TO A FAILURE OF INTERPRETATION. FOR THE FACT REMAINS THAT TRANSLATIONS OF JASPERS' WORKS, AND, IN PARTICULAR, MAJOR STUDIES OF JASPERS IN ENGLISH HAVE BROUGHT JASPERS' MESSAGE HOME TO NOT ONLY PHILOSOPHICALLY INTERESTED READERS. A COMPARISON WITH HEIDEGGER'S GROWING INFLUENCE SHOWS THAT--BY CONTRAST TO JASPERS--HEIDEGGER WAS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A WORLD-WIDE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT AND THAT HIS PHILOSOPHY CORRESPONDED TO THE INTELLECTUAL CLIMATE OF OUR TIME (I.E. THE ATTEMPT AT A DESTRUCTION OF TRADITIONAL METAPHYSICS AND THE RADICALNESS OF A NEW BEGINNING). BY CONTRAST, THE REAL DIMENSION OF THE JASPERIAN INQUIRY AS TO WHAT IS "TIMELESS THROUGHOUT TIME" HAS NOT YET BEEN RESEARCHED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LINGIS1981, author = {LINGIS, ALPHONSO}, title = {SENSATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {160-170}, keywords = {consciousness, epistemology, intentionality, perception, sensation}, abstract = {FOR MERLEAU-PONTY PHENOMENOLOGY REQUIRES A REJECTION OF THE ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION INTO SENSATIONS. BUT THIS PHENOMENOLOGY DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SENSUOUS CHARACTER OF PERCEPTION. THE SENSUOUS ELEMENT IS NEITHER A MULTIPLICITY NOR A TISSUE OF RELATIONS, BUT DEPTH, A MEDIUM, APEIRON. WE PERCEIVE FORMS IN THIS ELEMENT--IN THE LIGHT, ON THE GROUND, IN A CHROMATIC MEDIUM, IN THE HEAT. THE SENSING OF THIS SENSUOUS ELEMENT IS NOT AN INTENTIONALITY, AND NOT IDENTIFYING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Lipton1991, author = {Lipton, Peter}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {970-972}, publisher = {Routledge}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Inference to the Best Explanation}, volume = {53(4)}, year = {1991} } @article{LITTLE1981, author = {LITTLE, DANIEL}, title = {COUNTERVAILING TENDENCIES AND FALSIFIABILITY IN "CAPITAL".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {283-291}, keywords = {capitalism, falsifiability, scientific-method; social-philosoph}, abstract = {MARX'S CLAIM OF SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY FOR HIS THEORY OF CAPITALISM IS CHALLENGED BY KARL POPPER'S ALLEGATION OF UNFALSIFIABILITY. IN RESPONSE TO KNOWN INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE LABOR THEORY OF VALUE AND THE ACTUAL BEHAVIOR OF A CAPITALIST ECONOMY, MARX REFERS TO A VARIETY OF "COUNTERVAILING TENDENCIES" WHICH HAVE THE EFFECT OF UNDERCUTTING THE WORKING OF THE LAW OF VALUE. POPPER REGARDS SUCH APPEAL AS A REFUSAL TO ACCEPT FALSIFICATION, AND THEREFORE UNSCIENTIFIC. THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT POPPER'S POSITION ENTAILS AN UNREASONABLY STRICT RESPONSE TO ANOMALY. IMRE LAKATOS'S DISCUSSION OF THE "RESEARCH PROGRAM" IS MORE SATISFACTORY; HE ARGUES THAT IT IS RATIONAL TO MODIFY A THEORY FACED WITH ANOMALY SO LONG AS SUCH MODIFICATIONS ARE "PROGRESSIVE." THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT MARX'S USE OF COUNTERVAILING TENDENCIES SATISFIES REASONABLE STANDARDS OF "PROGRESSIVENESS," AND IS THEREFORE SCIENTIFICALLY APPROPRIATE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Livingston1991, author = {Livingston, Paisley}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {731-734}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Literature and Rationality}, volume = {54(3)}, year = {1991} } @article{Loar1999, author = {Loar, Brian}, title = {David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {465-472}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, mind}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Loeb1996, author = {Loeb, Don}, title = {Generality and Moral Justification}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {79-96}, keywords = {ethics, foundationalism, generality, justification, morality}, abstract = {Demands for generality sometimes exert a powerful influence on our thinking, pressing us to treat more general moral positions, such as consequentialism, as superior to more specific ones, like those which incorporate agent-centered restrictions or prerogatives. I articulate both foundationalist and coherentist versions of the demands for generality and argue that we can best understand these demands in terms of a certain underlying metaphysical commitment. I consider and reject various arguments which might be offered in support of this commitment, and argue that generality may not be the weapon in moral argument that it is sometimes thought to be.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Loeb2005, author = {Loeb, Don}, title = {Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(1)}, pages = {193-208}, keywords = {belief, ethics, explanation, morality}, abstract = {Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in nonmoral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Loeb2001, author = {Loeb, Louis-E}, title = {Integrating Hume's Accounts of Belief and Justification}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {279-303}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, justification, knowledge}, abstract = {Hume's claim that a state is a belief is often intertwined--though without his remarking on this fact--with epistemic approval of the state. This requires explanation. Beliefs, in Hume's view, are steady dispositions (not lively ideas), nature's provision for a steady influence on the will and action. Hume's epistemic distinctions call attention to circumstances in which the presence of conflicting beliefs undermine a belief's influence and thereby its natural function. On one version of this interpretation, to say that a belief is justified, ceteris paribus, is to say that for all that has been shown the belief would be steady in its influence under suitable reflection. On a second version, it is to say that prima facie justification is an intrinsic property of the state, in virtue of its steadiness. These versions generate different understandings of the relationship between Parts iii and iv of Book I of the Treatise.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Loeb1994, author = {Loeb, Louis-E}, title = {A Progress of Sentiments, Reflections on Hume's "Treatise"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {467-474}, keywords = {emotion, epistemology, scepticism, sentiment}, abstract = {Baier argues effectively that Hume treats causal inference positively, not sceptically, in "Treatise" I.III, though it subverts itself in I.IV. This leads to an important problem: explaining how I.III's confidence in causal inference gives way. Baier holds that I.IV is ironic, a "reductio" of "Cartesian", "individualist", "sceptical", "intellectualist" reason, preparing the way for the "cooperative", "socialized", "passionate", "moralized" method Hume favors. Baier does not succeed in showing that Hume adopts this perspective in his treatments of personal identity, body, association, and causal inference. There are also severe difficulties for her thesis that I.IV is ironic.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Loeb2002, author = {Loeb, Louis-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {233-235}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise}, volume = {72(1)}, year = {2002} } @article{Loewer2002, author = {Loewer, Barry}, title = {Comments on Jaegwon Kim's Mind and the Physical World}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {655-662}, keywords = {metaphysics, mind-body; physicalism, supervenience}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lombard1994, author = {Lombard, Lawrence-B}, title = {The Doctrine of Temporal Parts and the "No-Change" Objection}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {365-372}, keywords = {change, epistemology, metaphysics, scepticism, temporality}, abstract = {In his recent paper, "Things Change", Mark Heller argues that the Doctrine of Temporal Parts (DPT) can be used to explain away a puzzle about how it is possible for things to survive change. He also responds to a criticism of DTP based on the idea that it is ill- suited to account for the fact that things survive change. In this paper, I undermine Heller's argument in favor of temporal parts, by showing that the argument, at best, rests on an equivocation. I also undermine Heller's response to the "No- Change" criticism, by arguing that his response makes the introduction of temporal parts in order to explain how it is possible for things to survive change unnecessary.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Long1992, author = {Long, Douglas-C}, title = {The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {67-84}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, knowledge, scepticism}, abstract = {In addressing skeptical doubts about our knowledge of material things, philosophers have generally assumed that introspective self-awareness cannot be successfully challenged. I argue on the contrary that, without knowledge of our own objective existence, a purely subjective knowledge of ourselves is not possible. Therefore, wholesale skepticism undermines beliefs about our own mental agency, as well as our own existence, and makes it impossible to explain self-reference. Philosophical doubt expressed in the form: "I know that I exist but I cannot know about the existence of anything else, "is self-defeating in more than one sense.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Long1994, author = {Long, Douglas-C}, title = {One More Foiled Defense of Skepticism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {373-375}, keywords = {epistemology, global, introspection, scepticism}, abstract = {In "The Self- Defeating Character of Skepticism", "Phil Phenomenol Res", March 1992, I argued that epistemic skepticism is incoherent because questioning knowledge of the external world undermines self- knowledge. 1) Skepticism cancels perceptual access to oneself; 2) The self cannot be directly inspected "internally"; 3) Its existence cannot be inferred from direct awareness of its experiences. In "One More Failed Transcendental Argument", "Phil Phenomenol Res", Sept 1993, Anthony Brueckner challenged 3), insisting that the ego "can" infer the existence of a mental substance from introspective knowledge. In the present reply I explain that he fails to address my objection that if the ego's own existence as a subject of experiences is epistemically inaccessible to it because of 1) and 2), it cannot refer to its own "experience" as a basis for inferring its existence.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LONG1965, author = {LONG, THOMAS-A}, title = {THE PROBLEM OF PAIN AND CONTEXTUAL IMPLICATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {106-111}, keywords = {behavior, context, criteria, epistemology, implication, pain, sign}, abstract = {IT IS ASSUMED THAT PAIN AND PAIN-BEHAVIOR ARE DIFFERENT AND THAT THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THEM IS CONTINGENT. IN WHAT SENSE CAN AN ACT RATHER THAN A STATEMENT BE SAID TO IMPLY SOMETHING? THE ANSWER IS GIVEN THAT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE BODILY BEHAVIOR ENTAILS WHAT THE BEHAVIOR IS SAID TO IMPLY. THEN IT IS ARGUED THAT SOMEONE'S BEHAVING IN A CERTAIN WAY IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES CONTEXTUALLY IMPLIES HIS HAVING A PRIVATE EXPERIENCE, I.E., PAIN. IT IS FINALLY SUGGESTED THAT IF ONE HAS A "REAL CASE" THEN ONE HAS CRITERIA OF PAIN, BUT THERE ARE NO PROCEDURES FOR DECIDING WHICH SITUATIONS ARE REAL CASES AND WHICH ARE NOT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lopes2000, author = {Lopes, Dominic-M-McIver}, title = {What Is It Like to See with Your Ears? The Representational Theory of Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {439-453}, keywords = {metaphysics, mind, psychology, representation}, abstract = {This paper proposes an alternative test of representationalism. Do experiences in different sense modalities have the same phenomenal character when they share content? Psychological work on the perception of shape through vision and spatial hearing is discussed. This work shows that visual and auditory experiences differ in phenomenal character even in so far as they represent similar properties. This objection to representationalism does not invite questions about secondary qualities or depend on establishing metaphysical possibilities. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Loptson2001, author = {Loptson, Peter}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {497-500}, publisher = {Univ of Toronto Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Reality: Fundamental Topics in Metaphysics}, volume = {67(2)}, year = {2001} } @other{Louden2000, author = {Louden, Robert-B}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {491-493}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings}, volume = {66(2)}, year = {2000} } @article{Lowe1994, author = {Lowe, E-J}, title = {Primitive Substances}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {531-552}, keywords = {epistemology, matter, object, substance, universal}, abstract = {Things or objects are what exist, but not all things are equal. Some depend for their existence and identity upon the existence and identity of other things, while others do not-- and the latter are the substances. Some amongst these are, necessarily, non- composite and consequently primitive, in the sense that their identity through time is not grounded in relations between other things. To consider the number and nature of such substances is the objective of the present inquiry.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lowe2003, author = {Lowe, E-J}, title = {In Defense of Moderate-Sized Specimens of Dry Goods}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {704-710}, keywords = {atom, metaphysics, object, property}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lowe2004, author = {Lowe, E-J}, title = {Locke: Compatibilist Event-Causalist or Libertarian Substance-Causalist?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {688-701}, keywords = {agency, causality, compatibilism, event, libertarian, metaphysics, substance}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Lowe2005, author = {Lowe, E-J}, title = {Is Conceptualist Realism a Stable Position?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {456-461}, keywords = {conceptualism, essentialism, metaphysics, realism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Lowe1996, author = {Lowe, E-Jonathan}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {224-228}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Subjects of Experience}, volume = {60(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{LUCAS1965, author = {LUCAS, J-R}, title = {THE ONE CONCEPT OF PROBABILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {180-201}, keywords = {belief, calculus, frequency, logic, mathematics, probability, proposition, truth}, abstract = {THE CONCEPT OF PROBABILITY ARISES FROM OUR INTERPOLATING A CONTINUOUS RANGE OF TRUTH VALUES BETWEEN THE EXTREME VALUES OF TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD. TWO FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE CALCULUS OF PROBABILITIES ARE DERIVED FROM THE TWIN REQUIREMENTS THAT PROBABILITIES ARE NUMERICAL MAGNITUDES, SUBJECT TO THE ORDINARY ALGEBRA OF REAL NUMBERS, AND THAT THEY ARE ASSIGNED TO PROPOSITIONS, WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO A BOOLEAN ALGEBRA. OBJECTIONS TO THE SIMPLE-MINDED APPLICATION OF BERNOULLI'S THEOREM ARE CONSIDERED AND COUNTERED, AND INTERPRETATION RULES GIVEN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LUCE1964, author = {LUCE, DAVID-RANDALL}, title = {ON THE LOGIC OF BELIEF.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {259-260}, keywords = {believing, existence, inference, logic}, abstract = {IT IS NOTED THAT RODERICK CHISHOLM'S LOGIC OF BELIEF HOLDS UP ONLY IF WE DENY EACH OF TWO PLAUSIBLE ASSUMPTIONS: (1) THAT EVERYONE BELIEVES THAT SOMETHING OR OTHER EXISTS, AND (2) THAT IF SOMEONE BELIEVES ANYTHING AT ALL, THEN THERE IS AT LEAST ONE THING ABOUT WHICH HE BELIEVES SOMETHING OR OTHER. IN VIEW OF THE PLAUSIBILITY OF THE ASSUMPTIONS, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT CHISHOLM'S LOGIC OF BELIEF IS PERHAPS OVERLY GENERAL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LUCE1988, author = {LUCE, LILA}, title = {FREGE ON CARDINALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {415-434}, keywords = {arithmetic, cardinality, logic, quantification}, abstract = {THERE IS GREAT MOTIVATION WITHIN FREGE'S THEORY TO CONSTRUE THE CARDINAL NUMBERS AS QUANTIFIERS, WHICH ARE HIGHER LEVEL CONCEPTS. BUT FREGE ARGUED THAT THE CARDINAL NUMBERS ARE OBJECTS, NOT CONCEPTS, AND DEFINED THEM ACCORDINGLY. MOREOVER, FREGE'S HIERARCHY OF CONCEPTS PREVENTED HIM FROM CONSTRUING THE NUMBERS AS CONCEPTS. MY PURPOSE IS TO BRING OUT THE QUANTIFICATIONAL NATURE OF THE NUMBERS IN THE FACE OF THESE OBSTACLES. THE PAPER PRESSES THE QUANTIFICATIONAL VIEW ONTO FREGE'S CONCEPT OF NUMBER AS IT TRACES ITS DEVELOPMENT FROM THE "BEGRIFFSSCHRIFT", THROUGH THE 1880S, INTO ITS FORMALIZATION IN THE "GRUNDGESETZE". THE THEORY YIELDS SURPRISINGLY EASILY UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE QUANTIFICATIONAL VIEW, AND ONE SYMPATHETIC WITH THAT VIEW MAY TAKE ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE FACT THAT IT WAS FREGE'S HIERARCHY OF CONCEPTS, NOT HIS ACTUAL ARGUMENTS, THAT PREVENTED HIS CONSTRUING NUMBERS AS QUANTIFIERS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LUCEY1979, author = {LUCEY, KENNETH-G}, title = {ON EPISTEMIC PREFERABILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {575-581}, keywords = {appraisal, epistemic, epistemology, error}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ludwig2003, author = {Ludwig, Kirk}, title = {Francois Recanati's Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta: An Essay on Metarepresentation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {481-488}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, representation, semantics}, abstract = {This review essay examines four central claims of Recanati's account of metarepresentations, that is, representations that represent a representation and its content, viz., (1) metarepresentations are iconic, i.e., they contain the object representation; (2) metarepresentations are semantically innocent; (3) metarepresentational sentences are not relational, but involve a metarepresentational sentential operator applied to a sentence; (4) metarepresentational operators shift situation or circumstance of evaluation. The essay concludes that the case of (1) has not been, that the argument from (1) and (2) to (3) and (4) is flawed, and that the account offers is inconsistent with its official characterization in (3).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ludwig1992, author = {Ludwig, Kirk-A}, title = {Skepticism and Interpretation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {317-339}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, scepticism, truth}, abstract = {I offer an interpretation and criticism of Donald Davidson's arguments against radical skepticism. I distinguish two lines of argument, the omniscient interpreter argument, and an argument from the necessary publicity of language. I argue the omniscient interpreter argument begs the question, and that the argument from the necessary publicity of language requires a much stronger publicity requirement than is supported any intuitive ... considerations in support of the claim that languages are necessarily public. I conclude with a criticism of the central argument for a coherence theory and a suggestion based on that criticism for an alternative approach to skepticism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Luper-Foy1992, author = {Luper-Foy, Steven}, title = {The Absurdity of Life}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {85-101}, keywords = {life, metaphysics, nihilism, scepticism}, abstract = {I address the attempt made by Thomas Nagel in his essay "The Absurd" and in his book "The View From Nowhere" to show that life is necessarily absurd. Nagel has misdiagnosed the source of absurdity and he has exaggerated the extent to which it is unavoidable. I acknowledge that there are limits to what we can and should do to escape absurdity, but I argue that our lives are not necessarily absurd.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LUPER-FOY1987, author = {LUPER-FOY, STEVEN}, title = {THE CAUSAL INDICATOR ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {563-587}, keywords = {belief, causality, epistemology, knowledge, principle, reliability}, abstract = {THIS PAPER DESCRIBES AND MOTIVATES AN APPROACH TO KNOWLEDGE THAT IS CALLED THE CAUSAL INDICATOR ANALYSIS. THE STRATEGY IS TO SKETCH THE MAIN FEATURES OF AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE, THEN USE THAT SKETCH TO REVEAL SOME OF THE FAULTS OF SOME LEADING ANALYSES DEFENDED TODAY. THE AUTHOR IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING THE WORK OF FRED DRETSKE, WHOSE VIEWS HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCED HIS OWN. WITH THESE TASKS ACCOMPLISHED, THE AUTHOR OFFERS HIS OWN ACCOUNT AND ARGUES THAT IT HAS THE FEATURES AN ACCOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE SHOULD HAVE. STATED CONCISELY, THE VIEW IS THAT WE KNOW THAT A GIVEN BELIEF IS TRUE JUST IN CASE IT IS NOT IRRATIONAL AND OUR BEING CORRECT ABOUT IT IS NOT SIMPLY A LUCKY ACCIDENT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{LYCAN1991, author = {LYCAN, William-G}, title = {Why We Should Care Whether Our Beliefs Are True.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Lynch2004, author = {Lynch, Michael-P}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {231-239}, publisher = {Bradford Book MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {True to Life: Why Truth Matters}, volume = {71(1)}, year = {2004} } @article{LYONS1978, author = {LYONS, WILLIAM}, title = {EMOTIONS AND BEHAVIOR.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {410-418}, keywords = {behavior, emotion, epistemology}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR DISCUSSES THE FOLLOWING TOPICS: THAT THE BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF AN EMOTION IS TYPICAL IN A MUCH LOOSER SENSE THAN AN EQUIVALENT CLAIM ABOUT BEHAVIOUR BEING TYPICAL OF AN APPETITE; THAT THERE IS A VIEW THAT BEHAVIOUR TYPICAL OF AN EMOTION IS LINKED CONCEPTUALLY TO THAT EMOTION BUT THAT THIS VIEW IS MISTAKEN; THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FACTORS WHICH MILITATE AGAINST BEING ABLE TO SPECIFY WITH ANY DEGREE OF EXACTITUDE WHAT BEHAVIOUR WILL FLOW FROM ANY PARTICULAR OCCURRENCE OF AN EMOTION; THAT THE LINK BETWEEN EMOTIONS AND BEHAVIOUR IS A CAUSAL ONE BASED ON THE APPETITIVE ASPECT OF EMOTIONS, BUT IS ALSO A RATIONAL LINK AS WELL; THAT BEHAVIOUR DOES HOWEVER HAVE SOME PART TO PLAY AS AN INDICATOR OF THE PRESENCE OF EMOTIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MACARMSTRONG1980, author = {MACARMSTRONG, A}, title = {A DIALOGUE ON SELFISHNESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {496-511}, keywords = {disinterestedness, duty, ethics, selfishness, self-lov}, abstract = {THIS SEEKS TO DISTINGUISH INTERESTED CONDUCT BOTH FROM BEING UNINTERESTED AND FROM BEING DISINTERESTED. IT CONTENDS THAT BEING DISINTERESTED IS THE NEGATIVE OF SELFISH CONDUCT, I.E., A STAGE IN WHICH THE AGENT, EXERTING HIMSELF TO DO WHAT MATTERS TO HIM, TREATS HIMSELF AS THE CENTRE OR YARDSTICK OF THE UNIVERSE BUT STILL DOES NOT ACT GENUINELY IN THAT OFFICE OR CAPACITY, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE TREATING WHAT MATTERS TO HIM AS ONE EGO AS NOT MATTERING TO HIM IN THAT CAPACITY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Macbeth1995, author = {Macbeth, Danielle}, title = {Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Language}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {501-523}, keywords = {empiricism, language, pragmatism, thought}, abstract = {After sketching familiar pragmatist arguments that seem to show that relations of reference and meaning shed no light on the role of language in our claims to knowledge, an alternative conception (inspired by Kripke's work on proper names and Sellars' conception of concepts and causal laws) is outlined. Neither relations of reference nor meanings are given; instead both essentially involve commitments that are different in kind from the sorts of propositional commitments made in judgment. If so, the pragmatist is mistaken in concluding that meaning is a philosopher's fiction and reference nothing more than a technical notion of formal semantics.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Macdonald1999, author = {Macdonald, Cynthia}, title = {Shoemaker on Self-Knowledge and Inner Sense}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {711-738}, keywords = {epistemology, internal, self-knowledge; sense}, abstract = {What is introspective knowledge of one's own intentional states like? This paper aims to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the cogito-type ones, are enough like perception to count as cases of quasi-observation. To this end it considers the highly influential arguments developed by Sydney Shoemaker in his recent Royce Lectures. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Machamer1995, author = {Machamer, Peter}, title = {Kitcher and the Achievement of Science}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {629-636}, keywords = {advancement, darwinian, morality, progress, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MACINTYRE1991, author = {MACINTYRE, Alasdair}, title = {Reply to Roque's "Language Competence and Tradition-constituted Rationality".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {culture, political-philosophy; rationality, tradition}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MacIntyre1994, author = {MacIntyre, Alasdair}, title = {Critical Remarks on "The Sources of the Self" by Charles Taylor}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {187-190}, keywords = {identity, metaphysics, self}, abstract = {Three questions about Charles Taylor's central positions in "Sources of the Self" are raised. First, how can Taylor's realism about goods by reconciled with his view that judgments about genuine goods may be in conflict? Secondly, are choices between the conflicting claims of goods governed by any standard or are they mere preferences? Thirdly, do Taylor's historical narratives presuppose the very interpretations which they are supposed to confirm, and is this damaging?}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MACINTYRE1991a, author = {MACINTYRE, Alasdair}, title = {Reply to Dahl, Baier and Schneewind.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {ethics}, abstract = {The differences between Baier and myself arise from different conceptions of how social agreement is related to practices involving moral judgment and from incompatible understandings of the narrative of eighteenth century Scottish philosophy. Against Dahl I suggest that his arguments about Aristotelian practical rationality deprive phronesis of its place in that rationality and that those concerning relativism involve a misconstrual of my position. Against Schneewind I elucidate my conception of traditional further and argue that his claims about tradition-independent enquiry encounter serious difficulties.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MACINTYRE1991b, author = {MACINTYRE, Alasdair}, title = {Precis of "Whose Justice? Which Rationality?".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {justice, rationality, social-philosoph}, abstract = {Central to Whose Justice? Which Rationality? is the project of distinguishing between the standards appropriate to judging the rival claims about justice of philosophers working within the same socially embodied tradition of rational enquiry and those appropriate to judging the rival claims about justice of philosophers working within very different such traditions. When these are distinguished, it becomes clear that there is no such thing as tradition-independent rational enquiry, but that this does not afford support to relativist conclusions.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MACINTYRE1990, author = {MACINTYRE, Alasdair}, title = {Moral Dilemmas.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {axiology, dilemma, moral-theory; rationalism, thomism}, abstract = {Against theses of Bernard Williams and Bas C. van Fraassen, it is argued that there are no facts about moral dilemmas, characterizable independently of any moral theory. It is further argued that any adequate theory which denies that there are genuine moral dilemmas must provide a convincing account of how and why moral agents take themselves to be in dilemmatic situations. The ability of rationalist theories, which deny that genuine moral dilemmas occur, to provide such account is examined. Aquinas's contribution receives particular attention.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MacIntyre1998, author = {MacIntyre, Alasdair}, title = {What Can Moral Philosophers Learn from the Study of the Brain?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {865-869}, keywords = {brain, ethics, metaphysics, morality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Mack1993, author = {Mack, Eric}, title = {Of Transplants and Trolleys}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {163-167}, keywords = {consequentialism, epistemology, rights, transplantation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MACKINNON1973, author = {MACKINNON, EDWARD}, title = {LANGUAGE, SPEECH, AND SPEECH-ACTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {224-238}, keywords = {language, speaking, speech, speech-ac}, abstract = {THERE IS AN UNRESOLVED AND GENERALLY UNRECOGNIZED CONFLICT BETWEEN THE WITTGENSTEINIAN ANALYSIS WHICH EXPLICATES THE MEANING OF A WORD THROUGH THE ROLE IT PLAYS IN LANGUAGE GAMES AND THE AUSTIN-SEARLE ANALYSIS WHICH STRESSES SPEECH ACTS AND THE INTENTIONALITY OF THE PERFORMER AS A BASIS OF MEANING. TO CLARIFY AND PARTIALLY RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT DE SAUSSURE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND SPEECH IS REVIVED AND UTILIZED. THOUGH THE TWO DOMAINS ARE INTIMATELY INTERRELATED THE PROBLEMMATIC OF MEANING ANALYSIS ASSUMES A DIFFERENT FORM IN EACH DOMAIN. TO BRING THIS OUT IT IS NECESSARY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE ROLE AND RULE DEPENDENT SENSE OF WORDS IN LANGUAGE AND THE PERFORMANCE DEPENDENT MEANING OF WORDS IN SPEECH AS WELL AS BETWEEN DENOTATION IN LANGUAGE AND REFERENCE IN SPEECH. THE BEARING SUCH DISTINCTIONS HAVE ON SOME BROADER ISSUES IS BRIEFLY INDICATED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MACKLIN1972, author = {MACKLIN, RUTH}, title = {REASONS VS CAUSES IN EXPLANATION OF ACTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {78-89}, keywords = {action, cause, explanation, metaphysics, reasons}, abstract = {IT HAS BEEN ARGUED THAT 'CAUSES' OF ACTION AND 'REASONS' FOR ACTING REPRESENT INCOMPATIBLE CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES. THIS PAPER EXAMINES THE ALLEGED INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THESE CONCEPTS AND ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT NOT ONLY ARE 'REASON' EXPLANATIONS COMPATIBLE WITH CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS BUT ALSO THAT IT IS PLAUSIBLE TO CONSTRUE THE FORMER AS A SPECIES OF THE LATTER. PROVIDING REASONS OFTEN AIDS IN THE SEARCH FOR RELEVANT CAUSAL FACTORS, AND CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS ARE MORE SYSTEMATIC THAN CORRESPONDING REASON EXPLANATIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Macpherson2005, author = {Macpherson, Fiona}, title = {Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(1)}, pages = {127-152}, keywords = {color, content, epistemology, proposition, representationalism}, abstract = {I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional externalist views about the nature of the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, color inversion scenarios are more damaging to externalist representationalist views than have been previously thought. More specifically, I argue that representationalists who endorse externalism about experiential content either have to become internalists about the content of propositional attitudes or they have to adopt a novel variety of externalism about the content of propositional attitudes. This novel type of propositional attitude externalism is investigated. It can be seen that adopting it forces one to reject Putnam's and Burge's externalist considerations about the nature of the propositional attitudes. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MADDEN1964, author = {MADDEN, EDWARD-H}, title = {THE MANY FACES OF EVIL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {481-492}, keywords = {evil, free-will; god, harmony, religion, theism}, abstract = {THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF EVIL IS A PUZZLE FOR THE THEIST. IF GOD IS ALL POWERFUL AND ALL GOOD WHY IS THERE SO MUCH "PRIMA FACIE" GRATUITOUS MORAL AND PHYSICAL EVIL IN THE WORLD? THE THEIST OFFERS NUMEROUS SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM, BUT, AFTER EXAMINING THEM IN DETAIL, THE AUTHOR CONCLUDES THAT THEY ALL HAVE SOME FATAL FLAW. THE ULTIMATE HARMONY VIEW IS PARTICULARLY FASCINATING, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT IS THE LAST REFUGE OF THE THEIST. HOWEVER, "THE PROBLEM OF GOOD," THE AUTHOR CLAIMS WHICH IS ISOMORPHIC WITH THE PROBLEM OF EVIL, SERIOUSLY QUALIFIES AND DAMAGES THIS GAMBIT. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES THAT THE INSOLUBILITY OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IS ONE GOOD REASON FOR NOT BELIEVING IN ANY SORT OF THEISTIC GOD WHATEVER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MADDEN1986, author = {MADDEN, EDWARD-H}, title = {WAS REID A NATURAL REALIST?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {255-276}, keywords = {metaphysics, realism}, abstract = {HAMILTON WORRIED THAT THERE WERE REPRESENTATIVE ELEMENTS IN REID'S EPISTEMOLOGY, WHILE J S MILL FLATLY CHARACTERIZED THE SCOT AS A REPRESENTATIVE REALIST. I ARGUE THAT HAMILTON AND MILL WERE MISTAKEN AND THAT THEIR MISTAKES AROSE FROM AN INSUFFICIENT UNDERSTANDING AND APPRECIATION OF THE NATIVISTIC ELEMENTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING INTRODUCED BY REID; AND TO INSUFFICIENT AWARENESS OF REID'S CHARACTERIZATION OF PERCEPTION AS ACTIVE IN CONTRAST TO BRITISH EMPIRICIST RELIANCE ON A PASSIVELY GIVEN EPISTEMIC BASE. REID REJECTED EVERY VARIETY OF THE "MESSENGER" THEORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MADDEN1973, author = {MADDEN, EDWARD-H and HARE, PETER}, title = {C J DUCASSE'S PROGRESSIVE, UNIVERSAL HEDONISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {36-50}, keywords = {altruism, ethics, hedonism, liberal-educatio}, abstract = {THOUGH C J DUCASSE PUBLISHED MUCH ON THE MEANING OF ETHICAL TERMS, HE PUBLISHED LITTLE OR NOTHING ON NORMATIVE ISSUES. SOME PHILOSOPHERS HAVE INFERRED FROM THIS FACT, PLUS HIS SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTIFYING MORAL FRAMEWORKS, THAT HE HELD NO NORMATIVE VIEW OF HIS OWN. THIS INFERENCE IS FALSE, HOWEVER, FOR IN HIS UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS HE FORMULATED AND DEFENDED A 'PROGRESSIVE, UNIVERSAL HEDONISM' WHICH EMPHASIZES THE MORAL CENTRALITY OF A LIBERAL EDUCATION THAT PRODUCES PEOPLE WHO IN FACT CARE ABOUT OTHERS IN CONTRAST WITH THE MORAL IRRELEVANCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL EFFORTS TO PROVE WHY ONE SHOULD CARE EVEN WHEN HE DOESN'T. THE POINT OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO RECONSTRUCT AND EXPLICATE DUCASSE'S HEDONISM, AND HIS REPLIES TO CRITICISMS, BY DRAWING UPON HIS UNPUBLISHED NOTES AS WELL AS HIS ARTICLES ON EDUCATION. IN OUR EVALUATION OF DUCASSE'S VIEW WE POINT OUT, ALONG WITH CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES, HOW HE CAN REBUT A CRITICAL OBJECTION BY APPLYING THE ADVERBIAL ANALYSIS HE PROPOSES OF 'SEEING THIS COLOR' TO 'EXPERIENCING THIS PLEASURE'.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MADDEN1967, author = {MADDEN, E-H and HARE, P-H}, title = {ON THE DIFFICULTY OF EVADING THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {58-69}, keywords = {christianity, evil, religion, theology}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE IS A CRITICISM OF THE EFFORTS OF KARL BARTH, PAUL TILLICH, AND LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHERS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE LATER WITTGENSTEIN TO EVADE THE PROBLEM OF EVIL. BOTH THE CONCEPTS OF A 'THEOLOGICAL CIRCLE' AND A 'LINGUISTIC CIRCLE'--THAT IS, NEO-ORTHODOXY IN THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY--ARE CRITICIZED IN DETAIL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MAHOWALD1973, author = {MAHOWALD, MARY-B}, title = {MARX'S "GEMEINSCHAFT": ANOTHER INTERPRETATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {472-488}, keywords = {community, man, social-philosophy; society}, abstract = {THIS IS A CLARIFICATION OF MARX'S CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY. SECTION I EXAMINES HIS VIEW OF MAN (I.E., THE 'GATTUNGSWESEN', OR SPECIES-BEING) AS ESSENTIALLY SOCIAL, PRODUCTIVE, AND FREE; SECTION II CONSIDERS THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF SOCIETY AS MEANS TO MAN'S PROGRESS IN HUMANNESS; AND SECTION III DEVELOPS THE NOTION OF COMMUNITY AS THE TOTAL HUMANIZATION OF SOCIETY. ANALYSES OF MARX'S USE OF PERTINENT TERMS (VIZ., 'GEMEINDE', 'GEMEINWESEN', 'GEMEINDEWESEN', 'GEMEINSCHAFT') AND OF SEVERAL POSSIBLE MEANINGS FOR COMMUNITY (E.G., A PRESENTLY EXISTING SOCIAL GROUP, OR A NOT-YET EXISTING COMMUNAL IDEAL) LEADS TO AN IDENTIFICATION OF 'GEMEINSCHAFT' WITH THE SECOND PHASE OF COMMUNISM, I.E., A SITUATION WHERE INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL INTERESTS ARE FINALLY WED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Maitzen2005, author = {Maitzen, Stephen}, title = {Anselmian Atheism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(1)}, pages = {225-239}, keywords = {atheism, conception, god, metaphysics}, abstract = {I develop an argument that confronts theology with a trilemma: (a) God does not exist, (b) no human being can have even the slightest conception of God, or (c) the Anselmian requirement of maximal greatness in God is wrong. My own view is that the argument establishes atheism. In any case, the argument shows that Anselmian theology is possible for human beings only if it lacks a genuine object of study.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Maitzen1995, author = {Maitzen, Stephen}, title = {Our Errant Epistemic Aim}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(4)}, pages = {869-876}, keywords = {content, epistemology, justification, knowledge, truth}, abstract = {Prominent epistemologists, including both externalists and internalists, have proposed (or often just assumed) that the ultimate aim, purpose, or value of epistemic justification is that of maximizing true belief and minimizing false belief. In spite of its endorsement by noted theorists, this explanation of the value of justification makes trouble, I try to show, for theories of justification which adopt it. Stated as the goal of epistemic justification--or as the reason we value justification--it generates the plainly unacceptable result that all and only true beliefs are justified.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MAKER1991, author = {MAKER, William}, title = {Davidson's Transcendental Arguments.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {epistemology, foundationalism, transcendental}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MALINOVICH1967, author = {MALINOVICH, STANLEY}, title = {A REPLY TO MR HOFFMAN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {441}, keywords = {epistemology, perceiving, seeing}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE DEFENDS RYLE'S ACHIEVEMENT ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION. MR. HOFFMAN ATTACKS AN EARLIER PAPER IN WHICH AYER'S CRITICISM OF RYLE IS CRITICISED. HOFFMAN CLAIMS (1) LOOKING AT AN OBJECT, AS DISTINCT FROM LOOKING FOR AN OBJECT, INSURES SEEING IT (HENCE NO SUCCESS), AND (2) THAT SEEING A PAINTING HAS A DURATION. (1) IS DENIED SINCE ONE MAY LOOK AT AN OBJECT AND NOT SEE IT. (2) IS DENIED BY PARALLELING IT WITH WINNING RACES. THE WINNING OF EACH RACE HAS NO DURATION; WINNING ALL DOES. SIMILARLY, THE SEEING OF EACH PART OF A PAINTING HAS NO DURATION; SEEING ALL DOES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MALINOVICH1964, author = {MALINOVICH, STANLEY}, title = {PERCEPTION: AN EXPERIENCE OR AN ACHIEVEMENT?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {161-168}, keywords = {achievement, doing, epistemology, experience, perception, sense-dat}, abstract = {PROFESSOR AYER'S CRITICISMS, IN "THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE", OF RYLE'S TREATMENT OF PERCEPTION ARE EXAMINED AND REJECTED. RYLE'S THESIS IS THAT THE CONCEPT OF PERCEPTION IS AN ACHIEVEMENT CONCEPT, AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS A MISTAKE TO LOOK FOR EXPERIENCES WHICH WILL INDICATE WHAT IS PERCEIVED. IT IS ARGUED THAT AYER DOES NOT SUCCEED IN MAKING OUT HIS CASE THAT THERE IS AN EXPERIENTIAL ASPECT IN PERCEPTUAL SITUATIONS WHICH SENSE-DATA PHILOSOPHERS HAVE RIGHTLY CALLED ATTENTION TO BUT WHICH RYLE'S ANALYSIS NEGLECTS. BY PARALLELING PERCEPTUAL SITUATIONS WITH NON-DISPUTABLE ACHIEVEMENT SITUATIONS, THE PAPER TRIES TO SHOW WHERE AYER ERRS IN HIS CLAIM THAT THERE ARE EXPERIENCES WHICH MUST BE IDENTIFIED WITH WHAT IS PERCEIVED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MALL1974, author = {MALL, R-A}, title = {ON REFLECTION AND NEGATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {79-92}, keywords = {epistemology, negation, perception, reflection}, abstract = {ONE OF THE MOST DECEITFUL CONCEPTS IN THE LONG HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY--INDIAN AS WELL AS WESTERN--IS THE CONCEPT OF NEGATION. AFTER GIVING A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF NEGATION IN RELATION TO REFLECTION UNDER DIFFERENT HEADS, E.G., PERCEPTION, INTENTION, LANGUAGE, IMAGINATION AND SO ON, THE AUTHOR WORKS OUT THE NON-PERCEPTUAL (REFLECTIVE) CHARACTER OF NEGATION WHICH LEADS HIM TO HIS THEORY OF 'REFLECTIVE FACTS'. THE AUTHOR PROCEEDS PHENOMENOLOGICALLY AND SEARCHES FOR THE NOETIC CORRELATE OF THE PERCEPTUALLY NEGATED NOEMA. THE AUTHOR ALSO REFERS TO THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF NEGATION AS THE IMAGINED PRESENCE OF A PERCEPTUALLY ABSENT OBJECT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MALONEY1986, author = {MALONEY, J-CHRISTOPHER}, title = {SENSATION AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {471-482}, keywords = {epistemology, object, realism, science, sensation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Malpas1998, author = {Malpas, Jeff}, title = {Unity, Locality and Agency: Bilgrami on Belief and Meaning}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {627-633}, keywords = {belief, meaning, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MANASSE1980, author = {MANASSE, E-M}, title = {A THEMATIC INTERPRETATION OF PLATO'S 'APOLOGY AND CRITO'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {393-400}, keywords = {ancient, historicity, textual-criticis}, abstract = {A DISCUSSION OF LUIS NOUSSAN-LETTRY'S "SPEKULATIVES DENKEN IN PLATONS FRUHSCHRIFTEN: APOLOGIE UND KRITON". "APOLOGY AND CRITO" ARE SAID NOT TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MEMORY OF THE HISTORICAL SOCRATES BUT TO BE PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISES CENTERED ABOUT A SINGLE THEME: THE "PRAGMA" OF SOCRATES, AND THAT IS DIALOGICAL EXISTENCE. EVERY PART OF THE TEXT IS EXPLAINED IN THE LIGHT OF THE CENTRAL THEME. BASIS AND AIM OF DIALOGICAL EXISTENCE IS HOMOLOGY WITH ONE'S PARTNER, A PERSON OR THE LAWS OF ATHENS. DESPITE SOME SHORTCOMINGS IN THE DISCUSSION OF METHOD, THE AUTHOR POINTS OUT AN ORIGINAL AND GENUINE APPROACH TO THE TWO DIALOGUES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MANICAS1966, author = {MANICAS, PETER-T}, title = {MEN, MACHINES, MATERIALISM, AND MORALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {238-246}, keywords = {ethics, machine, man, materialism, metaphysics, morality}, abstract = {PART I CONSIDERS WHETHER MATERIALISM SHOULD BE REJECTED ON MORAL GROUNDS. AFTER CLEARING AWAY SOME MISCONCEPTIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS, WE CONCLUDE THAT A MATERIALIST PHILOSOPHY IS NO BAR TO FORMULATING A PLAUSIBLE ETHIC. PART II ARGUES THAT MORAL CONSIDERATIONS DO BEAR ON THE DECISION TO ACCEPT OR REJECT MATERIALISM IN THE FOLLOWING SENSE: IF A FUTURE SCIENCE COULD CREATE AN ARTIFACT WHICH WE HAD GOOD REASON TO ADMIT TO THE MORAL COMMUNITY, THEN IT COULD BE SAID THAT MATERIALISM WAS A CORRECT METAPHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE UNIVERSE. PROBLEMS CONCERNING THIS ASSUMPTION ARE CONSIDERED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Mann1998, author = {Mann, William-E}, title = {Piety: Lending a Hand to Euthyphro}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {123-142}, keywords = {ethics, god, piety, sovereignty}, abstract = {Many philosophers take the point of Plato's Euthyphro to be an indictment of attempts to ground morality in religion, specifically in the attitudes of a deity or deities. It has been argued cogently in recent essays that Plato's case is far from conclusive. This essay suggests instead that the Euthyphro can be read more narrowly as raising critical questions about a specific religious virtue, piety. Then it presents the ingredients of a reply to those questions. The reply proceeds by suggesting that one need not accept the standards of definition used by Plato, and that one can provide an explanation of what piety is by embedding piety in a more comprehensive picture of the human, the divine, and the relations between the two. The picture makes use of a doctrine of divine sovereignty and a doctrine concerning love between God and humans.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Marcus2001, author = {Marcus, Eric}, title = {Mental Causation: Unnaturalized but not Unnatural}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(1)}, pages = {57-83}, keywords = {causation, mental, metaphysics, naturalism, physicalism}, abstract = {The central problem for a realist about mental causation is to show that mental causation is compatible with the causal completeness of physical systems. This problem has seemed intractable in large part because of a widely held view that any sort of systematic overdetermination of events by their causes is unacceptable. I account for the popularity of this view, but argue that we ought to reject it. In doing so, I show how we thereby undermine the idea that mental causes must be naturalizable in order to be legitimate. Thus, I argue that a non-naturalist conception of mental causation is compatible with a plausible kind of physicalism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MARCUS1990, author = {MARCUS, Ruth-Barcan}, title = {Some Revisionary Proposals About Belief and Believing.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, language}, abstract = {A departure is proposed from those language oriented accounts of "x believes that P" where P is taken as a sentence (e.g., Davidson, J Fodor) or a quasi-linguistic proposition (e.g., Frege et al.). Believing is here viewed as relating an agent and an actual or non-actual state-of-affairs, P, where under local internal and external circumstances an agent is disposed to act as if P obtains. Although speech acts such as first person belief reports are often markers of believing, they are shown to be neither necessary nor sufficient conditions. The position therefore accommodates beliefs of non-language users. A further revisionary proposal recommends that belief avowals should be retroactively revised where P is impossible, analogous to retroactive revising of knowledge avowals where P does not obtain.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Marcus1993, author = {Marcus, Ruth-Barcan}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {978-979}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Modalities: Philosophical Essays}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1993} } @article{MARGOLIS1982, author = {MARGOLIS, JOSEPH}, title = {THE REASONABLENESS OF RELATIVISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {91-97}, keywords = {metaphysics, relativism, scepticism}, abstract = {THIS IS A REJOINDER TO OBJECTIONS TO THE AUTHOR'S THEORY OF ROBUST RELATIVISM AND DEMONSTRATES, AGAINST MICHAEL WREEN, THAT THAT THEORY IS NOT INCONSISTENT, NOT IMMODERATE, AND DOES NOT ENATIL SKEPTICISM. A FORMALLY COHERENT MODEL OF RELTIVISM IS SPECIFIED AND THE KIND OF SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATIONS THAT WOULD ENCOURAGE ADOPTING A RELATIVISTIC POSITION ARE SAMPLED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MARGOLIS1963, author = {MARGOLIS, JOSEPH}, title = {LYING IS WRONG AND LYING IS NOT ALWAYS WRONG.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {414-418}, keywords = {argument, ethics, lying, moral-judgment; principle, tautology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Margolis1994, author = {Margolis, Joseph}, title = {Nicholas Rescher's Metaphilosophical Inquiries}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {427-432}, keywords = {analytic, epistemology, knowledge, model, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MARGOLIS1961, author = {MARGOLIS, JOSEPH}, title = {DESCRIBING AND INTERPRETING WORKS OF ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {537-542}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, criticism, describing, evaluation, interpretation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MARGOLIS1967, author = {MARGOLIS, JOSEPH}, title = {AYER ON PRIVACY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {259-263}, keywords = {epistemology, privacy}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MARGOLIS1964, author = {MARGOLIS, JOSEPH}, title = {CERTAINTY ABOUT SENSATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {242-247}, keywords = {certainty, epistemology, incorrigibility, pain, perception, sensation}, abstract = {IN THIS ARTICLE THE DISTINCTION IS DRAWN BETWEEN THE EXPERIENCE OF PAIN, WHICH IS FIRST PERSON AND DESCRIBING; AND, THE CAUSE OF PAIN, WHICH IS THIRD PERSON AND DEALING WITH PROBABLE CAUSES. IT IS MAINTAINED THAT MY OWN REPORTS AND DESCRIPTIONS ARE NOT CONTROVERTIBLE BY ANOTHER. ALSO, TRUTH CONDITIONS OF FIRST PERSON SENTENCES ARE DECIDED BY COMPARISON WITH TRUTH CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTUAL STATEMENTS. THE CONCLUSION IS DRAWN THAT A MAN KNOWS FOR CERTAIN WHEN HE IS IN PAIN, BUT NO SCIENCE CAN REST ON IT! (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Margolis1991, author = {Margolis, Joseph}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {964-966}, publisher = {Blackwell}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Truth About Relativism}, volume = {53(4)}, year = {1991} } @article{MARK1981, author = {MARK, THOMAS-CARSON}, title = {PHILOSOPHY ON PIANO PLAYING: REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF PERFORMANCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {299-324}, keywords = {aesthetics, music, performance}, abstract = {THIS PAPER DEALS WITH THE RELATION BETWEEN A WORK OF ART AND A PERFORMANCE OF THAT WORK. I CLAIM THAT PERFORMANCES ARE NOT NECESSARY FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE WORK PERFORMED, OR FOR ACQUAINTANCE WITH IT. I THEN DEVELOP THE CONCEPT OF PERFORMANCE BY EXPLOITING AN ANALOGY BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND CERTAIN SPEECH ACTS; PERFORMANCES ARE LIKE THOSE SPEECH ACTS WHICH ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY QUOTATION AND ASSERTION. THIS CONCEPT OF PERFORMANCE HELPS TO BRING OUT SOME ASPECTS OF WHAT PERFORMING IS LIKE, AND TO ILLUMINATE SOME FEATURES OF INTERPRETATION. FINALLY, IT PROVIDES A PERSPECTIVE IN WHICH WE CAN RECOGNIZE PERFORMANCES AS WORKS OF ART.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MARKIE1982, author = {MARKIE, PETER-J}, title = {THE COGITO PUZZLE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {59-81}, keywords = {certitude, cogito, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Markie2004, author = {Markie, Peter-J}, title = {Nondoxastic Perceptual Evidence}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {530-553}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, evidence, norm, perception}, abstract = {How does a particular experience evidence a particular perceptual belief for us? Promising, but unsuccessful, answers cite a reliable connection between our having the experience and the belief's being true, our having good reason to believe in such a connection, the proper functioning of our faculties, and objective epistemic norms. A superior view, developed here, is that our experience of being appeared to greenly evidences for us that something is green because we have learned to identify green objects by experiences of that sort. Our learning to do so amounts to our adopting an epistemic norm directing us to form that belief on the basis of that experience. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MARKIE1988, author = {MARKIE, PETER-J}, title = {MULTIPLE PROPOSITIONS AND "DE SE" ATTITUDES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {573-600}, keywords = {intentional, language, mental-states; phenomenology, proposition}, abstract = {THE MULTIPLE PROPOSITIONS THEORY SAYS THE "DE DICTO" FORM OF EACH INTENTIONAL ATTITUDE CONSISTS OF A RELATION BETWEEN A PERSON AND A PROPOSITION. IT TREATS THE "DE RE" AND "DE SE" FORMS OF EACH ATTITUDE AS SPECIAL CASES OF THE "DE DICTO" FORM, AND IT ASSUMES THAT TWO PEOPLE WITH THE SAME "DE SE" BELIEF BELIEVE SIMILAR BUT NUMERICALLY DISTINCT PROPOSITIONS. THIS ARTICLE DEFENDS THE THEORY AGAINST SEVERAL OBJECTIONS REGARDING "DE SE" BELIEF. IT ARGUES FOR THE THEORY'S SUPERIORITY TO FOUR OTHER THEORIES: THE SINGLE PROPOSITION THEORY, WHICH SAYS DIFFERENT PEOPLE WITH THE SAME "DE SE" BELIEF BELIEVE IDENTICAL PROPOSITIONS; THE MENTAL STATES-PROPOSITIONS THEORY, WHICH TREATS BELIEF AS A RELATION BETWEEN A BELIEVER, A PROPOSITION AND A BELIEF STATE; THE "DE SE" PROPERTY THEORY, WHICH TREATS "DE SE" BELIEF AS THE BASIC FORM OF BELIEF; AND THE "DE RE" PROPERTY THEORY, WHICH TREATS "DE RE" BELIEF AS THE BASIC FORM OF BELIEF.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Markie1996, author = {Markie, Peter-J}, title = {Goldman's New Reliabilism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {799-817}, keywords = {epistemology, folk, knowledge, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Markie2005, author = {Markie, Peter-J}, title = {Easy Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {406-416}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, perception, reliabilism}, abstract = {Stewart Cohen has recently presented solutions to two forms of what he calls "the problem of easy knowledge." I offer alternative solutions. Like Cohen's, my solutions allow for basic knowledge. Unlike his, they do not require that we distinguish between animal and reflective knowledge, restrict the applicability of closure under known entailments, or deny the ability of basic knowledge to combine with self-knowledge to provide inductive evidential support. My solution to the closure version of the problem covers a variation on the problem that is immune to Cohen's approach. My response to the bootstrapping version presents reasons to question whether the problem case, as Cohen presents it, is even possible, and, assuming it is, my solution avoids a false implication of Cohen's own. The key to my solutions for both versions is the distinction between an inference's transferring epistemic support, on the one hand, and its not begging the question against skeptics, on the other. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MARKING1962, author = {MARKING, KASPER-C}, title = {SOME QUALIFYING REMARKS ON LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {566-573}, keywords = {idea, language, linguistics, perception, relativity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Markosian2000, author = {Markosian, Ned}, title = {What Are Physical Objects?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {375-395}, keywords = {epistemology, object, physical, proposition, space}, abstract = {I consider several attempts at answering the question What are physical objects?, and give my reasons for preferring one of them over its rivals. The account that I defend--the spatial location account--defines physical objects as objects with spatial locations. The intuitive idea is this. Objects from all of the different ontological categories--physical objects; nonphysical objects like souls, if there are any; propositions; universals; etc.--have this much in common: they all exist in time. But not all of them exist in space. The ones that exist in time and space, i.e., the ones that have spatial locations, are the ones that count as physical objects.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Markosian2004, author = {Markosian, Ned}, title = {Two Arguments from Sider's Four Dimensionalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {665-673}, keywords = {composition, mereology, metaphysics, time-travel; vagueness}, abstract = {In this essay for a PPR book symposium on Theodore Sider's Four-Dimensionalism, I focus on two of Sider's arguments for four-dimensionalism: (i) his argument from vagueness, and (ii) his argument from time travel. Concerning (i), I first show that Sider's argument commits him to certain strange consequences that many four-dimensionalists may not endorse, and then I discuss an objection that involves appealing to 'brutal composition', the view that there is no informative answer to Peter van Inwagen's 'special composition question'. Concerning (ii), I argue that the three-dimensionalist can account for time travel scenarios in a way that is analogous to Sider's four-dimensionalist account of such scenarios.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Markosian1993, author = {Markosian, Ned}, title = {How Fast Does Time Pass?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {829-844}, keywords = {metaphysics, time}, abstract = {This paper has two main aims. The first is to present a coherent formulation of the view that time passes. The second is to spell out what has been an influential argument against that view, and to defend the view against that argument. The argument in question concerns the alleged incoherence of talk about the rate of the passage of time.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Marras2003, author = {Marras, Ausonio}, title = {Audi on Substantive vs Instrumental Rationality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {194-201}, keywords = {epistemology, instrumental, rationality, substantive}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MARRAS1968, author = {MARRAS, AUSONIO}, title = {INTENTIONALITY AND COGNITIVE SENTENCES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {257-263}, keywords = {cognition, epistemology, intentionality, sentence}, abstract = {I OFFER A CRITIQUE OF CHISHOLM'S THIRD CRITERION OF INTENTIONALITY IN "PERCEIVING," WHICH WAS DESIGNED TO SHOW THE INTENTIONALITY OF COGNITIVE ('KNOW') SENTENCES. THIS CRITERION APPEARS DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT FAILS TO SHOW THAT SIMPLE COGNITIVE SENTENCES (E.G. 'A KNOWS X') ARE INTENTIONAL WHILE INAPPROPRIATELY ALLOWING MODAL SENTENCES TO BE INTENTIONAL. A PROPOSAL BY J.W. CORNMAN IN FAVOR OF CONSTRUING COGNITIVE SENTENCES AS NONINTENTIONAL (WITH THE ADVANTAGE THAT CHISHOLM'S PROBLEMATIC THIRD CRITERION WOULD THEN BE DISPENSIBLE) IS EXAMINED AND REJECTED. IT IS THEN ARGUED THAT COGNITIVE SENTENCES CAN BE SHOWN TO BE INTENTIONAL BY SUPPLEMENTING EACH OF CHISHOLM'S FIRST TWO CRITERIA BY THE FOLLOWING CONDITION: "ANY SENTENCE WHICH ENTAILS A SENTENCE THAT IS INTENTIONAL BY THIS CRITERION IS ITSELF INTENTIONAL."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Marshall2001, author = {Marshall, Dan and Parsons, Josh}, title = {Langton and Lewis on "Intrinsic"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {347-351}, keywords = {intrinsic, metaphysics, modality, naturalism}, abstract = {In their paper "Defining 'Intrinsic'" Rae Langton and David Lewis propose a definition of intrinsicality in terms of modality and naturalness. We argue that this definition is subject to a clear counterexample. This counterexample highlights a deeper problem with Langton's and Lewis's approach: their account requires that there be facts about the relative naturalness of properties that the theories of natural properties they appeal to don't seem to provide.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MARSHALL1980, author = {MARSHALL, NORMAN-A}, title = {CORRIGIBILITY AND INFERENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {158-166}, keywords = {corrigibility, epistemology, evidence, inference}, abstract = {AN INFERENCE IS OVER AND ABOVE THE EVIDENCE ON WHICH IT IS BASED. AN EXAMINATION OF THIS CRITERION DEMONSTRATES THREE POINTS: 1) IN ORDER TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT A PARTICULAR KNOWLEDGE CLAIM GOES BEYOND THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED, ONE MUST FIRST PROPERLY DESCRIBE THE EVIDENCE. 2) THE PROPER DESCRIPTION OF THE EVIDENCE WILL DEPEND PARTIALLY ON THE PERSON USING THE EVIDENCE. 3) ONCE THE EVIDENCE IS PROPERLY DESCRIBED IT WILL BE SEEN THAT SOME KNOWLEDGE BASED ON EVIDENCE IS NOT INFERENTIAL, EVEN THOUGH CORRIGIBLE. AN APPLICATION OF THESE RESULTS TO THE MIND/BODY PROBLEM IS SHOWN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Martens1994, author = {Martens, David}, title = {Demonstratives, Descriptions, and Knowledge: A Critical Study of Three Recent Books}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {947-963}, keywords = {experience, mental, metaphysics, phenomena}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MARTIN1986, author = {MARTIN, C-B and PFEIFER, KARL}, title = {INTENTIONALITY AND THE NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {531-554}, keywords = {intentionality, language, metaphysics, speech-ac}, abstract = {IT IS SHOWN IN DETAIL THAT RECENT ACCOUNTS FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONALITY AND MERELY CAUSALLY DISPOSITIONAL STATES OF INORGANIC PHYSICAL OBJECTS--A QUICK ROAD TO PANPSYCHISM. THE CLEAR NEED TO MAKE SUCH A DISTINCTION GIVES DIRECTION FOR FUTURE WORK. A BEGINNING IS MADE TOWARD PROVIDING SUCH AN ACCOUNT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Martin2001, author = {Martin, M-F}, title = {Epistemic Openness and Perceptual Defeasibility}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {441-448}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, openness, perception}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MARTIN1969, author = {MARTIN, ROBERT-L}, title = {DRANGE ON TYPE CROSSINGS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {126-135}, keywords = {language, sentence, type}, abstract = {AFTER A BRIEF SUMMARY OF MAJOR ASPECTS OF THEODORE DRANGE'S "TYPE CROSSINGS" (THE HAGUE, 1966), I CRITICIZE DRANGE'S TREATMENT OF THE NEGATIONS OF TYPE CROSSINGS, SUGGEST THAT HIS USE OF THE TERM "MEANINGLESS" IS INSUFFICIENTLY PRECISE TO AID IN AN INVESTIGATION OF THE SORT HE HAS UNDERTAKEN, AND CONSIDER IN DETAIL SOME OF HIS ARGUMENTS FOR THE THESIS THAT THERE ARE NO TYPE RULES IN A NATURAL LANGUAGE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT PROFESSOR DRANGE HAS REPLIED TO MY CRITICISMS IN HIS "REPLY TO MARTIN ON TYPE CROSSINGS", 'PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH' 30, 136-139.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MARTIN1960, author = {MARTIN, R-M}, title = {ON WHITEHEAD'S CONCEPT OF ABSTRACTIVE HIERARCHIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {374-382}, keywords = {abstraction, cosmology, eternal-object; hierarchy, logic, metaphysics, type-theor}, abstract = {THE PURPOSES HERE ARE TO EXAMINE THE TEXT, "SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD", WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE CHAPTER: "ABSTRACTION," SINCE IT IS HELD THAT THIS CHAPTER CONTAINS A KEY TO UNDERSTANDING ONE VERY IMPORTANT ASPECT OF WHITEHEAD'S LATER COSMOLOGY. IT IS THE TEXT FOR THE DOCTRINE OF ETERNAL OBJECTS. IT IS MAINTAINED THAT THERE IS CLOSE FORMAL AFFINITY BETWEEN TYPE THEORY AND THE ANALYTICAL CHARACTER OF THE REALM OF ETERNAL OBJECTS. FINALLY, WHITEHEAD WAS PRESUPPOSING THE TYPE THEORY AS THE UNDERLYING LOGIC OF HIS LATER COSMOLOGY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MARTIN1982, author = {MARTIN, R-M}, title = {A MEMO ON METHOD: HILARY PUTNAM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {587-603}, keywords = {logic, mathematics, methodology, ontology}, abstract = {MOST OF THE DIFFICULTIES WITH PUTNAM'S GENERAL METHODOLOGY IN HIS "MATHEMATICS, MATTER AND METHOD" (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1975) CAN BE TRACED BACK TO HIS LACK OF INTEREST IN EXACT STATEMENT AND FORMALIZATION. HE RESTS CONTENT WITH FORMALIZATION IN MATHEMATICS, BUT IS SLOW TO ESPOUSE IT WHEN WE STEP BEYOND. HE WRITES PHILOSOPHY IN THE INTUITIVE STYLE OF THE WORKING SCIENTIST. CURIOUSLY, HOWEVER, THE METHODOLOGICAL SITUATION OF THE PHILOSOPHER, AS COMPARED WITH THAT OF THE SCIENTIST, IS JUST THE OTHER WAY AROUND. FORMALIZATION IN MATHEMATICS IS OF COURSE OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE, BUT IS NOT ALWAYS NEEDED. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MARTIN1963, author = {MARTIN, R-M}, title = {ON THE FREGE-CHURCH THEORY OF MEANING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {605-609}, keywords = {denotation, language, meaning, proper-name; sense, term}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Martin1998, author = {Martin, Raymond}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {718-720}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to What Matters in Survival}, volume = {61(3)}, year = {1998} } @other{Martin1993, author = {Martin, Rex}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {241-244}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A System of Rights}, volume = {56(1)}, year = {1993} } @article{MARTINICH1979, author = {MARTINICH, A-P}, title = {REFERRING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {157-172}, keywords = {hearing, identification, intentionality, language, referring, speech-ac}, abstract = {REFERRING IS AN ACT OF COMMUNICATION AND AS SUCH REQUIRES BOTH A SPEAKER INTENDING TO GET A HEARER TO IDENTIFY AN OBJECT THROUGH THE USE OF A SINGULAR TERM AND THE HEARER ACTUALLY IDENTIFYING AN OBJECT AS THE INTENDED REFERENT. IN ADDITION TO PARADIGMATIC REFERENCE AND UNSUCCESSFUL REFERENCE, IT IS NECESSARY TO DISTINGUISH VARIOUS TYPES OF SUCCESSFUL BUT DEFECTIVE REFERENCE. THESE DISTINCTIONS CAN BE USED TO SHOW THAT INSTANCES OF THE SO-CALLED ATTRIBUTIVE USE ARE IN FACT CASES OF THE REFERENTIAL USE AND THAT DONNELLAN EQUIVOCATED ON THE EXPRESSION "CORRECT IDENTIFICATION" WHEN ARGUING THAT THERE IS AN ATTRIBUTIVE USE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MASLOW1967, author = {MASLOW, VERA}, title = {LUKACS' MAN-CENTERED AESTHETICS}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {542-552}, keywords = {aesthetics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MATHUR1974, author = {MATHUR, D-C}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF ACTION IN THE BHAGAVAD-GITA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {34-45}, keywords = {action, hinduism, religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MATHUR1975, author = {MATHUR, D-C}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE AND THE CONTEMPORARY CRISIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {391-395}, keywords = {crisis, social-philosoph}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO ANALYSE THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE CRISIS WHICH OVERTOOK AMERICA FROM 1967 TO 1970, AND SUGGEST A WAY TO OVERCOME IT. IT DESCRIBES THE SYMPTOMS OF THE CRISIS AS MANIFESTED IN THE DRUG SUBCULTURE, RACIAL TENSIONS, URBAN DECADENCE, SEX DISCRIMINATION, AND THE WHOLESALE WITHDRAWAL OF THE AMERICAN YOUTH FROM THE MAINSTREAM OF AMERICAN LIFE. THE CAUSES OF THE CRISIS ARE LOCATED IN AMERICAN "EXPERIENCE" AS A WHOLE AND ITS UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF "EXISTENCE" DERIVED FROM VARIOUS SOURCES SUCH AS RUGGED INDIVIDUALISM OF THE PIONEERS, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, 19TH CENTURY CAPITALISM, THEORIES OF EVOLUTION, EMERSON, THOREAU, ZEN AND CONTEMPORARY EXISTENTIALISM, ETC. A CORRECT VIEW OF HUMAN EXISTENCE IN ITS NATIONAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS IS SUGGESTED TO REPLACE BOTH ROMANTIC AND DETERMINISTIC VIEWS OF HUMAN NATURE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MATHUR1972, author = {MATHUR, D-C}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF SELF IN THE UPANISHADS: AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {390-396}, keywords = {hinduism, religion, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MATHUR1981, author = {MATHUR, DINESH-C}, title = {ABHINAVAGUPTA AND DEWEY ON ART AND ITS RELATION TO MORALITY: COMPARISONS AND EVALUATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {224-235}, keywords = {aesthetic-relevance; aesthetics, morality, rasa, theory}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO ANALYZE, COMPARE AND EVALUATE THE AESTHETIC THEORIES OF THE INDIAN METAPHYSICAL IDEALIST ABHINAVAGUPTA (CA.1000) AND THE NATURALIST JOHN DEWEY AND EXPLORE THEIR BEARING ON THE RELATION OF ART TO MORALITY. IT BRINGS OUT THE REMARKABLE SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE THEORY OF "RASA" AS DEVELOPED BY ABHINAVA FOLLOWING BHARATA'S "NATYA-SASTRA" AND DEWEY'S KEY AESTHETIC CONCEPT OF "CONSUMMATORY EXPERIENCES" AS DEVELOPED IN HIS CLASSIC "ART AS EXPERIENCE". BOTH OF THEM EMPLOYED A COMMON METHODOLOGY AND ANALYZED THE WORK OF ART IN TERMS OF THE TOTAL PERVASIVE QUALITY OF THE AESTHETIC SITUATION WHICH IS NEITHER PURELY OBJECTIVE NOR PURELY SUBJECTIVE BUT IS A DYNAMIC UNION OF VARIOUS CONSTITUENTS. BOTH OF THEM GAVE A PROMINENT PLACE TO THE FACTOR OF CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION IN ARTISTIC CREATION. DESPITE THEIR DIFFERENT METAPHYSICAL OUTLOOKS BOTH MAINTAINED THE AUTONOMY OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND PUT FORWARD A SOPHISTICATED RELATION BETWEEN ART AND MORALITY. HOWEVER, SOME DIFFERENCES IN VIEWPOINT ARE ALSO BROUGHT OUT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MATTHEWS1990, author = {MATTHEWS, Gareth-B}, title = {Aristotelian Essentialism.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {essentialism, metaphysics}, abstract = {This article reviews most of the recent efforts to characterize Aristotle's essentialism. Almost all founder on (1) a failure to appreciate that Aristotle does not have our idea of a thing "quite independently of the language in which the thing is referred to, if at all" and on (2) an inadequate appreciation of the fact that we couldn't determine whether having p belongs to the Aristotelian essence of an F without having at hand a satisfactory Aristotelian science of F's.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Maund1995, author = {Maund, Barry}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {735-737}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Colours: Their Nature and Representation}, volume = {58(3)}, year = {1995} } @article{MAUND1977, author = {MAUND, J-B}, title = {ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERCEPTUAL AND ORDINARY BELIEFS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {209-219}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, image, memory, perception}, abstract = {IN THIS ARTICLE, OBJECTIONS ARE RAISED TO G PITCHER'S EPISTEMIC ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION WHICH PURPORTS TO ELIMINATE REFERENCE TO SENSE-IMPRESSIONS (AS COMMONLY UNDERSTOOD). IN HOLDING THAT TO BE IN A PERCEPTUAL STATE IS TO ACQUIRE BY SPECIAL CAUSAL MEANS CERTAIN BELIEF STATES, PITCHER ARGUES FOR A CRUCIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERCEPTUAL BELIEFS AND 'THIN' ORDINARY BELIEFS. THE FORMER BELIEFS ARE SAID TO DIFFER IN COMPLEXITY, THE LATTER IN RICHNESS AND VIVIDNESS. IN CRITICISM OF PITCHER IT IS ARGUED (A) THAT MANY ORDINARY NON-PERCEPTUAL BELIEFS ARE RICHER, MORE COMPLEX AND MORE VIVID THAN MANY PERCEPTUAL BELIEFS, (B) THAT PITCHER'S ACCOUNT ALONE CANNOT SUPPORT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERCEIVED AND UNPERCEIVED PROPERTIES OF THE SAME PHYSICAL OBJECT AND (C) THAT THE FACT THAT WE CAN DISTINGUISH, IN THE CASE OF MEMORY, BETWEEN REMEMBERING WITH MEMORY IMAGES AND REMEMBERING WITHOUT SUCH IMAGES, SHOWS THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH IN THE CASE OF PERCEPTION, BETWEEN PERCEIVING WITH PERCEPTUAL IMAGES AND PERCEIVING WITHOUT SUCH IMAGES AND HENCE SHOWS THAT PITCHER'S ACCOUNT FAILS AS A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{May1997, author = {May, Todd}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {721-723}, publisher = {Penn State Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Reconsidering Difference: Nancy, Derrida, Levinas, and Deleuze}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1997} } @other{May1995, author = {May, Todd}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {271-273}, publisher = {Penn St Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Moral Theory of Poststructuralism}, volume = {59(1)}, year = {1995} } @article{MAYER-HILLEBRAND1963, author = {MAYER-HILLEBRAND, FRANZISKA}, title = {REMARKS CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRANZ BRENTANO: A REPLY TO DR SRZEDNICKI.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {438-444}, keywords = {development, philosophy, publication, system}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McCall2005, author = {McCall, Storrs and Lowe, Jonathan}, title = {Indeterminist Free Will}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {681-690}, keywords = {choice, consistency, free-will; indeterminism, libertarianism, metaphysics}, abstract = {The aim of the paper is to prove the consistency of libertarianism. We examine the example of Jane, who deliberates at length over whether to vacation in Colorado (C) or Hawaii (H), weighing the costs and benefits, consulting travel brochures, etc. Underlying phenomenological deliberation is an indeterministic neural process in which nonactual motor neural states n(C) and n(H) corresponding to alternatives C and H remain physically possible up until the moment of decision. The neurophysiological probabilities pr(n(C)) and pr(n(H)) evolve continuously according to the different weights Jane's judgement attaches to C and H at different times during the deliberation. The overall process is indeterministic, since Jane's exact judgemental weighting would vary slightly were the process to be repeated from the same initial conditions. The weighting is however rational, and entirely under Jane's control. This controlled, rational, indeterministic process shows that libertarianism is a consistent philosophical thesis.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{McClamrock1995, author = {McClamrock, Ron}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {537-541}, publisher = {Univ of Chicago Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World}, volume = {59(2)}, year = {1995} } @article{MCCLOSKEY1964, author = {MCCLOSKEY, H-J}, title = {THE PHILOSOPHY OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS AND THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {329-338}, keywords = {language, linguistic-analysis; metaphysics, methodology, naming, problem, resemblance, universal}, abstract = {IT IS ARGUED THAT LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS DOES NOT DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS IN A SATISFACTORY WAY. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF RYLE, WITTGENSTEIN AND PEARS ARE CONSIDERED. IT IS HELD THAT THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS IS A GENUINE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM AND DOES NOT ADMIT OF BEING DISPOSED OF BY CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS. MOREOVER, THE FAILURE OF ATTEMPTS BY LINGUISTIC ANALYSTS HERE MUST CAST DOUBT ON THE SOUNDNESS OF THEIR BOLD ANTIMETAPHYSICAL CLAIMS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS IS NOT PRIMARILY ONE OF NAMING, BUT RATHER OF RESEMBLANCES. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MCCLOSKEY1980, author = {MCCLOSKEY, H-J}, title = {JUSTIFICATION, AND THE PROBLEMS TO WHICH IT GIVES RISE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {536-557}, keywords = {civil-disobedience; conscientious-objection; justification, moral-agent; necessity, political-philosophy; right}, abstract = {THE PREVALENCE AND MORAL PERMISSIBILITY OF MUCH CRIMINAL CONDUCT WHICH "IN ITSELF" IS NOT IMMORAL AND THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION TO ESTABLISH THE IMMORALITY OF SUCH ACTS ARE NOTED. IT IS THEN ARGUED THAT CONSCIENTIOUS DISOBEDIENCE OF THE LAW IS DICTATED BY THE NATURE OF MORALITY, MORAL AUTONOMY, AND MORAL INTEGRITY. IT IS ARGUED THAT THE CONSEQUENTIALIST ARGUMENTS FOR CONSCIENTIOUS CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE ESTABLISH A STRONGER, LESS QUALIFIED MORAL RIGHT, ONE NOT NECESSARILY TIED TO THE SUCCESS OF THE DISOBEDIENCE, THAN IS COMMONLY CLAIMED. PROBLEMS CONCERNING HOW STATES CAN AND OUGHT TO RESPOND TO CONSCIENTIOUS DISOBEDIENCE ARE THEN DISCUSSED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MCCLURE1978, author = {MCCLURE, GEORGE}, title = {CONTINGENT A PRIORI TRUTHS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {399-409}, keywords = {a-priori; certainty, contingency, epistemology, experience, knowledge, necessity, synthetic-a-priori; truth}, abstract = {WHILE AFFIRMING THE EXISTENCE OF SYNTHETIC A PRIORI TRUTHS (SAPT'S), THAT IS, TRUTHS RESTING UPON THE VERY MEANING OF THE TERMS OR CONCEPTS USED, KNOWABLE PRIOR TO EXPERIENCE TO WHICH THEY RELATE, ETC., IT IS ARGUED HERE THAT THESE TRUTHS ARE CONTINGENT, CORRIGIBLE. TWO SETS OF GROUNDS FOR THIS CLAIM ARE OFFERED: EPISTEMIC AND ONTIC. THE FIRST SET TRIES TO SHOW THAT OUR GRASP OF OR KNOWLEDGE OF SAPT'S IS FAULTY OR LESS THAN COMPLETE; THE SECOND SET TRIES TO SHOW THAT THE VERY NATURE OF THE PATTERNS DEALT WITH BY SAPT'S RESULTS IN CONTINGENCY. THESE PATTERNS BLEND, IN PLATO'S SENSE, AND THEIR INSTANTIATIONS ARE OFTEN NOVEL OR CREATIVE. THE TWO SETS OF ARGUMENTS LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, IN APHORISTIC FORM, THE TRUTH OF SAPT'S IS CONTEXT-RELATED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MCCLURE1964, author = {MCCLURE, GEORGE}, title = {RESEMBLANCE AND PURPOSE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {180-187}, keywords = {context, metaphysics, order, perception, purpose, resemblance, universal}, abstract = {I ARGUE THAT A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE LOGIC OF RESEMBLANCE STATEMENTS REQUIRES THE USE OF SECOND-ORDER PREDICATES, GIVING THE RESPECT IN WHICH THE RESEMBLANCE IS TO BE NOTED. THUS, "X RESEMBLES Y" GETS EXPANDED INTO, "X RESEMBLES Y WITH RESPECT TO SOME F." I THEN SHOW THAT THE FULL EXPLICATION OF WHAT IS INVOLVED IN THE STATEMENT OF THIS THIRD, OR CONTEXT-CONFERRING TERM, MUST INCLUDE VALUES: THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE RESEMBLANCE IS TO BE NOTED. THOUGH NOT EXPLICITLY ARGUED, THE ARTICLE WAS DESIGNED TO ILLUSTRATE THE UTILITY OF THE ASSUMPTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF UNIVERSALS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McConnell1994, author = {McConnell, Terrance}, title = {On the Nature and Scope of Morality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {421-425}, keywords = {ethics, knowledge, morality, relativism, scope}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MCCULLAGH1980, author = {MCCULLAGH, C-B}, title = {HISTORICAL REALISM HANS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {420-425}, keywords = {epistemology, historical-realism; science}, abstract = {THE ARGUMENTS DEPLOYED BY LEON J GOLDSTEIN AGAINST HISTORICAL REALISM ARE EXAMINED. ALTHOUGH SUCCESSFUL IN DENYING A NAIVE FORM OF HISTORICAL REALISM, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THEY DO NOT INVALIDATE A MORE SOPHISTICATED FORM, NAMELY THE DOCTRINE THAT IT IS SOMETIMES REASONABLE TO BELIEVE AN HISTORICAL STATEMENT CORRECTLY DESCRIBES EVENTS WHICH HAVE ACTUALLY OCCURRED IN THE PAST.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McCullagh2002, author = {McCullagh, Mark}, title = {Self-Knowledge Failures and First Person Authority}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {365-380}, keywords = {authority, epistemology, person, self-knowledg}, abstract = {While the core idea behind Davidson's and Burge's accounts appears inadequate to this task, I argue that it can be deployed in such a way as to deliver the desired result. What makes this possible is that two attitude-types can differ as follows: the self-knowledge required for an utterance to be a phiing that p is different from the self-knowledge required for it to be a psiing that p. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MCDOUGALL1973, author = {MCDOUGALL, DEREK-A}, title = {'DESCRIPTIVE' AND 'REVISIONARY' METAPHYSICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {209-223}, keywords = {description, language, metaphysics, ordinary-languag}, abstract = {THE NOTION OF A DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS PRESUPPOSES THAT THE IDEA WHICH PERSONS HAVE OF THEMSELVES AS BELONGING TO A SPATIO-TEMPORAL WORLD IS PRE-THEORETICAL: THE CATEGORIES REVEALED IN A DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF THE COMMON SENSE VIEW OF THE WORLD SHOULD BE REGARDED, NOT AS ELEMENTS IN A THEORY ABOUT THE WORLD SO MUCH AS BASIC ELEMENTS IN THEIR CONCEPTUAL EQUIPMENT WHICH ALLOW PERSONS TO DEAL WITH IT. THIS BEING ESTABLISHED AS A PRINCIPLE OF MUCH RECENT PHILOSOPHY, IT REMAINS TO SHOW HOW ONE CAN DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE THEORETICAL AND PRE-THEORETICAL ELEMENTS IN EXPERIENCE, TO WHAT EXTENT THIS CATEGORICAL STRUCTURE CAN BE SAID TO DELIMIT IN ADVANCE THE THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS WHICH PHILOSOPHERS PRODUCE IN REFLECTING UPON IT, AND LASTLY, WHAT HOPE THERE IS FOR REVISIONARY METAPHYSICS ITSELF.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McDowell2003, author = {McDowell, John}, title = {Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {675-681}, keywords = {coherentism, epistemology, objectivity, subjectivity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McDowell1997, author = {McDowell, John}, title = {Brandom on Representation and Inference}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {157-162}, keywords = {epistemology, inference, linguistics, meaning, representation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McDowell2004, author = {McDowell, John}, title = {Reality and Colours: Comment on Stroud}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {395-400}, keywords = {a-priori; color, metaphysics, reality, subjectivism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McDowell1998, author = {McDowell, John}, title = {Reply to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {403-431}, keywords = {existence, metaphysics, world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McDowell1998a, author = {McDowell, John}, title = {Precis of Mind and World}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {365-368}, keywords = {metaphysics, mind, myth, world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McDowell2002, author = {McDowell, John}, title = {Knowledge and the Internal Revisited}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {97-105}, keywords = {epistemology, inference, internal, justification, knowledge}, abstract = {In "Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons," Robert Brandom reads my "Knowledge and the Internal" as sketching a position that, when properly elaborated, opens into his own social-perspectival conception of knowledge (and of objectivity in general). But this depends on taking me to hold that there cannot be justification for a belief sufficient to exclude the possibility that the belief is false. And that is exactly what I argued against in "Knowledge and the Internal." (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McDowell2001, author = {McDowell, John}, title = {Comment on Richard Schantz, "The Given Regained"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {181-184}, keywords = {concept, epistemology, experience, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McDowell1995, author = {McDowell, John}, title = {Knowledge and the Internal}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(4)}, pages = {877-893}, keywords = {epistemology, external, internal, knowledge, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McFarl1999, author = {McFarland, Duncan}, title = {Mark Johnston's Substitution Principle: A New Counterexample?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {683-689}, keywords = {a-priori; conditional, epistemology, substitution}, abstract = {According to a subjectivist view of some concept, C, there is an a priori implication of subjective responses in C's application or possession conditions. Subjectivists who intend their view to be descriptive of our practice with C will hold that it is possible for there to be true empirical claims which explain such responses in terms of certain things being C. Mark Johnston's "missing-explanation argument" employs a substitution principle with a view to establishing that these strands of subjectivism are inconsistent. I suggest that Johnston's substitution principle survives an attempt by Alexander Miller to show that it is unreliable, but that it is prey to a counterexample which cannot be explained away by the proponent of the missing-explanation argument. I conclude that the missing-explanation argument poses no threat to subjectivism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MCGILL1966, author = {MCGILL, V-J}, title = {BEHAVIORISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {578-588}, keywords = {behaviorism, experience, methodology, phenomenology, psychology, science, textual-criticis}, abstract = {A SYMPOSIUM (1964) OF PHILOSOPHERS AND PSYCHOLOGISTS DISCUSSED THE ISSUE: WHETHER BEHAVIORISM CAN DEAL WITH PRIVACY AND PRIVATE DATA. SKINNER HELD THAT PEOPLE ORDINARILY ACCOUNT FOR BEHAVIOR IN MENTAL TERMS, BUT SUCH EXPLANATIONS ARE ABBREVIATIONS OF THE REAL THING. MALCOLM HELD THAT BEHAVIORISM FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR INTROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE AND CANNOT GIVE AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION OF FIRST PERSON SINGULAR REPORTS. MACLEOD ILLUSTRATED THE NEGLECT AND USE OF PHENOMENOLOGY. SCRIVEN PREDICTED THAT THE PRESENT DISORGANIZED AND FRAGMENTED STATE OF PSYCHOLOGY WOULD PERSIST. CARL ROGERS WAS CRITICAL OF THE OBJECTIVE METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND THEIR FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THAT THEY DEPEND ON "SUBJECTIVE KNOWING." (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MCGILL1963, author = {MCGILL, V-J}, title = {EPISTEMOLOGICAL DUALISM AND THE PARTITION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {511-526}, keywords = {data, dualism, epistemology, immediacy, memory, object, perception, transcendence}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MCGILL1960, author = {MCGILL, V-J}, title = {CONFLICTING THEORIES OF FREEDOM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {437-452}, keywords = {freedom, self-determination; self-development; self-realization; social-philosophy; type}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE DISCUSSES TYPES OF FREEDOM AS DISTINGUISHED AND INTERRELATED BY CHRISTOFF AND GEIGER, AND THE OVERALL TREATMENT OF THE RIVAL FREEDOMS GIVEN BY ADLER AND MCKEON. IT IS ARGUED THAT THE INSIGHTS OF THE VARIOUS TYPES OF FREEDOM RECOGNIZED BY THE ABOVE AUTHORS CAN BE INCLUDED IN ONE OF THEM--THE THEORY OF "SELF-REALIZATION," THAT FREEDOM IS THE ABILITY TO DO AS ONE PLEASES UNDER FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE ARTICLE ALSO EXPLORES THE THREE FREEDOMS OF SELF-REALIZATION, PERFECTION, AND DETERMINATION. FREEDOM OCCURS IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND/OR ONE'S ABILITIES ENABLE THE PERSON TO DO AS HE PLEASES. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ONE SHOULD UNDERSTAND FREEDOM RELATIVE TO THE PARTICULAR DESIRE THE INDIVIDUAL CAN ACT UPON OR FULFILL, INSTEAD OF TALKING ELLIPTICALLY OF UNQUALIFIED FREEDOM. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McGrath2002, author = {McGrath, Matthew}, title = {Scott Soames: Understanding Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {410-417}, keywords = {language, logic, truth, understanding}, abstract = {Scott Soames has written a valuable book. It is unmatched in its clear expositions and evaluations of the theories of truth of Tarski, Kripke, and Strawson, and much other formal and philosophical work on truth. Its centerpiece is the application of a theory of partial definitions to the liar paradox and the problem of vagueness. Most of my discussion will focus on this important contribution. I close with an examination of Soames's discussion of T-sentences. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McGrath2003, author = {McGrath, Matthew}, title = {What the Deflationist May Say about Truthmaking}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(3)}, pages = {666-688}, keywords = {belief, deflationism, epistemology, proposition, truth}, abstract = {The correspondence theory of truth is often thought to be supported by the intuition that if a proposition (sentence, belief) is true, then something makes it true. I argue that this appearance is illusory and is sustained only by a conflation of two distinct notions of truthmaking, existential and nonexistential. Once the conflation is exposed, I maintain, deflationism is seen to be adequate for accommodating truthmaking intuitions.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MCKEON1981, author = {MCKEON, RICHARD}, title = {PHILOSOPHY AS AN AGENT OF CIVILIZATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {419-436}, keywords = {civilization, culture, history, humanism, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McKerlie2005, author = {McKerlie, Dennis}, title = {The Ethics of Killing by Jeff McMahan}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {477-490}, keywords = {death, ethics, harm, killing, rights}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MCKIE1987, author = {MCKIE, JOHN-R}, title = {THE PERSUASIVENESS OF ZENO'S PARADOXES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {631-639}, keywords = {persuasion, phenomenology, philosophy, zeno's-parado}, abstract = {IT HAS BEEN ARGUED THAT WE FIND ZENO'S PARADOXES OF MOTION PERSUASIVE BECAUSE PHYSICAL TIME IS DENSE AND CONTINUOUS, WHILE TIME AS WE EXPERIENCE IT IS DISCRETE. BUT WE DO NOT EXPERIENCE TIME AS A SUCCESSION OF DISTINCT, COUNTABLE, CONSECUTIVELY ORDERED MENTAL "NOWS." NOR IS IT COMMON TO ATTEMPT THE FUTILE MENTAL TASK OF TRAVERSING IN THOUGHT THE INFINITE NUMBER OF SPATIAL SUBINTERVALS IN ZENO'S PARADOXES, AS HAS ALSO BEEN SUGGESTED. RATHER, WE FIND THE PARADOXES PERSUASIVE BECAUSE THERE ARE A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT CONCEPTUAL AND LINGUISTIC PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THEM. FOR INSTANCE, UNDERSTANDING HOW IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ACHILLES TO COME TO THE END OF AN ENDLESS SEQUENCE OF SPATIAL INTERVALS REQUIRES DISAMBIGUATING DIFFERENT SENSES OF THE WORD "END."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McKitrick2003, author = {McKitrick, Jennifer}, title = {The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Dispositions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {349-369}, keywords = {brain, counterfactual, disposition, epistemology, identity}, abstract = {Many philosophers hold that all dispositions must have independent causal bases. I challenge this view, hence defending the possibility of bare dispositions. In part 1, I explain more fully what I mean by "disposition," "causal basis," and "bare disposition." In part 2, I consider the claim that the concept of a disposition entails that dispositions are not bare. In part 3, I consider arguments, due to Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, that dispositions necessarily have distinct causal bases. In part 4, I consider arguments by Smith and Stoljar that there can't be bare dispositions because they would make for unwelcome "barely true" counterfactuals. In the end, I find no reason to deny the possibility of bare dispositions.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{McLaughlin1993, author = {McLaughlin, Brian}, title = {On Punctate Content and on Conceptual Role}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {653-660}, keywords = {content, language, linguistics, punctuation, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{McMahan2002, author = {McMahan, Jeff}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {477-490}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life}, volume = {71(2)}, year = {2002} } @article{Meeker2004, author = {Meeker, Kevin}, title = {Justification and the Social Nature of Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(1)}, pages = {156-172}, keywords = {belief, deontology, epistemology, justification, knowledge, social}, abstract = {In this paper I shall closely examine some of Gilbert Harman's cases that purport to show that one can have a justified true belief that does not constitute knowledge because of the social environment. I shall provide an account of these cases that helps us not only understand why the people in these situations lack knowledge, but also why philosophers have a difficult time evaluating these cases. More specifically, I shall argue that in these cases we should conclude that the cognizers lack justification. I shall also show how this account sheds some light on certain aspects of the internalism/externalism debate}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Meeker2006, author = {Meeker, Kevin}, title = {Was Hume a Proper Functionalist?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {72(1)}, pages = {120-136}, keywords = {epistemology, proper-function; scepticism, warrant}, abstract = {Nicholas Wolterstorff has claimed that David Hume hinted at a proper functionalist account that anticipates the epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In this paper, I shall argue that we should refrain from attributing a proper functionalist epistemology to Hume. I shall first raise doubts as to how one could fit a notion of proper functioning into Hume's descriptive project. Next, I shall argue that adopting a proper functionalist epistemology would undermine some of Hume's most famous claims about causal inferences.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MEGILL1970, author = {MEGILL, KENNETH-A}, title = {THE COMMUNITY IN MARX'S PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {382-393}, keywords = {being, community, democracy, political-philosophy; state}, abstract = {MARX DEVELOPS HIS CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY IN THREE WAYS: AS THE PRE-CAPITALIST FORM OF ASSOCIATION WHICH IS LIMITED AND AREA-BOUND, AS THE STATELESS SOCIETY WHICH IS THE "FORM AND DYNAMIC PRINCIPLE OF THE FUTURE", AND AS A WAY OF BEING. TO UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF DEMOCRACY, WE MUST LOOK AT THE CONCRETE WAY IN WHICH MAN LIVES IN COMMUNITY. THE DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY IS UNIVERSAL, CLASSLESS, HISTORICAL AND SCIENTIFIC. MARX'S SERVICE TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY LIES IN HIS TRANSCENDENCE OF THE LIBERAL THEORY OF POLITICS AND SOCIETY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MEI1963, author = {MEI, TSU-LIN}, title = {THE LOGIC OF DEPTH GRAMMAR.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {97-105}, keywords = {depth, grammar, language, linguistics, methodology, ordinary-language; structure}, abstract = {THE OVERALL PURPOSE IS TO CLARIFY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY AND STRUCTURAL LINGUISTICS. THE AUTHOR ILLUSTRATES, WITH TWO EXAMPLES OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY (FREGE AND RYLE), THAT HEREIN IS STRUCTURAL LINGUISTICS IN DISGUISE. THEIR DISTINCTIONS CAN BE MADE IN TERMS OF THE OCCURRENCE OF EXPRESSIONS RELATIVE TO OTHER EXPRESSIONS, WITHOUT THE INTRUSION OF FEATURES SUCH AS MEANING OR USE. THEREFORE, HE ASKS US TO RECONSIDER THE NATURE OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY, BECAUSE IT IS SUFFICIENT, IF CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION IS THE AIM, TO ATTEND TO THE GRAMMATICAL FORMS OF LANGUAGE ALONE. LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY WILL BE NEEDED LESS AS WE KNOW MORE ABOUT ENGLISH. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Meil1994, author = {Meiland, Jack-W}, title = {Cognitive Schemes and Truth as an Ideal}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {403-407}, keywords = {cognition, epistemology, idealism, metaphysics, truth}, abstract = {One way to think of the pursuit of knowledge is as the use of new conceptual perspectives to come closer to the truth without ever reaching it. Truth serves as an ideal here, not something we can actually attain. After discussion of such notions as levels of truth and intuitive apprehension, it is concluded that the doctrine of conceptual perspectives is not compatible with the doctrine of truth as an ideal.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MEISSNER1966, author = {MEISSNER, W-W}, title = {THE IMPLICATIONS OF EXPERIENCE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {503-528}, keywords = {behavior, evidence, experience, methodology, psychology, science, theory}, abstract = {THE QUESTION IS RAISED WHETHER THE METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY ARE ADEQUATE TO PROVIDE AN ACCOUNT OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN TERMS MEANINGFUL FOR HUMAN EXISTENCE. ALSO, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH IT RESTS IS DISCUSSED. "CORRELATIONISM" AND "CONSTRUCTURALISM" ARE PRESENTED AS TWO OPPOSITE ORIENTATIONS TO THEORY IN PSYCHOLOGY. THE AUTHOR QUESTIONS WHETHER EXPERIENCE SHOULD BE ACCEPTED AS LEGITIMATE EVIDENCE AND CONCLUDES THAT THERE SHOULD BE ACCEPTABILITY OF INNER EXPERIENCE AS LEGITIMATE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN ITS OWN RIGHT. THE AUTHOR THINKS THE METHODOLOGIES OF OPERATION-ISM AND BEHAVIORISM TO BE LIMITED. THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD, AS USED ON THE PERSON AND THEIR EXPERIENCE, MUST REMAIN AT THE DESCRIPTIVE LEVEL FOR SOME TIME TO COME. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Meixner2005, author = {Meixner, Uwe}, title = {The Rationality of (a Form of) Relative Identity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {449-455}, keywords = {identity, location, metaphysics, relativity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MELCHERT1977, author = {MELCHERT, NORMAN}, title = {MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE AND ONTOLOGICAL CLAIMS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {445-463}, keywords = {experience, individuality, mysticism, oneness, realism, religion, self-transcendenc}, abstract = {A FUNDAMENTAL TYPE OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE, INVOLVING THE ELIMINATION OF ALL SENSE OF SELF, IS DESCRIBED. THE QUESTION IS RAISED WHETHER THIS TYPE OF EXPERIENCE JUSTIFIES TYPICAL CLAIMS OF MYSTICS TO BE ONE WITH THE ALL OR WITH THE DIVINE. AN ARGUMENT IS OFFERED IN SUPPORT OF A NEGATIVE ANSWER, AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE PERSUASIVENESS OF A POSITIVE ANSWER IS GIVEN. THE VALUE OF SUCH EXPERIENCES CAN NONETHELESS BE UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED. AND THEIR OCCURRENCE CAN BE EXPLAINED IN TERMS CHARACTERISTIC OF A PHYSICAL REALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MELDEN1971, author = {MELDEN, ABRAHAM-I}, title = {WILLING AND THE WILL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {451-453}, keywords = {epistemology, willing}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MELDIN1969, author = {MELDIN, A-I}, title = {EXPRESSIVES, DESCRIPTIVES, PERFORMATIVES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {498-505}, keywords = {descriptives, expressives, language, performatives}, abstract = {WHILE A CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON A PAPER BY PROF. VUILLEMIN A NUMBER OF POINTS ARE ELABORATED IN ORDER TO EXPOSE CERTAIN MISCONCEPTIONS CURRENT TODAY CONCERNING VIEWS EXPRESSED BY WITTGENSTEIN IN PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Mele2000, author = {Mele, Alfred-R}, title = {Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {447-452}, keywords = {control, ethics, omission, responsibility}, abstract = {This essay, part of a symposium on John Fischer and Mark Ravizza's "Responsibility and Control" (1998), develops three problems. My targets are (1) the authors' contention that "taking responsibility," which is necessary for moral responsibility, requires that the agent "accept that he is a fair target of the reactive attitudes as a result of how he exercises (a certain kind of) agency in certain contexts," their claim that "moderate reasons-responsiveness," which is required for moral responsibility, "consists in regular reasons-receptivity, and at least weak reasons-reactivity, of the actual-sequence mechanism that leads to the action," and their account of omissions.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MELE1988, author = {MELE, ALFRED-R}, title = {EFFECTIVE REASONS AND INTRINSICALLY MOTIVATED ACTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {723-731}, keywords = {action-theory; intrinsic-action; metaphysics, motivation, reasons}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE ADVANCES AN ALTERNATIVE TO DONALD DAVIDSON'S ACCOUNT OF EFFECTIVE REASONS, THE REASONS "FOR WHICH" ACTIONS ARE PERFORMED. ON THE ACCOUNT PRESENTED IN THIS ARTICLE, AS ON DAVIDSON'S, EVERY EFFECTIVE REASON HAS BOTH A COGNITIVE ELEMENT AND A CONATIVE ELEMENT THAT MOTIVATES THE PURSUIT OF A GOAL OR A SUBGOAL. HOWEVER, WHEREAS FOR DAVIDSON THE COGNITIVE ELEMENT IS A BELIEF, FOR THE AUTHOR IT IS A PLAN, OR AN ELEMENT OF A PLAN, FOR ACHIEVING THE PERTINENT GOAL OR SUBGOAL. THIS ACCOUNT PRESERVES THE SPIRIT OF DAVIDSON'S WHILE AVOIDING A PROBLEM POSED FOR THE LATTER BY A FAMILIAR SPECIES OF INTENTIONAL ACTION--ROUGHLY, ACTION DONE FOR ITS OWN SAKE, OR "INTRINSICALLY MOTIVATED" ACTION. THE CRUCIAL COGNITIVE ELEMENT OF THE REASON FOR WHICH AN INTRINSICALLY MOTIVATED ACTION, "A", IS DONE IS A REPRESENTATION OF ONE'S "A"-ING CARRIED IN THE AGENT'S DESIRE TO "A". THIS REPRESENTATION IS AN ELEMENT OF A PERTINENT ACTION-PLAN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MELE1986, author = {MELE, ALFRED-R}, title = {IS AKRATIC ACTION UNFREE?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {673-679}, keywords = {action, akrasia, metaphysics, self-contro}, abstract = {AKRATIC ACTIONS NEED NOT BE UNFREE. A POPULAR ACCOUNT OF IRRESISTIBLE DESIRE AND FREE ACTION IMPLIES THAT ALL FULL-BLOWN AKRATIC ACTIONS ARE MOTIVATED BY IRRESISTIBLE DESIRES AND ARE THEREFORE UNFREE. THIS ACCOUNT RESTS ON THE "FALSE" ASSUMPTION THAT IF AN AGENT'S BELIEF THAT THERE IS GOOD AND SUFFICIENT REASON FOR NOT ACTING ON A CERTAIN DESIRE FAILS TO GENERATE SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE OF THAT DESIRE, THEN SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE WAS NOT WITHIN HIS POWER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MELE1989, author = {MELE, ALFRED-R}, title = {AKRATIC FEELINGS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {277-288}, keywords = {akrasia, feeling, metaphysics, self-control; weakness}, abstract = {THIS PAPER CHARACTERIZES A FEELING-ANALOGUE OF FULL-BLOWN AKRATIC ACTION, ESTABLISHES ITS POSSIBILITY, AND SKETCHES AN EXPLANATION OF ITS OCCURRENCE. THE ETIOLOGY OF MANY FEELINGS IS COMPLEX, INVOLVING DESIRES, HABITS OF INTERPRETATION, LEARNED PATTERNS OF EMOTIONAL RESPONSE, PHYSIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS, ETC. THE EVALUATIONS GROUNDING AN INDIVIDUAL'S BETTER JUDGMENTS ABOUT MATTERS OF FEELING NEED NEITHER FULLY FIX NOR EXACTLY GAUGE THE CAUSAL POWER OF FEELING-INFLUENCING ITEMS. IF THERE IS A MISMATCH BETWEEN THE DETERMINANTS OF A FEELING AND THE AGENT'S BETTER JUDGMENT, AND IF, DESPITE THIS DISPARITY, WHAT THE AGENT FEELS OR CONTINUES TO FEEL IS SUBJECT TO HIS CONTROL, AKRATIC FEELINGS ARE POSSIBLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Mele1995, author = {Mele, Alfred-R}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {735-737}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy}, volume = {68(3)}, year = {1995} } @other{Mele1992, author = {Mele, A-R}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {979-982}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Springs of Action}, volume = {54(4)}, year = {1992} } @article{MELNYK1991, author = {MELNYK, Andrew}, title = {Physicalism: From Supervenience to Elimination.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {eliminativism, metaphysics, physicalism, qualia, supervenience, vocabulary}, abstract = {Supervenience physicalism holds that all facts, of whatever type, globally supervene upon the physical facts, even though neither type-type nor token-token nonphysical-physical identities hold. I argue that, invoked like this, supervenience is metaphysically mysterious, needing explanation. I reject two explanations (Lewis and Forrest). I argue that the best explanation of the appearance of supervenience is an error-theoretic, projectivist one: there are no nonphysical properties, but we erroneously project such onto the physical world in a systematic way, yielding the appearance of supervenience.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MENDOLA1990, author = {MENDOLA, JOSEPH}, title = {Objective Value and Subjective States.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {695-713}, keywords = {ethics, normative, objective, realism, value}, abstract = {There has been a revival of interest in moral realism, but many recent discussions have not focused on specifying plausible examples of normative facts, and this may have left the abstract discussion of their possibility unsatisfying. I argue that there are plausible examples of normative facts. In particular, I argue that there are phenomenal states which are an essential part of some pleasure and pain and which have, as a matter of objective fact, the normative properties of intrinsic objective value or disvalue.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Menn1998, author = {Menn, Stephen}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {721-723}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Descartes and Augustine}, volume = {61(3)}, year = {1998} } @other{Mensch1996, author = {Mensch, James-Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {550-553}, publisher = {SUNY Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {After Modernity: Husserlian Reflections on a Philosophical Tradition}, volume = {59(2)}, year = {1996} } @article{Merricks1997, author = {Merricks, Trenton}, title = {More On Warrant's Entailing Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {627-631}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, knowledge, truth, warrant}, abstract = {Warrant is that, whatever it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere truth belief. In "Warrant Entails Truth" (PPR, December 1995), I argued that it is impossible that a false belief is warranted. Sharon Ryan attacked the argument of that paper in her "Does Warrant Entail Truth?" (PPR, March 1996). In "More on Warrant's Entailing Truth" I present arguments for the claim that warrant entails truth that are, I think, significantly more compelling than the arguments of my original "Warrant Entails Truth." This paper responds to Ryan's objections, but it is not merely a reply to Ryan's article. It is, rather, a free-standing defense of warrant's entailing truth that is the product of discussion and argument for over two years with many philosophers including Ryan, over the arguments contained in my original paper.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Merricks2003, author = {Merricks, Trenton}, title = {Precis of Objects and Persons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {700-703}, keywords = {identity, metaphysics, object, person, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Merricks2003a, author = {Merricks, Trenton}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {727-744}, keywords = {causation, existence, metaphysics, object, person}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Merricks2000, author = {Merricks, Trenton}, title = {Perdurance and Psychological Continuity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {195-198}, keywords = {continuity, metaphysics, personal-identity; psychology}, abstract = {If persons endure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. That is one conclusion defended in my "Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity" (PPR, 1999). Rea and Silver (PPR, 2000) claim that my argument for that conclusion is sound only if a parallel argument is sound. The parallel argument concludes that if persons perdure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. In this paper, I show that Rea and Silver are mistaken. My argument is sound but the parallel argument is not.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Merricks2003b, author = {Merricks, Trenton}, title = {Maximality and Consciousness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {150-158}, keywords = {consciousness, maximality, metaphysics, supervenience}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Merricks2001, author = {Merricks, Trenton}, title = {Varieties of Vagueness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {145-157}, keywords = {epistemology, linguistics, logic, metaphysics, vagueness}, abstract = {According to one account, vagueness is "metaphysical." The friend of metaphysical vagueness believes that, for some object and some property, there can be no determinate fact of the matter whether that object exemplifies that property. A second account maintains that vagueness is due only to ignorance. According to the epistemic account, vagueness is explained completely by and is nothing over and above our not knowing some relevant fact or facts. These are the minority views. The dominant position maintains that there is a third possible variety of vagueness, linguistic vagueness. And, it goes on to insist, all vagueness is of this third variety. I shall argue, however, that linguistic vagueness is not a third variety of vagueness. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Merricks1999, author = {Merricks, Trenton}, title = {Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {983-997}, keywords = {endurance, metaphysics, personal-identity; psychology}, abstract = {This paper argues that if persons last over time by "enduring", then no analysis or reduction of personal identity over time in terms of any sort of psychological continuity can be correct. In other words, any analysis of personal identity over time in terms of psychological continuity entails that persons are four-dimensional and have temporal parts. The paper then shows that if we abandon psychological analyzes of personal identity--as we must if persons endure--Parfit's argument for the claim that identity does not matter in survival is easily undermined. The paper then suggests that this offers support for the claim that persons endure. Along the way the paper tries to clarify the contrast between the doctrine that persons endure and its rival, four-dimensionalism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Merricks1995, author = {Merricks, Trenton}, title = {Warrant Entails Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(4)}, pages = {841-855}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, knowledge, self, truth}, abstract = {Warrant is that, whatever it is, that separates knowledge from mere true belief. I argue that it is not possible that a false belief be warranted; I argue, in other words, that warrant entails truth. The argument is independent of any particular account of warrant. That warrant entails truth has at least two important consequences. First, any substantive analysis of warrant which is such that warrant does not entail truth must be rejected. And secondly, since, necessarily, all warranted beliefs are true, any independent truth condition in an analysis of knowledge is superfluous; knowledge is warranted belief.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Meskin2004, author = {Meskin, Aaron}, title = {Aesthetic Testimony: What Can We Learn from Others about Beauty and Art?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(1)}, pages = {65-91}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, beauty, justification, testimony}, abstract = {The thesis that aesthetic testimony cannot provide aesthetic justification or knowledge is widely accepted--even by realists about aesthetic properties and values. This Kantian position is mistaken. Some testimony about beauty and artistic value can provide a degree of aesthetic justification and, perhaps, even knowledge. That is, there are cases in which one can be justified in making an aesthetic judgment purely on the basis of someone else's testimony. But widespread aesthetic unreliability creates a problem for much aesthetic testimony. Hence, most testimony about art does not have much epistemic value. The situation is somewhat different with respect to aesthetic testimony about nature, proofs, and theories.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MEYERS1971, author = {MEYERS, ROBERT-G}, title = {MEANING AND METAPHYSICS IN JAMES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {369-380}, keywords = {belief, meaning, metaphysics, pragmatism}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ARGUES, AGAINST A. O. LOVEJOY AND WITH R. B. PERRY, THAT JAMES' THEORY OF MEANING DOES NOT CONFUSE CONSEQUENCES OF BELIEVING AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE STATEMENTS BELIEVED. RATHER, I ARGUE THAT JAMES HOLDS THAT THE MEANING OF A SYNTHETIC STATEMENT IS TO BE FOUND IN ITS PERCEPTUAL CONSEQUENCES WHILE CONSEQUENCES OF BELIEVING ARE RELEVANT TO 'JUSTIFYING' OVERBELIEFS; THAT IS, TO JUSTIFYING MEANINGFUL STATEMENTS FOR WHICH THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE A RATIONAL, NON-PASSIONAL JUSTIFICATION. ALTHOUGH THIS THEORY OF MEANING APPEARS ANTI-METAPHYSICAL, JAMES DOES NOT USE IT TO RULE OUT METAPHYSICS BECAUSE HE BELIEVES, ALONG WITH COMMON SENSE, THAT METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINES ARE MEANINGFUL; THUS, THE QUESTION IS WHAT METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINES MEAN AND NOT WHETHER THEY ARE MEANINGFUL. ALTHOUGH JAMES IS OFTEN MISLEADING IN TALKING ABOUT MEANING, I ARGUE THAT THIS INTERPRETATION IS SUPPORTED BY HIS NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS OF METAPHYSICS. PAUL HENLE'S ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE A FAVORABLE INTERPRETATION OF JAMES WITHIN LOVEJOY'S FRAMEWORK, IS ALSO SHOWN TO BE INCOHERENT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MEYERS1970, author = {MEYERS, ROBERT-G}, title = {KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE: A REPLY TO HAYNER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {293-296}, keywords = {acquaintance, epistemology, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MEYERS1965, author = {MEYERS, ROBERT}, title = {STACE, HISTORICAL STATEMENTS, AND VERIFIABILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {260-262}, keywords = {history, meaning, metaphysics, positivism, statement, verifiability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MICKUNAS1972, author = {MICKUNAS, ALGIS and OASTLER, JOHN}, title = {TOWARD A RAPPROCHEMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {241-248}, keywords = {analysis, phenomenology, philosophy}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE INVESTIGATES SOME COMMON GROUNDS BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS SHOWING THAT BOTH SCHOOLS CLAIM THAT LINGUISTIC USAGES ARE NOT BASED ON A) PSYCHOLOGICAL OR SUBJECTIVE PROCESSES, B) SOCIOLOGICAL OR COMMUNAL CONVENTIONS. RATHER LINGUISTIC USAGES MUST BE UNDERSTOOD A) AS HAVING A LOGIC WHICH CANNOT BE ARBITRARILY ALTERED WITHOUT THE LOSS OF COMPREHENSION, B) IN CONTEXTS INDICATING WHICH TERMS ARE PROPER WHICH IMPLIES C) THAT LINGUISTIC USAGE OF TERMS OUT OF CONTEXT MUST EITHER BE ABANDONED OR JUSTIFIED BY PROPER CLARIFICATIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Migotti1998, author = {Migotti, Mark}, title = {Slave Morality, Socrates, and the Bushmen: A Reading of the First Essay of On the Genealogy of Morals}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {745-779}, keywords = {ethics, morality, slave}, abstract = {This paper raises three questions: (1) Can Nietzsche provide a satisfactory account of how the slave revolt could have begun to "poison the consciences" of masters? (2) Does Nietzsche's affinity for "master values" preclude him from acknowledging claims of justice that rest upon a sense of equality among human beings? and (3) How does Nietzsche's story fare when looked on as (at least in part) an empirical hypothesis? The first question is answered in the affirmative, the second in the negative, and the third with the verdict "quite well". Nietzsche's interpretation of Socrates is held to vindicate the affirmative answer to question one; his conception of nobility as spontaneously self-affirming to justify the negative answer to question two, and historical, anthropological and etymological evidence to support the favorable answer to question three.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MIJUSKOVIC1978, author = {MIJUSKOVIC, BEN}, title = {BRENTANO'S THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {315-324}, keywords = {consciousness, epistemology, mental, mind, phenomena, physical}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MILLER1985, author = {MILLER, ARTHUR}, title = {A REPLY TO WAYNE A DAVIS' "MILLER ON WANTING, INTENDING, AND BEING WILLING".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {457-458}, keywords = {intention, metaphysics, wanting, willing}, abstract = {THIS IS A BRIEF REPLY TO WAYNE A DAVIS' "MILLER ON WANTING, INTENDING, AND BEING WILLING," WHICH IN TURN IS WRITTEN IN RESPONSE TO MY EARLIER "WANTING, INTENDING, AND KNOWING WHAT ONE IS DOING." THE PRESENT DEFENSE EMPHASIZES THREE THINGS: (1) MY ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DESIRING AND INTENDING WAS RESTRICTED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO THE ASSESSMENT OF ALREADY COMPLETED ACTIONS (AS OPPOSED TO FUTURE-LOOKING INTENTIONS); (2) THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN '"A" INTENDS/INTENDED TO "X"' (WHERE THE RELEVANT INTENTION COMMONLY ENTAILS THE CORRESPONDING DESIRE), AND '"A" DID "X" AND THEREBY CAUSED "Y" (A "NATURAL"--BUT UNWANTED--CONSEQUENCE OF "X" FORESEEN BY "A" HERSELF); AND (3) HAVING TWO SENSES OF "BEING WILLING", (VIZ. ACQUIESCING VS BEING WILLING TO "DO"), IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT ALL INSTANCES OF THE ACTION--RELEVANT SENSE ARE NECESSARILY INTENTIONAL ON THE PART OF THE AGENT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MILLER1980, author = {MILLER, ARTHUR-R}, title = {WANTING, INTENDING, AND KNOWING WHAT ONE IS DOING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {334-343}, keywords = {intending, knowing, metaphysics, wanting}, abstract = {THIS IS AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AGENT'S KNOWLEDGE OR AWARENESS OF WHAT HE IS DOING AND THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONAL ACTION. THE DISCUSSION PROCEEDS VIA A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE THESIS THAT INTENDING ENTAILS WANTING, A CLAIM WHICH BOASTS A LONG AND VENERABLE LIST OF DEFENDERS. WITH RESPECT TO A CERTAIN CLASS OF ACTIONS, IT IS SHOWN THAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF ADHERING TO THIS POSITION ARE CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE; AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THAT ALTHOUGH WANTING IS A FREQUENT ACCOMPANIMENT OF--IT IS BY NO MEANS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR--INTENTIONAL ACTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Miller2004, author = {Miller, Alexander}, title = {Rule-Following and Externalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {127-140}, keywords = {externalism, language, scepticism}, abstract = {John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favored solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular from of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Miller1995, author = {Miller, Alexander}, title = {Objectivity Disfigured: Mark Johnston's Missing-Explanation Argument}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(4)}, pages = {857-868}, keywords = {epistemology, judgment, knowledge, objectivity}, abstract = {Mark Johnston has recently attacked various versions of antirealism using what he calls "the missing-explanation argument". In this paper, I outline Johnston's argument and show it would apply to various forms of antirealism, both historical and contemporary. I then argue that in all cases Johnston's argument is either a failure, or redundant.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MILLER1980a, author = {MILLER, ARTHUR-R}, title = {A REJOINDER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {232-233}, keywords = {ethics, intending, wanting}, abstract = {THIS IS WRITTEN IN RESPONSE TO JEAN BEER BLUMENFELD'S "ACTING INTENTIONALLY AND ACTING VOLUNTARILY" ("PHIL PHENOMENOL RES", VOLUME 41, 228-231, S-D 80). IT IS URGED THAT HER ANALYSIS OF TWO PAIRS OF HYPOTHETICAL CASES DEMONSTRATES (A) THAT A DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTENDED AND MERELY FORESEEN CONSEQUENCES CAN BE DRAWN, (B) THAT SUCH A DISTINCTION IS AT TIMES DRAWN, AND (C) THAT THIS DISTINCTION CAN HAVE AN IMPORTANT BEARING ON OUR MORAL/LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF ACTS AND AGENTS. AN ANALOGUE OF CASTANEDA'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIMARY AND DERIVATIVE INTENTIONS IS INTRODUCED AND EXPLOITED TO SHOW THAT NOTHING I HAVE SAID OR COMMITTED MYSELF TO IN MY EARLIER PAPER TO WHICH BLUMENFELD REFERS IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH ANY OF THE ABOVE THESES, (A)-(C).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MILLER1961, author = {MILLER, LEONARD-G}, title = {MORAL SCEPTICISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {239-245}, keywords = {commitment, ethics, justification, morality, principle, reasons, scepticism, ultimate}, abstract = {THE MORAL SCEPTIC IS ONE WHO BELIEVES MORALITY CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED AND THEREFORE THERE ARE GOOD REASONS FOR BEING SUSPICIOUS OF IT, AND FURTHER, THAT ONE WHO CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN A MORAL POSITION IS BEING UNREASONABLE. THE AUTHOR MAINTAINS THAT EVEN THOUGH THE CONCEPT OF JUSTIFICATION DOES NOT APPLY, THE SCEPTIC IS MISTAKEN IN DRAWING THE CONCLUSIONS HE DOES. THE SCEPTIC CONTENDS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF REASONS, IT IS UNREASONABLE TO BELIEVE. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO REASON US FROM MORALITY INTO SCEPTICISM. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Miller1995a, author = {Miller, Richard-W}, title = {The Advancement of Realism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {637-645}, keywords = {advancement, natural-sciences; rationality, realism, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Miller-Jr1995, author = {Miller-Jr, Fred-D}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {276-278}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics}, volume = {59(1)}, year = {1995} } @article{Millgram1994, author = {Millgram, Elijah}, title = {An Apprentice Argument}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {913-916}, keywords = {belief, mental, metaphysics, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MILLIKAN1990, author = {MILLIKAN, RUTH-GARRETT}, title = {Seismograph Readings for "Explaining Behavior".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {807-812}, keywords = {behavior, metaphysics}, abstract = {Dretske's views in Explaining Behavior are vacillating both concerning what functions are and concerning what indication is. Indication cannot play the role he assigns to it in the learning history of an organism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Millikan2000, author = {Millikan, Ruth-Garrett}, title = {Representations, Targets and Attitudes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {103-111}, keywords = {attitude, behavior, epistemology, representation}, abstract = {This is a critical review of Robert Cummins, Representations, Targets and Attitudes arguing that the basics of the position he outlines do not differ all that much, except in terminology, from Millikan's position in Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Millikan1993, author = {Millikan, Ruth-Garrett}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {233-237}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice}, volume = {58(1)}, year = {1993} } @article{Mills2004, author = {Mills, Eugene}, title = {Williamson on Vagueness and Context-Dependence}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {635-641}, keywords = {context, dependence, logic, vagueness}, abstract = {Several philosophers offer explanations of linguistic vagueness by appealing to the referential context-dependence of vague terms. Timothy Williamson argues pre-emptively that any such approach must fail, on the grounds that context-dependence is neither necessary nor sufficient for vagueness. He supports this claim, in turn, by example. This paper argues that his examples fail to show that context-dependence is either unnecessary or insufficient for vagueness and, hence, that he has failed by his own lights to show that it cannot explain vagueness.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Mills1998, author = {Mills, Eugene}, title = {The Unity of Justification}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {27-51}, keywords = {epistemology, ignorance, justification, knowledge, unity}, abstract = {The thesis that practical and epistemic justification can diverge--that it can be reasonable to believe something, all things considered, even when believing is epistemically unjustified, and the reverse--is widely accepted. I argue that this acceptance is unfounded. I show, first, that examples of the sort typically cited as straightforwardly illustrative of the "divergence thesis" do not, in fact, support it. The view to the contrary derives from conflating the assessment of acts which cause one to believe with the assessment of believing itself. I argue, too, that the divergence thesis cannot be rescued by appeal to the possibility of doxastic voluntarism. Finally, I argue that the general acceptance of the divergence thesis rests on a conception of justification, both practical and epistemic, which is seriously flawed.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Minar1994, author = {Minar, Edward}, title = {Paradox and Privacy: On Chapter 201-202 of Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {43-75}, keywords = {epistemology, language, paradox, privacy}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MIRVISH1983, author = {MIRVISH, ADRIAN-MICHAEL}, title = {MERLEAU-PONTY AND THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {449-476}, keywords = {empiricism, gestalt, philosophy, reality}, abstract = {GESTALT THEORY IS CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT TO MERLEAU-PONTY, PROVIDING HIM WITH THE BASIS ON WHICH TO ANALYZE THE STRUCTURE OF EXPERIENCE. IT ALSO ENABLES ONE TO EXPLAIN HIS REACTION AGAINST INTROSPECTIONIST PSYCHOLOGY AND INTELLECTUALISM. FOR MERLEAU-PONTY THE WORLD IS MOST FUNDAMENTALLY EXPERIENCED AT A PREPREDICATIVE LEVEL, AND HERE HE MAKES USE OF SCHELER'S NOTIONS OF THE LIVED BODY AND RESISTANCE. THIS WORLD IS THEN SHOWN TO BE THAT INTUITIVELY CAPTURED BY CEZANNE'S PAINTING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MISCHEL1970, author = {MISCHEL, THEODORE}, title = {WUNDT AND THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {1-26}, keywords = {behaviorism, causality, introspection, mind, psychology, science, volition}, abstract = {THE "DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY" PROPOUNDED BY WUNDT, THE "FOUNDER" OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, IS EXAMINED IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT. AFTER SHOWING WHY WUNDT'S FORMULATION, INCLUDING THE RELATED NOTIONS OF THE DIFFERENT "POINTS OF VIEW" OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "PSYCHOLOGICAL" AND "PHYSICAL" CAUSALITY, ETC., SEEMED ATTRACTIVE IN THAT CONTEXT, IT IS ARGUED THAT WUNDT'S "DEFINITION" MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THERE TO BE A SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY. THE FAILURE OF THE "EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE MIND" WAS NO ACCIDENT, THESE INVESTIGATIONS WERE CONCEPTUALLY CONFUSED FROM THE START. THE DEBACLE OF WUNDTIAN PSYCHOLOGY PAVED THE WAY FOR WATSON'S ATTEMPT TO STUDY BEHAVIOR WHILE "IGNORING CONSCIOUSNESS." SINCE BEHAVIORISTS ACCEPTED WUNDT'S CARTESIAN ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING THE MENTAL, THEY INSISTED ON DEFINING BEHAVIOR IN PHYSICAL TERMS THUS PRECLUDING THE STUDY OF ACTIONS (AS CONTRASTED WITH MOVEMENTS). A SOCIAL APPROACH IS REQUIRED FOR THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HUMAN CONDUCT, BUT WUNDT'S SHARP SEPARATION OF EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY RULED THIS OUT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MISCHEL1961, author = {MISCHEL, THEODORE}, title = {BAD ART AS THE "CORRUPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {390-396}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, bad, consciousness, corruption, criteria, emotion}, abstract = {R G COLLINGWOOD'S ACCOUNT OF BAD ART IS AN AWARENESS OF EMOTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN SOMEHOW FALSIFIED OR CORRUPTED. THE AUTHOR TAKES ISSUE WITH THIS, AND CLAIMS THAT IT FAILS TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE CRITERIA FOR DISTINGUISHING GOOD ART FROM BAD ART. THE CORRUPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS MAY HAPPEN IN THE PROCESS OF ARTISTIC CREATION. WHAT RELEVANCE DOES IT HAVE FOR DECIDING WHETHER A PRODUCT, THE FINISHED WORK OF ART, IS GOOD OR BAD? IT MAY BE THAT IT IMPLIES UNSUCCESSFUL EXPRESSION, BUT NOT EVERY UNSUCCESSFUL EXPRESSION IMPLIES A CORRUPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS. FINALLY, THERE IS NO PROCEDURE BY WHICH ANYONE, NOT EVEN THE ARTIST HIMSELF, CAN DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT HIS CONSCIOUSNESS IS CORRUPT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MISCHEL1963, author = {MISCHEL, THEODORE}, title = {PSYCHOLOGY AND EXPLANATIONS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {578-594}, keywords = {behavior, empiricism, existentialism, explanation, laws, literature, motive, psychology, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MITSCHERLING1985, author = {MITSCHERLING, JEFF}, title = {ROMAN INGARDEN'S "THE LITERARY WORK OF ART": EXPOSITION AND ANALYSES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {351-382}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, literary-theory; phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MOMEYER1975, author = {MOMEYER, RICHARD-W}, title = {IS PLEASURE A SENSATION?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {113-121}, keywords = {epistemology, pain, pleasure, sensation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MONTAGUE1972, author = {MONTAGUE, PHILLIP}, title = {JUSTICE, REASONABLENESS, AND THE SIMILAR HANDLING OF SIMILAR CASES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {90-99}, keywords = {consistency, justice, law, political-philosophy; reasonableness}, abstract = {MY PRIMARY PURPOSE IN THIS PAPER IS TO ELUCIDATE THE PRINCIPLE (CALL IT P) THAT RELEVANTLY SIMILAR CASES OUGHT TO BE HANDLED SIMILARLY, AND IN PARTICULAR TO DISPUTE THE CLAIM OF SEVERAL PHILOSOPHERS THAT P CAN SERVE AS A LINK BETWEEN THE CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND REASONABLENESS. I OFFER WHAT I BELIEVE ARE THE MOST PLAUSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF P AS A PRINCIPLE OF REASONABLENESS AND AS A PRINCIPLE OF JUSTICE, SHOW THAT NO SINGLE INTERPRETATION CAN FULFILL BOTH PURPOSES, AND CONCLUDE THAT P CANNOT BE USED TO RELATE THE TWO CONCEPTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MONTAGUE1975, author = {MONTAGUE, PHILLIP-T}, title = {ON THE RELATION OF NATURAL PROPERTIES TO NORMATIVE AND EVALUATIVE PROPERTIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {341-351}, keywords = {ethics, evaluative, normative, property}, abstract = {THIS PAPER IS CONCERNED WITH THE CLAIM MADE BY MANY NON-NATURALISTS THAT NORMATIVE AND EVALUATIVE PROPERTIES ARE RELATED IN A CERTAIN WAY TO NATURAL PROPERTIES. THIS CLAIM IS OFTEN EXPRESSED BY SAYING THAT NORMATIVE AND EVALUATIVE PROPERTIES ARE "DEPENDENT" OR "CONSEQUENT" UPON NATURAL PROPERTIES. THAT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP EXISTS IS ASSUMED TO BE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND HOW OUR "KNOWLEDGE" OF NORMATIVE AND EVALUATIVE PROPERTIES IS TO OUR "KNOWLEDGE" OF NATURAL PROPERTIES. I ARGUE THAT THIS ASSUMPTION IS MISTAKEN--THAT WE CAN EXPLAIN MORAL KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT CONSIDERING WHETHER NORMATIVE AND EVALUATIVE PROPERTIES ARE RELATED TO NATURAL PROPERTIES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MONTAGUE1986, author = {MONTAGUE, PHILLIP}, title = {IN DEFENSE OF MORAL PRINCIPLES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {643-654}, keywords = {ethics, moral, principle, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Montague1995, author = {Montague, Phillip}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {548-550}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Punishment as Societal Defense}, volume = {59(2)}, year = {1995} } @article{Montero2003, author = {Montero, Barbara}, title = {The Epistemic/Ontic Divide}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {404-418}, keywords = {epistemology, explanation, metaphysics, mind, ontology, physicalism}, abstract = {A number of philosophers think that, while we cannot explain how the mind is physical, we can know that it is physical, nonetheless. That is, they accept both the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical and ontological physicalism. I argue that this position is unstable. Among other things, I argue that once one accepts the explanatory gap, the main argument for ontological physicalism, the argument from causation, looses its force. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Montero2004, author = {Montero, Barbara}, title = {Consciousness Is Puzzling, but Not Paradoxical}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(1)}, pages = {213-226}, keywords = {consciousness, materialism, metaphysics, physicalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Montmarquet2002, author = {Montmarquet, James-A}, title = {Wallace's 'Kantian' Strawsonianism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {687-692}, keywords = {ethics, morality, responsibility}, abstract = {This is a critical discussion of R. Jay Wallace's Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Two lines of criticism are pressed. In construing moral responsibility in terms of the moral claims we accept--in terms of moral obligations, as opposed to character traits--Wallace struggles to come up with an account of moral praiseworthiness (as the mere satisfaction of an obligation is not, as such, praiseworthy). Wallace also struggles to account for blameworthiness simply in terms of what obligations one has violated, in contrast to one's reason for acting in the way that one has.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MONTMARQUET1988, author = {MONTMARQUET, JAMES-A}, title = {Castaneda on Agency}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {733-743}, keywords = {agency, causation, free-will; intentional, metaphysics}, abstract = {This paper explores the theory of agency Castaneda develops in "thinking and doing" and related papers. The first half is largely expository; the second poses a number of difficulties concerning a notion crucial to Castaneda's theory of action, the "practical copula." Unlike other recent discussions of this work, the focus here is on its metaphysics rather than its logic or semantics.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Montmarquet1993, author = {Montmarquet, James}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {970-973}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Epistemic Virture and Doxastic Responsibility}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1993} } @article{MOODY1986, author = {MOODY, TODD-C}, title = {DISTINGUISHING CONSCIOUSNESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {289-295}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, mind}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Moody-Adams1997, author = {Moody-Adams, Michele-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {716-720}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture, and Philosophy}, volume = {63(3)}, year = {1997} } @article{MOORE1967, author = {MOORE, ASHER}, title = {EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {408-414}, keywords = {epistemology, existence, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MOORE1967a, author = {MOORE, ASHER}, title = {REPLY TO ROLLO HANDY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {418-420}, keywords = {epistemology, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Moore2004, author = {Moore, A-W}, title = {The Metaphysics of Perspective: Tense and Colour}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {387-394}, keywords = {color, metaphysics, perspective, representation, tense}, abstract = {This article is a contribution to a symposium on Barry Stroud's book The Quest for Reality. The author exploits various analogies between tense and color to defend the idea, about which Stroud is deeply skeptical, that there could be such a thing as undertaking "the philosophical quest for reality": namely, by arguing that any fact can be represented from no point of view.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Moore2002, author = {Moore, A-W}, title = {Quasi-Realism and Relativism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {150-156}, keywords = {ethics, realism, relativism}, abstract = {The author argues that the quasi-realism which Simon Blackburn champions in his Ruling Passions commits him, despite his protestations to the contrary, to a substantial form of ethical relativism. By considering the parallel claim that a quasi-realist about modality is committed to a substantial form of modal relativism, and by trying to make sense of the latter position, the author argues that the form of ethical relativism to which Blackburn is committed is essentially relativism about which "thick" ethical concepts we possess.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MOORE1960, author = {MOORE, ASHER}, title = {CHISHOLM ON INTENTIONALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {248-254}, keywords = {attitude, criteria, intentionality, language, object, sentence}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Moore1997, author = {Moore, Adrian-W}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {488-491}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Points of View}, volume = {61(2)}, year = {1997} } @article{MORA1963, author = {MORA, JOSE-FERRATER}, title = {ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF 'ONTOLOGY'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {36-47}, keywords = {ancient, being, metaphysics, modern, ontology, origin}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR STUDIES KANT'S REJECTION OF WOLFF AND BAUMGARTEN. KANT FELT THAT ONTOLOGY WAS A PSEUDO SCIENCE AND A TEMPTATION. THE AUTHOR EXAMINES WHAT KANT HAD IN MIND WHEN HE DECIDED TO OVERTHROW THE AMBITIOUS PROJECTS OF RATIONAL ONTOLOGISTS. IT IS HELD THAT ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT OF ONTOLOGY AND ITS ORIGINS, IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THE THINKING OF KANT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORA1961, author = {MORA, JOSE-FERRATER}, title = {ON MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO'S IDEA OF REALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {514-520}, keywords = {consciousness, fact, metaphysics, ontology, reality, reason, soul}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORA1982, author = {MORA, J-FERRATER}, title = {THE LANGUAGES OF HISTORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {137-150}, keywords = {history, language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Moran2004, author = {Moran, Richard}, title = {Precis of Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {423-426}, keywords = {authority, epistemology, estrangement, moral-psychology; self-consciousness; self-knowledg}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Moran2004a, author = {Moran, Richard}, title = {Replies to Heal, Reginster, Wilson, and Lear}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {455-472}, keywords = {epistemology, rationality, responsibility, self-knowledg}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Moran1994, author = {Moran, Richard}, title = {Arthur Collins's "The Nature of Mental Things"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {917-920}, keywords = {belief, mental, metaphysics, phenomena}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Moran2001, author = {Moran, Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {423-426}, publisher = {Princeton Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge}, volume = {69(2)}, year = {2001} } @other{Moran2001a, author = {Moran, Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {427-432}, publisher = {Princeton Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge}, volume = {69(2)}, year = {2001} } @other{Moran2001b, author = {Moran, Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {433-439}, publisher = {Princeton Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge}, volume = {69(2)}, year = {2001} } @other{Moran2001c, author = {Moran, Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {440-447}, publisher = {Princeton Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge}, volume = {69(2)}, year = {2001} } @other{Moran2001d, author = {Moran, Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {448-454}, publisher = {Princeton Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge}, volume = {69(2)}, year = {2001} } @other{Moran2001e, author = {Moran, Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {455-472}, publisher = {Princeton Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge}, volume = {69(2)}, year = {2001} } @article{MORAWETZ1980, author = {MORAWETZ, THOMAS}, title = {UNDERSTANDING, DISAGREEMENT, AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {46-63}, keywords = {conceptual-scheme; disagreement, metaphysics, understanding}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORELAND1989, author = {MORELAND, J-P}, title = {WAS HUSSERL A NOMINALIST?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {661-674}, keywords = {nominalism, realism, twentieth, universal}, abstract = {STUDENTS OF HUSSERL ARE DIVIDED WHEN IT COMES TO STATING HIS THEORY OF UNIVERSALS. WAS HUSSERL A NOMINALIST OR A REALIST? THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO ARGUE THAT HUSSERL WAS, IN FACT, A REALIST IN HIS THEORY OF UNIVERSALS. BUT THE PURPOSE IS NOT MERELY HISTORICAL IN NATURE. IN THE PROCESS OF ANALYZING HUSSERL, THE AUTHOR CLARIFIES THE DIFFERENT FACETS OF BOTH NOMINALISM AND REALISM REGARDING THE RELATION BETWEEN QUALITIES AND QUALITY-INSTANCES, AND CONCLUDES THAT THE NOMINALIST INTERPRETATION OF HUSSERL IS INADEQUATE. HUSSERL WAS A REALIST. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORICK1981, author = {MORICK, HAROLD}, title = {OPACITY AND MENTALITY: A REPLY TO CRITICISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {128-129}, keywords = {mentalism, metaphysics, modality, opacity}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR SKETCHES AN ARGUMENT THAT CONCLUDES THAT REFERENTIAL OPACITY IS A DISTINGUISHING FEATURE OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. HE PRESUPPOSES THAT THE MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK TO THIS CONCLUSION IS THAT THERE SEEM TO BE MODAL CLAIMS THAT ARE OPAQUE BUT NONPSYCHOLOGICAL. HE DEALS WITH THIS STUMBLING BLOCK BY WAY OF THE PARTICULAR MODALITY NECESSITY. BELIEVERS IN NECESSITY FALL INTO EITHER OF TWO CAMPS. SOME BELIEVERS SAY THAT NECESSITY RESIDES IN THE WAY WE SPEAK OF THINGS, AND NOT IN THE THINGS WE SPEAK OF; OTHER BELIEVERS SAY THAT NECESSITY CAN RESIDE IN THINGS, INDEPENDENTLY OF THE WAY WE SPEAK OF THEM. GIVEN THE FIRST VIEW OF NECESSITY AND KINDRED NOTIONS, MODAL CLAIMS--THE AUTHOR ARGUES--ARE MENTALISTIC; GIVEN THE SECOND VIEW, THEY AREN'T IN FACT OPAQUE. SO, GIVEN EITHER VIEW, THERE ARE NO MODAL CLAIMS THAT ARE OPAQUE AND AT THE SAME TIME NONPSYCHOLOGICAL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORICK1980, author = {MORICK, HAROLD}, title = {CAN WE BELIEVE WHAT WE KNOW?.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {406-410}, keywords = {believing, epistemology, knowing}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORICK1976, author = {MORICK, HAROLD}, title = {EXTENSIONALIZING THE NONPSYCHOLOGICAL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {551-553}, keywords = {logic, necessity, possibility}, abstract = {AT THIS TIME, ALETHIC LOGIC PROVIDES THE LAST PLAUSIBLE REASON FOR DOUBTING THAT REFERENTIAL OPACITY IS PECULIAR TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE SOCIAL (AS OPPOSED TO THE PHYSICAL) SCIENCES AND, IN THIS RESPECT, TO MIND, THEIR ULTIMATE SUBJECT MATTER. I REMOVE THIS LAST REASON FOR DOUBT BY EXPLOITING THE RECENT DISTINCTION BETWEEN DESIGNATORS WHICH ARE "RIGID" AND THOSE WHICH AREN'T.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORICK1971, author = {MORICK, HAROLD}, title = {CARTESIAN PRIVILEGE AND THE STRICTLY MENTAL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {546-551}, keywords = {epistemology, self-knowledg}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORILLO1980, author = {MORILLO, CAROLYN-R}, title = {REPLY TO GOWEN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {434-435}, keywords = {contingency, logic, necessary}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORILLO1977, author = {MORILLO, CAROLYN-R}, title = {THE LOGIC OF ARGUMENTS FROM CONTINGENCY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {408-417}, keywords = {contingency, cosmological-proof; god, metaphysics, necessity, sufficient}, abstract = {IT IS CLAIMED THAT DESPITE EXTREME DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT INTERPRETATIONS OF ARGUMENTS FROM CONTINGENCY, IT IS POSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY A STRATEGY COMMON TO ALL INTERPRETATIONS. THIS STRATEGY IS BASED ON A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NECESSARY AND WHICH THEREFORE IN SOME SENSE 'MUST BE', AND THOSE WHICH ARE CONTINGENT AND THUS IN SOME SENSE 'JUST ARE'. THE STRATEGY IS THEN RELATED TO CONCEPTIONS OF EXPLANATION. IT IS FINALLY CLAIMED THAT THIS BASIC STRATEGY INVOLVES AN INSUPERABLE DILEMMA AND THAT ARGUMENTS FROM CONTINGENCY "CANNOT" SUCCEED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORREALL1982, author = {MORREALL, JOHN}, title = {HUME'S MISSING SHADE OF BLUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {407-415}, keywords = {color, empiricism, epistemology}, abstract = {IT IS A FUNDAMENTAL TENET OF HUME'S EMPIRICISM THAT ANY SIMPLE IDEA IN SOMEONE'S MIND IS AN EXACT COPY OF A SIMPLE IMPRESSION PREVIOUSLY FOUND IN HIS MIND. HUME HIMSELF, HOWEVER, OFFERED A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO THIS TENET--THE PERSON WHO CAN IMAGINE A SHADE OF BLUE BETWEEN TWO SHADES SHOWN TO HIM, EVEN THOUGH HE HAS NEVER SEEN JUST THAT SHADE. CURIOUSLY, HUME DISMISSES THIS COUNTEREXAMPLE AS BEING TOO SINGULAR AN INSTANCE TO JUSTIFY MODIFYING HIS GENERAL THEORY. THE AUTHOR DOES THREE THINGS. FIRST, HE SHOWS THAT THE CASE OF THE MISSING SHADE OF BLUE IS NOT AT ALL UNUSUAL; THERE ARE MANY SUCH PHENOMENA IN VISION AND THE OTHER SENSES. SECOND, HE RESPONDS TO A RECENT SUGGESTION THAT HUME NEED NOT WORRY ABOUT SUCH CASES BECAUSE THEY ARE UNVERIFIABLE. AND THIRD, HE ARGUES THAT HUME'S EMPIRICISM CAN SURVIVE EVEN IF WE DROP THE COPY THESIS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORRIS1964, author = {MORRIS, BERTRAM}, title = {THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT AGREEMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {1-15}, keywords = {agreement, ethics, indifference, morality, need, taste}, abstract = {THIS ESSAY VIEWS ETHICS AS INVOLVING TWO INTER-DEPENDENT PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LIFE: UTILITY AND SOCIALITY. THE FIRST RELATES MAN TO NATURE AND DEPENDS ON KNOWLEDGE; THE SECOND RELATES MAN TO MAN AND DEPENDS ON AGREEMENT. THE STIMULUS TO REACH AGREEMENTS DERIVES FROM OUTSTANDING DISAGREEMENTS. CIVIL LIFE SUPPOSES THAT THERE IS ALWAYS A GOOD AND SUFFICIENT REASON WHY PERSONS SHOULD COMPOSE THEIR DIFFERENCES AS CIVIL BEINGS RATHER THAN TO MAGNIFY THEM INTO IRRECONCILABLE HOSTILITIES, EVEN IF THE LATTER ARE SOMETIMES UNAVOIDABLE. ONE CANNOT EXPECT TO LIVE IN THE WORLD AND FASHION IT TO HIS DREAMS; BUT BECAUSE THE ARTS CAN PROVIDE IN SOCIAL AFFAIRS BOTH UTILITY AND BEAUTY, ONE CAN EXPECT TO LIVE IN IT AND WITH OTHERS WITH BOTH EFFECT AND ELEGANCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORRIS1973, author = {MORRIS, BERTRAM}, title = {GAUTHIER ON HOBBES' MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {387-392}, keywords = {morality, political-philosoph}, abstract = {GAUTHIER'S IMPRESSIVE ACCOUNT RESTS ON A SUSTAINED ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT HOBBES' THOUGHT FROM MAN AS A SELF-MAINTAINING ENGINE TO AN AUTHOR WHO BINDS HIMSELF TO AN AGENT (SOVEREIGN), SANCTIONED BY A NONTERMINABLE COVENANT. TO THIS END HE EMPLOYS THE DEVICE OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN FORMAL AND MATERIAL DEFINITIONS IN HOBBES' MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. THE VALIDITY OF THIS PROCEDURE IS CALLED INTO QUESTION BY INSISTING THAT HOBBES' CONCLUSION CANNOT BE DISSOCIATED FROM HIS INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE ARTS OF PEACE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Morris1998, author = {Morris, Christopher-W}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {491-494}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {An Essay on the Modern State}, volume = {61(2)}, year = {1998} } @article{MORRIS1965, author = {MORRIS, CHARLES and HAMILTON, DANIEL-J}, title = {AESTHETICS, SIGNS, AND ICONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {356-364}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, iconic, pragmatics, semantics, semiotics, sign, syntactics}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE REVIEWS THE MAIN DISCUSSIONS AND CRITICISMS OCCASIONED BY THE PAPER OF CHARLES MORRIS, "ESTHETICS AND THE THEORY OF SIGNS." THIS PAPER HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE WORK OF ART WAS AN ICONIC SIGN SIGNIFYING THE VALUE WHICH, AS ICONIC, IT EMBODIED IN ITSELF AS SIGN-VEHICLE. THE THEORY OF SIGNS WAS CONSIDERED THE PROPER METALANGUAGE FOR AESTHETICS. THE PRESENT ARTICLE DISPLAYS CRITICISMS OF THIS VIEW: THAT THE WORK OF ART IS NOT A SIGN; THAT THE TREATMENT OF THE ICONIC SIGN RAISES A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS; THAT SEMIOTIC HAS AT BEST A LIMITED VALUE FOR AESTHETICS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Morris1996, author = {Morris, Katherine-J}, title = {Pain, Injury and First/Third-Person Asymmetry}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {125-136}, keywords = {asymmetry, injury, metaphysics, mind, pain}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORRIS1988, author = {MORRIS, KATHERINE-J}, title = {ACTIONS AND THE BODY: HORNSBY VERSUS SARTRE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {473-488}, keywords = {action, body, metaphysics}, abstract = {HORNSBY CLAIMS THAT ACTIONS ARE TRYINGS WHICH CAUSE BODILY MOVEMENTS. THIS THEORY, I ARGUE, HAS CERTAIN PRESUPPOSITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES WHICH ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH SARTRE'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE BODY. IT MAKES ROOM FOR SCEPTICISM ABOUT OTHER MINDS; IT INVOLVES GENERALIZATIONS FROM ABERRANT TO ORDINARY CASES; AND IT TREATS THE RELATION BETWEEN A PERSON AND HER BODY LIKE THE RELATION BETWEEN A PERSON AND AN INSTRUMENT. THAT HORNSBY'S THEORY FALSIFIES THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY DOES NOT "IPSO FACTO" SHOW HER THEORY TO BE WRONG, BUT IT RAISES VERY GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY AND PHILOSOPHICAL CLAIMS, INCLUDING THE CLAIM (CENTRAL TO HORNSBY'S THEORY) THAT ACTIONS ARE EVENTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORRIS1985, author = {MORRIS, PHYLLIS-SUTTON}, title = {SARTRE ON THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE EGO.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {179-198}, keywords = {ego, metaphysics, transcendence}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORRISON1970, author = {MORRISON, JAMES-C}, title = {HUSSERL AND BRENTANO ON INTENTIONALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {27-46}, keywords = {consciousness, intentionality, metaphysics, phenomenology, psychology}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE IS AN ATTEMPT TO EXPOUND AND DISTINGUISH BRENTANO'S CONCEPT OF "INTENTIONAL INEXISTENCE" (FOUND IN 'PSYCHOLOGIE VON EINEM EMPIRISCHEN STANDPUNKT') AND HUSSERL'S EARLY CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY (IN 'LOGISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN'). THE MAIN PURPOSE IS TO SHOW THAT HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEWS ARE VERY DIFFERENT FROM AND FAR MORE DEVELOPED THAN BRENTANO'S AND THAT HE REJECTS MANY OF HIS CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINES. FIRST, BRENTANO'S DESIGNATION OF EIGHT DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO DEFINE PSYCHOLOGY, IS OUTLINED. THIS IS FOLLOWED BY A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF HUSSERL'S CRITICISMS AND REVISIONS, EMPHASIZING WHAT HUSSERL THOUGHT WAS BRENTANO'S MOST IMPORTANT INSIGHT, I.E., THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS INTENTIONAL. A DISCUSSION OF THREE VIEWS OF THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS GIVEN, CONCLUDING WITH HUSSERL'S GENERAL CRITICISMS THAT BRENTANO FELL VICTIM TO DUALISM AND REPRESENTATIONALISM AND THAT HIS CONCEPT OF THE INTENTIONAL NATURE OF MIND WAS DISTORTED BY A COMMITMENT TO NATURALISM, THE LATTER BEING OVERCOME ONLY BY HUSSERL'S OWN TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY IN 'IDEEN' AND LATER WORKS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORRISON1977, author = {MORRISON, JAMES-C}, title = {HUSSERL'S "CRISIS"; REFLECTIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {312-330}, keywords = {historicity, history, phenomenology, philosophizing, self-awareness; subjectivity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Morrison1995, author = {Morrison, Margaret}, title = {Capacities, Tendencies and the Problem of Singular Causes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {163-168}, keywords = {causation, experiment, gravity, science, universal}, abstract = {The paper, part of a book symposium on Nancy Cartwright's "Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement", discusses some of the difficulties with Cartwright's account of capacities as she relates it to Mill's notion of tendencies. I claim that the two cannot be linked in the way that Cartwright suggests and that her attempt to do so leaves unresolved the tension between the singular and universal aspects of capacities. This tension is also discussed as it arises on the context of the gyro experiment used to test GTR, an example Cartwright uses to argue for the importance of capacities for science. I claim that capacities are not required for understanding this experiment and its relation to GTR; a simple causal account will suffice.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MORRISTON1979, author = {MORRISTON, WESLEY}, title = {EXPERIENCE AND CAUSALITY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MERLEAU-PONTY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {561-574}, keywords = {causality, epistemology, experience, motive, perception}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MOSER1984, author = {MOSER, PAUL-K}, title = {TYPES TOKENS, AND PROPOSITIONS: QUINE'S ALTERNATIVE TO PROPOSITIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {361-376}, keywords = {language, proposition, token, type}, abstract = {A NOTORIOUS FEATURE OF W V QUINE'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE IS ITS REJECTION OF PROPOSITIONS CONSTRUED AS ABSTRACT EXTRA-LINGUISTIC ITEMS. THE OVERARCHING AIM OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO ARGUE THAT QUINE'S ATTACK ON PROPOSITIONS IS IN PART DEFECTIVE AND CAN IN PART BE TURNED AGAINST HIS OWN THEORY OF TRUTH-BEARERS. PART I SETS FORTH AND BEGINS ASSESSMENT OF QUINE'S MAJOR OBJECTIONS TO THE THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS, VIZ., THOSE CONCERNED WITH THE EXPLANATORY VALUE OF PROPOSITIONS AND THE CONDITIONS OF PROPOSITIONAL IDENTITY. IT ARGUES, IN BRIEF, THAT THOSE OBJECTIONS ARE INCONCLUSIVE. PART II PREPARES FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THIS ARGUMENT BY OUTLINING QUINE'S THEORY OF SENTENCE-TYPES, HIS ALTERNATIVE TO PROPOSITIONS AS TRUTH-BEARERS. PART III THEN RESUMES ASSESSMENT OF QUINE'S ALTERNATIVE TO PROPOSITIONS. ITS MAJOR CONCERN IS TO DETERMINE WHETHER SENTENCE-TYPES ENJOY CLEAR-CUT IDENTITY CONDITIONS OF THE SORT QUINE REQUIRES OF PROPOSITIONS. THE VERDICT IS NEGATIVE, AND THIS LEADS TO ONE OF THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF PART IV: QUINE'S OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSITIONS, IF SUCCESSFUL, UNDERMINE HIS OWN THEORY OF TRUTH-BEARERS ALSO.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Moser1997, author = {Moser, Paul-K}, title = {The Relativity of Skepticism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {401-406}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, pyrrhonism, relativity, scepticism}, abstract = {This paper is part of a symposium on Robert Fogelin's book, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. The paper argues that Pyrrhonian skeptics typically rely on epistemic standards that lack cogent, nonquestion begging epistemic support. This conclusion raises a serious challenge to Pyrrhonian skepticism, including that of Fogelin's book.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Moser1996, author = {Moser, Paul-K}, title = {Precis of Philosophy after Objectivity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {379-385}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, language, objectivity, scepticism}, abstract = {This paper is part of a symposium on Paul Moser, Philosophy After Objectivity (Oxford University Press, 1993). The paper identifies and clarifies the main themes of Philosophy After Objectivity.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Moser1996a, author = {Moser, Paul-K}, title = {Reply to Quinn and Audi on Philosophy after Objectivity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {401-406}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, objectivity}, abstract = {This paper is part of a symposium on Paul Moser, Philosophy After Objectivity (Oxford University Press, 1993). The paper replies to contributions by Philip Quinn and Robert Audi.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MOTHERSHEAD1962, author = {MOTHERSHEAD, JOHN-L}, title = {THE ROLE OF CONTRADICTION IN ETHICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {490-500}, keywords = {a-priori; commitment, compatibility, consequence, consistency, contradiction, ethics, intention, moral-judgmen}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MOUTAFAKIS1971, author = {MOUTAFAKIS, NICHOLAS-J}, title = {CONCERNING VON WRIGHT'S LOGIC OF NORMS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {600-603}, keywords = {deontic-logic; logic, norm}, abstract = {THE STUDY ILLUSTRATES HOW VON WRIGHT'S THESIS THAT A LOGIC OF NORMS IS POSSIBLE BY FIRST ARTICULATING A LOGIC OF CHANGE AND THEN A LOGIC OF ACTION IS UNTENABLE. VON WRIGHT FAILS TO CLEARLY EXPLAIN WHAT HE MEANS BY CHANGE, AND THUS HIS LOGIC OF CHANGE IS FOUND TO BE DEFICIENT IN ITS APPLICABILITY. FURTHERMORE, HIS PROPOSED LOGIC OF ACTION ALLOWS FOR A VERY LOOSE CONCEPTION OF "ACTION," WHICH SEES MENTAL STATES LIKE FORBEARANCES AS CORRELATES TO ACTIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, VON WRIGHT'S LOGIC OF ACTION SUFFERS FROM A LACK OF PRECISION. THUS IT IS SEEN THAT THE TWO BASIC INGREDIENT'S OF HIS LOGIC OF NORMS ARE DEFECTIVE, AND THIS IN TURN RENDERS HIS ENTIRE ENTERPRISE IMPOTENT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MUCCIOLO1974, author = {MUCCIOLO, LAURENCE-F}, title = {THE IDENTITY THEORY AND CRITERIA FOR THE MENTAL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {167-180}, keywords = {body, epiphenomenalism, epistemology, identity-theory; materialism, mind}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MUKERJEE1966, author = {MUKERJEE, RADHAKAMAL}, title = {HOMEOSTASIS, SOCIETY, AND VALUES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {74-79}, keywords = {environment, function, homeostasis, organism, social-philosophy; social-sciences; society, value}, abstract = {HOMEOSTASIS IMPLIES MAINTENANCE AND IMPROVEMENT OF STABILITY OF THE ORGANISM, REVEALING THE POTENTIALITIES OF LIFE IN ITS DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS. THE CONCEPT OF VALUES IS DERIVED FROM THE BASIC HOMEOSTATIC FUNCTIONS OF SELF-MAINTENANCE, CONTROL AND DIRECTIVENESS TOWARDS DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM. IN EVOLUTIONARY PROGRESS THE FIELDS OF LIFE RISE TO GREATER COMPLEXITY AND HIGHER DIMENSIONS, INCLUDING NOT SIMPLY MAN BUT THE SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND MANKIND-AS-A-WHOLE. GROUPS, SOCIETIES, AND CULTURES DEVELOP EVER MORE INTEGRATED VALUES, "WHOLES," OR HOMEOSTATIC SYSTEMS OF ORGANIZED RELATIONS, BEHAVIOR, AND VALUES, IN AND WITH REFERENCE TO WHICH INDIVIDUAL GOALS, PURPOSES, AND OBLIGATIONS ARISE AND ARE INTEGRATED AND ORDERED IN A SYSTEM OF "NATURAL" HIERARCHY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MULLANE1976, author = {MULLANE, HARVEY}, title = {UNCONSCIOUS AND DISGUISED EMOTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {403-411}, keywords = {emotion, epistemology, fear, language, unconscious}, abstract = {THE "DISPOSITIONAL" ANALYSIS OF THE NOTION OF UNCONSCIOUS EMOTION IS DEFENDED AGAINST THE THESIS OF PROFESSOR MICHAEL FOX. FOX ARGUES THAT UNCONSCIOUS EMOTIONAL STATES MUST HAVE (CONSCIOUS) PHENOMENOLOGICAL MANIFESTATIONS; THAT AN UNCONSCIOUS EMOTION IS REALLY "PRESENT" IN CONSCIOUSNESS BUT "DISGUISED," NOT "SPELLED OUT." I CONTEND THAT THIS VIEW IS INADEQUATE AS A GENERAL THEORY OF NONCONSCIOUS AFFECT, AND THAT A DISPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT CAN BE MADE TO FIT THE VARIETY OF CASES ONE FINDS IN PSYCHOANALYTIC LITERATURE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MULLIGAN1984, author = {MULLIGAN, KEVIN and SIMONS, PETER and SMITH, BARRY}, title = {TRUTH-MAKERS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {287-322}, keywords = {logic, moment, realism, semantics, truth}, abstract = {A "REALIST" THEORY OF TRUTH FOR A CLASS OF SENTENCE HOLDS THAT THERE ARE ENTITIES IN VIRTUE OF WHICH THESE SENTENCES ARE TRUE OR FALSE. WE CALL SUCH ENTITIES "TRUTH-MAKERS", AND CONTEND THAT THOSE FOR A WIDE RANGE OF SENTENCES ABOUT THE REAL WORLD ARE "MOMENTS" (DEPENDENT PARTICULARS). SINCE MOMENTS ARE UNFAMILIAR WE PROVIDE A DEFINITION AND A BRIEF PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY, ANCHORING THEM IN OUR ONTOLOGY BY SHOWING THEY ARE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION. THE CORE OF OUR THEORY IS THE ACCOUNT OF TRUTH-MAKING FOR ATOMIC SENTENCES, IN WHICH WE EXPOSE A PERVASIVE "DOGMA OF LOGICAL FORM", WHICH SAYS THAT ATOMIC SENTENCES CANNOT HAVE MORE THAN ONE TRUTH-MAKER; THE AUTHORS UPHOLD THE MUTUAL INDEPENDENCE OF LOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY. THE THEORY IS COMPARED WITH THAT OF WITTGENSTEIN'S "TRACTATUS", AND THE AUTHORS OUTLINE FORMAL PRINCIPLES OF TRUTH-MAKING TAKING ACCOUNT OF BOTH KINDS OF COMPLEXITY AND SUGGESTING HOW TO OVERCOME WITTGENSTEIN'S PROBLEM OF NEGATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Mumford1998, author = {Mumford, Stephen}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {246-248}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Dispositions}, volume = {62(1)}, year = {1998} } @article{MUNK1968, author = {MUNK, ARTHUR-W}, title = {A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY: A PLEA FOR CREATIVITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {59-67}, keywords = {creativity, philosophy}, abstract = {FOUR FACTS ABOUT AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY ARE EMPHASIZED. THE FIRST IS ITS 'GOLDEN AGE' WHEN GIANTS SUCH AS PEIRCE, JAMES, AND ROYCE FLOURISHED. THE SECOND CONSISTS OF A DISCUSSION OF THE CAUSES OF ITS DECLINE. THE THIRD INVOLVES THAT NARROWING OF ITS SCOPE THAT HAS MADE IT ABSTRACT, TECHNICAL, AND ESOTERIC. THE FOURTH CONSTITUTES THE NEED OF A NEW CREATIVITY CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A WORLD VIEW COMMENSURATE WITH THE NEEDS OF THE NUCLEAR AGE. THIS LATTER SERVES AS ITS GREATEST CHALLENGE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MUNK1965, author = {MUNK, ARTHUR-W}, title = {PHILOSOPHICAL FERMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {393-399}, keywords = {british, history, metaphysics, philosophy, theology, twentieth}, abstract = {MUNK SUMMARIZES MANY PHILOSOPHICAL TENDENCIES IN BRITAIN SINCE 1962, WHICH INCLUDE THE WORK OF: RAMSEY, DALY, SMART, AYER, FLEW, WALSH, "ET, AL". HE CLAIMS THAT THERE SIGNS OF CREATIVITY IN: METAPHYSICS, THEOLOGY, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. HE CONCLUDES THAT IN SPITE OF THE ANALYTIC AND ANTI-METAPHYSICAL ATTITUDES, THERE ARE SIGNS OF A COMING CHANGE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF A REBIRTH OF METAPHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY, AND ALSO A NEW INTEREST IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY FROM TOYNBEE'S PERSPECTIVE. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MUNSON1962, author = {MUNSON, THOMAS-N}, title = {WITTGENSTEIN'S PHENOMENOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {37-50}, keywords = {linguistic-analysis; meaning, phenomenology, philosophy, sign, thought}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR FOCUSES ON WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD, IN ORDER TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE TWO PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS. THE AUTHOR CONCLUDES THAT WITTGENSTEIN IS PRACTICING PHENOMENOLOGY. THE ARTICLE SHOWS THAT THE RELATION OF SIGN TO SIGNIFIED IS THE UNIFYING CONCERN OF WITTGENSTEIN'S PROBLEMS, AND THAT THIS BASIC ISSUE OF "MEANING" ACCOUNTS FOR HIS VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY AS A PHENOMENOLOGY, AS EXERCISING A DESCRIPTIVE FUNCTION. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MUNSON1961, author = {MUNSON, THOMAS-N}, title = {HEIDEGGER'S RECENT THOUGHT ON LANGUAGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {361-372}, keywords = {being, dasein, expression, intelligibility, language, phenomenology, speech, talking, thinking}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MURCHLAND1969, author = {MURCHLAND, BERNARD}, title = {SOME COMMENTS ON ALIENATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {432-438}, keywords = {alienation, social-philosoph}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE ARGUES (CONTRA HOROWITZ ET AL.) THAT THE ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM OF ALIENATION ANTEDATE GERMAN IDEALISM OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. SPECIFIC ANTECEDENTS TO THE CONTEMPORARY CONCERN WITH ALIENATION CAN BE FOUND IN: (1) THE MEDIEVAL SCHOOL OF NOMINALISM AND ITS CONCERN WITH SINGULARS; (2) THE RENAISSANCE PRE-OCCUPATION WITH SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND (3) DESCARTES' SOLIPSISTIC DUALISM. WHEN 19TH CENTURY THINKERS, PARTICULARLY HEGEL, GAVE EXTENSIVE AND EXPLICIT CONSIDERATION TO THE PROBLEM OF ALIENATION THEY WERE IN LARGE PART ARTICULATING TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS. TO BE FULLY GRASPED THE ALIENATION PROBLEM MUST BE VIEWED WITHIN THE BROAD MAINSTREAM OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Murphy1992, author = {Murphy, Jeffrie-G}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {238-241}, publisher = {Kluwer}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Retribution Reconsidered}, volume = {56(1)}, year = {1992} } @article{MURPHY1965, author = {MURPHY, RICHARD-T}, title = {HUSSERL AND PRE-REFLEXIVE CONSTITUTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {100-105}, keywords = {constitution, ego, epistemology, intentionality, life-world; phenomenology, transcendental-reductio}, abstract = {THE POINT HERE IS TO SHOW THAT TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY IS A LOGIC OF EXPERIENCE, AND THAT PREREFLEXIVE INTENTIONALITY OCCURS IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO. AN EFFORT IS MADE TO PROVE THAT THE LAWS OF "INTENTIONAL CONSTITUTION" ARE OPERATIVE IN PRE-REFLEXIVE CONSCIOUSNESS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT TRANSCENDENCE IS IMMANENT BECAUSE IT IS CONSTITUTED IN PREREFLEXIVE CONSCIOUSNESS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Murray1995, author = {Murray, Michael-J}, title = {Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {75-108}, keywords = {divinity, foreknowledge, freedom, religion}, abstract = {This essay examines Leibniz's views on divine providence and human freedom against the background of the competing views of his day. It is argued that Leibniz develops a unique position according to which a sufficient reason for free acts is found in dispositions of the intellect and will. It is these dispositions which account for the choice and also provide the means by which God can foreknow the free choices of a creature. Nonetheless, Leibniz argues that these dispositions neither metaphysically nor physically necessitate choice but only necessitate them "morally", a modality he borrows from seventeenth century scholasticism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MYERS1983, author = {MYERS, C-MASON}, title = {PEIRCE AND CONCEPT OF REALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {95-102}, keywords = {fallibilism, metaphysics, pragmatism, reality}, abstract = {C. S. PEIRCE GIVES TWO DEFINITIONS OF THE REAL, ONE OF WHICH CALLED THE "SCOTISTIC" DEFINITION BECAUSE ATTRIBUTED BY PEIRCE TO DUNS SCOTUS, HAS THE SECOND GRADE OF CLARITY, AND ONE OF WHICH CALLED THE "PRAGMATIC" DEFINITION BECAUSE ORIGINAL WITH PEIRCE, HAS ACCORDING TO PEIRCE THE THIRD GRADE OF CLARITY. PRIMA FACIE THE EXPERIENCE OF PAIN SEEMS A COUNTER INSTANCE TO THE SCOTISTIC DEFINITION. A WEAKENED VERSION OF THE SCOTISTIC DEFINITIONS IS FORMULATED WHICH ESCAPES THIS CRITICISM, BUT FURTHER CONSIDERATION SHOWS THIS NOT TO BE NECESSARY SINCE THE PUTATIVE COUNTER INSTANCE IS NOT A TRUE COUNTER INSTANCE. THE PRAGMATIC DEFINITION IS SHOWN TO BE CIRCULAR AND TO LACK THE THIRD GRADE OF CLARITY FOR REASONS INDEPENDENT OF THIS CIRCULARITY. IT IS ARGUED THAT NEITHER OF THESE CRITICISMS IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PRAGMATIC DEFINITION'S ELUCIDATIVE POWER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MYERS1966, author = {MYERS, C-MASON}, title = {THE CIRCULAR USE OF METAPHOR.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {391-402}, keywords = {circularity, concept, explication, logic, metaphor, structure}, abstract = {AN EXPLICATORY METAPHOR HAS A CIRCULAR USE WHEN THE METAPHORICAL EXPRESSION LITERALLY REFERS TO SOMETHING, THE CONCEPT OF WHICH INVOLVES IN SOME ESSENTIAL WAY THE CONCEPT BEING EXPLICATED. SUCH EXPLICATION MAY BE EMPIRICAL OR CONCEPTUAL, AND THE CIRCULARITY MAY BE VICIOUS OR NON-VICIOUS. BERKELEY'S METAPHOR OF THE PROPER OBJECTS OF SIGHT CONSTITUTING WORDS IN A LANGUAGE CAN BE SEEN, WITH MINOR MODIFICATION, TO BE CAPABLE OF FRUITFUL APPLICATION EVEN THOUGH IT IS CIRCULAR. ON THE OTHER HAND, CERTAIN VERSIONS OF THE "GHOST IN THE MACHINE" METAPHOR ARE OBVIOUSLY STERILE AND HENCE VICIOUSLY CIRCULAR. THIS IS DISTINCT FROM RYLE'S CRITICISM OF THIS METAPHOR. WHENEVER A METAPHOR IS NON-VICIOUSLY CIRCULAR THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS MUST HOLD: (1) THE EXPLICANDUM MUST BE UNDERSTOOD WITH AT LEAST THE FIRST GRADE OF PEIRCEAN CLARITY, AND (2) THE EXPLICANS MUST HAVE CERTAIN STRUCTURE-REVEALING CHARACTERISTICS. IN ADDITION, CERTAIN OF THE INTERPRETER'S CONCEPTS MUST BE IMPLICIT AND CERTAIN OTHERS EXPLICIT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MYERS1962, author = {MYERS, CHARLES-M}, title = {INEXPLICABLE ANALOGIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {326-333}, keywords = {analogy, determinacy, explication, metaphysics, particulars, property, quality, similarity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MYERS1971, author = {MYERS, C-MASON}, title = {ONTOLOGICAL CRYPTOPHOBIA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {32}, pages = {219-234}, keywords = {metaphysics, ontology, possibility}, abstract = {IT IS ARGUED THAT REACTION TO A SEEMINGLY INFLATED ONTOLOGY OFTEN RESULTS IN UNWARRANTED ONTOLOGICAL PARSIMONY. QUINE'S REJECTION OF EXISTENT POSSIBILITIES IN "ON WHAT THERE IS" IS COUNTERED BY SHOWING EACH OF HIS OBJECTIONS ANSWERABLE WITHOUT UNNECESSARY OR IRRATIONAL REIFICATION. IN PARTICULAR, REASONS ARE GIVEN WHY POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE REGARDED AS SOMETHING 'MERELY MENTAL'. THE CONCEPT OF REALITY IS EXAMINED IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IN WHAT SENSE A POSSIBILITY CAN BE REAL IN A PHILOSOPHICALLY INTERESTING WAY. THIS SENSE IS SHOWN TO BE THAT IN WHICH X CAN BE SAID TO BE REAL (1) ONLY IF 'X HAS SOME PREDICATE P' IS LOGICALLY INDEPENDENT OF 'SOMEONE BELIEVES X HAS P' AND (2) ONLY IF THERE IS NO OBVIOUS WAY IN WHICH X IS A CONSTRUCT. REQUIREMENT (2) IS THEN DEFENDED AGAINST THE CRITICISM THAT IT DISREGARDS THE QUESTION OF ONTOLOGICAL ULTIMACY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MYERS1976, author = {MYERS, DAVID-B}, title = {MARX AND THE PROBLEM OF NIHILISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {193-204}, keywords = {humanism, nihilism, social-philosoph}, abstract = {THE PAPER IS AN ATTEMPT TO ANSWER STANLEY ROSEN'S CHARGE THAT MARX'S VIEW OF MAN IS EITHER NIHILISTIC OR INCOHERENT. IT IS ALLEGED THAT MARX'S NOTION THAT MAN MAKES HIMSELF LEADS TO THE NIHILISTIC CONCLUSION THAT EVERYTHING IS PERMISSIBLE. THUS, MARX'S CONCEPT OF HUMAN ALIENATION IS EMPTY BECAUSE HE CANNOT MAKE GOOD ON THE NORMATIVE CONCEPT OF UNALIENATED EXISTENCE. I ATTEMPT TO EXTRICATE MARX FROM ROSEN'S DILEMMA BY SHOWING THAT MARX'S NOTION OF HUMAN SELF-CREATION IS NOT ONLY CONSISTENT WITH BUT REQUIRES THE AFFIRMATION OF A SOCIALIST FRAMEWORK. MARX'S CONCEPT OF UNIQUE HUMAN NEEDS TURNS OUT TO BE CRUCIAL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{MYERS1962a, author = {MYERS, G-E}, title = {PRESCRIPTIONS, PERMISSIONS, AND OBLIGATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {481-489}, keywords = {ethics, justification, obligation, permission, prescription, rule}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Myers1999, author = {Myers, Robert-H}, title = {The Inescapability of Moral Reasons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {281-307}, keywords = {authority, ethics, moral-theory; reason}, abstract = {According to Thomas Nagel, morality's authority is determined by the extent to which its way of balancing agent-neutral and agent-relative values resembles reasons. He himself would like to think that the resemblance is close enough to ensure that it will always be reasonable to act as morality demands. But his attempts to establish this never really get off the ground, in large part because he never makes it very clear how these two perspectives on value are to be characterized. My goal in this paper is to show how we might flesh out Nagel's conception of these matters by construing reason as a kind of self-governance and morality as involving a certain kind of cooperation. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Myers1999a, author = {Myers, Robert-H}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {498-501}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Self-Governance and Cooperation}, volume = {66(2)}, year = {1999} } @article{MYHILL1972, author = {MYHILL, JOHN}, title = {EMPIRICAL MEANINGFULNESS AND INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {186-191}, keywords = {intuition, logic, meaning}, abstract = {CONSIDER A NON EMPTY BUT OTHERWISE ARBITRARY SET OF PROPERTIES CALLED OBSERVATION-PROPERTIES (O-PROPERTIES). CALL A PROPERTY P A MEANINGFUL PROPERTY (M-PROPERTY) IF IT IS EQUIVALENT TO A (FINITE OR INFINITE) DISJUNCTION OF O-PROPERTIES--I.E., A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR P IS THAT AT LEAST ONE OBSERVATION-PROPERTY IN A CERTAIN SET O(P) BE TRUE. OBVIOUSLY THE CONJUNCTION AND DISJUNCTION OF TWO M-PROPERTIES IS AN M-PROPERTY; IN GENERAL THE NEGATION OF AN M-PROPERTY IS NOT AN M-PROPERTY. HOWEVER WE CAN DEFINE THE PSEUDO NEGATION OF AN M-PROPERTY P AS THE POSSESSION OF SOME O-PROPERTY INCOMPATIBLE WITH P. THE ALGEBRA OF DISJUNCTION, CONJUNCTION AND PSEUDO NEGATION OF M-PROPERTIES TURNS OUT TO START IN THE SAME RELATION TO BOOLEAN ALGEBRA AS INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC (NOT 3-VALUED LOGIC) DOES TO CLASSICAL LOGIC, AND SUGGESTS THEREFORE THAT INTUITIONISTIC RATHER THAN 3-VALUED LOGIC IS THE APPROPRIATE FORMALISM TO DEAL WITH THE PARADOXES OF THE BALD MAN, THE HEAP, ETC.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NAESS1964, author = {NAESS, ARNE}, title = {REFLECTIONS ABOUT TOTAL VIEWS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {16-29}, keywords = {epistemology, philosophy, scepticism, system, totality, world-vie}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE ATTEMPTS TO INDUCE THE READER TO FEEL THAT AN EXPLICIT TOTAL VIEW IS SOMETHING PARADOXICAL AND UNREACHABLE, BUT THAT ARGUMENTATION AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF A TOTAL VIEW IS NOT LESS PARADOXICAL. TO TAKE REFUGE IN SCEPTICISM IS SELF-DEFEATING BECAUSE EFFORTS TO BE MODEST, WHETHER IN CLAIMS TO KNOW OR OTHERWISE, TEND TO PASS INTO WILD IMMODESTY IF PUSHED VERY FAR. WHEREAS SPINOZA AND OTHERS MAY HAVE INTENDED TO ELABORATE AN EXPLICIT TOTAL VIEW, RESEARCHERS INTO THEIR SYSTEM DO WELL BY TREATING THEIR SYSTEM AS PENULTIMATE, ONE-STEP-FROM-TOTAL. BELIEVERS IN TOTAL VIEWS ARE PERHAPS TODAY MORE OFTEN FOUND AMONG SOCIAL SCIENTISTS THAN AMONG PHILOSOPHERS. KARL MANNHEIM, E.G., IS BELIEVED TO HAVE AN ALL-EMBRACING FRAME OF REFERENCE SUCH THAT HE CAN SWEEPINGLY LOCATE AND DESCRIBE "THE TOTAL STRUCTURE OF THE MIND"--INCLUDING THE PHILOSOPHIES--OF ANY EPOCH.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NAGEL1960, author = {NAGEL, ERNEST}, title = {DETERMINISM IN HISTORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {291-317}, keywords = {action, assumption, chance, condition, determinism, freedom, history, indeterminism, inevitability, laws, necessity, novelty, responsibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NARSKII1980, author = {NARSKII, IGOR-S}, title = {ON "MARX'S USE OF CONTRADICTION".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {564-567}, keywords = {contradiction, formal-logic; social-philosoph}, abstract = {DEN ARTIKEL VOM PROFESSOR L CROCKER BESPRECHEND, WILL DER AUTHOR HAUPTZUGE SEINER KONCEPTION DES DIALETCTISCHEN WIDERSPRUCHS IN KURZE AUSLEGEN. DAZU GEHOREN: DIE THESE VON DER ZWEISPALTIGKEIT DES "VERSTANDES" BEI HEGEL UND VON SEINEM IRRTUM DER IDENTIFIKATION DER FORMALLOGISCHEN UND DER DIALEKTISCHEN "ZUSPITZUNGEN" DES WIDERSPRUCHS, DIE THESE VON DER IDENTIFIZIERUNG DURCH HEGEL (IN EINIGEN FALLEN) DER SYNTHESE DES WIDERSPRUCHS MIT DER KOPPELUNG VON THESE UND ANTITHESE, UND ANDERE. DAS MACHT MARXENS POSITION IN DIESER FRAGE KLAR.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NASSER1975, author = {NASSER, ALAN}, title = {MARX'S ETHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {484-500}, keywords = {ethics, man, philosophical-anthropolog}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NATANSON1982, author = {NATANSON, MAURICE}, title = {ERWIN STRAUS AND ALFRED SCHUTZ.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {335-342}, keywords = {communication, comparison, metaphysics, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NATANSON1966, author = {NATANSON, MAURICE}, title = {MAN AS AN ACTOR.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {327-341}, keywords = {action, life, man, philosophical-anthropology; social-role; theater}, abstract = {MAN IS BOTH AN ACTOR IN THE SOCIAL WORLD AND A THEATRICAL PERFORMER. THE AMBIGUITY IN THIS DOUBLE SENSE OF "ACTOR" IS EXAMINED THROUGH A PERCEPTUAL METAPHOR: SEEING THE ACTION OF A STAGE PLAY IS SOMETHING LIKE SEEING PERSONS IN PAINTED PORTRAITS, FOR THERE IS A STRANGENESS AND A FRAGILITY TO THEIR MODE OF BEING. THEY ARE UNREAL IN THEIR PHYSICAL REALITY AND REAL IN THEIR FICTIVE UNREALITY. THERE IS ALSO A CURIOUS RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN ACTION IN MUNDANE LIFE AND ON THE STAGE. LIFE-ACTION IS A CONDENSED REHEARSAL IN ONGOING IMAGINATION OF LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES. THE ACTOR IN LIFE IS PROBING, FEELING OUT, THRUSTING HIMSELF TOWARD DECISIONS HE KNOWS HE CAN AND WILL MAKE. THE STAGE ACTOR UTILIZES MARGINAL OR FRINGE DIMENSIONS OF PERCEPTION. STAGE ACTING IS A KIND OF TRANSLITERATION OF THE MARGINAL LANGUAGE OF PROTO-REFLECTIVE LIFE. ACTING, OFF-STAGE AS WELL AS ON, IS A SEARCH FOR THE ESSENTIAL IN BOTH PERSON AND ROLE, AND THE ESSENTIAL SELF IS THE SOUL. ACTING, THEN, IS THE HERMENEUTICS OF THE SOUL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NATHAN1975, author = {NATHAN, M-N-L}, title = {MATERIALISM AND ACTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {501-511}, keywords = {action, agency, epistemology, materialism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Nathan2001, author = {Nathan, N-M-L}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {735-739}, publisher = {Routledge}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Price of Doubt}, volume = {70(3)}, year = {2001} } @article{NATHANSON1982, author = {NATHANSON, STEPHEN-L}, title = {NONEVIDENTIAL REASONS FOR BELIEF: A JAMESIAN VIEW.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {572-580}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, rationality}, abstract = {THIS PAPER CONTAINS AN INTERPRETATION OF WILLIAM JAMES' "WILL TO BELIEVE" AND A DEFENSE OF HIS VIEW. ACCORDING TO JAMES, IT CAN BE RATIONAL TO ACCEPT BELIEFS ON THE BASIS OF NON-EVIDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS. BECAUSE CRITERIA OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY APPLY TO BELIEF CHOICE, BELIEVING CAN BE JUSTIFIED BY APPEAL TO CONSEQUENCES AS WELL AS EVIDENCE. JAMES' VIEW IMPLIES THAT ONE COULD RATIONALLY ACCEPT BELIEFS WHICH ONE KNOWS ARE FALSE. I DEFEND ALL OF THESE CONCLUSIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Nayak1995, author = {Nayak, Abhaya-C and Sotnak, Eric}, title = {Kant on the Impossibility of the "Soft Sciences"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {133-151}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, natural-science}, abstract = {In the "Metaphysical Foundations" Kant declares that every discipline is a science only to the extent that it can be mathematized and he refuses the status of science to chemistry and psychology. In the "First Critique" he suggests that qualities can be mathematized. Since chemistry and psychology are traditionally taken to be the study of certain qualities, Kant's claims seem to be conflicting. We resolve this conflict by suggesting that although mathematics can be applied to chemistry or psychology in some measure, it cannot be applied enough or in the right manner.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NAYLOR1985, author = {NAYLOR, MARGERY-BEDFORD}, title = {VOLUNTARY BELIEF.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {427-436}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, voluntariness, will}, abstract = {HOW IS IT POSSIBLE FOR SOME PERSON, "S", TO BELIEVE A GIVEN PROPOSITION, "P", "VOLUNTARILY"--I.E., "AT WILL," JUST BECAUSE HE HAS CHOSEN TO? I ARGUE, FIRST, THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO INDUCE, AT WILL, THE CONVICTION THAT "P" IS TRUE. THEN I ARGUE THAT ALSTON'S QUESTION 'IS "S" BELIEVING THAT "P" EITHER (A) A "BASIC" ACT, OR (B) A "NECESSARY AND IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE" OF A BASIC ACT'? IS IRRELEVANT TO THE QUESTION, 'DOES "S" BELIEVE THAT "P" VOLUNTARILY'? FINALLY, I FORMULATE THE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS OF VOLUNTARY BELIEF IN THIS WAY. "S" BELIEVES THAT "P" VOLUNTARILY IF AND ONLY IF (I) "S" CHOSE TO BELIEVE THAT "P", AND (II) BECAUSE HE CHOSE TO BELIEVE THAT "P", "S" HIMSELF BROUGHT IT ABOUT, USING MEANS HE HIMSELF CHOSE TO USE, THAT HE REGARDS "P" AS BEING CONCLUSIVELY EVIDENT OR AS BEING SELF-EVIDENT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NAYLOR1988, author = {NAYLOR, MARGERY-BEDFORD}, title = {THE MORAL OF THE TROLLEY PROBLEM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {711-722}, keywords = {choice, ethics, killing, moral-judgment; right, transplantation}, abstract = {JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON HAS POSED A TANTALIZING PROBLEM: IF IT WOULD BE MORALLY PERMISSIBLE TO DIVERT A RUNAWAY TROLLEY TO SAVE FIVE PEOPLE, THEREBY KILLING ONE OTHER PERSON, WHY WOULD IT NOT ALSO BE MORALLY PERMISSIBLE TO REMOVE ORGANS FROM THE BODY OF ONE PERSON, THEREBY KILLING HIM, TO SAVE FIVE PEOPLE WHO WOULD DIE WITHOUT THOSE ORGANS? THIS PROBLEM IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO ETHICS, BECAUSE IT DISPLAYS WHEN AND HOW RIGHTS LIMIT WHAT IS MORALLY PERMISSIBLE. THIS ARTICLE ARGUES THAT THE MORALLY DECISIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO CASES IS THAT REMOVING THE ORGANS IS MORALLY IMPERMISSIBLE, BECAUSE IT WOULD "AVOIDABLY" VIOLATE THE DONOR'S RIGHT TO CONTROL WHAT IS DONE TO HIS BODY; WHEREAS, SINCE DIVERTING THE TROLLEY WOULD "UNAVOIDABLY" VIOLATE THE ONE ON THE SPUR'S CORRESPONDING RIGHT TO CONTROL WHAT IS DONE TO HIS BODY, VIOLATING IT DOES "NOT" MAKE DIVERTING THE TROLLEY MORALLY IMPERMISSIBLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NEISSER1965, author = {NEISSER, HANS}, title = {THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL BASIS OF DESCARTES' DOUBT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {572-574}, keywords = {doubt, ego, epistemology, existence, mental, phenomenology, universality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NEISSER-HANS-P1971, author = {NEISSER-HANS-P}, title = {ARE SPACE AND TIME REAL?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {421-425}, keywords = {metaphysics, reality, space, time}, abstract = {KANT'S CLASSIFICATION OF WHAT IS REAL IS INCOMPLETE. BESIDES SUBSTANCES AND THEIR PROPERTIES THERE ARE THE FORMS PROPER OF THE SUBSTANCE; SPACE AND TIME ARE THE FORMS PROPER OF REALITY. THE ANTINOMIES CANNOT DESTROY THIS RESULT. KANT SEES THE REAL WORLD - THE THING-IN-ITSELF - AS HIDDEN FROM THE HUMAN MIND. FOR THE TRANSCENDENTAL REALISM PRESENTED HERE THE MIND HAS ACCESS TO REALITY. EXTENDING HARTMANN'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN CATEGORIES OF THE REAL BEING AND CATEGORIES OF KNOWLEDGE TO THE FORMS PROPER WE SEE A FAR REACHING IDENTITY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NELKIN1989, author = {NELKIN, NORTON}, title = {PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES AND CONSCIOUSNESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {413-430}, keywords = {attitude, belief, consciousness, phenomenology, twentieth}, abstract = {THE PRIMARY TOPIC OF THIS PAPER IS OUR APPARENT CONSCIOUSNESS THAT WE HAVE ONE PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE RATHER THAN ANOTHER (THAT WE BELIEVE "P", SAY, RATHER THAN SUPPOSE IT). IT IS ARGUED THAT ATTEMPTS TO UNDERSTAND THIS NONINFERENTIAL SORT OF AWARENESS SUFFER FROM AN ACCEPTANCE OF WHAT ONE MIGHT CALL "CARTESIAN" (OR AS I SAY, "INTROSPECTIONIST") VIEWS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. SUCH AN ACCEPTANCE IS FOUND EVEN IN THE WRITINGS OF THE OPPONENTS OF INTROSPECTIONISM. THE INTROSPECTIONISTS, AND THEIR OPPONENTS, THINK OF ALL CONSCIOUSNESS AS BEING LIKE SENSATION-CONSCIOUSNESS, THAT SORT OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF WHICH, IN THOMAS NAGEL'S TERMS, IT CAN BE SAID THAT THERE IS SOMETHING IT IS LIKE TO BE THAT CONSCIOUS BEING. THE AUTHOR ARGUES, TO THE CONTRARY, THAT IT IS A MISTAKE TO ASSIMILATE CONSCIOUSNESS OF OUR PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES WITH SENSATION CONSCIOUSNESS. THERE ARE "DIFFERENT" SORTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS (EACH DIFFERENTIATING US, IN DIFFERENT WAYS, FROM THINGS WE SAY ARE NOT CONSCIOUS). CONFLATING THESE DIFFERENT STATES UNDER THE SINGLE PARADIGM OF SENSATION-CONSCIOUSNESS, HE ARGUES, IS A CAUSE OF ERROR IN BOTH THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL-NEURAL SCIENCES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Nelkin1996, author = {Nelkin, Norton}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {273-276}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Consciousness and the Origins of Thought}, volume = {59(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{NELSON1966, author = {NELSON, JOHN-O}, title = {TASTES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {537-545}, keywords = {disposition, epistemology, object, power, realism, sensation, sense, subjectivism, taste}, abstract = {IN THIS ARTICLE I FIRST EXAMINE THREE TRADITIONAL THEORIES CONCERNING THE METAPHYSICAL NATURE OF TASTES OR FLAVORS. THESE ARE THE THEORY CLAIMING THAT TASTES OR FLAVORS ARE SUBJECTIVE AFFECTIONS OF THE SENSES, THE THEORY CLAIMING THAT THEY ARE OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE MATERIAL THINGS SAID TO HAVE THEM, AND HUME'S THEORY OF TASTES. I ARGUE THAT THESE THEORIES, IN SPITE OF SOME PORTION OF TRUTH WHICH THEY POSSESS, ARE ALL UNTENABLE. I THEN DEFEND AS THE CORRECT THEORY OF THE METAPHYSICAL NATURE OF TASTES A THEORY SIMILAR TO ARISTOTLE'S. IN SUPPORT OF THIS THEORY AND AGAINST HUME, I MAINTAIN THAT IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT A TASTE OR FLAVOR HAVE A SHAPE, ALTHOUGH AGREEING WITH HUME THAT IT WOULD BE ABSURD TO SAY THAT THE TASTE OF A FIG WAS FIG-SHAPED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NELSON1964, author = {NELSON, JOHN-O}, title = {THE CONCLUSION OF BOOK ONE, PART FOUR, OF HUME'S TREATISE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {512-521}, keywords = {empiricism, experience, human-nature; man, philosophy, scepticism, science, textual-criticis}, abstract = {THE CONCLUSION OF BOOK ONE, PART FOUR, OF HUME'S "TREATISE" HAS BEEN VIEWED BY HIS CRITICS AS BEING EITHER A VAGARY OF YOUTH OR AN ADMISSION OF PHILOSOPHICAL FAILURE. THE CHIEF CAUSE OF THIS VIEW IS THE OSCILLATION OF FEELINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE PURSUIT OF PHILOSOPHY WHICH HUME PORTRAYS IN THIS SECTION. THE ARTICLE ARGUES THAT THIS OSCILLATION OF HUME'S FEELINGS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN ADMISSION OF PHILOSOPHICAL FAILURE OR A VAGARY OF YOUTH, BUT RATHER CONFIRMS AND CONSUMMATES THE THREE BASIC THESES AND ENDS OF THE "TREATISE", NAMELY, TO SHOW THAT ALL OTHER SCIENCES ARE BASED ON THE SCIENCE OF MAN, THAT THIS SCIENCE IS PROPERLY BASED ON OBSERVATION AND EXPERIMENT, AND THAT OUR KNOWLEDGE HAS CERTAIN DEFINITE LIMITATIONS. THE AUTHOR ARGUES FURTHER THAT IN THE CONCLUDING SECTION OF BOOK ONE HUME REFLEXIVELY VALIDATES THE SCIENCE OF MAN, AND THAT IS TO SAY, THE PRECEDING SECTIONS OF BOOK ONE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NELSON1969, author = {NELSON, JOHN-O}, title = {HOW IS NON-METAPHYSICS POSSIBLE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {219-237}, keywords = {game, language, metaphysics, philosophy}, abstract = {THESIS 1: IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THAT THE SYNTAX OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE INCORPORATES METAPHYSICAL THESES, THUS MAKING ALL DISCOURSE ENGAGEMENT IN METAPHYSICS. THESIS 2: THE POSSIBILITY OF NON-METAPHYSICS AND ITS PRIORITY TO METAPHYSICS ARE COMPARED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF VARIOUS GAMES IN LANGUAGE BEING PLAYED ON DIFFERENT "TERRAINS" (NON-METAPHYSICS) WITHOUT THERE BEING DESCRIPTIONS OF THOSE GAMES AND THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIPS (METAPHYSICS), VERSUS THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE CONVERSE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Neta2003, author = {Neta, Ram}, title = {Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self-Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {396-411}, keywords = {contextualism, epistemology, scepticism, self-knowledge; semantics}, abstract = {Stephen Schiffer has argued that contextualist solutions to skepticism rest on an implausible "error theory" concerning our own semantic intentions. Similar arguments have recently been offered also by Thomas Hofweber and Patrick Rysiew. I attempt to show how contextualists can rebut these arguments. The kind of self-knowledge that contextualists are committed to denying us is not a kind of self-knowledge that we need, nor is it a kind of self-knowledge that we can plausibly be thought to possess.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Neta2003a, author = {Neta, Ram}, title = {Contextualism and the Problem of the External World}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {1-31}, keywords = {contextualism, external-world; knowledge, metaphysics}, abstract = {A skeptic claims that I do not have knowledge of the external world. It has been thought that the skeptic reaches this conclusion because the employs unusually stringent standards for knowledge. But the skeptic does not employ unusually high standards for knowledge. Rather, she employs unusually restrictive standards of evidence. It is argued that this solution to the problem of the external world enjoys all of the benefits, and suffers none of the problems, of other solutions to the problem of the external world. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Newman1999, author = {Newman, Lex}, title = {The Fourth Meditation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {559-591}, keywords = {god, meditation, metaphysics, truth}, abstract = {Recent scholarship suggests that Descartes's effort to establish a truth criterion is not viciously circular (notwithstanding its reputation)--a fact that invites closer scrutiny of his epistemological program. One of the least well understood features of the project is his deduction of a truth criterion from theistic premises, a demonstration Descartes says he provides in The Fourth Meditation. This paper reconstructs the argument of The Fourth Meditation, detailing the steps in the demonstration of the criterion and clarifying its role in the larger program. Surprisingly, Descartes deduces a truth criterion more fundamental than clarity and distinctness; this more fundamental criterion helps explain what are otherwise cryptic (though central) epistemological moves in The Sixth Meditation. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NICOL1961, author = {NICOL, EDUARD}, title = {THE RETURN TO METAPHYSICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {26-39}, keywords = {being, crisis, experience, first-principle; knowledge, metaphysics, science, system}, abstract = {THE INCREASING RESEARCH AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE SCIENCES ARE NOT ONLY COMPATIBLE WITH A FUNDAMENTAL CRISIS BUT ARE EVEN ONE OF ITS SYMPTOMS. THE GREATER AND FASTER THE PROGRESS, THE MORE FUNDAMENTAL THE CRISIS; UNTIL A NEW THEORETICAL FRAME HAS BEEN FOUND, IN WHICH THE NEW FACTS CAN BE ARRANGED AND ORDERED. THE SEARCH FOR A NEW SYSTEMATIC FRAME IS NOT THE TASK OF ANY PARTICULAR SCIENCE, BUT OF PHILOSOPHY. THE PROBLEM OF THE FOUNDATION OF SCIENCE IS NOT A SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM; SCIENCE CANNOT ESTABLISH ITS OWN FOUNDATIONS. HENCE THERE MUST BE COMMON TO ALL SCIENCES A SCIENCE OF PRINCIPLES--METAPHYSICS. THE AUTHOR THINKS THAT A METAPHYSICS OF EXPRESSION, (IN THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRADITION), CAN REVEAL THE FOUNDATIONS OF METAPHYSICS AS THE FIRST SCIENCE OF BEING AND KNOWLEDGE. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NICOL1965, author = {NICOL, E}, title = {SOME INDICATIONS ABOUT THE METAPHYSICS OF EXPRESSION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {580-587}, keywords = {communication, expression, metaphysics, ontology, science, subjectivism, truth}, abstract = {METAPHYSICS HERE IS CONCEIVED AS THE SCIENCE OF PRINCIPLES AND THE RETURN TO ORIGINS (WHICH SOMETIMES INVOLVES THE DESTRUCTION OF THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTIONS). NICOL ARGUES THAT PHILOSOPHY HAS ADOPTED TWO PRINCIPLES: THAT OF CONTRADICTION AND THE CARTESIAN "COGITO" OR SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE. HE WOULD LIKE TO GET BEYOND THE IDEALISM/REALISM CONTROVERSY, AND HE IS OPPOSED TO SUBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM. HE CONCLUDES THAT EVIDENCE IS COMMON, APODICTICITY IS DIALOGICAL, AND THE FOUNDATION OF TRUTH NEEDS TO BE ONTOLOGICALLY NECESSARY, AND NOT SOCIOLOGICALLY CONTINGENT. HOWEVER, THE ONTOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNICATION REMAINS A PROBLEM. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Nida-Rumelin1998, author = {Nida-Rumelin, Martine}, title = {On Belief about Experiences: An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument against Physicalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {51-73}, keywords = {belief, experience, knowledge, metaphysics, physicalism}, abstract = {The article introduces two kinds of belief--phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief--about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called knowledge argument should not be formulated--as usual--using the locution of 'knowing what it's like' but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why 'knowing what it's like' does not serve the purposes of those who wish to defend the knowledge argument. The article distinguishes two rival accounts of the phenomenal/nonphenomenal distinction and explains how the result of the knowledge argument depends upon which of these accounts one wishes to accept.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NIELSEN1976, author = {NIELSEN, KAI}, title = {ETHICAL SUBJECTIVISM AGAIN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {123-124}, keywords = {ethics, subjectivism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NIELSEN1974, author = {NIELSEN, KAI}, title = {DOES ETHICAL SUBJECTIVISM HAVE A COHERENT FORM?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {93-99}, keywords = {ethics, subjectivism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NIELSEN1967, author = {NIELSEN, KAI}, title = {IS TO ABANDON DETERMINISM TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ENTERPRISE OF SCIENCE?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {117-121}, keywords = {determinism, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NIELSEN1982, author = {NIELSEN, KAI}, title = {SOCIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE: WINCH, MARXISM, AND "VERSTEHEN" REVISITED.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {465-491}, keywords = {science, sociology-of-knowledge; understanding}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NIELSEN1977, author = {NIELSEN, KAI}, title = {ON JUSTIFYING REVOLUTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {516-532}, keywords = {class-struggle; distribution, justice, revolution, social-philosophy; socialism, wealth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NIELSEN1963, author = {NIELSEN, KAI}, title = {ON MORALITY AND CONVENTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {252-259}, keywords = {authority, convention, ethics, language, morality, reasons, sanction, society}, abstract = {NIELSEN ARGUES THAT ONE SHOULD ALWAYS DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW AND THE VANTAGE POINT OF SELF-INTEREST. HE SPENDS MUCH TIME CRITICIZING FALK'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIMARY AND MATURE MORALITY. NIELSEN DOES NOT THINK THAT MORAL PHILOSOPHY HAS EXISTED ONLY TO DISPUTE THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO DEFINITE, RULE-GOVERNED MORALITY! MORALITY FOR HIM IS MADE UP OF CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NIELSEN1962, author = {NIELSEN, KAI}, title = {CONVENTIONALISM IN MORALS AND THE APPEAL TO HUMAN NATURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {217-231}, keywords = {conventionalism, custom, essence, ethics, human-nature; morality, obligation, reasons, rule}, abstract = {CAN A REASONABLE CASE BE MADE FOR THE CLAIM THAT MORAL RULES AND PRINCIPLES ARE MERELY RATIONALIZATIONS OF CUSTOM? THE AUTHOR ANSWERS NO. A CONVENTIONALIST WOULD ARGUE THAT MORALITY IS CERTAIN CONVENTIONS, SOCIAL RULES AND ATTITUDES, ETC., BUT IF THIS IS SO, ANY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH THE SOUNDNESS OR TRUTH OF MORAL CLAIMS WOULD BE FUTILE. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS AN IMPORTANT LINK BETWEEN OUR HUMAN NATURES AND OUR MORALITY, BUT IT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN THAT WE HAVE THE RULE OF RIGHT WITHIN. UNDERSTANDING MORALITY IS NOT JUST UNDERSTANDING OURSELVES. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Niiniluoto1999, author = {Niiniluoto, Ilkka}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {227-230}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Critical Scientific Realism}, volume = {69(1)}, year = {1999} } @article{Noe1994, author = {Noe, Robert-Alva}, title = {Wittgenstein, Phenomenology and What It Makes Sense to Say}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {1-42}, keywords = {color, epistemology, knowledge, language, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NOLA1987, author = {NOLA, ROBERT}, title = {NIETZSCHE'S THEORY OF TRUTH AND BELIEF.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {525-562}, keywords = {belief, correspondence, metaphysics, pragmatic, truth}, abstract = {THE FIRST PART OF THIS PAPER OUTLINES NIETZSCHE'S THEORY ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE WORLD--THE WORLD IS A MATRIX OF DISEMBODIED FORCES AND POWERS. IN THE SECOND PART A CASE IS MADE FOR NIETZSCHE'S COMMITMENT TO A VERSION OF THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH IN DECIDING BETWEEN BROAD METAPHYSICAL THEORIES SUCH AS HIS OWN AND RIVALS SUCH AS MECHANISTIC ATOMISM OR ANY SUBSTANCE-BASED OR MATERIAL-BASED THEORY. IN THE THIRD PART NIETZSCHE'S CLAIM THAT OUR MATERIAL OR SUBSTANCE-BASED ORDINARY MODES OF TALK ARE ILLUSORY IS OUTLINED BUT NOT CRITICALLY EXAMINED. NIETZSCHE'S PRAGMATIC THEORY OF BELIEF AND TRUTH WITH RESPECT TO OUR ORDINARY BELIEFS IS SKETCHED AND ALLOCATED A ROLE THAT STILL LEAVES ROOM FOR THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH TO ACCOUNT FOR THE ALLEGED ILLUSORY CHARACTER OF THESE BELIEFS. IN THE FINAL SECTION, ONE ARGUMENT FOR THE CLAIM THAT THESE ORDINARY MODES OF TALK ARE ILLUSORY IS EXPLORED. IT TURNS OUT THAT NIETZSCHE'S GROUNDS FOR HIS CLAIM REVEAL SOME UNRESOLVED DIFFICULTIES FOR HIS POSITION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NOLT1983, author = {NOLT, JOHN-E}, title = {MATHEMATICAL INTUITION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {189-212}, keywords = {epistemology, intuition, mathematics, perception}, abstract = {MATHEMATICAL INTUITION IS OFTEN REGARDED AS A SPECIAL FORM OF PERCEPTION WHOSE OBJECTS ARE ABSTRACT ENTITIES. THE THESIS OF THIS PAPER IS THAT MATHEMATICAL INTUITION IS JUST ORDINARY PERCEPTION AND IMAGINATION OF FAMILIAR OBJECTS. IT IS DISTINGUISHED, HOWEVER, BY ITS MODE OF CONCEPTUALIZATION, WHICH UTILIZES RELATIVELY FEW PREDICATES AND HENCE TREATS MANY DISTINCT OBJECTS AS INDISTINGUISHABLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Noordhof2003, author = {Noordhof, Paul}, title = {Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {75-100}, keywords = {consciousness, epistemology, evidence, interpretation, self-deceptio}, abstract = {I argue that the extant theories of self-deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterizing self-deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a more general difficulty for interpretism. Principles of reasoning--in particular, the requirement of total evidence--are given a weight in attentive consciousness which does not correspond to our reflective judgment of their weight. Successful interpretation does not involve ascribing beliefs and desires by reference to what a subject ought to believe and desire, contrary to what interpretists suggest.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Norcross1999, author = {Norcross, Alastair}, title = {Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {769-776}, keywords = {epistemology, paradox, person, transitivity}, abstract = {Philosophy journals and conferences have recently seen several attempts to argue that 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey strict transitivity. I focus on Larry Temkin's argument in "Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox." Although his argument is not aimed just at utilitarians or even consequentialists in general, it is of particular significance to consequentialists. If 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey transitivity, there may be choice situations in which there is no optimal choice, which would seem to open the door to a consequentialist account of moral dilemmas. Temkin's argument crucially appeals to what he calls "the Person-Affecting Principle (PAP)," which he roughly characterizes as follows, "On PAP, one outcome is worse than another only if it affects people for the worse." I argue that PAP, although plausible, does not hold in precisely those situations in which it would have to hold in order for Temkin's argument against transitivity to work.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NORCROSS1989, author = {NORCROSS, ALASTAIR}, title = {A REPLY TO MARGERY NAYLOR'S: "THE MORAL OF THE TROLLEY PROBLEM".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {715-719}, keywords = {avoidability, ethics, right, violation}, abstract = {THIS IS A REPLY TO MARGERY NAYLOR'S PAPER, "THE MORAL OF THE TROLLEY PROBLEM." NAYLOR CLAIMS THAT THE MORALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TROLLEY AND TRANSPLANT CASES IS THAT THE FORMER INVOLVES AN UNAVOIDABLE VIOLATION OF RIGHTS. I ARGUE THAT NAYLOR IS COMMITTED TO AN INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO CONTROL WHAT IS DONE TO ONE'S BODY WHICH LEADS TO UNACCEPTABLE RESULTS. I FURTHER ARGUE THAT NAYLOR DOES NOT, IN FACT, SUCCEED IN SHOWING THAT THE VIOLATION IS UNAVOIDABLE IN ONE CASE AND AVOIDABLE IN THE OTHER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NOREN1979, author = {NOREN, STEPHEN-J}, title = {ANOMALOUS MONISM, EVENTS, AND 'THE MENTAL'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {64-74}, keywords = {event, freedom, materialism, mental-act; metaphysics, monism, neurophysiology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NOVAK1965, author = {NOVAK, MICHAEL}, title = {TOWARD UNDERSTANDING ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {117-123}, keywords = {accident, category, existence, metaphysics, substance, thing, univocity}, abstract = {IT IS MAINTAINED THAT THREE POSITIONS MUST BE ASSUMED IN ORDER TO INTERPRET THE FIRST FIVE CHAPTERS OF ARISTOTLE'S "CATEGORIES". THIS INCLUDES THE MEANING AND ROLE OF "PRESENT IN A SUBJECT." THESE POSITIONS ARE: 1) A REJECTION OF UNIVOCITY, 2) A DUAL CONCEPTION OF ACCIDENT, 3) THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION. THERE ARE SOME COMMENTS ON ARISTOTLE'S ATTEMPTS TO WORK OUT A NOTION OF SCIENCE THAT WOULD ACCOUNT, AT THE SAME TIME, FOR THE FLUX OF INDIVIDUALS AND THE NECESSITY AND UNIVERSALITY PROPER TO SCIENCE. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT WITHIN THE INDIVIDUAL OR THE CONCRETE, PARTICULAR PRESENT, IS GRASPED THE NECESSITY REQUIRED FOR SCIENCE. ALSO, FROM INSIGHT FLOWS THE CONCEPT OR DEFINITION, WHICH IS THE UNIVERSALIZATION OF THE INSIGHT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NOVAK1963, author = {NOVAK, MICHAEL}, title = {A KEY TO ARISTOTLE'S 'SUBSTANCE'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {1-19}, keywords = {essence, individual, intelligibility, knowledge, metaphysics, particulars, sensation, substance, universal}, abstract = {HOW COULD ARISTOTLE IDENTIFY ESSENCE WITH SUBSTANCE, IF ESSENCE IS UNIVERSAL AND SUBSTANCE IS PARTICULAR? THE KEY IS HIS NOTION OF HUMAN KNOWING, INVOLVING A MOVEMENT FROM OBSERVATION THROUGH INQUIRY TO AFFIRMATION. ESSENCE IS WHAT MAKES THE INDIVIDUAL BOTH WHAT IT IS AND KNOWABLE. SUBSTANCE IS 1) "THE WHAT-IS-IT GRASPED IN CONCRETE DATA AND ABLE TO BE AFFIRMED IN TRUE JUDGMENT, BUT "STILL AS CONCRETE""; AND 2) "CONCEPTUALIZED APART FROM ITS CONCRETE INSTANTIATIONS, IT IS UNIVERSALIZED." SUBSTANCE IS THE CRUX BETWEEN EXPERIENCE AND SCIENCE; IT IS THE AFFIRMED UNITY OF PARTICULAR AND UNIVERSAL. LONERGAN'S UNDERSTANDING OF ARISTOTLE IS THE MODEL FOR THIS ANALYSIS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Novitz1998, author = {Novitz, David}, title = {Forgiveness and Self-Respect}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {299-315}, keywords = {ethics, forgiveness, judeo-christian; religion, self-respec}, abstract = {The aim of this paper is to explain what is involved in the exercise of the Judaeo-Christian virtue of forgiveness, and in so doing to lay bare the structure of human (rather than Divine) forgiveness. It argues that it is not possible, through some act of will, to forgive a person for the wrongs that have been done to one, but shows nonetheless that forgiving is a task and that the disposition to undertake this task in the appropriate circumstances may properly be regarded as a virtue. However, to be too willing to undertake this task, or to undertake it in inappropriate circumstances, is a vice since it is indicative of diminished self-respect. Success in the task of forgiving falls beyond our full rational control and depends very largely on a capacity to empathize and to feel an appropriate degree of compassion. Whether or not we are able to do so and sustain this itself depends on certain social contingencies.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NULL1978, author = {NULL, GILBERT-T}, title = {GENERALIZING ABSTRACTION AND THE JUDGMENT OF SUBSUMPTION IN ARON GURWITSCH'S VERSION OF HUSSERL'S THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {469-488}, keywords = {abstraction, generalization, ideation, intentionality, metaphysics, perception, phenomenology, predication, subsumption}, abstract = {THE ESSAY ADDRESSES AN ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM OF CONCEPTUALIZATION, WHICH IS A SHARED THEME OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY. THE FORMATION OF EXACT SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS (HUSSERL'S "KANTIAN IDEAS") SUCH AS ARE DEFINED BY CERTAIN (VIZ., COMPLETE) AXIOM SETS IS CALLED BY HUSSERL 'IDEATION'. IDEATION PRESUPPOSES THE AVAILABILITY OF THE VAGUE, COMMON SENSE CONCEPTS (HUSSERL'S 'MORPHOLOGICAL' OR 'DESCRIPTIVE' CONCEPTS) WHICH ARE USED IN EVERY DAY, PRESCIENTIFIC EXPERIENCE WITHIN SOME PARTICULAR CULTURAL MILIEU. THESE PRESCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS ARE CONCEIVED AS ORIGINATING IN PERCEPTION, AND AS ARISING VIA SOME FORM OF DETACHMENT OF A "PERCEPTUAL SCHEMA" (TYPE OF PERCEPTUAL ACT) FROM THE PERCEPTUAL PROCESS. THE ESSAY SKETCHES A POSSIBLE ACCOUNT OF SUCH A PROCESS OF "DETACHMENT" IN TERMS OF GURWITSCH'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Nussbaum1999, author = {Nussbaum, Martha-C}, title = {Precis of The Therapy of Desire}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {785-786}, keywords = {desire, epistemology, hellenism, stoicism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Nussbaum1999a, author = {Nussbaum, Martha-C}, title = {Reply to Papers in Symposium on Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {811-819}, keywords = {desire, epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Nussbaum2004, author = {Nussbaum, Martha-C}, title = {Precis of Upheavals of Thought}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {443-449}, keywords = {cognition, compassion, emotion, ethics, goals}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Nussbaum2004a, author = {Nussbaum, Martha-C}, title = {Responses}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {473-486}, keywords = {cognition, compassion, emotion, ethics, feeling}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Nussbaum2002, author = {Nussbaum, Martha-C}, title = {Transcendence and Human Values}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {445-452}, keywords = {ethics, good, metaethics, transcendence, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NUSSBAUM1989, author = {NUSSBAUM, MARTHA-C}, title = {MORTAL IMMORTALS: LUCRETIUS ON DEATH AND THE VOICE OF NATURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {303-351}, keywords = {ancient, death, metaphysics, nature}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{NUTE1976, author = {NUTE, DONALD}, title = {IDENTIFICATION AS ACCOMPLISHMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {46-69}, keywords = {description, epistemology, identification, particulars}, abstract = {The views on identification expressed by Hintikka, Strawson and Wiggins are examined and the following special notion of identification is developed and discussed: (D) a D-identifies b = 'subscript df'. a is an agent, b exists and for any property phi fully understood by a, a is in a position without preliminaries to play (with due restrictions on contingency planning) a course of action from beginning to end which, if carried out by a, would result in a's acquiring the best possible information as to whether 'phi b' be true.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{O'Brien1999, author = {O'Brien, Gerard and Opie, Jonathan}, title = {A Defense of Cartesian Materialism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {939-963}, keywords = {cartesianism, consciousness, materialism, metaphysics}, abstract = {Our primary aim in this paper is to defend Cartesian materialism from Dennett's assault. We do this by showing that Dennett's argument against this position is founded on an implicit assumption (about the relationship between phenomenal experience and information coding in the brain), which while valid in the context of classical cognitive science, is not forced on connectionism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{O'Brien2005, author = {O'Brien, Lucy}, title = {Self-Knowledge, Agency and Force}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {580-601}, keywords = {agency, authority, epistemology, force, judgment, self-knowledge; truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{O'CONNOR1979, author = {O'CONNOR, ROBERT}, title = {ORTEGA'S REFORMULATION OF HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {53-63}, keywords = {essence, existentialism, intentionality, intuition, metaphysics, phenomenology, transcendence}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{O'Connor1993, author = {O'Connor, Timothy}, title = {Indeterminism and Free Agency: Three Recent Views}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {499-526}, keywords = {action, epistemology, free-will; indeterminism, moral}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{O'Connor2003, author = {O'Connor, Timothy}, title = {Understanding Free Will: Might We Double-Think?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {222-229}, keywords = {dualism, free-will; illusion, indeterminism, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{O'Connor2000, author = {O'Connor, Timothy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {228-243}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will}, volume = {66(1)}, year = {2000} } @article{O'Grady2003, author = {O'Grady, Paul}, title = {The Scope of Deflationism: Reply to Gregory}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {649-653}, keywords = {analytic, deflationism, epistemology, synthetic}, abstract = {Paul Gregory's careful and insightful response to "Carnap and Two Dogmas of Empiricism" highlights a number of points which were underdeveloped in that paper. I think that he has brought into relief a central issue between Carnap and Quine by supplying a crucial distinction. However, I still maintain that Quine's assault is less than successful and that Gregory's further analysis of the debate sheds light on why this is so.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{O'Grady1999, author = {O'Grady, Paul}, title = {Carnap and Two Dogmas of Empiricism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {1015-1027}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {There is a general consensus that Quine's assault on analyticity and verificationism in 'Two Dogma of Empiricism' has been successful and that Carnap's philosophical position has been vanquished. This paper so characterizes Carnap's position that it escapes Quine's criticisms. It shows that the disagreement is not a first order dispute about analyticity or verificationism, but rather a deeper dispute about philosophical method.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{O'Hear1997, author = {O'Hear, Anthony}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {235-238}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation}, volume = {62(1)}, year = {1997} } @article{O'NEILL1964, author = {O'NEILL, JOHN}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF ESTRANGEMENT IN THE EARLY AND LATER WRITINGS OF KARL MARX.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {64-84}, keywords = {alienation, collectivism, economics, estrangement, historicism, ideology, social-philosophy; social-sciences; socialism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{O'NEILL1968, author = {O'NEILL, JOHN}, title = {SITUATION AND TEMPORALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {413-422}, keywords = {aesthetics, history, literature}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{O'Neill1996, author = {O'Neill, Onora}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {1103-1105}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning}, volume = {49(4)}, year = {1996} } @article{OAKES1982, author = {OAKES, ROBERT}, title = {SEEING OUR OWN FACES: A PARADIGM FOR INDIRECT REALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {442-448}, keywords = {causality, epistemology, knowing, seeing}, abstract = {IT HAS OFTEN BEEN HELD THAT THE CANONICAL CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION ("INDIRECT" OR "REPRESENTATIVE" REALISM) CONSTITUTES A SELF-VITIATING OR PARADOXICAL ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWING, I.E., THAT THERE IS SOMETHING CONCEPTUALLY AMISS INHERENT IN THE NOTION OF "INDIRECT PERCEPTUAL KNOWING". THE AUTHOR HOPES TO HAVE ESTABLISHED THAT THE PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE HAD BY EACH OF US WHEN "SEEING OUR OWN FACES" CONSTITUTES A PARADIGM OF INDIRECT PERCEPTUAL KNOWING, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, SUFFICES TO SHOW THAT THIS LONG-STANDING OBJECTION TO INDIRECT REALISM IS WITHOUT FOUNDATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OAKES1978, author = {OAKES, ROBERT-A}, title = {HOW TO RESCUE THE TRADITIONAL CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {370-383}, keywords = {causality, epistemology, object, perception, representation}, abstract = {MOST CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGISTS TEND TO REGARD THE 'TRADITIONAL CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION' (I.E., 'REPRESENTATIONAL REALISM') AS MORIBUND, LARGELY ON THE GROUND THAT IT MAKES 'THEORETICAL ENTITIES' OUT OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS AND IS THEREBY A 'SELF-DEFEATING' ACCOUNT OF HOW WE COME TO HAVE 'PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE' OF THE EXISTENCE AND PROPERTIES OF (MIND-INDEPENDENT) PHYSICAL OBJECTS/EVENTS. I ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT THIS TIME-HONORED CRITICISM FALLS VERY WIDE OF THE MARK; SPECIFICALLY, I HOPE TO HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THE TRADITIONAL CAUSAL THEORY CAN BE EXPLICATED--IN A MANNER THAT REMAINS FAITHFUL TO ITS SPIRIT "AND" LETTER--SO AS TO HAVE THE VERY OPPOSITE ENTAILMENT, I.E., THAT PHYSICAL OBJECTS ARE "NOT" THEORETICAL (BUT ARE PERCEIVABLE) ENTITIES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OAKES1972, author = {OAKES, ROBERT-A}, title = {PRAGMATISM, GOD, AND PROFESSOR MATSON: SOME CONFUSIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {397-402}, keywords = {belief, god, pragmatism, religion}, abstract = {IN "THE EXISTENCE OF GOD", WALLACE MATSON ARGUES THAT THE 'PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT' FOR BELIEF IN GOD FAILS ON NO LESS THAN PRAGMATIC GROUNDS, I.E., IT SIMPLY DOES NOT 'WORK' - IN THE LONG RUN - TO BELIEVE IN GOD 'WITHOUT EVIDENCE.' IT IS MY CONTENTION THAT MATSON'S INTERPRETATION OF THE 'PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT' IS SERIOUSLY DEFICIENT, AND THAT THIS IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY MATSON'S MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE PRAGMATIC IDENTIFICATION OF BELIEF WITH TENDENCY TO ACT. HENCE, MY CONCLUSION IS THAT, WHILE THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO THEISM MAY INDEED BE INADEQUATE, IT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO BE SO BY MATSON.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OAKES1970, author = {OAKES, ROBERT-A}, title = {SCIENCE, ERROR, AND DUALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {450-452}, keywords = {dualism, epistemology, error, science}, abstract = {EPISTEMOLOGICAL MONISTS, SUCH AS PROFESSOR CHARLES BAYLIS, HAVE CONTENDED THAT A SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE CAUSAL CONDITIONS PRECIPITATING PERCEPTUAL ERROR WILL TEND TO DISCONFIRM EPISTEMOLOGICAL DUALISM. I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT EPISTEMOLOGICAL DUALISM IS A DEDUCTIVE IMPLICATION OF PERCEPTUAL ERROR, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THAT ITS VALIDITY IS NOT AT ALL CHALLENGED BY ANY DISCOVERIES REGARDING THE PHYSIOLOGICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES OF PERCEPTUAL ERROR.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OAKES1974, author = {OAKES, ROBERT-A}, title = {GOD, EVIL, AND PROFESSOR ROSS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {261-267}, keywords = {evil, god, religion}, abstract = {THROUGH HIS WELL-DEVELOPED CONCEPT OF 'REALITY-LEVELS' AND THE SOMEWHAT STARTLING SUGGESTION (INFLUENCED BY AQUINAS) THAT DIVINE DETERMINISM IS COMPATIBLE WITH HUMAN FREEDOM--PERHAPS, MORE SPECIFICALLY, THAT GOD "IS" TO BE REGARDED AS THE 'METAPHYSICAL DETERMINANT' OF ALL HUMAN ACTION--ROSS PROVIDES US WITH AN EXTRAORDINARILY PROVOCATIVE AND ORIGINAL EFFORT TO RECONCILE THE GOODNESS OF GOD WITH MORAL EVIL. I TRY TO SHOW THAT HIS INGENIOUS ATTEMPT FAILS INSOFAR AS HE PRESUPPOSES (MISTAKENLY) THAT IF GOD'S CAUSAL SUFFICIENCY FOR ALL EVENTS WERE TO EXONERATE HUMAN AGENTS FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MORAL EVIL, THERE WOULD "BE" NO MORAL EVIL. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE WOULD BE NO MORAL EVIL WHICH COULD POSSIBLY BE PERFORMED BY "HUMAN" AGENTS. HOWEVER, IT COULD THEN QUITE PROPERLY BE CONCLUDED THAT "GOD" WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MORAL EVIL IN THE WORLD.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OAKLANDER1977, author = {OAKLANDER, L-NATHAN}, title = {THE 'TIMELESSNESS' OF TIME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {228-233}, keywords = {direction, language, metaphysics, time, timelessness, truth}, abstract = {IN HIS BOOK, "THE LANGUAGE OF TIME", RICHARD GALE ATTEMPTS TO VINDICATE THE INTUITIONS OF MCTAGGART AND SEVERAL A-THEORISTS THAT THERE CANNOT BE TEMPORAL RELATIONS WITHOUT BECOMING. THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO SHOW THAT GALE'S PURPORTED REDUCTIVE ANALYSIS OF TEMPORAL RELATIONS FAILS BECAUSE IT CANNOT ACCOUNT FOR THE "TIMELESSNESS" OF TIME. I PROCEED BY FIRST EXPLAINING FOUR NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR AN ADEQUATE ANALYSIS OF TEMPORAL RELATIONS AND THEN BY ARGUING THAT GALE'S ANALYSIS OF TEMPORAL RELATIONS DOES NOT SATISFY THESE CONDITIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Oakley1992, author = {Oakley, Justin}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {725-728}, publisher = {Routledge}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Morality and the Emotions}, volume = {54(3)}, year = {1992} } @article{OBSTFELD1983, author = {OBSTFELD, KAILA}, title = {THE CONFLICT BETWEEN INTENTIONALITY AND INNER OBSERVATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {271-278}, keywords = {intentionality, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OCHS1966, author = {OCHS, C-R}, title = {THE SENSITIVE TERM PAIN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {255-260}, keywords = {epistemology, pain, sensation}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT PAIN STATEMENTS HAVE A COGNITIVE ELEMENT WHICH REFERS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN CUES AND "MENTAL SETS" OR EXPECTATIONS. ALTHOUGH THERE IS THIS COGNITIVE ASPECT TO PAIN PERCEPTION, PAIN STATEMENTS ARE NONETHELESS INCORRIGIBLE AND PERSONS EXPERIENCING PAIN HAVE PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO THIS PAIN. PAIN HAS THE SAME REFERENCE IN FIRST PERSON STATEMENTS AS IN SECOND AND THIRD PERSON STATEMENTS. THIS REFERENCE IS TO AN INNER OCCURRENCE AND TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CUES FOR THIS OCCURRENCE. WHILE DISPOSITION MAY TEST THE EXISTENCE OF THIS STATE AND MAY CONSTITUTE A WAY OF LEARNING TO USE THE TERM, IT IS ONLY INCIDENTALLY (NOT NECESSARILY) REFERRED TO IN PAIN STATEMENTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Oddie1993, author = {Oddie, Graham}, title = {Act and Maxim: Value-Discrepancy and Two Theories of Power}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {71-92}, keywords = {consequentialism, epistemology, power, semantics, value}, abstract = {"Value-discrepancy" obtains if the value of each act of maxim-compliance is lower than the value of each act of non-compliance, even though maxim-compliance overall would be best. The focus is a single perduring individual rather than a group of synchronic agents. It is shown that under typical conditions there is a straightforward way for the act consequentialist to harmonize the values of act and maxim, and a simple theorem of 'extensional equivalence' is proved. But this reveals the conditions under which genuine discrepancy arises. Rule-consequentialism can be avoided by the strategy theory of ability: that agents are endowed with non-causal powers over future events by the strategies open to them.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Odegard1997, author = {Odegard, Douglas}, title = {Neorationalist Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {567-584}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, knowledge, rationality, scepticism}, abstract = {Whether any beliefs are justified nonempirically is important in a debate with sceptics who deny empirical justification, if the parties involved in the debate claim that their position is justified. Sceptics must assume that their premises are justified nonempirically, to avoid begging the question. The main problem with advocating nonempirical justification is that accounts tend to be either too niggardly or too generous, implying either that nonempirical justification is impossible or that peer adversaries must be equally justified. The way to solve this problem is to recognize that justification involves satisfying two conditions: having reason to hold a belief and having a ground for being confident about one's reason. The reason can be nonempirical even though the ground is almost always empirical. This distinction can be used to resolve a number of familiar concerns.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ODEGARD1970, author = {ODEGARD, DOUGLAS}, title = {PERSONS AND BODIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {225-242}, keywords = {body, metaphysics, person}, abstract = {THE THESES 'I AS A PERSON AM NOT IDENTICAL WITH THE BODY CALLED "MY BODY"' AND 'NO EMBODIED PERSON IS IDENTICAL WITH THE BODY CALLED "HIS BODY" ARE BOTH TRUE. ATTENDING TO THE GENERAL CONCEPTS 'PERSON' AND 'BODY' WILL NOT DISCLOSE THIS, HOWEVER; INSTEAD, ONE MUST WORK FROM ONE'S OWN CASE, MEET OBJECTIONS RAISED BY THEORIES WHICH MAKE BODILY CONTINUITY A NECESSARY CONDITION OF PERSONAL CONTINUITY, AND THEN DEDUCE THE SECOND GENERAL THESIS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ODEGARD1965, author = {ODEGARD, DOUGLAS}, title = {THE DISCOVERY OF ANALYTIC TRUTH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {248-252}, keywords = {analytic, knowledge, language, linguistic-analysis; meaning, paradox, truth}, abstract = {IF WE REGARD AN ANALYTIC INVESTIGATION AS SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM A MERE DESCRIPTION OF HOW A SPECIFIC WORD IS USED, AND IF WE REGARD IT AS AN ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE AN EXACT ANALYSIS, EITHER PARTIAL OR COMPLETE, OF WHATEVER IT IS INVESTIGATING, THEN IT MAY SEEM DOOMED TO BEING EITHER FALSE OR UNINSTRUCTIVE. ITS TRUTH IMPLIES AN IDENTITY OF SENSE, IN ADDITION TO AN IDENTITY OF REFERENCE, AND THE FORMER IDENTITY APPARENTLY SANCTIONS UNLIMITED SUBSTITUTION WITHOUT A CHANGE IN TRUTH VALUE, ONE CONSEQUENCE OF WHICH IS THAT AN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHER MUST ALREADY KNOW WHATEVER HE PURPORTEDLY DISCOVERS. APPEARANCES ARE MISLEADING HERE, HOWEVER. IT IS POSSIBLE TO DRAW FURTHER DISTINCTIONS WITHIN THE ALLEGEDLY HOMOGENEOUS AREA OF SAMENESS IN SENSE, SUCH THAT IN THE "RELEVANT" SENSE, SAMENESS IN SENSE DOES NOT JUSTIFY UNIVERSAL INTERCHANGEABILITY AND THEREFORE DOES NOT RENDER TRUE ANALYSES AUTOMATICALLY TRIVIAL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Oderberg2004, author = {Oderberg, David-S}, title = {Temporal Parts and the Possibility of Change}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {686-708}, keywords = {change, intrinsic, mereology, metaphysics, part, temporal}, abstract = {Things change. If anything counts as a datum of metaphysics, that does. Hence, any correct theory of persistence must be consistent with the existence of change. Yet temporal part theory, alias four-dimensionalism, does not satisfy this basic requirement. First, I outline the theory in its standard form. I then show why, contra Mark Heller, there can be no argument for temporal parts based on the indiscernibility of identicals, which itself presupposes facts of identity rather than grounds them. Nor does David Lewis's so-called 'problem of temporary intrinsics' give any support to four-dimensionalism. As far as the semantics of change goes, I advocate (as against adverbialism and relationalism) 'sententialism': temporal expressions, such as 'at t' or 'from t1 to t2', operate on whole sentences and may not be dropped from sentences expressing change without thereby entailing contradiction. Finally, although not every argument for the inconsistency of four-dimensionalism and change succeeds, I argue, via a discussion of Lombard and van Inwagen, that there is indeed such an inconsistency: temporal part theory is a replacement theory, whereby nothing ever does, literally, change.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OIZERMAN1981, author = {OIZERMAN, TEODOR-I}, title = {I KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE "THINGS IN THEMSELVES" AND NOUMENA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {333-350}, keywords = {epistemology, noumena, thing-in-itsel}, abstract = {IN SPITE OF TERMINOLOGICAL UNCLEARNESS BY KANT IT IS TO DISTINGUISH NOUMENA FROM THINGS IN THEMSELVES AS AN IMPORTANT RESULT OF HIS CRITICISM OR PRECIOUS METAPHYSIC. NOUMENA ARE A PRIORI IDEAS OF PURE REASON WHICH HAVE NO RELATION TO SENSIBILITY AND THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE. KANT DID NOT AFFIRM THAT NOUMENA REALLY EXIST. THEY ARE OBJECTS OF BELIEF ROOTED IN MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS. YET, THE EXISTENCE OF THINGS IN THEMSELVES IS FOR KANT INDISPUTABLE BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PHENOMENA WITHOUT OF WHAT THAT APPEARS. THERE ARE THINGS IN THEMSELVES, NOT NOUMENA, WHICH EFFECT OUR SENSIBILITY AND DETERMINE THE CONTENT OF KNOWLEDGE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Okasha2003, author = {Okasha, Samir}, title = {Scepticism and Its Sources}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {610-632}, keywords = {epistemology, fallibilism, foundationalism, perception, scepticism}, abstract = {A number of recent philosophers, including Michael Williams, Barry Stroud and Donald Davidson, have argued that skepticism about the external world stems from the foundationalist assumption that sensory experience supplies the data for our beliefs about the world. In order to assess this thesis, I offer a brief characterization of the logical form of skeptical arguments. I suggest that skeptical arguments rely on the idea that many of our beliefs about the world are 'underdetermined' by the evidence on which they are based. Drawing on this characterization of skepticism, I argue that Williams, Stroud and Davidson are right to see the foundationalist assumption as essential to the skeptic's argument, but wrong to think that skepticism is inevitable once that assumption is in place. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OKRENT1990, author = {OKRENT, MARK}, title = {Individuation and Intentional Ascriptions.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(3)}, pages = {461-480}, keywords = {ascription, individuation, intentional, metaphysics, ontology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OLAFSON1991, author = {OLAFSON, Frederick}, title = {Nietzsche's Philosophy of Culture: A Paradox in "The Will to Power".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {axiology, culture, nineteenth, strength, weakness}, abstract = {I examine Nietzsche's concept of a nihilism of strength and the relationship in which it stands to the kind of vital self-assertion that he admired in archaic aristocracies. What is new in Nietzsche's nihilism of strength is a self-awareness that was lacking in the past and that would enable a fully autonomous human being to recognize the "being" he imposes on "becoming" as the expression of his own will to power. I show that this idea leads to serious incoherencies in Nietzsche's account of this new kind of strength and undermines any possible authority that such volitional enactments might have for other people.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Olafson1994, author = {Olafson, Frederick-A}, title = {Comments on "Sources of the Self" by Charles Taylor}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {191-196}, keywords = {history, identity, metaphysics, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OLSCAMP1965, author = {OLSCAMP, PAUL-J}, title = {WITTGENSTEIN'S REFUTATION OF SKEPTICISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {239-247}, keywords = {behavior, criteria, definition, epistemology, language, pain, scepticism, sign}, abstract = {BERKELEY ARGUED THAT SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE REAL WORLD IS ONLY JUSTIFIED IF WE ASSUME THAT OUR PERCEPTIONS ARE REPRESENTATIVE OF SOMETHING NOT IN PRINCIPLE PERCEIVABLE, AND THAT WE CAN THEREFORE NEVER VERIFY JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION. BY SHOWING THAT THE CONCEPT OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCE IS EITHER MEANINGLESS, OR IF THERE IS SUCH A THING, THAT WE CANNOT KNOW THAT THERE IS, BERKELEY SHOWED THAT ANY THEORY BASED UPON THE ASSUMPTION OF THE RELEVANCE OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCE TO THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF OUR JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION IS UNJUSTIFIED. SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF THIRD-PERSON SENSATION SENTENCES IS ONLY JUSTIFIED IF WE ASSUME THAT "INNER PROCESSES," IN PRINCIPLE UNPERCEIVABLE TO THE OBSERVER, ARE RELEVANT TO THE CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT SUCH SENTENCES ARE TRUE. I ARGUE THAT WITTGENSTEIN TRIES TO SHOW THAT THEY ARE NOT POSSIBLY RELEVANT TO SUCH CRITERIA, AND THAT HE THEREFORE ACCOMPLISHES A "REFUTATION OF SKEPTICISM" SIMILAR TO BERKELEY'S, THOUGH IN A DIFFERENT AREA OF INVESTIGATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Olson1999, author = {Olson, Eric-T}, title = {Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {161-166}, keywords = {embryo, fetus, person, science}, abstract = {In "Was I Ever a Fetus?" I argued that, since each of us was once an unthinking fetus, psychological continuity cannot be necessary for us to persist through time. Baker claims that the argument is invalid, and that both the premise and the conclusion are false. I attempt to depend argument, premise, and conclusion against her objections.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Olson1997, author = {Olson, Eric-T}, title = {Was I Ever A Fetus?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {95-110}, keywords = {continuity, existence, mental, metaphysics, personal-identity; self}, abstract = {The standard view of personal identity says that someone who exists now can exist at another time only if there is continuity of her mental contents or capacities. But no person is psychologically continuous with a fetus, for a fetus, at least early in its career, has no mental features at all. So the standard view entails that no person was ever a fetus--contrary to the popular assumption that an unthinking fetus is a potential person. It is also mysterious what does ordinarily happen to a human fetus, if it does not come to be a person. Although an extremely complex variant of the standard view may allow one to persist without psychological continuity before one becomes a person but not afterwards, a far simpler solution is to accept a radically nonpsychological account of our identity.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Olson2003, author = {Olson, Eric-T}, title = {Was Jekyll Hyde?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {328-348}, keywords = {cohabitation, disorder, epistemology, identity, truth}, abstract = {Many philosophers say that two or more people or thinking beings could share a single human being in a split-personality case, if only the personalities were sufficiently independent and individually well integrated. I argue that this view is incompatible with our being material things, and conclude that there could never be two or more people in a split-personality case. This refutes the view, almost universally held, that facts about mental unity and disunity determine how many people there are. I suggest that the number of human people is simply the number of appropriately endowed human animals.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Olson1997a, author = {Olson, Eric-T}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {495-497}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology}, volume = {60(2)}, year = {1997} } @article{Olson2003a, author = {Olson, Jonas}, title = {Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {412-422}, keywords = {axiology, object, person, trope, value}, abstract = {In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen I defend trope-value reductionism against three challenges. I focus mainly on their central objection, that holds that the reduction is untenable since different evaluative attitudes have, ontologically speaking, different objects. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OLSON1961, author = {OLSON, ROBERT-G}, title = {ETHICAL EGOISM AND SOCIAL WELFARE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {528-536}, keywords = {blame, egoism, ethics, praise, self-interest; social, welfare}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Olsson2005, author = {Olsson, Erik-J}, title = {Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: Pragmatism and Radical Doubt}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(1)}, pages = {98-126}, keywords = {epistemology, pragmatism, scepticism}, abstract = {Pragmatist responses to radical skepticism do not receive much attention in contemporary analytic epistemology. This observation is my motivation for undertaking a search for a coherent pragmatist reply to radical doubt, one that can compete, in terms of clarity and sophistication, with the currently most popular approaches, such as contextualism and relevant alternatives theory. As my point of departure I take the texts of C. S. Peirce and William James. The Jamesian response is seen to consist in the application of a wager argument to the skeptical issue in analogy with Pascal's wager. The Peircean strategy, on the other hand, is to attempt a direct rejection of one of the skeptic's main premises: that we do not know we are not deceived. I argue that while the Jamesian attempt is ultimately incoherent, Peirce's argument contains the core of a detailed and characteristically "pragmatic" rebuttal of skepticism, one that deserves to be taken seriously in the contemporary debate.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OOSTHUIZEN1968, author = {OOSTHUIZEN, D-C-S}, title = {THE ROLE OF IMAGINATION IN JUDGMENTS OF FACT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {34-58}, keywords = {epistemology, imagination, judgment, perception}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OPLER1973, author = {OPLER, MARVIN-K}, title = {SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF THE NATURALISTIC OUTLOOK.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {561-573}, keywords = {psychology, social-philosophy; society}, abstract = {ONE TEST OF CULTURAL EVOLUTIONARY PROCESSES IS WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAS BEEN AN EVOLUTION IN THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR. THIS PAPER EMPHASIZES AN EVOLUTION IN BEHAVIORAL OR MENTAL DISORDERS WHICH, IN MODERN INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETIES, HAS NOT BEEN PROGRESSIVE FROM AN ETHICAL OR SOCIAL POINT OF VIEW. MATERIALS ARE DRAWN FROM BUFFALO, NEW YORK, STUDIES IN THE POSTINDUSTRIAL PERIOD CONDUCTED BY DR. LAURENCE GLASCO AND SUPERVISED BY DR. OPLER, AND THESE ARE CONTRASTED WITH CONDITIONS IN NONLITERATE SOCIETIES. THE AUTHOR MAKES FURTHER CONTRASTS BETWEEN THE MODERN SCENE AS HE HAS STUDIED IT IN THE MIDTOWN MANHATTAN RESEARCH STUDY AND CULTURES WHICH HE HAS STUDIED ON OTHER CONTINENTS. RATHER THAN PROGRESS AS MEASURED BY A DIMINUTION IN THE AMOUNT AND SERIOUSNESS OF MENTAL DISORDERS, HE FINDS AN INCREASE IN THE AMOUNT AND SERIOUS CHARACTER OF MENTAL DISEASE. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF OUR TIMES SUCH AS WAR, POVERTY AND RACISM AFFECT THE ENTIRE SOCIAL FABRIC AND HENCE OUR INDIVIDUAL LIVES. (EDITED).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OPLER1967, author = {OPLER, MARVIN-K}, title = {CULTURAL EVOLUTION AND SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {587-596}, keywords = {culture, evolution, psychiatry, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OPLER1962, author = {OPLER, MARVIN-K}, title = {ETHICAL FUNCTIONS AS EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PATTERNS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {528-536}, keywords = {culture, ethics, ideal, individual, psychology, relativism, sociology, text}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OPLER1963, author = {OPLER, MARVIN-K}, title = {SCIENTIFIC SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY ENCOUNTERS EXISTENTIALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {240-243}, keywords = {dasein, existentialism, naturalism, philosophical-anthropology; psychology, psychotherapy}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Oppy2005, author = {Oppy, Graham}, title = {Omnipotence}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {58-84}, keywords = {divinity, omnipotence, orthodoxy, religion, theism}, abstract = {Recently, many philosophers have supposed that the divine attribute of omnipotence is properly understood as some kind of maximal power. I argue that all of the best known attempts to analyze omnipotence in terms of maximal power are multiply flawed. Moreover, I argue that there are compelling reasons for supposing that, on orthodox theistic conceptions, maximal power is not one of the divine attributes.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Oppy1995, author = {Oppy, Graham}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {715-719}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Ontological Arguments and Belief in God}, volume = {58(3)}, year = {1995} } @article{OSHEROFF1976, author = {OSHEROFF, STEVEN-S}, title = {WITTGENSTEIN: PSYCHOLOGICAL DISPUTES AND COMMON MOVES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {339-363}, keywords = {behaviorism, consciousness, epistemology, psychology}, abstract = {AT LEAST TWO INTERESTING PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS RESULT FROM THE FACT THAT PSYCHOLOGISTS DISAGREE ABOUT WHICH, IF ANY, STATES OF MIND SHOULD BE EMPLOYED IN EXPLAINING HUMAN BEHAVIOR: (1) WHAT IS THERE ABOUT THE KINDS AND USES OF DIFFERENT PSYCHOLOGICAL PARADIGMS WHICH PRODUCES THESE DISAGREEMENTS, AND; (2) IS IT POSSIBLE TO COMPARE THESE PARADIGMS AND DECIDE UPON ONE AS BETTER THAN THE REST? WITTGENSTEIN PROVIDES THE FRAMEWORK IN WHICH TO ANSWER THE FIRST QUESTION. HOWEVER, HIS NEGATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE SECOND QUESTION ARE UNFOUNDED. IT IS POSSIBLE TO COMPARE PSYCHOLOGICAL PARADIGMS AND PERHAPS CONCLUDE THAT ONE PROVIDES BETTER EXPLANATIONS THAN THE REST BY COMPARING THE SUCCESS WITH WHICH PSYCHOLOGISTS UTILIZE THEIR PARADIGMS IN COMMON AREAS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OTERO1970, author = {OTERO, MARIO-H}, title = {GERGONNE ON IMPLICIT DEFINITION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {596-599}, keywords = {cause, cybernetics, metaphysics, mind}, abstract = {GERGONNE INTRODUCES (1818) THE NOTION OF IMPLICIT DEFINITION WITHIN THE FRAME OF THE CONDITIONS HE STATES FOR NOMINAL DEFINITION IN GENERAL. IT CANNOT BE DEFENDED HOWEVER, THAT GERGONNE HAS INTRODUCED THE IMPLICIT DEFINITION OF PRIMITIVE TERMS BY AXIOM SYSTEMS, AS IT IS CURRENTLY DONE BY THE HISTORIANS OF LOGIC NOWADAYS. AMONG OTHER REQUIREMENTS, THAT OF ELIMINABILITY OF DEFINED TERMS HINDERS HIM, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT HIS LOGICAL ALGORITHM, THE CONCEPT OF DUALITY HE USES AS A PRINCIPLE IN PROJECTIVE GEOMETRY FOR THE FIRST TIME, AS WELL AS HIS THEORY OF SCIENCE, POINTED IN THAT DIRECTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OVEREND1975, author = {OVEREND, TRONN}, title = {ALIENATION: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {301-322}, keywords = {alienation, social-philosoph}, abstract = {THIS PAPER EXAMINES THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ALIENATION WHICH, IT IS ARGUED, ARE LOGICALLY PRIOR TO THE SOCIOLOGICAL. APART FROM ISOLATING THE FALLACIES (A) THAT ALIENATION HAS A METAPHORICAL MEANING, (B) THAT ALIENATION HAS NO MEANING AND/OR SHOULD BE REJECTED AS A CONCEPT, AND (C) THAT ALIENATION HAS EVALUATIVE MEANING, AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL MODEL IS EMPLOYED TO (D) ATTACK THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL DEBATE ON VALUES, AND (E) DEFINE THE TERM THROUGH CONTINGENT IDENTITY STATEMENTS. THE CENTRAL ONTOLOGICAL ISSUE INVESTIGATED IS WHETHER ALIENATION IS A RELATIONAL OR QUALITATIVE FACT; AND THROUGH THIS CONSIDERATION CONCLUSIONS DRAWN INCLUDE (F) WHETHER ALIENATION IS A PROCESS, AND (G) THE MEASURABILITY OF ALIENATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{OVERVOLD1984, author = {OVERVOLD, MARK-CARL}, title = {MORALITY, SELF-INTEREST, AND REASONS FOR BEING MORAL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {493-508}, keywords = {ethics, morality, motivation, self-interes}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Owen2001, author = {Owen, David}, title = {Reason and Commitment}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {191-196}, keywords = {cognition, commitment, metaphysics, reason}, abstract = {This is my contribution to a book symposium on Don Garrett's Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy. It is well known that Hume's missing shade of blue causes trouble for his thesis that all ideas are derived from impressions. It is not so well known that his use of distinctions of reason causes trouble for his thesis that all distinct ideas are separable. I show how Garrett's original account of Hume on simple ideas, and on abstract ideas, can solve these problems. I then outline, and criticize, Garrett's interpretation of Hume on induction. We agree that Hume's account is not skeptical, in the sense that it does not aim to show that all inductive inferences are unwarranted, but we disagree on precisely what Hume meant when he denied that we are "determin'd by reason" when we infer an idea from an impression.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Owen1999, author = {Owen, David}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {233-236}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Hume's Reason}, volume = {67(1)}, year = {1999} } @article{Owens1996, author = {Owens, David}, title = {A Lockean Theory of Memory Experience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {319-332}, keywords = {epistemology, experience, memory, temporality}, abstract = {The paper aims to provide an account of the phenomenological differences between perception, recognition and recall. In the first section, recall is distinguished from nonexperiential forms of memory. In the second section, it is argued that we can't distinguish perceptual experience from the experience of recall by means of perception's present tense content because it is possible to perceive as well as to recall the past. The Lockean theory of recall as a revival of previous perceptual experience is then introduced, applied and defended against objections. Next, recall is distinguished from memory recognition. Finally, some relevant psychological data is described.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Owens1994, author = {Owens, Joseph}, title = {Psychological Externalism and Psychological Explanation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {921-928}, keywords = {externalism, mental, metaphysics, phenomena, psychology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Palmer1999, author = {Palmer, John-A}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {247-249}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Plato's Reception of Parmenides}, volume = {66(1)}, year = {1999} } @article{PALMIERI1962, author = {PALMIERI, L-E}, title = {TO SLEEP, PERCHANCE TO DREAM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {583-586}, keywords = {corrigibility, criteria, dream, epistemology, judgment, perception}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PALUCH1970, author = {PALUCH, S-J}, title = {HEIDEGGER "WHAT IS METAPHYSICS"?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {603-609}, keywords = {dread, metaphysics, nothing}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PALUCH1967, author = {PALUCH, STANLEY}, title = {ARE THERE AESTHETIC ATTITUDES?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {606-609}, keywords = {aesthetics, attitude}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PAPANOUTSOS1963, author = {PAPANOUTSOS, E-P}, title = {MORAL CONFLICTS (TRANSLATED BY JOHN P ANTON).}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {73-82}, keywords = {conflict, conscience, duty, effect, ethics, intention, interest, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PAPANOUTSOS1973, author = {PAPANOUTSOS, E-P}, title = {LAW AND REVOLUTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {201-208}, keywords = {law, political-philosophy; revolution}, abstract = {THE THESIS 'REVOLUTION CREATES LAW' IS ANALYZED AND TYPES OF VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF THE POLITICAL ORDER ARE EXAMINED FOR THEIR AUTHENTICITY. CASES ARE DISCUSSED AS THEY PERTAIN TO LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS, THEORIES OF POSITIVE LAW AND ETHICAL PRINCIPLES. SINCE ALL POLITICAL EVENTS EMBODY MORAL ISSUES, THE DOCTRINE THAT ANY TYPE OF VIOLENT OVERTHROW CAN CLAIM LEGITIMACY MUST BE REJECTED. THE ONLY REVOLUTION THAT CREATES LAW IS ONE WHICH IS MORALLY AUTHENTIC, WITH DEEP COMMUNITY ROOTS AND HISTORICALLY JUSTIFIED BY ITS OWN DEEDS; IT CREATES LAW BY RENEWING THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, REVISING OLD RULES AND INTRODUCING NEW ONES INTO THE LEGAL CODE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Papineau1996, author = {Papineau, David}, title = {Reply to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {687-697}, keywords = {epistemology, naturalism, philosophy}, abstract = {In response to Steward, Papineau agrees that his statement of supervenience is strong enough to constitute a plausible physicalism by itself, without the help of realization claims; but he points out that his argument for supervenience in fact only supports a weaker claim. In response to Godfrey-Smith, Papineau maintains that his explanations of representational abilities might be justified as actual explanations and no just possible ones. In response to Tye, Papineau clarifies his ideas on the vagueness of consciousness and tries to explain why it might make sense to hold that alien ascriptions of consciousness are arbitrary.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Papineau1996a, author = {Papineau, David}, title = {Precis of Philosophical Naturalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {657-665}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, mind, naturalism, physicalism}, abstract = {This precis explains that Philosophical naturalism contains three parts. Part I examines arguments for physicalism and maintains I) that all causally relevant special science properties must be realized by physical ones, and II) that all special science laws must reduce to physical ones, apart from the significant category of special laws that result from selection processes. Part II defends a teleological theory of representation and an identity theory of consciousness. Part III defends reliabilism and applies it to inductive scepticism and also defends a fictionalist account of mathematics.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Papineau1996b, author = {Papineau, David}, title = {Discussion of Christopher Peacocke's A Study of Concepts}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {425-432}, keywords = {concept, conditionality, epistemology, form}, abstract = {This discussion of Peacocke's book deals with three points. First, it examines Peacocke's use of phrases of the form "the concept GON f GOF," and raises some difficulties about whether these phrases refer uniquely. Second, it responds to Peacocke's claim that teleological theories of representation face a problem of "reduced content." Third, it argues that Peacocke's own account of the normativity of judgement ties norms too closely to facts of actual judgemental practice.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Papineau2005, author = {Papineau, David}, title = {Precis of Thinking about Consciousness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {143-146}, keywords = {consciousness, distinctness, materialism, metaphysics, phenomenology, physicalism}, abstract = {Thinking about Consciousness defends the thesis that conscious properties are identical to material properties. In addition, the book aims to understand why so many people find materialism intuitively hard to believe. Previous writers have tended to take it for granted that any such antimaterialists intuition is due to the persuasiveness of standard antimaterialist arguments. I offer a different diagnosis. We have a special set of concepts which refer to conscious states -- phenomenal concepts -- and the peculiar structure of these concepts makes it very natural to suppose that their referents must be distinct from any material states.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Papineau2005a, author = {Papineau, David}, title = {Replies to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {171-186}, keywords = {consciousness, materialism, metaphysics, phenomenology}, abstract = {There are three commentators on my book Thinking about Consciousness. Christopher Hill is largely concerned with my initial argument for materialism. Tim Crane raises doubts specifically about my explanation of the intuition of mind-brain distinctness. Diana Raffman wonders whether my account of phenomenal concepts is adequate to our powers of perceptual discrimination and introspective awareness. In all three cases they helpfully advance the debate. I try to show how a development of the ideas in my book can deal with their worries.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Papineau2002, author = {Papineau, David and Shea, Nicholas}, title = {Ruth Millikan's On Clear and Confused Ideas}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {453-466}, keywords = {confusion, epistemology, idea, thought}, abstract = {Millikan's book has two main themes. The earlier chapters focus on empirical concepts of 'substances'. The later chapters develop some strongly externalist and anti-Fregean thoughts applicable to empirical concepts, in general. This review article aims to clarify both themes. In addition, it points to various difficulties occasioned by Millikan's anti-Fregean rejection of senses, especially in connection with propositional attitude attributions and identity judgments, and makes some suggestions as to how these difficulties might best be circumvented within Millikan's programme.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Pappas1999, author = {Pappas, George-S}, title = {Berkeley and Scepticism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {133-149}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, scepticism}, abstract = {In both the Principles and the Three Dialogues, Berkeley claims that he wants to uncover those principles which lead to scepticism; to refute those principles; and to refute scepticism itself. This paper examines the principles Berkeley says have sceptical consequences, and contends that only one of them implies scepticism. It is also argued that Berkeley's attempted refutation of scepticism rests not on his acceptance of the esse est percipi principle, but rather on the thesis that physical objects and their sensible qualities are immediately perceived.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PAPPAS1990, author = {PAPPAS, GEORGE-S}, title = {Causation and Perception in Reid.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {763-766}, keywords = {causation, epistemology, perception, realism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Pappas1994, author = {Pappas, George-S}, title = {Perception and Mystical Experience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {877-883}, keywords = {experience, god, mysticism, perception, religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PARK1982, author = {PARK, YNHUI}, title = {THE FUNCTION OF FICTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {416-424}, keywords = {fiction, language, linguistics}, abstract = {THE AIM OF THE PAPER WAS TO SPECIFY THE FUNCTION OF FICTION. IT IS ARGUED THAT FICTION HAS AN UNREDUCIBLE FUNCTION TO ANY OTHER LINGUISTIC FUNCTION, WHICH CONSISTS IN OPENING UP ALWAYS POSSIBLE WORLDS, WORLDS WE LIVE IN. THE PAPER WAS SPECIFICALLY AIMED AT AGAINST THE GOODMANIAN VIEW OF THE FUNCTION OF ART IN GENERAL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PARKS1972, author = {PARKS, R-Z}, title = {NOTE ON THE SWITCHES PARADOX.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {408-409}, keywords = {logic, paradox}, abstract = {IN AN EARLIER ARTICLE, ARMSTRONG DISCUSSES THE ARGUMENT FORM: CKPQP, THEREFORE ACPRCQR. THIS IS TRUTH-FUNCTIONALLY VALID, BUT HAS MANY INSTANCES NOT INTUITIVELY VALID. ARMSTRONG FINDS THIS PARADOXICAL AND SUGGESTS THAT IT IS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE PARADOXES OF MATERIAL IMPLICATION. I DISCUSS CONSIDERATIONS THAT WOULD SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THESE SO-CALLED PARADOXES ARE MORE CLOSELY RELATED THAN ARMSTRONG WOULD HAVE ONE BELIEVE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PARRY1980, author = {PARRY, RICHARD-D}, title = {RYLE'S THEORY OF ACTION IN 'THE CONCEPT OF MIND'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {379-392}, keywords = {action, disposition, metaphysics, minds}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE (A) CONSTRUCTS FROM "THE CONCEPT OF MIND" FOUR VERSIONS OF THE INTELLECTUALIST ERROR; (B) LAYS OUT RYLE'S TWO MAJOR ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE INTELLECTUALIST ERROR; (C) OUTLINES RYLE'S THEORY OF ACTION; (D) SHOWS THAT THIS THEORY OF ACTION EITHER FALLS PREY TO ONE OF HIS ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE INTELLECTUALIST ERROR OR BEGS THE QUESTION; (E) SHOWS HOW THIS DILEMMA IS CAUSED BY MISLOCATING THE LOGICAL ISSUE IN THE INTELLECTUALIST ERROR. ONCE PROPERLY LOCATED, THE LOGICAL ISSUE IS SEEN TO BE SEPARATE FROM THE ONTOLOGICAL ISSUE OF DUALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PARRY1966, author = {PARRY, WILLIAM-TUTHILL}, title = {QUANTIFICATION OF THE PREDICATE AND MANY-SORTED LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {342-360}, keywords = {distribution, logic, predicate, quantification, sortal, term}, abstract = {USING MANY-SORTED LOGIC WITH IDENTITY (MSI) IN SMILEY'S WAY, WE WRITE ""PASB"("A=B")" FOR "EVERY "A" IS (IDENTICAL WITH) SOME "B""; ""PAPB"("A DOES NOT EQUAL B")" FOR "EVERY "A" IS DISTINCT FROM EVERY "B"," I.E., "NO "A" IS A "B""; SIMILARLY FOR I AND O FORMS. THIS ANALYSIS THROWS LIGHT ON SCHOLASTIC LOGIC. ANY TERM "DISTRIBUTED" IN A STANDARD CATEGORICAL FORM NOW HAS A UNIVERSAL QUANTIFIER. THERE ARE FOUR NON-TRADITIONAL FORMS; E.G., ""PAPB"("A=B)," "EVERY "A" IS (IDENTICAL WITH) EVERY "B"," WHICH WE LABEL "ALPHA". ARISTOTLE AND HIS COMMENTATORS HELD ALPHA IS ALWAYS FALSE. BUT OCKHAM SAW THAT ALPHA IS TRUE JUST IN CASE THE ONE AND ONLY "A" IS THE ONLY "B". DE MORGAN'S EXEMPLAR SYSTEM CORRESPONDS TO THE EIGHT MSI FORMS, BUT HE MISINTERPRETS TWO FORMS. WE GIVE RULES FOR IMMEDIATE INFERENCES. BURLEIGH AND GERSONIDES, TAKING "OMNIS" COLLECTIVELY, FOUNDED A HAMILTONIAN TRADITION OF QUANTIFICATION OF THE PREDICATE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Parry1991, author = {Parry, William-T and Hacker, Edward-A}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {241-243}, publisher = {SUNY Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Aristotelian Logic}, volume = {54(1)}, year = {1991} } @article{PARSONS1972, author = {PARSONS, HOWARD-L}, title = {RECONSTRUCTION OF EDUCATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {100-106}, keywords = {capitalism, creativity, education, socialism}, abstract = {ANTI-INTELLECTUAL AND ANTIHISTORICAL, U.S. SOCIETY IS NOT EQUIPPED TO SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS. OF TWO ALTERNATIVE PHILOSOPHIES, CAPITALISM AND MARXIST SOCIALISM, THE LATTER AIMS AT HUMAN, SOCIAL, PROLETARIAN, REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE. EDUCATORS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO SUCH PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT BY UNDERSTANDING U.S. YOUTH AND HISTORY, THE DETERMINISM OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, AND AN ADEQUATE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PARSONS1969, author = {PARSONS, HOWARD-L}, title = {A PHILOSOPHY OF WONDER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {84-101}, keywords = {creativity, man, metaphysics, wonder}, abstract = {CONCERNING WONDER EXPERIENCE, WHAT ARE ITS TYPES, DIFFERENTIAE, MAN'S CAPACITY FOR IT, COMPONENTS, SUBTYPES, ELICITING CONDITIONS, ALLIED EXPERIENCES, RELATION TO VALUES, SOCIAL CONDITIONS? WORDSWORTH, SHAKESPEARE, LEONARDO DA VINCI, KEPLER, ECKHART, KEKULE, HANDEL, AND HENRY WIEMAN ARE MENTIONED. THE METHOD USED IS OBSERVING SPECIMEN EXPERIENCES OF DISTINCTIVE WONDERS AND ORDERING THESE IN AN IMPLICIT PHILOSOPHY OF MAN, SOCIETY, AND VALUES. CONCLUSIONS ARE: A COMMON TYPE OF WONDER IS SURPRISE PLUS INCIPIENT CURIOSITY; SUBTYPES ARE RECEPTIVE, INWARD WONDER (LIKE MYSTICAL AND PSYCHEDELIC EXPERIENCES) AND CREATIVE, MEANING-MAKING WONDER (ART, SCIENCE); A WARFARE SOCIETY WEAKENS WONDER, AN ESSENTIAL HUMAN VALUE, AND MUST BE RECONSTRUCTED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PARSONS1964, author = {PARSONS, HOWARD-L}, title = {VALUE AND MENTAL HEALTH IN THE THOUGHT OF MARX.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {355-365}, keywords = {alienation, development, mental-health; nature, philosophical-anthropology; private-property; production, self-determination; value}, abstract = {FOR MARX VALUE IS THE PRACTICAL, CRITICAL, PRODUCTIVE INTERACTION OF MAN AS INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP WITH OTHER MEN AND NATURE, CREATING PERSONS, SOCIETY, AND USE-VALUES, AND TRANSFORMING NATURE. THE PSYCHOSOMATIC SELF IS CREATED THROUGH THIS PROCESS OF FULFILLING VITAL AND HIGHER NEEDS; THROUGH PRODUCTIVE LABOR, THE SELF'S RELATIONS TO OTHERS AND TO NATURAL OBJECTS ARE CREATED. MENTAL HEALTH IS THE PROGRESSIVE FULFILLMENT OF MAN'S PRACTICAL-CRITICAL CAPACITIES IN PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY. UNDER CAPITALISM MAN EXPERIENCES ILL HEALTH AND ALIENATION. THIS DISORDERING OF MAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF HIS SPECIES-LIFE CAN BE CORRECTED BY THE WORKERS' TRANSFORMATION OF THE SYSTEM OF PRIVATE PROPERTY INTO A SOCIALIST ORDER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PARSONS1975, author = {PARSONS, HOWARD-L}, title = {THE PHILOSOPHER AND MANKIND'S STRUGGLE FOR VALUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {246-252}, keywords = {philosophy, value}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE IS TO FIND OUT WHAT THE PHILOSOPHER IS DOING AND OUGHT TO DO. THIS IS ACHIEVED BY OBSERVING AND ANALYZING WHAT PHILOSOPHERS HAVE DONE IN THEIR BIOSOCIAL SITUATIONS AND DRAWING OUT THE VALUE-IMPLICATIONS. LIKE ALL ORGANISMS AND PERSONS, PHILOSOPHERS STRUGGLE TO SURVIVE AND FULFILL THEIR NEEDS. IN THIS STRUGGLE SOME HAVE SIDED WITH THE RULING CLASSES; OTHERS HAVE IDENTIFIED WITH THE BROAD MASSES. THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF HUMAN LIVES IMPLIES A UNIVERSAL RULE: TREAT ALL AS HAVING EQUAL RIGHTS TO LIFE AND FULFILLMENT. PHILOSOPHERS OUGHT TO FOLLOW THIS RULE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PARSONS1973, author = {PARSONS, KATHRYN-PYNE}, title = {THREE CONCEPTS OF CLUSTERS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {514-523}, keywords = {family-resemblance; language, term}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PARSONS1991, author = {PARSONS, Terence}, title = {Tropes and Supervenience.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {language, metaphysics, supervenience, trope}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PASTORE1967, author = {PASTORE, NICHOLAS}, title = {CONDILLAC'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL REJECTION OF LOCKE AND BERKELEY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {429-431}, keywords = {epistemology, modern, perception}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PATEMAN1973, author = {PATEMAN, TREVOR}, title = {THE EXPERIENCE OF POLITICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {547-560}, keywords = {experience, political-philosophy; politics, psychoanalysis}, abstract = {"THE EXPERIENCE OF POLITICS" INTRODUCES AND EXPLAINS THE CONCEPTS OF 'ALIENATION' AND 'REIFICATION' IN THE CONTEXT OF A DISCUSSION OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF POLITICAL LIFE. IT POINTS TO ANALOGIES BETWEEN SCHIZOPHRENIA (AS THEORIZED BY R D LAING) AND POLITICAL APATHY, AND ON THAT BASIS TRIES TO PRODUCE A MORAL JUSTIFICATION FOR DIRECT OR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN TERMS OF THE SATISFACTION OF HUMAN NEEDS FOR PRACTICE (PRAXIS). IT'S QUITE A GOOD PAPER, IF I MAY SAY SO.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Paull1992, author = {Paull, R-Cranston and Sider, Theodore-R}, title = {In Defense of Global Supervenience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {833-854}, keywords = {dependency, metaphysics, property, supervenience}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PAVLOVIC1982, author = {PAVLOVIC, KARL-RICHARD}, title = {DEFORMALIZATION, SIGHT, AND PHENOMENOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {239-252}, keywords = {epistemology, phenomenology, sight}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PEACH1976, author = {PEACH, BERNARD}, title = {THE ETHICS OF C A BAYLIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {1-24}, keywords = {ethics, good, naturalistic-fallacy; pleasure, preference, twentieth}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE IS INTENDED AS A TRIBUTE TO C A BAYLIS ON THE OCCASION OF HIS RETIREMENT. IT ARGUES THAT HE DOES NOT COMMIT THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY NO MATTER HOW BROADLY IT IS INTERPRETED BUT THAT HE LEAVES HIS CONCEPT OF PROBABILITY UNCLEAR AND MAY EMBRACE A KIND OF NON-NATURALISM IN HIS APPEAL TO NORMATIVE NECESSITY AND THE PROPERTY OF PREFERABILITY. ON THE BASIS OF AN INTERPRETATION OF PREFERABILITY, PROBABILITY AND NORMATIVE NECESSITY USING THE CONCEPTS OF COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITIONALS, DEFEASIBLE NECESSITY, AND CONCEPTUALISTIC PRAGMATISM IT IS SUGGESTED THAT HIS EMPIRICISM AND NATURALISM CAN BE EXTENDED AND STRENGTHENED IN A WAY THAT HE MIGHT FIND ACCEPTABLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Peacocke2002, author = {Peacocke, Christopher}, title = {Precis of Being Known}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {636-640}, keywords = {being, epistemology, knowing, metaphysics, modality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Peacocke2002a, author = {Peacocke, Christopher}, title = {The Principle-Based Account of Modality: Elucidations and Resources}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {663-679}, keywords = {epistemology, metaphysics, modality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Peacocke2001, author = {Peacocke, Christopher}, title = {Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {609-615}, keywords = {content, metaphysics, perception, phenomenology}, abstract = {This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly's position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation-dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. The crucial arguments against conceptualism stem from animal perception, and from a distinction, elaborated in the final section of the paper, between content which is objective and content which is also conceived of by its subject as objective.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Peacocke1998, author = {Peacocke, Christopher}, title = {Nonconceptual Content Defended}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {381-388}, keywords = {experience, metaphysics, mind, world}, abstract = {This article responds to McDowell's arguments in Mind and World against nonconceptual representational content in perception. I argue that the fine-grained content of perception cannot properly be accounted for by the use of perceptual demonstratives of the form 'that F'; that McDowell's argument from a premise of articulability in language of perceptual content by means of 'It looks that way' to the conceptual character of representational content establishes only the conceptual character of the sense of 'that way', not its reference; and that relations between experience and conceptualized judgment can be rational and scrutinizable, without the experience's content being fully conceptual.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Peacocke1996, author = {Peacocke, Christopher}, title = {Precis of A Study of Concepts}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {407-411}, keywords = {concept, conditionality, epistemology, form, puzzle}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Peacocke1996a, author = {Peacocke, Christopher}, title = {Can Possession Conditions Individuate Concepts?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {433-460}, keywords = {conditionality, epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {Responding to Heal, Rey and Papineau, the paper considers the relation of the possession-condition theory of concepts to various rivals. It discusses Quinean, covariation and teleological approaches. It also proposes a theory of implicit conceptions, to account for (amongst other cases) Leibniz's and Newton's possession of the concept of the limit of a series. Finally it emphasizes a point of convergence between the possession-condition theory and simulation theories. In simulating another, a thinker carries over satisfaction of the possession conditions for the concepts in question. This is distinct from having tacit knowledge of the possession conditions.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Peacocke1992, author = {Peacocke, Christopher}, title = {A Moderate Mentalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {425-430}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, mental, psychology, science, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PEARL1970, author = {PEARL, LEON}, title = {IS THEAETETUS DREAMING?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {108-113}, keywords = {dreaming, epistemology}, abstract = {I ARGUE THAT IF A MAN IS AWAKE AND BELIEVES THAT HE IS AWAKE, THEN THIS CONSTITUTES A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR HIS KNOWING THAT HE IS AWAKE. I TRY TO EXPLAIN THE ABOVE FACT BY POINTING OUT THAT OUR CONCEPT OF BEING AWAKE INVOLVES NOT ONLY THAT A MAN IS AWARE OF HIS SURROUNDINGS BUT ALSO THAT HIS THOUGHTS ARE EFFECTED BY THE BELIEFS AND MEMORIES WHICH ARE DORMANT WHEN DREAMING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PEARL1972, author = {PEARL, LEON}, title = {A REPLY TO JULIAN WOLFE'S CRITICISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {269}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {PROFESSOR JULIAN WOLFE'S CRITICISM IS BASED ON A MISTAKEN INTERPRETATION OF MY POSITION. HE TAKES MY POSITION TO BE THAT "WHEN AWAKE, A PERSON'S BELIEF THAT HE IS AWAKE CONSTITUTES A CRITERION FOR HIS KNOWING THAT HE IS AWAKE. THIS, HOWEVER, IS NOT MY POSITION. WHAT I HAD TRIED TO DO IN PART OF MY PAPER WAS TO GIVE A CAUSAL EXPLANATION AS TO WHY A PERSON'S BELIEF THAT HE IS AWAKE, WHEN IN FACT HE IS AWAKE, IS A SUFFICIENT CONDITION (NOT A SUFFICIENT REASON) FOR HIS KNOWING THAT HE IS AWAKE. MY POINT, THERE, BEING THAT A PERSON CAN KNOW THAT HE IS AWAKE WITHOUT REQUIRING ANY SORT OF CRITERION WHATSOEVER."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Pears1990, author = {Pears, David}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {475-479}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Hume's System}, volume = {54(2)}, year = {1990} } @article{PELTZ1966, author = {PELTZ, RICHARD-W}, title = {INDEXICAL SENTENCES AND CARTESIAN RATIONALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {80-84}, keywords = {cogito, criteria, epistemology, indexical-sentence; rationalism, scepticism, truth}, abstract = {IN "MEDITATION" I, DESCARTES APPARENTLY CASTS DOUBT ON HIS ULTIMATE RATIONALISTIC CRITERION OF CLEAR AND DISTINCT CONCEPTION BY INVOKING THE EVIL GENIUS. THIS DOUBT APPLIES TO TWO KINDS OF STATEMENTS: THOSE BASED ON EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES AND MATHEMATICAL STATEMENTS. "I AM," HOWEVER, IS OF A DIFFERENT LOGICAL KIND, AN INDEXICAL SENTENCE, AND THUS MAY ESCAPE EVEN THE DOUBT CREATED BY THE EVIL GENIUS, BEING GROUNDED ONLY IN CLEAR AND DISTINCT CONCEPTION. INDEXICAL SENTENCES CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THEIR PRAGMATIC CONTEXTS OF UTTERANCE IN THE WAY NONINDEXICAL SENTENCES CAN. ALL SENTENCES OF THE LATTER KIND REQUIRE A DIVINE GUARANTEE; SOME OF THE FORMER DO NOT. "MEDITATION" V SUGGESTS THAT DESCARTES WAS AWARE OF THE LOGICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SENTENCES LIKE "2+2=4" AND "I AM." SIMILARLY, THE PASSAGE IN THE "DISCOURSE ON METHOD", WHICH INVOKES THE DIVINE GUARANTEE, CONFINES ITSELF SOLELY TO THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH IN NONINDEXICAL SENTENCES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PELTZ1962, author = {PELTZ, RICHARD-W}, title = {THE LOGIC OF THE "COGITO".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {256-262}, keywords = {cogito, existence, i, language, logic, necessity, syllogism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PENDLEBURY1990, author = {PENDLEBURY, MICHAEL}, title = {Why Proper Names are Rigid Designators.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(3)}, pages = {519-536}, keywords = {denoting, metaphysics, proper-name; rigid-designator; semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PENDLEBURY1988, author = {PENDLEBURY, MICHAEL}, title = {RUSSELLIAN THOUGHTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {669-682}, keywords = {aboutness, belief, existence, metaphysics, object}, abstract = {A 'RUSSELLIAN THOUGHT' CAN BE DEFINED AS A MENTAL STATE WHICH IS A BELIEF ABOUT AN OBJECT BUT WHICH WOULD NOT BE A BELIEF IF THAT OBJECT DID NOT EXIST. THIS PAPER ARGUES AGAINST GARETH EVANS AND OTHER 'RUSSELLIANS' THAT THERE ARE NO SUCH STATES. SECTION I IS A SYMPATHETIC PRESENTATION OF THE CASE FOR RUSSELLIAN THOUGHTS (WHICH IS BASED PRIMARILY ON SEMANTIC CONSIDERATIONS). SECTION II PRESENTS THE FUNDAMENTAL CASE AGAINST THEM. IT IS CLAIMED THAT THIS CASE (WHICH IS BASED PRIMARILY ON PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS) IS STRONG ENOUGH TO SUGGEST THAT THE ARGUMENTS FOR RUSSELLIAN THOUGHTS MUST BE FLAWED. SECTION III PROVIDES AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT IS WRONG WITH THEM. IN THE COURSE OF DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF RUSSELLIAN THOUGHTS, THE PAPER RAISES SOME IMPORTANT GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF BELIEF AND THE ATTRIBUTION AND SPECIFICATION OF INTENTIONAL CONTENT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Pendlebury1995, author = {Pendlebury, Michael}, title = {Making Sense of Kant's Schematism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(4)}, pages = {777-797}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, reason, understanding}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Pendlebury1994, author = {Pendlebury, Michael}, title = {Content and Causation in Perception}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {767-785}, keywords = {causation, content, experience, metaphysics, perception}, abstract = {To perceive something is to have a sense experience with a content which fits it to an appropriate degree (which varies in a specified way between state of affairs, events and thing perception), providing that the item concerned causes the experience through a mechanism which is reliable in the sense that in relevant circumstances it is generally apt to connect facts with experiences which fit those facts. I elaborate and defend this account, showing how it solves a number of problems in the philosophy of perception and avoids the main weaknesses of its rivals.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PENDLEBURY1985, author = {PENDLEBURY, MICHAEL}, title = {HEIDELBERGER ON THE FIRST AND SECOND PERSON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {323-331}, keywords = {i, language, you}, abstract = {THIS PAPER DEALS WITH THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 'I' AND 'YOU' AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE THEORY OF BELIEF. I UNDERMINE HEIDELBERGER'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE VIEW THAT THE FIRST PERSON IS SPECIAL IN CERTAIN RESPECTS, OFFER A DIAGNOSIS OF THE SOURCE OF HIS ERROR, OUTLINE SOME BETTER ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM, AND CONCLUDE WITH SOME BRIEF POSITIVE REMARKS ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 'I', 'YOU', AND 'HE'.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PEPPER1971, author = {PEPPER, STEPHEN-C}, title = {A DYNAMIC VIEW OF PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {42-46}, keywords = {epistemology, perception}, abstract = {ACTS OF PERCEPTION ARE SHOWN TO BE BASED ON DYNAMIC DRIVES AND INTERESTS, AND SO TO BE PARTS OF PURPOSIVE ACTS. A NUMBER OF CONSEQUENCES FOLLOW. FOR INSTANCE, IN DISTAL AUDITORY OR VISUAL PERCEPTIONS THERE ARE TWO OBJECTS--THE TRANSCENDENT OBJECT OF THE DISTANT GOAL AND SOURCE OF STIMULATION, AND THE IMMEDIATE SENSORY OBJECT WITH ITS ANTICIPATORY REFERENCES. THIS LEADS TO AN OPERATIONAL-CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH TO VERIFY THE REFERENCES. PASSIVE TRADITIONAL THEORIES ARE CONFUSED ON THIS AND OTHER RELEVANT POINTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Pereboom1998, author = {Pereboom, Derk}, title = {On Bilgrami's Belief and Meaning}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {621-626}, keywords = {belief, meaning, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Pereboom2002, author = {Pereboom, Derk}, title = {On Baker's Persons and Bodies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {615-622}, keywords = {body, constitution, metaphysics, person}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Pereboom1994, author = {Pereboom, Derk}, title = {Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {315-329}, keywords = {brain, introspection, mental-states; metaphysics, science}, abstract = {According to a prominent reply to the knowledge arguments against materialism, the troublesome what- it- is- like aspect is assigned to a mode of presentation of the sensation, and not to the sensation itself. It is then claimed that physical omniscience yields complete knowledge of the sensation. But if the what- it- is-like aspect is assigned to a mode of presentation, then the crucial issue becomes whether physical omniscience yields complete knowledge of the mode of presentation. I argue that the mode- of- presentation reply can be extended to solve this problem.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Pereboom2001, author = {Pereboom, Derk}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {494-497}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Living without Free Will}, volume = {67(2)}, year = {2001} } @article{PERRY1966, author = {PERRY, DAVID-L}, title = {SIMPLE IDEAS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {278-280}, keywords = {epistemology, idea}, abstract = {WE NEED A PROCEDURE OTHER THAN INTUITION FOR DETERMINING CONCEPTUAL SIMPLICITY. LOCKE REGARDED INDEFINABILITY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF SIMPLICITY. INSTEAD, INDEFINABILITY COULD BETTER BE TREATED AS DEFINITIVE OF SIMPLICITY. AN IDEA IS SIMPLE JUST IN CASE ANY TERM THAT MIGHT SIGNIFY IT WOULD BE INDEFINABLE. A TERM WOULD BE INDEFINABLE JUST IN CASE NO POSSIBLE LANGUAGE COULD CONTAIN TWO NON-SYNONYMOUS TERMS WHICH WOULD COMBINE TO FORM A COMPLEX TERM SYNONYMOUS WITH THE DEFINIENDUM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Perry1998, author = {Perry, John}, title = {Broadening the Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {223-231}, keywords = {computation, epistemology, intentionality, psychology}, abstract = {In The Elm and the Expert Fodor maintains that (1) psychological laws classify by content; (2) content is informational, and hence broad rather than narrow; and (3) psychological laws are implemented by computational processes. But Frege cases and twin cases show that internal, computational states do not line up with content broadly individuated. Fodor's solution is that these cases don't occur very often. But the problem is with the part of (2) I have italicized. Informational content can be as narrow as one needs. The possibility of Frege and twin cases reflects the structure of information. Differently typed states can carry the same information relative to different constraints and circumstances; similarly typed states can carry different information relative to different constraints and circumstances.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Perry2004, author = {Perry, John}, title = {Precis of Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {172-181}, keywords = {consciousness, knowledge, metaphysics, physicalism, possibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Perry2004a, author = {Perry, John}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {207-229}, keywords = {knowledge, metaphysics, modality, possibility, zombie}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PERRY1985, author = {PERRY, THOMAS-D}, title = {TWO DOMAINS OF RIGHTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {567-580}, keywords = {liberty, natural-rights; social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PETERS1978, author = {PETERS, TED}, title = {METAPHOR AND THE HORIZON OF THE UNSAID.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {355-369}, keywords = {context, event, horizon, language, meaning, metaphor}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE DEBATE BETWEEN THE ELLIPSIS THEORY, WHICH ARGUES THAT ALL METAPHORS ARE ELLIPTICAL SIMILES AND HENCE ARE REDUCIBLE TO LITERAL REFORMULATION, AND THE INTERACTION THEORY, WHICH ARGUES THAT METAPHORS CREATE NEW MEANING APART FROM ANY SIMILE AND HENCE ARE IRREDUCIBLE. THE RESOLUTION OFFERED EMPLOYS THE CONCEPT OF HORIZON OF MEANING DRAWN FROM PHENOMENOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS. IT ARGUES THAT METAPHORS MUST RELY UPON SOME COMPARISON, IMPLICIT OR EXPLICIT, IN ORDER TO HAVE ANY MEANING AT ALL; YET IT IS ALSO THE CASE THAT METAPHORS HAVE A CREATIVE EVENT CHARACTER THAT RESISTS REDUCTIVE REFORMULATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Peterson1995, author = {Peterson, Philip}, title = {Are Some "Propositions" Empirically Necessary?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(2)}, pages = {251-277}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, language, linguistics, proposition}, abstract = {Kripke and Putnam hold that certain identity statements are necessarily true but only empirically justifiable. Is their position compatible with the non-Putnam, anti-Kripke view that non-linguistic propositions (rather than sentence types, sentence tokens, statements, or sentence meanings) are the proper objects of belief and justification, and the bearers of truth values? Yes. Propositionalizing the Kripke-Putnam view reveals that although a single proposition cannot (or need not) be both intuitive and demonstrative, still one and the same proposition can be empirically justified "and" justified "a priori". Propositionalizing Kripke and Putnam does not remove all the mysteries about identity statements, but it does replace the issues about questionable phenomena like individual concepts and reference-in-thought with those concerning identities between (and alternative cognitive approaches to) propositions themselves. It is not clear, however, that any identity statement about propositions can be as empirical as some identity statements about concrete objects.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PETRIE1987, author = {PETRIE, BRADFORD}, title = {GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE AND REDUCTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {119-130}, keywords = {immaterial, metaphysics, physical, reduction, supervenience, world}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO KIM'S STRONG SUPERVENIENCE (AS HE HAS ARGUED IT IS) AND THAT IT DOES NOT ENTAIL THE TYPE OR TOKEN REDUCIBILITY OF THE SUPERVENIENT PROPERTIES TO THE PROPERTIES UPON WHICH THEY SUPERVENE (AS STRONG SUPERVENIENCE DOES). IT THEN TURNS TO AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENT THAT GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE IS EQUIVALENT TO IMPLICIT DEFINABILITY WHICH ACCORDING TO BETH'S THEOREM ENTAILS EXPLICIT DEFINABILITY. THE AUTHOR HOPES TO SHOW THAT GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE IS A DISTINCT AND ESPECIALLY INTERESTING RELATION WHICH CAPTURES ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHYSICAL PROPERTIES AND THOSE PROPERTIES WHICH ARE DETERMINED BY THEM THAT OTHER RELATIONS DO NOT DO JUSTICE TO.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PETROVIC1963, author = {PETROVIC, GAJO}, title = {MARX'S THEORY OF ALIENATION (TRANSLATION).}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {419-426}, keywords = {alienation, history, human-nature; self, social-philosophy; textual-criticis}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE IS TO STIMULATE DISCUSSION ABOUT SOME QUESTIONS WHICH NECESSARILY ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH MARX'S THEORY OF ALIENATION. SOME MARXISTS THINK THERE IS NO PROBLEM AND OTHERS JUST COMMENT ON WHAT MARX SAID AND AVOID WHAT IS CONTROVERSIAL. THE PROBLEM IS POSED WHETHER SELF-ALIENATION IS MERELY HISTORICAL, CHARACTERIZING ONLY ONE STAGE IN THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MAN OR WHETHER IT IS A PERMANENT (NON TEMPORAL) STRUCTURAL MOMENT OF HUMAN EXISTENCE. THE DISCUSSION HERE CENTERS AROUND THE ISSUE OF HOW ALIENATION COULD BE ESSENTIALLY RELATED TO THE NATURE OF HISTORY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Pettit1996, author = {Pettit, Philip}, title = {Realism and Truth: A Comment on Crispin Wright's Truth and Objectivity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {883-890}, keywords = {epistemology, objectivity, realism, truth}, abstract = {Realism about any area of talk or thought requires a view of the discourse both as truth-seeking and in some of its positive claims, truth-attaining. But what else does it need? Crispin Wright suggests: a commitment to a heavyweight conception of what is involved in sentences of the discourse being true. I disagree. If anything else is needed, it is only that the true sentences of the discourse are made true--true, under a common conception of truth--by how things are in the world-at-large, not just by how things are with us or by how things relate to us.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Pettit2005, author = {Pettit, Philip}, title = {From Republic to Democracy: A Comment on Henry Richardson}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {196-203}, keywords = {autonomy, democracy, freedom, government, political-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Pettit2001, author = {Pettit, Philip}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {498-501}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency}, volume = {70(2)}, year = {2001} } @article{Philipse2001, author = {Philipse, Herman}, title = {How Are We to Interpret Heidegger's Oeuvre? A Methodological Manifesto}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {573-586}, keywords = {interpretation, metaphysics, methodology, works}, abstract = {The paper argues that these different aims, applicative and historical ones, require different methodologies of interpretation, and imply different criteria of success. In particular, the "principle of charity" according to which an interpretation is better to the extent that we agree more with what the text as interpreted says, is fitting for applicative interpretations, but not without further qualifications for historical ones. The paper argues further that we should apply the methodology of historical interpretation to the entire body of German texts now available, if we want to interpret Martin Heidegger's philosophical oeuvre, assess its philosophical value, and investigate its links to Nazism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Philipse1992, author = {Philipse, Herman}, title = {Heidegger's Question of Being and the Augustinian Picture' of Language}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {251-287}, keywords = {being, epistemology, language, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Philipse1998, author = {Philipse, Herman}, title = {Shifting Position?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {885-892}, keywords = {connectionism, metaphysics, reason, science, soul}, abstract = {In The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul (MIT Press, 1995), Paul Churchland aims at making recent developments in connectionist neuroscience available to the general public. It is argued that the results of connectionist neuroscience that Churchland describes refute three philosophical views which he cherished in earlier works: (1) a theory of language according to which all knowledge is theoretical, (2) the thesis of the plasticity of perception, and (3) eliminative materialism. The paper is a sequel to "The Absolute Network Theory of Language and Traditional Epistemology", Inquiry 33 (1990), 127-178.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Philipse1998a, author = {Philipse, Herman}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {478-481}, publisher = {Princeton Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Heidegger's Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation}, volume = {65(2)}, year = {1998} } @article{Phillips2000, author = {Phillips, David}, title = {Butler and the Nature of Self-Interest}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {421-438}, keywords = {ethics, happiness, nature, self-interes}, abstract = {Butler's famous arguments in Sermon XI, designed to refute psychological egoism and to mitigate conflict between self-interest and benevolence, turn out to depend crucially on his own distinctive conception of self-interest. Butler does not notice (or anyway, doesn't notice at the crucial points) the availability of several alternative conceptions of self-interest. Some such alternatives are available within the framework of Butler's moral psychology; others can be developed outside that framework. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PIETERSMA1989, author = {PIETERSMA, HENRY}, title = {THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND PHENOMENOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {27-47}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, perception, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PIETERSMA1973, author = {PIETERSMA, HENRY}, title = {INTUITION AND HORIZON IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUSSERL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {95-101}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, intuition, seeing}, abstract = {THE NOTION OF "SEEING THE OBJECT ITSELF," BASIC IN HUSSERL'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, CAN ONLY MAKE SENSE, IF WE INTERPRET IT WITH THE HELP OF HIS NOTION OF HORIZON OR IMPLICIT CONTEXT. SEEING THE OBJECT ITSELF IS AN ACHIEVEMENT EXPERIENCED AS SUCH. THIS MUST MEAN THAT THE SUBJECT HAS AN IMPLICIT AWARENESS OF A CONTEXT OF OTHER POSSIBLE EPISTEMIC SITUATIONS IN WHICH WHAT IS NOW "SEEN" OR VIEWED "CLOSE UP" CAN BE REFERRED TO FROM A "DISTANCE." "DISTANCE" IS HERE OF COURSE NOT TO BE UNDERSTOOD IN A PURELY OBJECTIVE SPATIAL SENSE. WHAT DISTANCE, IF ANY, SEPARATES HIM FROM THE OBJECT IS A FUNCTION OF WHAT COGNITIVE STEPS, IF ANY, THE SUBJECT IS AWARE OF AS STEPS HE MIGHT TAKE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A BETTER GRASP OF THE OBJECT. IT IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE TO STUDY HOW THIS PURELY PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONTRAST BETWEEN MODES OF INTENTIONALITY PRECISELY FUNCTIONS WITHIN HUSSERL'S EPISTEMOLOGY AS A WHOLE. THIS WOULD REQUIRE A THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF HIS CONCEPTS OF 'EVIDENZ' AND TRUTH AND OF THE WAY IN WHICH HE CONFRONTS SKEPTICISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PIETERSMA1979, author = {PIETERSMA, H}, title = {HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {194-211}, keywords = {factuality, intentionality, metaphysics, object, perception}, abstract = {HUSSERL SPEAKS OF HORIZONS, HEIDEGGER OF WORLDS. THE CONCEPT BEHIND THESE TERMS IS THE SAME; THE TWO PHILOSOPHERS MENTIONED HELD GENERALLY WIDELY DIVERGENT VIEWS. IN THIS ARTICLE I ARTICULATE THE SHARED CONCEPT AND THEN PROCEED TO ARGUE THAT THE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW CAN BE REDUCED TO A DIFFERENCE IN THE RANGE ACCORDED TO THE CONCEPT. THIS STRATEGY BRINGS ABOUT A GREAT SIMPLIFICATION IN THE GENERALLY MUDDLED CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE TWO PHILOSOPHERS. IT ALSO HAS THE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF SHOWING THE INTEREST THIS DISCUSSION COULD HAVE FOR CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Pietroski2000, author = {Pietroski, Paul-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {230-244}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Causing Actions}, volume = {68(1)}, year = {2000} } @article{PIKE1974, author = {PIKE, ALFRED}, title = {FOUNDATIONAL ASPECTS OF MUSICAL PERCEPTION: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {34}, pages = {429-434}, keywords = {epistemology, music, perception, phenomenology}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE ENDEAVORS TO PROBE BENEATH THE ABSTRACTIONS OF THE MIND IN AN EXAMINATION OF IMMEDIATE MUSICAL EXPERIENCE, FREEING THE ACTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS FROM ENCUMBERING EXTRA-MUSICAL INVOLVEMENTS, TO THE DIRECT PERCEPTION OF CONCRETE MUSICAL EVENTS, AND ITS OWN REACTIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEW IS CONCERNED WITH MUSIC AS IT REALLY IS, DEVOID OF SUPERIMPOSED STRATA OF CULTURALLY IMPLANTED PRE-CONCEPTIONS WHICH HAVE OBSCURED THE SIMPLE OBSERVATION OF MUSICAL EVENTS AND THEIR MEANINGS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PIKE1966, author = {PIKE, ALFRED}, title = {THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO MUSICAL PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {247-254}, keywords = {aesthetics, music, perception, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Piller2003, author = {Piller, Christian}, title = {Two Accounts of Objective Reasons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {444-451}, keywords = {axiology, duty, objective, reality, reasons}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Pincione2006, author = {Pincione, Guido and Teson, Fernando-R}, title = {Rational Ignorance and Political Morality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {72(1)}, pages = {71-96}, keywords = {balance, deontology, display, evil, ignorance, morality, political-philosoph}, abstract = {People frequently advance political proposals in the name of a goal while remaining apparently indifferent to the fact that those proposals, if implemented, would frustrate that goal. Theorists of "deliberative democracy" purport to avoid this difficulty by arguing that deliberation is primarily about moral not empirical issues. We reject this view (the moral turn) and propose a method (the display test) to check whether a political utterance is best explained by the rational ignorance hypothesis or by the moral turn: the speaker must be prepared to openly acknowledge the bad consequences of his political position. If he is, the position is genuinely moral; if he is not, the position evinces either rational ignorance or posturing. We introduce deontological notions to explain when the moral turn works and when it does not. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PINKARD1981, author = {PINKARD, TERRY}, title = {HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {452-464}, keywords = {dialectic, infinite, logic, mathematics, number, quantity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PINKARD1986, author = {PINKARD, TERRY}, title = {FREEDOM AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES IN HEGEL'S ETHICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {209-232}, keywords = {ethics, freedom}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Pirrucello1997, author = {Pirrucello, Ann}, title = {"Gravity" in the Thought of Simone Weil}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {73-93}, keywords = {gravity, model, science}, abstract = {Simone Weil's concept of gravity (la pesanteur) has received attention from philosophers and interested readers at least since the 1947 publication of La Pesanteur et la grace. "Gravity" is a key concept in Weil's moral and spiritual psychology, and despite the attention Weil's writings have received, there is ample need for a study that draws together Weil's scattered references to gravity and demonstrates their cohesion. This article develops a treatment of gravity that seeks to clarify one of the major scientific analogies Weil uses to develop her notion of moral gravity. It is hoped that this approach will furnish a point of departure for interpreting Weil's obscure and often fragmentary remarks on gravity. In addition, something important can be said about both the difficulties and the promise of Weil's analogy, and this article offers a few critical comments towards that end.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PITSON1984, author = {PITSON, A-E}, title = {BASIC SEEING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {121-130}, keywords = {epistemology, perception}, abstract = {I ARGUE IN SUPPORT OF THE VIEW THAT THE ABILITY TO DISCRIMINATE OR DIFFERENTIATE WHAT IS SEEN IS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR SEEING. I THEN TAKE ISSUE WITH THOSE PHILOSOPHERS WHO--LIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, DRETSKE AND SOLTIS--ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE THIS CONDITION WITH THE NOTION THAT THERE IS A SENSE OF 'SEEING' WHICH IS BASIC OR SIMPLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Pitt2004, author = {Pitt, David}, title = {The Phenomenology of Cognition Or What Is It Like to Think That P?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(1)}, pages = {1-36}, keywords = {cognition, externalism, intentionality, metaphysics, phenomenology}, abstract = {A number of philosophers endorse, without argument, the view that there's something it's like consciously to think that p, which is distinct from what it's like consciously to think that q. This thesis, if true, would have important consequences for philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I offer two arguments for it. The first argument claims it would be impossible introspectively to distinguish conscious thoughts with respect to their content if there weren't something it's like to think them. This argument is defended against several objections. The second argument uses what I call "minimal pair" experiences--sentences read without and with understanding--to induce in the reader an experience of the kind I claim exists. Further objections are considered and rebutted.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PLANTINGA1991, author = {PLANTINGA, Alvin}, title = {Ad Walls.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {axiology, freedom, god, libertarianism, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Plantinga2004, author = {Plantinga, Alvin}, title = {Evolution, Epiphenomenalism, Reductionism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {602-619}, keywords = {epiphenomenalism, evolution, metaphysics, naturalism, reductionism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PLANTINGA1990, author = {PLANTINGA, Alvin}, title = {Justification in the 20th Century.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {duty, epistemology, internalism, justification, knowledge}, abstract = {Noting the enormous importance of justification in 20th century epistemology, I point to the bewildering variety of contemporary accounts of its nature (in Alston, Chisholm, Firth, Lehrer, Pollock, Goldman, BonJour and others). I then show how this blooming, buzzing confusion can be reduced to order and understood by tracing all of these conceptions back to their deontological roots in Descartes and Locke.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PLOCHMANN1962, author = {PLOCHMANN, GEORGE-KIMBALL}, title = {CONCEPTS AND BASES IN KORNER'S LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {111-118}, keywords = {applicability, concept, logic, proposition, rule, textual-criticism; thinking}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PLUMER1987, author = {PLUMER, GILBERT}, title = {DETECTING TEMPORALITIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {451-460}, keywords = {metaphysics, temporality}, abstract = {I ARGUE THAT PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE DETERMINATIONS, AND SIMULTANEITY AND SUCCESSION, HAVE THE SAME EMPIRICAL STATUS IN THAT THEY ARE ALL NEITHER HISTORICALLY DISCOVERABLE NOR SENSIBLE, BUT ARE DETECTABLE AND ARE DETECTABLE IN THE SAME WAY. THIS CONSTITUTES A REASON FOR DENYING THE RUSSELLIAN VIEW THAT "IN A WORLD IN WHICH THERE WAS NO EXPERIENCE THERE WOULD BE NO PAST, PRESENT, OR FUTURE, BUT THERE MIGHT WELL BE EARLIER AND LATER." THE ARGUMENT IS DEVELOPED TO FURNISH AN EXPLANATION OF HOW IN FACT AND "CONTRA" MCTAGGART WE ARE "IMMEDIATELY CERTAIN OF THE REALITY OF TIME," THE EXPLANATION BEING THAT WE DETECT TIME.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Pogge1999, author = {Pogge, Thomas-W}, title = {Take and Give}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {189-193}, keywords = {choice, consequentialism, ethics, giving}, abstract = {In Living High and Letting Die, Peter Unger supports his main claim that it is seriously wrong not to use one's nonessential wealth to prevent premature deaths, through a "principle of ethical integrity": If one may impose significant losses on others to save lives, then one ought to impose equal or lesser losses on oneself for the same purpose. Read impersonally, this principle implausibly derives an "ought" from a "may." It is better read ad hominem. If you do in fact, or are disposed to, impose losses on others to save lives and take this to be permissible, then you ought.... But this version supports Unger's main claim only for those who satisfy the antecedent and, thus, may win it few new adherents.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Pojman1992, author = {Pojman, Louis}, title = {Are Human Rights Based on Equal Human Worth?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {605-622}, keywords = {equality, human-rights; liberalism, secularism, social-philosoph}, abstract = {In this paper I examine ten arguments for equal human rights given by contemporary egalitarians: (1) The Presumption Argument; (2) The Properly Basic Belief Strategy; (3) The Existential Strategy; (4) The Libertarian Argument; (5) The Family Argument; (6) The Pragmatic Argument; (7) The Utilitarian Argument; (8) The Coherentist Argument;(9) The Rational Agency Argument; and (10) The Argument from Moral Personality. I argue that in their present form none of them is compelling and that there are reasons to give up egalitarianism altogether.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Pol1994, author = {Poland, J}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {223-226}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations}, volume = {57(1)}, year = {1994} } @article{POLIN1969, author = {POLIN, RAYMOND}, title = {THE SENSE OF THE HUMAN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {536-561}, keywords = {freedom, humanness, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{POLITZ1979, author = {POLITZ, ALFRED}, title = {ON THE ORIGIN OF SPACE PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {258-264}, keywords = {metaphysics, motion, perception, sense, space, vision}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THE ARTICLE IS TO PROVE THAT BI-FOCAL VISION IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR PERCEPTION OF THREE-DIMENSIONAL SPACE. VISION PLAYS A MAJOR ROLE IN DEPTH PERCEPTION. THE RETINA RECEIVES A TWO-DIMENSIONAL IMAGE. THE THIRD DIMENSION (DEPTH) IS MISSING. TRADITION STATES: THE IMAGES DIFFER. FROM THE DIFFERENCE THE MIND INFERS DEPTH. HOWEVER, THE THIRD DIMENSION IS NOT AN EXTENSION BUT A DEVIATION FROM THE FIRST AND SECOND. DEVIATION CANNOT BE INFERRED. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT MOTION AND TOUCH ARE THE ORIGIN. VISION LEARNS THE CUES WHICH ARE OPTICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH DEPTH. MANY ANIMALS WITH EXCELLENT DEPTH PERCEPTION HAVE THEIR EYES ON THE SIDES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{POLLARD1975, author = {POLLARD, DENIS-E-B}, title = {FICTION AND MODALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {472-483}, keywords = {epistemology, fiction, modal-logic; modality}, abstract = {THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE ARTICLE IS TO SHOW HOW THE MODAL TERMS 'NECESSARY' AND 'POSSIBLE' CAN HAVE APPLICATION TO FICTION. TO THIS END, USE IS MADE OF THE NOTION OF LOGICAL DERIVABILITY. THE MODALITIES ARE TREATED METALINGUISTICALLY SO THAT '... IS NECESSARY' AND '... IS POSSIBLE' APPEAR AS PREDICATES APPLYING TO STATEMENTS. SCIENCE FICTION PROVIDES AN EXAMPLE OF DISCOURSE IN WHICH ASSUMPTIONS NORMALLY REGARDED AS NECESSARY ARE SUSPENDED, YET REPLACED BY OTHERS CONCEPTUALLY NECESSARY TO THE STORY. THE ANALYSIS IS SHOWN TO BE RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS, WHETHER IN RELATION TO FICTION OR NON-FICTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{POLLARD1977, author = {POLLARD, D-E-B}, title = {M J SIRRIDGE, FICTION, AND TRUTH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {251-256}, keywords = {aesthetics, epistemology, fiction, literature, proposition, truth}, abstract = {THIS PAPER IS A REPLY TO MARY SIRRIDGE'S OBJECTIONS TO THE 'PROPOSITION THEORY' OF LITERARY TRUTH AND MEANING. IT IS CONTENDED THAT WHILE HER CRITICISMS HAVE SOME FORCE AGAINST CERTAIN STANDARD FORMS OF 'PROPOSITIONAL' ACCOUNT, THEY DO NOT INVALIDATE THE THEORY AS SUCH. THE DISCUSSION PROCEEDS TO THE ISSUES OF THE RELATION OF A WORK OF LITERATURE TO SOME GENERAL MORAL OR THESIS, AND SOME 'PROPOSITION THEORY' SUGGESTIONS ARE SKETCHED BY WAY OF ANALYSIS OF THIS RELATIONSHIP. SCEPTICISM IS ENTERTAINED TOWARDS THE CLAIM THAT A WORK OF LITERATURE CAN EXERCISE AN INFLUENCE TOTALLY INDEPENDENT OF ITS SOURCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Pollock1992, author = {Pollock, John}, title = {Reply to Shope's "You Know What You Falsely Believe"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {411-413}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, knowledge, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Pols1992, author = {Pols, Edward}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {723-725}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Radical Realism, Direct Knowing in Science and Philosophy}, volume = {55(3)}, year = {1992} } @article{POPLIN1969, author = {POPLIN, RICHARD}, title = {COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR DERRIDA'S PAPER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {58-65}, keywords = {french, man, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{POSTOW1989, author = {POSTOW, B-C}, title = {CRITERIA FOR THEORIES OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY: REFLECTIONS ON BRANDT'S THEORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {69-87}, keywords = {criteria, metaphysics, practical-reason; rationality}, abstract = {MY GOAL IS TO IDENTIFY AND ARTICULATE POSSIBLE CRITERIA FOR THE EVALUATION OF NORMATIVE THEORIES OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY. IN ADDITION TO NOTING THE CRITERIA USED BY RICHARD BRANDT, I IDENTIFY THE CRITERIA IMPLICIT IN VARIOUS EVALUATIONS OF HIS THEORY. AN EXAMPLE OF SUCH A CRITERION IS THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE THEORY EXPLAIN HOW RATIONAL DESIRES ARE "APPROPRIATE" TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF CERTAIN FACTS RATHER THAN MERELY "CAUSED" BY AN UNDERSTANDING OF THEM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{POSTOW1978, author = {POSTOW, B-C}, title = {ETHICAL RELATIVISM AND THE IDEAL OBSERVER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {39}, pages = {120-121}, keywords = {conflict, consistency, ethics, observer, relativism}, abstract = {I SHOW THAT RODERICK FIRTH'S IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY CONTAINS A LOOPHOLE WHICH ALLOWS CONFLICTING ETHICAL STATEMENTS TO BE TRUE. TO REMEDY THIS, I RECOMMEND THAT WE ADD TO THE LIST OF DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF AN IDEAL OBSERVER, THE REQUIREMENT THAT HE BE UNABLE TO HAVE OBLIGATION-DETERMINING REACTIONS TOWARD ACTS WHICH HE KNOWS TO BE INCOMPATIBLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{POTEAT1960, author = {POTEAT, WILLIAM-H}, title = {GOD AND THE "PRIVATE-I".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {409-416}, keywords = {behaviorism, god, language, private, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{POTTER1986, author = {POTTER, RICHARD-C}, title = {THE THEORY OF SELF-APPEARING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {615-630}, keywords = {appearance, epistemology, perception, sensation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{POWELL1988, author = {POWELL, C-THOMAS}, title = {KANT'S FOURTH PARALOGISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {389-414}, keywords = {metaphysics, paralogism}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS (1) TO EXAMINE TWO VERSIONS OF THE FOURTH PARALOGISM IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHAT KANT HIMSELF TAKES IT BE; (2) TO SUGGEST LIKELY SOURCES FOR THIS PARALOGISM; AND FINALLY, ON THE BASIS OF THIS READING, (3) TO CONSIDER IN WHAT WAY KANT'S CRITIQUE OF THE FOURTH PARALOGISM CONTRIBUTES TO THE ATTACK ON "RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{POWELL1985, author = {POWELL, CHARLES-THOMAS}, title = {KANT, ELANGUESCENCE, AND DEGREES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {199-217}, keywords = {change, degree, metaphysics, soul}, abstract = {IN "COMING INTO BEING AND PASSING AWAY: CAN THE METAPHYSICIAN HELP?", RODERICK CHISHOLM CRITICIZES WHAT HE TAKES TO BE KANT'S NOTION OF "ELANGUESCENCE." THROUGH A CLOSE READING OF THE ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION, AND BY LOCATING KANT'S DISCUSSION OF ELANGUESCENCE WITHIN HIS REFUTATION OF MOSES MENDELSSOHN'S PROOF OF THE SOUL'S IMMORTALITY, I ARGUE THAT CHISHOLM HAS MISUNDERSTOOD WHAT KANT MEANS BY "DEGREES OF REALITY"; THUS, CHISHOLM'S CRITICISMS ARE NOT CRITICISMS OF KANT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PRADO1970, author = {PRADO, C-G}, title = {A NOTE ON ARMSTRONG AND THE CYBERNETIC MODEL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {600-602}, keywords = {definition, nineteenth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PRASAD1971, author = {PRASAD, RAJENDRA}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF MOKSA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {381-393}, keywords = {ethics, indian, morality, self-realization; value}, abstract = {THIS PAPER IS AN EXERCISE IN CONCEPTUAL MAPPING OF THE LOGICAL STATUS OF THE NOTION OF MOKSA IN ANCIENT INDIAN VALUE-THEORY. ITS CONCLUSION IS THAT IT CANNOT FULFIL THE LOGICAL ROLE OF JUSTIFYING MORALITY WHICH IT IS CLAIMED TO DO. THE MOKSA-THEORY ASSUMES THAT THE SYSTEM OF MORALITY NEEDS JUSTIFICATION WHICH CAN BE OBTAINED ONLY BY GOING BEYOND MORALITY. BOTH OF THESE ASSUMPTIONS HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED. WE MAY BE ADVISED TO STOP OUR JUSTIFICATORY SEARCH WHEN WE TALK ABOUT MOKSA, SINCE IT IS THE ULTIMATE VALUE, BUT THEN WE COULD VERY WELL HAVE STOPPED AT THE STAGE OF MORALITY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PRESS1977, author = {PRESS, HOWARD}, title = {THE EXISTENTIAL BASIS OF MARXISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {331-334}, keywords = {consciousness, dialectic, economics, existentialism, necessity, object, social-philosophy; survival}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Preston1993, author = {Preston, Beth}, title = {Heidegger and Artificial Intelligence}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {43-69}, keywords = {artificial-intelligence; cognition, epistemology, knowledge, machine}, abstract = {A Heideggerian critique of AI does not show that intelligent machines are impossible, but rather that the cognitivist approach of explaining intelligent behavior exclusively in terms of internal representation and computation is misguided. Heidegger's analysis of routine activity suggests that explanation must be in terms of the complex interactions of a relatively simple creature with nonrepresented environmental structures and processes. I call this approach the interactionist alternative. Its adoption is motivated by considerations of computational complexity, and by discussion of successful AI systems which employ it. The methodological implications for further research in cognitive science are indicated.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Price1995, author = {Price, Huw}, title = {"The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics" by Philip Pettit}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {689-699}, keywords = {common, mind, psychology, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Price1996, author = {Price, Huw}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {1093-1096}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point: New Directions for the Physics of Time}, volume = {49(4)}, year = {1996} } @article{Priest2005, author = {Priest, Graham}, title = {Words without Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {686-694}, keywords = {dialetheism, epistemicism, epistemology, incredibility, vagueness}, abstract = {This article is a review of Roy Sorensen's Vagueness and Contradiction (Oxford University Press, 2001). It is a critique of a number of the themes that underlie his epistemicism about vague predicates. These include: (a) the claim that understanding a vague predicate requires a person to have false beliefs; (b) Sorensen's account of what grounds the existence of a sharp cut off in a sorites sequence; and (c) the claim that it is reasonable to suppose that classical logic applies to vague predicates.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Priest1995, author = {Priest, Graham}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {719-723}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Beyond the Limits of Thought}, volume = {58(3)}, year = {1995} } @article{Prior1996, author = {Prior, William-J and Parent, William-A}, title = {Thomson on the Moral Specification of Rights}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {837-845}, keywords = {ethics, justice, rights}, abstract = {In this paper we offer a limited defense of the "moral specification" view of rights in response to criticisms of Judith Jarvis Thomson. The moral specification view states that moral rights embody principles of justice, so their meaning is specifiable by those principles. Our defense is limited in that we do not attempt to demonstrate the overall superiority of this view to others, including the view currently advocated by Thomson. We only attempt to show that the advocate of moral specifications (MS) has a plausible response to two objections she raises.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Proops2005, author = {Proops, Ian}, title = {Kant's Conception of Analytic Judgment}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {588-612}, keywords = {analytic, identity, judgment, logic}, abstract = {In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant appears to characterize analytic judgments in four distinct ways: once in terms of "containment," a second time in terms of "identity," a third time in terms of the explicative-ampliative contrast, and a fourth time in terms of the notion of "cognizability in accordance with the principle of contradiction." The paper asks which, if any, of these characterizations -- or apparent characterizations -- has the best claim to be Kant's fundamental conception of analyticity in the first Critique. It argues that it is the second. The paper argues, further, that Kant's distinction is intended to apply only to judgments of subject-predicate form, and that the fourth alleged characterization is not properly speaking a characterization at all. These theses are defended in the course of a more general investigation of the distinction's meaning and tenability.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Psillos2006, author = {Psillos, Stathis}, title = {What Do Powers Do When They Are Not Manifested?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {72(1)}, pages = {137-156}, keywords = {metaphysics, modality, physics, power, properties, regress}, abstract = {In the present paper, I offer a conceptual argument against the view that all properties are pure powers. I claim that thinking of all properties as pure powers leads to a regress. The regress, I argue, can be solved only if nonpowers are admitted. The kernel of my thesis is that any attempt to answer the title question in an informative way will undermine a pure-power view of properties. In particular, I focus my critique on recent arguments in favour of pure powers by the late George Molnar and Jennifer McKitrick. The lines of defence of the friends of powers converge on what I call 'the ultimate argument for powers', viz., that current physics entails (or supports) the view that the fundamental properties (spin, mass, charge) are ungrounded powers. I take issue with this argument and make a modest suggestion: that the evidence from current physics is inconclusive.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Psillos1999, author = {Psillos, Stathis}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {495-497}, publisher = {Routledge}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth}, volume = {68(2)}, year = {1999} } @article{Pugmire1994, author = {Pugmire, David}, title = {Real Emotion}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {105-122}, keywords = {behavior, belief, emotion, epistemology, language}, abstract = {Emotions can deceive us in various ways. One of these is by being synthetic, specious tokens of emotion-types, however convincing they may seem to their hosts. Why and how can this happen? What are the conditions of the integrity of emotion? There are two answers to the motivational question, two kinds of satisfaction emotions can bring: hedonic and moral. To the dynamical question the answer seems to involve confusing the sort of outright judgment that emotions of the given type require with merely entertaining the view that such an emotion requires and then mistaking feelings typical of that emotion for the emotion itself.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PUSTILNIK1968, author = {PUSTILNIK, JACK}, title = {ART AND THE LANGUAGE OF ACTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {591-595}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PUTNAM1991, author = {PUTNAM, Hilary}, title = {Philosophical Reminiscences with Reflections on Firth's Work.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Putnam1992, author = {Putnam, Hilary}, title = {Truth, Activation Vectors and Possession Conditions for Concepts}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {431-447}, keywords = {epistemology, functionalism, reality, representation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{PUTNAM1982, author = {PUTNAM, HILARY}, title = {SEMANTICAL RULES AND MISINTERPRETATIONS: REPLY TO R M MARTIN'S "A MEMO ON METHOD".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {604-609}, keywords = {logic, rule, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Quinn2002, author = {Quinn, Philip-L}, title = {Obligation, Divine Commands and Abraham's Dilemma}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {459-466}, keywords = {divine-imperative; ethics, good, metaethics, obligation}, abstract = {This paper is devoted to a critical examination of the divine command account of obligation offered by Robert M. Adams in his Finite and Infinite Goods. First it considers questions about the way Adams formulates his account and criticizes his arguments for preferring a divine command theory of obligation to rival divine will theories. Then it discusses the inconsistency apparently created by the divine command to Abraham to kill his innocent son. Its main argument is that Adams has not shown that the Kantian resolution he favors, according to which there really is no such command, is superior to the Kierkegaard solution, according to which it is not wrong for Abraham to kill his son.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{QUINN1990, author = {QUINN, Philip-L}, title = {The Recent Revival of Divine Command Ethics.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {commandment, divine-imperative; ethics, god, religion}, abstract = {This paper begins with a review of recent philosophical work on divine command ethics. Its central sections set forth two arguments for the divine command conception of morality. Following a tradition of medieval commentary, I try to show that a divine command theory best explains the scriptural cases of the immoralities of the patriarchs. I go on to argue that such a theory is a consequence of a strong version of the doctrine of divine sovereignty.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Quinn1996, author = {Quinn, Philip-L}, title = {Some Puzzles about Moser's Conditional Ontological Agnosticism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {387-393}, keywords = {epistemology, language, objectivity, puzzle}, abstract = {In this contribution to a symposium on Paul Moser's book, Philosophy after Objectivity, I raise three questions about his doctrine of conditional ontological agnosticism (COA). What precisely does COA assert? What arguments does Moser use to support COA? And what work does COA do in Moser's larger enterprise? I argue that the answers to these questions that can be found in the book all give rise to fairly serious philosophical problems.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{QUINN1968, author = {QUINN, WARREN-S}, title = {PLEASURE-DISPOSITION OR EPISODE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {578-586}, keywords = {epistemology, pleasure}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RABB1975, author = {RABB, J-DOUGLAS}, title = {PROLEGOMENON TO A PHENOMENOLOGY OF IMAGINATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {74-81}, keywords = {consciousness, imagination, intentionality, metaphysics, phenomenology}, abstract = {A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ACCOUNTS OF IMAGINATION FOUND IN J P SARTRE, "L'IMAGINAIRE" AND F COWLEY, "A CRITIQUE OF BRITISH EMPIRICISM" IS PRESENTED AND A SOLUTION TO SOME OF THE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES SUGGESTED. THE ADVERBIAL ANALYSIS OF IMAGERY IS SHOWN TO ILLUMINATE THE CONCEPTS OF REFLEXIVE AWARENESS, THE ILLUSION OF IMMANENCE AND INTENTIONALITY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RABB1985, author = {RABB, J-DOUGLAS}, title = {EMPIRICISM FROM A PHENOMENOLOGICAL STANDPOINT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {243-263}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, phenomenology}, abstract = {FRASER COWLEY'S CLASSICAL STUDY, A "CRITIQUE OF BRITISH EMPIRICISM", SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED AS SIMPLY ANOTHER CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON BRITISH EMPIRICISM. IT IS IN FACT MUCH MORE THAN THAT. IT OUGHT TO BE READ AS A CONTRIBUTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY IN ITS OWN RIGHT. I SUPPORT THIS CONTENTION BY EXAMINING IN SOME DETAIL, COWLEY'S NOTION OF REFLEXIVE OR PHENOMENOLOGICAL AWARENESS, AND BY PRESENTING A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF COWLEY'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PERCEIVING CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE IMAGINING CONSCIOUSNESS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rabinowicz2003, author = {Rabinowicz, Wlodzimierz}, title = {Tropic of Value}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {389-403}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, object, proposition, trope, value}, abstract = {The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value (value for their own sake), which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz., those that concern the reducibility issue. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RADCLIFF1971, author = {RADCLIFF, PETER}, title = {MATSON AND HOSPERS ON FREE WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {32}, pages = {250-258}, keywords = {ethics, libertarianism, responsibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Radcliffe1997, author = {Radcliffe, Dana}, title = {Scott-Kakures on Believing at Will}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {145-151}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, metaphysics, will}, abstract = {Many philosophers hold that it is conceptually impossible to form a belief simply by willing it. Noting the failure of previous attempts to locate the presumed incoherence, Dion Scott-Kakures offers a version of the general line that voluntary believing is conceptually impossible because it could not qualify as a basic intentional action. This discussion analyzes his central argument, explaining how it turns on the assumption that a prospective voluntary believer must regard the desired belief as not justified, given her other beliefs. It then shows that this assumption is false and also that some initially plausible suggestions for weakening the assumption fail to secure Scott-Kakures's conclusion.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Radden1994, author = {Radden, Jennifer}, title = {Second Thoughts: Revoking Decisions Over One's Own Future}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {787-801}, keywords = {causation, experience, future, metaphysics, self}, abstract = {We are invited by a standard alignment; advance directives are morally binding while traditional identity notions prevail, not when we adopt a Parfitian metaphysics. But exotic metaphysics aside, there are more reasons to question the authority of advance directives than are customarily recognized. Overemphasis on a central expression of autonomy (our ability to plan for the future and adhere to that plan) and on easy cases, have led theorists to neglect an equally central expression of autonomy in our ability to change our minds. The tension between these aspects of autonomy is regularly and vividly illustrated where marginally competent mental patients struggle to revoke earlier decisions.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Radden1996, author = {Radden, Jennifer}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {492-495}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Divided Minds and Successive Selves: Ethical Issues in Disorders of Identity and Personality}, volume = {60(2)}, year = {1996} } @article{RAFF1966, author = {RAFF, CHARLES}, title = {INTROSPECTION AND INCORRIGIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {69-73}, keywords = {contingency, epistemology, incorrigibility, introspection, mental-states; necessity, truth}, abstract = {IN HIS RECENT ARTICLE, "IS INTROSPECTION INCORRIGIBLE," D M ARMSTRONG PRESENTS VERSIONS OF FOUR CURRENT ARGUMENTS DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT A PERSON'S INTROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS CURRENT MENTAL STATE IS NOT INCORRIGIBLE. EACH ARGUMENT IS SHOWN TO BE UNSOUND. TO EVALUATE ARMSTRONG'S ARGUMENTS, THREE DIFFERENT TECHNICAL SENSES OF "INCORRIGIBLE" ARE DISTINGUISHED. ONE OF ARMSTRONG'S ARGUMENTS IS AN ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT, IF INTROSPECTION IS INCORRIGIBLE, THEN IT IS MEANINGLESS TO SPEAK OF AWARENESS OF ONE'S OWN CURRENT MENTAL STATE. IN THIS ARGUMENT ARMSTRONG EMPLOYS A "CONTRAST PRINCIPLE" OF MEANINGFULNESS WHICH HAS THE UNWANTED CONSEQUENCE THAT MANY SENTENCES WHICH EXPRESS NECESSARY TRUTHS TURN OUT TO BE MEANINGLESS. IN ANOTHER OF HIS ARGUMENTS, ARMSTRONG APPEALS TO AN ONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE: IF INDIVIDUALS "A" AND "B" ARE NON-IDENTICAL, THEN IT IS POSSIBLE THAT "A" EXISTS AND "B" DOES NOT EXIST. THIS PRINCIPLE IS SHOWN TO BE UNACCEPTABLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Raffman2005, author = {Raffman, Diana}, title = {Some Thoughts about Thinking about Consciousness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {163-170}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Raffman1993, author = {Raffman, Diana}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {734-737}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Language, Music, and Mind}, volume = {55(3)}, year = {1993} } @article{Railton1998, author = {Railton, Peter}, title = {Moral Explanation and Moral Objectivity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {175-182}, keywords = {ethics, explanation, moral-theory; objectivity, scepticism}, abstract = {What is the real issue at stake in discussions of "moral explanation"? There isn't one; there are many. The standing of purported moral properties and problems about our epistemic or semantic access to them are of concern both from within and without moral practice. An account of their potential contribution to explaining our values, beliefs, conduct, practices, etc. can help in these respects. By examining some claims made about moral explanation in Judith Thompson's and Gilbert Harman's Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, I try to suggest a worthwhile account of this potential explanatory contribution.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Railton1992, author = {Railton, Peter-A}, title = {Nonfactualism about Normative Discourse}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {961-968}, keywords = {ethics, fact, normative}, abstract = {Nonfactualism--the model here is Allan Gibbard's highly insightful "Wise Choice, Apt Feelings"-- is a very dramatic philosophical response to normative discourse. It requires a nonstandard semantic theory that nonetheless mimics, and dovetails with, standard assertoric semantics. Moreover, it yields a dualism about concepts with explanatory as well as normative uses--e.g., "reason for action", "meaning", "good", and many others (if one assumes meaning holism, language is pervaded with normativity). Gibbard's account may be unable to yield the fact/value distinction he seeks, which is meant to be term-by-term, conservative of the "Galilean core", and itself factual.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rainbolt1993, author = {Rainbolt, George-W}, title = {Rights as Normative Constraints on Others}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {93-111}, keywords = {epistemology, language, rights, semantics}, abstract = {The article sketches a new theory of what it is to have a right. Because rights are normative constraints on others, one has a right if and only if one has an Hohfeldian claim or an Hohfeldian immunity. Liberty rights and power rights are packages of Hohfeldian relations which are rights because they contain a claim. This claim protects the relation after which the right is named. There are similar packages of relations corresponding to the rest of the Hohfeldian relations, i.e., there are duty rights, disability rights, liability rights and no-claim rights.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RAMSLAND1987, author = {RAMSLAND, KATHERINE}, title = {GRICE AND KIERKEGAARD: IMPLICATION AND COMMUNICATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {327-334}, keywords = {communication, implication, language}, abstract = {KIERKEGAARD'S NOTION OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION IS OFTEN MISTAKENLY UNDERSTOOD AS IMPLICIT EXPRESSION, USUALLY SOMETHING LIKE WHAT H P GRICE CHARACTERIZED IN HIS ESSAY ON THE CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION. THE TWO IDEAS ARE QUITE DISTINCT AND THIS ESSAY INTENDS TO SHOW THAT "GRICEAN IMPLICATURE" TOUCHES ON, BUT IN NO WAY PORTRAYS, WHAT KIERKEGAARD MEANT BY INDIRECT COMMUNICATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RANDALL-JR1966, author = {RANDALL-JR, JOHN-HERMAN}, title = {IDEALISTIC SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND BERNARD BOSANQUET.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {473-502}, keywords = {collectivism, freedom, idealism, individual, reason, regulation, self-realization; social-philosophy; state}, abstract = {THE THOUGHT OF GREEN (AS A CRITIC OF UTILITARIANISM), BRADLEY (WITH HIS SOCIALIZED CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM), AND BOSANQUET (WITH TRUTH BEING FOUND IN THE SOCIAL WHOLE) ARE EXPLORED. IT IS ARGUED THAT GENERALLY, THE MORAL IDEAL IS SELF-REALIZATION, AND THAT IDEALISM STRESSED THE RELATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. THE ARTICLE ENDS BY ELUCIDATING BOSANQUET'S EMPHASIS ON--THE APPLICATION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO STATE COERCION OR THE GENERAL WILL, AND THE VALUE OF THE STATE TO ITS MEMBERS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RANDALL-JR1963, author = {RANDALL-JR, JOHN-HERMAN}, title = {ARTHUR O LOVEJOY AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {475-479}, keywords = {evolution, history, idea, literature, method, philosophy}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RANKEN1967, author = {RANKEN, NANI-L}, title = {A NOTE ON PAST AND FUTURE FUTURES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {615-617}, keywords = {epistemology, future, induction}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RANKEN1967a, author = {RANKEN, NANI-L}, title = {A NOTE ON DUCASSE'S PERCEIVABLE CAUSATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {269-270}, keywords = {causation, epistemology, perception}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RANKIN1966, author = {RANKIN, K-W}, title = {EXISTENCE AND TIME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {199-215}, keywords = {existence, metaphysics, time}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RANSDELL1978, author = {RANSDELL, JOSEPH}, title = {A MISUNDERSTANDING OF PEIRCE'S PHENOMENOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {550-553}, keywords = {description, epistemology, given, inference, perception, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RAVAL1972, author = {RAVAL, R-K}, title = {AN ESSAY ON 'PHENOMENOLOGY'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {216-226}, keywords = {epistemology, phenomenology}, abstract = {PRIMARILY BEING THE WAY CONSCIOUSNESS SELECTS AND STUDIES OBJECTS, PHENOMENOLOGY SUBJECTS TO ITS SCRUTINY BOTH, THE WORLD OF OBJECTS AND THE MODES OF CONSCIOUSNESS. FROM BRENTANO WITH WHOM IT BECOMES AN 'INTERNAL INEXISTENCE', TO MEINONG FOR WHOM ANYTHING INTENDED IS AN OBJECT, IT CULMINATES IN HUSSERL IN A TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY STUDYING BOTH THE MEANING SIDE (THE NOETIC) AND THE MEANT SIDE (THE NOEMETIC). HUSSERL PROCEEDS STAGE-WISE, FROM A NATURAL STANDPOINT VIEW OF THE WORLD TO ITS TRANSCENDENTAL APPERCEPTION VIA THE WAY OF EIDETIC REDUCTION DEMANDING RADICAL SHIFTS BOTH IN STANCES AND MODES ADOPTED BY THE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE MULTIFARIOUS VIEWS AND ANGLES EXPOSED BY THE OBJECT. LIKE PURE MATHEMATICS, PURE PHENOMENOLOGY, FIRST PRECEDES AND THEN PROCEEDS TO CONFER AN ESSENCE, A MEANING ON TO AN OBJECT NOW ENVELOPED BY AND REDUCED TO A TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVITY. CORROBORATIONAL EVIDENCES OF OTHERS LEAD TO A TRANSCENDENTAL INTER-SUBJECTIVITY. FINAL EPOCHE IS THUS ACHIEVED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RAVAL1980, author = {RAVAL, SURESH}, title = {RATIONAL INQUIRY IN LITERARY CRITICISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {354-378}, keywords = {aesthetics, conceptual-scheme; literary-criticism; poetry, rationality, science, scientific-metho}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RAWLS1991, author = {RAWLS, John}, title = {Roderick Firth: His Life and Work.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {biography, epistemology, twentieth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Rawls1999, author = {Rawls, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {241-243}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Law of Peoples: With "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited"}, volume = {64(1)}, year = {1999} } @other{Raz1999, author = {Raz, Joseph}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {745-748}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action}, volume = {66(3)}, year = {1999} } @article{Rea2002, author = {Rea, Michael-C}, title = {Lynne Baker on Material Constitution}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {607-614}, keywords = {body, constitution, metaphysics}, abstract = {This paper is part of a symposium on Lynne Baker's Persons and Bodies. It focuses on several problems with her account of material constitution.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rea1998, author = {Rea, Michael-C}, title = {In Defense of Mereological Universalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {347-360}, keywords = {existence, mereology, metaphysics, universalism}, abstract = {This paper defends Mereological Universalism (the thesis that, for any set S of disjoint objects, there is an object that the members of S compose. Universalism is unpalatable to many philosophers because it entails that if there are such things as my left tennis shoe, W. V. Quine, and the Taj Mahal, then there is another object that those three things compose. This paper presents and criticizes Peter van Inwagen's argument against universalism and then presents a new argument in favor of Universalism. It turns out that the most reasonable way to resist the argument for Universalism is to deny the existence of artifacts; thus, if we believe in artifacts, we have no real choice other than to embrace Universalism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Rea2002a, author = {Rea, Michael-C}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {494-497}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {World without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism}, volume = {71(2)}, year = {2002} } @article{Rea2000, author = {Rea, Michael-C and Silver, David}, title = {Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {185-193}, keywords = {belief, continuity, metaphysics, personal-identit}, abstract = {In a recent article, Trenton Merricks argues that psychological continuity analyses (PC-analyses) of personal identity over time are incompatible with endurantism. We contend that if Merricks's argument is valid, a parallel argument establishes that PC-analyses of personal identity are incompatible with perdurantism; hence, the correct conclusion to draw is simply that such analyses are all necessarily false. However, we also show that there is good reason to doubt that Merricks's argument is valid.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Recanati2000, author = {Recanati, Francois}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {481-488}, publisher = {MIT Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta: An Essay on Metarepresentation}, volume = {66(2)}, year = {2000} } @other{Recanati1993, author = {Recanati, Francois}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {953-956}, publisher = {Blackwell}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Direct Reference}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1993} } @article{REDMON1975, author = {REDMON, ROBERT}, title = {A NOTE ON NOMINALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {122-124}, keywords = {knowledge, language, nominalism, statement}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{REDMON1978, author = {REDMON, ROBERT}, title = {NAMES AND EXISTENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {524-530}, keywords = {causality, existence, identity, metaphysics, name, reference, statement}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Reed2005, author = {Reed, Baron}, title = {Accidentally Factive Mental States}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {134-142}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, knowledge, mental-states; truth}, abstract = {Knowledge is standardly taken to be belief that is both true and justified (and perhaps meets other conditions as well). Timothy Williamson rejects the standard epistemology for its inability to solve the Gettier problem. The moral of this failure, he argues, is that knowledge does not factor into a combination that includes a mental state (belief) and an external condition (truth), but is itself a type of mental state. Knowledge is, according to his preferred account, the most general factive mental state. I argue, however, that Gettier cases pose a serious problem for Williamson's epistemology: in these cases, the subject may have a factive mental state that fails to be cognitive. Hence, knowledge cannot be the most general factive mental state.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{REED1977, author = {REED, GRAHAM-F}, title = {THE OBSESSIONAL-COMPULSIVE EXPERIENCE: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL RE-EMPHASIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {381-385}, keywords = {compulsion, metaphysics, obsession, phenomenology, psychopathology, volition}, abstract = {HISTORICALLY, ALL DEFINITIONS OF OBSESSIONAL-COMPULSIVE EXPERIENCE HAVE FOCUSSED UPON THE EGO-ALIEN INTRUSION--UNWANTED THOUGHTS OR IMPULSES WHICH INVADE THE INDIVIDUAL, WHO RESISTS THEM UNAVAILINGLY. EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON THE "INVADER" RATHER THAN ON THE VICTIM'S ATTEMPTS TO RESIST. EXCERPTS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH OBSESSIONALS SUGGEST THAT THIS EMPHASIS REFLECTS FAULTY PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS. THE ACCOUNTS REFER NOT TO THE STRENGTH OF THE OBSESSIONAL PREOCCUPATIONS OR COMPULSIVE BEHAVIORS, BUT TO THE INDIVIDUAL'S WEAKNESS OF WILL IN COUNTERING THEM. IN GENERAL, THE OBSESSIONAL SEEMS TO EXPERIENCE HIS STRUGGLES NOT AS THOUGH SOMETHING IS FORCING HIM TO CONTINUE, BUT AS THOUGH HE LACKS SOMETHING TO MAKE HIM STOP.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Reeder-Jr1996, author = {Reeder-Jr, John-P}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {545-547}, publisher = {Penn St Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Killing and Saving: Abortion, Hunger, and War}, volume = {59(2)}, year = {1996} } @article{REESE1961, author = {REESE, WILLIAM-L}, title = {THE "EXPERIMENTUM CRUCIS" IN LOCKE'S DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {490-500}, keywords = {abstraction, conceptualism, epistemology, idea, nominalism, realism, universal, word}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Reginster2004, author = {Reginster, Bernard}, title = {Self-Knowledge, Responsibility, and the Third Person}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {433-439}, keywords = {epistemology, responsibility, self-knowledg}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Reginster1997, author = {Reginster, Bernard}, title = {Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {281-305}, keywords = {ethics, integrity, self, valuation}, abstract = {The paper examines Nietzsche's claim that valuations born out of a psychological condition he calls "ressentiment" are objectionable. It argues for a philosophically sound construal of this type of criticism, according to which the criticism is directed at the agent who holds values out of ressentiment, rather than at those values themselves. After presenting an analysis of ressentiment, the paper examines its impact on valuation and concludes with an inquiry into Nietzsche's reasons for claiming that ressentiment valuation is "corrupt." Specifically, the paper proposes that ressentiment valuation involves a form of self-deception, that such self-deception is objectionable because it undermines the integrity of the self and that the lack of such integrity ensnares the agent in a peculiar kind of practical inconsistency. The paper ends with a brief review of the problems and prospects of this interpretation.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Reginster2001, author = {Reginster, Bernard}, title = {The Paradox of Perspectivism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {217-233}, keywords = {metaphysics, paradox, perspectivism, self-referenc}, abstract = {In this review essay, I discuss some recent work on Nietzsche's epistemology and metaphysics. I focus on the paradox of perspectivism, or the view that perspectivism is a self-referentially inconsistent view. I consider two solutions to this paradox proposed or revived in two recent works. According to the two-level solution (introduced by Richardson), the limitations on knowledge-claims implied by perspectivism somehow do not apply to perspectivism itself. According to the perspectivist solution (discussed by Poellner), Nietzsche avoids the paradox by admitting the perspectivist limitations of his perspectivism itself. I discuss the merits and problems of both interpretations.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Reimer1992, author = {Reimer, Marga}, title = {Demonstrating with Descriptions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {877-893}, keywords = {communication, demonstration, description, language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RESCHER1990, author = {RESCHER, Nicholas}, title = {How Wide Is the Gap Between Facts and Values?.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {axiology, fact, justification, value-theor}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rescher1999, author = {Rescher, Nicholas}, title = {How Many Possible Worlds Are There?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {403-420}, keywords = {epistemology, metaphysics, possible-world; truth}, abstract = {In recent years possible worlds and individuals have been in philosophical vogue, playing an important role in logical semantics, analytic metaphysics, linguistic theory, and elsewhere. In the enthusiasm over this much-promising device people have lost sight of the fact that the actual identification and introduction of such possibilia is effectively impossible. For the prospect of ostensive confrontation is here lost, and the purely descriptive individuation of nonexistent individuals is an altogether impracticable project. The very most we can accomplish here is to deal with schemata and scenarios--items whose element of generality is always present. We can indeed meaningfully operate a possibilism that is proportionately oriented (de dicto), but cannot succeed with one that is substantively oriented (de re).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rescher1994, author = {Rescher, Nicholas}, title = {Precis of "A System of Pragmatic Idealism"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {377-390}, keywords = {epistemology, idealism, knowledge, pragmatism, reality, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rescher1994a, author = {Rescher, Nicholas}, title = {Replies to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {441-457}, keywords = {epistemology, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RESCHER1961, author = {RESCHER, NICHOLAS}, title = {ON THE LOGIC OF PRESUPPOSITION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {521-527}, keywords = {inference, logic, presupposition, property, proposition, typology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rescher2005, author = {Rescher, Nicholas}, title = {The Fallacy of Respect Neglect}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {392-398}, keywords = {amalgamation, analogy, neglect, respect, science, simplicity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RESNICK1972, author = {RESNICK, LAWRENCE}, title = {LANGUAGE, CONCEPTS, AND NONSENSE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {192-198}, keywords = {concept, epistemology, thinking}, abstract = {H H PRICE HOLDS THAT WE THINK BY MEANS OF CONCEPTS. THE CONCEPT OF DODECAHEDRON, FOR EXAMPLE, ALLOWS US TO BELIEVE THAT DODECAHEDRONS ARE MADE OF WOOD, FORCES US TO BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE THREE-DIMENSIONAL, AND PREVENTS US FROM BELIEVING THAT THEY ARE EXTINCT REPTILES. I ARGUE FIRST THAT THIS IS JUST AS NONSENSICAL AS THE CLAIM THAT BACHELORHOOD ALLOWS BACHELORS TO BE SHORT, FORCES THEM TO BE MEN AND PREVENTS THEM FROM BEING MARRIED. THE ANALYTIC PRINCIPLE FROM WHICH THIS PARALLEL MAY BE DRAWN IS THAT SINCE THE CRITERION FOR SAYING THAT SOMEONE CAN THINK SENSIBLY ABOUT DODECAHEDRONS IS ALSO THE CRITERION FOR SAYING THAT HE HAS THE CONCEPT, THERE ARE NOT TWO STATES OR CIRCUMSTANCES HERE, BUT ONLY ONE. THEN, AFTER DRAWING A PARALLEL WITH THE MOLECULAR THEORY OF HEAT, I REJECT THE ANALYTIC PRINCIPLE AS SIMPLISTIC AND INAPPLICABLE. PRICE'S CLAIM IS NOT NONSENSE AFTER ALL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RESNIK1974, author = {RESNIK, MICHAEL-DAVID}, title = {THE FREGE-HILBERT CONTROVERSY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {34}, pages = {386-403}, keywords = {axiom, concept, geometry, logic, proof}, abstract = {THIS PAPER EXAMINES FREGE'S CRITIQUE OF HILBERT'S EARLY VIEWS ON THE AXIOMATIC METHOD AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS. IT DISCUSSES SUCH TOPICS AS 'IMPLICIT DEFINITIONS', CONSISTENCY AND INDEPENDENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RESNIK1967, author = {RESNIK, MICHAEL-DAVID}, title = {THE CONTEXT PRINCIPLE IN FREGE'S PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {356-365}, keywords = {epistemology, meaning}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rey1993, author = {Rey, Georges}, title = {Idealized Conceptual Roles}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {647-652}, keywords = {atomism, epistemology, holism, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rey2001, author = {Rey, Georges}, title = {Digging Deeper for the A Priori}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {649-656}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology, knowledge, universal}, abstract = {For all the inadequacies of empiricism that BonJour admirably sets out in his first three chapters, one wonders whether rationalism is any better off. I'm afraid I don't find BonJour's account reassuring. It seems to be precisely the one that has led so many to be wary of the a priori in the first place. I want here to reiterate the reasons for that wariness, and sketch what seems to me a more promising approach.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rey1996, author = {Rey, Georges}, title = {Resisting Primitive Compulsions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {419-424}, keywords = {concept, conditionality, epistemology, form}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Reynolds1998, author = {Reynolds, Steven-L}, title = {Evaluational Illusions and Skeptical Arguments}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {529-558}, keywords = {argument, cartesianism, explanation, metaphysics, scepticism, world}, abstract = {A traditional diagnosis of the error in the Cartesian skeptical arguments holds that they exploit our tendencies to take a representationalist view of perception. Thinking (perhaps not too clearly) that we perceive only our own sensory states, it seems to us that our perceptual beliefs about physical objects must be justified qua explanations of those sensory states. Such justification requires us to have reasons to reject rival explanations, such as the skeptical hypotheses, which we lack. However, those who adopt the direct realist view of perception still find these arguments plausible, although, according to this diagnosis, they shouldn't. To avoid this objection, I argue that the Cartesian skeptical arguments exploit, not our representational tendencies, but our habits for evaluating causal explanatory justifications.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RICHARDS1969, author = {RICHARDS, B.A}, title = {INALIENABLE RIGHTS: RECENT CRITICISM AND OLD DOCTRINE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {391-404}, keywords = {political-philosophy; right}, abstract = {RECENT CRITICISM OF INALIENABLE-RIGHTS DOCTRINE IS SHOWN TO BE BASED UPON THE ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION THAT, IN CALLING CERTAIN RIGHTS INALIENABLE, EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CONSTITUTION-WRITERS IMPLIED THAT THEY ARE UNCONDITIONAL. S.M. BROWN, JR., D.G. RITCHIE, AND E.F. CARRITT ALL REJECT THE DOCTRINE BECAUSE THE EXERCISE OR ENJOYMENT OF THESE RIGHTS CAN SOMETIMES BE JUSTIFIABLY DENIED. PROVISIONS OF BILLS OF RIGHTS AND OTHER WRITINGS ARE CITED TO ESTABLISH THAT THEIR AUTHORS DID NOT CONSIDER THESE RIGHTS UNLIMITED. WHAT THEY MEANT IN DECLARING THEM INALIENABLE IS THAT NO MAN CAN VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISH THEM. CONSEQUENTLY, THE DISTINCTION FRANKENA PROPOSES IS NOT NEEDED TO SAVE TRADITIONAL THEORY FROM THE ADVERSE VERDICT OF ITS CRITICS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RICHARDS1976, author = {RICHARDS, ROBERT-J}, title = {JAMES GIBSON'S PASSIVE THEORY OF PERCEPTION: A REJECTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIFIC NERVE ENERGIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {218-233}, keywords = {epistemology, nerve, perception, sensation}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE BRIEFLY SKETCHES JOHANNES MULLER'S DOCTRINE OF SPECIFIC NERVE ENERGIES AND THEN INVESTIGATES JAMES GIBSON'S OPPOSING IMAGE OF PERCEPTION. THE EXAMINATION REVEALS GIBSON'S PASSIVE THEORY OF PERCEPTION TO BE UNWARRANTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND LOGICALLY DEFECTIVE IN ITS FORMULATIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Richardson1998, author = {Richardson, Alan-W}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {717-720}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Carnap's Construction of the World: The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1998} } @article{Richardson1994, author = {Richardson, Henry}, title = {Rescuing Ethical Theory}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {703-708}, keywords = {common-sense; ethics, morality, virtue}, abstract = {Part of a symposium on Michael Slote's "From Morality to Virtue", this piece raises questions about Slote's intriguing positive proposal to avoid the asymmetries and paradoxes confronting standard ethical theories by developing a theory in which "admirable," rather than "good" or "right," was the primitive notion. But admirability will not serve as a useful fulcrum for systematizing theory, as it is too loosely connected to action. In addition, the content of admirability contrasts with that of ethics in important instances.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Richardson2005, author = {Richardson, Henry-S}, title = {Precis of Democratic Autonomy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {187-195}, keywords = {autonomy, decision-making; democracy, government, policy, political-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Richardson2005a, author = {Richardson, Henry-S}, title = {Response to Pettit, Estlund, and Christiano}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {218-230}, keywords = {autonomy, democracy, political-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Richardson2002, author = {Richardson, John}, title = {Nietzsche Contra Darwin}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {537-575}, keywords = {metaphysics, teleology, willpower}, abstract = {This paper argues that we find a stronger reading of will to power--both more plausible and more consistent with Nietzsche's other views--by developing his affinities with Darwinism. By seeing will to power as an 'internal revision' to Darwinism, opposing the latter's stress (as Nietzsche thinks) on 'survival', but assenting to its uses of natural selection, we can ground or naturalize that notion, congenially to Nietzsche and to us. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rickless2004, author = {Rickless, Samuel-C}, title = {From the Good Will to the Formula of Universal Law}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {554-577}, keywords = {categorical-imperative; ethics, goodwill, law, maxim}, abstract = {In the First Section of the Groundwork, Kant argues that a good-willed person "under subjective limitations and hindrances" is required "never to act except in such a way that (she) could also will that (her) maxim should become a universal law." Call this argument "K". Although recent commentators (including Barbara Herman, Christine Korsgaard, Nelson Potter, and Allen Wood) have done much to clarify and defend many of the important claims Kant makes in the First Section, they have accurately identified neither K's premises nor the reasoning by means of which K's conclusion is derived. The result of this is that K's strengths are underappreciated. My aim is to rectify this state of affairs, by providing a detailed reconstruction of K, and thereby bring out the various ways in which the argument deserves our recognition and praise.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ridge2005, author = {Ridge, Michael}, title = {Universalizability for Collective Rational Agents: A Critique of Agent-Relativism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(1)}, pages = {34-66}, keywords = {agent, ethics, relativism, universalizability}, abstract = {This paper contends that a Kantian universalizability constraint on theories of practical reason in conjunction with the possibility of collective rational agents entails the surprisingly strong conclusion that no fully agent-relative theory of practical reason can be sound. The basic point is that a Kantian universalizability constraint, the thesis that all reasons for action are agent-relative and the possibility of collective rational agents gives rise to a contradiction. This contradiction can be avoided by either rejecting Kantian universalizability, the possibility of collective rational agents, or the tenability of a fully agent-relative theory of practical reason; we cannot have all three.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rieber1998, author = {Rieber, Steven}, title = {The Concept of Personal Identity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {581-594}, keywords = {existence, metaphysics, personal-identity; self}, abstract = {Theories of personal identity try to explain what the identity of a person necessarily consists in, but frequently leave open what kind of necessity is at issue. This paper is concerned with conceptual necessity. It proposes an analysis of the concept of personal identity in terms of a definite description. The analysis coheres without judgments about clear cases and explains why cases of division seem indeterminate. The apparent indeterminacy results from attempting to apply a definite description to a situation in which more than one object would satisfy the description. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RIEPE1966, author = {RIEPE, DALE}, title = {THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ATTACK UPON RATIONALITY BY ZEN BUDDHISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {434-437}, keywords = {doubt, mysticism, rationality, religion, unity, zen-buddhis}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RIEPE1968, author = {RIEPE, DALE}, title = {A NOTE ON WILLIAM JAMES AND INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {587-590}, keywords = {indian, nineteenth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RIEPE1961, author = {RIEPE, DALE}, title = {AN INTRODUCTION TO NISHIDA'S PURE RADICAL EMPIRICISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {479-489}, keywords = {contradiction, empiricism, epistemology, japanese, metaphysics, truth, twentieth, value, verification}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Riggs2002, author = {Riggs, Wayne-D}, title = {Reliability and the Value of Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {79-96}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, knowledge, reliabilism, value}, abstract = {Reliabilism has come under recent attack for its inability to account for the value typically ascribed to knowledge. It is charged that being reliably-produced provides no additional value to true belief. I argue that being reliably-produced does add value of a sort to true beliefs. The added value stems from the fact that a reliably-held belief is nonaccidental in a particular way. While it is widely acknowledged that accidentally true beliefs cannot count as knowledge, it is rarely questioned why this should be so. An answer to this question emerges from the discussion of the value of reliability.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RINALDI1967, author = {RINALDI, F}, title = {LOGICAL POSSIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {81-99}, keywords = {logic, possibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Risjord2000, author = {Risjord, Mark-W}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {230-233}, publisher = {SUNY Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Woodcutters and Witchcraft: Rationality and Interpretive Change in the Social Sciences}, volume = {67(1)}, year = {2000} } @article{ROBERTS1968, author = {ROBERTS, GEORGE-W}, title = {A PROBLEM IN WHITEHEAD'S DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACTIVE HIERARCHIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {437-439}, keywords = {metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROBERTS1985, author = {ROBERTS, JOY-H}, title = {ON RUSSELL'S REJECTION OF AKOLUTHIC SENSATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {595-600}, keywords = {awareness, metaphysics, time}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Roberts1999, author = {Roberts, Robert-C}, title = {Emotions As Judgments}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {793-798}, keywords = {emotion, epistemology, judgment}, abstract = {The thesis that emotions are judgments is vulnerable to two objections. (1) The propositional content of some full-fledged emotions is not assented to by the subject of the emotion. (2) The very same judgment that is supposedly identical with an emotion can be made in the absence of the emotion. A concept of judgment is delineated, some attractions of the judgment theory are canvassed, and Professor Nussbaum's responses to (1) and (2), in The Therapy of Desire, are considered. It is argued that emotions are better taken to be something like Stoic phantasiai, than judgments.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROBERTS1984, author = {ROBERTS, ROBERT-C}, title = {SOLOMON ON THE CONTROL OF EMOTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {395-404}, keywords = {control-theory; emotion, judgment, metaphysics}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR EXAMINES SOLOMON'S THESES 1) THAT EMOTIONS ARE "CONSTITUTIVE" JUDGMENTS, 2) THAT THEY ARE ACTS WE PERFORM, AND 3) THAT THEY ARE NOT EVENTS THAT HAPPEN TO US. THE AUTHOR ARGUES AGAINST 1) AND 3), AND QUALIFIES 2). THE AUTHOR CLAIMS THAT THE THESIS THAT EMOTIONS ARE ACTS/EVENTS IN CONSCIOUSNESS THAT THE AUTHOR CALLS "CONSTRUALS" (CLOSELY RELATED TO ACTS OF IMAGINATION) PRESERVES THE SPIRIT OF SOLOMON'S THEORY WHILE AVOIDING ITS PROBLEMS, AND BEST EXPLAINS THE AMOUNT AND KINDS OF CONTROL THAT WE HAVE OVER OUR EMOTIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROBERTS1991, author = {ROBERTS, Robert-C}, title = {Virtues and Rules.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {ethics, grammar, moral, rule, virtue}, abstract = {An ethics of virtue is sometimes regarded as opposed to an ethics of rules. This paper argues that, with an appropriate revision in our concept of a moral rule, an ethics of virtue is necessarily an ethics of rules. The concept of the grammar of a virtue is commended, as a way of thinking of the rules that govern virtues. Such rules are capable of reflecting differences between moral traditions (e.g., the differences between Christian and Aristotelian generosity), and capturing the motivational and emotive requirements for virtues, as well as the actions characteristic of them.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROBINSON1963, author = {ROBINSON, DANIEL-S}, title = {MR ARMSTRONG ON PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {433-436}, keywords = {cognition, common-sense; definition, philosophy, scottish, textual-criticis}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Robinson2005, author = {Robinson, William-S}, title = {Thoughts without Distinctive Non-Imagistic Phenomenology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {534-561}, keywords = {image, metaphysics, phenomenology, propositional-attitudes; theory, thinking}, abstract = {Silent thinking is often accompanied by subvocal sayings to ourselves, imagery, emotional feelings, and nonsensory experiences such as familiarity, rightness, and confidence that we can go on in certain ways. Phenomenological materials of these kinds, along with our dispositions to give explanations or draw inferences, provide resources that are sufficient to account for our knowledge of what we think, desire, and so on. We do not need to suppose that there is a distinctive, nonimagistic, 'what it is like' to think that p, and a different nonimagistic 'what it is like' to think that q. Nor need we suppose that there is a proprietary 'what it is like' to have one propositional attitude type rather than another.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rodriguez-Pereyra1999, author = {Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo}, title = {Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {965-982}, keywords = {community, epistemology, nominalism}, abstract = {The object of this paper is to provide a solution to Nelson Goodman's Imperfect Community Difficulty as it arises for Resemblance Nominalism, the view that properties are classes of resembling particulars. The imperfect community difficulty consists in that every two members of a class resembling each other is not sufficient for it to be a class such that there is some property common to all their members, even if 'x resembles y' is understood as 'x and y share some property'. In the paper I explain and criticize several solutions to the difficulty. Then I develop my own solution, which is not subject to the objections I make to the other solutions, and which accords completely with the basic tenets of resemblance nominalism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Rodriguez-Pereyra2002, author = {Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {241-246}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals}, volume = {72(1)}, year = {2002} } @article{ROHATYN1983, author = {ROHATYN, DENNIS}, title = {HUME'S DIALECTICAL CONCEITS: THE CASE OF DIALOGUE XII.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {519-532}, keywords = {god, metaphysics, rhetoric}, abstract = {THREE PRINCIPAL MOTIVES GOVERN THE ESSAY: (A) THE DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND WHY HUME MAKES CERTAIN DELIBERATELY INFLAMMATORY REMARKS ABOUT THE PRIVILEGED STATUS OF PHILOSOPHERS; (B) THE DEMAND THAT WE LOOK AT THE FRIENDSHIP (OR ENMITY) BETWEEN THE CHARACTERS AS A MORE CENTRAL CONCERN THAN THE OVERT ARGUMENTATIVE CONTENT; (C) THE IMPLICATIONS OF A DRAMATISTIC METHOD FOR GRASPING WHAT HUME IS UP TO IN OTHER WORKS, MOST NOTABLY, THE CONCEALED AIM (OR PROGRAM) OF THE THOUGHT EXPERIMENT KNOWN AS SCEPTICISM. HUME'S UNDERLYING MESSAGE? TO FOUND PEACE, OR TOLERANCE, IN HUMAN RELATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS, EVEN WHILE (OR PRECISELY BY) SUBVERTING KNOWLEDGE-CLAIMS AND FORMS OF DOGMA.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROLSTON1975, author = {ROLSTON, HOLMES}, title = {SCHLICK'S RESPONSIBLE MAN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {261-267}, keywords = {ethics, responsibility}, abstract = {MORITZ SCHLICK'S CELEBRATED DISSOLUTION OF THE FREE WILL PSEUDO-PROBLEM IS FOUND TO BE INCOHERENT. IN HIS "PROBLEMS OF ETHICS", SCHLICK ANALYZES RESPONSIBILITY BOTH OBJECTIVELY AND SUBJECTIVELY AND CLAIMS THAT HIS ACCOUNTS CONFIRM EACH OTHER AND ARE TOGETHER COMPATIBLE WITH DETERMINISM. BUT THE ANALYSES ARE IN DIRECT CONFLICT. SCHLICK'S INCOHERENCE IS TO CONCLUDE THAT A COMPEL-ABILITY IS MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, WITH THE SIMULTANEOUS ADMISSION THAT WHEN CAUSALITY WORKS COMPELLINGLY "ON" US IT DOES SO WITH VIOLENCE TO THE CAUSALITY THAT WORKS FREELY "IN" US.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROMA1967, author = {ROMA, EMILIO and THOMAS, SID-B, JR}, title = {NOMINALISM AND THE DISTINGUISHABLE IS SEPARABLE PRINCIPLE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {230-234}, keywords = {individual, metaphysics, nominalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROMANELL1961, author = {ROMANELL, PATRICK}, title = {BERGSON IN MEXICO: A TRIBUTE TO JOSE VASCONCELOS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {501-513}, keywords = {antipositivism, catholicism, christianity, dualism, mexican, mysticism, twentieth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rondhuis2000, author = {Rondhuis, Hud}, title = {Universalism, Four Dimensionalism, and Vagueness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {547-560}, keywords = {epistemology, mereology, universalism, vagueness}, abstract = {Anyone who endorses universalism and four dimensionalism owes us an argument for those controversial mereological theses. One may put forth David Lewis's and Ted Sider's arguments from vagueness. However, the success of those arguments depends on the rejection of the epistemic view of vagueness, and thus, opens the door to a fatal confrontation with one particularly troubling version of The Problem of Many. The alternative for friends of universalism and four dimensionalism is to abandon those currently fashionable arguments in favor of others which are consistent with the epistemic view of vagueness and with the elegant solution it furnishes to that problem.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROQUE1991, author = {ROQUE, Alicia-Juarrero}, title = {Language Competence and Tradition-constituted Rationality.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {history, language, rationality, tradition}, abstract = {MacIntyre claims that relativism can be avoided even if inquiry is tradition-constituted if followers of one tradition can come to recognize an alien tradition as superior to their own. To do so it must be possible to "learn...the language of the alien tradition as a new and second first language." The paper argues that these two claims--that an adult can learn a second first language, and that rationality is tradition-constituted-- contradict each other.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rorty2000, author = {Rorty, Amelie-Oksenberg}, title = {Distinctive Measures of Epistemic Evaluation: Character as the Configuration of Traits}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {203-206}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, knowledge, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rorty1997, author = {Rorty, Richard}, title = {What Do You Do When They Call You a 'Relativist'}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {173-177}, keywords = {epistemology, linguistics, meaning, relativism, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rorty1994, author = {Rorty, Richard}, title = {Taylor on Self-Celebration and Gratitude}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {197-201}, keywords = {history, identity, metaphysics, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rorty1998, author = {Rorty, Richard}, title = {McDowell, Davidson, and Spontaneity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {389-394}, keywords = {metaphysics, mind, world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rorty1992, author = {Rorty, Richard}, title = {Putnam on Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {415-418}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, reality, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rorty2005, author = {Rorty, Richard}, title = {True to Life: Why Truth Matters}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {231-239}, keywords = {ethics, metaphysics, minimalism, physicalism, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROSE1965, author = {ROSE, LYNN-E}, title = {THE CARTESIAN CIRCLE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {80-89}, keywords = {certainty, circularity, clarity, distinctness, doubt, epistemology, god, idea, proof}, abstract = {THIS PAPER SUGGESTS THAT THE APPEARANCE OF CIRCULARITY IN DESCARTES' ARGUMENTS IS DUE TO A LACK OF PRECISION IN HIS STATEMENTS OF THEM, RATHER THAN TO ANY FLAW IN HIS REASONING. THE CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTIONS PRESUPPOSED IN THE DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD ARE NOT THE SAME AS THOSE WHOSE RELIABILITY DEPENDS UPON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. HE IS PRESUPPOSING THE RELIABILITY ONLY OF THOSE CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTIONS WHICH ARE KNOWN THROUGH THE LIGHT OF NATURE AND HAVE METAPHYSICAL CERTAINTY IN THAT THEY CANNOT BE IMAGINED FALSE EVEN ON THE DEMON HYPOTHESIS. AND THE ONLY CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTIONS WHOSE RELIABILITY HE IS DEMONSTRATING ARE THOSE WHICH ARE NOT KNOWN THROUGH THE LIGHT OF NATURE WITH METAPHYSICAL CERTAINTY BUT ARE SUBJECT TO METAPHYSICAL DOUBT ON THE DEMON HYPOTHESIS, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVE MORAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL CERTAINTY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROSE1965a, author = {ROSE, LYNN-E}, title = {REPLY TO MR KRETZMANN'S "ON ROSE'S 'CARTESIAN CIRCLE'".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {93}, keywords = {certainty, circularity, epistemology, god, idea, proof}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROSEN1970, author = {ROSEN, BERNARD}, title = {RULES AND JUSTIFIED MORAL JUDGMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {436-443}, keywords = {ethics, judgment, principle, rule}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rosen2001, author = {Rosen, Gideon}, title = {Brandom on Modality, Normativity and Intentionality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {611-623}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, modality, normativity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rosen2002, author = {Rosen, Gideon}, title = {Peacocke on Modality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {641-648}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, metaphysics, modality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rosen2002a, author = {Rosen, Gideon}, title = {The Case for Incompatibilism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {699-706}, keywords = {ethics, incompatibilism, morality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rosen1997, author = {Rosen, Gideon}, title = {Who Makes the Rules Around Here?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {163-171}, keywords = {intentionality, language, meaning, rule, semantics}, abstract = {In Making It Explicit, Brandom maintains that the normative is strictly prior to the intentional in the order of explanation, and also that normative facts are invariably "creatures of our practices," "imposed" by us. Brandom glosses the latter claim as the thesis that normative facts about the "normative statuses" of performances supervene on facts about our "practical attitudes" toward performances. The paper argues that this is not an adequate explication of the metaphors of "creation" and "imposition," and that any attempt to modify the account so as to sustain these metaphors involves rejecting the view that the normative is strictly prior to the intentional.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROSEN1960, author = {ROSEN, STANLEY-H}, title = {POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND EPISTEMOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {453-468}, keywords = {common-sense; empiricism, epistemology, magic, meaning, openness, political-philosophy; rationalism, society}, abstract = {IT IS ASSUMED THAT NO CRITERIA OF SIGNIFICANCE, IN THE SENSE OF A DEFINITION OR GENERALIZATION ABOUT SIGNIFICANT SENTENCES, IS POSSIBLE UNLESS WE ALREADY KNOW HOW TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SIGNIFICANT AND MEANINGLESS SENTENCES. SINCE LOGIC IS THINKING AND SPEAKING, THE ORDINARY IDIOM IS FIRST. ROSEN ATTACKS THE DOGMATISM OF LOGICAL EMPIRICISM IN ENGLISH-SPEAKING PHILOSOPHY, AND CLAIMS THAT ITS EPISTEMOLOGY COMES INTO BEING BY ASSUMING ITSELF TO BE TRUE. THE "COMMON SENSE" WORLD IS A MAGICAL NOTION; SHOULD WE WISH TO TRANSCEND THIS WORLD, OR THAT OF THE STATE, WE CAN DO SO ONLY BY ACCEPTING ANOTHER MATRIX, (OR MAGICAL CONSTRUCTION). AN ATTEMPT TO EXPUNGE MAGICAL CONSTRUCTIONS CAN ONLY RESULT IF IT IS SUCCESSFUL, IN POLITICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHAOS. AN AWARE SOCIETY IS ONE THAT OFFERS A GROUND FOR POLITICAL THINGS, NOT BY BLIND ADHERENCE TO MAGIC BUT BY THE RECOGNITION OF MAGIC. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROSENBAUM1976, author = {ROSENBAUM, STUART-E}, title = {DENOTATION AND ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {391-397}, keywords = {argumentation, denotation, logic, materialism, metaphysics}, abstract = {THIS PAPER CONTINUES THE DISCUSSION OF THE THEORY OF ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM. THE ARGUMENT OF THE PAPER IS THAT THERE IS A SIMPLE PRINCIPLE ABOUT DENOTATION--CALLED "THE PRINCIPLE OF THE USE OF INTER-DENOTING TERMS"--WHICH CAN BE SEEN TO BE CLEARLY AND NECESSARILY TRUE, AND ALSO TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE THEORY OF ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROSENBAUM1989, author = {ROSENBAUM, STEPHEN-E}, title = {THE SYMMETRY ARGUMENT: LUCRETIUS AGAINST THE FEAR OF DEATH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {353-373}, keywords = {ancient, death, fear, metaphysics}, abstract = {AN INTERPRETATION, DISCUSSION, AND DEFENSE OF THE ARGUMENT EMBODIED IN LUCRETIUS'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE SYMMETRY OF PRENATAL AND POSTHUMOUS NONEXISTENCE. THE AUTHOR INTERPRETS THE COMMENTS AS AN ARGUMENT THAT IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO FEAR DEATH, AND DEFENDS THE ARGUMENT AGAINST CONTEMPORARY CRITICISMS. THE SYMMETRY ARGUMENT IS SHOWN TO BE A UNIQUE AND IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO EPICUREAN THANATOLOGY, WHICH SHEDS LIGHT ON THE SENSE IN WHICH EPICURUS BELIEVED THAT IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO FEAR ONE'S DEATH.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rosenberg1999, author = {Rosenberg, Alexander}, title = {Naturalistic Epistemology for Eliminative Materialists}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {335-358}, keywords = {eliminativism, epistemology, knowledge, materialism, naturalism}, abstract = {This paper defends and extends Quine's version of a naturalistic epistemology, and defends it against criticism, especially that offered by Kim, according to which Quine's naturalism deprives epistemology of its normative role, and indeed of its relevance to psychological states, such as beliefs, whose warrant epistemology aims to assess. I defend Quinean epistemology's objections to the epistemic pluralism associated with other self-styled naturalistic epistemologies, and show how recent theories in the philosophy of psychology which fail to account for the intentionality of psychological states in fact provide a cognitive foundation for an eliminativist epistemology which both honors Quine's strictures and helps us accommodate important findings and results in experimental psychology and cognitive science.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rosenberg1993, author = {Rosenberg, Jay-F}, title = {Comments on Peter Van Inwagen's "Material Beings"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {701-708}, keywords = {being, epistemology, material}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rosenberg1997, author = {Rosenberg, Jay-F}, title = {Brandom's Making It Explicit: A First Encounter}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {179-187}, keywords = {epistemology, language, meaning, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rosenberg1993a, author = {Rosenberg, Jay-F}, title = {Raiders of the Lost Distinction: Richard Rorty and the Search for the Last Dichotomy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {195-214}, keywords = {dialectic, philosopher, philosophy, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rosenberg2006, author = {Rosenberg, Jay-F}, title = {Still Mythic After All Those Years: On Alston's Latest Defense of the Given}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {72(1)}, pages = {157-173}, keywords = {cognition, empiricism, epistemology, given}, abstract = {Wilfrid Sellars's conclusion in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" that "the given" is a "myth" quickly elicited philosophical opposition and remains contentious fifty years later. William Alston has challenged that conclusion on several occasions by attempting to devise an acceptable account of perception committed to the givenness of perceived objects. His most recent challenge advances a "theory of appearing" which posits irreducible nonconceptual relations, ostensibly overlooked by Sellars, e.g., of "looking red", between the subject and the object perceived, that can play a justificatory role vis-a-vis the corresponding beliefs, e.g., that the object is red. I argue that Alston undermines his positive plausibility arguments by first blurring and then ignoring crucial differences among various looks-concepts, and that his own putative "phenomenal" looks-concept demonstrably cannot play the justificatory role that he envisions for it. Both his critique of Sellars's arguments and his own alternative proposal thus fail on all fronts.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rosenkrantz2002, author = {Rosenkrantz, Gary-S}, title = {Reflections on the Ontological Status of Persons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {389-393}, keywords = {metaphysics, ontology, person, status}, abstract = {This paper examines Lynne Baker's view that human animals constitute us and, hence, we are not identical with them. I raise doubts about her theses that personhood is an essential kind and that reflective consciousness is so distinctive that when it arose it characterized a "new kind of being." I also argue that biological species are not essential kinds, but that, nevertheless, human animals have persistence conditions. Finally, I criticize Baker's argument that a person's being identical with a human animal is incompatible with Chisholm's requirement that persons are necessarily such that it is physically possible that they consciously think.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rosenkrantz2002a, author = {Rosenkrantz, Gary}, title = {The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {728-736}, keywords = {identity, metaphysics, substance, time}, abstract = {This is a review essay on Jonathan Lowe's The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time. I begin with a sympathetic exposition of Lowe's neo-Aristotelian conception of metaphysics as "the systematic study of the fundamental structure of reality." This includes an exploration of the historical background of his conception of metaphysics. Next, I critically assess Lowe's account of the concrete/abstract distinction, according to which a concretum is an entity that is in space or time, and examine Lowe's account of the ontological independence of an individual substance. Finally, I contrast these accounts with the ones that Joshua Hoffman and I have defended.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rosenkrantz2005, author = {Rosenkrantz, Gary}, title = {An Epistemic Argument for Enduring Human Persons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(1)}, pages = {209-224}, keywords = {consciousness, epistemology, existence, perdurance, person}, abstract = {A typical human person has privileged epistemic access to its identity over time in virtue of having a first-person point of view. In explaining this phenomenon in terms of an intimate relation of self-attribution or the like, I infer that a typical human person has direct consciousness of itself through inner awareness or personal memory. Direct consciousness of oneself is consciousness of oneself, but not by consciousness of something else. Yet, a perduring human person, S 'subscript p', i.e., a human person with temporal parts, is identical with the complete series of its temporal parts. I argue that because S 'subscript p' is diverse from any incomplete series of its temporal parts, and because S 'subscript' cannot be conscious of all of its temporal parts through inner awareness or personal memory, S 'subscript' cannot have direct consciousness of itself. I conclude that a human person endures, i.e., wholly exists at each of the times it exists.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROSENKRANTZ1991, author = {ROSENKRANTZ, Gary}, title = {The Independence Criterion of Substance.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {category, independence, individuality, metaphysics, ontology, substance}, abstract = {We construct a new version of the traditional view that an individual substance as ordinarily understood is that which could exist all by itself or which is in some sense "independent." We intend this analysis of substance to be ontologically neutral in the sense that it is compatible with the existence of entities of any intelligible sort, given some plausible view about the natures, existence conditions, and interrelationships of such entities. Employing a hierarchy of ontological categories, we argue that the category of substance is distinctive (partly) because it could have a single instance over an interval of time.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROSENSTEIN1978, author = {ROSENSTEIN, LEON}, title = {MYSTICISM AS PREONTOLOGY: A NOTE ON THE HEIDEGGERIAN CONNECTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {39}, pages = {57-73}, keywords = {being, metaphysics, mysticism, ontology, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rosenthal2004, author = {Rosenthal, David-M}, title = {Subjective Character and Reflexive Content}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {191-198}, keywords = {epiphenomenalism, materialism, metaphysics, qualitative, zombie}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rosenthal1993, author = {Rosenthal, David-M}, title = {Multiple Drafts and Higher-Order Thoughts}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {911-918}, keywords = {consciousness, mental-states; metaphysics, mind}, abstract = {Daniel Dennett's Multiple Drafts Model of consciousness (MDM), advanced in his "Consciousness Explained", deals successfully with many empirical findings and conceptual conundrums that traditional theories can't handle successfully. But Dennett defends the MDM in connection with his thesis of "first person operationalism," which denies that there's any fact of the matter about whether certain stimuli reach consciousness, and about what our conscious experiences are at any particular moment. I argue that first - person operationalism is indefensible, and that the explanatory merits of the MDM minus first - person operationalism are the same as the less radical higher - order - thought hypothesis about consciousness that I've argued elsewhere on independent grounds.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROSENTHAL1977, author = {ROSENTHAL, SANDRA-B}, title = {RETURN TO LIVED EXPERIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {56-65}, keywords = {experience, intensionality, phenomenology, pragmatism, scientific-method; twentieth}, abstract = {THE REACTION OF PRAGMATISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY TO CERTAIN PHILOSOPHIC TENDENCIES OF TRADITIONAL EMPIRICISM EMERGED FROM, AND IN TURN GAVE FURTHER IMPETUS TO, DIVERSE METHODOLOGIES. SUCH DIVERSITY HAS TENDED TO OBSCURE THE COMMON GROUND OF THEIR REACTIONS TO TRADITIONAL EMPIRICISM AND THE COMMON NATURE OF THEIR RETURN TO LIVED EXPERIENCE. INDEED, THE LINKAGE OF PRAGMATISM WITH THE METHOD OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN THE HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHIC ALIENATION OF THE MOVEMENTS OF PRAGMATISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY. YET, CLOSE EXAMINATION REVEALS THAT IT IS PRECISELY THE PRAGMATIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE AND ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY WHICH PROVIDES THE BASIC AFFINITIES OF PRAGMATISM WITH THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL RETURN TO LIVED EXPERIENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROSENTHAL1981, author = {ROSENTHAL, SANDRA-B}, title = {LEWIS, PRAGMATISM, AND PHENOMENALISM: A REVISIT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {396-400}, keywords = {epistemology, phenomenalism, pragmatism}, abstract = {THIS ESSAY IS A RESPONSE TO A CRITICISM OF MY ARTICLE, "C I LEWIS AND THE PRAGMATIC REJECTION OF PHENOMENALISM," WHICH APPEARED IN THE PREVIOUS ISSUE OF "PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY RESEARCH". IT DEVELOPS THE POSITION THAT THE CRITICISM HOUSES A DEEPLY ROOTED AND PERVASIVE MISUNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE EPISTEMIC AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A DISPOSITIONAL THEORY OF MEANING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROSENTHAL1969, author = {ROSENTHAL, SANDRA}, title = {THE "WORLD" OF C I LEWIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {589-697}, keywords = {epistemology, reality}, abstract = {THE CONCEPT OF WORLD IN LEWIS'S PHILOSOPHY IS USUALLY TAKEN AS A COMMON-SENSE ONE INDICATING "WHAT IS THE CASE," AND THEN IT IS NOTED THAT HIS STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE WORLD ARE INCONSISTENT WITH HIS PRAGMATICALLY ORIENTED POSITION AS A WHOLE. HOWEVER, LEWIS'S CONCEPT OF WORLD IS A PRECISE TECHNICAL CONCEPT WHICH PROVIDES AN IMPORTANT KEY TO THE SYSTEMATIC UNITY OF HIS CONCEPTUAL PRAGMATISM. THOUGH METAPHYSICAL REALITY IS A CONCRETE ONGOING PROCESS FAR DIFFERENT FROM THE WORLD, THIS LEADS TO A PROBLEM ONLY THROUGH A CONFUSION OF METAPHYSICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CATEGORIES; THE WORLD IS BASICALLY A CONCEPT OF EPISTEMOLOGY. TO UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THE WORLD IS TO UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THAT PRECISE ENCOMPASSING STRUCTURE WHICH EMERGES FROM THE APPLICATION OF AN ABSTRACT CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM TO THE CONCRETE PROCESS AND WHICH, AS A PRODUCT OF THE LOGICAL INTERACTION OF BOTH, IS IN FACT IDENTICAL WITH NEITHER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROSENTHAL1980, author = {ROSENTHAL, SANDRA-B}, title = {C I LEWIS AND THE PRAGMATIC REJECTION OF PHENOMENALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {204-217}, keywords = {epistemology, experience, meaning, phenomenalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROSHWALD1969, author = {ROSHWALD, MORDECAI}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM, A FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF CIVILIZATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {102-112}, keywords = {civilization, freedom, social-philosoph}, abstract = {THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM CAN BE A USEFUL FRAMEWORK FOR A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CIVILIZATIONS. ASSUMING THAT FREEDOM IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE CONDITION, BUT MOVES IN A SPECTRUM BETWEEN OSSIFIED FORMS AND TOTAL ANARCHY, THE ACTUAL PRACTICE OF FREEDOM VARIES FROM CULTURE TO CULTURE. MOREOVER, THE NOTION OF FREEDOM IS RELATED TO RESTRICTIVE NORMS - SUCH AS LAW, MORALS, AESTHETICS, CUSTOM, VOGUE. IN RESPECT OF EACH SUCH NORM THE DEGREE OF FREEDOM MAY VARY. THUS, THE PROFILE OF FREEDOM OF A SOCIETY MAY BE STUDIED BY COMPARING ITS DEGREE IN RESPECT OF DIVERSE NORMS, AS WELL AS BY MAKING CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROTENSTREICH1985, author = {ROTENSTREICH, NATHAN}, title = {WILL AND REASON: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF KANT'S CONCEPTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {37-58}, keywords = {metaphysics, phenomenology, reason, will}, abstract = {THIS PAPER SEEKS TO DELINEATE EVERYDAY USAGE OF THE TWO CONCEPTS--WILL AND REASON--IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY THE SYSTEMATIC TRANSFORMATION THESE CONCEPTS UNDERWENT IN KANT'S SYSTEM. IT HAS BEEN OBSERVED THAT EVEN IN OUR EVERYDAY INTERPRETATION AND PARLANCE THERE ARE DIFFERENT MEANINGS OR NUANCES OR MEANINGS ATTRIBUTED TO THE PHENOMENON OF WILL AND PERHAPS ALSO, TO A LESSER EXTENT, TO THE PHENOMENON OF WILL SERVE AS THE POINT OF DEPARTURE OF KANT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CONCEPT "WILL" WHICH IS, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, CONGRUENT WITH ITS ORDINARY USAGE. YET IN OTHER INSTANCES, AS WE SHALL SEE, KANT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE WILL IS IMBUED WITH SYSTEMATIC MEANING WHICH HAS TO BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL AND OF HIS PHILOSOPHY OF PRACTICE IN PARTICULAR.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROTENSTREICH1977, author = {ROTENSTREICH, NATHAN}, title = {AN ANALYSIS OF PIAGET'S CONCEPT OF STRUCTURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {368-380}, keywords = {contextuality, epistemology, formalization, rationality, reconstruction, structure}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE ANALYZING PIAGET'S CONCEPT OF STRUCTURE RAISES THE QUESTION WHETHER STRUCTURES BELONG TO THE ESSENCE OF THE WORLD IN THE PLATONIC SENSE, OR WHETHER THEY ARE CONSTRUCTIONS SERVING THE NEED OF EXPLORATION AND PREDICTION. THE CONTENTION OF THE ARTICLE IS THAT PIAGET WAVERS BETWEEN THE TWO POSSIBILITIES. THE NEXT STEP IN THE ANALYSIS IS CONCERNED WITH THE MOVE FROM STRUCTURES TO VALUES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROTENSTREICH1963, author = {ROTENSTREICH, NATHAN}, title = {HISTORICAL INEVITABILITY AND HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {380-396}, keywords = {christianity, evaluation, history, inevitability, marxism, prediction, responsibility, social-science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROTENSTREICH1960, author = {ROTENSTREICH, NATHAN}, title = {THE VALUE ASPECT OF SCIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {513-520}, keywords = {beauty, function, intrinsic-value; knowledge, metaphysics, science, technology, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROTENSTREICH1972, author = {ROTENSTREICH, NATHAN}, title = {FREEDOM, REFLECTION AND FINITUDE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {163-173}, keywords = {finitude, freedom, metaphysics, reflection}, abstract = {THE PAPER CRITICIZES THE LODGING OF FREEDOM ON THE LEVEL OF PURE REASON AS SUGGESTED BY KANT. IT CRITICIZES ALSO FREEDOM AS AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF NECESSITY AS SUGGESTED BY SPINOZA. FREEDOM IS RELATED TO THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE FINITE HUMAN BEING, AND THUS IS AN ATTRIBUTE OF THAT BEING IN ITS CONCRETE MANIFESTATIONS IN HISTORY AND IN MORAL DECISIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROTENSTREICH1980, author = {ROTENSTREICH, NATHAN}, title = {RELATIVITY AND VARIETY OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {187-203}, keywords = {cognition, context, interpretation, philosophy, relativism, system}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN THE INNER STRUCTURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC ENVIRONMENTS AND RELATIVISTIC APPROACHES TO PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS, I.E., THE NOTION THAT SYSTEMS ARE DETERMINED BY FACTORS OUTSIDE THEIR OWN STRUCTURES. THESE FACTORS ARE EITHER HISTORICAL ERAS OR PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS. THE DIRECTION OF THE ARTICLE IS TO SHOW THE INNER LOGIC OF THE SYSTEM EVEN IN TERMS OF THEIR LIMITATIONS. THE DISTINCTION SUGGESTED IS BETWEEN PARTIALNESS AND RELATIVITY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Roth2000, author = {Roth, Abraham-Sesshu}, title = {What Was Hume's Problem with Personal Identity?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {91-114}, keywords = {metaphysics, personal-identit}, abstract = {An appreciation of Hume's psychology of object identity allows us to recognize certain tensions in his discussion of the origin of our belief in personal identity--tensions which have gone largely unnoticed in the secondary literature. This will serve to provide a new solution to the problem of explaining why Hume finds that discussion of personal identity so problematic when he famously disavows it in the Appendix to the Treatise. It turns out that the two psychological mechanisms which respectively generate the ideas of object and of personal identity are mutually incompatible. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Roth1999, author = {Roth, Abraham-Sesshu}, title = {Reasons Explanations of Actions: Causal, Singular, and Situational}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {839-874}, keywords = {action, epistemology, ethics, explanation, reason}, abstract = {Davidson held that the explanation of action in terms of reasons was a form of causal explanation. He challenged anticausalists to identify a noncausal relation underlying reasons-explanation which could distinguish between merely having a reason and that reason being the one for which one acts. George Wilson attempts to meet Davidson's challenge, but the relation he identifies can serve only in explanations of general facts, whereas reasons explanation is often of particular acts. This suggests that the relation underlying reasons explanation is not only causal, but singular as well. A further proposal, extracted from Fred Dretske's views, characterizes this singular causal relation in terms of nonmental triggers. But this suggestion underestimates the explanatory role of the environment at the time of action, and shares with Wilson's proposal the inability to account for the rationalization of particular acts. A situational environmentalist conception of reasons explanation, however, does not face these difficulties.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ROUTLEY1982, author = {ROUTLEY, RICHARD}, title = {ON WHAT THERE IS NOT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {151-178}, keywords = {existence, metaphysics, ontology, set-theor}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Rowe1991, author = {Rowe, William-L}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {945-949}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality}, volume = {53(4)}, year = {1991} } @other{Rowl2001, author = {Rowlands, Mark}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {745-748}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Nature of Consciousness}, volume = {70(3)}, year = {2001} } @article{Ruben1997, author = {Ruben, David-Hillel}, title = {John Searle's The Construction of Social Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {443-447}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, reality, social}, abstract = {A critical discussion of Searle's The Construction of Social Reality, focusing on his distinction between constitutive and regulative rules and arguing that the distinction can only be cashed out in a nonmetaphorical way as a rather uninteresting distinction between two different kinds of action descriptions.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RUBEN1977, author = {RUBEN, DAVID-HILLEL}, title = {A NOTE ON JUSTIFICATION: ITS DEFINITION AND ITS CRITERIA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {552-555}, keywords = {belief, criteria, justification, logic, truth-valu}, abstract = {A NOTE ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A DEFINITION OF JUSTIFICATION AND A CRITERION OF JUSTIFICATION. ALTHOUGH MOST ACCOUNTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE ARE PLAUSIBLE CANDIDATES FOR A DEFINITION OF JUSTIFICATION, ONLY A COHERENCE ACCOUNT WILL SERVE AS A PLAUSIBLE CANDIDATE FOR A CRITERION. THE CONCEPTION OF A CRITERION FOR JUSTIFICATION IS DEFENDED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Ruben1990, author = {Ruben, David-Hillel}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {477-482}, publisher = {Routledge}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Explaining Explanation}, volume = {56(2)}, year = {1990} } @other{Rudebusch1999, author = {Rudebusch, George}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {490-492}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Socrates, Pleasure, and Value}, volume = {65(2)}, year = {1999} } @article{RUJA1967, author = {RUJA, HARRY}, title = {A NEW REALISTIC SYNTHESIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {421-428}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, realism}, abstract = {DONALD C WILLIAMS, IN HIS BOOK "PRINCIPLES OF EMPIRICAL REALISM," PRESENTS A PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM CONSISTING OF EMPIRICISM AND REALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY, MATERIALISTIC ACTUALISM IN METAPHYSICS, AND NATURALISM IN VALUE THEORY. THE DOCTRINES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS POSITION ARE LUCID AND PROBABLE; TO PREFER THEM RATHER THAN THE OBSCURANTIST AND MYSTICAL ONES WHICH ARE FASHIONABLE TODAY IS IN LARGE PART TO EXPRESS ONE'S COMMITMENT TO THE PHILOSOPHIC ENTERPRISE ITSELF.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RUJA1968, author = {RUJA, HARRY}, title = {CHRISTIAN PRECEPTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {295-296}, keywords = {christianity, ethics}, abstract = {COMMENTS ON THE DESIGNATION BY PETER MANICAS OF "LOVE THY BROTHER AS THYSELF" AS A PRECEPT OF CHRISTIANITY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RUJA1961, author = {RUJA, HARRY}, title = {THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE VERIFIABILITY CRITERION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {216-222}, keywords = {criteria, language, logical-positivism; meaning, verifiability}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE SKETCHES THE HISTORY OF THE VERIFIABILITY CRITERION AND ITS PRESENT STATUS, THE PROBLEMS OF CONCLUSIVE VERIFICATION OF UNIVERSAL LAWS AND THE PERPLEXITIES CONCERNING THE PAST, THE FUTURE AND OTHER MINDS ARE ELABORATED. IT SHOWS THE SHIFTS OF MEANING FROM: VERIFIABLE TO TESTABLE TO CONFIRMABLE; ALSO, THE ADMISSION OF A CONCEPT OF "TRUTH" APART FROM KNOWLEDGE AND THE UNOBSERVABLES IN SCIENCE. THE AUTHOR SHOWS THAT LOGICAL POSITIVISM HAS COME TO HAVE A GROWING HUMILITY AND MATURITY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Russell1993, author = {Russell, Bruce}, title = {Exploring "The Realm of Rights"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {159-j162}, keywords = {epistemology, language, power, rights, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Russell1995, author = {Russell, Paul}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {263-265}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility}, volume = {59(1)}, year = {1995} } @article{RUSSOW1985, author = {RUSSOW, LILLY-MARLENE}, title = {DENNETT, MENTAL IMAGES, AND IMAGES IN CONTEXT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {581-594}, keywords = {intentionality, mental-image; metaphysics, psychology}, abstract = {IN HIS DISCUSSION OF MENTAL IMAGES IN "BRAINSTORMS", D C DENNETT TAKES A SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL APPROACH TO MENTAL IMAGES: SPECIFICALLY, HE CONSIDERS THEM IN ISOLATION, RATHER THAN IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ACTIVITY SUCH AS IMAGINING, REMEMBERING, OR PROBLEM-SOLVING. IN THIS PAPER, IT IS ARGUED THAT THIS ISOLATION LEADS TO INADEQUACIES IN HIS LIST OF 'ACCEPTABLE' APPROACHES TO MENTAL IMAGE. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE APPROACHES DENNETT MENTIONS IS SKETCHED AND DEFENDED AGAINST DENNETT'S OBJECTIONS, AND IT IS ARGUED THAT THIS ALTERNATIVE POINTS TO SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT DENNETT'S MORE GENERAL STRATEGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RUTHROF1973, author = {RUTHROF, HORST}, title = {A PHENOMENO-SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO FICTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {399-407}, keywords = {aesthetics, fiction}, abstract = {THE PAPER ATTEMPTS TO SHOW AT WHICH POINT IMMANENT ANALYSES OF STORIES MUST BE COMPLEMENTED BY SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS. A PHENOMENOLOGICAL MODEL OF FICTION IS PROJECTED IN WHICH THE LANGUAGE SIGNALS SUGGEST THE GROUPS 'POINT OF VIEW'; 'SPACE', 'TIME', 'ACTION', 'CHARACTER'; 'ATMOSPHERE'; 'TONE I AND II'; 'INTERPRETIVE ABSTRACTIONS'. ALL GROUPS REST ON THE READER'S CULTURAL BACKGROUND, BUT IN THE GROUPS OF 'TONE AND ABSTRACTIONS' THE APPLICATION OF SOCIOLOGICAL FRAMEWORKS BECOMES COMPELLING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ryan1996, author = {Ryan, Sharon}, title = {Does Warrant Entail Truth?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {183-192}, keywords = {epistemology, truth, warrant}, abstract = {Trenton Merricks has argued that warrant entails truth. (PPR, December 1995) Merricks claims that he has shown that warrant entails truth, without assuming any substantive account of warrant. According to Merricks, the denial that warrant entails truth leads either to a contradiction or to three utterly implausible claims. In my paper, I argue that Merricks has failed to show that warrant entails truth. I propose, for consideration, a plausible account of warrant. This account of warrant does not lead to a contradiction and it does not lead to any of the three implausible claims.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ryan1996a, author = {Ryan, Sharon}, title = {Does Warrant Entail Truth?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {183-192}, keywords = {epistemology, truth, warrant}, abstract = {Trenton Merricks has argued that warrant entails truth. (PPR, December 1995) Merricks claims that he has shown that warrant entails truth, without assuming any substantive account of warrant. According to Merricks, the denial that warrant entails truth leads either to a contradiction or to three utterly implausible claims. In my paper, I argue that Merricks has failed to show that warrant entails truth. I propose, for consideration, a plausible account of warrant. This account of warrant does not lead to a contradiction and it does not lead to any of the three implausible claims.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ryckman1993, author = {Ryckman, Thomas-C}, title = {Contingency, A Prioricity and Acquaintance}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {323-343}, keywords = {contingency, epistemology, knowledge, language, reality, semantics, statement}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{RYCKMAN1986, author = {RYCKMAN, THOMAS-C}, title = {BELIEF, LINGUISTIC BEHAVIOR, AND PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {277-287}, keywords = {belief, content, language, proper-name; proposition}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Rynasiewicz1995, author = {Rynasiewicz, Robert}, title = {Absolute vs Relational Theories of Space and Time: A Review of "World Enough and Space-Time" by John Earman}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {675-687}, keywords = {objectivity, science, space, time}, abstract = {This review not only explains why Earman's monograph counts as a landmark contribution to the traditional absolute-relational debate, but goes on to explore a number of key issues: (1) What is the distinction between absolute and relative motion supposed to be? (2) Does the program of Leibniz algebras offer an alternative to substantivalism? (3) What should be concluded from the whole argument regarding the substantival-relational debate? (4) Does that debate remain meaningful in the context of modern field theory?}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sabates2002, author = {Sabates, Marcelo}, title = {Mind in a Physical World?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {663-670}, keywords = {causation, epiphenomenalism, metaphysics, supervenience}, abstract = {In his recent Mind in a Physical World Kim offers the first extended presentation of his new theory, which I will call reductive functionalization (RF). I will explore some aspects of the proposal in MIAPW with special attention to how RF fares vis-a-vis the sources of dissatisfaction that prompted Kim to abandon SC and to criticize other nonreductive, supervenience-based views. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SACHS1970, author = {SACHS, MENDEL}, title = {POSITIVISM, REALISM, AND EXISTENTIALISM IN MACH'S INFLUENCE ON CONTEMPORARY PHYSICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {403-420}, keywords = {existentialism, field-theory; measurement, physics, positivism, quantum-mechanics; science}, abstract = {THE INFLUENCE OF TWO ASPECTS OF MACH'S PHILOSOPHY ON CONTEMPORARY PHYSICS ARE DISCUSSED. ON THE ONE HAND, MACH'S ADHERENCE TO POSITIVISM IN SCIENCE HAS STRONGLY INFLUENCED THE INTERPRETATION OF ONE OF THE TWO MAJOR REVOLUTIONS IN MODERN PHYSICS - THE QUANTUM THEORY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE MACH PRINCIPLE, WHICH INDICATES THAT ANY PHYSICAL SYSTEM MUST BE CLOSED AT THE OUTSET, AND IMPLIES A PHILOSOPHICAL STAND OF REALISM WITH ASPECTS OF EXISTENTIALIST THINKING, HAS STRONGLY INFLUENCED THE OTHER REVOLUTION IN MODERN PHYSICS - THE THEORY OF RELATIVITY. AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF PHYSICS, IT HAS BECOME NECESSARY TO ACCEPT ONE OF THESE CONTRARY ASPECTS OF MACH'S PHILOSOPHY AND NOT THE OTHER TO ADEQUATELY DESCRIBE HIGH ENERGY PHYSICS. IT IS ARGUED THAT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE POSITIVISTIC APPROACH OF THE QUANTUM THEORY HAS THUS FAR NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY SUCCESSFUL TO LEAD TO A FULLY RELATIVISTIC QUANTUM THEORY, THE APPROACH OF REALISM AND THE NOTIONS OF EXISTENTIALISM THAT ARE IMPLICIT IN THE MACH PRINCIPLE AS A BASIS OF RELATIVITY THEORY, INDICATE A LIKELY PHILOSOPHICAL STAND FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF PHYSICS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SACKSTEDER1963, author = {SACKSTEDER, WILLIAM}, title = {THEORIES AND THEIR CONTEXT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {48-60}, keywords = {commitment, communication, context, epistemology, experience, object, theory}, abstract = {ALL THEORETICAL ACTIVITIES ARE PURSUED WITHIN SOME CONTEXT. BUT NO FACTS FROM ANY SUCH CONTEXT CAN BE INDICATED IN INDEPENDENCE OF A THEORY. HENCE THE DEVICES OF THEORETICAL COMMUNICATION ARE MUDDLED BY VARIATION IN EXPERIENTIAL CONTEXTS AND BY ALTERNATIVE MODES OF EXPRESSION. YET WE MIGHT TURN OUR ATTENTION TO THOSE MINIMAL AND LIMITING CONDITIONS WHICH ARE PRESUPPOSED BY ANY THEORY WHATSOEVER. THESE ARE FOUND IN THE CONTEXT WITHOUT WHICH EXPERIENCE COULD NOT TAKE PLACE AT ALL AND IN THE REQUIREMENTS SET BY ANY POSSIBILITY FOR EXCHANGE OF THEORIES FOR PURPOSES OF KNOWLEDGE. BUT SUCH CONDITIONS ARE THEMSELVES COMMUNICATED BY A THEORETICAL ARTIFACT. THEY ARE NOT NEUTRAL. HENCE IT IS ONLY BY A KIND OF FICTION THAT WE TURN OUR ATTENTION TO THE CONTEXT OF THEORIES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SACKSTEDER1985, author = {SACKSTEDER, WILLIAM}, title = {SIMPLE WHOLES AND COMPLEX PARTS: LIMITED PRINCIPLES IN SPINOZA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {393-406}, keywords = {complexity, metaphysics, part, simplicity, whole}, abstract = {NOTIONS OF "PART" AND "WHOLE" ARE INTERTWINED IN SPINOZA, THOUGH IT FOLLOWS FROM HIS EFFECTIVE DEFINITIONS OF THIS PAIR OF TERMS THAT LEAST PARTS CANNOT BE THOUGHT AS SIMPLE AND A GREATEST WHOLE CANNOT BE THOUGHT AS COMPLEX. RATHER WHOLES ARE "SIMPLE", AND PARTS "COMPLEX". IN CONSEQUENCE, SEARCH FOR A LIMIT AT EXTREMES OF THE SCALE REVEALS, IN ONE DIRECTION, UNLIMITED REGRESSIVE COMPLICATION, AND IN THE OTHER, AN ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE WHICH MUST BE REGARDED AS SIMPLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SACKSTEDER1967, author = {SACKSTEDER, WILLIAM}, title = {LOOKING GLASS: A TREATISE ON LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {338-355}, keywords = {literature, logic}, abstract = {LEWIS CARROLL'S SECOND ALICE BOOK IS ANALYSED AS A MOCK EPIC IMITATING A TREATISE ON LOGIC. ITS LITERARY DEVICES ARE SHOWN TO DISPLAY A WHOLE INTELLECTUAL PROGRESS, ITS DIRECTION TOWARD SEMANTIC AND PRAGMATIC PRINCIPLES, DISTINCT STAGES OF VERBAL AND SYNTACTIC DEVELOPMENT, AND AN IMPLICIT ORGANIZATION OF THE SCHEME OF PROBLEMS FOR A COMPLETE LOGICAL TREATISE. ARCHITECTONIC RECOMMENDATIONS AND ENLARGED SCOPE OF PROBLEMS ARE SUGGESTED FOR MODERN LOGICIANS IN TERMS OF SERIOCOMIC EVENTS IN THE WORK.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SACKSTEDER1980, author = {SACKSTEDER, WILLIAM}, title = {TRANSFORMATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {474-495}, keywords = {argument, communication, interpretation, language, logic, structure, transformation}, abstract = {A DEFINITION OF TRANSFORMATIONS IS UNPACKED IN AN EFFORT TO SHOW THAT TRANSFORMATIONS SO UNDERSTOOD CAN FUNCTION AS THE NERVE OF ALL ARGUMENT, AS ORDERING ALL DISCOURSE, AS CONDITIONING ANY COMMUNICATION, AND AS ONE PATTERN BOTH RULING AND INSTANTIATED. TO THIS EXTENT, TRANSFORMATIONS ESTABLISH PRINCIPLES, PROVIDE STANDARDS OF VALIDITY, AND INSURE APPLICABILITY. THEY FORM BOTH LOGICS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS. A TRANSFORMATION HERE IS "A DELIBERATE ACT WHEREBY THE INGREDIENTS IN A STRUCTURE ARE MODIFIED IN A MANNER WHICH CAN BE REPEATED AS IF ACCORDING TO A RULE ESTABLISHED OR EXEMPLIFIED BY THAT ALTERATION".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sainsbury1997, author = {Sainsbury, R-Mark}, title = {Easy Possibilities}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {907-919}, keywords = {belief, conditional, determinism, epistemology, possibility, reliability}, abstract = {If you know, you couldn't easily have been wrong. This "Reliability Conditional" is compared with other constraints on knowledge, for example tracking, and its connection with KK, possible worlds and determinism is explored. The main conclusion of the article is that an account of knowledge centred on the Reliability Conditional can vindicate certain aspects of Williamson's position concerning the epistemic theory of vagueness: vagueness is ignorance due to the fact that our words might easily have had slightly different meanings, yet we do know the meanings of our words.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sainsbury1996, author = {Sainsbury, R-Mark}, title = {Crispin Wright: Truth and Objectivity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {899-904}, keywords = {epistemology, justice, objectivity, truth}, abstract = {This belongs to a symposium about Crispin Wright's Truth and Objectivity. Wright entertains the "possibility of a pluralist view of truth." I suggest that this should not entail ambiguity in the word "true." For truth to amount to different things for different kinds of subject matter no more entails ambiguity than does the fact that existence amounts to different things for different kinds of entity. Turning to cognitive command, I argue that it is trivially satisfied: if I judge that p and you disagree, then under suitable conditions I must take it that something is wrong with your cognitive mechanisms.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SALAMUN1988, author = {SALAMUN, KURT}, title = {MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF KARL JASPERS' EXISTENTIALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {317-323}, keywords = {ethics, existentialism, self-realizatio}, abstract = {ALTHOUGH THE EXISTENTIALISTS DIDN'T PROPOSE AN EXPLICIT ETHICS IN THEIR PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS, ONE CAN FIND A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF MORAL IMPLICATIONS IN THEIR PHILOSOPHY; THESE MORAL FEATURES FUNCTION AS A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK IN THEIR EXISTENTIAL THOUGHT. THE INTENTION OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO POINT OUT SOME IMPLICIT MORAL IDEAS OF JASPERS'S EXISTENTIALISM, WHICH ARE BASIC TO HIS CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE, OF BOUNDARY SITUATIONS AND OF EXISTENTIAL COMMUNICATION. IN CONNECTION WITH HIS SUBTLE ANALYSES OF REACTIONS TO BOUNDARY SITUATIONS (DEATH, SUFFERING, GUILT, STRUGGLE) AND HIS REFLECTIONS ON EXISTENTIAL COMMUNICATION, HE APPEALS TO A NUMBER OF MORAL ATTITUDES, WHICH ARE HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT FOR HIS CONCEPT OF MAN AND HIS IDEAL OF EXISTENTIAL SELF-REALISATION: COURAGE WITHOUT SELF-DECEPTION IN FACE OF DEATH, PATIENCE AND DIGNITY, EXISTENTIAL SOLIDARITY WITH A COMMUNICATION-PARTNER, OPEN-MINDEDNESS, INTELLECTUAL INTEGRITY, TRUTHFULNESS, THE ABILITY TO BEAR LONELINESS AS A PRESUPPOSITION OF COMMUNICATION, PERMANENT READINESS FOR TAKING OVER PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND SO ON.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SANBORN1967, author = {SANBORN, PATRICIA}, title = {OBJECTIFICATION AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {39-47}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, objectification, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sanford2005, author = {Sanford, David-H}, title = {Difficulties for the Reconciling and Estranging Projects: Some Symmetries}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(1)}, pages = {240-244}, keywords = {determinism, epistemology, estrangement, reconciliation, symmetry}, abstract = {Suppose that Susan did not go to the movies. The reconciling project attempts to show that this plus determinism does not imply that Susan could not have gone to the movies. The estranging project attempts to show the opposite. A counterentailment argument is of the form A is consistent with C, and C entails not-B, therefore A does not entail B. An instance of the counterentailment arguments undermines a central argument for the reconciling project. Another instance undermines a central argument for the estranging project. This is one symmetry. In each case, the natural response to the counterentailment argument begs the question. This is another symmetry.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SANTONI1962, author = {SANTONI, RONALD-E}, title = {COMMENTS REGARDING THE DOMMEYER-DUCASSE DISAGREEMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {125-126}, keywords = {appraisal, ethics, morality, norm, principle, scientific-metho}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SANTONI1978, author = {SANTONI, RONALD-E}, title = {BAD FAITH AND 'LYING TO ONESELF'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {384-398}, keywords = {bad-faith; being, epistemology, freedom, given, possibility, self-deceptio}, abstract = {WHILE ATTEMPTING TO OFFER A CLOSE, INTEGRATIVE ANALYSIS OF SARTRE'S VIEWS ON BAD FAITH, I RAISE THE BASIC QUESTION OF WHETHER, GIVEN SARTRE'S ONTOLOGICAL PREMISES AND SYSTEM OF MEANINGS, IT IS POSSIBLE TO LIE TO ONESELF. NOTING THAT FOR SARTRE THE "TRUE PROBLEM" OF BAD FAITH ORIGINATES IN THE FACT THAT BAD FAITH IS "FAITH," I ARGUE THAT, INSOFAR AS "THE "ACCEPTANCE" OF NOT BELIEVING WHAT ONE BELIEVES" IS ONE ARTICULATION OF WHAT SARTRE UNDERSTANDS BY "LYING TO ONESELF," SARTRE OFFERS US A HIGHLY QUALIFIED POSSIBILITY OF BAD FAITH AS "LYING TO ONESELF." HOWEVER, I CONTEND THAT THIS WEAKENED VERSION IS A FAR CRY FROM THE VIEW OF BAD FAITH WHICH REQUIRES A SUCCESSFUL CONCEALMENT OF TRUTH FROM CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE FULL TRANSLUCENCY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Santoni1995, author = {Santoni, Ronald-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {983-986}, publisher = {Temple Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Bad Faith, Good Faith, and Authenticity in Sartre's Early Philosophy}, volume = {58(4)}, year = {1995} } @article{SAPONTZIS1978, author = {SAPONTZIS, S-F}, title = {A NOTE ON MERLEAU-PONTY'S 'AMBIGUITY'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {538-543}, keywords = {ambiguity, experience, identity, metaphysics, norm, object}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE ANSWERS THE FOLLOWING FOUR QUESTIONS: WHAT DOES "AMBIGUITY" REFER TO IN MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY; WHAT DOES THIS TERM MEAN IN HIS PHILOSOPHY; WHY DOES MERLEAU-PONTY USE THIS TERM TO REFER TO THE THINGS LISTED IN ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION; AND WHAT FUNCTION DOES THE CONCEPT OF AMBIGUITY SERVE IN MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY? I CONCLUDE THAT SINCE THE USE OF "AMBIGUITY" BY MERLEAU-PONTY, HIS COMMENTATORS, AND HIS CRITICS INVOLVES CARTESIAN PRESUMPTIONS, "PHILOSOPHY OF AMBIGUITY" IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE, DESCRIPTIVE LABEL FOR HIS PHILOSOPHY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SAPONTZIS1977, author = {SAPONTZIS, S-F}, title = {DIRECT PERCEPTION, SOME FURTHER COMMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {556-565}, keywords = {description, epistemology, experience, fact, perception, sensation}, abstract = {THIS PAPER IS A CRITICISM OF A POINT MADE BY D D TODD IN HIS ARTICLE "DIRECT PERCEPTION" ("PHILO PHENOMENOL RES" 35, 352-62). THE POINT CONCERNS WHETHER CERTAIN SENSE DATUM STATEMENTS ARE INFALLIBLE. FOLLOWING A R WHITE ("G E MOORE" (BLACKWELL, 1958)), TODD DISTINGUISHES SENSE DATUM IDENTIFICATIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS AND ARGUES THE FORMER ARE FALLIBLE BUT THE LATTER ARE NOT. I ARGUE THAT TODD'S REASON FOR HOLDING IDENTIFICATIONS FALLIBLE APPLIES TO DESCRIPTIONS AS WELL AND THAT HIS REASON FOR HOLDING DESCRIPTIONS INFALLIBLE IS NOT A GOOD REASON. I CONCLUDE THAT ALL SENSE DATUM STATEMENTS ARE FALLIBLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SAUNDERS1975, author = {SAUNDERS, JOHN-TURK}, title = {THE PARADOX OF SELF-DECEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {559-570}, keywords = {epistemology, paradox, self-deceptio}, abstract = {AN APPARENT PARADOX ARISES WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THE NOTION OF SELF-DECEPTION. AS DECEIVER, ONE MUST BE IN THE KNOW. AS DECEIVED, ONE MUST BE KEPT IGNORANT AND MADE TO BELIEVE SOMETHING CONTRARY TO WHAT ONE KNOWS. YET IN SELF-DECEPTION DECEIVER AND DECEIVED ARE ONE. SO IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE SELF-DECEIVER BOTH IS AND IS NOT CONSCIOUS AND KNOWLEDGEABLE WITH RESPECT TO THAT ABOUT WHICH HE DECEIVES HIMSELF. I ENDEAVOR TO DISSOLVE THIS (APPARENT) PARADOX BY MEANS OF TECHNICAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT SENSES OF "CONSCIOUS OF" AND "CONSCIOUS THAT." I ARGUE THAT THE SELF-DECEIVER IS NOT CONSCIOUS REGARDING THAT ABOUT WHICH HE DECEIVES HIMSELF IN THE SENSE THAT HE WILL NOT ADMIT IT EVEN TO HIMSELF, ALTHOUGH HE IS NON-EXPLICITLY CONSCIOUS OF IT--AND THE LATTER FACT MAY BE EVIDENCED BY WAY OF A VARIETY OF TESTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SAVAGE1961, author = {SAVAGE, HELEN-BARNES}, title = {VARIETIES OF THE PLEASURE-PAIN COMPLEX IN AESTHETIC THEORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {402-406}, keywords = {aesthetic-experience; aesthetics, art, feeling, pain, pleasure}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Savellos1992, author = {Savellos, Elias}, title = {Criteria of Identity and the Individuation of Natural-Kind Events}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {807-831}, keywords = {event, identity, individuation, metaphysics, natural-kind}, abstract = {Metaphysicians have distinguished the problem of individual differentiation (what makes x other than y), from that of the structure of individuality (what makes a single individual x, an individual nonetheless). I argue that, as the case of events shows, the Aristotelian "this-such" doctrine provides for a uniform solution to both of these problems. I propose that an event is a "this-such", and I employ sortal terms to formulate Aristotle's doctrine in a way that yields both criteria of event-identity and the structure of event-individuality. I argue that this view fits particularly well "natural-kind" events such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and the like.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SAVIGNY1991, author = {SAVIGNY, Eike-V}, title = {Self-Conscious Individual versus Social Soul: The Rationale of Wittgenstein's Discussion of Rule Following.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {individual, rule, social-philosoph}, abstract = {Careful examination of linguistic details of crucial P. I. passages and of their contexts warrants five conclusions: (1) critique of rules is restricted to the efficiency, for an agent's being guided, of his awareness of 'expressions' of rules.(2) This critique rests on Wittgenstein's rejection of a basic role of autonomously enacted rules. (3) Adapting, replacing dominating as a conception of rule following, makes the latter a perfectly normal social fact about single individuals (comparable to the fact of being famous). (4) Meaning and, by parity of reasoning, any psychological fact, is thus a perfectly normal social fact about single individuals. (5) Thus man, by virtue of having a soul, is a social animal for purely conceptual reasons.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SAYWARD1983, author = {SAYWARD, CHARLES}, title = {MINDS, SUBSTANCES, AND CAPACITIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {213-226}, keywords = {body, metaphysics, minds}, abstract = {WHILE DESCARTES WAS NOT MUCH INTERESTED IN SHOWING THAT THE MIND IS A SUBSTANCE (NOT REALLY SEEING A RYLE-TYPE VIEW AS AN ALTERNATIVE) THERE IS A PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT OF THE SUBSTANCE VIEW TO BE FOUND IN DESCARTES' WRITINGS. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE PAPER IS TO BRING THIS FACT OUT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Scala2002, author = {Scala, Mark}, title = {Homogeneous Simples}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {393-397}, keywords = {homogeneity, metaphysics, part, substance, supervenience}, abstract = {I give reasons to suggest that the various 'homogeneous substance' objections to perdurance theory should not be regarded as raising serious difficulties. The main strategy is to show that there are equally exotic possibilities involving extended mereological simples that may turn the tables on the endurance theorist, insofar as she will have difficulties with these cases analogous to those she raises for the perdurantist. I conclude that such exotic cases are less useful that we might suppose in adjudicating between these competing doctrines of persistence.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Scanlon1995, author = {Scanlon, Thomas-M}, title = {Moral Theory: Understanding and Disagreement}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(2)}, pages = {343-356}, keywords = {definition, ethics, moral-theory; morality, understanding}, abstract = {Aims of moral theory include clarification of the substantive content of morality and explanation of the kinds of claims moral judgments make and the reasons we have for taking them seriously. Inquiry into these reasons may disclose that each of us uses the term "morality" to refer to requirements supported by diverse reasons, and that as used by different people this term may express requirements that have quite different sources. Some moral disagreement may therefore be better understood as disagreement about what reasons are to be taken seriously than as disagreement about a single subject matter, "morality".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Scanlon2003, author = {Scanlon, T-M}, title = {Precis of What We Owe to Each Other}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {159-161}, keywords = {ethics, moral-theory; other, owe, reasons, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Scanlon2003a, author = {Scanlon, T-M}, title = {Reply to Gauthier and Gibbard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {176-189}, keywords = {action, desire, ethics, reasons}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Scanlon2003b, author = {Scanlon, Thomas-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {162-168}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {What We Owe to Each Other}, volume = {66(1)}, year = {2003} } @other{Scanlon2003c, author = {Scanlon, Thomas-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {169-175}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {What We Owe to Each Other}, volume = {66(1)}, year = {2003} } @other{Scanlon2003d, author = {Scanlon, Thomas-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {176-189}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {What We Owe to Each Other}, volume = {66(1)}, year = {2003} } @article{SCARROW1962, author = {SCARROW, DAVID-S}, title = {BRADLEY'S INFLUENCE UPON MODERN LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {380-382}, keywords = {hypothetical, influence, judgment, logic, proposition, universal}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHACHT1990, author = {SCHACHT, Richard}, title = {Philosophical Anthropology: What, Why and How.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {phenomenology, philosophical-anthropolog}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Schacht1995, author = {Schacht, Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {737-740}, publisher = {Univ of Illinois Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Making Sense of Nietzsche: Reflections Timely and Untimely}, volume = {58(3)}, year = {1995} } @article{Schaffer2004, author = {Schaffer, Jonathan}, title = {Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(1)}, pages = {138-155}, keywords = {contextualism, conversation, discrimination, epistemology, scepticism}, abstract = {The skeptic says that "knowledge" is an absolute term, whereas the contextualist says that "knowledge" is a relationally absolute term. Which is the better hypothesis about "knowledge"? And what implications do these hypotheses about "knowledge" have for knowledge? I argue that the skeptic has the better hypothesis about "knowledge", but that both hypotheses about "knowledge" have deeply antiskeptical implications for knowledge, since both presuppose our capacity for epistemically salient discrimination.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Schaffer2004a, author = {Schaffer, Jonathan}, title = {Of Ghostly and Mechanical Events}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {230-244}, keywords = {action, causation, dualism, metaphysics, naturalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Schaffer2003, author = {Schaffer, Jonathan}, title = {The Problem of Free Mass: Must Properties Cluster?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {125-138}, keywords = {cluster, mass, metaphysics, primitivism, properties}, abstract = {Properties come in clusters. It seems impossible, for instance, that a mass could float free, unattached to any other property. David Armstrong takes this as a reductio of the bundle theory and an argument for substrata, while Peter Simons and Arda Denkel reply by supplementing the bundle theory with accounts of property interdependencies. I argue against both views. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHALLER1987, author = {SCHALLER, WALTER-E}, title = {KANT'S ARCHITECTONIC OF DUTIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {299-314}, keywords = {duty, ethics, self-control; virtue}, abstract = {THIS INTERPRETATION OF THE DUTIES OF VIRTUE ENTAILS THAT CONSCIENTIOUSNESS--RESPECT FOR THE MORAL LAW--IS NOT THE SOLE KANTIAN VIRTUE. WHEREAS DUTY IS THE PROPER MOTIVE FOR "ADOPTING" THE HAPPINESS OF OTHERS AS AN END, SINCE THESE DUTIES REQUIRE THE CULTIVATION OF CHARACTER TRAITS THE VIRTUOUS OR MORALLY GOOD PERSON WILL BE THE INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS DEVELOPED THESE DISPOSITIONS (OF BENEVOLENCE, SYMPATHY, ETC.) AND IS MOTIVATED BY THEM TO ACT BENEFICENTLY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Schantz2001, author = {Schantz, Richard}, title = {The Given Regained: Reflections on the Sensuous Content of Experience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {167-180}, keywords = {belief, content, epistemology, experience}, abstract = {The article deals with the epistemological question of what conditions experience must satisfy to rationally warrant, and not merely to cause, our beliefs. Against the currently popular view that experience itself has to be propositionally and conceptually structured, the author defends the claim that there is given element in experience which is independent of thought and which is possessed of a distinctive nonpropositional and nonconceptual content. Further, he argues that this given element is indeed fit to play a significant evidential role in the justification of our beliefs about the world.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHATZKI1988, author = {SCHATZKI, THEODORE-R}, title = {THE NATURE OF SOCIAL REALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {239-260}, keywords = {methodology, reality, social-philosophy; social-relation}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ANALYZES THE NATURE OF SOCIAL REALITY AND, IN ADDITION, EXPLORES THE CONSEQUENCES THIS ANALYSIS HOLDS FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA. IT FIRST DISCUSSES HOW AN ANALYSIS OF THIS SORT UNDERLIES ONE SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO ISSUES IN SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE. IT IS THEN ARGUED THAT SOCIAL REALITY IS NOTHING BUT INTERRELATED ONGOING LIVES, WHICH THEMSELVES CONSIST IN SERIES OF ACTIONS GOVERNED BY PRACTICAL INTELLIGIBILITY AND TAKING PLACE IN INTERCONNECTED SETTINGS. FOLLOWING AN EXPLICATION OF THE TERMS OF THIS ANALYSIS, AN EXAMPLE OF THE SORT OF ENTITY IT EXCLUDES FROM SOCIAL REALITY IS DISCUSSED: BHASKAR'S CONCEPTION OF SYSTEMS OF NONEMPIRICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN POSITIONS AND PRACTICES. THE THESIS, CONSEQUENT UPON MY ANALYSIS, IS THEN EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED, NAMELY, THAT SOCIAL FORMATIONS CONSIST IN COLLECTIONS OF ELEMENTS OF AND INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL LIVES. THE PAPER CONCLUDES BY CRITICIZING MANDELBAUM'S FAMOUS ARGUMENT FOR THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF SOCIAL FACTS TO INDIVIDUALIST FACTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Scheffler2001, author = {Scheffler, Israel}, title = {My Quarrels with Nelson Goodman}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {665-677}, keywords = {appearance, art, epistemology, language, meaning}, abstract = {Beginning with brief comments on Goodman's major early works, the paper criticizes the irrealism of his Ways of Worldmaking, arguing that, while we make right versions, we do not thereby make the things to which such versions refer. The paper concludes with a defense of what I call "plurealism," that is, an affirmation both of pluralism and realism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHENCK1985, author = {SCHENCK, DAVID}, title = {MERLEAU-PONTY ON PERSPECTIVISM, WITH REFERENCES TO NIETZSCHE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {307-314}, keywords = {epistemology, perspectivism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Schick-Jr1992, author = {Schick-Jr, Theodore-W}, title = {The Epistemic Role of Qualitative Content}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {383-393}, keywords = {content, epistemology, knowledge, quality}, abstract = {Empiricists take qualitative content to be part of the meaning of mental terms, for they believe that one cannot know what a mental term like "pain" means unless one has experienced pain. Eliminative materialists disagree, claiming that the meaning of a term is determined by its causal/relational properties, and that one can know these without knowing its qualitative content. I argue that those with a knowledge of qualitative content have a better understanding than those who don't, for not only are they better able to use mental terms, but they also know why they are used as they are.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Schiffer1992, author = {Schiffer, Stephen}, title = {How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {713-724}, keywords = {artificial-intelligence; computer, epistemology, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Schiffer2002, author = {Schiffer, Stephen}, title = {A Normative Theory of Meaning}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {186-192}, keywords = {epistemology, grammar, language, meaning, normative, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Schiffer1997, author = {Schiffer, Stephen}, title = {Williamson on Our Ignorance in Borderline Cases}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {937-943}, keywords = {ignorance, language, vagueness}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHLAGEL1966, author = {SCHLAGEL, RICHARD-H}, title = {SCIENCE, TRUTH, AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {27-44}, keywords = {common-sense; concept, correspondence, experience, meaning, ordinary-language; science, truth}, abstract = {ONE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO CORRECT THE CURRENT FALSE ASSUMPTION THAT ORDINARY LANGUAGE IS A SELF-CONTAINED, SELF-SUFFICIENT, ABSOLUTE FRAMEWORK. MOST OF THE ARTICLE IS DEVOTED TO SHOWING HOW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES FROM COPERNICANISM TO RELATIVITY THEORY HAVE AFFECTED REVISIONS IN OUR CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, IMPOSING NEW REPRESENTATIONS OF THE WORLD ON OUR THOUGHT. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS IMPLY A RELATIONAL CONCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSE DESCRIBED AS "CONTEXTUALISTIC REALISM". THE CHALLENGE FACING PHILOSOPHERS TODAY IS TO REVISE ORDINARY LANGUAGE TO ACCOMMODATE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PHYSICS CONVEYING A RADICALLY DIFFERENT CONCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSE THAN THAT IMPOSED BY ORDINARY LANGUAGE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHLAGEL1981, author = {SCHLAGEL, RICHARD-H}, title = {CONTEXTUALISTIC REALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {437-451}, keywords = {context, metaphysics, ontology, realism}, abstract = {AFTER POINTING OUT THE WEAKNESSES OF COMMON SENSE REALISM, CRITICAL REALISM, AND PHENOMENALISM, THE AUTHOR DEFENDS "CONTEXTUALISTIC REALISM" AS A MORE ADEQUATE EPISTEMIC POSITION FOR CHARACTERIZING THE DIFFERENT DOMAINS OF PHYSICAL REALITY AS INVESTIGATED BY THE VARIOUS SCIENCES. ACCORDING TO THIS POSITION, WHICH IS SIMILAR TO THE "LEVELS HYPOTHESIS" HELD BY DAVID BOHM, MARIO BUNGE, AND JOHN COWPERTHWAITE GRAVES, ALL PHENOMENA EXIST WITHIN CERTAIN CONTEXTS OR CONDITIONS, BUT WHATEVER EXISTS IS 'REAL' (OR AUTONOMOUS) RELATIVE TO THESE CONDITIONS. THUS NATURE CONSISTS OF A MATRIX OF APPARENTLY INEXHAUSTIBLE CONTEXTS, ALL OF WHICH ARE RELATIVELY REAL, AND OF WHICH WE CAN OBTAIN SOME APPROXIMATE KNOWLEDGE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHLAGEL1962, author = {SCHLAGEL, RICHARD-H}, title = {LANGUAGE AND PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {192-204}, keywords = {appearance, condition, epistemology, object, ordinary-language; perception, science, sense-dat}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHLESINGER1986, author = {SCHLESINGER, GEORGE-N}, title = {CONFIRMATION AND OBLIGATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {145-148}, keywords = {obligation, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHLESINGER1985, author = {SCHLESINGER, GEORGE-N}, title = {THE CENTRAL PRINCIPLE OF DEONTIC LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {515-536}, keywords = {deontic-logic; inductive-logic; logic, moral-reasonin}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHMITT1962, author = {SCHMITT, RICHARD}, title = {PHENOMENOLOGY AND ANALYSIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {101-110}, keywords = {a-priori; experience, explication, meaning, metaphysics, ordinary-language; phenomenology, philosophy, statement}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR CLAIMS THAT WE CAN GET A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF PHENOMENOLOGY IF WE NOTICE ITS RESEMBLANCES TO ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY. HE DRAWS PARALLELS IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: (1) THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN HUSSERL'S AND HARE'S DESCRIPTIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS; (2) HUSSERL'S CRITICISMS OF TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINES ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY MISUSE ORDINARY LANGUAGE, AND (3) IT IS ILLUSTRATED THAT PHENOMENOLOGY IS AN EXPLICATION AND CLARIFICATION OF MEANINGS, AND THAT IT DOES NOT CONSTRUCT METAPHYSICAL THEORIES OR PROPOUND THESES. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Schmitt1995, author = {Schmitt, Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {989-992}, publisher = {Westview Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Beyond Separateness: The Social Nature of Human Beings--Their Autonomy, Knowledge, and Power}, volume = {58(4)}, year = {1995} } @article{SCHNEEWIND1991, author = {SCHNEEWIND, J-B}, title = {MacIntyre and the Indispensability of Tradition.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {ethics, traditionalism}, abstract = {Agreeing with MacIntyre's claim in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? that inquiry is situated in a matrix of unquestioned assumptions, I argue that this does not force us to conclude, as he thinks it does, that inquiry must utilize the assumptions of some definite historical tradition of thought.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Schneewind1998, author = {Schneewind, Jerome-B}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {483-487}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy}, volume = {62(2)}, year = {1998} } @article{SCHOENBERG1969, author = {SCHOENBERG, JUDITH}, title = {BELIEF AND INTENTION IN THE EPIMENIDES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {270-278}, keywords = {belief, intention, logic, lying, paradox}, abstract = {THE 'EPIMENIDES' IS A GENUINE PARADOX, CONCLUDING THAT A CONFIRMING INSTANCE OF L ("ALL CRETANS ARE LIARS") REFUTES L. BUT THE ARGUMENT IS INVALID. LYING ASSERTIONS ARE INTENTIONAL ACTIONS IN FUNCTION OF BELIEF. HOWEVER, THEIR DEFINITION IS PROBLEMATICAL BECAUSE LYING INTENTION IS COMPATIBLE WITH FALSE BELIEF, BUT "IF THE ASSERTION OF P IS A LIE, THEN P IS FALSE" IS NOT. NOW EPIMENIDES DOES OR DOES NOT BELIEVE L, WHICH IS TRUE OR FALSE. FOUR SPECIFIABLE SITUATIONS RESULT. ONE OF TRUE BELIEF IS CLEARLY IMPOSSIBLE (WHILE SHARPLY POSING THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM); THE OTHER, TRIVIALLY POSSIBLE. ONE CASE OF FALSE BELIEF UNDERMINES THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENT. (IF L IS TRUE, THEN IF EPIMENIDES INTENTIONALLY LIES, HE BELIEVES IT IS FALSE.) THE LAST AND MOST INTERESTING CASE INVOLVES A SET OF CONTRADICTORY BELIEFS AND AN EXISTENTIALLY (BUT NOT LOGICALLY) ABSURD INTENTIONAL ACTION. ORDINARY ANALYSIS THUS RESOLVES THE PARADOX AND ELICITS PROBLEMS OTHER THAN SELF REFERENCE LATENT IN IT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHON1968, author = {SCHON, DONALD-A}, title = {ARTHUR MURPHY ON THE THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {423-429}, keywords = {ethics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHON1961, author = {SCHON, DONALD-A}, title = {PLAYING THE ETHICAL GAME WITH MR HOLMES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {388-389}, keywords = {conflict, ethics, resolution, rule, system}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHON1960, author = {SCHON, DONALD}, title = {RATIONALITY IN RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE DELIBERATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {477-486}, keywords = {criticism, decision, deliberation, ethics, fact, moral-judgment; rationality}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE HERE IS TO EXPLORE SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE DELIBERATION, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR WHAT IS ORDINARILY TAKEN TO BE RATIONALITY IN PRACTICAL DELIBERATION. PROSPECTIVE DELIBERATION MAY INCLUDE BOTH THE JUDGMENT THAT AN ACT IS RIGHT AND THE DECISION TO PERFORM IT. ALL RETROSPECTIVE DELIBERATION IS EVALUATIVE; THERE IS NO DECISION TO PERFORM. A THREEFOLD DISTINCTION EMERGES: RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATION, PROSPECTIVE EVALUATION, AND PROSPECTIVE DECISION. THE DISTINCTIONS DRAWN HERE ARE COMPLEX. WHETHER DELIBERATION IS DIRECTED TOWARD AN ACTION ALREADY PERFORMED (RETROSPECTIVE) OR TOWARD AN ACTION NOT YET PERFORMED (PROSPECTIVE), THESE DISTINCT DELIBERATIONS ARE SUBJECTED TO DIFFERENT TYPES OF IRRATIONALITY. THE DISTINCTIONS DRAWN HELP TO CLARIFY CRITERIA GOVERNING RATIONAL PRACTICAL DELIBERATION. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHRAG1980, author = {SCHRAG, CALVIN-O}, title = {PROFESSOR SEIGFRIED ON DESCRIPTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {411-414}, keywords = {constructivism, phenomenology, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHRAG1962, author = {SCHRAG, CALVIN-O}, title = {JOHN WILD ON CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {409-411}, keywords = {epistemology, existence, experience, phenomenology, self-consciousnes}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Schroeder2005, author = {Schroeder, Timothy}, title = {Moral Responsibility and Tourette Syndrome}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {106-123}, keywords = {blameworthiness, disorder, ethics, moral-responsibility; neurology}, abstract = {Philosophers generally assume that individuals with Tourette syndrome are not responsible for their Tourettic tics, and so not blameworthy for any harm their tics might cause. Yet this assumption is based largely on ignorance of the lived experience of Tourette syndrome. Individuals with Tourette syndrome often experience their tics as freely chosen and reason-responsive. Yet it still seems wrong to treat a Tourettic individual's tic as on a moral par with others' actions. In this paper, I examine the options and argue that, if this is correct, then a surprising consequence follows: the standard, motivation-based theory of desire must be false. I go on to argue that, given what is known about the neurological basis of Tourette syndrome, this is a reasonable conclusion to draw.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Schroeter2004, author = {Schroeter, Francois}, title = {Endorsement and Autonomous Agency}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {633-659}, keywords = {action, agency, autonomy, endorsement, metaphysics}, abstract = {We take self-governance or autonomy to be a central feature of human agency: we believe that our actions normally occur under our guidance and at our command. A common criticism of the standard theory of action is that it leaves the agent out of his actions and thus mischaracterizes our autonomy. According to proponents of the endorsement model of autonomy, such as Harry Frankfurt and David Velleman, the standard theory simply needs to be supplemented with the agent's actual endorsement of his actions in order to make room for our autonomy. I argue that their proposal fails and that a more substantive enrichment of the standard theory is called for.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHUFREIDER1983, author = {SCHUFREIDER, GREGORY}, title = {THE LOGIC OF THE ABSURD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {61-84}, keywords = {absurd, metaphysics, subjectivity, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHUHMANN1983, author = {SCHUHMANN, KARL}, title = {MARKERS ON THE ROAD TO THE CONCEPTION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT: APPENDIX TO SPIEGELBERG'S PAPER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {299-306}, keywords = {metaphysics, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHUHMANN1990, author = {SCHUHMANN, Karl}, title = {Husserl's Yearbook.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {philosophy}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHUHMANN1987, author = {SCHUHMANN, KARL and SMITH, BARRY}, title = {QUESTIONS: AN ESSAY IN DAUBERTIAN PHENOMENOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {353-384}, keywords = {metaphysics, phenomenology}, abstract = {THIS IS A HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE LOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND LINGUISTIC DIMENSIONS OF THE ACT OF QUESTIONING, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE WORK OF THE MUNICH SCHOOL OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND OF E HUSSERL. THE ESSAY IS A CONTRIBUTION TO RECENT WORK ON ANTICIPATIONS BY THE MUNICH SCHOOL OF THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHURMANN1979, author = {SCHURMANN, REINER}, title = {THE ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {99-122}, keywords = {being, language, ontology, political-philosophy; reference, symbol, thought}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHWANKL1967, author = {SCHWANKL, PETER}, title = {ON THE PHENOMENON OF PERPLEXITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {553-563}, keywords = {epistemology, perplexity, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Schwartz2001, author = {Schwartz, Robert}, title = {Vision and Cognition in Picture Perception}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {707-719}, keywords = {aesthetics, cognition, epistemology, perception, picture, vision}, abstract = {On the surrogate paradigm, pictures are mimetic stand-ins, re-presenting their real-life counterparts. So picture perception is not critically different from ordinary perception. On the symbolic paradigm, pictures are first and foremost vehicles of thought and communication. Like diagrams, maps, and words pictures have an essential symbolic function. Resistance to this approach rests largely on the presumption that in allying pictures with other forms of representation, the symbolic paradigm ignores the "visuality" of pictures. I challenge this claim and explore how adopting the symbolic paradigm casts new light on current problems in the study of picture perception.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHWARZ1962, author = {SCHWARZ, WOLFGANG}, title = {KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {71-80}, keywords = {freedom, international-relations; law, peace, political-philosophy; reason, right}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHWARZ1965, author = {SCHWARZ, WOLFGANG}, title = {PROFESSOR ENGEL ON KANT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {406-411}, keywords = {existence, god, ontological-proof; predicate, religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHWARZ1980, author = {SCHWARZ, WOLFGANG}, title = {A LOST CAUSE: THE CONTINUING PTOLEMAIC AGE IN PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {568-575}, keywords = {metaphysics, metascience, paradigm, philosophy}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE PRESENTS A NEW ASSESSMENT OF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY IN RESPECT OF KANT'S "COPERNICAN TURN," FOCUSING ON KANT'S ACHIEVEMENT AS A CASE OF NON-RECEPTION OF A SCIENTIFIC BREAK THROUGH. JUDGED BY THE NON-ACCEPTANCE OF HIS RIGOROUSLY DETERMINED SCIENCE OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY REFUTATION OF ITS PROOFS, KANT MUST BE CONSIDERED NOT THE COPERNICUS OF METAPHYSICS BUT ITS ARISTARCHUS. ARISTARCHUS' HELIOCENTRIC IDEA NEEDED NINETEEN HUNDRED YEARS TO SURFACE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SCHWARZ1987, author = {SCHWARZ, WOLFGANG}, title = {KANT'S CATEGORIES OF REALITY AND EXISTENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {343-346}, keywords = {existence, metaphysics, perception, reality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Schweizer1993, author = {Schweizer, Paul}, title = {Mind/Consciousness Dualism in Sankhya-Yoga Philosophy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {845-859}, keywords = {consciousness, dualism, metaphysics, sinkhya, yoga}, abstract = {The paper explores an alternative formulation of the mind/body problem advanced by the Sankhya- Yoga school of Indian philosophy. In contrast to the Cartesian polarity of mind and matter, Sankhya- Yoga dualism is between matter and consciousness, where the mind is viewed as a material faculty. This has a number of important consequences for the relation between consciousness and representation. For example, qualia are viewed as composite phenomena, where their material structure is the vehicle of representational content. This alternative conception eliminates several of the most pronounced difficulties of Cartesian dualism, including introspective transparency of meaning, and mental causation.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Scott-Kakures2002, author = {Scott-Kakures, Dion}, title = {At "Permanent Risk": Reasoning and Self-Knowledge in Self-Deception}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {577-603}, keywords = {deflationism, epistemology, reasoning, risk, self-deception; self-knowledg}, abstract = {In this essay, I defend the following two claims: (1) reflective, critical reasoning is essential to the process of self-deception; and (2), the process of self-deception involves a certain characteristic error of self-knowledge. By appeal to (1) and (2), I hope to show that we can adjudicate the current dispute about the nature of self-deception between those we might term "traditionalists," and those we might term "deflationists."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Scott-Kakures1996, author = {Scott-Kakures, Dion}, title = {Self-Deception and Internal Irrationality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {31-56}, keywords = {epistemology, irrationality, self, self-deceptio}, abstract = {I characterize a notion of internal irrationality which is central to hard cases of self-deception. I argue that if we aim to locate such internal irrationality in the process of self-deception, we must fail. The process of self-deception, I claim, is a wholly arational affair. If we are to make a place for internal irrationality we must turn our attention to the state of self-deception. I go on to argue that we are able to offer an account of this peculiar form of irrationality only if we recognize the role the self-deceiver's own efforts at self-explanation play in the generation of internal irrationality.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Scott-Kakures1994, author = {Scott-Kakures, Dion}, title = {On Belief and the Captivity of the Will}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {77-103}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, language, rationality, will}, abstract = {Many theorists argue that our inability to will beliefs directly is not a "contingent matter" (Williams, 1973). Such philosophers have tended to argue that something about the nature of belief (e.g., its truth-directedness) rules out as incoherent such belief state transitions. I argue that such arguments must inevitably fail. I point out, however, that the apologist for believing at will must distinguish the case of willing a belief directly from a case in which desires or intentions deviantly cause a belief. I argue that these cannot be distinguished, and that in no case could my intending here-and-now to believe that p produce the belief that p in a way which would make for intentional basic action.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Seager1993, author = {Seager, William}, title = {The Elimination of Experience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {345-365}, keywords = {consciousness, experience, metaphysics, qualia}, abstract = {In 'Quining Qualia', and again in "Consciousness Explained", Daniel Dennett attempts no less than the elimination of qualitative experience ("qualia"). Crudely, the grounds for the elimination are two-fold. First, qualia fall prey to a variety of verificationist difficulties; second, there is no coherent concept of qualia behind our crowd of intuitions. Dennett's attack is serious, detailed and fuelled by a range of fascinating thought experiments. But, I argue, it is ultimately unconvincing. I try to show that there is a fairly minimal conception of qualia which is entirely coherent (though not without its mysteries) and also that Dennett's verificationist attacks are two radical to carry conviction.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SEAGER1988, author = {SEAGER, WILLIAM-E}, title = {WEAK SUPERVENIENCE AND MATERIALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {697-709}, keywords = {logic, materialism, metaphysics, reductionism, supervenience}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE ARGUES THAT WEAK SUPERVENIENCE IS SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO ESTABLISH A REASONABLE AND PLAUSIBLE MATERIALISM. SUPERVENIENCE IS A RELATION BETWEEN FAMILIES OF PROPERTIES, SUCH THAT, ROUGHLY SPEAKING, FAMILY A SUPERVENES ON FAMILY B IF ANY OBJECTS WHICH ARE INDISCERNIBLE WITH RESPECT TO B ARE THEREBY INDISCERNIBLE WITH RESPECT TO A. WEAK SUPERVENIENCE IS SUPERVENIENCE RESTRICTED TO ONE POSSIBLE WORLD; STRONG SUPERVENIENCE IS A "NECESSARY" SUPERVENIENCE EXTENDING ACROSS SOME PRINCIPLED SET OF POSSIBLE WORLDS. THESE NOTIONS ARE MADE SOMEWHAT MORE RIGOROUS FOLLOWING JAEGWON KIM'S DEVELOPMENT OF THEM. KIM HAS ARGUED THAT ONLY STRONG SUPERVENIENCE CAN GROUND A 'ROBUST' MATERIALISM, SO THE ARTICLE BEGINS BY CRITICIZING HIS ARGUMENTS FOR THIS POSITION. IT ARGUES THAT ANY FORM OF STRONG SUPERVENIENCE IS IN FACT TOO STRONG TO CHARACTERIZE MATERIALISM AS IT IS NORMALLY CONCEIVED, FOR MATERIALISM IS NEITHER LOGICALLY NOR PHYSICALLY NECESSARY. BUT THE DAY IS SAVED AS WEAK SUPERVENIENCE CAN BE SHOWN TO BE JUST SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO GROUND MATERIALISM. IN PARTICULAR, IT IS SHOWN THAT SUPERVENIENCE CAN SUPPORT COUNTERFACTUALS WITHOUT REQUIRING ANY NOTION OF "NECESSARY" SUPERVENIENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Searle1995, author = {Searle, John-R}, title = {Consciousness, the Brain and the Connection Principle: A Reply}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {217-232}, keywords = {biology, brain, connectionism, consciousness, mind, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Searle1997, author = {Searle, John-R}, title = {Precis of The Construction of Social Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {427-428}, keywords = {concept, epistemology, knowledge, reality, social}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Searle1997a, author = {Searle, John-R}, title = {Responses to Critics of The Construction of Social Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {449-458}, keywords = {epistemology, reality, social}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SEARLE1989, author = {SEARLE, JOHN-R}, title = {REPLY TO JACQUETTE'S "ADVENTURES IN THE CHINESE ROOM".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {701-707}, keywords = {intentionality, metaphysics, mind, syntax}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Searle1994, author = {Searle, John-R}, title = {The Connection Principle and the Ontology of the Unconscious: A Reply to Fodor and Lepore}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {847-855}, keywords = {behavior, connectionism, mental, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SEDERBERG1975, author = {SEDERBERG, PETER-C and SEDERBERG, NANCY-B}, title = {TRANSMITTING THE NONTRANSMISSIBLE: THE FUNCTION OF LITERATURE IN THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {173-196}, keywords = {aesthetics, knowledge, literature, social-philosophy; society}, abstract = {THIS ESSAY TREATS LITERATURE AS A WAY TO SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE WHICH CAN REVEAL ASPECTS WHICH ARE EXCLUDED BY THE ASSUMPTIONS AND RIGOROUS LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY. THE QUESTION REMAINS TO WHAT EXTENT ONE CAN DRAW ON BOTH OF THESE COMPLEMENTARY "WAYS" TO KNOWLEDGE. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A TENTATIVE ANSWER TO THIS PROBLEM, AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK CAPABLE OF COMPREHENDING SCIENTIFIC METHOD AS WELL AS OTHER WAYS TO KNOWLEDGE IS DEVELOPED. SECOND, SOME OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC AND LITERARY "METHOD" ARE EXAMINED. LASTLY, CONSIDERATION IS GIVEN TO HOW A MORE HOLISTIC APPROACH ENRICHES SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SEDGWICK1988, author = {SEDGWICK, SALLY-S}, title = {ON THE RELATION OF PURE REASON TO CONTENT: A REPLY TO HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF FORMALISM IN KANT'S ETHICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {59-80}, keywords = {ethics, formalism, natural-la}, abstract = {HEGEL THINKS THAT THE "EMPTINESS" OF KANT'S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INADEQUACY OF ETHICAL FORMALISM IN AT LEAST TWO RESPECTS: (1) PARTICULAR DUTIES CAN ONLY BE DERIVED FROM THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE GIVEN THE "PRESUPPOSITION" OF SOME ADDITIONAL MORAL PRINCIPLE(S); (2) ITS APPLICATION AS A TEST OF MORAL WORTH REQUIRES THAT WE "ABSTRACT" THE MAXIM UNDER INVESTIGATION FROM ALL CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATIONS. THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT HEGEL IS MISTAKEN IN CONCLUDING THAT EMPIRICAL CONTENT PLAYS NO ROLE IN KANT'S MORAL THEORY IN DERIVING SPECIFIC DUTIES. SHE ALSO ARGUES THAT HEGEL MISCONSTRUES WHAT IS "FORMAL" ABOUT THE MORAL LAW IN IDENTIFYING IT AS SIMPLY AN APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION (A LAW OF "GENERAL LOGIC") TO THE PRACTICAL SPHERE. IN SO DOING, HE BYPASSES ANY CONSIDERATION OF THE UNIQUE WAY IN WHICH--AS AN "A PRIORI SYNTHETIC" LAW--THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IS INTENDED BY KANT TO CONDITION THE CONTENT TO WHICH IT APPLIES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SEEBURGER1975, author = {SEEBURGER, FRANCIS-F}, title = {HEIDEGGER AND THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {212-221}, keywords = {phenomenology, reduction, twentieth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sehon2000, author = {Sehon, Scott}, title = {An Argument against the Causal Theory of Action Explanation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {67-85}, keywords = {belief, causation, epistemology, explanation}, abstract = {This paper argues against the causal construal of action explanation. It first defends the claim that unless beliefs are brain states, beliefs cannot causally explain behavior. Second, the paper argues against the view that beliefs are brain states. It follows from these claims that beliefs do not causally explain behavior. An alternative account is then proposed, according to which action explanation is teleological rather than causal, and the paper closes by suggesting that teleological account makes sense of and supports the autonomy of common sense psychology. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Seibt1994, author = {Seibt, Johanna}, title = {A Janus View on Rescher's Perspectival Pluralism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {433-439}, keywords = {epistemology, experience, idealism, metaphysics, pluralism}, abstract = {In "Metaphilosophical Inquiries", the third part of his trilogy "A System of Pragmatic Idealism", N Rescher presents a new metaphilosophical stance labelled "perspectival pluralism". Perspectival pluralism is committed to the pluralist thesis that there is necessarily a multitude of philosophical positions with conflicting cognitive- value standards or perspectives, as well as the monist thesis that we always philosophize from within a perspective which we must deem universally valid and superior. I draw attention to a number of difficulties arising for Rescher's exposition of this stance (especially for his criticism of consensus theories of truth), as well as for perspectival pluralism "per se" as a viable metaphilosophical view.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SEIGFRIED1988, author = {SEIGFRIED, HANS}, title = {AGAINST NATURALIZING PRECONCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {505-518}, keywords = {concept, metaphysics, naturalism, phenomenology}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SCIENTIFIC, THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE CANNOT BE JUDGED EMPIRICALLY BUT MUST BE JUDGED TRANSCENDENTALLY. A THEORY IS JUSTIFIED TRANSCENDENTALLY BY ITS SUCCESS IN METHODICALLY REORGANIZING NATURAL EXPERIENCE IN TERMS OF THE TRANSPARENCY REQUIRED FOR THE CALCULATING AND PLANNING OF HUMAN ACTION. THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING MUST "ARTIFICIALLY" DECONCEPTUALIZE WHAT IS PRETHEORETICALLY GIVEN IN CONTROLLED SMALL STEPS, I.E., METHODICALLY REORGANIZE IT FROM SCRATCH. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SEIGFRIED1980, author = {SEIGFRIED, HANS}, title = {A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR SCHRAG'S COMMENTS ON "DESCRIPTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {415-419}, keywords = {constructivism, phenomenology, science}, abstract = {TO A LARGE EXTENT, I AGREE WITH PROFESSOR SCHRAG'S EXCEPTION OF HUSSERL HIMSELF FROM MY CRITICISM OF THE UNDULY NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY NOW FASHIONABLE AMONG MANY PHENOMENOLOGISTS, BUT I ARGUE (1) THAT HEIDEGGER'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROGRAM ALLOWS FOR A PHILOSOPHICALLY MORE PROMISING ASSESSMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND (2) THAT, IN THE END, THE HUSSERLIAN REDUCTION OF THE PHENOMENAL FINDINGS TO A TRANSCENDENTAL "EGO" TURNS PHENOMENOLOGICAL "A PRIORI" RESEARCH ITSELF INTO SOMETHING LIKE THE ALLEGEDLY ABSTRACT AND CONSTRUCTIVISTIC SPECULATION OF THE SCIENCES. I FULLY APPRECIATE PROFESSOR SCHRAG'S MAIN PROBLEM WITH MY PAPER, MORE ACCURATELY WITH HEIDEGGER'S IDEA OF A UNIVERSAL, NECESSARY, AND TRANSCENDENTAL "A PRIORI" WHICH IS AT THE SAME TIME FACTUAL AND FUNDAMENTALLY FINITE. I POINT OUT THAT THE PURPOSE OF MY PAPER WAS TO DEMONSTRATE MERELY THAT THIS PROBLEM DOES INDEED REQUIRE OUR CRITICAL ATTENTION, AND THAT IT CANNOT SIMPLY BE GLOSSED OVER OR EVEN DISMISSED AS A PSEUDOPROBLEM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SEIGFRIED1976, author = {SEIGFRIED, HANS}, title = {DESCRIPTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {248-261}, keywords = {epistemology, ontology, phenomenology, science}, abstract = {PHENOMENOLOGISTS, COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO THE DESCRIPTION OF THE LIFE-WORLD, FREQUENTLY CRITICIZE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE FOR BEING ABSTRACT AND CONSTRUCTIVISTIC. DISCUSSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ONTOLOGY AND SCIENCE IN A HEIDEGGERIAN CONTEXT, I DISMISS SUCH CRITICISM BY ARGUING THAT THE PHENOMENA WHICH PHENOMENOLOGY DESCRIBES ARE BY THEIR VERY NATURE CONSTRUCTIONS. PHENOMENOLOGY ITSELF IS NOTHING BUT A METHOD MODELED ON THAT OF THE SCIENCES AND DESIGNED TO FINALLY TURN PHILOSOPHY INTO A STRICT SCIENCE AFTER CENTURIES OF RANDOM SPECULATION. PHENOMENOLOGY, CONSEQUENTLY, CANNOT FUNCTION AS A BASIS FOR DIATRIBES AGAINST SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SELIGMAN1976, author = {SELIGMAN, DAVID-B}, title = {WITTGENSTEIN ON SEEING ASPECTS AND EXPERIENCING MEANINGS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {205-217}, keywords = {epistemology, illusion, meaning, seeing, sensation}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR SHOWS THAT WITTGENSTEIN'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL SOUNDING TALK IN "PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS", II, XI, ABOUT "EXPERIENCING MEANINGS" SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF WHAT WITTGENSTEIN ELSEWHERE REFERS TO AS THE "FORM OF LIFE" OR TOTAL CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH LINGUISTIC MEANING IS ESTABLISHED AND MAINTAINED. THIS IS DONE BY DRAWING CERTAIN ANALOGIES WITH THE EXPERIENCE OF SEEING ASPECTS OR SEEING ASPECT SHIFTS FAMILIAR TO GESTALTIST PSYCHOLOGY. THESE OTHERWISE PUZZLING PASSAGES ARE THUS SHOWN TO BE OF A PIECE WITH WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEWS AS EXPRESSED IN PART I OF THE "INVESTIGATIONS".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SELLARS1967, author = {SELLARS, ROY-WOOD}, title = {IN WHAT SENSE DO VALUE JUDGMENTS AND MORAL JUDGMENTS HAVE OBJECTIVE IMPORT?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {1-16}, keywords = {ethics, judgment, naturalism, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SELLARS1961, author = {SELLARS, ROY-WOOD}, title = {REFERENTIAL TRANSCENDENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {1-15}, keywords = {american, epistemology, immanence, perceiving, reference, sensation, transcendence, twentieth}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE EMPHASIZES THE MECHANISM OF PERCEIVING, ESPECIALLY THE ROLE OF SENSATIONS, WHICH IT IS MAINTAINED GIVE PERCEIVING OBJECTIVE IMPORT. THE AUTHOR TAKES ISSUE WITH TRADITIONAL EMPIRICISM, BY SHOWING THAT SENSATIONS ARE NOT TERMINAL AND NOT IN THE PURELY INTROSPECTIVE TRADITION; BUT INTEGRAL TO THE ACTIVITY OF RESPONSE. ONE LOOKS THROUGH HIS VISUAL FIELD "AT" THE OBJECT! THERE IS SOME BASIS FOR COGNITIVE TRANSCENDENCE. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT PHENOMENALISM, EXPERIMENTALISM AND PHILOSOPHICAL BEHAVIORISM ALL ARE UNABLE TO GRASP THE MECHANISM OF PERCEIVING AND CANNOT SHOW HOW IT CONNECTS UP THE PERCIPIENT WITH HIS WORLD. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SELLARS1965, author = {SELLARS, ROY-WOOD}, title = {EXISTENTIALISM, REALISTIC EMPIRICISM, AND MATERIALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {315-332}, keywords = {dialectical-materialism; empiricism, epistemology, existentialism, philosophy, realism, twentieth}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO CORRELATE AND APPRAISE CONTENDING POSITIONS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY. THERE ARE FOUR OF THESE DEMANDING ATTENTION: REALISTIC EMPIRICISM, MATERIALISM, EXISTENTIALISM, AND NEO-THOMISM. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THESE POSITIONS ARE DOMINANT IN DIFFERENT CULTURAL REGIONS AND HAVE DIVERGENT HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS. IN THIS RESPECT, PHILOSOPHY DIFFERS FROM SCIENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SELLARS1969, author = {SELLARS, WILFRID}, title = {LANGUAGE AS THOUGHT AND AS COMMUNICATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {506-527}, keywords = {communication, language, thought}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sennett1992, author = {Sennett, James-F}, title = {Toward a Compatibility Theory for Internalist and Externalist Epistemologies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {641-655}, keywords = {compatibilism, epistemology, externalism, internalism, language}, abstract = {The internalist argues that justification is a matter of internal access, while the externalist insists that processes or mechanisms functioning to produce certain types of beliefs in certain types of stimulative situations are the key to a theory of justification. These positions are often considered mutually exclusive. It is my contention that the intuitions that motivate both theory types are important epistemologically, that both define issues that must be addressed in a theory of knowledge, and that they can be understood as compatible doctrines. In this paper I present certain distinctions between internalism and externalism that define two different epistemological tasks. I then propose an approach to the theory of knowledge under which both tasks can and should be legitimately pursued.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Senor1996, author = {Senor, Thomas-D}, title = {The Prima/Ultima Facie Justification Distinction in Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {551-566}, keywords = {coherentism, epistemology, feasibility, foundationalism, justification}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Setiya2004, author = {Setiya, Kieran}, title = {Transcendental Idealism in the "Aesthetic"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {63-88}, keywords = {aesthetics, intuition, metaphysics, transcendental-idealis}, abstract = {In the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant offers an argument for transcendental idealism. This argument is one focus of the longstanding controversy between "one-world" and "two-world" interpretations of the distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear. I present an interpretation of the argument of the "aesthetic" that supports a novel "one-world" interpretation. On this interpretation, Kant is concerned with the mind-dependence of spatial and temporal properties; and with the idea that space and time can be identified with mental objects. I end by arguing that, for Kant, even on a "one-world" interpretation, we do not know the nature of even the existence of mind-independent things.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SETTLE1973, author = {SETTLE, TOM}, title = {THE SWITCHES PARADOX: WHICH SWITCH?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {421-428}, keywords = {epistemology, paradox}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SEVERENS1967, author = {SEVERENS, RICHARD}, title = {SEEING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {213-221}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, seeing}, abstract = {VERBS OF SENSATION, WHEN COMPLETED BY PROPOSITIONAL CLAUSES, ARE SEEN TO PLAY A DISTINCTIVE ROLE: THAT OF TAKING PART IN REPORTS OF INFORMATION GAINED BY SENSATION. CONSTRUING SUCH VERBS AS EXPRESSING THE RELATION OF PERCEIVERS TO FACTS PERCEIVED IS FOUND TO ISSUE IN PROBLEMS INVOLVING IDENTITY. VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF OTHER PSYCHOLOGICAL WORDS ARE PROPOSED AS ANALYSES OF THE PARADIGMATIC 'SEES THAT.' ALL ARE FOUND EITHER TO BE CIRCULAR OR TO ADMIT OF COUNTEREXAMPLES. 'SEES THAT' AND ITS KIN THUS LACK ANY SATISFACTORY NATURAL ACCOUNTING, LEAVING UNACCOUNTED THE ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION BY MEANS OF SENSATION. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR EMPIRICISM ARE OBVIOUS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shafer-L1994, author = {Shafer-Landau, Russ}, title = {Ethical Disagreement, Ethical Objectivism and Moral Indeterminacy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {331-344}, keywords = {belief, ethics, indeterminacy, morality, self}, abstract = {Consider the following argument: 1) If there are objective moral facts, then there can be no intractable moral disagreement among ideal moral judges. 2) There can be such disagreement. 3) Thus there are no objective moral facts. I provide three responses on behalf of the ethical objectivist. Two of these accept the second premise while rejecting the first. The last rejects the second premise and accepts the first. The novelty of these strategies lies in their reliance on different forms of moral indeterminacy. I offer a taxonomy of such indeterminacy in the paper.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shagrir1999, author = {Shagrir, Oron}, title = {More on Global Supervenience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {691-701}, keywords = {epistemology, global, supervenience}, abstract = {Jaegwon Kim contends that global supervenience is consistent with nonmaterialistic cases. Paull and Sider, Horgan, as well as Kim, attempt to defend it from these charges. It is shown here that their defense is only partially successful. Their defense meets one challenge to global supervenience--the hydrogen-atom case--but fails to meet other, 'local', cases. It is suggested that the other challenges can be met if global supervenience is combined with weak supervenience. The combination of global and weak supervenience constitutes a viable picture of psychophysical relations, and is especially attractive to nonreductive materialists who are also anti-individualists.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SHALKOWSKI1987, author = {SHALKOWSKI, SCOTT-A}, title = {CONCEPTS AND CORRESPONDENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {461-474}, keywords = {concept, correspondence, metaphysics, realism}, abstract = {IN "WAYS OF WORLDMAKING", NELSON GOODMAN DEFENDS A VERSION OF METAPHYSICAL RELATIVISM WHICH INVOLVES POSITING MULTIPLE ACTUAL WORLDS. HE ARGUES FOR THIS BY TRYING TO SHOW THE INCOHERENCE OF METAPHYSICAL REALISM WHICH INVOLVES TRUTH AS CORRESPONDENCE TO A (LARGELY) DETERMINATE WORLD. I EXAMINE ARGUMENTS FROM THE NATURE OF CONCEPTS AND THE NON-REDUCIBILITY OF TRUE THEORIES TO ONE MOST FUNDAMENTAL THEORY WHICH GOODMAN USES TO DEFEND HIS CLAIMS. I FIND IN THEM NOTHING TO THREATEN REALIST METAPHYSICS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SHALKOWSKI1987a, author = {SHALKOWSKI, SCOTT-A}, title = {CORRESPONDENCE REVISITED.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {481-483}, keywords = {metaphysics, realism, truth}, abstract = {HERE I RESPOND TO CATHERINE ELGIN'S DEFENSES OF RELATIVISM. SHE CLAIMS MY VERSION OF REALISM IS SAVED AT GREAT THEORETICAL COST AND STILL DOES NOT ADEQUATELY DEAL WITH THE FACT THAT WE ACCEPT AS TRUE IRRECONCILABLE THEORIES. I CLAIM THAT THE OPTIONS I POSE FOR THE REALIST ARE NOT "AD HOC" AND MAY BE FORCED UPON US ON INDEPENDENT GROUNDS, AND THAT ELGIN HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THERE ARE "IRRECONCILABLE" THEORIES WE TAKE TO BE TRUE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shapere1995, author = {Shapere, Dudley}, title = {Kitcher on Advancing Science}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {647-651}, keywords = {advancement, knowledge, science, society}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shapere1998, author = {Shapere, Dudley}, title = {Churchland on Cognitive Creativity and the Understanding of Science}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {879-884}, keywords = {cognition, creativity, metaphysics, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shapiro2004, author = {Shapiro, Lionel}, title = {Brandom on the Normativity of Meaning}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {141-160}, keywords = {deflationism, inferentialism, meaning, metaphysics}, abstract = {Brandom's "inferentialism"--his theory that an expression's or state's contentfulness consists in its use or occurrence being governed by inferential norms--proves dubiously compatible with his own deflationary approach to underwriting the objectivity of intentional content (an approach that is one of the theory's essential presuppositions). This is because a deflationist argument, adapted from the case of truth to that of correct inference, undermines the key criterion of adequacy Brandom employs in motivating inferentialism. Once that constraint is abandoned, furthermore, Brandom is left vulnerable to the charge that his inferential norms are unavailable to play the meaning-constituting role he claims for them. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SHARVY1983, author = {SHARVY, RICHARD}, title = {MIXTURES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {227-240}, keywords = {matter, metaphysics}, abstract = {WHEN I ADD A LITTLE MILK "M" TO A CUP OF COFFEE "C" I DO NOT GET ANY MORE COFFEE THAN I STARTED WITH. "C" + "M" IS NOT COFFEE, AND "M" IS STILL NOT "PART" OF ANY QUANTITY OF COFFEE. HOWEVER, "M" IS NOW "IN" SOME COFFEE; THE COFFEE SURROUNDS IT. THE COFFEE + THE MILK IS NOT "LIGHT COFFEE"; LIGHT COFFEE IS COFFEE WITH MILK IN IT, BUT IT IS, AT ANY RATE, COFFEE, AND "C" + "M" IS NOT COFFEE. THE COFFEE THAT THE MILK IS IN IS "C", AND "C" IS STILL COFFEE AFTER THE MIXING HAS TAKEN PLACE. "C" IS NO LONGER BLACK COFFEE, ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL COFFEE. LIGHT COFFEE IS NOT "BLACK" COFFEE WITH MILK IN IT: THAT WOULD BE AS SELF-CONTRADICTORY AS CALLING ME A NAKED MAN WITH CLOTHES ON.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shatz1997, author = {Shatz, David}, title = {The Metaphysics of Control}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {955-960}, keywords = {control, free-will; metaphysics, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SHEA1988, author = {SHEA, JOSEPH}, title = {THE COMMENSURABILITY OF THEORIZING AND MORAL ACTION IN THE "NICOMACHEAN ETHICS".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {753-755}, keywords = {action, ethics, incommensurability, moral, theoretical-reaso}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SHEEHAN1975, author = {SHEEHAN, P-J and NAULTY, R-A}, title = {HUME, PRICE AND TESTIMONY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {376-384}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, evidence, observation}, abstract = {IN HIS BOOK "BELIEF", H H PRICE ARGUES THAT WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE CREDENCE WE GIVE TO TESTIMONIES. SO INSTEAD OF "EVIDENTIAL" SUPPORT FOR SUCH BELIEFS, PRICE TURNS TO "PRUDENTIAL" SUPPORT: IF WE ACCEPT THE REPORTS OF WITNESSES WE SHALL ACQUIRE MUCH MORE INFORMATION THAN WE SHOULD OTHERWISE. BUT THAT PLAINLY ASSUMES THAT THE INFORMATION IS RELIABLE, SO THE QUESTION OF THE TRUTH OF THAT ASSUMPTION REASSERTS ITSELF. WE POINT OUT THAT THERE IS MUCH MORE EVIDENCE FOR THE TRUTH OF THE ASSUMPTION THAN EITHER PRICE AND HUME REALIZE. BUT EVEN SO, THE NATURE OF THE CASE MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHETHER THERE IS "ENOUGH" EVIDENCE. IF THERE IS NOT, WE SUGGEST, THAT MAKES TESTIMONY AN IRREDUCIBLE WAY OF FINDING OUT ABOUT FACTS, ALONG WITH PERCEPTION, INTROSPECTION, MEMORY, AND DEDUCTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SHEETS-JOHNSTONE1986, author = {SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, MAXINE}, title = {ON THE CONCEPTUAL ORIGIN OF DEATH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {31-58}, keywords = {dasein, death, metaphysics}, abstract = {THE PAPER EXAMINES NONHUMAN ANIMAL BEHAVIOR IN FACE OF DEATH, THE CLASSIC EXISTENTIAL PHYSICAL/LIVED BODY DISTINCTION, AND THE-OTHER-IN-DEATH AS A VISUAL BODY RADICALLY DIFFERENT FROM ITS FORMER ANIMATE PRESENCE. IT SHOWS HOW, THROUGH AN HUSSERLIAN ACCOUNT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF OTHERS-THAN-I, AN ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING IS HAD OF THE-OTHER-IN-DEATH, AND HOW THIS ORIGINARY UNDERSTANDING IS AT THE SAME TIME A SELF-UNDERSTANDING. HEIDEGGER'S AND SARTRE'S EXPOSITIONS OF DEATH ARE BROUGHT INTO THIS PALEOANTHROPOLOGICAL/PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SHELTON1988, author = {SHELTON, JIM}, title = {SCHLICK AND HUSSERL ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {557-561}, keywords = {intuition, metaphysics, phenomenology}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE IS AN EXAMINATION OF THE CLAIM MADE BY HUSSERL, AND RECENTLY RENEWED BY M M VAN DE PITTE, THAT MORITZ SCHLICK MISREPRESENTED HUSSERL'S VIEW OF THE NATURE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROPOSITIONS. IT IS ARGUED THAT SCHLICK DID NOT MISREPRESENT HUSSERL'S NOTION OF SYNTHETIC "A PRIORI" PROPOSITIONS. THE DISPUTE IS VIEWED FROM SCHLICK'S POINT OF VIEW IN WHICH A FIRM DISTINCTION IS MADE BETWEEN INTUITION AND KNOWLEDGE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SHER1975, author = {SHER, GEORGE}, title = {SENTENCES IN THE BRAIN?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {94-99}, keywords = {intentionality, materialism, mental-states; metaphysics, sentence}, abstract = {THE INTENTIONALITY OF MENTAL STATES POSES A DIFFICULTY FOR THE MATERIALIST; FOR IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW DESIRES, BELIEFS, ETC., COULD BE IDENTICAL WITH BRAIN-STATES IF THEY ARE, WHILE BRAIN-STATES ARE NOT, "ABOUT" THINGS. RECENTLY, ARTHUR DANTO HAS PROPOSED THAT THIS DIFFICULTY WOULD NOT ARISE IF MENTAL STATES WERE IDENTICAL WITH "MEANING-BEARING" BRAIN-STATES, I.E., WITH PHYSICAL CONFIGURATIONS WITHIN OUR SKULLS SEMANTICALLY ON A PAR WITH THE MARKS ON THIS PAPER. I ARGUE THAT DIFFICULTIES ARISE FOR DANTO'S SUGGESTION WHEN WE TRY TO UNDERSTAND (A) THE LINGUISTIC CONVENTIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO GOVERN SUCH STATES, AND (B) HOW, ON DANTO'S ACCOUNT, ONE MENTAL STATE COULD DIFFER FROM ANOTHER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sher2002, author = {Sher, George}, title = {Blameworthy Action and Character}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {381-392}, keywords = {action, blameworthy, character, ethics}, abstract = {A number of philosophers from Hume on have claimed that it does not make sense to blame people for acting badly unless their bad acts were rooted in their characters. In this paper, I distinguish a stronger and a weaker version of this claim. The claim is false, I argue, if it is taken to mean that agents can only be blamed for bad acts when those acts are manifestations of character flaws. However, what is both true and important is the weaker claim that an act is not blameworthy unless it is rooted in some enduring aspect or aspects of the agent's character that may or may not be flaws, and that, if flaws, may or may not be bad in the same way that the act itself is.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SHERIDAN1983, author = {SHERIDAN, GREGORY}, title = {CAN THERE BE MORAL SUBJECTS IN A PHYSICALISTIC UNIVERSE?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {425-448}, keywords = {metaphysics, mind, moral-agent; physicalism, subjectivity}, abstract = {PHILOSOPHICAL DISPUTES ABOUT THE RECONCILABILITY OF PHYSICALISM WITH CONDITIONS FOR PERSONHOOD AND THE RATIONALITY OF MORAL CLAIMS HAVE USUALLY CENTERED AROUND THE QUESTION: CAN THERE BE MORAL AGENTS IN A PHYSICALISTIC UNIVERSE? IN THIS PAPER I FOCUS MY ATTENTION ON THE QUESTION: CAN THERE BE "MORAL SUBJECTS" IN A PHYSICALISTIC UNIVERSE? I ARGUE THAT THE CONCEPT OF A MORAL SUBJECT POSES AN EVEN GREATER OBSTACLE TO RECONCILABILITY WITH PHYSICALISM THAN THAT OF MORAL AGENCY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sherman2004, author = {Sherman, Nancy}, title = {"It Is No Little Thing to Make Mine Eyes to Sweat Compassion": APA Comments of Martha Nussbaum's Upheavals of Thought}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {458-464}, keywords = {compassion, cosmopolitanism, emotion, ethics, stoicism}, abstract = {One way to read Nussbaum's Upheavals of Thought is as an invitation to the reader to find a role for compassion in public life. I take up her invitation by considering a part of public life she doesn't herself touch on in this chapter--namely, the military and the role of compassion within it. I also consider the topic from the point of view of something quite central to Nussbaum's own project--namely, the viability of stoicism as informing views about emotions and eudaimonia more generally. To narrow the lens even more, I consider the role of compassion for someone I call, the stoic warrior, (a term that serves as the title of my own forthcoming book on stoicism and the military).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sherman1993, author = {Sherman, Nancy}, title = {The Virtues of Common Pursuit}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {277-299}, keywords = {common-good; ethics, morality, virtue}, abstract = {When we think about being good, morally good that is, what comes to mind is being good to others, and in a less definite, though still important way, being good to ourselves. Thus, the virtues typically divide into self and other regarding character states. I want to argue that in addition to caring about self and others, we care about the fact that we do things together. To share in projects, ideas, and communities has values for us. And an interest in and enthusiasm for such common projects can be morally virtuous. I want to explore these views in the contexts of a comparison of Aristotelian and Kantian moral conceptions on the value of community. While securing a place for community in a Kantian scheme may seem initially more troubling than finding a comparable home in an Aristotelian account, I hope to dispel some of these worries by the end of the paper. This will require turning to some of Kant's early political essays in which he develops the notion of moral virtue as part of a larger, collective endeavor, as well as the much later "Religion" in which he discusses the notion of an ethical commonwealth as a rallying point for those devoted to virtue.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SHERMAN1987, author = {SHERMAN, NANCY}, title = {ARISTOTLE ON FRIENDSHIP AND THE SHARED LIFE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {589-613}, keywords = {ethics, friendship, good-life; happiness, self, sharing}, abstract = {IN THIS PAPER I CONSIDER THE VALUE OF FRIENDSHIP FROM AN ARISTOTELIAN POINT OF VIEW. THE ISSUE IS OF CURRENT INTEREST GIVEN RECENT CHALLENGES TO IMPARTIALIST ETHICS TO TAKE MORE SERIOUSLY THE COMMITMENTS AND ATTACHMENTS OF A PERSON. HOWEVER, I ENTER THAT DEBATE IN ONLY A RESTRICTED WAY BY STRENGTHENING THE CHALLENGE ARTICULATED IN ARISTOTLE'S SYSTEMATIC DEFENSE OF FRIENDSHIP AND THE SHARED LIFE. AFTER SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, I BEGIN BY CONSIDERING ARISTOTLE'S NOTION THAT GOOD LIVING OR HAPPINESS ("EUDAIMONIA") FOR AN INDIVIDUAL NECESSARILY INCLUDES THE HAPPINESS OF OTHERS. SHARED HAPPINESS ENTAILS THE RATIONAL CAPACITY FOR JOINTLY PROMOTING COMMON ENDS AS WELL AS THE CAPACITY TO IDENTIFY WITH AND COORDINATE SEPARATE ENDS. THIS EXTENDED NOTION OF HAPPINESS PRESUPPOSES THE EXTENSION OF SELF THROUGH ATTACHMENTS, AND I NEXT CONSIDER CERTAIN MINIMAL CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR ATTACHMENT. FINALLY, I DISCUSS HOW ARISTOTLE'S NOTION OF A FRIEND AS "ANOTHER SELF" IS COMPATIBLE BOTH WITH A CONCEPTION OF THE SEPARATENESS OF THE INDIVIDUALS AND OF THE DISTINCTIVE WAYS IN WHICH EACH INDIVIDUAL REALIZES VIRTUE WITHIN A SHARED LIFE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shoemaker1999, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Reply to Cynthia Macdonald}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {739-745}, keywords = {epistemology, internal, self-knowledge; sense}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shoemaker1998, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Two Cheers for Representationalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {671-678}, keywords = {metaphysics, qualia, representationalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shoemaker1992, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Unger's Psychological Continuity Theory}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {139-143}, keywords = {continuity, metaphysics, personal-identit}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shoemaker2000, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Phenomenal Character Revisited}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {465-467}, keywords = {experience, mental-states; metaphysics, mind}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SHOEMAKER1990, author = {SHOEMAKER, Sydney}, title = {Qualities and Qualia: What's in the Mind?.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {metaphysics, property, qualia, quality, secondary-qualit}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shoemaker2003, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Realization, Micro-Realization, and Coincidence}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {1-23}, keywords = {coincidence, metaphysics, physicalism, property, realization}, abstract = {Let thin properties be properties shared by coincident entities, e.g., a person and her body, and thick properties ones that are not shared. Thick properties entail sortal properties, e.g., being a person, and the associated persistence conditions. On the first account of realization defined here, the realized property and its realizers will belong to the same individual. This restricts the physical realizers of mental properties, which are thick, to thick physical properties. We also need a sense in which mental properties can be realized in thin physical properties shared by a person and her body. Defining this in turn requires defining a sense in which the instantiations of sortal properties and of thick properties are realized in microstructural states of affairs. A fourth notion of realization is needed to allow for the possibility of coincident entities that share a sortal property, e.g., coincident persons.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shoemaker1999a, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {On David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {439-444}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, mind, zombie}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shoemaker1994, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Lecture I: The Object Perception Model -- Self Knowledge and "Inner Sense"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {249-269}, keywords = {introspection, metaphysics, perception, self-knowledg}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shoemaker1994a, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model -- Self Knowledge and "Inner Sense"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {271-290}, keywords = {intrinsic, introspection, metaphysics, perception, self-knowledg}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shoemaker1994b, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience -- Self Knowledge and "Inner Sense"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {291-314}, keywords = {experience, intrinsic, introspection, metaphysics, self-knowledg}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shoemaker1993, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Lovely and Suspect Ideas}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {905-910}, keywords = {consciousness, experience, metaphysics, mind}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shogenji2000, author = {Shogenji, Tomoji}, title = {The Problem of the Criterion in Rule-Following}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {501-525}, keywords = {criteria, epistemology, knowledge, rule}, abstract = {This paper addresses the issue of rule-following in the context of the problem of the criterion. It presents a line of reasoning which concludes we do not know what rule we follow, but which develops independently of the problem of extrapolation that plays a major role in many recent discussions of rule-following. The basis of the argument is the normativity of rules, but the problem is also distinct from the issue of the gap between facts and values in axiology.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SHOPE1991, author = {SHOPE, Robert-K}, title = {Firth's Critique of Epistemological Rule-Utilitarianism.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {epistemology, reliability, rule-utilitarianism; warrant}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SHOPE1973, author = {SHOPE, ROBERT-K}, title = {REMEMBERING, KNOWLEDGE, AND MEMORY TRACES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {303-322}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, memory}, abstract = {THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE WILL CLEARLY ENTER INTO AN ADEQUATE ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF REMEMBERING, BUT NOT PRECISELY IN THE WAY SOME PHILOSOPHERS HAVE THOUGHT. IT IS ARGUED THAT SUCH AN ANALYSIS DOES NOT REQUIRE THE CONTINUOUS PRIOR RETENTION OF REMEMBERED KNOWLEDGE. SOMETIMES, PHILOSOPHERS HAVE MENTIONED THE RETENTION OF 'MEMORY TRACES' IN THEIR ANALYSIS OF REMEMBERING BUT THE NEED FOR THIS STEP IS DISPUTED. THE POSSIBILITY OF APPEALING TO MEMORY TRACES IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A CAUSAL EXPLANATION, RATHER THAN AN ANALYSIS, OF REMEMBERING. TO PROVIDE A FULL ANALYSIS OF REMEMBERING IS A LARGE TASK WHICH IS NOT DISCUSSED HERE, BUT A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR REMEMBERING, WHICH HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY IGNORED BY PHILOSOPHERS, EMERGES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SHOPE1972, author = {SHOPE, ROBERT-K}, title = {THE NEUTRALITY OF EXPERIENTIAL STATEMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {377-383}, keywords = {epistemology, experience, sense-dat}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Shope1992, author = {Shope, Robert-K}, title = {You Know What You Falsely Believe (Or: Pollock, Know Thyself!)}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {405-410}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, knowledge, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Shope1999, author = {Shope, Robert-K}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {484-488}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Nature of Meaningfulness: Representing, Powers, and Meaning}, volume = {65(2)}, year = {1999} } @article{SHUFORD1967, author = {SHUFORD, HAYWOOD-R, JR}, title = {THE LOGIC OF AS IF.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {401-408}, keywords = {as-if; logic, statement}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SHUSTERMAN1986, author = {SHUSTERMAN, RICHARD}, title = {WITTGENSTEIN AND CRITICAL REASONING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {91-110}, keywords = {aesthetics, reasoning}, abstract = {THIS PAPER TRACES THREE IMPORTANT THEMES OF WITTGENSTEIN'S AESTHETICS WHICH COMPELLED HIM TO SEEK A NEW ACCOUNT OF CRITICAL REASONING; THE RADICAL INDETERMINACY OF AESTHETIC CONCEPTS, THE LOGICAL PLURALITY OF AESTHETIC DISCOURSE, AND THE ESSENTIAL HISTORICITY OF ART AND AESTHETIC APPRECIATION. I THEN EXAMINE WITTGENSTEIN'S NOVEL ACCOUNT OF AESTHETIC ARGUMENT AND THE POPULAR PERCEPTUALIST THEORY OF CRITICAL REASONING WHICH EMERGED FROM IT. THE LATTER IS SHOWN TO BE NOT ONLY WRONG BUT INCONSISTENT WITH THE THREE THEMES WHICH HELPED ENGENDER IT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SIBAJIBAN1963, author = {SIBAJIBAN}, title = {DESCARTES' DOUBT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {106-116}, keywords = {certainty, cogito, doubt, ego, empiricism, epistemology, method, phenomenology, transcendental-reductio}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE IS TO ANALYZE THE NATURE OF DOUBT IN GENERAL, AND EXAMINE THE DOUBT WHICH DESCARTES USES AS THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY IN HIS "MEDITATIONS". THE AUTHOR TRIES TO SHOW THAT THIS DOUBT CAN NEITHER YIELD, NOR BE RESOLVED BY, THAT TYPE OF CERTAINTY WHICH DESCARTES BELIEVES TO HAVE REALIZED IN HIS COGITO. FINALLY, PARALLELS ARE DRAWN WITH HUSSERL'S TECHNIQUE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SICHEL1972, author = {SICHEL, BETTY-A}, title = {KARL MARX AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {355-360}, keywords = {political-philosophy; property, right}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sidelle2000, author = {Sidelle, Alan}, title = {Finding an Intrinsic Account of Identity: What Is the Source of Duplication Cases?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {415-430}, keywords = {duplication, epistemology, identity, intrinsic, knowledge}, abstract = {The obvious intrinsic approach--perhaps taken for granted--appeals to considerations of quantity of matter, requiring over 50% shared matter between identicals (at adjacent times). But this rules out plausible cases of halving and doubling for which there are not duplication cases. After bringing out this problem, I ask what makes duplication cases possible, and use this to formulate an intrinsic condition which allows identity whenever there is continuity of function, but no threat to intrinsicness via duplication cases. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sidelle1996, author = {Sidelle, Alan}, title = {What's Wrong with Being Strange?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {209-215}, keywords = {epistemology, language, ontology}, abstract = {In Dividing Reality, Eli Hirsch attempts, he believes unsuccessfully, to find a rational basis for our intuition that languages which divide things up strangely--with predicates like 'gricular' (green or circular) or 'grue', or odd individuative terms like 'incar' or 'contacti dog'--are in some way 'wrong'. This paper argues that Hirsch has identified not one, but a cluster of intuitions, varying over the expressive power of the language, facts about the speakers, and their circumstances. For the clearest intuitions, Hirsch has given some plausible defenses, while the intuition he believes cannot be justified is one we do not really have. The discussion focuses on whether our 'strangeness' intuitions are directed at lexicons, or the expressive power of whole languages.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sidelle2002, author = {Sidelle, Alan}, title = {Innoculi Innocula}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {409-411}, keywords = {epistemology, infallibility, internalism, justification, truth}, abstract = {In "Innocuous Infallibility," Earl Conee argues that the infallibility to which I argue internalism is committed, in "An Argument that Internalism Requires Infallibility," is harmless and trivial. I maintain that this overlooks the fact that internalism makes use of an intuitive notion of 'epistemic twinhood' to drive its position, rather than one antecedently defined with a filled-out notion of 'relevant epistemic circumstances'. Conee is correct that any theory requires, and trivially gets, some sort of infallibility--but it is not trivial that there is a coherent and univocal notion of the sort of relevant circumstances--and so, twinhood and infallibility--behind the internalist strategy and motivation.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sidelle2001, author = {Sidelle, Alan}, title = {An Argument That Internalism Requires Infallibility}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(1)}, pages = {163-179}, keywords = {argument, epistemology, infallibility, internalism, truth}, abstract = {I argue that the internal twins argument for, or commitment of internalism, commits one to the claim that the conditions in virtue of which one is justified must be ones about which a believer is infallible. The basic argument is that for anything about which one can be mistaken, one has an internal twin who is mistaken, but is equally well justified--and so, not in virtue of that about which one can be mistaken. If the argument can be resisted, this should tell us something useful about how to properly understand both internalism in general, and the idea of internal twins in particular. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sider2001, author = {Sider, Theodore}, title = {Maximality and Intrinsic Properties}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {357-364}, keywords = {intrinsic, maximization, metaphysics}, abstract = {A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are typically extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. Maximality makes trouble for a recent analysis of intrinsicality by Rae Langton and David Lewis. Their theory implies that "nondisjunctive" properties are intrinsic if they are independent of "loneliness"; but many ordinary, apparently nondisjunctive, properties satisfy this test but are nevertheless extrinsic in virtue of being maximal.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sider2003, author = {Sider, Theodore}, title = {What's So Bad about Overdetermination?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {719-726}, keywords = {existence, metaphysics, object, overdetermination, physics, property}, abstract = {It is hard to deny that many effects have multiple intimately related causes. A window is caused to shatter, both by the parts of a baseball and by the baseball itself. The raising of a hand is caused, both by the instantiation of a supervening mental property and by the instantiation of a subvenient physical property. And yet, many philosophers claim that there is something wrong with such "overdetermination", and are thereby led to construct theories that avoid it. This is misguided: various potential reasons for dissatisfaction with overdetermination collapse upon examination. There is nothing wrong with overdetermination in the first place.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sider2004, author = {Sider, Theodore}, title = {Precis of Four-Dimensionalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {642-647}, keywords = {existence, meaning, mereology, metaphysics, perdurance, stage}, abstract = {I defend the spatio-temporal ontology of Russell, Smart, Quine, and Lewis, including four-dimensionalism (the doctrine of temporal parts, on my usage) and eternalism (realism about past and future objects). Presentism (the main rival to eternalism) is mistaken because it is difficult to reconcile with special relativity, because it requires reality to have noncategorical fundamental features, and because the presentist's tensed language cannot express the fundamental facts of space-time structure. Three-dimensionalism (the rejection of temporal parts) is mistaken because it precludes the possibility of time travel, is difficult to combine with space-time relationalism, leads to the incoherent position that existence is vague, and forces a suboptimal resolution of the paradoxes of material coincidence. Objections to four-dimensionalism (e.g., the problem of motion in homogenous entities) can be answered. I also defend a robust realism about ontology.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sider2004a, author = {Sider, Theodore}, title = {Replies to Gallois, Hirsch and Markosian}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {674-687}, keywords = {composition, existence, grounding, metaphysics, presentism, quantifier, vagueness}, abstract = {Gallois's objection to my argument from vagueness is argued to turn on an equivocation between a loaded and an unloaded sense of 'fusion'. A new argument that Gallois's theory of temporary identity implies the A-theory of time is presented. Hirsch objects to my realism about ontology and my thesis that natural language quantifiers express an ontological notion of existence. I defend my realism (disentangling my conception of a natural kind from the notion of similarity); I defend my thesis about natural language, but also explore the possibility of moving the ontological debate from natural language to a new, invented language. I concede to Markosian that my ontology includes some surprising objects, and clarify the dimension of surprise. I reply to his criticism of my time travel argument, although my reply vindicates Wellsian, not Godelian, time travel.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sider1997, author = {Sider, Theodore}, title = {A New Grandfather Paradox?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {139-144}, keywords = {paradox, quantum-mechanics; science}, abstract = {In a 1994 Scientific American article, physicist David Deutsch and philosopher Michael Lockwood give a defense of the possibility of time travel based on the "Many Worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics. They motivate their appeal to the "Many Worlds" interpretation arguing that the standard formulation of the paradox of time travel in terms of ability is misguided, presenting their own version of the paradox based on "autonomy principle," and arguing that this paradox should be resolved by appeal to the "Many Worlds" interpretation. But whatever the merits of their solution, it is unmotivated, for their new version of the paradox turns out on closer scrutiny to be nothing more than the original ability version of the paradox in disguise.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sider2003a, author = {Sider, Theodore}, title = {Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {139-149}, keywords = {maximality, metaphysics, supervenience}, abstract = {A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are typically extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. This makes trouble for a recent argument against microphysical supervenience by Trenton Merricks. The argument assumes that consciousness is an intrinsic property, whereas consciousness is in fact maximal and extrinsic.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sider1999, author = {Sider, Theodore}, title = {Global Supervenience and Identity Across Times and Worlds}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {913-937}, keywords = {identity, metaphysics, supervenience, world}, abstract = {The existence and importance of supervenience principles for identity across times and worlds have been noted, but insufficient attention has been paid to their precise nature. Such attention is repaid with philosophical dividends. The issues in the formulation of the supervenience principles are two. The first involves the relevant variety of supervenience: that variety is global, but there are in fact two versions of global supervenience that must be distinguished. The second involves the subject matter: the names "identity over time" and "identity across worlds" are misnomers, for in neither case is identity at issue. The philosophical dividends then follow. Nathan Salmon's argument that identity over time needs no "grounds" in matters of qualitative fact can be answered, as can an argument offered by many, that coincident objects (such as statues and lumps of clay) would require objectionably ungrounded differences in identities across times and worlds.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Sider2001a, author = {Sider, Theodore}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {642-647}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time}, volume = {68(3)}, year = {2001} } @other{Sider2001b, author = {Sider, Theodore}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {648-657}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time}, volume = {68(3)}, year = {2001} } @other{Sider2001c, author = {Sider, Theodore}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {658-664}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time}, volume = {68(3)}, year = {2001} } @other{Sider2001d, author = {Sider, Theodore}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {665-673}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time}, volume = {68(3)}, year = {2001} } @other{Sider2001e, author = {Sider, Theodore}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {674-687}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time}, volume = {68(3)}, year = {2001} } @article{Sider2000, author = {Sider, Theodore}, title = {Simply Possible}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {585-590}, keywords = {epistemology, object, possibility}, abstract = {In the process of arguing against all theories of extended material objects made up of simples, Dean Zimmerman has recently argued against the compossibility of continuous closed and continuous open material objects. But it is surely undeniable that point-like material objects are possible; plausible principles of recombination and the principle of unrestricted composition then lead to the possibility Zimmerman rejects. Fortunately, Zimmerman's arguments can be resisted; what appear to be implausible modal consequences of the compossibility of open and closed continuous material objects turn out to be merely the results of a decision to use 'material object' in a certain way. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Siegel1992, author = {Siegel, Harvey}, title = {Justification by Balance}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {27-46}, keywords = {balance, epistemic, justification, logic}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Siegel2005, author = {Siegel, Harvey}, title = {Truth, Thinking, Testimony and Trust: Alvin Goldman on Epistemology and Education}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {345-366}, keywords = {critical-thinking; education, social-epistemology; trust, truth}, abstract = {In his recent work in social epistemology, Alvin Goldman argues that truth is the fundamental epistemic end of education, and that critical thinking is of merely instrumental value with respect to that fundamental end. He also argues that there is a central place for testimony and trust in the classroom, and an educational danger in overemphasizing the fostering of students' critical thinking. In this paper I take issue with these claims, and argue that (1) critical thinking is a fundamental end of education, independently of its instrumental tie to truth, and (2) it is critical thinking, rather than testimony and trust, that is educationally basic.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SIEGEL1961, author = {SIEGEL, RUDOLPH-E}, title = {PARMENIDES AND THE VOID.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {264-266}, keywords = {cosmos, extension, metaphysics, negation, reality, void}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SIEVERT1982, author = {SIEVERT, DONALD}, title = {DESCARTES ON THEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {201-220}, keywords = {god, metaphysics, ontological-proof; theology}, abstract = {ARNAULD CHARGED DESCARTES WITH CIRCULARITY IN HIS THEOLOGICAL PROOF. I ARGUE THAT DESCARTES'S SYSTEM IS CIRCULAR. THEN I DISCUSS HOW DESCARTES RESPONDS TO THIS PROBLEM. HE DEVELOPS DISTINCTIONS WHICH ONLY SEEM TO ALLAY THE CIRCULARITY CHARGE. IRONICALLY, IT IS DESCARTES HIMSELF, BY MEANS OF HIS INSISTENCE ON THE IDEA-THING DISTINCTION AND ATTENDANT DOUBTS, AND HIS INSISTENCE ON 'DOUBTING THE INDUBITABLE', WHO HIGHLIGHTS THE CHRONIC DIFFICULTIES OF THE THEOLOGICAL PROOFS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Simmons2003, author = {Simmons, Alison}, title = {Descartes on the Cognitive Structure of Sensory Experience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {549-579}, keywords = {cognition, epistemology, perception, sensation}, abstract = {I argue that Descartes offers a unified cognitive account of sensory experience according to which the senses and intellect operate together to produce a fundamentally imagistic representation of the world in both its primary and secondary quality aspects. At stake here is not only our understanding of the cognitive structure of sensory experience but the relation of sense and intellect more generally in the Cartesian mind. The deep bifurcation in the Cartesian mind is not between the sensory perception of primary and secondary qualities but between sensory perception and purely intellectual perception. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Simmons2006, author = {Simmons, Keith}, title = {Deflationism and the Autonomy of Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {72(1)}, pages = {196-204}, keywords = {deflationism, epistemology, inference, minimalism, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SIMON1979, author = {SIMON, MICHAEL-A}, title = {ACTION AND DIALECTICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {465-479}, keywords = {action, causal-explanation; knowledge, philosophical-anthropolog}, abstract = {AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO SHOW THAT THERE IS A DIALECTIC OF ACTION-SEQUENCES, ANALOGOUS TO THAT OF THOUGHT-PROCESSES, AND THAT THIS DIALECTIC ARISES FROM THE ESSENTIALLY DIALECTICAL CHARACTER OF ACTION ITSELF. IT IS ARGUED THAT MANY OF THE MOST CHARACTERISTICALLY HUMAN ACTIVITIES HAVE FEATURES THAT A DIALECTICAL CONSIDERATION MAY REVEAL BUT WHICH MAY FAIL TO BE NOTICED WHEN A CAUSAL APPROACH IS TAKEN. DIALECTICS IS PRESENTED BOTH AS A HEURISTIC PRINCIPLE AND AS A DESCRIPTIVE CATEGORY WHOSE IMPOSITION OFFERS A USEFUL MEANS FOR MAKING ACTION COMPREHENSIBLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SIMON1981, author = {SIMON, MICHAEL-S}, title = {THE PRIMACY OF ACTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {266-282}, keywords = {action, behavior, movement, social-philosophy; volition}, abstract = {THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO DEFEND AN ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTION OF ACTION, TO SHOW THAT ACTION MUST BE CONCEIVED AS A LOGICAL PRIMITIVE AND THUS AS INCAPABLE OF ANALYSIS IN TERMS OF OTHER TYPES OF OCCURRENCES. THE LEADING ALTERNATIVE MODES OF CONCEIVING ACTION, THE AUTHOR ARGUES, EITHER FAIL TO CAPTURE WHAT IS DISTINCTIVE AND EPISTEMOLOGICALLY IMPORTANT ABOUT HUMAN ACTION OR ELSE ARE REDUCIBLE TO THE ACCOUNT BEING DEFENDED. THE HUMAN BEING, IT IS ARGUED, IS "SUI GENERIS" BECAUSE ACTION IS: SINCE THE CONCEPT OF ACTION IS PRIMITIVE AND INDISSOLUBLY LINKED TO THAT OF A PERSON, AND SINCE PERSONS ARE ESSENTIALLY DOERS, A SCIENCE OF HUMAN BEINGS MUST BE INTRINSICALLY ANTHROPOCENTRIC AND HENCE SEPARATE FROM THE SCIENCES OF NATURE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SIMON1970, author = {SIMON, MICHAEL-ARTHUR}, title = {MATERIALISM, MENTAL LANGUAGE, AND MIND-BODY IDENTITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {514-532}, keywords = {introspection, language, materialism, metaphysics, mind-bod}, abstract = {THE CATEGORIES "MENTAL" AND "PHYSICAL" ARE TWO SCHEMES FOR CLASSIFYING A SINGLE SET OF OBJECTS, VIZ. THOSE PRESUPPOSED BY A THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION OF NON-LIVING MATTER. AN IDENTITY THEORY THAT IDENTIFIES MENTAL ENTITIES WITH BRAIN PROCESSES IS REJECTED AND REPLACED BY ONE THAT CONSTRUES MENTAL LANGUAGE AS A WAY OF SAYING THINGS ABOUT ORGANISMS WITHOUT REFERRING TO ANYTHING INSIDE THE ORGANISMS AT ALL. MENTAL LANGUAGE IS RECONCILED WITH A MATERIALIST ONTOLOGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Simons1994, author = {Simons, Peter}, title = {Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {553-575}, keywords = {epistemology, substance, trope, universal}, abstract = {If the attributes of concrete individuals (substances) are tropes, particular instances, what are the substances? Are they bundles of tropes related by compresence, or is there a non- trope bearer or substratum? Both theories have their drawbacks. This paper proposes a third, "nuclear" theory, according to which substances have an inner bundle or nucleus of essential tropes tied by strong ontological dependence, and an outer swarm of generically necessary and optional tropes. The theory's flexibility is tested by examining the differences between fermions and bosons considered as trope bundles.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Simons1996, author = {Simons, Peter}, title = {The Importance of Joint Respect: Interplanetary Thoughts on a Naturalistic Account of Naturalness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {217-221}, keywords = {division, epistemology, naturalism, reality}, abstract = {Using a fable about a creature from the atmosphere of Jupiter, it is argued that what properties count as natural and what do not is dependent on what it is important to recognize for local survival.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Simpson1992, author = {Simpson, David}, title = {Lying, Liars and Language}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {623-639}, keywords = {epistemology, language, lying, truth}, abstract = {This paper considers the phenomenon of lying and the implications it has for those subjects who are capable of lying. It is argued that lying is not just intentional untruthfulness, but is intentional untruthfulness plus an insincere invocation of trust. This trust that the liar appears to invoke points to an assumed mutuality underlying the possibility of communication. Understood in this way, lying demands of liars a sophistication in relation to language, to themselves, and to those whom they lie which exceeds the demands on mere truth-tellers.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SIMPSON1976, author = {SIMPSON, R-L}, title = {NIELSEN ON ETHICAL SUBJECTIVISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {121-122}, keywords = {ethics, subjectivism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SIMSON1986, author = {SIMSON, ROSALIND-S}, title = {AN INTERNALIST VIEW OF THE EPISTEMIC REGRESS PROBLEM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {179-208}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, justification, regress}, abstract = {THIS PAPER EXAMINES THE PROJECT OF OFFERING AN INTERNALIST ACCOUNT OF JUSTIFICATION IN RESPONSE TO THE EPISTEMIC REGRESS PROBLEM. IT SUGGESTS THAT THE TYPICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE NEED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN FOUNDATIONALIST AND COHERENTIST SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OVERLOOKS SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF THE ACTIVITY OF SUPPLYING JUSTIFICATION AND THEREFORE INADEQUATELY CHARACTERIZES THE INTERNALIST OPTIONS. THE PAPER ALSO PROPOSES THAT CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF THE WIDELY SHARED STANDARDS ORDINARILY INFORMING JUSTIFICATORY ACTIVITY CAN PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR AN INTERNALIST ACCOUNT. THE PAPER DETAILS SUCH AN ACCOUNT AND COMPARES IT WITH FOUNDATIONALISM, COHERENTISM, AND CONTEXTUALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SINARI1970, author = {SINARI, RAMAKANT}, title = {THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN ALIENATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {123-130}, keywords = {alienation, philosophical-anthropolog}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE TRIES TO BRING OUT VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE PHENOMENON OF HUMAN ALIENATION--RELIGIOUS, METAPHYSICAL, SOCIO-POLITICAL, ETC. IT IS HELD THAT THE SINGLE STATE OF MIND UNDERLYING THIS PHENOMENON IS A STRANGE FEELING OF BEING IN A SITUATION WITH WHICH ONE IS NOT IN HARMONY. THERE ARE , HOWEVER, "WASTEFUL" ALIENS AND "CREATIVE" ALIENS. WHILE THE FORMER ARE A SOCIAL PROBLEM, THE LATTER ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR THE PROGRESS OF THE COMMUNITY. METAPHYSICALLY, AN ALIEN EXPERIENCES A GAP BETWEEN "I" AND "MY WORLD".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SINARI1966, author = {SINARI, RAMAKANT}, title = {SOME REFLECTIONS ON PHILOSOPHY IN INDIA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {438-448}, keywords = {hinduism, humanism, indian, philosophy, religion, revelation, text, twentieth}, abstract = {SINARI'S REMARKS DEAL WITH THE WESTERN REACTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY, AND ESPECIALLY WITH THE INTERACTION FROM THE PARTICULAR WESTERN POINTS OF VIEW. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE INDIAN ORTHODOX METAPHYSICS OF REVEALED SCRIPTURES MAY CRUMBLE AGAINST THE PRESSURES OF THE QUESTIONS OF THE PRESENT, AND THE AWAKENING OF INDEPENDENT THINKING. WHAT WILL BE RETAINED IS PROBABLY SOME SORT OF RELIGION OF HUMANISM. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SINGER1965, author = {SINGER, MARCUS-G}, title = {LAMONT ON RIGHTS AND DUTIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {112-116}, keywords = {correlation, definition, duty, ethics, law, right}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SINGER1975, author = {SINGER, MARCUS-G}, title = {LOGIC, FACTS, AND EVENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {253-254}, keywords = {event, fact, logic}, abstract = {A BRIEF NOTE THAT ARGUES, BY WAY OF EXAMPLE, THAT THERE CAN BE LOGICAL CONNECTIONS BETWEEN FACTS AND BETWEEN EVENTS, SO THAT THE DOGMA OF EMPIRICISM, "NO LOGICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN FACTS," NEEDS TO BE RECONSIDERED, ALONG WITH THE CONCEPTS OF "FACT" AND "EVENT."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Singer1999, author = {Singer, Peter}, title = {Living High and Letting Die}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {183-187}, keywords = {death, ethics, life}, abstract = {In Living High and Letting Die, Peter Unger has provided powerful new arguments for the conclusion that we ought to give far more to the poor in developing countries than we presently do. But his book is also significant for ethical theory in general, because it shows that our intuitions on many ethical questions are on very shaky ground. Thus, ways of arguing in ethics that start from these intuitions, and take them as premises, are undermined.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SINHA1963, author = {SINHA, D}, title = {PHENOMENOLOGY AND POSITIVISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {562-577}, keywords = {consciousness, epistemology, evidence, given, knowledge, phenomenology, positivism}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE POINTS OUT PARALLELS BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND POSITIVISM. THE LATTER EMPHASIZED THE GIVEN AS THE REAL SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE AND WAS FREE FROM IDEAL PRESUPPOSITIONS. PHENOMENOLOGY REFERS BACK TO EVIDENCE, IMMEDIATE "SEEING," BUT NOT JUST THE SENSUOUS; IT IS SEEING IN GENERAL, AS ORIGINALLY GIVEN IN CONSCIOUSNESS. THE PROBLEM POSED HERE IS WHETHER UNIVERSALS OR GENERAL ESSENCES CAN BE CONSIDERED AS GIVEN IN THE GENUINE SENSE OF THE TERM. HUSSERL THINKS THEY CAN BE, AND IN SAYING SO, HE ARGUES THAT POSITIVISM WAS PREJUDICED IN NOT ACCEPTING ANYTHING OTHER THAN PARTICULAR, EMPIRICAL SENSE-DATA. IT WAS THE PREJUDICE OF TRADITIONAL EMPIRICISM THAT ONLY THE INDIVIDUAL COULD BE ORIGINALLY INTUITED. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SINISI1967, author = {SINISI, VITO-F}, title = {TARSKI ON THE INCONSISTENCY OR COLLOQUIAL LANGUAGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {537-541}, keywords = {language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SINISI1969, author = {SINISI, VITO-F}, title = {LEIBNIZ'S LAW AND THE ANTINOMY OF THE LIAR.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {279-289}, keywords = {antinomy, logic, paradox, semantics, truth}, abstract = {I CONSIDER A DERIVATION OF THE ANTINOMY OF THE LIAR ATTRIBUTED TO LUKASIEWICZ AND PRESENTED IN TARSKI'S "THE SEMANTIC CONCEPTION OF TRUTH AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF SEMANTICS," AND ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT WE DO NOT HAVE ADEQUATE REASONS FOR BELIEVING THAT THE DERIVATION IS VALID BECAUSE WE DO NOT HAVE ADEQUATE REASONS FOR BELIEVING THAT LEIBNIZ'S LAW HAS BEEN CORRECTLY APPLIED IN THE DERIVATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sinnott-Armstrong2000, author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter}, title = {Expressivism and Embedding}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(3)}, pages = {677-693}, keywords = {embedding, ethics, expressivism, lying}, abstract = {The basic problem is for expressivists to explain why evaluative instances of modus ponens are valid. The deeper problem is to explain why a particular argument like (1)-(3) is valid. The deepest problem is to explain the meanings of evaluative conditionals like (1). Expressivists can solve the initial and basic problems simply by acknowledging that evaluative sentences have minimal truth aptness, but the deeper and deepest problems require more. The deepest problem cannot be solved even with the semantics of Gibbard and Blackburn, as is shown by an extension of Dreier's hiyo argument. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sinnott-Armstrong2003, author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter}, title = {Experience and Foundationalism in Audi's The Architecture of Reason}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {181-187}, keywords = {analogy, epistemology, experience, foundationalism, reason}, abstract = {In The Architecture of Reason, Robert Audi claims that good reasoning always has some foundation in experience. It is not clear, however, precisely what kind of experience is supposed to ground practical reasoning. It is also not clear whether inference is necessary for a belief to be justified, even when the source of the belief is experience without inference. Finally, it is not clear why beliefs based on some kinds of experience would not need to be justified by inference when beliefs based on other experiential sources (such as extra-sensory perception) do not share this epistemically privileged status.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SIRRIDGE1975, author = {SIRRIDGE, M-J}, title = {TRUTH FROM FICTION?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {453-471}, keywords = {epistemology, fiction, literature, truth}, abstract = {IT IS COMMONLY CLAIMED THAT WORKS OF FICTION HAVE COGNITIVE VALUE, THAT THEY EXPAND AND CLARIFY OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTUAL WORLD--THOUGH THEY ARE ONLY STORIES, AND NOT TRUE STORIES AT THAT. I ARGUE THAT IT IS INCORRECT TO ATTEMPT TO ACCOUNT FOR THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF WORKS OF FICTION BY CLAIMING THAT THOSE PROPOSITIONS COMMONLY ASSOCIATED WITH A WORK AS ITS "MORAL" OR "THEME" ARE PART OF THE PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT OF THE WORK. I PROPOSE INSTEAD THAT FICTIONAL WORKS FUNCTION COGNITIVELY IN VERY MUCH THE SAME WAY AS THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS AND CONCOCTED COUNTEREXAMPLES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SIRRIDGE1977, author = {SIRRIDGE, M-J}, title = {THE MORAL OF THE STORY: A REJOINDER TO POLLARD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {257-259}, keywords = {aesthetics, literature, proposition, truth}, abstract = {POLLARD ARGUES THAT IN MY EARLIER ARTICLE, "TRUTH FROM FICTION?", I UNDERESTIMATE THE STRENGTH OF THE POSITION THAT WORKS OF FICTION CONTAIN OR IMPLY THEIR "MORALS" OR "MESSAGES." I ARGUE THAT HIS PROPOSED METHOD FOR DETERMINING SUCH TRUTHS PRODUCES ONLY PROPOSITIONS WHICH CAN BE CLAIMED TO BE TRUE OF THE WORK, AND NOT PROPOSITIONS WHICH HAVE A CLAIM TO TRUTH ABOUT THE REAL WORLD. IN ADDITION, HE HAS FALLEN INTO A DIFFICULTY I PREDICTED FOR HIS SORT OF POSITION: HE HAS TO DEFEND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE AUTHOR AS INFORMANT IN ORDER TO DEFEND THE COGNITIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE AUTHOR'S WORK OF FICTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SKLAIR1971, author = {SKLAIR, LESLIE}, title = {MORAL PROGRESS REVISITED.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {433-439}, keywords = {moral, progress, science, social-philosophy; technology}, abstract = {A RECENT CRITICISM BY HODGES OF A MARXIST ACCOUNT OF ETHICS BY SELSAM PROVIDES THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF MORAL PROGRESS. HODGES' TECHNOLOGISTIC AND BEHAVIOURISTIC ACCOUNT OF MORAL PROGRESS IS REJECTED ON LOGICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS, AND A MORE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW, IN TERMS OF WHAT HUMAN GROUPS WANT AND NEED, IS ADVANCED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Skyrms2002, author = {Skyrms, Brian}, title = {Critical Commentary on Unto Others}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {697-701}, keywords = {altruism, correlation, ethics, evolution, group}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Skyrms1999, author = {Skyrms, Brian}, title = {Precis of Evolution of the Social Contract}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {217-220}, keywords = {epistemology, evolution, game-theory; social-contract; society}, abstract = {Evolution of the social contract uses evolutionary game theory and evolutionary dynamics to analyze the sorts of interactions that are important to the social contract. The discussion is at a level that accommodates cultural as well as biological evolution. Various chapters deal with central issues in bargaining, commitment, mutual aid, property, and communication by means of simple game-theoretic models. These include Nash Bargaining, Ultimatum Bargaining, Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken (or Hawk-Dove), and Sender-Receiver Signaling Games. Evolutionary models provide better explanations of observed behavior than rational choice models.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Skyrms1999a, author = {Skyrms, Brian}, title = {Reply to Critics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {243-254}, keywords = {epistemology, game-theory; prisoner's-dilemm}, abstract = {There is a rationale for the replicator dynamics as a model of cultural evolution based on imitation. The Nash bargaining game has quite general significance in conditions of social exchange and is at least as important as Prisoner's Dilemma for a theory of the social contract. Conditions affecting evolution of the equal split norm in infinite and finite populations are discussed. There is a guide to empirical literature supporting the claim that evolutionary models are better explanations of observed behavior than rational choice models.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SLEIGH-JR1964, author = {SLEIGH-JR, ROBERT-C}, title = {NOTES ON CHISHOLM ON THE LOGIC OF BELIEVING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {261-265}, keywords = {believing, existence, inference, intentionality, logic, mental, modal-logi}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Slote1994, author = {Slote, Michael}, title = {Precis of "From Morality to Virtue"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {683-687}, keywords = {ethics, kantianism, morality, value, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Slote1994a, author = {Slote, Michael}, title = {Reply to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {709-719}, keywords = {ethics, morality, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SMALL1986, author = {SMALL, ROBIN}, title = {BOSCOVICH CONTRA NIETZSCHE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {419-435}, keywords = {determinism, energy, metaphysics, recurrence}, abstract = {COMMENTATORS HAVE NOTED THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHY OF BOSCOVICH ON NIETZSCHE'S THOUGHT, BUT NOT AN IMPORTANT CONFLICT BETWEEN THEIR IDEAS. BOSCOVICH DESCRIBES A THEORY OF ETERNAL RECURRENCE, AND OFFERS AN INTENDED REFUTATION OF IT WHICH ANTICIPATES SOME LATER CRITICISMS OF NIETZSCHE. THIS ARTICLE PROVIDES A DETAILED ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE DISPUTE. IT SHOWS HOW MUCH RECENT WORK ON NIETZSCHE HAS FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE REAL PROBLEMS RAISED IN THESE ARGUMENTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Smilansky1997, author = {Smilansky, Saul}, title = {Should I Be Grateful to You for Not Harming Me?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {585-597}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, harm, maleficence, virtue}, abstract = {Getting people not to harm others is a central goal of morality. But while it is commonly perceived that those who benefit others merit gratitude, those who do not harm others are not ordinarily thought to merit anything. I attempt to argue against this, claiming that all the arguments against gratitude to the nonmaleficent are unsuccessful. Finally, I explore the difference it would make if we thought that we owe gratitude to those who do not harm us.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Smilansky1994, author = {Smilansky, Saul}, title = {The Ethical Advantages of Hard Determinism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {355-363}, keywords = {action, determinism, ethics, morality}, abstract = {Hard determinism is commonly thought to have grave moral consequences. Without attempting to fully deny this, I explore a previously unnoticed apparent ethical advantage of a belief in hard determinism. The lack of concern with personal desert which accompanies belief in hard determinism seems to make possible a form of purer morality' than ordinary morality. In the process I briefly consider some perplexities of Kantianism, the personal' difficulty of being a hard determinist, and the question as to whether non- utilitarian ethical considerations are possible with hard determinist premises.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Smilansky2000, author = {Smilansky, Saul}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {222-229}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Free Will and Illusion}, volume = {67(1)}, year = {2000} } @article{SMILLIE1971, author = {SMILLIE, DAVID}, title = {A PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE OTHER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {64-77}, keywords = {epistemology, other, phenomenology, psychology}, abstract = {IN THE FIFTH "CARTESIAN MEDITATION" HUSSERL ARGUES THAT A PHENOMENOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE OTHER REQUIRES A FUNDAMENTAL SIMILARITY BETWEEN MY BODY AND THAT OF THE OTHER, WHICH HE CALLS AN "ANALOGIZING APPREHENSION." ORTEGA Y GASSET OBJECTS THAT IT IS JUST PHENOMENOLOGY WHICH REVEALS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MY BODY, AS LIVED, AND THE OTHER'S BODY, AS OBJECT. IMITATION, AS EMPIRICAL FACT, ENCOMPASSES THESE ISSUES, SINCE TO IMITATE A BODILY ACTIVITY PRESUPPOSES THAT THE IMITATOR SEE A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HIS OWN BODY AND THAT OF THE OTHER. OBSERVATIONS BY PIAGET INDICATE THE PRESENCE OF TRUE IMITATION IN THE INFANT AS EARLY AS THREE MONTHS OF AGE. THIS SUPPORTS HUSSERL'S CLAIM FOR AN ANALOGIZING APPREHENSION, DESPITE ORTEGA'S OBJECTIONS. IT ALSO SUGGESTS THAT THE INFANT IS NOT FIRST AN ISOLATED EGO WHO CONSTRUCTS THE OTHER BUT RATHER A SOCIAL BEING WHO KNOWS OTHERS FROM THE BEGINNING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Smith2001, author = {Smith, A-D}, title = {Perception and Belief}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {283-309}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, metaphysics, perception}, abstract = {An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SMITH1980, author = {SMITH, BARRY}, title = {INGARDEN VS MEINONG ON THE LOGIC OF FICTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {93-105}, keywords = {fiction, language, ontology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Smith2000, author = {Smith, Barry and Varzi, Achille-C}, title = {Fiat and Bona Fide Boundaries}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {401-420}, keywords = {boundary, mereology, metaphysics, quality, space}, abstract = {Bona fide boundaries yield a notion of contact that is effectively modelled by classical topology; the analogue of contact involving fiat boundaries calls, however, for a different account, based on the intuition that fiat boundaries do not support the open/closed distinction on which classical topology is based. In the presence of this two-sorted ontology it then transpires that mereotopology--typology erected on a mereological basis--is more than a trivial formal variant of classical point-set topology. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SMITH1974, author = {SMITH, CAROL-ANN}, title = {MS FRIQUEGNON ON "THE PARADOXES OF DETERMINISM".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {271-274}, keywords = {determinism, epistemology, freedom, logic, paradox}, abstract = {THE FRIQUEGNON CLAIM THAT WE MUST EITHER REJECT DETERMINISM OR EXCLUDE KNOWLEDGE AS A CAUSAL FACTOR IS REJECTED. I SHOW THAT HER ARGUMENT IS NOT MERELY A PARADOX ABOUT WHAT WILL HAPPEN, BUT YIELDS A CONTRADICTION ABOUT WHAT I NOW KNOW. I ATTEMPT A REFORMULATION DISTINGUISHING WHAT I KNOW HAPPENS BECAUSE OF MY DECISIONS AND ACTIONS FROM WHAT I KNOW HAPPENS INDEPENDENT OF MY DECISIONS AND ACTIONS. I THEN SHOW THAT THE CONTRADICTION IS AVOIDED, BUT ALSO THAT NO PARADOX IS GENERATED FOR THE LIBERTARIAN TO RESOLVE. THE FRIQUEGNON ARGUMENT SHOWS THAT SOME MEANS OF CAPTURING THIS DISTINCTION IS NECESSARY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SMITH1985, author = {SMITH, JANET-FARRELL}, title = {THE RUSSELL-MEINONG DEBATE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {305-350}, keywords = {intentionality, metaphysics, nonexistence, reference}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Smith2003, author = {Smith, Michael}, title = {Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {460-467}, keywords = {axiology, belief, desire, normative, psychologism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Smith1995, author = {Smith, Michael}, title = {Internal Reasons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {109-131}, keywords = {behavior, epistemology, internal, model, rationality}, abstract = {According to internalism, an agent has a reason to do something just in case she would desire to do that thing if she were fully rational. The advice' model of internalism is distinguished from the example' model. Though Korsgard accepts the example' model, the advice' model is argued to be superior. Williams argues that internalism entails that reasons are relative to the desires agents actually have. But once different kinds of relativism about reasons are distinguished, this claim is seen to be false. Internalism is consistent with rationalism, and so with non-relativism about reasons.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Smith2002, author = {Smith, Michael}, title = {Which Passions Rule?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {157-163}, keywords = {belief, cognitivism, ethics, passion, subjectivism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Smith1998, author = {Smith, Michael}, title = {Galen Strawson and the Weather Watchers}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {449-454}, keywords = {behaviorism, mental, metaphysics, reality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SMITH1977, author = {SMITH, QUENTIN}, title = {ON HUSSERL'S THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE FIFTH "LOGICAL" "INVESTIGATION".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {482-497}, keywords = {act, consciousness, intentional, judgment, metaphysics, objectification, phenomenology, sensation}, abstract = {THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE ARTICLE IS TO EXPLAIN HUSSERL'S DEVELOPMENT OF A VALID MEANING TO THE PROPOSITION THAT "EVERY ACT EITHER IS A PRESENTATION OR IS FOUNDED UPON A PRESENTATION." THE FINAL DEFINITION HUSSERL ACHIEVES IS THAT PRESENTATIONS CONSIST OF ACT-MATTERS (WHICH ARE THE MOMENTS OF AN ACT THAT REFER TO SENSUOUS OR CATEGORIAL OBJECTS) AND OBJECTIFYING ACT-QUALITIES (WHICH ARE THE MOMENTS THAT POSIT THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF THE OBJECT). THE ACTS FOUNDED ON PRESENTATIONS ARE NON-OBJECTIFYING ACT-QUALITIES (FEELINGS). I ARGUE, HOWEVER, THAT FEELINGS ARE REALLY A TYPE OF ACT-MATTER (AN ACT-MATTER IS WHAT "REFERS TO AN OBJECT"), AS THEY REFER TO THEIR OWN FEELING OBJECTS (E.G., ENJOYABLENESS). THE ACTS FOUNDED ON PRESENTATIONS ARE THEREFORE ACT-MATTERS, NOT ACT-QUALITIES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Smith1997, author = {Smith, Quentin}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {732-735}, publisher = {Yale Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Ethical and Religious Thought in Analytical Philosophy of Language}, volume = {62(3)}, year = {1997} } @other{Smith1993, author = {Smith, Quentin}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {486-489}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Language and Time}, volume = {56(2)}, year = {1993} } @article{SMITH1970, author = {SMITH, R-J}, title = {COMMENTS ON ICHHEISER'S THEORY OF SOCIAL PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {457-461}, keywords = {epistemology, perception}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SMITH1984, author = {SMITH, ROBERT-J}, title = {THE PSYCHOPATH AS MORAL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {177-194}, keywords = {ethics, psychopathy, rationality, responsibility, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SNARE1975, author = {SNARE, FRANK}, title = {JOHN RAWLS AND THE METHODS OF ETHICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {100-112}, keywords = {ethics, judgment, metaethics, method, morality, objectivity, principle}, abstract = {SINCE SIDGWICK IT HAS BEEN THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM OF PHILOSOPHERS THAT MORAL PHILOSOPHY CONSISTS IN 'TESTING' MORAL SYSTEMS, E.G., UTILITARIANISM, AGAINST THE PARTICULAR COMMON SENSE MORAL JUDGMENTS WE MAKE, PERHAPS WHEN WE ARE IN 'STANDARD CONDITIONS'. THIS PAPER CONSIDERS TWO OTHER APPROACHES TO ETHICS WHICH ARE TO BE FOUND IN BENTHAM, AMONG OTHERS. THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT THESE TWO APPROACHES ARE MUCH SUPERIOR TO THE APPROACH EMPLOYED BY CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS AND, FURTHER, THAT JOHN RAWLS' APPEAL TO THE ORIGINAL POSITION MAY BE SEEN AS AN EXAMPLE OF ONE OF THESE OLDER APPROACHES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SNEDDEN1967, author = {SNEDDEN, JAMES-A}, title = {HISTORICAL ESTIMATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {241-251}, keywords = {history, methodology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SNOW1982, author = {SNOW, NANCY-E}, title = {SOME COMMENTS ON LUCKHARDT'S INTERPRETATION OF EMPIRICAL PROPOSITIONS AS PARADIGMS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {259-264}, keywords = {empirical, epistemology, paradigm}, abstract = {IN "BEYOND KNOWLEDGE: PARADIGMS IN WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER PHILOSOPHY," ("PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH" 39, 240-252, DECEMBER 1978) C G LUCKHARDT CLAIMS THAT EMPIRICAL PROPOSITIONS ARE A KIND OF PARADIGM; THAT IS, THEY ARE GROUNDINGS FOR SYSTEMS OF REPRESENTATION AND JUSTIFICATION THAT ARE THEMSELVES BEYOND KNOWLEDGE AND JUSTIFICATION. I CRITICIZE LUCKHARDT'S INTERPRETATION ON THE GROUND THAT IT FORCES EMPIRICAL PROPOSITIONS INTO TOO NARROW A ROLE. AN EXAMINATION OF THIS CLASS OF PROPOSITIONS USING LUCKHARDT'S OWN CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING PARADIGMS SHOWS THAT EMPIRICAL PROPOSITIONS CANNOT BE REGARDED AS SIMPLY ANOTHER KIND OF PARADIGM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Snowdon1998, author = {Snowdon, Paul-F}, title = {Strawson's Agnostic Materialism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {455-460}, keywords = {mental, metaphysics, reality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SNYDER1981, author = {SNYDER, LEE-R}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF EVIDENCE IN EDMUND HUSSERL'S GENEALOGY OF LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {547-555}, keywords = {consciousness, evidence, experience, metaphysics, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Soames2002, author = {Soames, Scott}, title = {Precis of Understanding Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {397-401}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, truth, understanding}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Soames2002a, author = {Soames, Scott}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {429-452}, keywords = {language, truth, vagueness}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sobel2001, author = {Sobel, Jordan-Howard}, title = {Blackburn's Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {361-383}, keywords = {discourse, ethics, morality, properties}, abstract = {Moral properties would supervene upon nonmoral properties and be conceptually autonomous. That, according to Simon Blackburn, would make them if not impossible at least mysterious, and evidence for them best explained by theorists who say they are not real. In fact moral properties would not challenge in ways Blackburn has contended. There is, however, something new that can be gathered from his arguments. What would the supervenience of moral properties and their conceptual autonomy from at least total nonmoral properties entail not only for intuitionists, who 'knew this all along,' but for all moral realists, that there are synthetic necessary moral principles? There is for all moral realists the problem of explaining 'what in the world' makes possible these necessities.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sober1995, author = {Sober, Elliott}, title = {Why Not Solipsism?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {547-566}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, knowledge, sensation, solipsism}, abstract = {This paper addresses a problem of explanation, not a problem of justification. The question is not why we are entitled to think that there are objects that exist outside our own minds, but why we in fact do so. This is interpreted as an issue about evolutionary adaptation: What advantage does an organism receive by formulating beliefs about such mind-independent entities, rather than confining its beliefs to the description and prediction of its own mental states? This question is connected with problems in the philosophy of science concerning operationalism and the eliminability of theoretical terms.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sober2004, author = {Sober, Elliott}, title = {A Modest Proposal}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {487-494}, keywords = {bayes'-theorem; epistemology, miracle, religion}, abstract = {This paper is an essay review of John Earman's book, Hume's Abject Failure--the Argument against Miracles (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000). Earman is very critical of Hume's famous argument about miracles, I am more sympathetic, though I grant that Earman makes many good critical points. Earman's method of analysis is Bayesian, as is mine.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOBLE1985, author = {SOBLE, ALAN}, title = {THE NATURAL, THE SOCIAL, AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {139-154}, keywords = {historical-materialism; human-nature; phenomenology, social-philosoph}, abstract = {HISTORICAL MATERIALISM IS DEVELOPED TO PROVIDE NOT ONLY AN ACCOUNT OF THE NATURAL AND THE SOCIAL, BUT ALSO AN ACCOUNT OF ACCOUNTS OF THE NATURAL AND THE SOCIAL. FOUR PROBLEM AREAS ARE DISTINGUISHED, PERTAINING TO (1) THE ONTOLOGICAL DIVISION PER SE BETWEEN NATURAL AND SOCIAL, (2) THE TIME-RELATIVE CONTENT OF THE NATURAL AND THE SOCIAL, (3) THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ONTOLOGICAL DIVISION, AND (4) THE IDEOLOGY OF THE CONTENT. SOME TIME IS SPENT DISCUSSING THE NATURAL AND THE SOCIAL IN HUMANS, AND ON THE METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOGANI1971, author = {SOGANI, K-C}, title = {SOME COMMENTS ON THE ACTIVE AND THE CONTEMPLATIVE VALUES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {32}, pages = {264-266}, keywords = {action, contemplation, religion, value}, abstract = {MY COMMENTS TRY TO SHOW THAT THE TWO REALMS OF VALUES, ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE, MAY BE THEORETICALLY APART, BUT THEY HAVE NEVER BEEN SO PRACTICALLY AND EMPIRICALLY. THE GREAT CONTEMPLATIVES LIKE MAHAVIRA, BUDDHA, CHRIST, GANDHI ETC. WERE NEITHER NONACTIVIST NOR DID THEY REGARD ACTIVITY AS A 'NECESSARY EVIL'. THUS THERE IS NO INTRINSIC OPPOSITION BETWEEN THE TWO REALMS OF VALUES. THE MEANING OF ACTIVE VALUES AS 'THE CONTINUOUS ENGAGEMENT IN AN ACTIVITY WHICH MAY PROBABLY HELP OTHERS OR ACHIEVE A CERTAIN STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE NATURAL OR THE SOCIAL WORLD' SEEMS TO ME TO BE NARROW. WHERE WILL PROF. DAYA KRISHNA PLACE A MAN OF PURE MATHEMATICS OR A PHILOSOPHER LIKE KANT? THAT THE MYSTIC KEEPS A MINIMAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE WORLD OF OBJECTS DOES NOT SUPPORT THE WITHDRAWAL ACTIVITY OF THE MYSTIC. AS A CRITERION OF WITHDRAWAL IS PROF. DAYA KRISHNA THINKING IN TERMS OF THE NUMBER OF OBJECTS OR IN TERMS OF THEIR SIGNIFICANCE?}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sokolowski1992, author = {Sokolowski, Robert}, title = {Husserl and Analytic Philosophy and Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {725-730}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, realism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOKOLOWSKI1968, author = {SOKOLOWSKI, ROBERT}, title = {THE LOGIC OF PARTS AND WHOLES IN HUSSERL'S INVESTIGATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {537-553}, keywords = {epistemology, phenomenology}, abstract = {DEPENDENT PARTS (MOMENTS) ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM INDEPENDENT PARTS (PIECES) AND SHOWN TO BE THE BASIS FOR A PRIORI EVIDENCES IN HUSSERL'S PHILOSOPHY. SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF THE APPLICATION OF PART-WHOLE LOGIC IN LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND USES OF IT IN HUSSERL'S GENERAL THOUGHT, ARE GIVEN. THE A PRIORI IN HUSSERL IS COMPARED TO ITS CONCEPTION BY WAISMANN AND COHEN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOKOLOWSKI1964, author = {SOKOLOWSKI, ROBERT}, title = {IMMANENT CONSTITUTION IN HUSSERL'S LECTURES ON TIME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {530-551}, keywords = {consciousness, constitution, epistemology, immanence, intentionality, object, sensation, textual-criticism; time}, abstract = {THIS IS A STUDY OF WHAT HUSSERL MEANS WHEN HE SAYS THAT IMMANENT OBJECTS (SENSATIONS AND INTENTIONAL ACTS) ARE "CONSTITUTED" BY INNER TEMPORALITY. THIS ARTICLE ALSO STUDIES HOW SENSATIONS AND INTENTIONS COME TO BE IN OUR SUBJECTIVITY AND HOW WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF THEM. THE BASIC DISTINCTIONS IN TEMPORALITY ARE EXPLAINED AS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SUBJECTIVE, SPONTANEOUS ACTIVITY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOLES1982, author = {SOLES, DEBORAH-H}, title = {SOME WAYS OF GOING WRONG: ON MISTAKES IN "ON CERTAINTY".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {555-571}, keywords = {epistemology, frame-of-reference; mistake}, abstract = {CAN A PERSON FAIL TO MAKE A MISTAKE, BUT STILL BELIEVE SOMETHING FALSE? IN "ON CERTAINTY", WITTGENSTEIN DRAWS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN MISTAKES AND MENTAL DISTURBANCES WHICH IS CRUCIAL TO HIS REFUTATION OF SKEPTICISM, BUT IT IS A DISTINCTION WHICH IS NOT THOROUGHLY WORKED OUT IN "ON CERTAINTY", AND WHICH HAS BEEN LITTLE ADDRESSED IN THE LITERATURE. THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO FILL BOTH THESE LACUNAE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOLOMON1990, author = {SOLOMON, MIRIAM}, title = {Apriority and Metajustification in BonJour's "Structure of Empirical Knowledge".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {767-777}, keywords = {empirical-knowledge; epistemology, internalism, justification}, abstract = {BonJour argues that, despite current interest in externalist approaches, and despite difficulties with simple coherentist views, there are reasons to take internalism, and his own more complex coherence view, seriously. On this view the need for an a priori metajustification of empirical knowledge arises. It is argued that there are difficulties with the metajustification that BonJour gives, which all stem from issues of apriority. This internal difficulty with BonJour's views serves to challenge the views about justification and knowledge that lead him to espouse the position. The paper concludes with a brief indication of the epistemological options remaining.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Solomon2001, author = {Solomon, Miriam}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {495-498}, publisher = {MIT Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Social Empiricism}, volume = {70(2)}, year = {2001} } @article{SOLOMON1970, author = {SOLOMON, R-C}, title = {NORMATIVE AND META-ETHICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {97-107}, keywords = {ethics, language, metaethics, normative-ethic}, abstract = {A WORKING ASSUMPTION OF MANY META-ETHICAL THEORISTS MAY BE SUMMARIZED IN THE PRINCIPLE THAT A COMPLETELY ADEQUATE MODEL OF ETHICAL LANGUAGE WILL PREJUDGE NO NORMATIVE ISSUES. IN THIS ESSAY, I ARGUE THAT A META-ETHICAL THEORY MAY BE BOTH CORRECT AND NORMATIVELY IMPLICATIVE, AND THAT THERE IS REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT NO META-ETHIC CAN BE WITHOUT NORMATIVE IMPLICATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOLOMON1984, author = {SOLOMON, ROBERT-C}, title = {I CAN'T GET IT OUT OF MY MIND (AUGUSTINE'S PROBLEM).}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {405-412}, keywords = {emotion, judgment, metaphysics, voluntary}, abstract = {IN HIS "CONFESSIONS", SAINT AUGUSTINE TORTURED HIMSELF OVER THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HIS LUSTY THOUGHTS AND IMPULSES, WHICH SO OFFENDED HIS RELIGIOUS SENSIBILITIES. WERE THOSE THOUGHTS AND IMPULSES TRULY "HIS"? WERE THEY IN HIS CONTROL, OR WERE THEY NOT? AUGUSTINE'S PROBLEM CAN BE APPLIED TO A RANGE OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. IN PARTICULAR, EMOTIONS HAVE OFTEN BEEN SAID TO BE WHOLLY INVOLUNTARY AND BEYOND OUR CONTROL. I HAVE ARGUED THAT EMOTIONS ARE BETTER UNDERSTOOD AS CANDIDATES FOR THE VOLUNTARY, INTIMATELY CONNECTED TO THE SELF AND ITS EXPRESSIONS. IN THIS ESSAY, I COUNTER CERTAIN ARGUMENTS AND OBJECTIONS TO THIS VOLUNTARISTIC THESIS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOLOMON1974, author = {SOLOMON, R-C}, title = {REASONS AS CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {34}, pages = {415-428}, keywords = {behavior, cause, explanation, language, reasons}, abstract = {HOW DOES A REASON EXPLAIN AN ACTION? SOME AUTHORS HAVE ARGUED THAT REASON-EXPLANATIONS ARE A SPECIES OF CAUSAL EXPLANATION; OTHERS HAVE ARGUED THAT REASON EXPLANATIONS ARE DECIDEDLY DIFFERENT FROM CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS, AND THAT THE TWO SORTS OF EXPLANATIONS ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. MY INTENTION IN THIS PAPER IS TO EXAMINE BOTH CLAIMS AND TO DEFEND THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF A GENERAL CAUSAL THEORY OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN WHICH REASON EXPLANATIONS PLAY A DOMINANT ROLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOLOMON1976, author = {SOLOMON, ROBERT-C}, title = {PSYCHOLOGICAL PREDICATES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {472-493}, keywords = {intentionality, language, phenomenology, predication, privacy}, abstract = {WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THOSE PREDICATES WHICH WE APPLY EXCLUSIVELY TO PEOPLE AND PEOPLE-LIKE CREATURES ("WANTING A DRINK," "LOVING MARYLYN," "HAVING A HEADACHE") AND THOSE WHICH WE ALSO APPLY TO MATERIAL OBJECTS ("WEIGHING 125 POUNDS")? SOME HAVE SAID THAT THE FORMER REFER TO CERTAIN MENTAL PROPERTIES. OTHERS HAVE ADDED, OR INSISTED INSTEAD, THAT INTENTIONALITY OR INTENSIONALITY IS THE MARK OF THE DIFFERENCE. I ARGUE AGAINST BOTH OF THESE ANSWERS, AND OFFER A "PRINCIPLE OF ASYMMETRY" TO EXPLAIN THIS CRUCIAL DIFFERENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Solomon2005, author = {Solomon, Robert-C}, title = {"What's Character Got to Do with It?"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {648-655}, keywords = {character, empiricism, ethics, motive, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Solomon2003, author = {Solomon, Robert-C}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {741-744}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Not Passion's Slave: Emotions and Choice}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2003} } @article{SOMERVILLE1971, author = {SOMERVILLE, JOHN}, title = {REJOINDER TO LAMONT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {110-111}, keywords = {freedom, metaphysics}, abstract = {ONE DELIBERATES, PICTURES ALTERNATIVES, CHOOSES, AND FEELS ONE DID SO FREELY. TO DR. LAMONT, THIS FREEDOM CONSISTS IN THE ALLEGED FACT THAT THE CHOOSING SELF OPERATES PARTLY OUTSIDE THE BOUNDS OF CAUSATION, SO THAT ALL THE CAUSES INVOLVED IN MAKING THE CHOICE COULD HAVE BEEN EXACTLY AS THEY WERE, YET THE CHOICE COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT. LAMONT EITHER DOES NOT SEE THAT THIS WOULD MEAN CERTAIN FINITE EFFECTS ARE POSSIBLE INDEPENDENTLY OF CAUSES, OR SEES THIS BUT DOES NOT REALIZE IT IS IRRATIONAL AND CONTRARY TO NATURALISM, WHICH HE PROFESSES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOMERVILLE1967, author = {SOMERVILLE, JOHN}, title = {MARXIST ETHICS, DETERMINISM, AND FREEDOM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {17-23}, keywords = {determinism, ethics, freedom, marxism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOMERVILLE1978, author = {SOMERVILLE, JOHN}, title = {THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AMERICAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {489-504}, keywords = {american, declaration-of-independence; equality, inalienable-right; political-philosophy; revolution, self-evident; truth}, abstract = {THAT ITS CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE IS GREATER THAN AT THE TIME IT WAS WRITTEN IS DEMONSTRATED BY LOGICAL, LINGUISTIC AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF WHAT WAS MEANT BY "INALIENABLE RIGHTS." THOSE EMPHASIZED IN THE DECLARATION ARE TO LIFE, LIBERTY, PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS AND FORCIBLE REVOLUTION WHEN GOVERNMENTS BECOME DESTRUCTIVE OF BASIC RIGHTS. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY BECAUSE THE BRITISH CROWN VIOLATED OUR RIGHT TO LIBERTY. OUR PRESENT GOVERNMENT NOT ONLY VIOLATES OUR RIGHT TO REVOLUTION BY ITS SMITH ACT, BUT THREATENS THE RIGHT TO LIFE OF ALL HUMANITY BY ITS DECLARED POLICY OF FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PRECISE DOCUMENTATION IS GIVEN THROUGHOUT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOMERVILLE1970, author = {SOMERVILLE, JOHN}, title = {SOME PERSPECTIVES ON FIFTY YEARS OF SOVIET PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {568-575}, keywords = {marxism, soviet, twentieth}, abstract = {SOME IMPORTANT THINGS SHOWN BY OR INVOLVED IN FIFTY YEARS OF SOVIET PHILOSOPHY: 1) ITS THESIS ON THEORY AND PRACTICE. 2) ITS CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHIC SIGNIFICANCE AND PHILOSOPHIC CRITICISM. 3) THE RELATION OF MARXISM TO SCIENCE.. 4) WHAT SOVIET PHILOSOPHY ADDED TO MARXISM. 5) SOVIET PHILOSOPHY IS MARXISM PLUS RUSSIAN HISTORY. 6) THE MOST IMPORTANT AREA OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY IS PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. 7) RELATIONS BETWEEN IDEOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY. 8) RELATIONS BETWEEN DOCTRINE, POLITICS AND WAR.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOMERVILLE1986, author = {SOMERVILLE, JAMES}, title = {MOORE'S CONCEPTION OF COMMON SENSE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {233-253}, keywords = {common-sense; language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOMERVILLE1973, author = {SOMERVILLE, JOHN}, title = {ADAM SCHAFF AND CONTEMPORARY MARXISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {239-247}, keywords = {communism, humanism, marxism, political-philosoph}, abstract = {ADAM SCHAFF'S WORK IS EVALUATED IN TERMS OF ITS PURPOSE, CONTENT AND SIGNIFICANCE ON TWO PLANES: CRITICISM OF TRADITIONAL MARXISM WITHIN 'COMMUNIST' COUNTRIES, AND POLEMICS BETWEEN PHILOSOPHERS OF 'COMMUNIST' AND ANTI-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. QUOTATIONS FROM SCHAFF CONVEY HIS VIEWS ON ALIENATION UNDER SOCIALISM (E.G., ALIENATION AND WAR, TECHNOLOGY AND COERCION, STALINISM, ALIENATION OF NATION AND RACE), ON FREEDOM, CENSORSHIP, CIVIL LIBERTIES, HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS, ANTI-SEMITISM, EQUALITY AND ELITE, THE MEANING OF LIFE. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF MARXIST CRITICISM IS ITS CONCEPT OF THE RELATION OF THEORY TO PRACTICE. IN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES THIS MEANS THAT PRACTICE MUST BE CRITICIZED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THEORY, WHILE IN 'COMMUNIST' COUNTRIES THEORY MUST BE CRITICIZED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PRACTICE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOMERVILLE1971a, author = {SOMERVILLE, JOHN}, title = {VIOLENCE, POLITICS, AND MORALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {32}, pages = {241-249}, keywords = {marxism, morality, political-philosophy; violence}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SOMERVILLE1962, author = {SOMERVILLE, JOHN}, title = {APPROACHES TO THE CRITIQUE OF SOVIET PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {269-273}, keywords = {dialectical-materialism; epistemology, methodology, ontology, russian, twentieth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SONTAG1964, author = {SONTAG, FREDERICK}, title = {HEIDEGGER AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {410-416}, keywords = {being, finitude, god, man, metaphysics, textual-criticism; time}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR SYMPATHETICALLY TREATS HEIDEGGER'S VIEW OF METAPHYSICS, AS A BASIC REFLECTION UPON SOME PREVIOUS THOUGHT STRUCTURE, WHICH IS NOT OVERT, BUT REVEALED TO THE MIND IN METAPHYSICAL WRITING. THERE IS NO ONE METAPHYSICAL STRUCTURE, AS THERE IS NO SINGLE WAY OF SPEAKING. ONE CAN REORGANIZE THE PAST BY EITHER GIVING A NEW ANALYSIS OF IT IN ORDER TO BETTER UNDERSTAND IT, OR BY DRAWING BACK FROM IT IN ORDER TO EXTRACT FROM IT A NEW DIRECTION FOR THOUGHT. (THE LATTER IS ILLUSTRATED THROUGH HEIDEGGER'S TREATMENT OF KANT.) FINALLY, METAPHYSICAL ENDEAVORS ARE LINKED WITH HUMAN FINITUDE AND TRANSCENDENCE. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sorabji1999, author = {Sorabji, Richard}, title = {Therapy of Desire}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {799-804}, keywords = {desire, epistemology, stoicism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Sorabji2000, author = {Sorabji, Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {245-247}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation: The Gifford Lectures}, volume = {70(1)}, year = {2000} } @article{Sorensen1998, author = {Sorensen, Roy-A}, title = {Self-Strengthening Empathy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {75-98}, keywords = {empathy, metaphysics, mind, self, understanding}, abstract = {Stepping into the other guy's shoes works best when you resemble him. After all, the procedure is to use yourself as a model: in goes hypothetical beliefs and desires, out comes hypothetical actions and revised beliefs and desires. If you are structurally analogous to the empathy, then accurate inputs generate accurate outputs--just as with any other simulation. The greater the degree of isomorphism, the more dependable and precise the results. This sensitivity to degrees of resemblance suggests that the method of empathy works best for average people. The advantage of being a small but representative sample of the population will create a bootstrap effect. For as average people prosper, there will be more average descendants and so the degree of resemblance in subsequent generations will snowball. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sorensen2004, author = {Sorensen, Roy}, title = {Charity Implies Meta-Charity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {290-315}, keywords = {charity, ethics, rationality}, abstract = {The principle of charity says that all agents are rational. The principle of metacharity says that all agents believe all agents are rational. My thesis is that the arguments which are used to support charity also support metacharity. Metacharity implies meta-meta-charity. By recursion, the principle of charity implies that it is common knowledge. But there appears to be intelligent, well-informed disagreement with the principle of charity. So if the entailment thesis holds, opponents of the principle of charity have a new objection to the principle. Defenders of the principle of charity must either refute the entailment thesis or accept much stronger consequences than they expected.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sorensen2005, author = {Sorensen, Roy}, title = {Precis of Vagueness and Contradiction}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {678-685}, keywords = {contradiction, correspondence, epistemicism, epistemology, truth, vagueness}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sorensen2005a, author = {Sorensen, Roy}, title = {A Reply to Critics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {712-728}, keywords = {analytic, analyticity, epistemology, truth, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Sorensen2001, author = {Sorensen, Roy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {678-685}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Vagueness and Contradiction}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2001} } @other{Sorensen2001a, author = {Sorensen, Roy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {686-694}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Vagueness and Contradiction}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2001} } @other{Sorensen2001b, author = {Sorensen, Roy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {695-703}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Vagueness and Contradiction}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2001} } @other{Sorensen2001c, author = {Sorensen, Roy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {704-711}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Vagueness and Contradiction}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2001} } @other{Sorensen2001d, author = {Sorensen, Roy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {712-728}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Vagueness and Contradiction}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2001} } @other{Sorensen1993, author = {Sorensen, Roy-A}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {975-977}, publisher = {Routledge}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Pseudo-Problems: How Analytic Philosophy Gets Done}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1993} } @article{SPANGLER1985, author = {SPANGLER, G-A}, title = {REFERENCE AND IDENTIFICATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {333-336}, keywords = {identification, language, reference}, abstract = {THIS PAPER CONTENDS THAT THEORIES OF REFERENCE ARE OFTEN DEFECTIVE BECAUSE THEORISTS PAY INSUFFICIENTLY CLOSE ATTENTION TO AN ACT/ACHIEVEMENT DISTINCTION AND THUS CONFUSE REFERRING TO SOMETHING AND IDENTIFYING IT. IN PARTICULAR THE PAPER EXAMINES THE VIEW THAT REFERRING IS REFERRING SOMEONE TO SOMETHING AND ARGUES THAT IT IS MISTAKEN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SPIEGELBERG1983, author = {SPIEGELBERG, HERBERT}, title = {MOVEMENTS IN PHILOSOPHY: PHENOMENOLOGY AND ITS PARALLELS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {281-298}, keywords = {metaphysics, phenomenology}, abstract = {IN RESPONSE TO DOUBTS WHETHER THE PROPER NAME FOR THE "PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT" SHOULD BE 'TENDENCY' OR 'SCHOOL' THIS STUDY EXPLORES THE GENESIS AND STRUCTURE OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL GROUPS ISSUING FROM EDMUND HUSSERL'S TEACHING IN GOTTINGEN, COMPARES THEM WITH OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS SUCH AS THE "SAINT LOUIS MOVEMENT", PRAGMATISM AND POSITIVISM AND WITH NON-PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS, CONTRASTS THE TYPICAL STRUCTURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS WITH THAT OF SCHOOLS AND DISCUSSES THE LEGITIMATE PLACE OF MOVEMENTS IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sprigge1994, author = {Sprigge, T-L-S}, title = {Idealism contra Idealism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {409-414}, keywords = {epistemology, idealism, nature, reason, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sreenivasan2001, author = {Sreenivasan, Gopal}, title = {A Proliferation of Liberties}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(1)}, pages = {229-237}, keywords = {freedom, liberty, political-philosophy; republicanism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sreenivasan2001a, author = {Sreenivasan, Gopal}, title = {Understanding Alien Morals}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {1-32}, keywords = {alien, anthropology, epistemology, ethics, morality}, abstract = {Anthropologists often claim to have understood an ethical outlook that they nevertheless believe is largely false. Some moral philosophers--e.g., Susan Hurley--argue that this claim is incoherent because understanding an ethical outlook necessarily involves believing it to be largely true. To reach this conclusion, they apply an argument of Donald Davidson's to the ethical case. My central aim is to defend the coherence of the anthropologists' claim against this argument. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Sreenivasan1995, author = {Sreenivasan, Gopal}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {997-999}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property}, volume = {58(4)}, year = {1995} } @article{SRZEDNICKI1963, author = {SRZEDNICKI, JAN}, title = {A REPLY TO PROFESSOR MAYER-HILLEBRAND'S "REMARKS CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRANZ BRENTANO".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {445-446}, keywords = {development, philosophy, publication, system}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SRZEDNICKI1962, author = {SRZEDNICKI, JAN-T-J}, title = {REMARKS CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRANZ BRENTANO.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {308-316}, keywords = {nineteenth, philosophy, problem, scholarship, scientific-method; system, textual-criticis}, abstract = {MOST EDITIONS OF BRENTANO'S WORKS AND HIS COMMENTATORS HAVE A TENDENCY TO ATTEMPT TO ARREST HIS THOUGHT AT A GIVEN MOMENT AND THEN TRY TO WORK OUT, IN A SYSTEMATIC WAY, HIS VIEWS CONCERNING MOST PROBLEMS. THE AUTHOR THINKS THIS APPROACH IS WRONG. FOR BRENTANO, PARTICULAR INSIGHTS ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE GENERAL HYPOTHESIS. HE NEVER THOUGHT OF HIMSELF IN POSSESSION OF THE FINAL AND COMPLETE THEORETICAL VIEW. IT IS SHOWN THAT A MORE DETAILED PAINSTAKING APPROACH IS BETTER; THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS MAKES SYSTEM BUILDING INAPPROPRIATE. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STACK1971, author = {STACK, GEORGE-J}, title = {SARTRE'S DIALECTIC OF SOCIAL RELATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {394-408}, keywords = {dialectic, marxism, social-philosophy; society}, abstract = {THIS ESSAY IS CONCERNED WITH A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SARTRE'S DESCRIPTION OF GROUP DYNAMICS. BASICALLY, I ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT SARTRE'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF GROUP FORMATION TENDS TOWARDS A RATIONALISTIC ANALYSIS WHICH IMBUES SOCIAL PROCESSES WITH A NECESSITY WHICH SARTRE HAD INTENDED TO OBVIATE. IN ADDITION, THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL UNIFICATION PRESENTED BY SARTRE IS CRITICIZED FOR NEGLECTING THE IRRATIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING GROUP COHESION - SPECIFIC REFERENCE BEING MADE TO THE INSIGHTS OF LEBON AND FREUD.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STACK1982, author = {STACK, GEORGE-J and PLANT, ROBERT}, title = {THE PHENOMENON OF "THE LOOK".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {359-373}, keywords = {gaze, metaphysics, phenomenology, response}, abstract = {THE PHENOMENON OF THE 'LOOK' INCORPORATED IN SARTRE'S PHENOMENOLOGY AS "LE REGARD" WHICH SIGNIFIES THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF OTHERS AND FIXES THE OBJECTIVE BEING OF THOSE IT IS DIRECTED TOWARD IS ANALYZED IN TERMS OF THE ASSUMPTION THAT SARTRE'S ACCOUNT OF BEING FIXED BY THE 'GAZE' OF THE OTHER IS 'PATHOLOGICAL'. IT IS ARGUED THAT 'THE LOOK' OR GAZE PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE BEHAVIOR OF INSECTS, BIRDS, "LEPIDOPTERA", LIZARDS, PRIMATES AND MAN. VARIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES ARE CITED IN ORDER TO SHOW THE APPARENT FUNCTION OF, AND RESPONSES TO, GAZE. THE AUTHORS TRY TO SHOW THAT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE 'LOOK' AND RESPONSES TO IT IN SARTRE'S WRITINGS IS NOT, AS SOME PSYCHOLOGISTS HAVE HELD, APPROPRIATE TO PATHOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO BEING STARED AT. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STAHL1964, author = {STAHL, GEROLD}, title = {LINGUISTIC STRUCTURES ISOMORPHIC TO OBJECT STRUCTURES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {339-344}, keywords = {correspondence, denotation, isomorphism, language, linguistics, object, structure}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STAHL1979, author = {STAHL, GEROLD}, title = {LOGICAL TREATMENT OF THE RELATIONS OF KNOWING AND BELIEVING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {511-523}, keywords = {believing, epistemology, knowing, logic}, abstract = {AN EXTENSIONAL TREATMENT IS APPLIED TO INTENSIONAL UNIVERSES (SEE ALSO "INTENSIONAL UNIVERSES," "PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH", VOLUME 30, NUMBER 2, PAGES 252-258, 1969), I.E., TO UNIVERSES OF DISCOURSE WHICH CONTAIN MORE THAN ONE INDIVIDUAL FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL OF THE USUAL UNIVERSES. THERE ARE SPECIAL INDIVIDUALS, CALLED "EVENTUALITIES," AND THE RELATIONS OF KNOWING AND BELIEVING MAY HOLD BETWEEN PERSONS AND EVENTUALITIES (SITUATIONS AND ANTISITUATIONS). EVENTUALITIES ARE DENOTED BY SPECIAL INDIVIDUAL SYMBOLS, THE EVENTUALITY DECLARATIONS, WHICH ARE RELATED TO SENTENCES. MINIMAL SYSTEMS OF KNOWING AND BELIEVING EVENTUALITIES AND THEIR MODELS ARE INDICATED. SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS (CONCERNING WHAT NOT CAN BE KNOWN, KNOWING THAT ONE KNOWS OR NOT KNOWS, ETC.) ARE ANALYSED. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF OF CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS IS GIVEN BY SPECIAL PREMISES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STAHL1973, author = {STAHL, GEROLD}, title = {THE AMBIGUITY OF THE INDICATORS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {248-251}, keywords = {ambiguity, indicator, language}, abstract = {THE INDICATORS, TERMS OF COMMON LANGUAGE LIKE 'I', 'THIS MAN', 'HERE', ETC., ARE TREATED AS ABBREVIATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL EXPRESSIONS OR DESCRIPTIONS. FREQUENTLY THEY ARE AMBIGUOUS AND FURTHER INFORMATION MIGHT BE NEEDED IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHICH ARE THE EXPRESSIONS THEY ABBREVIATE. THREE TYPES OF AMBIGUITY ARE CONSIDERED: THE PRAGMATICAL AMBIGUITY (INFORMATION ABOUT THE SPEAKER IN THE LARGE SENSE IS NEEDED), THE SYNTACTICAL AMBIGUITY (INFORMATION ABOUT THE EXPRESSIONS TO WHICH THE INDICATORS ARE RELATED, IS NEEDED) AND THE INTENSIONAL AMBIGUITY (INFORMATION ABOUT THE INTENSION OF THE INDICATOR WHICH ABBREVIATES AN EXPRESSION IN OBLIQUE OCCURRENCE, IS NEEDED). THE TREATMENT OF THE LAST CASE IS MADE ACCORDING TO STAHL'S "INTENSIONAL UNIVERSES", "PHIL PHENOMENOL RES" 30, 1969, 252-258.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STAHL1969, author = {STAHL, GEROLD}, title = {INTENSIONAL UNIVERSES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {252-257}, keywords = {extension, intensionality, logic, modal-logi}, abstract = {SOME EXPRESSIONS IN OBJECT LANGUAGE WHICH FREQUENTLY ARE SUPPOSED TO NEED AN INTENSIONAL TREATMENT ARE FORMALIZED EXTENSIONALLY IN THE PAPER, WITHOUT PRODUCING ANY OF THE TRADITIONAL PROBLEMS. THIS IS ACHIEVED BY USING (ESPECIAL DENOTATION RULES AND) UNIVERSES OF DISCOURSE WHICH CONTAIN MORE THAN ONE INDIVIDUAL FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL OF THE USUAL UNIVERSES. THE ENLARGED UNIVERSES ARE CALLED "INTENSIONAL UNIVERSES." PROBLEMS TREATED ARE THOSE OF THE DR. JEKYLL-MR. HYDE TYPE, THE RELATION OF KNOWING AND SOME APPEARING IN MODAL CONTEXTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STALKER1977, author = {STALKER, DOUGLAS-F}, title = {A GOOD POEM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {33-46}, keywords = {aesthetics, goodness, poetry}, abstract = {ONCE A POEM IS GOOD, IS IT GOOD ONCE AND FOR ALL? THERE ARE, AFTER ALL, VARIOUS LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL CHANGES, AND THEY SEEM TO TAKE THEIR TOLL: E.G., IMAGES LOSE THEIR POWER, RHYMES GO FLAT, THE SENSE OF A WORD SHIFTS, A SOCIAL TONE MOVES DOWN THE SPECTRUM. DO SUCH CHANGES SHOW SOMETHING ABOUT THE QUALITY OF A WORK FLUCTUATING OVER TIME? NO. TO THINK THEY DO IS TO MISJUDGE THE CHARACTER OF THE MEDIUM HERE. A POEM IS NOT A CONSTANT WORK IN AN EMINENTLY STABLE MEDIUM. A POEM IS A WORK IN AN ESSENTIALLY UNSTABLE MEDIUM, AND LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL CHANGES SHOW AS MUCH.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stalnaker2001, author = {Stalnaker, Robert}, title = {Metaphysics without Conceptual Analysis}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {631-636}, keywords = {conceptual-analysis; epistemology, ethics, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STAMPE1990, author = {STAMPE, DENNIS-W}, title = {Desires as Reasons--Discussion Notes on Fred Dretske's "Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {787-793}, keywords = {behavior, desire, metaphysics, reasons}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stampe1992, author = {Stampe, Dennis-W and Gibson, Martha-I}, title = {Of One's Own Free Will}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {529-556}, keywords = {free-will; language, linguistics, meaning}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STANDLEY1982, author = {STANDLEY, GERALD}, title = {THE LIMITATIONS OF SENSE EXPERIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {434-441}, keywords = {epistemology, experience, sense, truth}, abstract = {THE POSTULATES OF SCIENCE ARE SUBJECT TO REVISION BECAUSE DATA AFFORDED BY SENSE EXPERIENCE IS ITS CONCERN. HERE THE USUAL MEANING OF 'TRUTH' IS LEAST MOOT. IN MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC, BY CONTRAST, CONSISTENCY RATHER THAN SENSE EXPERIENCE IS PARAMOUNT. TO CALL EMPIRICALLY EMPTY STATEMENTS TRUTHS AT ALL IS MISLEADING; HENCE THIS IS CALLED THE REALM OF 'TRATH'. PREFERENCES--PRIZINGS--WHETHER IN ART, ETHICS, OR METAPHYSICS ARE POSTULATED QUITE DIFFERENTLY, NOT BEING ARBITRARY NOR GAME--LIKE AS IN LOGIC OR PURE MATHEMATICS. NOR ARE THEY, LIKE THE POSTULATES OF SCIENCE, ORIENTED TO SENSE EXPERIENCE; RATHER THEY ARE ROOTED IN 'EXISTENTIAL' EXPERIENCE. COMMITMENTS, ESPOUSAL CHARACTERIZE THIS REALM OF 'TROTH'. MISCONCEPTIONS RESULT FROM CONFUSING THESE REALMS OF DISCOURSE. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stein1997, author = {Stein, Edward}, title = {Can We Be Justified in Believing that Humans Are Irrational?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {545-565}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, human, irrational, language}, abstract = {In this paper, the author considers an argument against the thesis that humans are irrational in the sense that we reason according to principles that differ from those we ought to follow. The argument begins by noting that if humans are irrational, we should not trust the results of our reasoning processes. If we are justified in believing that humans are irrational, then, since this belief results from a reasoning process, we should not accept this belief. The claim that humans are irrational is, thus, self-undermining. The author shows that this argument--and others like it--fails for several interesting reasons, in fact, there is nothing self-undermining about the claim that humans are irrational; empirical research to establish this claim does not face the sorts of a priori problems that some philosophers and psychologists have claimed it does.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Stein1996, author = {Stein, Edward}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {234-237}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science}, volume = {60(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{STEINKRAUS1968, author = {STEINKRAUS, WARREN-E}, title = {A FURTHER NOTE ON WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {442-443}, keywords = {twentieth}, abstract = {HOCKING'S ADMIRATION FOR JOSIAH ROYCE (AS INDICATED IN D S ROBINSON'S EARLIER ARTICLE OF MARCH 1967) IS PARALLELED BY HIS HIGH REGARD FOR BORDEN P BOWNE. HOCKING'S EVALUATION OF BOWNE AND HIS COMPARISON OF BOWNE'S VIEWS WITH ROYCE'S AND JAMES' ARE GIVEN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sterba1999, author = {Sterba, James-P}, title = {Morality and Self-Interest}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {525-531}, keywords = {ethics, moral-theory; morality, order, self-interes}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STERBA1981, author = {STERBA, JAMES-P}, title = {HOW TO COMPLETE THE COMPATIBILIST ACCOUNT OF FREE ACTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {508-523}, keywords = {compatibilism, determinism, freedom, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sterelny1999, author = {Sterelny, Kim}, title = {Dawkins' Bulldog}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {255-262}, keywords = {darwinism, evolution, life, meaning, metaphysics, science}, abstract = {This book defends three central ideas. First, Dennett expounds a particular version of gene selectionism. On this view, rival gene lineages build different individuals, and these individuals' differential success results in the differential growth of gene lineages. So organisms affect evolutionary history only by determining which gene lineages prosper. Moreover, Dennett is an adaptationist: evolutionary history is dominated by selection. Second, Dennett thinks biological evolution is a special case of a more general phenomenon: evolution is "substrate neutral". So he is a friend of memes. Third, he argues that minds are adapted engines of behavioral control. While many would agree with this general thesis, Dennett argues that it has profound implications for theories of mind. I have reservations about Dennett's version of adaptationism, but the main critical thrust of this notice is with Dennett's second and third themes. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sterelny2000, author = {Sterelny, Kim}, title = {Roboroach, or, The Extended Phenotype Meets Cognitive Science}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {207-215}, keywords = {cognitive-science; epistemology, gene, language, mind}, abstract = {Being There is an interesting and provocative book. It develops three ideas; ideas which I argue are not a package deal. The first is about the boundaries of cognitive systems: there is no well-defined cognitive system within the human brain or even the human body. The second is focused on the nature of representation: Clark defends nonrepresentational theories and task-specific representational theories of intelligence, and reiterates his scepticism about sentential theories of cognition. The third set of ideas concerns methodological questions about the nature of explanation: Clark argues that familiar reductive strategies will not take us far in attempting to explain intelligent agency and defends instead ideas about emergence. I am much more persuaded by the first set of ideas than the others, for I think Clark much overstates the power of very limited representational systems in hostile natural environments.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STERN1967, author = {STERN, LAURENT}, title = {ON MAKE-BELIEVE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {24-38}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, pretending}, abstract = {IN MAKING BELIEVE WE ARE TRYING TO PRODUCE THE APPEARANCE OF WHAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE. IF WE ARE MAKING BELIEVE WITH THE INTENTION TO MAKE ANOTHER MAN BELIEVE WHAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE, THEN, UNLESS WE DISGUISE OUR INTENTION, IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT WE ARE MAKING BELIEVE WITH THAT INTENTION. IF WE ARE MAKING BELIEVE IN ORDER TO INDUCE THE PARTICIPATION OF ANOTHER MAN IN OUR MAKE-BELIEVE, THEN, UNLESS WE REVEAL THAT THIS IS OUR INTENTION, IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT WE ARE MAKING BELIEVE WITH THAT INTENTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STERN1965, author = {STERN, LAURENT}, title = {FICTIONAL CHARACTERS, PLACES, AND EVENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {202-215}, keywords = {aesthetics, character, event, fiction, imagination, literature, place, world}, abstract = {UNDER THE GOVERNING CONVENTION OF WORKS OF LITERARY ART, AUTHORS OF SUCH WORKS CANNOT SUCCESSFULLY REFER TO THEMSELVES WITHIN THEIR WORK. WE MUST MAKE-BELIEVE THAT THE STORIES TOLD WITHIN LITERARY WORKS OF ART ARE TOLD BY NARRATORS OF SUCH WORKS, I.E., BY FICTIONAL CHARACTERS. FICTIONAL SENTENCES ARE USED (1) TO CREATE FICTIONAL CHARACTERS, OBJECTS, PLACES AND EVENTS, I.E., AN IMAGINARY WORLD, AND (2) TO TALK ABOUT THIS IMAGINARY WORLD. IT IS ARGUED THAT SENTENCES THAT ARE USED TO CREATE AN IMAGINARY WORLD, (1) ABOVE, ACT AS PERFORMATIVES AND ONLY SENTENCES THAT ARE EXCLUSIVELY USED TO TALK ABOUT SUCH A WORLD, (2), CAN CONTAIN TRUE OR FALSE FICTIONAL STATEMENTS. SENTENCES THAT IN OTHER CONTEXTS COULD BE STATEMENTS ABOUT PARTICULARS, LOGICAL TRUTHS, EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATIONS, ETC., SERVE IN LITERARY WORKS OF ART AS VEHICLES TO PERMIT AND FACILITATE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF AN IMAGINARY WORLD WITHIN A WORK OF ART.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stern2004, author = {Stern, Robert}, title = {Coherence As a Test for Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {296-326}, keywords = {coherence, epistemology, justification, memory, perception, truth}, abstract = {This paper sets out to demonstrate that a contrast can be drawn between coherentism as an account of the structure of justification, and coherentism as a method of inquiry. Whereas the former position aims to offer an answer to the 'regress of justification' problem, the latter position claims that coherence plays a vital and indispensable role as a criterion of truth, given the fallibility of cognitive methods such as perception and memory. It is argued that 'early' coherentists like Bradley and Blanshard were coherentists of the latter kind, and that this sort of coherentism is not open to certain sorts of standard objection that can be raised against justificatory coherentism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stevenson2000, author = {Stevenson, Leslie-F}, title = {Synthetic Unities of Experience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {281-305}, keywords = {experience, metaphysics}, abstract = {Inspired by Kant, Merleau-Ponty and Sellars, I identify certain kinds of unity which are typical features of our conscious experience and argue that Kant was right that they are produced by unconscious processes of synthesis. A perceptual experience of succession is not reducible to a succession of experiences. Perceiving one object as having several features is not reducible to a conjunction of experiences of these features. A cross-modal perceptual experience is not reducible to a conjunction of single-modality experiences. Perceptual information is synthesized into a representation of the world from a spatio-temporal point of view. Any of the simultaneous features of a subject can be thought of together. Many of a subject's experiences can be thought of at a later time as part of her history of experience.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Steward1996, author = {Steward, Helen}, title = {Papineau's Physicalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {667-672}, keywords = {epistemology, naturalism, physicalism, supervenience, truth}, abstract = {The author discusses two lines of thought from Papineau's Philosophical Naturalism. She suggests, firstly, that Papineau's argument that supervenience of the mental on the physical is not sufficient for physicalism is flawed. Papineau claims that supervenience is consistent with epiphenomenalism; the author argues that any form of epiphenomenalism which is committed to the existence of irreducible psychophysical laws must be ruled out by the doctrine that Papineau labels 'supervenience'. The author further contends that Papineau's claim that there is something puzzling about the nonreductive stance taken by those who endorse a functionalist view of mental states has not been convincingly made out.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STEWARD1987, author = {STEWARD, RODERICK-M}, title = {INTENTIONALITY AND THE SEMANTICS OF 'DASEIN'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {93-106}, keywords = {dasein, intentionality, language, semantics}, abstract = {A PUZZLE FOR READERS OF HEIDEGGER'S "BEING AND TIME" IS WHY IT IS DESCRIBED AS A WORK IN THE TRADITION OF HUSSERLIAN "TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY," BUT SCARCELY MENTIONS THE PRIMARY PHENOMENON OF HUSSERL'S ANALYSIS, THE FACT AND PHENOMENON OF HUMAN INTENTIONALITY. THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO SHED SOME LIGHT ON THIS ISSUE BY EXAMINING SOME RECENT INTERPRETIVE WORK ON HEIDEGGER BY JOHN HAUGELAND, ROBERT BRANDOM, AND OTHERS. IN THE FIRST SECTION, THE PAPER DISCUSSES VARIOUS TEXTUAL CLUES FOR AND (ULTIMATELY) AGAINST HAUGELAND'S CLAIM THAT 'DASEIN" REFERS NOT TO PERSONS IN ANY TRADITIONAL SENSE, AND THUS HAS A "SEMANTICS" DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF TRADITIONAL COUNT- AND MASS-NOUNS. IN THE SECOND SECTION, IT ARGUES (1) FOR THE VIEW THAT HEIDEGGER'S EXISTENTIAL ANALYTIC HELPS ITSELF TO AN IDIOM OF TECHNICAL AND PRACTICAL INTENTIONALITY, AND (2) AGAINST THE HAUGELAND-BRANDOM CLAIM THAT HEIDEGGER'S REJECTION OF HUSSERLIAN CARTESIANISM IS TANTAMOUNT TO A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST STRATEGY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND LANGUAGE WHERE ALL REFERENCE TO HUMAN INTENTIONALITY IS TO BE REPLACED BY EXCLUSIVE TALK OF A "HERD-MEMBER'S" NORMALIZED DISPOSITIONS TO BEHAVE WITHIN A SET OF ONGOING SOCIAL PRACTICES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stewart1995, author = {Stewart, Jon}, title = {The Architectonic of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(4)}, pages = {747-776}, keywords = {knowledge, metaphysics, phenomenology, self, spirit}, abstract = {Despite Hegel's repeated claims for the necessity of a systematic or scientific philosophy, his first major work, the Phenomenology of Spirit, has long been reproached for being an unsystematic text. The central claim of this essay is that there is in fact a single, unifying argument in the book which has been obscured by the fact that later editors combined two separate organizational schemes in the table of contents, instead if opting for the one or the other. This paper attempts to defend Hegel's systematic pretensions by reconstructing the systematic unity of the text based on the second of the two schemes.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STICH1991, author = {STICH, Stephen-P}, title = {"The Fragmentation of Reason": Precis of Two Chapters.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {cognitive, epistemology, evaluation, reason, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STICH1991a, author = {STICH, Stephen-P}, title = {Evaluating Cognitive Strategies: A Reply to Cohen, Goldman, Harman, and Lycan.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {cognitive, epistemology, strategy}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STICH1990, author = {STICH, STEPHEN-P}, title = {Building Belief: Some Queries about Representation, Indication, and Function.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {801-806}, keywords = {belief, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Stich1996, author = {Stich, Stephen-P}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {479-483}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Deconstructing the Mind}, volume = {60(2)}, year = {1996} } @article{Stich2001, author = {Stich, Stephen and Weinberg, Jonathan-M}, title = {Jackson's Empirical Assumptions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {637-643}, keywords = {cognition, conceptual-analysis; epistemology, intuition, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STIERLIN1963, author = {STIERLIN, HELM}, title = {EXISTENTIALISM MEETS PSYCHOTHERAPY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {215-239}, keywords = {dasein, existence, existentialism, man, phenomenology, philosophical-anthropology; psychotherapy, schizophrenia}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE CONTRIBUTION OF EXISTENTIALIST THINKING TO PSYCHOTHERAPY, AND ATTEMPTS A CRITIQUE OF THESE IDEAS AS TO THEIR VALUE IN PSYCHIATRIC THEORY AND PRACTICE. IT ELABORATES THE THEME OF MAN'S EXISTENCE AS AN UNSTABLE EQUILIBRIUM AND DEALS AT SOME LENGTH WITH RECENT INSIGHTS FROM THE STUDY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA. THE DIFFERENT USES OF LANGUAGE ARE DESCRIBED, BY ALLUDING TO HEIDEGGER, JASPERS AND BOSS. THERE IS A SUGGESTION AT THE END OF THE SEEMING AFFINITY AND COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN THE SCHIZOPHRENIC CONDITION AND EXISTENTIALISM! (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STIERLIN1963a, author = {STIERLIN, HELM}, title = {REPLY TO ROLLO HANDY'S "EXISTENTIAL VS BIOSOCIAL THEORIES OF MAN".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {247}, keywords = {existentialism, philosophical-anthropology; psychotherapy, subjectivism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stocker1994, author = {Stocker, Michael}, title = {Self-Other Asymmetries and Virtue Theory}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {689-694}, keywords = {asymmetry, ethics, morality, other, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stoljar2001, author = {Stoljar, Daniel}, title = {Two Conceptions of the Physical}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {253-281}, keywords = {falsity, metaphysics, mind, physical}, abstract = {The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception, it is plausible that (2) is true and (3) is false; on the object-based conception, it is plausible that (3) is true and (2) is false. The paper also defends and explores the version of physicalism that results from this strategy.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STOLNITZ1961, author = {STOLNITZ, JEROME}, title = {SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING AESTHETIC PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {69-87}, keywords = {aesthetic-experience; aesthetic-object; aesthetics, attention, attitude, belief, disinterestedness, perception, purpose}, abstract = {IT IS STATED THAT A DISTINCTIVE PERCEPTUAL ATTITUDE OR "SET" HAS REVOLUTIONIZED MODERN AESTHETICS. HOWEVER, THIS ATTITUDE ITSELF HAS NOT BEEN SUBJECTED TO SELF-CONSCIOUS SCRUTINY. THE AUTHOR SYMPATHETICALLY EXPLORES THE WORK OF VINCENT TOMAS AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE. THERE IS AGREEMENT, THAT IN AESTHETIC EXPERIENCES ONE IS MADE AWARE OF FAMILIAR APPEARANCES, NOT OF FAMILIAR OBJECTS. FOUR DEFINITIONS ARE ELABORATED--THAT THIS ATTITUDE IS DISINTERESTED, VERY ATTENTIVE, APPEARANCES ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM REALITY, AND THE OBJECT IS NOT A SIGN. A CALL FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE FEATURES OF THE ESTHETIC ATTITUDE IS MADE. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stone2003, author = {Stone, Abraham-D}, title = {Specific and Generic Objects in Cavell and Thomas Aquinas}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {48-74}, keywords = {epistemology, god, metaphysics, object}, abstract = {Here I establish a parallel between modern epistemology and traditional metaphysics: between the way we know an object, on the one hand, and the way an object's causes cause it to exist, on the other. I show that different efficient causes in the Thomistic system correspond to different questions of knowledge, as analyzed by Stanley Cavell, and that in particular the question the Cavellian skeptic asks corresponds to God's causation in creation. As I have explained in detail elsewhere, and discuss briefly here, this parallel represents far more than a formal analogy between a series of issues in epistemology and a series of issues in metaphysics. It helps to explain, in fact, why modern philosophers (e.g., Husserl) were ultimately driven to put the human ego in the place of God, as creating (or "positing") the objects of its knowledge, thereby denying the very distinction between epistemology and ontology.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STONE1988, author = {STONE, JIM}, title = {PARFIT AND THE BUDDHA: WHY THERE ARE NO PEOPLE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {519-532}, keywords = {metaphysics, person, reductionism}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT THERE ARE NO PERSONS (IN LOCKE'S SENSE OF THE WORD "PERSON"). IT BEGINS BY ARGUING THAT REDUCTIONISM WITH REGARD TO PEOPLE IS INCOHERENT. TWO OF DEREK PARFIT'S ARGUMENTS FOR REDUCTIONISM ARE EXAMINED. THE SPECTRUM ARGUMENT TURNS OUT TO SUPPORT AN ELIMINATIVIST STANCE AS MUCH AS IT SUPPORTS REDUCTIONISM. THE FISSIONING ARGUMENT ALLEGES TO SHOW THAT IDENTITY ISN'T WHAT MATTERS IN SURVIVAL--BUT THE ARGUMENT BEGS THE QUESTION AND A COUNTERARGUMENT SHOWS THAT IF IDENTITY ISN'T WHAT MATTERS, NOTHING MATTERS. THIS CONCLUSION IS USED TO SHOW THAT A CONSEQUENCE OF REDUCTIONISM IS THAT THERE IS NOTHING WHICH CAN CONSIDER ITSELF AS ITSELF IN DIFFERENT TIMES AND PLACES--THERE ARE NO PERSONS. NOW WE MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN REALISM (THE VIEW THAT PERSONS ARE ONTOLOGICALLY EXTRA TO BODIES, BRAINS, AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL EVENTS) AND ELIMINATIVISM (THE VIEW THAT THERE ARE NO PERSONS). THE PAPER ARGUES THAT THE REALIST ONTOLOGY IS BOTH UNSCIENTIFIC AND THEORETICALLY UNSATISFYING (E.G., IT LEADS TO AN INFINITE REGRESS, ETC.). ELIMINATIVISM FOLLOWS FROM A CONSISTENT NATURALISM. THE HUMEAN AND BUDDHIST VIEWS ARE COMPARED; THEY COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER IN DIAGNOSING THE SOURCE OF THE CONVICTION THAT PERSONS EXIST.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stone2005, author = {Stone, Jim}, title = {Why There Still Are No People}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(1)}, pages = {174-191}, keywords = {connectedness, eliminativism, epistemology, identity, survival}, abstract = {This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to eliminativism are considered, especially that morality cannot survive the loss of persons.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stone2000, author = {Stone, Jim}, title = {Skepticism as a Theory of Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {527-545}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, scepticism}, abstract = {Skepticism about the external world may very well be correct, so the question is in order: what theory of knowledge flows from skepticism itself? The skeptic can give a relatively simple and intuitive account of knowledge by identifying it with indubitable certainty. Our everyday 'I know that p' claims, which typically are part of practical projects, deploy the ideal of knowledge to make assertions closely related to, but weaker than, knowledge claims. The truth of such claims is consistent with skepticism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STOUTLAND1971, author = {STOUTLAND, FREDERICK}, title = {ONTOLOGICAL SIMPLICITY AND THE IDENTITY HYPOTHESIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {491-509}, keywords = {brain, identity, materialism, metaphysics, sensation}, abstract = {THE HYPOTHESIS THAT SENSATIONS ARE IDENTICAL WITH BRAIN PROCESSES IS NOT ONTOLOGICALLY SIMPLER THAN DUALISTIC ALTERNATIVES. IT DOES NOT ENTAIL THAT THE SUBJECT OF SENSATIONS IS IDENTICAL WITH THE SUBJECT OF BRAIN PROCESSES; IT ENTAILS THAT BRAIN PROCESSES HAVE SENSATIONS PROPERTIES, WHICH ARE UNIQUE TO SENTIENT BEINGS AND NOT MERELY INTENTIONAL. WHETHER WE ACCEPT OR REJECT IT MAKES LITTLE DIFFERENCE TO OUR CONCEPTION OF HUMAN NATURE, AND PHILOSOPHERS SHOULD TURN THEIR ATTENTION TO OTHER MATTERS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STRATTON1974, author = {STRATTON, MELVILLE}, title = {ON TIME AND OTHER MINDS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {211-222}, keywords = {existence, metaphysics, minds, time}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS. THE METHOD USED INVOLVES INTRODUCING THREE NEW TERMS, EACH OF WHICH IN SOME WAYS RESEMBLES IN MEANING, AND IN SOME WAYS DIFFERS FROM IN MEANING, THE ORDINARY TERM "EXISTS." WHEN THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS IS RESTATED WITH THESE NEW TERMS, THERE IS A PRONOUNCED INCREASE IN THE COMPLEXITY OF THE DISCUSSION, BUT THERE IS ALSO A PRONOUNCED DECREASE IN THE VAGUENESS OF THE DISCUSSION. A COMPLETE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS IS OFFERED. A VERSION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RELATIVITY OF TIME, WHICH IS EVEN MORE DRASTIC THAN EINSTEIN'S VERSION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RELATIVITY OF TIME, IS NEEDED IN THE SOLUTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Strawson1998, author = {Strawson, Galen}, title = {Precis of Mental Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {433-435}, keywords = {mental, metaphysics, observation, phenomena, reality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Strawson1998a, author = {Strawson, Galen}, title = {Replies to Noam Chomsky, Pierre Jacob, Michael Smith, and Paul Snowdon}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {461-486}, keywords = {mental, metaphysics, reality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Strawson2000, author = {Strawson, Galen}, title = {The Unhelpfulness of Indeterminism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {149-155}, keywords = {determinism, epistemology, free-will; truth}, abstract = {This is a critical discussion of Robert Kane's libertarian theory of free will. It argues that his attempt to show that indeterminism can contribute to free will is unsuccessful.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Strawson1992, author = {Strawson, Peter-F}, title = {Comments on Some Aspects of Peter Unger's "Identity, Consciousness and Value"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {145-148}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, personal-identity; value}, abstract = {I expressed agreement with Unger's view of the essential nature of personal identity, but dissented from what I took to be his view of the value we attach to its preservation; saying, for example, that, in common, I think with many others, I would prefer being replaced or succeeded' by a numerically distinct continuator' with "qualitatively" identical memories and mental and physical characteristics to surviving as the "numerically" identical person with severe impairment of memory and abilities.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STROLL1986, author = {STROLL, AVRUM}, title = {THE ROLE OF SURFACES IN AN ECOLOGICAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {437-453}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, sense-data; surface}, abstract = {IN "THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO VISUAL PERCEPTION", J J GIBSON ARGUES THAT HUMAN OBSERVERS HAVE DIRECT VISUAL ACCESS TO THE "EXTERNAL WORLD" VIA THE DIRECT PERCEPTION OF THE SURFACES OF OBJECTS IN THE EXTERNAL WORLD. THE AUTHOR CONTENDS THAT GIBSON'S THEORY PRESUPPOSES THAT EVERY OPAQUE OBJECT HAS A SURFACE, AND ACCORDINGLY THAT IT IS A NECESSARY CONDITION OF SEEING SUCH AN OBJECT THAT ONE SEE ITS SURFACE. HE ARGUES THAT NEITHER OF THESE PRINCIPLES IS CORRECT, AND THAT GIBSON'S MISTAKE ARISES FROM MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF SURFACES, AND THE ROLE THEY PLAY IN PERCEPTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Stroll1994, author = {Stroll, Avrum}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {238-241}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty}, volume = {58(1)}, year = {1994} } @article{STROMBERG1980, author = {STROMBERG, WAYNE-H}, title = {WITTGENSTEIN AND THE NATIVISM-EMPIRISM CONTROVERSY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {127-141}, keywords = {empiricism, nativism, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stroud2003, author = {Stroud, Barry}, title = {Ostension and the Social Character of Thought}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {667-674}, keywords = {language, meaning, ostension, social, thought}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stroud2004, author = {Stroud, Barry}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {423-442}, keywords = {color, metaphysics, phenomenalism, reality, representation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stroud2004a, author = {Stroud, Barry}, title = {Precis of The Quest for Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {384-386}, keywords = {anthropocentrism, belief, color, metaphysics, reality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stroud2004b, author = {Stroud, Barry}, title = {Unmasking and Dispositionalism: Reply to Mark Johnston}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(1)}, pages = {202-212}, keywords = {color, dispositionalism, metaphysics}, abstract = {Mark Johnston acknowledges the potential significance of investigating the nature and prospects of metaphysical ambition as I try to do with respect to the colors of things in The Quest for Reality. But he is not impressed with the actual achievement. He thinks I spend too much time rejecting views that nobody nowadays, or perhaps ever, would take seriously, and too little time--and in some cases no time at all--opposing views contrary to mine that almost everybody who is anybody nowadays accepts. He raises some objections that I certainly have not answered or even explicitly forestalled in the book. The most I can do here is to indicate the directions in which I think adequate replies might be found, if they can be found at all.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stroud1997, author = {Stroud, Barry}, title = {Unpurged Pyrrhonism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {411-416}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, pyrrhonism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stroud1996, author = {Stroud, Barry}, title = {Epistemological Reflection on Knowledge of the External World}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {345-358}, keywords = {epistemology, external-world; knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stroud1992, author = {Stroud, Barry-G}, title = {Pursuit of Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {981-987}, keywords = {epistemology, language, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stroud1998, author = {Stroud, Sarah}, title = {Moral Relativism and Quasi-Absolutism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {189-194}, keywords = {ethics, moral-theory; objectivity, relativism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stroud-Drinkwater1994, author = {Stroud-Drinkwater, Clive}, title = {The Naive Theory of Colour}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {345-354}, keywords = {color, epistemology, perception, phenomenology, physicalism}, abstract = {Colours are invertible, private, and external. I support this naive view; I oppose various orthodox philosophical presuppositions and theories about colour. For example, I reject the almost universal presupposition that one colour excludes other colours at a place at a time. Such considerations suggest a picture of the mind as a field of awareness, rather than any sort of substance, in the physical world.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Stump2000, author = {Stump, Eleonore}, title = {The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {459-466}, keywords = {control, ethics, incompatibilism, responsibility}, abstract = {In Responsibility and Control, John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer an account of moral responsibility in terms of guidance control. On their view, an agent has guidance control in virtue of acting on his own moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, and guidance control is the freedom-relevant condition necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility. An advantage of this account, they think, is that it is compatible with both the truth and the falsity of determinism. All of these claims raise questions which are worth pursuing. In this very brief paper, I consider on aspect of their account, namely, their rejection of incompatibilism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sturgeon1998, author = {Sturgeon, Nicholas-L}, title = {Thomson against Moral Explanations}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {199-206}, keywords = {ethics, moral-theory; objectivity, relativism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{STURGEON1991, author = {STURGEON, Scott}, title = {Truth in Epistemology.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {epistemic, epistemology, justification, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SUCHTING1977, author = {SUCHTING, W}, title = {ON A CRITICISM OF MARX ON LAW AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {200-208}, keywords = {causation, law, production, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SUCHTING1968, author = {SUCHTING, W-A}, title = {PROFESSOR MACKIE ON THE DIRECTION OF CAUSATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {289-291}, keywords = {causation, epistemology}, abstract = {THE WORK ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT ONE OF TWO CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE DIRECTION OF CAUSATION SUGGESTED BY PROFESSOR MACKIE IS EITHER CIRCULAR OR UNHELPFULLY REGRESSIVE AND THE EVENT IS TOO NARROW.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SULLIVAN1990, author = {SULLIVAN, DAVID}, title = {Frege on the Statement of Number.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(3)}, pages = {595-603}, keywords = {mathematics, metaphysics, number}, abstract = {Recent debate about the value of historical research into Frege's work has centered on the question of the determination of distinct sources for any of Frege's key doctrines. This paper provides a possible historical source for Frege's central doctrine on the content of the statement of number. The historical source is located in the work of Herbart, to which Frege makes direct reference in the Grundlagen. The connection between Frege and Herbart is further substantiated by other evidence, principally the remarks of Frege's contemporary, Husserl. It is suggested that Frege's intellectual milieu may have contributed substantially to the formulation of his doctrines, albeit within the context of Frege's development of quantification theory.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SUMMERFIELD1991, author = {SUMMERFIELD, Donna-M}, title = {Modest A Priori Knowledge.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology, justification, knowledge}, abstract = {A priori knowledge is out of fashion these days. And yet, we really could use something like a priori knowledge. In this paper, I articulate a minimal, or modest, notion of a priori warrant which shows that there is a position to be taken between those who make extravagant claims for our non-empirical knowledge and those who deny that what is non-empirical can be knowledge at all. More specifically, my characterization of a priori justification enables us to see both how we might have a priori knowledge that is defeasible and how we might have a priori knowledge within a reliabilist framework.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SUPEK1963, author = {SUPEK, IVAN}, title = {THE TASK OF PHILOSOPHY TODAY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {117-124}, keywords = {international-relations; peace, philosophy, religion, science, technology, twentieth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SURESH1962, author = {SURESH}, title = {PRIVATE LANGUAGE AND SENSE STATEMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {374-379}, keywords = {incorrigibility, language, privacy, sensation, statement, textual-criticis}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SUTER1971, author = {SUTER, RONALD}, title = {STRAWSON'S ANALYSIS OF IDENTITY STATEMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {597-599}, keywords = {identity, language, statement}, abstract = {THIS PAPER DISCUSSES TWO THINGS. FIRST, STRAWSON'S EXPLANATION IN "ON REFERRING" ("MIND," 1950) WHY TWO USES OF SENTENCES OF THE FORM NN=NN MUST DIFFER FROM THOSE OF THE FORM NN=THE F, WHERE 'NN' AND 'THE F' ARE PROPER NAMES AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS, RESPECTIVELY. IT IS SHOWN THAT HIS ACCOUNT OF THE MATTER HAS UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES. SECONDLY, IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT HIS EXPLANATION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SENTENCES OF THE FORM NN=THE F AND THOSE OF THE FORM NN IS (AN) F IS EVEN LESS SATISFACTORY. STRAWSON'S CONFUSIONS HERE DERIVE CHIEFLY FROM HIS NOTION OF A 'PRESUPPOSITION'.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SUTER1967, author = {SUTER, RONALD}, title = {RUSSELL'S REFUTATION OF MEINONG IN "ON DENOTING".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {512-516}, keywords = {denoting, epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SUTER1971a, author = {SUTER, RONALD}, title = {'SUM' IS A LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF 'COGITO'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {32}, pages = {235-240}, keywords = {existence, language, predication, thought}, abstract = {HINTIKKA ("COGITO, ERGO SUM: INFERENCE OR PERFORMANCE?") WISHES TO REJECT (1) IF B(A) THEN THERE EXISTS X SUCH THAT X=A, POINTING OUT THAT IT WOULD CEASE TO BE PROVABLE IN QUANTIFICATION THEORY IF LOGICIANS DROPPED THE DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT (2) ALL THE SINGULAR TERMS WITH WHICH WE HAVE TO DEAL DESIGNATE SOME ACTUALLY EXISTING INDIVIDUAL. HE ALSO ARGUES FOR THE FALSITY OF (3) THINKING ENTAILS EXISTENCE. WILLIAMS ("THE CERTAINTY OF THE COGITO") CONTENDS THAT DESCARTES INFERRED 'I EXIST' FROM 'I THINK' USING (4) 'B(A)' PRESUPPOSES THAT THERE EXISTS X SUCH THAT X=A AS HIS PRINCIPLE OF INFERENCE. IN THIS PAPER, THE AUTHOR SHOWS WHY (3) SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AND (1), (2), AND (4) REJECTED. WHILE HE THUS AGREES WITH HINTIKKA AND WILLIAMS THAT APPEAL TO OUR LOWER FUNCTIONAL CALCULI FAILS TO EXPLAIN THE NECESSITY OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN 'COGITO' AND 'SUM', HE OFFERS AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF WHY 'SUM' IS NEVERTHELESS A LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF 'COGITO'. (EDITED).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sutton2001, author = {Sutton, Jonathan}, title = {The Contingent A Priori and Implicit Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {251-277}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology, implicit, knowledge}, abstract = {By introducing a name 'one meter' and stipulating that it refers to the length of stick S, the stipulator appears to be in a position to gain immediate (and arguably a priori) knowledge of a mind- and language-independent fact--the fact that the length of stick S is one meter. It appears that other users of the name can gain this knowledge only through empirical enquiry. I argue that this presents a paradox. After clarifying the nature of the paradox, I offer a solution by arguing that, contrary to appearances, other users of 'one meter' implicitly knew that the length of stick S is one meter before learning the name, as did the stipulator prior to introducing the name. There is some distinct knowledge that other users of the name can only gain empirically, but the stipulator cannot gain this knowledge without empirical enquiry either.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sutton2004, author = {Sutton, Jonathan}, title = {Are Concepts Mental Representations or Abstracta?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {89-108}, keywords = {abstraction, concept, metaphysics, representation, thought}, abstract = {I argue that thoughts and concepts are mental representations rather than abstracta. I propose that the most important difference between the two views is that the mentalist believes that there are concept and thought tokens as well as types; this reveals that the dispute is not terminological but ontological. I proceed to offer an argument for mentalism. The key step is to establish that concepts and thoughts have lexical as well as semantic properties. I then show that this entails that concepts and thoughts are susceptible to the type/token distinction. I finish by considering some objections to the argument.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SWANSON1967, author = {SWANSON, J-W}, title = {ON A PROBLEM OF NICOD AND STRAWSON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {222-229}, keywords = {epistemology, individual}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SWANSON1961, author = {SWANSON, J-W}, title = {LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY AND TRANSLATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {185-192}, keywords = {category, cognition, experience, language, metaphysics, relativity, structure, translation}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE HERE IS TO GIVE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NOTION OF LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY. PARALLELS ARE DRAWN BETWEEN WHORF AND KANT; KNOWLEDGE IS A JOINT PRODUCT OF RAW EXPERIENCE AND LANGUAGE. SUCH EXPERIENCE IS ORGANIZED INTO MEANINGFUL PATTERNS BY METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES IMPLICIT IN A GIVEN LANGUAGE. THE MAIN POINT IS TO DEFEND THE LINGUISTIC RELATIVIST'S STRONG CLAIM THAT CERTAIN ITEMS IN ONE LANGUAGE ARE NOT TRANSLATABLE INTO SOME OTHER LANGUAGE. EVIDENCE IS PRESENTED FOR THIS THESIS, WHERE INFORMATION IS LOST OR DISTORTED AS A RESULT OF TRANSLATION. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{SWEET1963, author = {SWEET, ALBERT-M}, title = {A SEMANTIC EXPLICATION OF METAPHYSICAL ANALOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {595-604}, keywords = {analogy, choice, comprehension, description, language, metaphysics, semantics, sign}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Sweet1993, author = {Sweet, Dennis-J}, title = {The Gestalt Controversy: The Development of Objects of Higher Order in Meinong's Ontology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {553-575}, keywords = {gestalt, metaphysics, ontology}, abstract = {To show how Meinong's ontology developed from the stark "Hume Studies" to the richness of his mature thought, I trace his analysis of complexes in light of the views of Ehrenfels, Cornelius, and Twardowski. Through their influences Meinong was compelled to modify his ontology in two ways. First, he developed a variety of reism that acknowledged ontological heterogeneity within perceptual complexes. Second, he endorsed the view of perceptual realism. With these modifications Meinong was able to introduce objects of higher order'.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Swinburne1992, author = {Swinburne, Richard}, title = {Discussion of Peter Unger's "Identity, Consciousness and Value"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {149-152}, keywords = {consciousness, identity, metaphysics, value}, abstract = {The deepest beliefs' about personal identity whose consequences Unger seeks to draw out are the beliefs of those who already share his theoretical convictions; and his pain-avoidance' experiments show nothing unless one already assumes those convictions. If there is a risk' that I may not survive a brain operation even though I know exactly which chunks of brain will be removed and replaced, that shows that I am a separate thing from my body and brain, about which the latter provide normally reliable, but still fallible evidence.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Swinburne2001, author = {Swinburne, Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {739-742}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Epistemic Justification}, volume = {70(3)}, year = {2001} } @other{Swinburne1994, author = {Swinburne, Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {473-476}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Christian God}, volume = {57(2)}, year = {1994} } @other{Swinburne1994a, author = {Swinburne, Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {473-476}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Christian God}, volume = {57(2)}, year = {1994} } @article{SWOYER1988, author = {SWOYER, CHRIS}, title = {RELATIVISM AND REPRESENTATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {151-155}, keywords = {epistemology, relativism, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Szabo2003, author = {Szabo, Zoltan-Gendler}, title = {Believing in Things}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(3)}, pages = {584-611}, keywords = {abstract-entity; belief, metaphysics, ontology}, abstract = {I argue against the standard view that ontological debates can be fully described as disagreements about what we should believe to exist. The central thesis of the paper is that believing in Fs in the ontologically relevant sense requires more than merely believing that Fs exist. Believing in Fs is not even a propositional attitude; it is rather an attitude one bears to the term expressed by 'Fs'. The representational correctness of such a belief requires not only that there be Fs, but also that the term expressed by 'Fs' should not misrepresent them. In certain cases we might believe that there are Fs without believing our conception of Fs applies to them. This may well be the situation we are in with regard to abstract entities of various sorts.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TALBOTT1986, author = {TALBOTT, THOMAS-B}, title = {ON DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND BRINGING ABOUT THE PAST.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {455-469}, keywords = {divine-will; epistemology, foreknowledge, past, time}, abstract = {MY PAPER IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. IN THE FIRST PART, I FORMULATE TWO TRUE PRINCIPLES FROM WHICH IT FOLLOWS THAT, IF GOD IS A NECESSARY BEING, ESSENTIALLY OMNISCIENT, AND HOLDS HIS BELIEFS IN TIME, THEN FREE AGENTS HAVE THE POWER TO "BRING ABOUT" GOD'S PAST BELIEFS. IN THE SECOND PART, I ARGUE FURTHER THAT WE MAY, WITHOUT ABSURDITY, SUPPOSE OURSELVES TO HAVE SUCH POWER, AND I CONCLUDE THAT DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREEDOM ARE COMPATIBLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Talbott1995, author = {Talbott, W-J}, title = {Intentional Self-Deception in a Single Coherent Self}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {27-74}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, intention, self-deceptio}, abstract = {The author proposes a new theory of self- deception that explains how intentional self- deception is possible in a single, coherent, Bayesian agent. On the author's account, self- deception is intentional in the sense that it is caused or sustained by the agent's intentionally interfering with her otherwise reliable cognitive processes -- for example, her attention, memory, reasoning, and evidence- gathering -- to bias them in favor of believing a proposition that which she desires to believe regardless of whether it is true. Thus, self- deception involves intentional biasing, not intentional lying. The author compares his intentionalist account to the anti- intentionalist accounts of Elster, Mele, and Johnston, and argues that the anti- intentionalist accounts do not satisfactorily resolve what Nisbett and Ross refer to as the "Basic Antinomy".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Talbott2002, author = {Talbott, William-J}, title = {The Case for a More Truly Social Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {199-206}, keywords = {authority, bayesian, epistemology, knowledge, social, truth}, abstract = {In these comments on Alvin Goldman's Knowledge in a Social World, the author argues that Goldman's social epistemology is too individualistic. Goldman's models of social cognition typically focus on the reasoning of individual cognizers. The author proposes understanding social epistemology as a kind of systems analysis that abstract away from the reasoning of individuals. The author compares his systems analysis approach with Goldman's more individualistic approach on a number of examples discussed by Goldman, including the basis for a right to freedom of speech, a comparison of the American common law system with the Continental civil law system, an evaluation of the jury system, and the role of epistemic authorities.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Talbott2005, author = {Talbott, William-J}, title = {Universal Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {420-426}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, holism, knowledge, nature}, abstract = {This is a review of Hilary Kornblith's naturalistic account of knowledge in Knowledge and Its Place in Nature. Kornblith's account is an inclusive account of knowledge, because it includes nonhuman as well as human knowers. It employs a bottom-up epistemology, because it seeks to generalize about knowledge on the basis of examples. The author argues for including these two virtues in a non-naturalist account, for two reasons: First, knowledge is a universal not a natural kind concept. Second, truths about knowledge and epistemic justification are universal not parochial truths, in the sense that they are true in all possible worlds.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TALIAFERRO1988, author = {TALIAFERRO, CHARLES}, title = {RELATIVISING THE IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {123-138}, keywords = {attitude, ideal-observer; metaphysics}, abstract = {THIS PAPER IS A DEFENSE OF AN OBJECTIVIST VERSION OF RODERICK FIRTH'S IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY OF ETHICS. IT ANALYZES AND CRITIQUES A POWERFUL, RELATIVIZED IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY ADVANCED BY THOMAS CARSON.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Taliaferro1997, author = {Taliaferro, Charles}, title = {Possibilities in Philosophy of Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {127-137}, keywords = {body, cartesianism, dualism, metaphysics, mind}, abstract = {This paper seeks to overturn the claim that Cartesian arguments for dualism based on the conceivable separation of person and body lack warrant, since it is just as conceivable that persons are identical with their bodies as it is that persons and their bodies are distinct. If the thesis of the paper is cogent, then it is not as easy to imagine person-body identity as many anti-Cartesians suppose.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Taliaferro1994, author = {Taliaferro, Chales}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {241-243}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Consciousness and the Mind of God}, volume = {57(1)}, year = {1994} } @article{TANNENBAUM1971, author = {TANNENBAUM, JERROLD}, title = {IN DEFENSE OF THE BRAIN PROCESS THEORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {552-563}, keywords = {brain, identity, image, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Tanney2004, author = {Tanney, Julia}, title = {On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, and Other 'Behaviourally Indistinguishable' Creatures}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(1)}, pages = {173-186}, keywords = {behavior, epistemology, verificationism, zombie}, abstract = {In this paper I argue that it would be unprincipled to withhold mental predicates from our behavioral duplicates however unlike us they are "on the inside." My arguments are unusual insofar as they rely neither on an implicit commitment to logical behaviorism in any of its various forms nor to a verificationist theory of meaning. Nor do they depend upon prior metaphysical commitments or to philosophical "intuitions". Rather, in assembling reminders about how the application of our consciousness and propositional attitude concepts are ordinarily defended, I argue on explanatory and moral grounds that they cannot be legitimately withheld from creatures who behave, and who would continue to behave, like us. I urge that we should therefore reject the invitation to revise the application of these concepts in the ways that would be required by recent proposals in the philosophy of mind.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Tappenden2002, author = {Tappenden, Jamie}, title = {Comments on Soames' Understanding Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {418-421}, keywords = {language, truth, understanding, vagueness}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TAPSCOTT1971, author = {TAPSCOTT, BANGS-L}, title = {PLANTINGA PROPERTIES AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {604-605}, keywords = {god, ontological-proof; religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TATARKIEWICZ1970, author = {TATARKIEWICZ, WLADYSLAW}, title = {DID AESTHETICS PROGRESS?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {47-59}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, beauty, progress}, abstract = {WESTERN AESTHETICS CERTAINLY PROGRESSED SINCE ANTIQUITY, BECAUSE ITS CONCEPTS BECAME SHARPER AND ITS PROPOSITIONS RICHER. IT PROGRESSED BUT DID NOT CHANGE. THE GREAT CLASSIC THEORY WHICH ORIGINATED IN GREECE CONTINUED TO BE THE LEADING THEORY IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND IN THE RENAISSANCE, ITS TWELVE MAJOR PROPOSITIONS WERE KEPT UNTIL THE MODERN TIMES. OTHER THEORIES WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY SET UP BUT THEY WERE MARGINAL AND INCIDENTAL THEORIES. THE CHANGE OCCURRED IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. AS THINGS NOW STAND THE CLASSIC THEORY HAS LOST ITS ASCENDENCE OVER OTHER THEORIES AND THERE IS MORE THAN ONE LEADING THEORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TATARKIEWICZ1966, author = {TATARKIEWICZ, WLADYSLAW}, title = {HAPPINESS AND TIME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {1-10}, keywords = {ethics, future, happiness, past, pleasure, present, satisfaction, time}, abstract = {HAPPINESS IS AN AMBIGUOUS WORD. IN THIS PAPER IT IS USED IN THE SENSE OF SATISFACTION OF ONE'S LIFE AS A WHOLE. AT LEAST SOME PEOPLE AT SOME MOMENTS OF THEIR LIVES ARE HAPPY IN THIS SENSE: THIS FORMS A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR AN EXAMINATION OF THE MATTER. HAPPINESS INCLUDES NOT ONLY AN AGREEABLE PRESENT BUT A SATISFACTORY RECOLLECTION OF THE PAST AND THE EXPECTATION OF A SATISFACTORY FUTURE. FOR A BEING WHO REMEMBERS THE PAST AND IS CONCERNED WITH THE FUTURE, THINGS HAVE A BEARING WHICH ARE NO LONGER OR NOT YET IN EXISTENCE. THE DIRECT EXPERIENCE OF GOOD AND EVIL MAKES ONLY A FRAGMENT, AND BY NO MEANS THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE OF HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS. THE THREE ELEMENTS OF HAPPINESS, THE PRESENT, THE PAST AND THE FUTURE ARE NOT COEQUAL. PRESENT EVENTS PLAY A COMPARATIVELY MINOR ROLE, ESPECIALLY IF THE PRESENT HAS TO MEAN A SINGLE MOMENT AND NOT THE PERIOD WHICH SURROUNDS THE MOMENT ACTUALLY BEING EXPERIENCED. SATISFACTORY PAST IS NOT INDISPENSABLE FOR SATISFACTORY RECOLLECTION, THANKS TO THE "OPTIMISTIC TENDENCY OF MEMORY." BUT THE FUTURE WEIGHS HEAVILY UPON OUR CONSCIOUSNESS. THEREFORE THE EXPECTATION OF GOOD OR EVIL HAS GREATER SIGNIFICANCE FOR HAPPINESS THAN ITS RECOLLECTION OR EVEN EXPERIENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TATARKIEWICZ1963, author = {TATARKIEWICZ, WLADYSLAW}, title = {OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY IN THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {157-173}, keywords = {aesthetics, ancient, beauty, medieval, modern, objectivity, renaissance, subjectivity, thing}, abstract = {THE THESIS HERE IS THAT THE OBJECTIVE THEORY IN AESTHETICS IS PREDOMINANT IN THE ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PERIOD, WHEREAS THE SUBJECTIVE THEORY IS PREDOMINANT IN MODERN TIMES. THE PURPOSE IS TO TRACE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS TO THE MOMENT WHEN THE SUBJECTIVISTIC VIEW WAS VICTORIOUS AND TO SHOW HOW EARLY IT APPEARED AND HOW LATE IT GAINED ASCENDANCY. THE PROBLEM OF AESTHETICS, HENCE, CHANGED SO THAT NOW ONE ASKS NOT WHAT IS BEAUTIFUL OR WHAT IS BEAUTY, BUT HOW DOES ONE EXPERIENCE IT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Taylor1994, author = {Taylor, Charles}, title = {Precis of "Sources of the Self"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {185-186}, keywords = {history, identity, metaphysics, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Taylor1994a, author = {Taylor, Charles}, title = {Reply to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {203-213}, keywords = {history, identity, metaphysics, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TAYLOR1981, author = {TAYLOR, PAUL}, title = {IMAGINATION AND INFORMATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {205-223}, keywords = {cognition, epistemology, imagination, knowledge, mental-imag}, abstract = {THE THESIS HERE IS THAT ACTS OF IMAGINATION CAN, IN CERTAIN CASES, GIVE RISE TO NEW KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE WORLD, WHERE WHAT IS AT ISSUE IS NOT THE ROLE OF IMAGINA"TIVENESS" AS AN ACCOMPANIMENT OF THIS OR THAT INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY, BUT IMAG"INING", AS EXEMPLIFIED BY AN ACT OF IMAGE CONJURING, SAY, OR THE INVENTING OF A STORY. SUCH ACTS OF IMAGINING, IT IS ARGUED, HAVE AN IMPORTANT EPISTEMOLOGICAL FUNCTION WHEN THEY ARE USED, FOR EXAMPLE, IN ASSESSING AESTHETIC EFFECTS WHERE THE OBJECTS OF ASSESSMENT ARE THEMSELVES ABSENT, OR IN ASSESSING OUR LIKELY EMOTIONAL AND PERCEPTUAL RESPONSES TO SITUATIONS REMOTE FROM OUR ACTUAL EXPERIENCE--ASSESSMENTS WHICH SEEM ESSENTIAL TO UNDERSTANDING THE RESPONSES OF PEOPLE QUITE DIFFERENTLY PLACED FROM OURSELVES. SARTRE'S VIEW OF THE GENERAL ISSUE IS DISCUSSED, AS WELL AS THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: WHEN DOES IMAGINATION HAVE AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL ROLE, AND HOW DOES IT GO BEYOND REMEMBERED EXPERIENCES?}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TAYLOR1963, author = {TAYLOR, STANLEY}, title = {SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF EMILE DURKHEIM TO RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {125-134}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, individualism, practice, rationality, religion, science}, abstract = {DURKHEIM'S PRESUPPOSITIONS ARE ELABORATED HERE, ESPECIALLY HIS DISTINCTION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RELIGION. THESE TWO ORDERS OF REALITY ARE SHARPLY SEPARATED. THE PHYSICAL ORDER USES EMPIRICAL AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, WHEREAS THE SOCIAL ORDER INVOLVES RITUAL AND CEREMONY OF BELIEVERS. IT IS THE OLD DISTINCTION BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON! IT IS CONCLUDED THAT DURKHEIM DENIES EPISTEMOLOGICAL VALUE TO RELIGION BECAUSE HE DEFINES KNOWLEDGE TOO NARROWLY. HE REALLY HAS A MORAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL RELATIVISM. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TEJERA1961, author = {TEJERA, V}, title = {PROFESSOR SHEFFER'S QUESTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {558-562}, keywords = {abstraction, aesthetics, art, form, logic, metaphor}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Temkin1999, author = {Temkin, Larry-S}, title = {Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle: A Response}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {777-784}, keywords = {epistemology, paradox, person, transitivity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Temkin1993, author = {Temkin, Larry-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {482-486}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Inequality}, volume = {56(2)}, year = {1993} } @article{Tenenbaum1999, author = {Tenenbaum, Sergio}, title = {The Judgment of a Weak Will}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {875-911}, keywords = {akrasia, judgment, metaphysics, weakness, will}, abstract = {This paper argues that there is such a thing as theoretical akrasia, and that we can find a characterization of this phenomenon in Descartes's Meditations. Drawing on certain passages in the Meditations, we can construct an account of theoretical akrasia; this account can then be adapted to resolve the original problem of akrasia in the realm of practical reason. The account asserts that there is a conceptual connection between motivation and evaluation in free action; it also enables us to show how the akratic agent is still acting freely when he does something that he does not judge to be the best all things considered. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TESCHNER1981, author = {TESCHNER, GEORGE}, title = {THE UNDIFFERENTIATED CONJUNCTION OF SENSATION AND JUDGMENT IN PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {119-122}, keywords = {cognition, judgment, metaphysics, perception, sensation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TEUBER1982, author = {TEUBER, ANDREAS}, title = {SIMONE WEIL: EQUALITY AS COMPASSION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {221-238}, keywords = {compassion, equality, ethics}, abstract = {EQUALITY IS GENERALLY VIEWED AS A DISTRIBUTIVE IDEA AND GREATER EQUALITY IS USUALLY SOUGHT IN THE REDISTRIBUTION OF GOODS AND SERVICES. FOR SIMONE WEIL, TO BE IN A RELATIONSHIP OF EQUALITY IS TO REGARD ANOTHER PERSON IN A CERTAIN LIGHT AND INVOLVES THE ABILITY TO SEE THE WORLD FROM THAT PERSON'S POINT OF VIEW. EQUALITY IS A KIND OF 'FRIENDSHIP WITHOUT INTIMACY AND CLOSENESS'. THE FIRST PART OF THE ESSAY IS DEVOTED TO AN ELUCIDATION OF HER VIEW OF EQUALITY AS COMPASSION; THE SECOND PART SEEKS TO LIMIT THE USE OF HER CONCEPTION BY FITTING IT INTO A BROADER MORAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Textor2001, author = {Textor, Mark}, title = {'Portraying' a Proposition}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(1)}, pages = {137-161}, keywords = {epistemology, indexical, omniscience, proposition, reference}, abstract = {Hector-Neri Castaneda claimed in several papers that a proposition expressed by an indexical sentence (in a context of utterance) can be re-expressed by means of an oratio obliqua clause (in a sentential context) that contains a quasi-indicator. Robert M. Adams and Rogers Albritton have presented a counterargument that is accepted by Castaneda himself. I will argue that the Adams/Albritton argument is not convincing. The argument uses several assumptions which could be disputed. The paper tries to develop a more direct argument against Castaneda's central claim. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{THALBERG1965, author = {THALBERG, I}, title = {LOOKS, IMPRESSIONS AND INCORRIGIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {365-374}, keywords = {appearance, epistemology, impression, incorrigibility, perception, phenomenalism, sense-data; visual}, abstract = {PHENOMENALISTIC THEORIES OF PERCEPTION ENTICE US BECAUSE THEY INOCULATE ONE CLASS OF STATEMENTS, NAMELY THOSE DESCRIBING CURRENT APPEARANCES AND SENSE-DATA, AGAINST DOUBT. CONSEQUENTLY IT WILL WEAKEN THE SPELL OF PHENOMENALISM IF WE CAN EXPLAIN WHY APPEARANCE AND SENSE-DATUM STATEMENTS ARE NOT REALLY IMMUNE TO CHALLENGE AND CORRECTION. IN THE COURSE OF THE ARGUMENT, CRUCIAL DISTINCTIONS ARE SUGGESTED BETWEEN VARIOUS TYPES OF APPEARANCE-STATEMENTS, AND STATEMENTS CONCERNING SENSE-DATA AND IMPRESSIONS. FINALLY, IT IS ASKED WHETHER THE POSSIBILITY THAT A MAN SHOULD BE MISTAKEN OR IGNORANT ABOUT THE WAY THINGS LOOK TO HIM REQUIRES US TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE "APPARENT" AND THE "REAL" LOOKS OF THINGS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{THALBERG1962, author = {THALBERG, I}, title = {NATURAL EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {387-392}, keywords = {emotion, epistemology, expression, knowledge, other-minds; scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Thalos1999, author = {Thalos, Mariam}, title = {Degrees of Freedom: An Essay on Competitions between Micro and Macro in Mechanics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {1-39}, keywords = {dependence, freedom, mechanics, mind, science}, abstract = {This paper argues that the doctrines of determinism and supervenience, while logically independent, are importantly linked in physical mechanics--and quite interestingly so. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Thau1993, author = {Thau, Michael-Alan}, title = {Property in "The Realm of Rights"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {397-404}, keywords = {justification, property, rights, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Thau2002, author = {Thau, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {484-491}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {69(2)}, year = {2002} } @article{Thayer1996, author = {Thayer, H-S}, title = {Comments on Susan Haack's Evidence and Inquiry}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {615-619}, keywords = {cognitive-science; epistemology, evidence, inquiry, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{THOMAS1978, author = {THOMAS, JAMES-A}, title = {MORICK ON EXTENSIONALITY FOR "DE RE" SENTENCES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {544}, keywords = {extensionality, language, reference, rigid-designator; sentence}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Thomasson2003, author = {Thomasson, Amie-L}, title = {Realism and Human Kinds}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {580-609}, keywords = {artifact, epistemology, ontology, realism, semantics}, abstract = {It is often noted that institutional objects and artifacts depend on human beliefs and intentions and so fail to meet the realist paradigm of mind-independent objects. In this paper I draw out exactly in what ways the thesis of mind-independence fails, and show that it has some surprising consequences. For the specific forms of mind-dependence involved entail that we have certain forms of epistemic privilege with regard to our own institutional and artifactual kinds, protecting us from certain possibilities of ignorance and error; they also demonstrate that not all cases of reference to these kinds can proceed along a purely causal model. As a result, realist views in ontology, epistemology, and semantics that were developed with natural scientific kinds in mind cannot fully apply to the kinds of the social and human sciences. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Thomasson1996, author = {Thomasson, Amie-L}, title = {Fiction and Intentionality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {277-298}, keywords = {aesthetics, epistemology, fiction, intentionality, language}, abstract = {The ability to analyze our experiences of fictional objects is one of the most important tests of a theory of intentionality. Yet Husserlian content theories, contextualist theories, and mixed theories all encounter difficulties in accounting for the content-dependence and context-sensitivity of intentional acts directed towards fictional objects. These difficulties serve as the motivation for postulating fictional objects and developing the Intentional Object Theory of intentionality. According to the Intentional Object Theory, every intentional act has an object, although sometimes, as in the case of acts directed towards fictional objects, the object itself may be consciousness-dependent.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Thomasson1999, author = {Thomasson, Amie-L}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {723-727}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Fiction and Metaphysics}, volume = {63(3)}, year = {1999} } @article{Thomson1998, author = {Thomson, Judith-Jarvis}, title = {Precis of Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity: Precis of Part Two}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {171-173}, keywords = {ethics, moral-theory; objectivity, relativism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Thomson1998a, author = {Thomson, Judith-Jarvis}, title = {Reply to Critics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {215-222}, keywords = {ethics, moral-theory; objectivity, relativism, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Thomson1993, author = {Thomson, Judith-Jarvis}, title = {Precis of "The Realm of Rights"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {159-162}, keywords = {epistemology, language, power, rights, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Thomson1993a, author = {Thomson, Judith-Jarvis}, title = {Reply to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {187-194}, keywords = {epistemology, rights, transplantation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Thomson2003, author = {Thomson, Judith-Jarvis}, title = {Causation: Omissions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {81-103}, keywords = {causation, metaphysics, omission, presence}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{THROOP1989, author = {THROOP, WILLIAM-M}, title = {RELATIVISM AND ERROR: PUTNAM'S LESSONS FOR THE RELATIVIST.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {675-686}, keywords = {community, error, metaphysics, relativism}, abstract = {METAPHYSICAL REALISTS HAVE AN INTUITIVELY PLAUSIBLE WAY OF EXPLAINING HOW ERROR IS POSSIBLE: OUR BELIEFS ARE ERRONEOUS IF THEY FAIL TO CORRESPOND TO AN INDEPENDENT REALITY. HILARY PUTNAM, AMONG OTHERS, HAS ARGUED THAT RELATIVISTS HAVE NO SUCH PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION, FOR THEY MUST SHOW HOW IT IS POSSIBLE TO BE MISTAKEN ABOUT THINGS WHICH ARE TO A LARGE EXTENT DEPENDENT ON OUR THINKING. THREE OF PUTNAM'S ARGUMENTS ARE CONSIDERED, AND IT IS SHOWN THAT WHILE THEY DO NOT REFUTE RELATIVISM, THEY DO POINT TO IMPORTANT LESSONS FOR RELATIVISTS. IN RESPONSE TO THESE LESSONS, AN ACCOUNT OF ERROR IS DEVELOPED WHICH ENABLES RELATIVISTS TO EXPLAIN THE POSSIBILITY OF LEGITIMATELY CRITICIZING ANY SET OF CULTURAL NORMS BY LETTING CONTEXT DETERMINE WHAT NONCULTURAL NORMS GOVERN SUCH CRITICISM. THIS ACCOUNT ALSO AVOIDS REDUCING THE NORMATIVE TERMS LIKE "ERROR" TO NONNORMATIVE TERMS LIKE "ERROR-FOR-US" BY RELATIVIZING THE NORMS FOR APPRAISING ASSERTIONS RATHER THAN THE TERMS OF APPRAISAL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TIBBETTS1978, author = {TIBBETTS, PAUL}, title = {PEIRCE'S PHENOMENOLOGY: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR RANSDELL'S "A MISUNDERSTANDING OF PEIRCE'S PHENOMENOLOGY".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {554-556}, keywords = {epistemology, experience, given, inference, knowledge, perception, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TIBBETTS1975, author = {TIBBETTS, PAUL}, title = {PEIRCE AND MEAD ON PERCEPTUAL IMMEDIACY AND HUMAN ACTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {222-232}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, phenomenology}, abstract = {THE THESIS OF THIS PAPER IS THAT NEITHER THE CONTENT OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE NOR THE CORRESPONDING PERCEPTUAL JUDGMENT CAN BE FULLY EXPLICATED INDEPENDENTLY OF DISPOSITIONS, BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES, AND THE ACT-OBJECT RELATION. IT IS ARGUED THAT WHERE THIS THESIS IS AT BEST PERIPHERAL TO PEIRCE'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION, IT IS PIVOTAL TO MEAD'S ACCOUNT. IT IS ALSO ARGUED THAT PEIRCE'S LATER TURN TOWARD OBJECTIVE IDEALISM WAS LARGELY DUE TO HIS FAILURE TO INTEGRATE HIS PRAGMATIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND MEANING WITHIN A GENERAL THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Tidman1996, author = {Tidman, Paul}, title = {The Justification of A Priori Intuitions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {161-171}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology, intuition, justification, knowledge, luck}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Tieszen2005, author = {Tieszen, Richard}, title = {Free Variation and the Intuition of Geometric Essences: Some Reflections on Phenomenology and Modern Geometry}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(1)}, pages = {153-173}, keywords = {essence, geometry, phenomenology, science}, abstract = {Edmund Husserl has argued that we can intuit essences and, moreover, that it is possible to formulate a method for intuiting essences. Husserl calls this method 'ideation'. In this paper I bring a fresh perspective to bear on these claims by illustrating them in connection with some examples from modern pure geometry. I follow Husserl in describing geometric essences as invariants through different types of free variations and I then link this to the mapping out of geometric invariants in modern mathematics. This view leads naturally to different types of spatial ontologies and it can be used to shed light on Husserl's general claim that there are different ontologies in the eidetic sciences that can be systematically related to one another. The paper is rounded out with a consideration of the role of ideation in the origins of modern geometry, and with a brief discussion of the use of ideation outside of pure geometry.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Tiles1992, author = {Tiles, James-E}, title = {Pleasure, Passion and Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {931-941}, keywords = {ethics, passion, pleasure, reason, truth}, abstract = {Hume's claim that a passion 'contains not any representative quality' conflicts with Plato's doctrine that our pleasures and pains can be judged to be true or false. J. C. B. Gosling ("Phronesis" 1959) explained a sense in which Plato's claim could stand. By considering the relationships which obtain between the pleasure and pains we experience in anticipating what will happen, this article develops Gosling's sense into a full scale refutation of Hume's position. That is it dismantles the doctrine of representation on which Hume based his argument that there could be no combat between passion and reason.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TILLMAN1965, author = {TILLMAN, FRANK-A}, title = {EXPLICATION AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE ANALYSIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {375-383}, keywords = {analysis, clarification, explication, language, ordinary-language; performatives, semantics, truth}, abstract = {THE BUSINESS OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS IS CLARIFICATION, BUT EXPLICATORS AND ORDINARY-LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHERS DISAGREE ABOUT HOW TO ACHIEVE IT. THEIR MUTUAL CRITICISMS OR ATTEMPTS AT ARBITRATION ARE MADE AT SUCH A LEVEL OF GENERALITY AS TO LEAVE THE BASIS FOR DISPUTE OR SETTLEMENT OBSCURE. BY FOCUSING ON SUPPOSEDLY COMPETING ANALYSES OF TRUTH--TARSKI'S SEMANTICAL AND STRAWSON'S PERFORMATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF TRUTH--THE PAPER MAKES CLARIFICATION ITSELF THE SUBJECT OF CLARIFICATION IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE THE BASIS OF DISPUTE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TILLMAN1967, author = {TILLMAN, FRANK}, title = {LINGUISTIC PORTRAYAL AND THEORETICAL INVOLVEMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {597-605}, keywords = {philosophy}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Timmons1999, author = {Timmons, Mark}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {486-488}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism}, volume = {63(2)}, year = {1999} } @article{TODD1975, author = {TODD, D-D}, title = {DIRECT PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {352-362}, keywords = {epistemology, perception}, abstract = {NORMAN MALCOLM'S PAPER "DIRECT PERCEPTION" IS CRITICIZED. ITS MISTAKES ARE IDENTIFIED AND ITS INSIGHTS ARE EXTRACTED. THE IDENTIFICATORY/DESCRIPTIVE COMPONENTS OF PERCEPTUAL CLAIMS ARE EXAMINED, SENSE-DATA ARE FOUND TO BE CONGENERS OF THE DESCRIPTION HALF OF THE DICHOTOMY, AND THE INDIRECT/DIRECT PERCEPTION DISTINCTION IS FOUND TO BE A QUEER REFLECTION OF THE IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION DISTINCTION AND NOT A DISTINCTION BETWEEN TWO TYPES OF PERCEPTION CORRELATED WITH TWO TYPES OF "OBJECT," I.E., MATERIAL OBJECTS AND SENSE-DATA. SENSE-DATA ARE FOUND TO BELONG TO A PRIMITIVE EPISTEMIC LEVEL MUCH LOWER THAN THOSE WHICH ARE CONCEPTUALIZED IN TERMS OF THE PRIVATE/PUBLIC, PHYSICAL/MENTAL, REAL/UNREAL, ETC., DISTINCTIONS. EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY ARE SEPARATED. THE METAPHYSICS OF COMMON SENSE IS FOUND TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH A WEAKENED EPISTEMOLOGICAL PHENOMENALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TODD1977, author = {TODD, D-D}, title = {RESPONSE TO SAPONTZIS' "DIRECT PERCEPTION, SOME FURTHER COMMENTS".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {566-568}, keywords = {description, epistemology, incorrigibility, perception, sensation}, abstract = {I RESPOND TO SAPONTZIS' CRITICISM OF "DIRECT PERCEPTION" BY (1) AMPLIFYING REMARKS IN "DIRECT PERCEPTION" WHICH PROVIDE THE RATIONALE FOR MY VIEWS, IN ORDER TO SHOW WHY SAPONTZIS' CRITICISMS DO NOT MUCH MOVE ME; (2) I ARGUE THAT SAPONTZIS' CRITICISMS ARE NOT TELLING BECAUSE ESSENTIALLY THEY BEG IMPORTANT QUESTIONS; (3) I ISOLATE THE REAL BONE OF CONTENTION, VIZ. WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE FOR PHILOSOPHERS SO TO REFINE OUR COMMON MEANS OF DESCRIPTIVE RETICENCE THAT A STOCK OF PURE DESCRIPTIONS OF SENSORY QUALIA CAN BE GENERATED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TODD1983, author = {TODD, GEORGE-F}, title = {ART AND THE CONCEPT OF ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {255-270}, keywords = {aesthetics, concept, ontology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TOMAS1961, author = {TOMAS, VINCENT}, title = {MR STOLNITZ'S QUESTIONS CONCERNING AESTHETIC VISION: A REPLY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {88-91}, keywords = {aesthetic-experience; aesthetics, appearance, perception, reality, vision}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TOMBERLIN1989, author = {TOMBERLIN, JAMES-E}, title = {DEONTIC PARADOX AND CONDITIONAL OBLIGATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {107-114}, keywords = {deontic-logic; logic, obligation, paradox}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TOMBERLIN1968, author = {TOMBERLIN, JAMES-E}, title = {THE EXPRESSION THEORY OF AVOWALS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {91-96}, keywords = {avowals, incorrigibility, language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TOMBERLIN1967, author = {TOMBERLIN, JAMES-E}, title = {A PROBLEM WITH EXPRESSING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {114-116}, keywords = {asserting, epistemology, expression}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TOMBERLIN1966, author = {TOMBERLIN, JAMES-E}, title = {ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {85-89}, keywords = {assertion, conjecturing, doing, epistemology, saying, statement, truth, utterance}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE IS TO DISCUSS THE KINDS OF THINGS THAT MAY NOT BE TRUE. A NEW THEORY OF TRUTH IS NOT PRESENTED; NEITHER IS THERE A THEORY OF MEANING. THE QUESTION IS RAISED, OF WHAT SORT OF THINGS CAN TRUTH BE AFFIRMED, PREDICATED, OR ASSIGNED? THE AUTHOR SUGGESTS THAT THE PROBABLE BEARER OF TRUTH IS THE "STATEMENT," ALTHOUGH HE DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO DEFINE THIS. ONE NEEDS TO HAVE SOME AWARENESS OF WHAT A STATEMENT IS NOT, OF WHAT IT IS THAT MAY NOT BE TRUE. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TOMBERLIN1975, author = {TOMBERLIN, JAMES-E}, title = {ESSENTIALISM AND POSSIBLE WORLDS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {323-340}, keywords = {epistemology, essentialism, existence, necessity, possible-world; predication}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TOMBERLIN1971, author = {TOMBERLIN, JAMES-E}, title = {THE SEA BATTLE TOMORROW AND FATALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {352-357}, keywords = {excluded-middle; fatalism, logic}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TOMBERLIN1965, author = {TOMBERLIN, JAMES-E}, title = {THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS AND ETHICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {414-415}, keywords = {ethics, language, neutrality, political-science; science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TOMBERLIN1980, author = {TOMBERLIN, JAMES}, title = {SOME RECENT WORK IN ACTION THEORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {576-593}, keywords = {action, can, epistemology, event}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TOMBERLIN1979, author = {TOMBERLIN, JAMES-E}, title = {A FATALISTIC PARADOX EXAMINED.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {589-591}, keywords = {fatalism, logic}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TOOLEY1990, author = {TOOLEY, Michael}, title = {Causation: Reductionism Versus Realism.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {causation, metaphysics, realism, reductionism, supervenience}, abstract = {My basic thesis is that reductionist accounts, both of causal laws and of causal relations, are untenable. With regard to laws, I mention a fundamental epistemological difficulty, plus the problems posed by accidental uniformities, by uninstantiated basic laws, and by probabilistic laws. With regard to causal relations, I argue, first, that reductionist approaches cannot provide a satisfactory account of the direction of causation, and secondly, that causal relations between events are not logically supervenient even upon the totality of all noncausal facts, together with all laws, both causal and noncausal, plus the direction of causation in all potential causal processes.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Toribio1997, author = {Toribio, Josefa}, title = {Twin Pleas: Probing Content and Compositionality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {871-889}, keywords = {cognition, compositionality, content, dualism, epistemology, semantics}, abstract = {Dual factor theories of meaning are fatally flawed in at least two ways. First, their very duality constitutes a problem: the two dimensions of meaning (reference and conceptual role) cannot be treated as totally orthogonal without compromising the intuition that much of our linguistic and non-linguistic behavior is based on the cognizer's interaction with the world. Second, conceptual role semantics is not adequate for explaining a crucial feature of linguistic representation, viz., the special kind of compositionality known as concatenative compositionality. Dual factor theories, I conclude, cannot constitute an acceptable philosophical model of content.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TOWNSEND-JR1974, author = {TOWNSEND-JR, DABNEY-W}, title = {PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE FORM OF THE NOVEL: TOWARD AN EXPANDED CRITICAL METHOD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {34}, pages = {331-338}, keywords = {aesthetics, literary-criticism; novel, ontology, phenomenology}, abstract = {PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS DISCLOSES WHAT A NOVEL IS, BUT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE CRITICISM. WITHIN THE COMPLEX WHICH CONSTITUTES A NOVEL, TWO SYNTHETIC UNITS OF THETIC ACTS, THOSE WHICH POSIT OBJECTS OF THE WORLD AND THOSE WHICH BELONG TO THE PATTERN OF THE WORDS THEMSELVES, ARE BASIC. THE MEANING OF A NOVEL DEPENDS ON THE COMBINATION OF SOME ONTIC STRUCTURE AND ITS PRESENTATION IN A TOTAL SYNTHESIS. THE PRIMARY CRITICAL ACT, ONTOLOGICAL CRITICISM, IDENTIFIES THE ONTIC STRUCTURE, AND IT IS SUPPLEMENTED BY A DESCRIPTION OF THE WAY THAT STRUCTURE IS REALIZED IN A SYNTHETIC WHOLE, WHICH IS A FORM OF MYTHOLOGICAL CRITICISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TRAGESSER1972, author = {TRAGESSER, ROBERT}, title = {EIDETIC ANALYSIS, INFORMAL RIGOR, AND A PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF CARNAP'S NOTION OF EXPLICATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {48-61}, keywords = {consciousness, eidetic-reduction; logic, phenomenology}, abstract = {IF A NATURAL SCIENTIFIC THEORY IS TO HAVE THE GENUINE 'SENSE' OF BEING ABOUT THE WORLD WE FIND OURSELVES IN, THE CARNAP'S CRITERIA FOR THEORIES OF FRUITFULNESS, SIMPLICITY, WEAK SIMILARITY, ETC., IS NOT ADEQUATE. THUS WE OFTEN MUST HAVE A PROGRAM OF THE FAITHFUL ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS, RATHER THAN A PROGRAM OF 'EXPLICATION'. PART OF THIS PAPER IS DEVOTED TO ARGUING THIS POINT; THE REST IS DEVOTED TO EXPLAINING IN WHAT RESPECTS A PROGRAM OF 'FAITHFUL ANALYSIS' (INFORMAL RIGOUR) CAN BE CARRIED THROUGH. RELATIONS TO HUSSERL'S TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY ARE POINTED OUT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TRISTRAM1988, author = {TRISTRAM, ROBERT-J}, title = {VICO ON THE PRODUCTION AND ASSESSMENT OF KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {355-388}, keywords = {arts, epistemology, faculty, knowledge, logic, operation}, abstract = {THE ROLE OF EACH OF THE FACULTIES IN COGNITION AND THE SORTS OF METHODS THAT MUST BE EMPLOYED IN ACQUIRING AND TESTING KNOWLEDGE HAVE BEEN CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN BOTH ANCIENT AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY. THIS PAPER EXAMINES GIAMBATTISTA VICO'S SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS BY MEANS OF A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSION OF THE FACULTIES OF SENSE, MEMORY, IMAGINATION, INGENUITY, AND REASON; OF THE OPERATIONS OF PERCEPTION, JUDGMENT, AND REASONING; AND OF THE ARTS OF TOPICS, CRITICISM, AND METHOD. IT IS CLAIMED THAT BOTH IN HIS EARLY WORK, "ON THE ANCIENT WISDOM OF THE ITALIANS" AND IN HIS "NEW SCIENCE" HE BELIEVES THAT THE THREE ARTS REGULATE, RESPECTIVELY, THE THREE OPERATIONS, EACH OF WHICH HAS A SPECIAL RELEVANCE TO ONE OR MORE OF THE FACULTIES. INDEED, IT IS ARGUED THAT, FOR THE VICO OF THE "NEW SCIENCE", THERE IS A DIALECTICAL AND A HISTORICAL LOGIC IN THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE FACULTIES, OPERATIONS, AND ARTS. THE PAPER SHOWS, MOREOVER, THAT THIS LOGIC PROVIDES CRUCIAL INSIGHTS INTO HOW KNOWLEDGE, ESPECIALLY OF A PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KIND, IS PRODUCED AND MUST BE ASSESSED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Tsouna1998, author = {Tsouna, Voula}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {720-723}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School}, volume = {63(3)}, year = {1998} } @article{Tuomela1997, author = {Tuomela, Raimo}, title = {Searle on Social Institutions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {435-441}, keywords = {epistemology, institution, knowledge, society}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TUOMELA1991, author = {TUOMELA, Raimo}, title = {We Will Do It: An Analysis of Group Intentions.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {action, conditional, group, intention, metaphysics}, abstract = {If a person intends for his group, we may call his intention a group-intention. The main task of the present paper is to give informative truth-conditions for locutions like "We will do X", when understood as expressions of group-intention. The first part of the paper gives an account of "action-prompting" group-intentions, termed we-intentions. This account improves on the author's previous analysis of this notion and of its significance. In the rest of the paper other kinds of group-intentions, especially conditional we-intentions and "standing" group-intentions, are investigated.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TUOMELA1990, author = {TUOMELA, RAIMO}, title = {Are Reason-Explanations Explanations by Means of Structuring Causes?.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {813-818}, keywords = {explanation, metaphysics, reasons}, abstract = {In his recent book Explaining Behavior Fred Dretske claims that all reason-explanations are explanations by means of structuring causes. The present paper argues by means of a counterexample that Dretske's claim is wrong at least if by 'reason-explanation' is meant what it normally means.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TURBAYNE1962, author = {TURBAYNE, COLIN-MURRAY}, title = {BERKELEY'S TWO CONCEPTS OF MIND (PART I).}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {383-386}, keywords = {metaphor, metaphysics, mind, psychology, soul, substance}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TURBAYNE1962a, author = {TURBAYNE, COLIN-MURRAY}, title = {BERKELEY'S TWO CONCEPTS OF MIND (PART II).}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {577-580}, keywords = {language, metaphor, metaphysics, mind, substance}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TURNER1968, author = {TURNER, MERLE-B}, title = {DECIDING FOR GOD: THE BAYESIAN SUPPORT OF PASCAL'S WAGER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {84-90}, keywords = {god, logic, probability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Tye1998, author = {Tye, Michael}, title = {Precis of Ten Problems of Consciousness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {649-656}, keywords = {consciousness, internal, metaphysics, nature, visual}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Tye1998a, author = {Tye, Michael}, title = {Response to Discussants}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {679-687}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Tye1996, author = {Tye, Michael}, title = {Is Consciousness Vague or Arbitrary?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {679-685}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, naturalism, vagueness}, abstract = {This article is a contribution to a symposium on David Papineau's book, Philosophical Naturalism. It is argued, in opposition to Papineau, that consciousness is not arbitrary but it is vague.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{TYE1982, author = {TYE, MICHAEL}, title = {A CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF SEEING BY MICHAEL TYE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {311-325}, keywords = {causality, epistemology, seeing}, abstract = {CAUSAL THEORISTS HAVE ADVANCED A NUMBER OF PLAUSIBLE ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE VIEW THAT A PERSON CANNOT SEE A MATERIAL OBJECT UNLESS THERE IS A CAUSAL CONNECTION LINKING THE OBJECT TO HIS SENSORY STATE. THE AUTHOR'S PURPOSE IN THIS PAPER IS NOT TO REVIEW OR TO DEFEND DIRECTLY THESE ARGUMENTS BUT RATHER TO PRODUCE AN ACCEPTABLE ANALYSIS OF STATEMENTS OF THE FORM 'PERSON "P" SEES MATERIAL OBJECT "X"' WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CAUSAL VIEW. IN SECTION 1, HE DISCUSSES SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH ARE FACED BY THE MORE OBVIOUS VERSIONS OF SUCH AN ANALYSIS. THEN, IN SECTION 2, HE PROPOSES A VERSION WHICH SEEMS TO COVER THE CASES WE WANT IT TO COVER WHILE EXCLUDING THE CASES WHICH SHOULD BE EXCLUDED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Tye2000, author = {Tye, Michael}, title = {Shoemaker's The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {461-464}, keywords = {experience, mental-states; metaphysics, mind}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Tye1993, author = {Tye, Michael}, title = {Reflections on Dennett and Consciousness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {893-898}, keywords = {consciousness, materialism, metaphysics, mind}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Tye2000a, author = {Tye, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {245-247}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Consciousness, Color, and Content}, volume = {68(1)}, year = {2000} } @other{Tye1991, author = {Tye, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {958-961}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Imagery Debate}, volume = {53(4)}, year = {1991} } @article{TYMAN1983, author = {TYMAN, STEPHEN}, title = {THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF FORGETTING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {45-60}, keywords = {forgetting, memory, metaphysics, phenomenology}, abstract = {THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF FORGETTING IS USED AS A MEANS OF RAISING ANEW THE PROBLEM OF THE NATURE, POWER AND RANGE OF COGNITION. THE STRUCTURE OF CONTINUITY IN LIVED TIME IS PIVOTAL IN THE INVESTIGATION. IT IS ARGUED THAT SOME PART OF HUSSERL'S NOTION OF TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS MUST BE PRESERVED IF WE ARE TO MAKE SENSE OF THE SELF-REFLEXIVE DIMENSION OF THE TEMPORAL STREAM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Uleman2004, author = {Uleman, Jennifer-K}, title = {External Freedom in Kant's Rechtslehre: Political, Metaphysical}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {578-601}, keywords = {ethics, external, freedom, political, rights}, abstract = {External freedom is the central good protected in Kant's legal and political philosophy. But external freedom is perplexing, being at once freedom of spatio-temporal movement and a form of noumenal or 'intelligible' freedom. Moreover, it turns out that identifying impairments to external freedom nearly always involves recourse to an elaborated system of positive law, which seems to compromise external freedom's status as a prior, organizing good. Drawing heavily on Kant's understanding of the role of empirical 'anthropological' information in constructing a 'doctrine of right', or Rechtslehre, this essay offers an interpretation of external freedom that makes sense of its simultaneous spatio-temporality, dependence on positive law, intelligibility (or 'noumenality'), and a priority. The essay suggests that this account of Kantian external freedom has implications both for politics and for the metaphysics of everyday objects and institutions.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Unger1999, author = {Unger, Peter}, title = {Precis of Living High and Letting Die}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {173-175}, keywords = {behavior, death, ethics, life, poor, rich}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Unger1999a, author = {Unger, Peter}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {203-216}, keywords = {charity, ethics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Unger1995, author = {Unger, Peter}, title = {Contextual Analysis in Ethics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {1-26}, keywords = {action, common-sense; context, ethics, judgment, morality}, abstract = {Already seen successful in other domains of thought and talk, a context-sensitive semantics is provided for the ethical domain. In particular, for the sentence "What you did was morally all right" roughly this indexical analysis is offered? What you did was, in respect of the conditions for acceptability prevalent in this very context, close enough to being in complete conformity with morality. Through the likes of UNICEF, how much vital aid must you provide for your conduct to be morally acceptable? With a very lenient context, providing nothing may be close enough to complete conformity; but, when tough contexts are set, much more must be done for conduct to be "correctly assessed as" morally acceptable.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Unger1992, author = {Unger, Peter}, title = {Precis of "Identity, Consciousness and Value"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {133-137}, keywords = {consciousness, identity, metaphysics, value}, abstract = {This book presents, explains and defend an account of our identity, overtime that is both (a) psychologically aimed and (b) physically based. Not advanced as analytic, or as conceptually true, the account is meant to hold "only relative to the general correctness of our contemporary view of the world". Even so, it is explained why influential contemporary thinkers--Lewis, Nozick, Padfit, Shoemaker and others--have "vastly" underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival through time.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Unger1992a, author = {Unger, Peter}, title = {Reply to Reviewers of "Identity, Consciousness and Value"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {159-176}, keywords = {consciousness, identity, metaphysics, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Unger2002, author = {Unger, Peter}, title = {Free Will and Scientiphicalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {1-25}, keywords = {choice, free-will; metaphysics, scientific}, abstract = {It's been agreed for decades that not only does determinism pose a big problem for our choosing from available alternatives, but its denial seems to pose a bit of a problem, too. It's argued here that only determinism, and not its denial, means no real choice for us. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Uus1994, author = {Uus, Undo}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {469-473}, publisher = {APT Ltd}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Blindness of Modern Science}, volume = {57(2)}, year = {1994} } @article{VADAS1984, author = {VADAS, MELINDA}, title = {AFFECTIVE AND NON-AFFECTIVE DESIRE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {273-280}, keywords = {action, affectivism, desire, metaphysics, phenomenology}, abstract = {ON THE HUMEAN OR 'AFFECTIVIST' VIEW OF ACTION AND ITS MOTIVATION, THE END OF ALL INTENTIONAL ACTION MUST AND CAN ONLY BE GIVEN, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY DESIRE. SOMEWHERE IN THE LINE OF EXPLANATION THAT YIELDS THE AGENT'S MOTIVATION THERE MUST BE A DESIRE OF THE AGENT FOR "SOMETHING". IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A DESIRE, ACTION IS, BOTH CONCEPTUALLY AND AS A MATTER OF FACT, IMPOSSIBLE. IN THIS PAPER, I ARGUE THAT THE HUMEAN VIEW RESTS UPON A FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN AFFECTIVE AND NON-AFFECTIVE DESIRE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Vahid2003, author = {Vahid, Hamid}, title = {Externalism, Slow Switching and Privileged Self-Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {370-388}, keywords = {argument, epistemology, externalism, platonism, self-knowledg}, abstract = {Recent discussions of externalism about mental content have been dominated by the question whether it undermines the intuitively plausible idea that we have knowledge of the contents of our thoughts. In this article I focus on one main line of reasoning (the so-called 'slow switching argument') for the thesis that externalism and self-knowledge are incompatible. After criticizing a number of influential responses to the argument, I set out to explain why it fails. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Valberg1992, author = {Valberg, J-J}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {246-248}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Puzzle of Experience}, volume = {55(1)}, year = {1992} } @article{Van-Cleve1994, author = {Van-Cleve, James}, title = {Predication Without Universals? A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {577-590}, keywords = {epistemology, language, nominalism, realism, universal}, abstract = {In this paper I consider the merits of Realist theories of predication vis- a-vis three varieties of nominalism, which Armstrong has dubbed predicate nominalism resemblance nominalism, and ostrich nominalism. In Part I, I argue that ostrich nominalism is the most satisfactory position of these four, and that the realist view favored by Armstrong and many others is prone to the same fundamental difficulty as the other two varieties of nominalism. In Part II, I consider difficulties for the argument of Part I.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VAN-CLEVE1981, author = {VAN-CLEVE, JAMES}, title = {C I LEWIS' DEFENSE OF PHENOMENALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {325-332}, keywords = {epistemology, phenomenalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Van-Cleve2002, author = {Van-Cleve, James}, title = {Receptivity and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {218-237}, keywords = {epistemology, humility, intrinsic, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Van-Cleve2003, author = {Van-Cleve, James}, title = {Precis of Problems from Kant}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {190-195}, keywords = {a-priori; causation, idealism, metaphysics, transcendence}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Van-Cleve2003a, author = {Van-Cleve, James}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {219-227}, keywords = {metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Van-Cleve1999, author = {Van-Cleve, James}, title = {Epistemic Supervenience Revisited}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {1049}, keywords = {ethics, self, supervenience, trust}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Van-Cleve1996, author = {Van-Cleve, James}, title = {Minimal Truth is Realist Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {869-875}, keywords = {epistemology, objectivity, realism, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Van-Cleve1999a, author = {Van-Cleve, James}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {211-218}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Problems from Kant}, volume = {66(1)}, year = {1999} } @other{Van-Cleve1999b, author = {Van-Cleve, James}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {203-210}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Problems from Kant}, volume = {66(1)}, year = {1999} } @other{Van-Cleve1999c, author = {Van-Cleve, James}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {219-227}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Problems from Kant}, volume = {66(1)}, year = {1999} } @other{Van-Cleve1999d, author = {Van-Cleve, James}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {196-202}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Problems from Kant}, volume = {66(1)}, year = {1999} } @article{VAN-DE-PITTE1974, author = {VAN-DE-PITTE, FRED-P}, title = {RESERVATIONS ON A POST-WITTGENSTEINIAN VIEW OF DESCARTES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {107-114}, keywords = {epistemology, mind, other}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE HERE IS TO REFUTE THE POSITION OFFERED BY DONALD F HENZE IN HIS RECENT ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THAT DESCARTES EMPLOYS THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY FOR THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER MINDS. IT IS POINTED OUT THAT HENZE'S CASE RESTS ON A VIOLATION OF CARTESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY AND A MISCONCEPTION CONCERNING THE MIND-BODY DUALISM. MOREOVER, DESCARTES EXPLICITLY REJECTS ANALOGY FOR THIS KIND OF INVESTIGATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VAN-DE-PITTE1980, author = {VAN-DE-PITTE, FREDERICK-P}, title = {DESCARTES' ROLE IN THE FAITH-REASON CONTROVERSY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {344-353}, keywords = {epistemology, error, faith, free-choice; reason}, abstract = {HIRAM CATON ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN IRREGULARITIES IN DESCARTES' ACCOUNT OF THE WILL BY MEANS OF THE CLAIM THAT A THEOLOGICAL ISSUE HAS PROMPTED DESCARTES TO INTRODUCE UNNECESSARY COMPLEXITIES. ROUGHLY, SINCE DESCARTES COULD NOT GAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE CHURCH BY FORCE, HE WAS COMPELLED TO USE GUILE. THIS ACCOUNTS FOR A SUPPOSED ASYMMETRY OF THE DOCTRINES OF TRUTH AND ERROR IN "MEDITATION IV". IN FACT, A CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF DESCARTES' DOCTRINE OF THE WILL, AND THE DISTINCTION OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL FROM METHODOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS, SHOWS THE THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION TO BE UNNECESSARY. DESCARTES IS NOT THE PELAGIAN CATON BELIEVES HIM TO BE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VAN-DE-PITTE1976, author = {VAN-DE-PITTE, M-M}, title = {HUSSERL: THE IDEALIST MALGRE LUI.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {70-78}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, meaning, perception}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE DOCUMENTS THE OFTEN IGNORED FACT THAT HUSSERL WAS CONCERNED WITH VALIDATING A POSITION BEST DESCRIBED AS ONTOLOGICAL REALISM, AND THEN ARGUES THAT HIS METHOD WAS INAPPROPRIATE TO THE TASK HE SET IT. THE IMPLIED MORAL IS: (A) THAT IT IS THE "SCIENTIFIC" CHARACTER OF HUSSERL'S PHILOSOPHY THAT LED HIM TO IDEALISM AND, FINALLY, TO SOLIPSISM AND (B) THAT ANY NON-FORMAL SCIENCE WHICH PURPORTS TO OFFER MORE THAN PSYCHOLOGICAL CERTITUDE IS LIKELY COMMITTED TO A SPECIES OF METHODICAL IDEALISM AND IS THUS IN PRINCIPLE INCAPABLE OF GIVING COMFORT TO ONTOLOGICAL REALISTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VAN-DE-PITTE1984, author = {VAN-DE-PITTE, M-M}, title = {SCHLICK'S CRITIQUE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROPOSITIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {195-226}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology, factual-judgment; phenomenology}, abstract = {WITH A VIEW TOWARD ASSESSING SOME RECENT CLAIMS ABOUT THE NATURE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROPOSITIONS, SCHLICK'S ANALYSIS OF THEM IN "IS THERE A FACTUAL A PRIORI?" IS CRITICIZED IN THE SERVICE OF A PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATION OF THE MEANING OF THE PROPOSITIONAL PREDICATES USED TO DESCRIBE POSITIVISTIC AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROPOSITIONS RESPECTIVELY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VAN-DE-VATE-JR1971, author = {VAN-DE-VATE-JR, DWIGHT}, title = {THE PROBLEM OF ROBOT CONSCIOUSNESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {32}, pages = {149-165}, keywords = {consciousness, person, philosophical-anthropology; robot}, abstract = {CAN WE HUMANS MAKE A CONSCIOUS MACHINE, A MACHINE WITH THE SELFAWARENESS EACH OF US HAS? IN THE LITERATURE DEVOTED TO THIS PROBLEM, THE CONSCIOUS MACHINE IS USUALLY THOUGHT OF AS SOMETHING PRODUCED THE WAY OTHER MACHINES ARE PRODUCED, NAMELY BY A SOLITARY INVENTOR OR A LABORATORY TEAM. IF ONE HOLDS AS I DO, HOWEVER, THAT CONSCIOUS FLESH AND BONE PERSONS ARE PRODUCED BY SOCIETY, THAT IS, BY THE SOCIALIZATION PROCESS, THEN IT BECOMES INTERESTING TO ASK WHETHER SOCIETY COULD MAKE CONSCIOUS PERSONS OUT OF GEARS, WIRES, AND TRANSISTORS. THE THREE SECTIONS OF THE ARTICLE ARE ENTITLED "THE CONSCIOUS MACHINE AS A COLLECTIVE ACHIEVEMENT," "THE FIRST - PERSON STRUCTURE PROBLEM," AND "STRUCTURE AND CONTROL: THE THIRD - PERSON PROBLEMS."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VAN-DE-VEER1973, author = {VAN-DE-VEER, DONALD}, title = {MARX'S VIEW OF JUSTICE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {366-386}, keywords = {capitalism, justice, social-philosoph}, abstract = {ON ONE RECENT INTERPRETATION OF MARX'S VIEW OF JUSTICE, THAT BY PROFESSOR ROBERT TUCKER IN HIS "THE MARXIAN REVOLUTIONARY IDEA", IT IS CONCLUDED THAT MARX HAD AN "...AVERSION TO THE IDEA OF JUSTICE" AND, GENERALLY, THAT NO PRINCIPLE OF JUSTICE PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN MARX'S THOUGHT. THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT TUCKER FAILS TO ESTABLISH HIS CASE AND THAT, IN FACT, A CAREFUL READING OF MARX (PARTICULARLY CERTAIN KEY PASSAGES IN "THE CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAM") REVEALS THE CENTRALITY OF A PRINCIPLE OF JUSTICE IN MARX'S THOUGHT, EVEN THOUGH MARX HAD STRATEGIC REASONS FOR AVOIDING OVERT APPEALS TO "JUSTICE". IT IS FURTHER ARGUED THAT SOME OF MARX'S METAETHICAL REMARKS WHICH APPEAR TO ESPOUSE A FORM OF ETHICAL RELATIVISM DO NOT TAKE SUCH A STRONG FORM AS TO PRECLUDE MARX'S CONSISTENTLY ADHERING IN AN ABSOLUTIST MANNER TO A PRINCIPLE OF JUSTICE; THAT HE WAS CONSISTENT IS NOT DEFENDED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Van-Fraassen2000, author = {Van-Fraassen, Bas-C}, title = {The False Hopes of Traditional Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {253-280}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {After Hume, attempts to forge an empiricist epistemology have taken three forms, which I shall call the First, Middle, and Third Way. The First still attempts an a priori demonstration that our cognitive methods satisfy some (weak) criterion of adequacy. The Middle Way is pursued under the banners of naturalism and scientific realism, and aims at the same conclusion on non-a priori grounds. After arguing that both fail, I shall describe the general characteristics of the Third Way, an alternative epistemology suitable for empiricism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Van-Fraassen1993, author = {Van-Fraassen, Bas}, title = {Precis of "Laws and Symmetry"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {411-412}, keywords = {epistemology, laws, nature}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Van-Fraassen1993a, author = {Van-Fraassen, Bas}, title = {Armstrong, Cartwright, and Earman on "Laws and Symmetry"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {431-444}, keywords = {epistemology, inference, laws, nature}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Van-Gulick1995, author = {Van-Gulick, Robert}, title = {Why the Connection Argument Doesn't Work}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {201-207}, keywords = {biology, body, consciousness, mind, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VAN-HOOFT1979, author = {VAN-HOOFT, STAN}, title = {MERLEAU-PONTY AND THE PROBLEM OF INTENTIONAL EXPLANATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {33-52}, keywords = {consciousness, cybernetics, explanation, intention, metaphysics, perception, subjectivity}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THE ARTICLE IS TO SHOW THE RELEVANCE OF GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY TO THE PROBLEMATIC OF MERLEAU-PONTY'S THOUGHT. IF MERLEAU-PONTY HAS SHOWN THAT THE REALM OF EXISTENCE, INSOFAR AS IT IS GROUNDED IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD GRASPED PREOBJECTIVELY, IS NOT ONTOLOGICALLY REMOVED FROM THE REALM IN WHICH CAUSAL EXPLANATION HAS ITS PLACE, NAMELY THE OBJECTIVE WORLD, THEN HE MUST ALSO BE ABLE TO BRIDGE THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL GAP THAT IS INVOLVED. I SUGGEST THAT HE CAN DO THIS IF THE DESCRIPTIONS OF INTENTIONALITY AS THEY APPLY TO CONSCIOUSNESS AND TO BODILY SUBJECTIVITY WERE RELATED AS ELEMENTS IN A SYSTEM SO AS TO PROVIDE A COMMUNICATIVE AND DYNAMIC INTERFACE BETWEEN THOSE LEVELS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VAN-HORNE1981, author = {VAN-HORNE, WINSTON-A}, title = {PROLEGOMENON TO A THEORY OF DECEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {171-182}, keywords = {deception, epistemology, intention}, abstract = {THIS ESSAY CLARIFIES WHAT HAS BEEN SAID BEFORE BY REMOVING THE SHROUD OF LANGUAGE THAT HAS OBSCURED THE ANATOMY OF DECEPTION. IT EXPOSES THE LINE OF DEMARCATION BETWEEN AN ACT OF DECEPTION AND DECEPTION ITSELF. IT LAYS BARE THE RESULTANT POSSIBILITIES OF AN ACT OF DECEPTION. (IT MAKES NO ETHICAL OR MORAL JUDGMENT ABOUT THESE POSSIBILITIES.) FINALLY, IT PRESENTS FOUR LAW-LIKE SENTENCES, INTUITED FROM THE ANATOMICAL ELEMENTS OF DECEPTION, CONCERNING THE PROBABILITY OF DECEPTION. WHAT IS THE UTILITY OF THIS CLARIFICATION? ANYONE WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLITICAL AND/OR MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS SHOULD GRASP ITS UTILITY READILY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Van-Inwagen1993, author = {Van-Inwagen, Peter}, title = {"Precis of" Material Beings}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {683-686}, keywords = {being, epistemology, material, metaphysics, time}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Van-Inwagen1993a, author = {Van-Inwagen, Peter}, title = {Reply to Reviewers}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {709-719}, keywords = {being, epistemology, material}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VAN-ITEN1964, author = {VAN-ITEN, RICHARD-J}, title = {BERKELEY'S ANALYSIS OF MIND.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {375-382}, keywords = {abstraction, idea, immaterialism, metaphysics, mind, notion, quality, substance}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE ATTEMPTS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT TURBAYNE AND GRAVE ARE MISTAKEN IN THEIR ANALYSIS OF BERKELEY'S SUBSTANTIVALIST VIEW OF MIND. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT BERKELEY FIRST GAVE A HUMEAN ANALYSIS OF MIND AS MERELY A CONGERIES OF PERCEPTIONS AND LATER SHIFTED TO A SUBSTANCE VIEW. HE HAD TO ALLOW FOR MIND IN HIS ONTOLOGY, SO HE INTRODUCED NOTIONS, AS THAT BY WHICH MINDS ARE KNOWN. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS CONFUSION, BECAUSE NOTIONS AND MINDS ARE IDENTIFIED IN ORDER TO AVOID SCEPTICISM AND YET CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Van-Roojen2002, author = {Van-Roojen, Mark}, title = {Humean and Anti-Humean Internalism about Moral Judgements}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {26-49}, keywords = {ethics, internalism, moral-judgmen}, abstract = {Simple versions of internalism run into problems with people who do not desire to do what they believe right. This has long been urged by David Brink. Hence, many internalists have adopted more subtle defeasible views, on which only rational agents will have a desire to act. I will argue that more complex versions run into problems with self-effacing values of the sort Parfit highlights in another context. Such values can only be attained indirectly. After proposing a general account of motivation suited to the internalist thesis, I argue that anti-Humeanism is better suited to accommodating the internalist insight. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VARET1969, author = {VARET, GILBERT}, title = {COMPLEXITY AND AMBIGUITY, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON PROFESSOR DANTO'S "COMPLEX EVENTS".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {78-83}, keywords = {action, event, man, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Vasiliou1996, author = {Vasiliou, Iakovos}, title = {The Role of Good Upbringing in Aristotle's Ethics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {771-797}, keywords = {ethics, good, nicomachean-ethics; upbringing}, abstract = {It is argued that a proper appreciation of the passages in the Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle requires the student of ethics to be well brought up implies that the Ethics is not attempting to justify the objective correctness of its substantive conception of happiness to someone who does not already appreciate its distinctive value. Reflection on the import of the good-upbringing restriction can lead us to see that Aristotle's conception of ethical objectivity is not only radically different from modern moral philosophy's appeal "to any rational agent", but philosophically important for contemporary ethical thought.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VEATCH1963, author = {VEATCH, HENRY}, title = {ON TRYING TO SAY AND TO KNOW WHAT'S WHAT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {83-96}, keywords = {analysis, conceivability, definition, knowledge, language, logic, tautology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Velleman1997, author = {Velleman, J-David}, title = {How To Share An Intention}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {29-50}, keywords = {epistemology, intention, mental-states; preference, will}, abstract = {Existing accounts of shared intention (by Bratman, Searle and others) do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally shared, these accounts fail to resolve what seems problematic in the notion of shared intention. It then offers an account in which the problem of shared intention is resolved, because intention can indeed be literally shared. This account is derived from Margaret Gilbert's notion of a "pool of wills," to which it applies Searle's definition of intention.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VERMAZEN1968, author = {VERMAZEN, BRUCE}, title = {CONSISTENCY AND UNDERDETERMINATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {403-409}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {(1) IT IS ARGUED THAT A QUINEAN BELIEF-SYSTEM (AS IN 'TWO DOGMAS') SHOULD BE THOUGHT OF AS A PAIR OF SETS OF STATEMENTS: THE SET OF BELIEFS THEMSELVES AND A SET OF STATEMENTS DESCRIBING THE DYNAMICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BELIEFS. SINCE THE MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA FOR THE TWO SETS ALLOW ONE TO CONTAIN THE NEGATION OF A STATEMENT IN THE OTHER, IT IS MISLEADING TO TREAT THEIR UNION AS THE BELIEVER'S THEORY ABOUT THE WORLD AS QUINE DOES. (2) AUTHOR ATTEMPTS TO CHARACTERIZE 'RECALCITRANT EXPERIENCE'.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Vinci1998, author = {Vinci, Thomas-C}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {735-738}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Cartesian Truth}, volume = {62(3)}, year = {1998} } @other{Vision1997, author = {Vision, Gerald}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {729-731}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Problems of Vision: Rethinking the Causal Theory of Perception}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1997} } @article{VITA1973, author = {VITA, LUIS-WASHINGTON}, title = {THE MEANING AND DIRECTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT IN BRAZIL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {531-546}, keywords = {brazilian, enlightenment, philosophy, salvation, twentieth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Vlastos1991, author = {Vlastos, Gregory}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {237-242}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher}, volume = {55(1)}, year = {1991} } @article{Vogel1992, author = {Vogel, Jonathan}, title = {Sklar on Methodological Conservatism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {125-131}, keywords = {belief, conservatism, epistemology}, abstract = {In an important study, Lawrence Sklar has defended a doctrine of methodological conservatism (very roughly, the principle that a proposition derives some sort of epistemic warrant from being believed). I argue that Sklar's careful formulation of methodological conservatism remains too strong, and that a yet weaker version of the doctrine cannot be successfully defended. I also criticize Sklar's argument that the rejection of methodological conservatism would result in total skepticism. Finally, I turn to a closely related issue, and try to show why different people with the same evidence should be justified in believing the same things.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Vogel1993, author = {Vogel, Jonathan}, title = {The Problem of Self-Knowledge in Kant's "Refutation of Idealism": To Recent Views}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {875-887}, keywords = {idealism, metaphysics, self-knowledg}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Vogel1993a, author = {Vogel, Lawrence}, title = {Understanding and Blaming: Problems in the Attribution of Moral Responsibility}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {129-142}, keywords = {blame, moral, nazism, responsibility, social-philosoph}, abstract = {In "Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility" Susan Wolf appeals to the idea of insanity to explain why she would exonerate some wrongdoers who are victims of deprived childhoods or who act in ways strongly encouraged by their societies, "like slave owners in the 1850s, Nazis in 1930s Germany and male chauvinists in the 1950s." I challenge Wolf's application of the insanity defense to her examples, and recast them as cases of same, responsible agents whom it may be difficult to blame on account of the causal history of their moral beliefs or motivations. I contend that Wolf's loose use of the insanity defense presents several dangers. It leads us to misunderstand the difficulties that victims of deprived childhoods may have conforming to moral norms and encourages a dismissive attitude towards cultures that are historically distant or alien from our own.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VON-RINTELEN1977, author = {VON-RINTELEN, FRITZ-JOACHIM}, title = {PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALISM IN GERMANY: THE WAY FROM KANT TO HEGEL AND THE PRESENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {1-32}, keywords = {idealism, neo-kantianism; nineteenth, phenomenology, twentieth}, abstract = {IN THIS ARTICLE GERMAN IDEALISM DERIVES FROM THE GENERAL SUBJECTIVITY. KANT WAS THE FOUNDER LIMITED TO CATEGORICAL PERCEPTIONS. BUT HE OVERSTEPS THIS WITH THE POSTULATES: GOD, FREEDOM AND IMMORTALITY. FOR FICHTE IT IS ALL A PRODUCTION OF THE ETHICAL "POSIT" AND DOESN'T ACCEPT LIKE KANT A "THING IN ITSELF." BUT SCHELLING IS MORE COMPREHENSIVE. THE NATURE IS THE PRODUCTION OF A DIVINE SPIRIT, AESTHETICAL SEEN. IT IS A PANENTHEISM, LATER MORE MONOTHEISTIC INTERPRETED. HEGEL IS THEN THE SPECULATIVE METAPHYSICAL IDEALIST. FOR HIM THE WORLD IS THE SELF EVOLVING GOD, FIRSTLY IN HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, DECISIVE THE COMING (WERDEN) IN GERMAN THINKING. LATER IN THIS CENTURY BEGINS THE NEOKANTIANISM, BUT NOT WITH METAPHYSICAL IDEAS. ESPECIALLY THE HEIDELBERG-SCHOOL REPRESENTS THE "A PRIORI" IDEAS OF VALUES OR BE VALID. HUSSERL'S PHILOSOPHY IS ALSO A TRANSCENDENTAL "PHENOMENOLOGY" OR IDEALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VON-RINTELEN1960, author = {VON-RINTELEN, FRITZ-JOACHIM}, title = {THIRD EAST-WEST PHILOSOPHERS' CONFERENCE; AN INTERCHANGE BETWEEN WESTERN AND ASIATIC THINKING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {207-228}, keywords = {comparative-philosophy; culture, economics, ethics, law, philosophy, political-philosophy; practice, praxis, religion, technology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VOROBEJ1986, author = {VOROBEJ, MARK}, title = {ON THE CENTRAL PRINCIPLE OF DEONTIC LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {137-144}, keywords = {deontic-logic; logic}, abstract = {THIS PAPER IS A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF GEORGE N SCHLESINGER'S RECENT CLAIM THAT THERE EXISTS A CERTAIN ISOMORPHISM BETWEEN DEONTIC AND INDUCTIVE THEOREMS, AND THAT THEREFORE INDUCTIVE LOGIC CAN BE USED TO TEST DEONTIC VALIDITY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Vranas2004, author = {Vranas, Peter-B-M}, title = {Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: The Old Principal Principle Reconciled with the New}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {368-382}, keywords = {conditional, epistemology, principle}, abstract = {David Lewis (1980) proposed the 'principal principle' (PP) and a "reformulation" which later on he called 'OP' ('old principle'). Reacting to his belief that these principles run into trouble, Lewis (1994) concluded that they should be replaced with the 'new principle' (NP). This conclusion left Lewis uneasy, because he thought that an inverse form of NP is "quite messy", whereas an inverse form of OP, namely the simple and intuitive PP, is "the key to our concept of chance". I argue that, even if OP should be discarded, PP need not be. Moreover, far from being messy, an inverse form of NP is a simple and intuitive 'conditional principle' (CP). Finally, both PP and CP are special cases of a 'general principle' (GP); it follows that so are PP and NP, which are thus compatible rather than competing.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{VUILLEMIN1969, author = {VUILLEMIN, J}, title = {EXPRESSIVE STATEMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {485-497}, keywords = {expressives, language, performatives, statement}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WAGNER1977, author = {WAGNER, HELMUT-R}, title = {THE BERGSONIAN PERIOD OF ALFRED SCHUTZ.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {187-199}, keywords = {duration, intersubjectivity, i-thou; sociology, twentieth}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE DISCUSSES THE ATTEMPT WHICH SCHUTZ MADE IN 1925 TO LINK WEBER'S SOCIOLOGY OF UNDERSTANDING TO BERGSON'S PHILOSOPHY. THE MAJOR UNFINISHED ESSAY ANALYZED IS DEVOTED TO THE PRELIMINARY CONSTRUCTION OF A THEORY OF THE EGO, COMPRISING SIX "LIFE-FORMS" RANGING FROM PURE DURATION TO THE THINKING I. THE AUTHOR SUGGESTS THAT SCHUTZ GAVE UP THIS ATTEMPT, REALIZING THAT BERGSON'S "PURE DURATION" REMAINED INACCESSIBLE TO EXPERIENCE AND INTROSPECTION. THEREFORE, HE TURNED TO HUSSERL WHO CONTRIBUTED THE MAIN PHENOMENOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO HIS FUNDAMENTAL STUDY OF "DER SINNHAFTE AUFBAU DER SOZIALEN WELT" (1932).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WAGNER1984, author = {WAGNER, STEVEN-J}, title = {DESCARTES ON THE PARTS OF THE SOUL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {51-70}, keywords = {body, metaphysics, mind, soul}, abstract = {I CONSIDER DESCARTES'S ATTEMPT, IN MEDITATION VI, TO REFUTE AN ARISTOTELIAN THEORY OF PSYCHIC PARTS. DESCARTES INTERPRETS THE QUESTION OF PSYCHIC SIMPLICITY AS FOLLOWS: DO THE SOUL'S OPERATIONS CONSIST IN THOSE OF A SET OF OTHER SUBSTANCES? HIS NEGATIVE ANSWER DEPENDS ON "INDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLES" TO THE EFFECT THAT DISTINCT SUBSTANCES, AND DISTINCT MODES, CAN EXIST WITHOUT EACH OTHER. RECOGNIZING THE ROLE OF ISSUES--CONCERNING, FOR EXAMPLE, THOUGHT, SCIENCE, AND MATERIAL SUBSTANCE. IT ALSO HELPS US TO MAKE SENSE OF THE TRANSITION FROM ARISTOTELIAN METAPHYSICS TO THE MODERN SYSTEMS OF SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WAGNER1983, author = {WAGNER, STEVEN-J}, title = {DESCARTES'S ARGUMENTS FOR MIND-BODY DISTINCTNESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {499-518}, keywords = {body, dualism, god, metaphysics, minds}, abstract = {DESCARTES'S MAIN ARGUMENTS FOR DUALISM--FROM HIS INABILITY TO CONCEIVE MIND "APART FROM" BODY AND FROM PSYCHIC SIMPLICITY--ARE ESSENTIALLY ALIKE. BUT BOTH ARE AMBIGUOUS: DESCARTES VACILLATES BETWEEN USING GOD TO "VALIDATE" AN ALREADY GIVEN DUALIST CONCLUSION AND USING THE GUARANTEE TO INFER DUALISM FROM THE EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY OF A DISEMBODIED MIND. HIS THEORY OF REPRESENTATION LEAD HIM TO CONFUSE THESE STRATEGIES AND TO OVERLOOK THE PROBLEMS OF EACH. NONETHELESS, DESCARTES ANTICIPATES KANT'S INSIGHTS INTO THE FAILURES OF TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WAIDE1988, author = {WAIDE, JOHN}, title = {VIRTUES AND PRINCIPLES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {455-472}, keywords = {ethics, moral, principle, virtue}, abstract = {I RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING OBJECTION: IT IS SOMETIMES SAID THAT ANY VIRTUE JUDGMENT (THAT X IS A VIRTUE OR THAT P IS A VIRTUOUS PERSON) ALWAYS PRESUPPOSES SOME MORAL PRINCIPLE (E.G., CONCERNING THE GOODNESS OR RIGHTNESS OF ACTS TYPICALLY PERFORMED BY PEOPLE WITH THE CHARACTER TRAIT X) WHICH CANNOT BE ARTICULATED AS PART OF AN ETHICS OF VIRTUE. ACCORDINGLY, THE OBJECTION CONTINUES, VIRTUE ETHICS IS ALWAYS DERIVATIVE FROM PRINCIPLE ETHICS. I FOCUS ON AN UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION OF THE OBJECTION, THAT A PRINCIPLE IS THE ONLY THING WHICH CAN COUNT AS A GOOD REASON SUPPORTING A MORAL CLAIM. I EXAMINE THE ASSUMPTIONS KANT MAKES ABOUT THE ROLE OF PRINCIPLES IN MORALITY AND O'NEILL'S RECENT CLAIMS THAT KANT GIVES US PRIMARILY AN ETHIC OF VIRTUE RATHER THAN RULES. FINALLY, I SUGGEST A POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATION FOR VIRTUE CLAIMS THAT DO NOT RELY ON PRINCIPLES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WALHOUT1969, author = {WALHOUT, DONALD}, title = {ON SEEING THINGS DOUBLE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {405-413}, keywords = {epistemology, perspective}, abstract = {THIS PAPER DEFENDS THE PRINCIPLE THAT THERE CAN BE A PLURALITY OF WAYS OF INTERPRETING THE SAME PHENOMENA, NOT JUST IN THE TRIVIAL SENSE THAT THERE ARE OFTEN MANY VIEWERS WITH DIFFERENT STANDPOINTS, BUT IN THE LOGICAL SENSE THAT DIFFERENT TYPES OF STATEMENTS GIVEN FROM DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES OR LEVELS CAN BE EQUALLY RELEVANT AS EXPLANATORY OF PHENOMENA. TO CLARIFY THE PRINCIPLE AND SHOW ITS IMPORTANCE FOR PHILOSOPHY, NUMEROUS ILLUSTRATIONS IN WHICH IT IS ACCEPTED OR REJECTED ARE OFFERED. TWO NONPARTISAN PARADIGM CASES ARE THEN PRESENTED TO HELP VINDICATE THE PRINCIPLE, THOUGH NOT ITS UNIVERSAL APPLICATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WALKER1969, author = {WALKER, JEREMY}, title = {IMAGINATION AND THE PASSIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {575-588}, keywords = {epistemology, imagination, passion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wallace2003, author = {Wallace, R-Jay}, title = {Explanation, Deliberation, and Reasons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {429-435}, keywords = {axiology, deliberation, explanation, reality, reasons}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wallace2002, author = {Wallace, R-Jay}, title = {Precis of Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {680-681}, keywords = {ethics, moral-sentiment; responsibility}, abstract = {This is a precis of the argument of my book Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (introducing a symposium on the book, with commentaries by Hilary Bok, James Montmarquet, Robert Kane, and Gideon Rosen, and replies to the commentaries by me).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wallace2002a, author = {Wallace, R-Jay}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {707-727}, keywords = {ethics, normativity, responsibility}, abstract = {This contains replies to commentaries on my book Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments by Hilary Bok, James Montmarquet, Robert Kane, and Gideon Rosen. Issues addressed include the following: the normative approach; praiseworthiness; practical reason and moral reasons; physical possibility; the exercise of general powers; nomic necessity and revisionism about blame; ultimate responsibility and control.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wallace2000, author = {Wallace, R-Jay}, title = {An Anti-Philosophy of the Emotions?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {469-477}, keywords = {emotion, metaphysics, mind}, abstract = {This article is a discussion of Michael Stocker (with Elizabeth Hegeman), Valuing Emotions. The article touches on the following questions (among others): the nature of emotions, the complexity of emotional phenomena, the connections between emotions and moral epistemology and evaluative judgment, the importance of emotions to life and to (moral) philosophy.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Wallace1994, author = {Wallace, R-Jay}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {230-232}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments}, volume = {57(1)}, year = {1994} } @article{WALLRAFF1977, author = {WALLRAFF, C-F}, title = {JASPERS IN ENGLISH: A FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {537-548}, keywords = {english, text, translation, twentieth}, abstract = {RALPH MANHEIM AND E B ASHTON HAVE ENGLISHED THE MAIN BODY OF KARL JASPERS' PHILOSOPHIC WRITINGS. MANHEIM TRANSLATES JASPERS' HISTORICAL WRITINGS CLEARLY AND ACCURATELY, BUT OMITS PASSAGES AD LIB. ASHTON, DEALING WITH "EXISTENZPHILOSOPHIE", OBLITERATES FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTIONS, PROVIDES FAR-FETCHED INTERPRETATIONS, IMPROVISES A NEW KANTIAN TERMINOLOGY, AND, IN THE TRANSLATOR'S NOTE TO "PHILOSOPHY," NEEDLESSLY EXCORIATES THE AUTHOR. JASPERS' DEVOTEES CANNOT BUT WONDER HOW MUCH IS CONVEYED BY SO INACCURATE A MEDIUM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WALLRAFF1980, author = {WALLRAFF, CHARLES-F}, title = {REPLY TO PROFESSOR ADOLPH LICHTIGFELD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {223-224}, keywords = {translation, twentieth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WALLS1991, author = {WALLS, Jerry-L}, title = {Why Plantinga Must Move from Defense to Theodicy.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {free-will; god, religion, theodicy}, abstract = {Alvin Plantinga has consistently held that his 'free will defense', which hinges on the 'possibility' that we are free in the libertarian sense, is not to be taken as a theodicy. This paper argues that it follows from Plantinga's belief that God is perfectly good, as well as essentially omnipotent and omniscient, that we are in fact free in the libertarian sense given the moral evil in our world. In view of this entailment, Plantinga moves from defense to theodicy.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WALSH1979, author = {WALSH, DOROTHY}, title = {CAUSAL EFFICACY AND CAUSAL EXPLANATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {250-257}, keywords = {action, causal-explanation; causality, justification, metaphysics, reasons}, abstract = {THIS PAPER IS AN ATTEMPT TO EXHIBIT THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE PRIMITIVE NOTION OF CAUSALITY, SIMPLY AS EFFICACY, AND THE RESTRICTED MEANING OF THE EXPRESSION "CAUSAL EXPLANATION" AS ASSOCIATED WITH THE APPLICATION OF A METHODOLOGY OF CAUSAL "INQUIRY". THERE CAN BE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON WHETHER OR NOT A SINGLE GENERAL METHODOLOGY OF CAUSAL INQUIRY IS APPROPRIATE FOR NATURAL PHENOMENA AND FOR HUMAN INTENTIONAL ACTIONS. PHILOSOPHERS WHO REJECT A "METHODOLOGY" OF CAUSAL EXPLANATION FOR INTENTIONAL ACTIONS ARE NOT REJECTING CAUSALITY. THE BASIC PRIMITIVE EXPERIENCE OF CAUSAL EFFICACY, OF POWER EXERTED AND RECEIVED, IS INESCAPABLE. A LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXPERIENCE CAN BRING THIS OUT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WALSH1970, author = {WALSH, DOROTHY}, title = {KNOWING BY LIVING THROUGH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {265-272}, keywords = {epistemology, knowing}, abstract = {WHAT WE CAN LIVE THROUGH IS AN EXPERIENCE IN THE SINGULAR SENSE. WHAT WE CAN KNOW BY LIVING THROUGH IS THE QUALITATIVE CHARACTER OF THE EXPERIENCE. THIS IS KNOWLEDGE AS REALIZATION. SUCH KNOWLEDGE IS POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PHENOMENAL SELF WHO UNDERGOES AND THE WITNESSING SELF WHO OBSERVES. THIS DUALITY EXPLAINS THE POSSIBILITY OF IMAGINATIVE INSIGHT INTO THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHERS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WALTER1978, author = {WALTER, EDWARD}, title = {IS LIBERTARIANISM LOGICALLY COHERENT?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {505-513}, keywords = {act, causation, determinism, freedom, libertarianism, metaphysics, morality, self}, abstract = {LIBERTARIANISM, IN ANY FORM, IS UNINTELLIGIBLE. AS EXPRESSED BY C. A. CAMPBELL, IT CLAIMS THAT THE "SELF" ACTIVELY OVERRIDES THE PROCLIVITIES OF THE DETERMINED FORMED CHARACTER. BUT, EITHER THE SELF IS DETERMINED BY THE LAWS THAT GOVERN SUCH BEINGS, AND HENCE DETERMINISM IS ADMITTED, OR THE SELF ACTS SPONTANEOUSLY AND ACTIONS ARE RANDOM. IF THE LATTER IS TRUE, THEN THE CRITICISM MADE OF JAMES' THEORY WOULD APPLY. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY CANNOT BE LEVIED FOR RANDOM ACTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, MORAL FREEDOM IS INTELLIGIBLE. THEREFORE, THERE MUST BE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH IT IS VERIFIED AND FALSIFIED. IF SOFT DETERMINISM IS TRUE, THEN MORAL FREEDOM EXISTS; IF HARD DETERMINISM IS TRUE, THEN MORAL FREEDOM DOES NOT EXIST.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WARD1988, author = {WARD, ANDREW}, title = {A "SEMANTIC REALIST" RESPONSE TO DUMMETT'S ANTIREALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {553-555}, keywords = {ethics, realism, semantics, verificationism}, abstract = {IN HIS "WHAT IS A THEORY OF MEANING? (II)" MICHAEL DUMMETT ARGUES THAT A TRUTH-CONDITIONS THEORY OF MEANING, SUCH AS DONALD DAVIDSON'S, CANNOT ACCOUNT FOR THE MEANING OF MANY NATURAL LANGUAGE SENTENCES. THIS FAILURE LEADS DUMMETT TO ADOPT A VERIFICATIONIST, AND SO TOO ANTIREALIST THEORY OF MEANING. IN THIS PAPER I ARGUE THAT BY DISTINGUISHING THE ROLES PLAYED BY A COHERENCE AND CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH IN HIS THEORY, DAVIDSON CAN ANSWER DUMMETT'S ARGUMENT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WARD1985, author = {WARD, ANDREW}, title = {THREE REALIST CLAIMS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {437-448}, keywords = {belief, induction, metaphysics, perception, realism}, abstract = {A CRITIQUE OF THE REALIST'S USE OF HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS TO SOLVE THE SKEPTICAL PROBLEMS OF PERCEPTION, MEMORY, AND INDUCTION. THE REALIST'S STRATEGY CONFUSES THE CLAIM TO KNOW OF THE VERY "EXISTENCE" OF AN EXTERNAL WORLD, PAST, OR FUTURE, WITH THE CLAIM TO KNOW WHAT, ASSUMING EACH EXISTS, ITS "STRUCTURE" IS LIKE. THE SKEPTIC PRINCIPALLY DEMANDS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE FORMER CLAIM; YET IT IS THE LATTER CLAIM THAT THE REALIST'S ARGUMENTS CAN, AT MOST, JUSTIFY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WARD1990, author = {WARD, ANDREW}, title = {Talking Sense About Freedom.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {731-744}, keywords = {determinism, ethics, freedom, moral, responsibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Warfield1995, author = {Warfield, Ted-A}, title = {Knowing the World and Knowing Our Minds}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {525-545}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, metaphysics, mind, world}, abstract = {Hilary Putnam argued that externalism about mental content can be combined with standard views about privileged access in an argument showing that at least certain forms of skepticism are false. The standard reply claims that in assuming externalism, Putnam undercuts privileged access and thus cannot refute the skeptic. I show that this reply is a clear failure. I also argue that philosophers should either accept that skepticism is provably false or should embrace skepticism. The moderate position which holds that skepticism is false but not provably so is, I argue, demonstrably false.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WARREN1978, author = {WARREN, W-PRESTON}, title = {MODES OF OBJECTIVITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {39}, pages = {74-91}, keywords = {functionalism, language, metaphysics, objectivity, personality, structure, value}, abstract = {THE CONCEPTION OF OBJECTIVITY HAS BEEN UNDER RECENT CHALLENGES. IT COULD BE HELPFUL TO DISTINGUISH ITS MODES. LOGICAL AND EXISTENTIAL TYPES NEED, OF COURSE, TO BE DISTINGUISHED FROM PHENOMENAL ONES. LOGICAL OBJECTIVITY, IN TURN, HAS TWO MODES: 1) LOGICAL DISTINCTIVENESS WHICH IS THE BASIS OF SANTAYANA'S ESSENCES AND WHITEHEAD'S ETERNAL OBJECTS, ALONG WITH JUSTIFIED DISCRIMINATIONS GENERALLY; 2) LOGICAL NECESSITY WHICH IS AN INSISTENT CONSTRAINT UPON THOUGHT. EXISTENTIAL OBJECTIVITY HAS FOUR VARIATIONS: 1) PHYSICAL EXTERNALITY; 2) UNIVERSALITY WHICH MAY TAKE THE FORM OF; 3) FUNCTIONAL REGULARITIES THAT DISPLAY SPECIFIC STRUCTURES (AND STRUCTURE IS ITSELF A TYPE OF OBJECTIVITY) AND PASS INTO; 4) FUNCTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, THE MOST BASIC EXISTENTIAL MODE AND EXPRESSIBLE IN FUNCTIONAL LAWS. THE ESSAY CONCLUDES WITH AN EXAMINATION OF THE TYPES OF OBJECTIVITY DISCERNIBLE IN THE A) PERSONAL, B) IRRATIONAL, AND C) NORMATIVE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WARREN1965, author = {WARREN, W-PRESTON}, title = {THE MOTE IN THE EYE OF THE CRITIC OF CRITICAL REALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {35-50}, keywords = {american, critical-realism; dualism, epistemology, knowledge, object, twentieth}, abstract = {IN HIS "STORY OF AMERICAN REALISM," WILLIAM P MONTAGUE RECOGNIZES SIX "UNOFFICIAL" REALISTS OF WHOM HE TAKES NO FURTHER NOTE. YET ALL HAD PUBLISHED DISTINCTIVE REALISTIC WRITINGS. SOME OF THESE WERE SIGNIFICANTLY RELEVANT TO THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF CRITICAL REALISM, WHICH MONTAGUE ASSERTED WAS SIMPLY A REFORMULATION OF "THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DUALISM... EXPLICIT IN LOCKE AND DESCARTES, AND IMPLICIT IN HOBBES, SPINOZA..." THOUGH SANTAYANA'S CONCEPTS OF ESSENCE AND ANIMAL FAITH EXPRESSED AN ORIGINAL EFFORT TO GO BEYOND LOCKEAN EPISTEMOLOGY. THIS ATTRIBUTION OF DUALISM IS CHALLENGED PARTICULARLY WITH REFERENCE TO THE BIOLOGICALLY ORIENTED, REFERENTIAL REALISM OF R W SELLARS, BUT ALSO ON BEHALF OF THE PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN SANTAYANA AND THE INTENTIONALIST COMPONENT IN THE REALISMS OF LOVEJOY AND PRATT. NEITHER THIS PRAGMATISM NOR THIS INTENTIONALISM, HOWEVER, HAS A CLEAR BASIS. SELLARS' REALISM HAS SUCH A BASIS, BUT IT IS NONETHELESS OPEN TO COMPLEMENTATION BY THE WORK OF MACINTOSH AND BOODIN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WARREN1972, author = {WARREN, W-PRESTON}, title = {EXPERIMENTALISM PLUS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {149-162}, keywords = {epistemology, experimentalism}, abstract = {TO BE A COMPLETE PHILOSOPHY, EXPERIMENTALISM MUST BE EXPERIMENTALISM OF SOMETHING, BY SOMETHING, AND, IN CERTAIN INSTANCES AT LEAST, FOR SOMETHING. THIS ESSAY IS AN EXPLORATION OF R. W. SELLARS' COSMOLOGY WITH A VIEW TO ITS CONTINUITY WITH AND COMPLETION OF AN EXPERIMENTALISM SUCH AS DEWEY'S. SELLARS' COSMOLOGY MAY BE CONSIDERED EXPERIMENTALIST IN THAT NATURE IS ENDLESSLY ENGAGED IN REORDERING ITSELF, AND NEW EMERGENT LEVELS ARISE FROM PREVIOUSLY EMERGENT ENTITIES: BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION FROM CHEMICAL EVOLUTION, ETC. SELLARS' PHILOSOPHY, FURTHERMORE, HAS AN ESPECIALLY INTIMATE RELATION WITH EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE: 1) IN ITS CONCERN WITH THE CATEGORIAL UNDERGIRDING OF SCIENCE; AND 2) IN THE IMPORT OF THE FINDINGS OF DIVERSE SCIENCES FOR PERENNIAL PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS. SELLARS' COSMIC-ORIENTED EXPERIMENTALISM SHEDS FAR-REACHING LIGHT ON THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM AND THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE, AS WELL AS THE PROBLEM OF THE EMERGENCE OF MIND.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Watkins2004, author = {Watkins, Eric}, title = {Autonomy and Idealism in and after Kant}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {728-741}, keywords = {autonomy, ethics, idealism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Weatherson2001, author = {Weatherson, Brian}, title = {Intrinsic Properties and Combinatorial Principles}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {365-380}, keywords = {intrinsic, metaphysics, properties}, abstract = {Three objections have recently been leveled at the analysis of intrinsicness offered by Rae Langton and David Lewis. While these objections do seem telling against the particular theory Langton and Lewis offer, they do not threaten the broader strategy Langton and Lewis adopt: defining intrinsicness in terms of combinatorial features of properties. I show how to amend their theory to overcome the objections without abandoning the strategy.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Weatherson2005, author = {Weatherson, Brian}, title = {Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {613-635}, keywords = {epistemology, incoherence, indifference, knowledge, probability, risk, uncertainty}, abstract = {In a recent article, Adam Elga outlines a strategy for "Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief". The strategy relies on an indifference principle that is not up to the task. In general, there are two things to dislike about indifference principles: adopting one normally means confusing risk for uncertainty, and they tend to lead to incoherent views in some 'paradoxical' situations. I argue that both kinds of objection can be levelled against Elga's indifference principle. There are also some difficulties with the concept of evidence that Elga uses, and these create further difficulties for the principle.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Weberman2000, author = {Weberman, David}, title = {A New Defense of Gadamer's Hermeneutics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {45-65}, keywords = {epistemology, hermeneutics, knowledge, relativism}, abstract = {This paper re-examines the central thesis of Gadamer's hermeneutics that objectivity is not a suitable ideal for understanding a text, historical event, or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one correct interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make clear the grounds for this claim, this paper considers three possible arguments. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wedgwood2002, author = {Wedgwood, Ralph}, title = {Internalism Explained}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {349-369}, keywords = {epistemology, internalism, intuition, knowledge, rationality}, abstract = {According to epistemological internalism, the rationality of a belief supervenes purely on "internal facts" about the thinker's mind. But what are "internal facts"? Why does the rationality of a belief supervene on them? The standard answers are unacceptable. This paper proposes new answers. "Internal facts" are, simply, facts about the thinker's nonfactive mental states. The rationality of a belief supervenes on such internal facts because we need rules of belief revision that we can follow directly, not by means of following any other rules, and the proximate explanation of any belief revision always consists of such internal facts.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wedgwood1999, author = {Wedgwood, Ralph}, title = {The A Priori Rules of Rationality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {113-131}, keywords = {a-priori; belief, decision, epistemology, rationality}, abstract = {Both these ideas are intuitively plausible: rationality has an external aim, such as forming a true belief or good decision; and the rationality of a belief or decision is determined purely by facts about the thinker's internal mental states. Unlike earlier conceptions, the conception of rationality presented here explains why these ideas are both true. Rational beliefs and decisions, it is argued, are those that are formed through the thinker's following 'rules of rationality'. Some rules count as rules of rationality because it is rational to believe--through following other rules--that those rules are reliable. But there must also be certain basic rules, which are a priori, or 'built into' our basic cognitive capacities. That these rules are a priori is a purely internal matter; and in following these rules the thinker has done all that could reasonably be expected to achieve the external aim of forming a true belief or good decision.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wedgwood2001, author = {Wedgwood, Ralph}, title = {Sensing Values?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(1)}, pages = {215-223}, keywords = {affect, epistemology, sense, value}, abstract = {In "The Authority of Affect" (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, July 2001), Mark Johnston argues that, under favorable conditions, certain affective states are states in which we literally sense the exemplifications of certain objective values. But Johnston's argument does not convincingly show that the rival projectivist or dispositionalist conceptions of the relation between affect and value cannot explain all of his initial assumptions equally well. These affective states may also count as disclosures of exemplifications of certain objective values even if they are not states in which we literally sense exemplifications of these values.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WEIL1980, author = {WEIL, VIVIAN}, title = {INTENTIONAL AND MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {459-473}, keywords = {action, compatibilism, explanation, intension, mechanism, neurophysiology, psychology, science}, abstract = {SOME INFLUENTIAL PHILOSOPHERS HAVE HELD THAT IF NEUROPHYSIOLOGY WERE TO PROVIDE A COMPREHENSIVE, MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR, PURPOSIVE OR INTENTIONAL EXPLANATION WOULD BE RULED OUT. I ARGUE AGAINST THIS VIEW, SHOWING HOW TWO LEADING INCOMPATIBILIST CASES FAIL. IN AN EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN THE COMPATIBILIST POSITION, I DELINEATE THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF THE TWO KINDS OF EXPLANATION. EMPLOYING A COMPONENT ANALYSIS OF ACTIONS AND A RECENT EXPLICATION OF FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS, I EXPLAIN HOW IT IS THAT MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION DOES NOT RULE OUT INTENTIONAL EXPLANATION. I PROVIDE AN ACCOUNT OF THE LATTER, DETAILING ITS DISTINCTIVE PATTERN OF ILLUMINATION AND SHOWING ITS INDISPENSABILITY FOR INTERPRETING, PREDICTING, AND JUSTIFYING ACTIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WEINGARTNER1964, author = {WEINGARTNER, PAUL}, title = {PROBLEMS AND REQUIREMENTS IN THEORY RENDERING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {85-95}, keywords = {content, empirical, interpretation, logic, philosophy, significance, theory}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE TRIES TO GIVE AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION: "HOW CAN WE SELECT THE IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT STATEMENTS OF A DOCTRINE OR THEORY?" THIS IS DONE BY TWO DEFINITIONS ACCORDING TO WHICH ONE CAN DISTINGUISH TWO SENSES OF THE EXPRESSION "IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT OF A DOCTRINE OF THEORY": (1) THE STATEMENT IN QUESTION HAS A HIGH LOGICAL CONTENT AND THEREFORE A LOW DEGREE OF PROBABILITY. (2) THE STATEMENT HAS A HIGH EMPIRICAL CONTENT AND ALSO A LOW DEGREE OF PROBABILITY; I.E., THERE IS A LARGE CLASS OF SELF-CONSISTENT, SINGULAR EXISTENTIAL STATEMENTS OF THE FORM "THERE IS A SO AND SO IN THE SPACE-TIME REGION "K"" WHICH ARE FORBIDDEN BY THE STATEMENT IN QUESTION, I.E., WITH WHICH IT IS INCONSISTENT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WEINGARTNER1967, author = {WEINGARTNER, RUDOLPH}, title = {DANTO ON HISTORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {100-113}, keywords = {history}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WEINGARTNER1964a, author = {WEINGARTNER, RUDOLPH-H}, title = {VULGAR JUSTICE AND PLATONIC JUSTICE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {248-252}, keywords = {ethics, fallacy, happiness, justice, textual-criticis}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WEINZWEIG1962, author = {WEINZWEIG, MARJORIE}, title = {OUR KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER MINDS: A PSEUDO-PROBLEM?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {250-255}, keywords = {analogy, epistemology, inference, knowledge, other-minds; problem, validity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WEIRICH1986, author = {WEIRICH, PAUL}, title = {ROUSSEAU ON PROPORTIONAL MAJORITY RULE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {111-126}, keywords = {decision-theory; majority-rule; social-philosoph}, abstract = {ROUSSEAU PROPOSES MAJORITY RULE AS A PRACTICAL APPROXIMATION TO GOVERNMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL WILL. MORE SPECIFICALLY, HE PROPOSES PROPORTIONAL MAJORITY RULE, I.E., PASSING A MOTION, NORMALLY, ONLY IF IT HAS THE SUPPORT OF A MAJORITY WHOSE SIZE IS PROPORTIONAL TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MOTION. HOWEVER, ROUSSEAU DOES NOT EXPLICITLY STATE THE REASONS FOR HIS PROPOSAL. I SUGGEST AN ARGUMENT FOR PROPORTIONAL MAJORITY RULE THAT AGREES WITH THE MAIN LINES OF ROUSSEAU'S POLITICAL WORKS. IT SHOWS THAT MAJORITY RULE APPROXIMATES THE GENERAL WILL WHETHER VOTERS EXPRESS OPINIONS ABOUT THE GENERAL WILL OR OPINIONS ABOUT PRIVATE INTERESTS. AND IT SHOWS THE PROPORTIONAL MAJORITY RULE IMPROVES THE APPROXIMATION BY COMPENSATING FOR THE TENDENCY OF VOTERS TO OVERLOOK THE BENEFITS OF POLITICAL STABILITY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WEISSMAN1967, author = {WEISSMAN, DAVID}, title = {ONTOLOGY IN THE 'TRACTATUS'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {475-501}, keywords = {metaphysics, ontology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WEISSMANN1966, author = {WEISSMANN, HANS-ASRIEL}, title = {ON THE CONCEPT OF UNIVERSALS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {274-277}, keywords = {metaphysics, universal}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WEITZ1973, author = {WEITZ, MORRIS}, title = {THE GROUNDS OF SENSE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF EVERETT J NELSON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {455-471}, keywords = {logic, ontology, presupposition, twentieth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Weitzman1996, author = {Weitzman, Leora}, title = {What Makes a Causal Theory of Content Anti-skeptical?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {299-318}, keywords = {causation, content, epistemology, scepticism}, abstract = {Theories that give causal relations a role in determining representational content vary in their antiskeptical implications. These variations are here traced back to features that distinguish causal theories of content from one another. One relevant feature concerns whether something represents an actual, or merely a possible, cause of its occurrence under certain conditions. Further relevant features concern the particular conditions specified. Skeptical questions affected in different ways include whether there is an external world (and whether it evinces causal regularities), whether one's basic concepts have even been instantiated, and which of two empirically indistinguishable environments one is occupying.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WELLMAN1976, author = {WELLMAN, CARL}, title = {THE JUSTIFICATION OF PRACTICAL REASON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {531-546}, keywords = {argumentation, logic, practical-syllogism; reasoning}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE PRESENTS A RATIONAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE USE OF PRACTICAL REASON, SURPRISINGLY FREE FROM VICIOUS CIRCULARITY. ONE OUGHT TO ENGAGE IN REASONING ABOUT PRACTICE, ABOUT WHAT IS TO BE DONE, BECAUSE IT IS DANGEROUS TO ACT WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE REASONS AGAINST ONE'S CHOICE AND BECAUSE THINKING CRITICALLY ABOUT WHAT ONE IS DOING ADDS VALUE TO THE DOING. ONE OUGHT TO ACT ON THE CONCLUSIONS OF PRACTICAL REASON FOR PRECISELY THE SAME REASONS THAT ESTABLISH THOSE CONCLUSIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WELLMAN1971, author = {WELLMAN, CARL}, title = {SOME DEONTOLOGICAL EXPRESSIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {32}, pages = {205-218}, keywords = {deontology, ethics, obligation, ought}, abstract = {THE THESIS OF THIS ARTICLE IS THAT ALL DEONTOLOGICAL EXPRESSIONS HAVE THE SAME KIND OF MEANING, CRITICAL MEANING, AND THAT WHAT DISTINGUISHES THE MEANINGS OF DIFFERENT DEONTOLOGICAL EXPRESSIONS OR OF DIFFERENT SENSES OF THE SAME EXPRESSION IS THE DIFFERENT CRITICAL CLAIMS THEY MAKE. AFTER A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE NATURE OF CRITICAL MEANING, THE VARIOUS SENSES OF 'RIGHT,' 'WRONG,' 'OUGHT,' 'OBLIGATION,' AND 'DUTY' ARE DEFINED. THE MEANING OF MODIFIERS SUCH AS 'MORAL' OR 'LEGAL' WHEN APPLIED TO DUTIES OR OBLIGATIONS IS ALSO ANALYZED IN TERMS OF CRITICAL MEANING. IT IS CLAIMED THAT THIS PAPER CONSTITUTES A TEST CASE THAT PARTIALLY CONFIRMS THE THEORY OF THE NATURE OF JUDGMENTS OF OBLIGATION ORIGINALLY PROPOSED IN "THE LANGUAGE OF ETHICS".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Wellman1995, author = {Wellman, Carl}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {975-979}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Real Rights}, volume = {58(4)}, year = {1995} } @article{WHALLON1965, author = {WHALLON, ROBERT-E}, title = {UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL EVENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {400-403}, keywords = {awareness, event, evidence, existence, mental, metaphysics, unconscious}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wheeler-III1999, author = {Wheeler-III, Samuel-C}, title = {Derrida's Differance and Plato's Different}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {999-1013}, keywords = {differance, difference, metaphysics, philosophy}, abstract = {This essay shows that Derrida's discussion of "Differance," is remarkably parallel to Plato's discussion of Difference in the Parmenides. Plato's presentation of "Parmenides'" discussion of generation from a One which Is is a version of Derrida's preconceptual spacing. Derrida's implicit reference to Plato both interprets Plato and explains to obscure features of "Differance." Derrida's paradoxical remarks about Differance are very like what Plato implies about Difference. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{White1993, author = {White, Michael-J}, title = {Aristotle on the Non-Supervenience of Local Motion}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {143-155}, keywords = {epistemology, motion, physics, science, supervenience}, abstract = {Aristotle accepts 'non-supervenience' principles that preclude the constitution of what is continuous from parts that are indivisible. These principles are incompatible with a contemporary positional/'at-at' conception that identifies motion with a dense, Dedekind-continuous linear array of 'instantaneous positions' of a body. As an instantiation of his non-supervenience principles, Aristotle adopts a "metrical" conception of motion, according to which the motion of a body is analyzed as the 'measuring' of its trajectory by the body's magnitude or some proper part of that magnitude. This metrical conception underlies Aristotle's arguments indivisibles cannot move except "per accidens" and "may" have influenced Proclus' comments on geometers' definition of a line.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{White1999, author = {White, Morton}, title = {Peirce's Summum Bonum and the Ethical Views of C. I. Lewis and John Dewey}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {1029-1037}, keywords = {ethics, evolution, order, universe}, abstract = {I am primarily concerned here with C. I. Lewis's suggestion in a letter to me that some admitted defects in his ethical views might be removed by appealing to Peirce's views on the summum bonum, which Peirce identified as the evolutionary process, whereby, the universe becomes more and more orderly. Since Lewis held in his published writings that what is morally obligatory can never be determined by empirical facts alone, I argue that since the alleged growing orderliness of the universe must be established empirically, Lewis cannot analyze an obligatory action as one that contributes to that process without abandoning his view that obligatoriness cannot be established empirically. I also argue that if Lewis were to abandon his opposition to a naturalistic theory of obligation, appealing to Peirce's summum bonum would not help Lewis out of what he called his predicament in ethics.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{White2002, author = {White, Morton}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {238-241}, publisher = {Princeton Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A Philosophy of Culture: The Scope of Holistic Pragmatism}, volume = {72(1)}, year = {2002} } @other{White1997, author = {White, Michael-J}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {731-734}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Partisan or Neutral?: The Futility of Public Political Theory}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1997} } @article{White1999a, author = {White, Nicholas}, title = {Harmonizing Plato}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {497-512}, keywords = {ethics, eudaimonism, good, greek}, abstract = {This in a review of Plato's Ethics, by Terence Irwin. Critical attention is paid to Irwin's eudaimonist interpretation of Plato, especially of the Republic.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{White2002a, author = {White, Nicholas}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {246-248}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics}, volume = {71(1)}, year = {2002} } @article{WHITE1988, author = {WHITE, RICHARD}, title = {THE RETURN OF THE MASTER: AN INTERPRETATION OF NIETZSCHE'S "GENEALOGY OF MORALS".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {683-696}, keywords = {ethics, good, master-slave; origin, phenomenology}, abstract = {IN THIS INTERPRETATION OF "THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS", THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT IT WOULD BE MISLEADING TO VIEW NIETZSCHE'S WORK AS A STRAIGHTFORWARD HISTORICAL NARRATIVE WHICH LAMENTS A LOST ORIGIN. IN FACT, NIETZSCHE'S 'PARABLE' OF MASTERS AND SLAVES SUGGESTS THE "DOUBLE" ORIGIN OF VALUE, AND IN THIS RESPECT IT FORCES US TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF ALL OUR ACCEPTED IDEALS. IN THE "GENEALOGY", NIETZSCHE'S TASK IS TO MAKE US RECOLLECT THE FORGOTTEN POSITION OF THE MASTER. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{White1992, author = {White, Stephen-L}, title = {The Desire to Survive}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {153-158}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, personal-identity; survival}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Whiting2002, author = {Whiting, Jennifer}, title = {Eudaimonia, External Results, and Choosing Virtuous Actions for Themselves}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {270-290}, keywords = {action, ethics, eudaimonism, result, virtue}, abstract = {I offer an alternative interpretation, based on Aristotle's account of loving a friend for herself, according to which choosing a virtuous action for itself involves choosing it on account of those features of it that make it the kind of action it is, where these features include its intended consequences. I then suggest that Aristotle may take these consequences (including benefits to others) as contributing to the agent's own eudaimonia; and that there is no conflict here with Aristotle's view that eudaimonia is an activity of the soul. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WIDER1990, author = {WIDER, KATHLEEN}, title = {Overtones of Solipsism in Thomas Nagel's "What is it Like to Be a Bat?" and The View From Nowhere.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(3)}, pages = {481-499}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, mind, solipsism}, abstract = {This paper examines the solipsistic strain present in Nagel's defense of the claim that a physicalist account of consciousness can provide only an incomplete analysis of mind because it cannot capture the subjective character of experience. I argue that given Nagel's use of the imagination in grounding our conception of how an experience is for another and given his view of the relationship between the mental and the physical, it follows that the true nature of an experience is fully comprehensible only to the experiencer herself. It is this consequence of his views that constitutes the solipsistic strain in his work.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WIENER1963, author = {WIENER, PHILIP-P}, title = {THE CENTRAL ROLE OF TIME IN LOVEJOY'S PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {480-492}, keywords = {dualism, epistemology, experience, human-nature; memory, monism, self, time}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WIERENGA1983, author = {WIERENGA, EDWARD}, title = {OMNIPOTENCE DEFINED.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {363-376}, keywords = {god, metaphysics, omnipotence}, abstract = {THEISTS WHO HAVE ATTRIBUTED OMNIPOTENCE TO GOD HAVE TYPICALLY THOUGHT THAT VARIOUS LIMITATIONS ON ABILITY ARE COMPATIBLE WITH BEING OMNIPOTENT. I BEGIN BY LISTING A NUMBER OF SUCH LIMITATIONS. I THEN INTRODUCE TWO TECHNICAL CONCEPTS: STRONGLY ACTUALIZING A STATE OF AFFAIRS AND INITIAL SEGMENT OF A POSSIBLE WORLD. FINALLY, IN TERMS OF THESE CONCEPTS I PROPOSE A DEFINITION OF OMNIPOTENCE WHICH IS ADEQUATE TO MY INITIAL LIST OF CONDITIONS ON OMNIPOTENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wiggins2005, author = {Wiggins, David}, title = {Precis of Sameness and Substance Renewed}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {442-448}, keywords = {identity, metaphysics, particular, sameness, substance}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wiggins2005a, author = {Wiggins, David}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {470-476}, keywords = {metaphysics, sameness, substance}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WIKLUND1960, author = {WIKLUND, ROLF-A}, title = {A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE NEOFINALIST PHILOSOPHY OF RAYMOND RUYER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {187-198}, keywords = {activity, consciousness, determinism, freedom, mechanism, metaphysics, ontology, purpose}, abstract = {RUYER OPPOSES A MECHANISTIC UNIVERSE AND IN HIS PHILOSOPHY SHOWS THE ESSENTIAL PURPOSIVENESS OF LIFE. MEANING AND DIRECTION ARE INHERENT IN INORGANIC AND ORGANIC WORLDS, AND THERE IS A NATURAL PROLONGATION OF THIS IN MAN'S CONSCIOUS ACTIVITY. THE SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE IMPLIES FREEDOM. RUYER'S PHRASE IS: "I AM SEEKING A FIRST TRUTH, A CERTITUDE, THEREFORE I AM FREE." HIS IDEAS OF FREEDOM, EXISTENCE, WORK AND INVENTION ARE EXPLORED, AND FINALLY, HIS NOTION OF GOD AS THE SUPREME IDEAL. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wil2000, author = {Wiland, Eric}, title = {Good Advice and Rational Action}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {561-569}, keywords = {action, epistemology, rationality}, abstract = {This paper launches a new criticism of Michael Smith's advice model of internalism. Whereas Robert Neal Johnson argues that Smith's advice model collapses into the example model of internalism, the author contends that taking advice seriously pushes us instead toward some version of externalism. The advice model of internalism misportrays the logic of accepting advice. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WILCOX1972, author = {WILCOX, JOHN-T}, title = {ELEMENTS OF IRRATIONALISM IN NIETZSCHE'S METAETHICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {227-240}, keywords = {epiphenomenalism, ethics, illusion, irrationalism, metaethics, scepticism}, abstract = {WITHOUT DENYING THAT THERE ARE STRONG ELEMENTS OF RATIONALISM IN NIETZSCHE, THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES SEVEN MOTIFS SUPPORTING A NONCOGNITIVIST (OR 'IRRATIONALIST') INTERPRETATION OF HIS METAETHICAL THOUGHT: HIS EPISTEMOLOGICAL SKEPTICISM, HIS THEORY OF THE INSTRUMENTAL NATURE OF THE INTELLECT, HIS EPIPHENOMENALISM, HIS BELIEF IN THE UTILITY OF ILLUSION, HIS DOUBTS ABOUT PAST MORAL PHILOSOPHY, HIS ESOTERISM, AND HIS SUGGESTIONS THAT VALUES ARE CREATED OR WILLED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WILD1966, author = {WILD, JOHN}, title = {REPLY TO PROFESSOR FRANKENA'S "J D WILD ON RESPONSIBILITY".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {97-102}, keywords = {causation, condition, determinism, free-will; metaphysics, responsibility}, abstract = {WILD DEFENDS ARISTOTLE'S DISTINCTION--THAT, IF THE CAUSES OF AN ACT LIE OUTSIDE THE AGENT, THEN THEY ARE FORCED UPON HIM. IF THE CAUSES ARE HIS OWN DESIRES (WITHIN HIM) THEN THEY ARE VOLUNTARY ACTS AND HE IS RESPONSIBLE. WILD ARGUES THAT FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY ARE OPPOSED TO COMPULSION AND ENTAIL INTERNAL CAUSATION. ONE SHOULD THEREFORE DISTINGUISH VOLUNTARY ACTS FROM COMPULSIVE ACTS SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF TWO KINDS OF CAUSATION. HE CONCLUDES THAT RESPONSIBILITY IS A CERTAIN TYPE OF INTERNAL CAUSATION, CAUSED WITH INTENTION (MEANING), AND THE NORMATIVE IS WITHIN THIS WORLD OF MEANING. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WILD1962, author = {WILD, JOHN}, title = {REPLY TO FATHER ADELMANN AND PROFESSOR SCHRAG.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {412-415}, keywords = {causality, epistemology, existence, experience, phenomenology, self-consciousnes}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WILD1961, author = {WILD, JOHN}, title = {A REPLY TO MR GALE'S "NATURAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {377-383}, keywords = {essence, existence, man, natural-law; naturalism, need, political-philosophy; rationality, right}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Wilkerson1995, author = {Wilkerson, T-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {239-241}, publisher = {Avebury}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Natural Kinds}, volume = {57(1)}, year = {1995} } @article{WILKINS1971, author = {WILKINS, BURLEIGH-T}, title = {MELDEN ON WILLING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {444-450}, keywords = {epistemology, willing}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WILKINS1964, author = {WILKINS, BURLEIGH-TAYLOR}, title = {NAGEL'S CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {383-396}, keywords = {conduct, confirmability, evidence, laws, methodology, motive, psychoanalysis, science, structure, theory, unconscious}, abstract = {NAGEL EXAMINES THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE AND EMPIRICAL CONTENT OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY, AS WELL AS THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE USED TO SUPPORT THE THEORY. HE OPPOSES FREUDIAN THEORY IN ITS STRUCTURE AND IN ITS BASIC ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING THE NATURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT. HE POINTS OUT THE DIFFICULTY IN DEDUCING DETERMINATE CONSEQUENCES FROM THE THEORY AND OBJECTS TO THE WAY IN WHICH THE THEORETICAL NOTIONS ARE RELATED TO OBSERVABLE MATERIALS BY CORRESPONDENCE RULES. FINALLY, HE CRITICIZES THE ASSUMPTIONS THAT ALL CONDUCT IS MOTIVATED OR WISH-FULFILLING, AND THAT THERE ARE UNCONSCIOUS MOTIVES. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WILL1981, author = {WILL, FREDERIC}, title = {THE USE OF LANGUAGE AND ITS OBJECTS IN LITERATURE AND SOCIETY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {556-560}, keywords = {language, literature, reference}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WILLIAMS1984, author = {WILLIAMS, CLIFFORD}, title = {INDETERMINISM AND THE THEORY OF AGENCY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {111-120}, keywords = {agency, indeterminism, metaphysics}, abstract = {THE THEORY OF AGENCY HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD TO AVOID THE CHARGE THAT UNCAUSED ACTIONS ARE CAPRICIOUS. I ARGUE THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF AGENCY DOES NOT REMOVE THE CAPRICIOUSNESS THAT UNCAUSED ACTIONS ARE SAID TO HAVE, BECAUSE FREE ACTIONS, EVEN WITH AGENCY, STILL MUST POSSESS THOSE CHARACTERISTICS THAT THE INDETERMINIST'S UNCAUSED ACTIONS POSSESS: HAVING NO SUFFICIENT CONDITION, AND BEING ABLE TO BE DIFFERENT EVEN IF ALL PRIOR HAPPENINGS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WERE THE SAME. MOREOVER, AN APPEAL TO GOALS AND PURPOSES, THOUGH BLUNTING THE CHARGE OF CAPRICIOUSNESS, DOES NOT SHOW HOW AGENCY REMOVES CAPRICIOUSNESS, FOR THE INDETERMINIST CAN MAKE THE SAME APPEAL WITHOUT MENTIONING AGENCY. WHAT I SAY DOES NOT REFUTE THE THEORY OF AGENCY, BUT ONLY THE CLAIM THAT AGENCY REMOVES CAPRICIOUSNESS FROM UNCAUSED ACTIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WILLIAMS1964, author = {WILLIAMS, GARDNER}, title = {SUBJECTIVE ETHICS AND THE SUBCONSCIOUS VALUE JUDGMENTS OF THE AVERAGE CITIZEN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {201-207}, keywords = {ethics, hedonism, interest, relativism, subjectivism, value-judgmen}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE DEFINES "RIGHT" AS THAT WHICH IS MOST DEEPLY SATISFACTORY TO AN INDIVIDUAL IN THE LONG RUN, AND "GOOD" AS THE SATISFACTORY JOY AND LOSS OF SUFFERING. IT IS PROPOSED THAT A THEORY OF HEDONIC ETHICAL RELATIVISM MAKES MAN'S MORAL EXPERIENCE MORE INTELLIGIBLE THAN ANY ALTERNATIVE AXIOLOGICAL SYSTEM. ONE MUST COMBINE AN INTEREST THEORY OF VALUE WITH SOME OF EPICURUS AND SOME OF UTILITARIANISM. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Williams1998, author = {Williams, Michael}, title = {Bilgrami on Belief and Meaning: Is Fregean Externalism Possible?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {607-611}, keywords = {externalism, metaphysics, reference}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Williams1996, author = {Williams, Michael}, title = {Understanding Human Knowledge Philosophically}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {359-378}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, understanding}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Williams2000, author = {Williams, Michael}, title = {Dretske on Epistemic Entitlement}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {607-612}, keywords = {entitlement, epistemology, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Williams1991, author = {Williams, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {740-742}, publisher = {Blackwell}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Unnatural Doubts}, volume = {54(3)}, year = {1991} } @article{WILLIAMSON1966, author = {WILLIAMSON, JOHN}, title = {REALIZATION AND UNCONSCIOUS INFERENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {11-26}, keywords = {consciousness, epistemology, inference, knowledge, perceiving, realization, unconscious}, abstract = {TWO THINGS ARE ATTEMPTED HERE: TO EXPLORE THE RELATION BETWEEN REALIZING, INFERRING, PERCEIVING, REMEMBERING, AND BEING CONSCIOUS; AND TO ARGUE THAT EQUATING NORMAL VISUAL PERCEPTION WITH UNCONSCIOUS INFERENCE IS A PRIMA FACIE ABSURDITY. A FEW CASES ARE DISCUSSED TO SHOW THAT REALIZING IS A MENTAL EVENT THAT CAN SOMETIMES BUT NOT ALWAYS BE IDENTIFIED WITH PERCEIVING, WITH INFERRING, OR WITH NOT-FORGETTING. A BORDERLINE CASE IS DESCRIBED IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THE TEMPTATION TO IDENTIFY PERCEIVING WITH INFERRING. SOME REASONS ARE GIVEN FOR SAYING THAT IT IS HARD TO MAKE SENSE OF THE NOTION OF UNCONSCIOUS INFERENCE, ESPECIALLY IF ORDINARY VISUAL PERCEPTION IS CLAIMED TO BE AN INSTANCE OF IT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Williamson1997, author = {Williamson, Timothy}, title = {Sense, Validity and Context}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {649-654}, keywords = {context, epistemology, reference, self-consciousnes}, abstract = {The paper discusses John Campbell's book Past, Space and Self. Campbell defines sameness of sense in terms of the validity of inferences. The paper argues that, given an adequate logic of indexicals, this does not provide an account of sameness of sense across changes of context of the kind Campbell wants.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Williamson2002, author = {Williamson, Timothy}, title = {Soames on Vagueness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {422-428}, keywords = {language, vagueness}, abstract = {Scott Soames has a justly high reputation for the precision and rigor of his work in the philosophy of language. It is therefore with considerable interest that one turns to the chapter of Understanding Truth on vagueness and the sorites paradox to see what he has to say.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Williamson2002a, author = {Williamson, Timothy}, title = {Peacocke's Theory of Modality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {649-654}, keywords = {epistemology, knowing, metaphysics, modality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Williamson2001, author = {Williamson, Timothy}, title = {Ethics, Supervenience and Ramsey Sentences}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {625-630}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, ramsey-sentence; supervenience}, abstract = {The paper criticizes Frank Jackson's account of ethics in From Metaphysics to Ethics, especially his argument that if ethical truths supervene on descriptive truth then ethical properties are coextensive with descriptive properties. Although that does follow from stronger supervenience claims, they are more dubious than the one Jackson cites. The paper also criticizes Jackson's moral functionalism. His use of modified Ramsey sentences to define ethical predicates assumes that a unique sequence of properties satisfies folk morality. If folk morality is weak enough to guarantee its satisfaction, it may be weak enough to be multiply satisfied.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Williamson2002b, author = {Williamson, Timothy}, title = {Epistemicist Models: Comments on Gomez-Torrente and Graff}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {143-150}, keywords = {epistemic, error, knowledge, logic, semantics, vagueness}, abstract = {The paper responds to discussion by Mario Gomez-Torrente and Delia Graff of the iteration of definiteness operators in epistemic models of vagueness and sorites paradoxes. By consideration of a variety of models, it extends their results and argues that they refine, rather than undermine, the epistemic theory of vagueness. The discussion bears on higher-order vagueness.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Williamson1997a, author = {Williamson, Timothy}, title = {Precis of Vagueness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {921-928}, keywords = {epistemology, language, proposition, sentence, vagueness}, abstract = {Reasons are given for regarding vagueness as an epistemic phenomenon, in preference to accounts based on supervaluations or fuzzy logic.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Williamson1997b, author = {Williamson, Timothy}, title = {Reply to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {945-953}, keywords = {epistemology, falsity, truth, vagueness}, abstract = {The objections of Paul Horwich and Stephen Schiffer to the epistemic account of vagueness in my book Vagueness are answered.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Williamson1996, author = {Williamson, Timothy}, title = {Unreflective Realism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {905-909}, keywords = {cognition, epistemology, objectivity, realism, truth}, abstract = {The paper critically discusses Crispin Wright's Truth and Objectivity, arguing that it overestimates the extent of the a priori, particularly in its discussion of the Euthyphro Contrast and Cognitive Command, and that it has no justification for imposing the burden of proof on realism. A view is sketched on which the default assumption is of a gap between truth and superassertibility.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Williamson2005, author = {Williamson, Timothy}, title = {Precis of Knowledge and Its Limits}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {431-435}, keywords = {awareness, epistemology, ignorance, intelligence, knowledge, limits}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Williamson2005a, author = {Williamson, Timothy}, title = {Replies to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {468-491}, keywords = {causation, epistemology, evidence, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Williamson2000, author = {Williamson, Timothy}, title = {Scepticism and Evidence}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {613-628}, keywords = {epistemology, evidence, knowledge, rationality, scepticism}, abstract = {Sceptical arguments assume that one has the same evidence in a sceptical scenario as in the corresponding good case where one's beliefs are true. This assumption needs support. Sceptics implicitly supply it by an argument from the premise that rational thinkers can always know what their evidence is (which implies a phenomenal conception of evidence). But the premise leads by a sorites chain of parallel arguments to a clearly false conclusion. Rational thinkers cannot always know what their evidence is. Sceptical arguments go wrong by assuming that knowledge of one's evidence is easier than it really is.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wilson2002, author = {Wilson, David-Sloan}, title = {Precis of Unto Others}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {681-684}, keywords = {altruism, ethics, evolution, psychology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wilson2002a, author = {Wilson, David-Sloan}, title = {Reply to Commentaries}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {711-727}, keywords = {altruism, ethics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WILSON1984, author = {WILSON, DAVID-C}, title = {FUNCTIONALISM AND MORAL PERSONHOOD: ONE VIEW CONSIDERED.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {521-530}, keywords = {ethics, functionalism, morality}, abstract = {DANIEL DENNETT HAS OFFERED A SET OF NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR SOMETHING'S BEING THE PROPER OBJECT OF OUR MORAL COMMITMENT, THAT IS, FOR SOMETHING'S BEING A PERSON. STRICT APPLICATION OF THESE LARGELY PRAGMATIC CONDITIONS, HOWEVER, WOULD RESULT IN A MORAL COMMUNITY WITH QUITE A SURPRISING MEMBERSHIP ROSTER, BECAUSE OF BOTH WHO IS ON IT AND WHO ISN'T. THE PROBLEM IS THAT "YOUR" BEING A PERSON SHOULD AMOUNT TO MORE THAN A FUNCTION OF "MY" GOALS AND CLEVERNESS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wilson2004, author = {Wilson, George-M}, title = {Comment on Authority and Estrangement}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {440-447}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, self-knowledg}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wilson1998, author = {Wilson, George-M}, title = {Semantic Realism and Kripke's Wittgenstein}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {99-122}, keywords = {epistemology, fact, meaning, realism, semantics}, abstract = {This article argues, first, that the fundamental structure of the skeptical argument in Kripke's book on Wittgenstein has been seriously misunderstood by recent commentators. Although it focuses particularly on recent commentary by John McDowell, it emphasizes that the basic misunderstandings are widely shared by other commentators. In particular, it argues that, properly construed, Kripke offers a fully coherent reading of PI #201 and related passages. This is commonly denied and given as a reason for rejecting Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein's text. Second, it is pretty universally accepted that Kripke's Wittgenstein is 'nonfactualist' about ascriptions of meaning. The article argues that, when Kripke's discussion is rightly understood and the content of 'nonfactualism' is clarified, there is an important sense in which the skeptical solution is not committed to nonfactualism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Wilson1995, author = {Wilson, Robert-A}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {723-726}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind}, volume = {58(3)}, year = {1995} } @article{WINTHROP1971, author = {WINTHROP, HENRY}, title = {VARIETY OF MEANING IN THE CONCEPT OF DECADENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {510-526}, keywords = {culture, decadence, social-philosoph}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR SETS OUT TO DISCUSS THE MEANINGS OF THE CONCEPT OF DECADENCE HELD BY FOUR DIFFERENT THINKERS, NAMELY, MARCUSE, JOAD, ORTEGA Y GASSET AND SOROKIN. FOR MARCUSE, DECADENCE IS ASSOCIATED WITH RESISTANCE TO NEEDED SOCIAL CHANGE AND UNREASONING SUPPORT OF THE STATUS QUO. FOR JOAD, DECADENCE EXISTS WHEN THE VIEW IS WIDESPREAD AMONG THOUGHTFUL PERSONS, THAT EXPERIENCE IS TO BE VALUED FOR ITS OWN SAKE, REGARDLESS OF ITS QUALITY OR CONTENT. FOR ORTEGA Y GASSET, DECADENCE IS EXPRESSED LARGELY THROUGH THE LOSS OF PERSPECTIVE WITH RESPECT TO A HIERARCHICAL SENSE OF VALUE. FOR SOROKIN, DECADENCE IS DEFINED AS 'SENSATE' CULTURE AND 'SENSATE' ART. THE FOUR ATTRIBUTES OF THE CONCEPT OF DECADENCE WHICH EMERGE FROM THE WORK OF THESE FOUR THINKERS ARE 1) THE CONCEPT OF DECADENCE ALMOST ALWAYS HAS A METAPHYSICAL STATUS; 2) IN MOST CASES IT IS USED EVALUATIVELY AND NORMATIVELY; 3) MOST THINKERS EMPLOYING IT DO SO CONSERVATIVELY, ADVOCATING EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY A RETURN TO NORMS, WHICH ARE RAPIDLY DISAPPEARING FROM THE CULTURES IN WHICH THEY FIND THEMSELVES; AND 4) THE QUALITY OF DECADENCE IS REGARDED AS BEING MADE MANIFEST IN ALMOST ALL FORMS OF THE CULTURES IN WHICH IT IS FOUND, BUT PARTICULARLY THE ARTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WIREDU1974, author = {WIREDU, J-E}, title = {CARNAP ON ITERATED MODALITIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {240-245}, keywords = {logic, modality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WISDOM1972, author = {WISDOM, J-O}, title = {SCIENTIFIC THEORY: EMPIRICAL CONTENT, EMBEDDED ONTOLOGY, AND WELTANSCHAUUNG.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {62-77}, keywords = {metaphysics, ontology, refutability, science, theory}, abstract = {BOUNDARIES BETWEEN SCIENCE AND NON-SCIENCE HAVE BEEN BASED ON EMPIRICAL CONTENT. BUT ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS ARE THUS EXCLUDED. EMPIRICAL CONTENT HAS BEEN REGARDED AS OBSERVATIONAL. HOWEVER, THERE ARE ONTOLOGICAL FACTORS THAT ARE NOT. SOME SUCH ARE EMBEDDED IN THE CONTENT, SUCH AS ABSOLUTE SPACE IN NEWTONIAN MECHANICS, AND CANNOT BE ERADICATED. A METHOD OF THEORY-REFUTATION IS PROPOSED TO SERVE AS A CRITERIA FOR SUCH ONTOLOGIES WHERE OBSERVATIONAL TEST IS IRRELEVANT. NEXT COMES THE WELTANSCHAUUNG OF SCIENCE. THIS IS CONCERNED WITH RESEARCH POLICY, WHAT IS TO COUNT AS SCIENCE, WHAT IS TO COUNT AS METHOD IN SCIENCE; ALSO THE EMOTIONAL INVESTMENT INVOLVED. THEORY-TESTABILITY IS ALSO APPROPRIATE HERE, THOUGH OBSERVATION-TESTABILITY IS NOT. THUS SCIENCE CONSISTS OF CONTENT, ONTOLOGY, AND WELTANSCHAUUNG. THESE DISTINCTIONS SHARPEN PREVIOUS IDEAS ABOUT THE FORMS OF METAPHYSICS TO BE FOUND IN SCIENCE, AND THEY CLARIFY THE NOTION OF A PARADIGM. IT SEEMS THAT SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSY CENTERS BASICALLY ON WELTANSCHAUUNGEN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WISDOM1961, author = {WISDOM, WILLIAM-A}, title = {A PHENOMENOLOGICAL REVIEW OF MYSTICISM AND CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {397-401}, keywords = {children, evaluation, experience, mysticism, phenomenology, religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WITKOWSKI1975, author = {WITKOWSKI, KENNETH-S}, title = {THE 'IS-OUGHT' GAP: DEDUCTION OR JUSTIFICATION?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {233-245}, keywords = {ethics, is, ought}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE RE-EXAMINES THE DEBATE OVER THE SO-CALLED 'IS-OUGHT' GAP WHICH, IN RECENT YEARS, HAS CENTERED LARGELY AROUND JOHN SEARLE'S ARGUMENT THAT IT IS LOGICALLY POSSIBLE TO DEDUCE PROPOSITIONS INVOLVING THE ENGLISH MODAL AUXILIARY 'OUGHT' FROM OTHER PROPOSITIONS WHICH INVOLVE ONLY THE ENGLISH COPULA 'IS'. THE 'IS-OUGHT' PROBLEM HAS BEEN DISCUSSED BOTH AS A PROBLEM CONCERNING A LOGICAL DEDUCTION AND AS A PROBLEM OF A JUSTIFICATION WITHOUT NOTING THAT THESE ARE LOGICALLY DIFFERENT IN A SIGNIFICANT SENSE. WHILE THE PROCESS OF A DEDUCTION AND OF A JUSTIFICATION MAY SHARE SOME FEATURES, E.G., THEY BOTH CAN BE SEEN AS A PROCESS OF ADVANCING STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF OTHER STATEMENTS, NEVERTHELESS THEY DO NOT SHARE ANY SIGNIFICANT CONDITIONS AND THUS ARE LOGICALLY DISTINCT. FURTHERMORE, IT IS ARGUED THAT THE REAL ISSUE CENTERS AROUND THE PROBLEM OF JUSTIFICATION AND NOT OF DEDUCTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Witmer2005, author = {Witmer, D-Gene and Butchard, William and Trogdon, Kelly}, title = {Intrinsicality without Naturalness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {326-350}, keywords = {epistemology, independence, intrinsic, naturalness, properties}, abstract = {Rae Langton and David Lewis have proposed an account of "intrinsic property" that makes use of two notions: being independent of accompaniment and being natural. We find the appeal to the first of these promising; the second notion, however, we find mystifying. In this paper we argue that the appeal to naturalness is not acceptable and offer an alternative definition of intrinsicality. The alternative definition makes crucial use of a notion commonly used by philosophers, namely, the notion of one property being had in virtue of another property. We defend our account against three arguments for thinking that this "in virtue of" notion is unacceptable in this context. We also take a look at a variety of cases in which the definition might be applied and defend it against potential counterexamples. The upshot, we think, is a modest but adequate account of what we understand by "intrinsic property.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wolf2002, author = {Wolf, Susan}, title = {A World of Goods}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {467-474}, keywords = {ethics, framework, goods, metaethics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WOLFE1968, author = {WOLFE, JULIAN}, title = {AYER ON NON-STARTERS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {440-441}, keywords = {language, statement}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WOLFE1972, author = {WOLFE, JULIAN}, title = {ON KNOWING ONE IS AWAKE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {268}, keywords = {dreaming, epistemology, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Wolterstorff1996, author = {Wolterstorff, Nicholas}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {1105-1107}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {John Locke and the Ethics of Belief}, volume = {49(4)}, year = {1996} } @other{Wolterstorff1995, author = {Wolterstorff, Nicholas}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {727-729}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks}, volume = {58(3)}, year = {1995} } @article{WOLZ1970, author = {WOLZ, HENRY-G}, title = {PHILOSOPHY AS DRAMA: AN APPROACH TO PLATO'S SYMPOSIUM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {323-353}, keywords = {drama, good, love, philosophy}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE TRIES TO SHOW THAT WHEN PROPER ATTENTION IS PAID TO ITS DRAMATIC ASPECTS, THE 'SYMPOSIUM' REVEALS ITSELF AS MORE RELEVANT TO PRESENT-DAY CONCERNS THAN HAS APPEARED TO BE THE CASE HERETOFORE. IT REJECTS THE VIEW ADVOCATED BY PAUL FRIEDLANDER AND OTHERS THAT "WHEN SOCRATES TAKES THE FLOOR ALL PREVIOUS SPEECHES ARE REDUCED TO INSIGNIFICANCE", (PLATO I, PP. 56-57), AND MAINTAINS THAT, FAITHFUL TO THE 'SOCRATIC METHOD', PLATO DOES NOT SUPPLY THE ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM RAISED IN THE DIALOGUE. ALL THE DISCOURSES, INCLUDING THAT OF SOCRATES, MOVE AWAY FROM THE TRUTH AS FROM A COMMON CENTER; IT IS UP TO THE READER TO REVERSE THE DIRECTION OF THIS MOVEMENT AND TO DISCOVER THE TRUTH FOR HIMSELF. THE ARTICLE LAYS THE EMPHASIS ON THE CONTENT OF THE DISCOURSES. A DISCUSSION OF THE CHARACTER OF THE VARIOUS SPEAKERS HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITH ASTOUNDING ERUDITION AND THOROUGHNESS BY PROFESSOR STANLEY ROSEN IN A BOOK ENTITLED 'PLATO'S SYMPOSIUM' WHICH APPEARED AFTER THIS ARTICLE HAD BEEN SUBMITTED FOR PUBLICATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Wood1999, author = {Wood, Robert-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {488-489}, publisher = {Ohio Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Placing Aesthetics: Reflections on the Philosophic Tradition (Studies in Continental Thought, No. 26)}, volume = {65(2)}, year = {1999} } @article{Woodbridge2005, author = {Woodbridge, James-A and Armour-Garb, Bradley}, title = {Semantic Pathology and the Open Pair}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {695-703}, keywords = {epistemology, indeterminacy, paradox, pathology, vagueness}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WOODRUFF1978, author = {WOODRUFF, PAUL}, title = {THE SOCRATIC APPROACH TO SEMANTIC INCOMPLETENESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {453-468}, keywords = {evaluation, good, incompleteness, language, meaning, semantics, word}, abstract = {THE SOCRATES OF PLATO'S EARLY DIALOGUES OBSERVES A STRANGE RULE FOR ADJECTIVES EVEN WHEN THEY SEEM TO MEAN DIFFERENT THINGS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS. HE INSISTS THAT EVERYTHING TO WHICH AN ADJECTIVE IS CORRECTLY APPLIED HAS A CERTAIN CHARACTER, THE SAME IN ALL CONTEXTS. SOCRATES DOES THIS TO GUARANTEE THE USEFULNESS OF EVALUATIVE STATEMENTS, SO THAT TRUE ONES CAN DETERMINE PRACTICAL ETHICAL CHOICES. PLATO INHERITS THE RULE, WITH CONSEQUENCES FOR HIS METAPHYSICS. IF THE MEANING OF EACH PREDICATE IS GIVEN BY A SINGLE CHARACTER, THEN THE VAGUENESS OF WHAT WE WOULD CALL CONTEXTUALLY VAGUE SENTENCES MUST BE DUE TO THE INADEQUACY OF THINGS THE SENTENCES ARE ABOUT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WOODS1969, author = {WOODS, JOHN}, title = {PREDICATE RANGES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {259-269}, keywords = {contradiction, logic, predication}, abstract = {A CONJECTURE, CONCERNING WHAT STRAWSON MAY HAVE MEANT BY 'THE RANGE OF APPLICABILITY' OF A PREDICATE AND ITS NEGATIONS, WHICH DRAWS UPON THE AUTHOR'S THEORY OF CATEGORIES IN "NOUS," 1967.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WOODS1984, author = {WOODS, MICHAEL}, title = {SELLARS ON KANTIAN INTUITIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {413-418}, keywords = {intuition, kantianism, language, linguistics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Woolf2004, author = {Woolf, Raphael}, title = {A Shaggy Soul Story: How Not to Read the Wax Tablet Model in Plato's Theaetetus}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {573-604}, keywords = {false, judgment, metaphysics, mind, mistake}, abstract = {This paper sets out to re-examine the famous 'wax tablet model' in Plato's Theaetetus, in particular the section of it which appeals to the quality of individual souls' was as an explanation of why some are more liable to make mistakes than others (194c-195a).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WOOLHOUSE1972, author = {WOOLHOUSE, R-S}, title = {THINGS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {199-206}, keywords = {epistemology, thing}, abstract = {HUME SAYS "THE IDEA OF A SUBSTANCE... IS NOTHING BUT A COLLECTION OF SIMPLE IDEAS" WHEREAS LOCKE SAYS "(A) SUBSTANCE IS SUPPOSED ALWAYS SOMETHING BESIDES... OBSERVABLE IDEAS". IT MIGHT APPEAR THAT NECESSARILY ONE OF THESE VIEWS IS CORRECT; THAT EITHER THINGS ARE MERELY "COLLECTIONS" OF PROPERTIES OR ARE SUCH COLLECTIONS PLUS "SOMETHING BESIDES". BUT NEITHER IS CORRECT FOR BOTH FAIL TO ACKNOWLEDGE, AND TRY TO DENY, THE VERY CONSIDERATIONS THAT GIVE INTELLIGIBILITY TO THEIR CONCERN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WREEN1982, author = {WREEN, MICHAEL}, title = {NOT EVEN RELATIVELY ROBUST.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {83-89}, keywords = {metaphysics, relativism}, abstract = {IN 'ROBUST RELATIVISM' JOSEPH MARGOLIS CLAIMS THAT (1) INTERPRETIVE JUDGMENTS (CRITICAL INTERPRETATIONS), EVALUATIVE JUDGMENTS (CRITICAL EVALUATIONS), AND AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS ARE NOT AND CANNOT BE EITHER TRUE OR FALSE, (2) INTERPRETIVE, EVALUATIVE, AND AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS CAN, IN PRINCIPLE, BE PLAUSIBLE, IMPLAUSIBLE, PROBABLE, AND SO ON. MARGOLIS FURTHER CLAIMS THAT THIS VIEW, RR FOR SHORT, IS CONSISTENT AND MODERATE AND AVOIDS SKEPTICISM. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WREEN1988, author = {WREEN, MICHAEL}, title = {THE DEFINITION OF EUTHANASIA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {637-654}, keywords = {analysis, definition, ethics, euthanasia, value}, abstract = {A DEFINITION OF EUTHANASIA IS FIRST ADVANCED AND PARTIALLY EXPLAINED, THEN FURTHER CLARIFIED, EXPLAINED, AND DEFENDED IN THE COURSE OF EXAMINING THE SINGLE MOST CAREFULLY WORKED OUT DEFINITION FOUND IN THE LITERATURE. THAT ACCOMPLISHED, THE DEFINITION IS ASSAYED FOR VALUATIONAL ORES WHICH LIE WITHIN, AND PARTIAL EXPLICATIONS OF AT LEAST SOME OF THE VALUATIONAL CONCEPTS THAT EMERGE IN THE COURSE OF THE ANALYSIS ARE ATTEMPTED. THE DISCUSSION IS DECIDEDLY DIFFERENT FROM MOST ON EUTHANASIA, NOT JUST IN ITS FOCUS ON THE CONCEPTUAL ISSUE, BUT IN A NUMBER OF OTHER RESPECTS AS WELL: (1) NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR EUTHANASIA ARE OFFERED; (2) CONNECTIONS WITH ACTION THEORY ARE NOTED; (3) VALUATIONAL CONCEPTS WHICH LURK WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF EUTHANASIA ARE THEMSELVES PARTIALLY EXPLORED; (4) IMPLICIT EVALUATIONS WHICH "EUTHANASIA" HARBORS ARE MADE EXPLICIT; (5) CURRENTLY UNPOPULAR VIEWS ON THE INTRINSIC VALUATIONAL IMPORT OF EUTHANASIA ARE ARGUED FOR AND EMBRACED; (6) THE EVIL OF DEATH IS BRIEFLY DISCUSSED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wright2002, author = {Wright, Crispin}, title = {(Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {330-348}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wright2002a, author = {Wright, Crispin}, title = {On Knowing What Is Necessary: Three Limitations of Peacocke's Account}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {655-662}, keywords = {epistemology, knowing, metaphysics, modality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wright1998, author = {Wright, Crispin}, title = {McDowell's Oscillation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {395-402}, keywords = {existence, matter, metaphysics, world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wright1996, author = {Wright, Crispin}, title = {Precis of Truth and Objectivity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {863-868}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, objectivity, realism, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Wright1996a, author = {Wright, Crispin}, title = {Response to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {911-941}, keywords = {epistemology, objectivity, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WRIGHT1985, author = {WRIGHT, EDMOND-L}, title = {A DEFENCE OF SELLARS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {73-90}, keywords = {epistemology, metaphysics, perception, phenomenology}, abstract = {THIS IS A DEFENSE OF AND AN ADAPTATION OF WILFRID SELLARS' THEORY OF PERCEPTION. THERE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN A NUMBER OF ATTACKS UPON IT FROM VARYING POINTS OF VIEW, ALL OF WHICH, IT IS CLAIMED, CAN BE SATISFACTORILY MET IF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE NONEPISTEMIC NATURE OF THE SENSORIUM ARE BROUGHT OUT. IF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN EPISTEMIC PERCEIVING AND NONEPISTEMIC SENSING (APT FOR PUNCTIFORM PROPOSITIONALIZED DESCRIPTION AT THE LEVEL OF THE FIELD) IS MADE CLEAR, THEN THE CUSTOMARY OBJECTIONS (THE HOMUNCULUS OBJECTION, THE SOLIPSISM OBJECTION, THE ACCUSATIONS OF AMBIGUITY, OF EMPIRICAL IMPROBABILITY, ETC.) HAVE NO PURCHASE ON A REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY SUCH AS THAT OF SELLARS'. WHAT IS MORE, A THEORY OF OBJECT AND PERSON-REFERENCE (INCLUDING THAT OF THE SELF) CAN BE SUSTAINED WHICH MEETS, AND MEETS BY ABSORBING HARMLESSLY, RADICAL SCEPTICISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{WU1968, author = {WU, KUANG-MING}, title = {ARE PERSONS REPLACEABLE?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {245-256}, keywords = {ethics, friendship, person, uniqueness}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Yablo1993, author = {Yablo, Stephen}, title = {Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {1-42}, keywords = {belief, conceivability, epistemology, experience, language, model, proposition}, abstract = {This paper outlines the standard objections to conceivability arguments; proposes a reading of "conceivable" that escapes these objections; maintains the general reliability of modal intuition while admitting the phenomena of modal error and disagreement; attempts to explain these phenomena in terms of prior and independent cognitive miscues; and considers finally the modal realism debate, stressing the importance of well-disciplined modal dialectic.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Yablo1999, author = {Yablo, Stephen}, title = {Concepts and Consciousness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {455-463}, keywords = {a-priori; consciousness, metaphysics, mind}, abstract = {Chalmers's case against physicalism rests on his possible-worlds theory of understanding. Zombie-worlds are called in to explain why a full understanding of the conditional "if matters are physically like so, there is pain" does not prevent me from imagining it false. I argue that, depending on how the link between understanding and possible worlds is made out, either (1) I do understand the conditional but zombie-worlds aren't needed to explain how I can imagine it false, or (2) zombie-worlds would be needed to explain this, but I don't in the relevant sense understand "there is pain."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Yablo2005, author = {Yablo, Stephen}, title = {Prime Causation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {459-467}, keywords = {action, causation, denial, epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Yablo2005a, author = {Yablo, Stephen}, title = {Almog on Descartes's Mind and Body}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {709-716}, keywords = {body, dualism, essence, metaphysics, mind, separability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Yaffe2003, author = {Yaffe, Gideon}, title = {Indoctrination, Coercion and Freedom of Will}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {335-356}, keywords = {coercion, ethics, freedom, indoctrination, will}, abstract = {Manipulation by another person often undermines freedom. To explain this, a distinction is drawn between two forms of manipulation: indoctrination is defined as causing another person to respond to reasons in a pattern that serves the manipulator's ends; coercion as supplying another person with reasons that, given the pattern in which he responds to reasons, lead him to act in ways that serve the manipulator's ends. It is argued that both forms of manipulation undermine freedom because manipulators track the compliance of their victims, while neutral causal mechanisms do not. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Yagisawa1997, author = {Yagisawa, Takashi}, title = {Salmon Trapping}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {351-370}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, language, semantics}, abstract = {Call a sentential context semantically transparent if and only if all synonymous expressions are substitutable for one another in it salva veritate. Nathan Salmon has boldly advanced a refreshingly crisp semantic theory according to which belief contexts are semantically transparent. If he is right, belief contexts are much better behaved than widely suspected. Impressive as it is, this author does not believe that Salmon's theory is completely satisfactory. This article tries to show that Salmon's theory, in conjunction with a number of auxiliary but important claims he makes to buttress the theory, seems to lead to failure of semantic transparency of belief contexts.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Yalowitz2000, author = {Yalowitz, Steven}, title = {A Dispositional Account of Self-Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {249-278}, keywords = {disposition, epistemology, knowledge, normativity, self-knowledge; semantics}, abstract = {It is widely thought that dispositional accounts of content cannot adequately provide for two of its essential features: normativity and noninferentially-based self-knowledge. This paper argues that these criticism depend upon having wrongly bracketed the presumption of first-person authority. With that presumption in place, dispositional conceptions can account for normativity: conditions of correctness must then be presumed, ceteris paribus, to be successfully grasped in particular cases, and, thus, to result from semantic-constituting dispositions; error occurs when cetera are not paria. An account of these ceteris paribus conditions is offered. An expressivist epistemology is then developed that accounts for the noninferential self-ascription of semantic-constituting dispositions. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Y1993, author = {Yandell, Keith-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {235-238}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Epistemology of Religious Experience}, volume = {56(1)}, year = {1993} } @article{YOOS1971, author = {YOOS, GEORGE-E}, title = {A PHENOMENOLOGICAL LOOK AT METAPHOR.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {78-88}, keywords = {language, metaphor}, abstract = {IN WHAT SENSE DO METAPHORS DESCRIBE? FOCUSING ON INTERPRETATION RATHER THAN ON WHAT A METAPHOR DOES MISLEADS US AS TO HOW METAPHORS COGNITIVELY FUNCTION AS DESCRIPTIONS. METAPHORS GIVE US A WAY OF CONCEIVING OR LOOKING. THEY DO SO BY SPECIFYING CONCEPTS OR ASPECTS OF THINGS TO DIRECT OUR ATTENTION. THEY SERVE AS SUBSTITUTES FOR DESCRIPTIONS MUCH IN THE WAY THAT GETTING A PERSON TO LOOK AT SOMETHING IN A GIVEN WAY IS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DESCRIBING WHAT IS SEEN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{YOUNG1987, author = {YOUNG, JAMES-O}, title = {GLOBAL ANTI-REALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {641-647}, keywords = {antirealism, language, meaning, sentence, truth}, abstract = {DUMMETT HAS BEEN CONCERNED WITH SHOWING HOW ONE MIGHT GIVE AN ANTI-REALIST ACCOUNT OF RESTRICTED CLASSES OF SENTENCES. THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO GIVE AN ANTI-REALIST ACCOUNT OF ALL CLASSES OF SENTENCES. THAT IS, IN THE CASE OF NO CLASSES OF SENTENCES DOES TRUTH TRANSCEND WHAT CAN BE WARRANTED. THE KEY TO GLOBAL ANTI-REALISM IS REPLACING DUMMETT'S EMPIRICISM WITH A COHERENTIST ACCOUNT OF WARRANT. THE AUTHOR POINTS OUT THAT COLIN McGINN'S ARGUMENT AGAINST GLOBAL ANTI-REALISM FAILS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{YOUNG1974, author = {YOUNG, ROBERT}, title = {A SPECIOUS PARADOX.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {268-270}, keywords = {determinism, freedom, metaphysics, paradox}, abstract = {IN THIS PAPER I ARGUE THAT THE ALLEGED PARADOX FOR THE COMPATIBILIST ABOUT HUMAN FREEDOM WHICH HAS BEEN RAISED BY MS. FRIQUEGNON IS SPECIOUS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{YOURGRAU1989, author = {YOURGRAU, PALLE}, title = {"REFLECTIONS ON KURT GODEL" BY HAO WANG.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {391-408}, keywords = {logic, mathematics, metamathematics}, abstract = {IN "REFLECTIONS ON KURT GODEL", HAO WANG HAS ARGUED PERSUASIVELY THAT GODEL SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY AS A PHILOSOPHER WHO HAS MUCH TO CONTRIBUTE TO AREAS OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERN. I DISCUSS SOME OF THE CENTRAL ASPECTS OF GODEL'S PHILOSOPHY, AS PROF. WANG PRESENTS IT, AND TRY TO CLARIFY, INTERRELATE, AND, IN PART, DEFEND SOME OF THE LESS WELL KNOWN, AS WELL AS THE LESS WELL APPRECIATED, IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS OF GODEL'S.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{YOURGRAU1985, author = {YOURGRAU, PALLE}, title = {RUSSELL AND KAPLAN ON DENOTING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {315-321}, keywords = {denoting, description, language}, abstract = {DAVID KAPLAN HAS ARGUED THAT RUSSELL'S THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS IN EFFECT EXPLAINS AWAY THE VERY IDEA OF DEMOTING. IN THIS PAPER I TRY TO SHINE SOME LIGHT ON THE PUZZLE KAPLAN HAS UNCOVERED, AND IN THE PROCESS SHOW THAT 1) RUSSELL DID NOT HIMSELF FULLY REALIZE EXACTLY WHAT HIS THEORY ACCOMPLISHED, AND 2) IN EFFECT, RUSSELL'S THEORY IS, SURPRISINGLY, A KIND OF DEFINITIONAL VARIANT OF FREGE'S.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Yourgrau1991, author = {Yourgrau, Palle}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {737-740}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Disappearance of Time}, volume = {54(3)}, year = {1991} } @article{YOVEL1979, author = {YOVEL, YIRMIYAHU}, title = {EXISTENTIALISM AND HISTORICAL DIALECTIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {480-497}, keywords = {alienation, existentialism, historical-materialism; history}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ZABEEH1962, author = {ZABEEH, FARHANG}, title = {CATEGORY-MISTAKE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {277-278}, keywords = {category-mistake; existence, god, logic, necessity, ontology, religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ZABEEH1961, author = {ZABEEH, FARHANG}, title = {ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND HOW AND WHY SOME SPEAK OF GOD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {206-215}, keywords = {existence, god, necessary, ontological-proof; religion, tautology}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR ASKS THREE QUESTIONS ABOUT ANSELM'S ARGUMENT: 1) IS THE ARGUMENT VALID, 2) ARE THE PREMISES TRUE, 3) ARE THE PREMISES TAUTOLOGICALLY OR FACTUALLY TRUE. IT IS STATED THAT A SOUND ARGUMENT OCCURS WHEN THE ARGUMENT IS VALID AND THE PREMISES ARE FACTUALLY TRUE. NORMAN MALCOLM DISCUSSION OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT IS EXPLORED, AND IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NECESSARY STATEMENTS AND THE ONE ABOUT GOD. THE STATEMENT "GOD IS A NECESSARY BEING" IS NOT NECESSARY IN THE USUAL SENSE OF LOGICAL IMPLICATION. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Zagzebski2002, author = {Zagzebski, Linda}, title = {Obligation, Good Motives, and the Good}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {453-458}, keywords = {ethics, good, metaethics, motive, obligation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Zagzebski2003, author = {Zagzebski, Linda}, title = {Emotion and Moral Judgment}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {104-124}, keywords = {cognitivism, emotion, ethics, language, moral-judgmen}, abstract = {This paper argues that an emotion is a state of affectively perceiving its intentional object as falling under a "thick affective concept" A, a concept that combines cognitive and affective aspects in a way that cannot be pulled apart. For example, in a state of pity an object is seen as pitiful, where to see something as pitiful is to be in a state that is both cognitive and affective. One way of expressing an emotion is to assert that the intentional object of the emotion falls under the thick affective concept distinctive of the emotion. I argue that the most basic kind of moral judgment is in this category. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Zagzebski2000, author = {Zagzebski, Linda}, title = {Responses}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {207-219}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, knowledge, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Zagzebski2000a, author = {Zagzebski, Linda}, title = {Precis of Virtues of the Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {169-177}, keywords = {epistemology, methodology, mind, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Zagzebski1991, author = {Zagzebski, Linda-Trinkaus}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {239-241}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge}, volume = {54(1)}, year = {1991} } @article{ZAITCHIK1981, author = {ZAITCHIK, A}, title = {INTENTIONALISM AND PHYSICAL REDUCTIONISM IN COMPUTATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {23-41}, keywords = {complexity, epistemology, intentionalism, physicalism, psychology, reductionism}, abstract = {INTENTIONALISM IS A META-THEORETICAL STANCE TOWARDS COMPUTATIONAL COGNITIVE MODELS. IT THREATENS TO COLLAPSE INTO PHYSICALISM, AN ALTERNATIVE META-THEORY, ON SOME ACCOUNTS OF CONDITIONS OF COMPUTATIONAL MODELLING OF PHYSICAL SYSTEMS (FODOR'S). G CHEW'S "BOOTSTRAP HYPOTHESIS" ILLUMINATES AN ALTERNATIVE FORM OF INTENTIONALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ZAITCHIK1981a, author = {ZAITCHIK, ALAN}, title = {REPLY TO PROFESSOR FODOR ON PHYSICALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {294-295}, keywords = {intentionalism, metaphysics, physicalism}, abstract = {FODOR MISTAKENLY ATTRIBUTES TO ME THE VIEW THAT COUNTERFACTUAL GENERALIZATIONS DEFINED OVER PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES ARE UNTRUE OR CONCEPTUALLY OBJECTIONABLE. RATHER, THE ISSUE BETWEEN US CONCERNS THE ATTRIBUTION OF INTENTIONALLY INTERPRETED "COMPUTATIONAL ATTITUDES" TOWARDS FORMULAE OF AN INTERNAL CODE, WHERE SUCH ATTRIBUTIONS FAIL TO SATISFY STANDARD CRITERIA FOR INTENTIONAL IMPUTATIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ZANER1968, author = {ZANER, RICHARD-M}, title = {REPLY TO D A KELLY ON PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {123-124}, keywords = {philosophical-anthropolog}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ZANER1966, author = {ZANER, RICHARD-M}, title = {AN APPROACH TO A PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {55-68}, keywords = {being, crisis, essence, human-nature; man, phenomenology, philosophical-anthropology; question}, abstract = {THE "CRISIS" OF MAN, EMPHASIZED BY NUMEROUS THINKERS, PROMPTS THE URGENT RE-ASKING OF THE QUESTION, WHAT IS MAN? THIS ESSAY SEEKS TO DETERMINE THE "SENSE" OF THE QUESTION, AND SUGGESTS AN APPROACH TO THE CORE PHENOMENON. IT IS ARGUED THAT THE QUESTION IS NOT LINGUISTIC, EMPIRICAL, OR A QUEST FOR "PROPERTIES" OR "SUBSTANCE." RATHER IS IT "ONTOLOGICAL": THE "WHAT-IS-IT?" QUESTION DOES NOT BEAR ON THE "WHAT" BUT THE "IS." THIS QUESTION, HOWEVER, TURNS BACK ON THE BEING OF THE ASKER, DISCLOSING IT AS BOTH SUBJECT AND OBJECT, AND AS BEING REFLEXIVELY AWARE OF ITSELF AS SUCH. THE "MYSTERY" OF "HUMAN-BEING" IS DISCLOSED TO BE SELF-CONSCIOUS SUBJECTIVITY IN QUEST OF ITSELF; THE REFLEXIVITY OF HUMAN-BEING IS ONTOLOGICALLY A "BEING-IN-QUEST", OR "BEING-CONCERNED". THIS PHENOMENON, FINALLY, IS HELD TO BE PUBLICLY VERIFIABLE, AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL ARTICULATION THE CENTRAL TASK OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ZANER1972, author = {ZANER, RICHARD-M}, title = {DISCUSSION OF JACQUES DERRIDA, "THE ENDS OF MAN".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {384-389}, keywords = {humanism, man, phenomenology, philosophical-anthropolog}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Zangwill2000, author = {Zangwill, Nick}, title = {Skin Deep or In the Eye of the Beholder?: The Metaphysics of Aesthetic and Sensory Properties}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(3)}, pages = {595-618}, keywords = {aesthetics, metaphysics, mind, physicalism, properties, sensation}, abstract = {I begin this paper by describing and making attractive a physicalist aesthetic realist view of aesthetic properties. I then argue against this view on the basis of two premises. The first premise is thesis of aesthetic/sensory dependence that I have defended elsewhere. The second premise is the denial of a mind-independence thesis about sensory properties. I give an argument for that denial. Lastly, I put these two premises together and conclude that physicalist aesthetic realism is false. I articulate and give a limited defense of the view that if aesthetic properties exist at all, they are a certain kind of mind-dependent property.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ZANGWILL1990, author = {ZANGWILL, NICK}, title = {Quasi-Quasi-Realism.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(3)}, pages = {583-594}, keywords = {metaphysics, projection, realism, reductionism, subjectivism}, abstract = {At first sight, Simon Blackburn seems to be right to emphasize that Humean 'projectivism' in morality is not or should not be associated with the 'subjectivist' view that moral judgments are beliefs about attitudes. The view that moral judgments express attitudes which we project onto the world is not a reductionist theory. This seems to remove various objections to projectivism, such as that it makes moral truth 'mind-dependent'. The author pursues the idea that the attempt to earn some form of mind-independence for a subjectivist can be at least as successful as the quasi-realist's attempt to earn it for projectivism. The aim is not so much to succeed in capturing mind-independence as to achieve parity of success with quasi-realism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ZARTMAN1975, author = {ZARTMAN, JAMES-F}, title = {HUME AND "THE MEANING OF A WORD".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {255-260}, keywords = {language, meaning, word}, abstract = {HUME IS REGARDED AS HAVING IDENTIFIED THE MEANING OF A WORD WITH THE IDEA IT STANDS FOR. HUME'S VIEWS ARE MORE COMPLEX AND SOPHISTICATED. A GENERAL WORD IS NOT ONLY CORRELATED WITH A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT, RESEMBLING IDEAS, BUT ALSO WITH A CUSTOM THAT ENABLES US TO CALL UP ANY OF A NUMBER OF IDEAS UPON HEARING THE WORD. A HUMEAN VIEW WOULD BE TO IDENTIFY THE MEANING OF A WORD WITH THE CUSTOM CONNECTED WITH IT. THIS ALSO PERMITS US TO GENERATE A FORM OF THE EMPIRICIST CRITERION: A WORD IS MEANINGFUL IF AND ONLY IF IT IS CORRELATED WITH IDEAS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ZEMACH1983, author = {ZEMACH, E-M}, title = {MEMORY: WHAT IT IS, AND WHAT IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {31-44}, keywords = {causal-explanation; epistemology, memory, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Zemach1994, author = {Zemach, Eddy-M}, title = {Katz and Wittgenstein}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {151-155}, keywords = {epistemology, language, language-game; meaning}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ZEMACH1987, author = {ZEMACH, EDDY-M}, title = {LOOKING OUT FOR NUMBER ONE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {209-233}, keywords = {body, egoism, metaphysics, mind, rationality}, abstract = {IF A SELF-SEEKER CAN ACT RATIONALLY, HE HIMSELF MUST BE AN IDENTIFIABLE OBJECT, DISTINCT FROM ALL OTHERS. WHAT OBJECT IS HE, THEN? HE IS NOT HIS BODY, SINCE HE MAY WISH TO REPLACE PARTS OF HIS BODY BY OTHERS. HE IS NOT A SET OF EXPERIENCES, FOR HE MAY WISH HIS EXPERIENCES TO BE OTHER THAN WHAT THEY IN FACT ARE. HE IS NOT A SOUL, WHICH, EVEN IF IT IS THE ORGAN OF CONSCIOUSNESS, IS NOT THEREFORE VALUABLE IN ITSELF, ANY MORE THAN ANY OTHER ORGAN. LOCKE AND PARFIT ARE WRONG TO BELIEVE THAT MENTAL CONNECTEDNESS CAN EXPLICATE THE NOTION OF SELF OR APPROXIMATE IT, FOR THERE ARE MANY DISTINCT KINDS OF SUCH CONNECTEDNESS AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN THEM CAN ONLY BE CONVENTIONAL; HENCE, IT CANNOT HAVE ANY INHERENT VALUE FOR THE SELF-SEEKER. THE PAPER CONCLUDES THAT ACTION CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY SELF INTEREST. THE THEORY OF ACTION SUGGESTED IN THE PAPER IS VALUE GROUNDED, ENJOINING ACTIONS BECAUSE OF THE OBJECTIVE VALUE THEY ARE LIKELY TO PRODUCE. IT IS SHOWN HOW ETHICS CAN BE DEFENDED AND HOW IT CAN JUSTIFY ONE'S CONCERN FOR ONESELF, ONE'S FAMILY, ONE'S NATION, ONE'S CULTURE, AND ONE'S SPECIES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Zemach1997, author = {Zemach, Eddy-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {714-717}, publisher = {Penn St Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Real Beauty}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1997} } @article{Zimmerman2001, author = {Zimmerman, David}, title = {Thinking with Your Hypothalamus: Reflections on a Cognitive Role for the Reactive Emotions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {521-541}, keywords = {cognition, emotion, freedom, metaphysics, thinking}, abstract = {In "Freedom and Resentment," P. F. Strawson argues that the "profound opposition" between the objective and reactive stances is quite compatible with our rationally retaining the latter as important elements in a recognizably human life. Unless he can establish this, he has no hope of establishing his version of compatibilism in the free will debate. But, because objectivity is associated so intimately with the rationally conducted explanation of action, it is not clear how the opposition of these stances is compatible with the rationality of the reactive attitudes. More to the point, it is not clear how an intellectual activity like shifting from the reactive to the objective stance can dispel reactive attitudes without thereby also rationally disqualifying them. I solve this puzzle by drawing on the idea that one cognitive component of emotions is the rationally optional "shift of attention," a feature which in turn helps to explain a lot about the role reactive emotions can play in the fixation of belief.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Zimmerman2002, author = {Zimmerman, Dean}, title = {Persons and Bodies: Constitution without Mereology?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {599-606}, keywords = {body, constitution, mereology, metaphysics, person}, abstract = {In Persons and Bodies, Lynne Rudder Baker develops a theory of material constitution that makes no appeal to mereology. Its details are examined, some puzzles and problems are found, and ways to resolve them are suggested. Finally, counterexamples are raised that seem to require the addition of a clause about the sharing of parts. Constitution appears to be, at least in part, a mereological relation.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Zimmerman1996, author = {Zimmerman, Dean-W}, title = {Could Extended Objects Be Made Out of Simple Parts?: An Argument for "Atomless Gunk"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {1-29}, keywords = {atom, materiality, object, science}, abstract = {If a three-dimensionally extended object were completely decomposable into unextended "simple" parts, it would have to be either "closed", "open", or "partially open"--i.e., it would either have an outermost "skin" of simple parts, lack one, or have one on only part of its surface. The possibility of contact between extended objects raises difficulties for the assumption that all objects are closed, open, partially open, or any combination of these--unless one is prepared to admit that extended objects are not made entirely of simples. Conclusion: If there are extended objects, there is some "atomless gunk".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Zimmerman2002a, author = {Zimmerman, Dean-W}, title = {Scala and the Spinning Spheres}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {398-405}, keywords = {metaphysics, part, sphere, supervenience}, abstract = {I have argued that contemporary Humeans face a trilemma: either (i) give up temporal parts, (ii) deny the Humean supervenience of causal relations, or (iii) deny the possibility of there being a difference between rotating and nonrotating homogeneous spheres. Mark Scala ("Homogeneous Simples", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 64, 2002) describes an interesting class of seemingly possible objects, spinning and stationary simples; and argues their possibility undermines my argument. I argue that it does not. And I conclude with a more general assessment of the status of objections to Humeanism from the possibility of homogeneous objects in motion.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Zimmerman1999, author = {Zimmerman, Michael-J}, title = {Virtual Intrinsic Value and the Principle of Organic Unities}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {653-666}, keywords = {epistemology, organic-unity; truth}, abstract = {This paper argues that Moore's principle of organic unities is false. Advocates of the principle have failed to take note of the distinction between actual intrinsic value and virtual intrinsic value. Purported cases of organic unities, where the actual intrinsic value of a part of a whole is allegedly defeated by the actual intrinsic value of the whole itself, are more plausibly seen as cases where the part in question has no actual intrinsic value but instead a plurality of merely virtual intrinsic values.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ZIMMERMAN1966, author = {ZIMMERMAN, MARVIN}, title = {IS FREE WILL INCOMPATIBLE WITH DETERMINISM?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {415-420}, keywords = {causality, choosing, compatibility, determinism, free-will; metaphysics}, abstract = {IF WE MAINTAIN THAT FREE WILL REQUIRES THE ABSENCE OF DETERMINISM, THEN CAN WE CLAIM TO BE FREE WITHOUT ANY WANTS? IF WE HAD NO WANTS AT ALL, WHAT SENSE WOULD THERE TO BE TALK ABOUT FREE WILL? THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FREE WILL AND THE ABSENCE OF FREE WILL IS NOT THAT BETWEEN INDETERMINISM AND DETERMINISM. FREE CHOICE PRESUPPOSES DETERMINISM IN THAT IN ORDER TO MAKE A CHOICE AN INDIVIDUAL MUST HAVE SOME MOTIVE OR REASON FOR SO DOING. THE DIFFERENCE IS FOUND WITHIN DETERMINISM, AMONG THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF MOTIVES THAT CAN INFLUENCE AN INDIVIDUAL TO MAKE A CHOICE. FURTHERMORE, IF I ALREADY POSSESS THE MOTIVE TO CHANGE OR ELIMINATE UNDESIRABLE MOTIVES THEN I INCREASE MY OPPORTUNITY TO REALIZE MORE DESIRES AND THUS INCREASE FREEDOM OF CHOICE, EVEN THOUGH MY MOTIVE TO CHANGE OR ELIMINATE UNDESIRABLE MOTIVES IS ALREADY PREDETERMINED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ZIMMERMAN1962, author = {ZIMMERMAN, MARVIN}, title = {THE STATUS OF THE VERIFIABILITY PRINCIPLE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {334-343}, keywords = {criticism, empirical, language, meaning, metaphysics, statement, verifiability}, abstract = {IT IS USUALLY HELD THAT THE VERIFIABILITY PRINCIPLE RECEIVED A SERIES OF CRUSHING BLOWS IN THE FORM OF POWERFUL OBJECTIONS, FROM WHICH IT NEVER RECOVERED. THE AUTHOR DISAGREES, AND SUGGESTS THAT IT IS MORE THAN A MERE GHOST THAT IS LEFT; ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS ARGUED THAT IT IS A LIVING PRINCIPLE WHICH CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDED. SPECIFICALLY, THE ARTICLE EXPLORES THE USEFULNESS OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLE IN MAKING EXPLICIT THAT METAPHYSICAL STATEMENTS ARE NOT VERIFIABLE IN THE SENSE IN WHICH EMPIRICAL STATEMENTS ARE, AND ARE THEREFORE NOT TO BE TREATED AS IF THEY WERE EMPIRICAL. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ZIMMERMAN1979, author = {ZIMMERMAN, MICHAEL-E}, title = {HEIDEGGER'S "COMPLETION" OF "SEIN UND ZEIT".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {537-560}, keywords = {being, ontology, phenomenology, time, twentieth}, abstract = {THIS IS AN EXPOSITORY ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST PUBLISHED VOLUME OF HEIDEGGER'S COLLECTED WORKS ("GESAMTAUSGABE"): "DIE GRUNDPROBLEME DER PHANOMENOLOGIE", LECTURES DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MARBURG IN THE SUMMER SEMESTER OF 1927, SHORTLY AFTER THE PUBLICATION OF "BEING AND TIME". THE LECTURES ANNOUNCE THEMSELVES AS THE "NEW WORKING-OUT OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF PART ONE OF "SEIN UND ZEIT"," THIS THIRD DIVISION WAS NOT PUBLISHED WITH "BEING AND TIME", WHICH ALWAYS REMAINED INCOMPLETE. THE LECTURES PROVIDE IMPORTANT INSIGHT INTO THE ORIGINS OF HEIDEGGER'S EXISTENTIAL-ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEMATIC IN THE HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY. ALTHOUGH HIGHLY SUGGESTIVE, THE LECTURES DO NOT SUCCEED IN EXPLAINING THE "RELATION" BETWEEN TIME AND BEING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ZIMMERMAN1980, author = {ZIMMERMAN, MICHAEL-J}, title = {ON THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF STATES OF PLEASURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {26-45}, keywords = {ethics, intrinsic-value; pleasure}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Zimmerman2001a, author = {Zimmerman, Michael-J}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {492-494}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Nature of Intrinsic Value}, volume = {69(2)}, year = {2001} } @other{Zimmerman1996a, author = {Zimmerman, Michael-J}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {242-244}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Concept of Moral Obligation}, volume = {60(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{ZIMMERMAN1968, author = {ZIMMERMAN, ROBERT-L}, title = {ON NIETZSCHE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {274-281}, keywords = {christianity, metaphysics}, abstract = {AFTER DISTINGUISHING TWO TRADITIONAL VIEWS OF MAN THAT I CALL PYTHAGOREAN AND HEGELIAN - WHICH HOLD RESPECTIVELY, THAT MAN MUST RECOVER AND RETURN TO AN IDEAL STATE WHICH HE HAS LOST, AND THAT MAN MUST CREATE AN IDEAL STATE WHICH HAS NEVER EXISTED AND WHOSE DESIRABILITY IS A FUNCTION OF ITS ABILITY TO ACTUALIZE MAN'S HIGHEST POWERS - I ARGUE THAT NIETZSCHE IS IMPROPERLY CLASSIFIED AS PYTHAGOREAN AND PROPERLY CLASSIFIED AS HEGELIAN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ZIMMERMAN1964, author = {ZIMMERMAN, ROBERT-L}, title = {FORM, CONTENT, AND CATEGORIES IN ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {169-179}, keywords = {aesthetics, art-object; category, content, creation, form}, abstract = {ART IS NOT CONCERNED WITH "TELLING" SOMETHING; IT IS CONCERNED WITH "MAKING" SOMETHING. THE ARTISTIC PRODUCT IS A NEW NONNATURAL ENTITY, A FORMED UNITY OF DISPARATE PARTS; IT IS A VICTORY OF FORM OVER MATTER. IT IS ARGUED THAT A WORK OF ART PROJECTS BEING, AS SOME BEING, AND AS NOVEL AND UNIQUE BEING. HENCE, THE PROPER STANCE BEFORE A WORK OF ART IS COMPLETE ALERTNESS AND RECEPTIVITY TO ITS BEING AS SUCH, ITS PARTICULARITY, INDIVIDUALITY AND NEWNESS. THE AESTHETIC EMOTION IS ULTIMATELY METAPHYSICAL. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Zoeller1993, author = {Zoeller, Guenter}, title = {Main Developments in Recent Scholarship on the "Critique of Pure Reason"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {445-466}, keywords = {epistemology, history, reason}, abstract = {The paper is a critical discussion of scholarship on the "Critique of Pure Reason" published during the past ten years. The emphasis is on Anglo-American authors. I identify and discuss three main trends in the field: a shift from the general discussion of transcendental arguments to the analysis and evaluation of particular proofs in Kant; a renewed interest in the doctrine of transcendental idealism and the distinction between things in themselves and appearances; and the emergence of an entire body of literature on Kant's philosophy of mind, centered around the idea of a "transcendental psychology." The main body of the text is supplemented by extensive bibliographical information provided in the notes.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CUNNING2007, author = {CUNNING,DAVID}, title = {Descartes on the Dubitability of the Existence of Self}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {111-131}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00005.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00005.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00005.x} } @article{SENOR2007, author = {SENOR,THOMAS D.}, title = {Preserving Preservationism: A Reply to Lackey}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {199-208}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00009.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00009.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00009.x} } @article{STREUMER2007, author = {STREUMER,BART}, title = {Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {1-29}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00001.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00001.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00001.x} } @article{SHAFER-LANDAU2007, author = {SHAFER-LANDAU,RUSS}, title = {Audi’s Intuitionism*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {250-261}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00013.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00013.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00013.x} } @article{PEREBOOM2007, author = {PEREBOOM,DERK}, title = {Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {269-272}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00016.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00016.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00016.x} } @article{EVERETT2007, author = {EVERETT,ANTHONY}, title = {Pretense, Existence, and Fictional Objects}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {56-80}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00003.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00003.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00003.x} } @article{ELDER2007, author = {ELDER,CRAWFORD L.}, title = {On the Phenomenon of "Dog-Wise Arrangement"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {132-155}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00006.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00006.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00006.x} } @article{BIRD2007, author = {BIRD,ALEXANDER}, title = {Justified Judging}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {81-110}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00004.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00004.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00004.x} } @article{MILLAR2007, author = {MILLAR,ALAN}, title = {What the Disjunctivist is Right About}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {176-198}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00008.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00008.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00008.x} } @article{PETTIGROVE2007, author = {PETTIGROVE,GLEN}, title = {Understanding, Excusing, Forgiving}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {156-175}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00007.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00007.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00007.x} } @article{BICKLE2007, author = {BICKLE,JOHN}, title = {A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {262-264}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00014.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00014.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00014.x} } @article{HUEMER2007, author = {HUEMER,MICHAEL}, title = {Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {30-55}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00002.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00002.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00002.x} } @article{STREVENS2007, author = {STREVENS,MICHAEL}, title = {Review of Woodward, Making Things Happen*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {233-249}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00012.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00012.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00012.x} } @article{TIMMONS2007, author = {TIMMONS,MARK}, title = {Moral Realism: A Defense.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {265-269}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00015.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00015.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00015.x} } @article{MENDOLA2007, author = {MENDOLA,JOSEPH}, title = {Review Essay on Pleasure and the Good Life}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {220-232}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00011.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00011.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00011.x} } @article{LACKEY2007, author = {LACKEY,JENNIFER}, title = {Why Memory Really Is a Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {209-219}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00010.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00010.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00010.x} } @article{WETTSTEIN2007, author = {WETTSTEIN,HOWARD}, title = {Précis of The Magic Prism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {720-722}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00049.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00049.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00049.x} } @article{CAMP2007, author = {CAMP,JOSEPH L.}, title = {Précis of Confusion*1}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {692-699}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00046.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00046.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00046.x} } @article{BROGAARD2007, author = {BROGAARD,BERIT}, title = {A Puzzle about Properties}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {635-650}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00043.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00043.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00043.x} } @article{WEDGWOOD2007, author = {WEDGWOOD,RALPH}, title = {Christopher Peacocke’s The Realm of Reason*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {776-791}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00055.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00055.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00055.x} } @article{REIMER2007, author = {REIMER,MARGA}, title = {Empty Names: Communicative Value without Semantic Value1}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {738-747}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00052.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00052.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00052.x} } @article{STROUD2007, author = {STROUD,BARRY}, title = {The ‘Magic’ of Reference}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {748-753}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00053.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00053.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00053.x} } @article{FUMERTON2007, author = {FUMERTON,RICHARD}, title = {Practicing Magic}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {723-729}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00050.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00050.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00050.x} } @article{JAWORSKA2007, author = {JAWORSKA,AGNIESZKA}, title = {Caring and Internality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {529-568}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00039.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00039.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00039.x} } @article{BRANDOM2007, author = {BRANDOM,ROBERT}, title = {Inferentialism and Some of Its Challenges}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {651-676}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00044.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00044.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00044.x} } @article{FODOR2007, author = {FODOR,JERRY and LEPORE,ERNIE}, title = {Brandom Beleaguered}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {677-691}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00045.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00045.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00045.x} } @article{HOPKINS2007, author = {HOPKINS,ROBERT}, title = {What is Wrong With Moral Testimony?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {611-634}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00042.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00042.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00042.x} } @article{MARTI2007, author = {MARTI,GENOVEVA}, title = {‘Weak and strong directness: reference and thought’}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {730-737}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00051.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00051.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00051.x} } @article{WETTSTEIN2007a, author = {WETTSTEIN,HOWARD}, title = {Response to Fumerton, Marti, Reimer and Stroud}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {754-775}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00054.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00054.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00054.x} } @article{SMITH2007, author = {SMITH,DONALD P.}, title = {Vague Singulars, Semantic Indecision, and the Metaphysics of Persons*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {569-585}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00040.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00040.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00040.x} } @article{MARMOR2007, author = {MARMOR,ANDREI}, title = {Deep Conventions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {586-610}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00041.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00041.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00041.x} } @article{MACFARLANE2007, author = {MACFARLANE,JOHN}, title = {The Logic of Confusion*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {700-708}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00047.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00047.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00047.x} } @article{SREENIVASAN2007, author = {SREENIVASAN,GOPAL}, title = {Libertarianism without inequality.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {792-796}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00056.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00056.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00056.x} } @article{WILSON2007, author = {WILSON,MARK}, title = {Semantics Balkanized}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {709-719}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00048.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00048.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00048.x} } @article{LOGAN2007, author = {LOGAN,IAN}, title = {Whatever Happened to Kant’s Ontological Argument?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {346-363}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00021.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00021.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00021.x} } @article{BLACKSON2007, author = {BLACKSON,THOMAS A.}, title = {On Williamson’s Argument for (Ii) in His Anti-Luminosity Argument}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {397-405}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00024.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00024.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00024.x} } @article{LINQUIST2007, author = {LINQUIST,STEFAN and ROSENBERG,ALEX}, title = {The Return of the Tabula Rasa}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {476-497}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00033.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00033.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00033.x} } @article{PSILLOS2007, author = {PSILLOS,STATHIS}, title = {The Fine Structure of Inference to the Best Explanation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {441-448}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00030.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00030.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00030.x} } @article{HITCHCOCK2007, author = {HITCHCOCK,CHRISTOPHER}, title = {The Lovely and the Probable}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {433-440}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00029.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00029.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00029.x} } @article{KNAPP2007, author = {KNAPP,CHRISTOPHER}, title = {On Disgust.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {523-526}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00037.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00037.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00037.x} } @article{NETA2007, author = {NETA,RAM and PRITCHARD,DUNCAN}, title = {McDowell and the New Evil Genius}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {381-396}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00023.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00023.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00023.x} } @article{JAMES2007, author = {JAMES,AARON}, title = {Constructivism about Practical Reasons1}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {302-325}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00019.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00019.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00019.x} } @article{MORAN2007, author = {MORAN,RICHARD}, title = {Review Essay on The Reasons of Love*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {463-475}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00032.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00032.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00032.x} } @article{GOLDBERG2007, author = {GOLDBERG,SANFORD}, title = {Anti-Individualism and Knowledge.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {515-518}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00035.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00035.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00035.x} } @article{FIOCCO2007, author = {FIOCCO,M. ORESTE}, title = {Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {364-380}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00022.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00022.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00022.x} } @article{DEPAUL2007, author = {DEPAUL,MICHAEL R. and GRIMM,STEPHEN R.}, title = {Review Essay on Jonathan Kvanvig’s The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {498-514}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00034.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00034.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00034.x} } @article{HORNSBY2007, author = {HORNSBY,JENNIFER}, title = {On ‘Facts Revisited’}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {406-412}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00025.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00025.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00025.x} } @article{LIPTON2007, author = {LIPTON,PETER}, title = {Replies*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {449-462}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00031.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00031.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00031.x} } @article{BIRD2007a, author = {BIRD,ALEXANDER}, title = {Inference to the Only Explanation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {424-432}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00028.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00028.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00028.x} } @article{LIPTON2007a, author = {LIPTON,PETER}, title = {Précis of Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd Edition*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {421-423}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00027.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00027.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00027.x} } @article{THOMASSON2007, author = {THOMASSON,AMIE L.}, title = {Real Natures and Familiar Objects.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {518-523}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00036.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00036.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00036.x} } @article{SMITH2007a, author = {SMITH,BARRY C.}, title = {Can We Say More about Factual Discourse?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {413-420}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00026.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00026.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00026.x} } @article{WILAND2007, author = {WILAND,ERIC}, title = {How Indirect Can Indirect Utilitarianism Be?*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {275-301}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00018.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00018.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00018.x} } @article{DOUVEN2007, author = {DOUVEN,IGOR}, title = {A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman’s Paradox}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {326-345}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00020.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00020.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00020.x} } @article{BROOME2007, author = {BROOME,JOHN}, title = {Reply to Qizilbash*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {152-157}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00064.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00064.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00064.x} } @article{SCHIFFER2007, author = {SCHIFFER,STEPHEN}, title = {Interest-Relative Invariantism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {188-195}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00070.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00070.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00070.x} } @article{MILLER2007, author = {MILLER,CHRISTIAN}, title = {The Structure of Instrumental Practical Reasoning}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {1-40}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00058.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00058.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00058.x} } @article{HETHERINGTON2007, author = {HETHERINGTON,STEPHEN}, title = {Is This a World Where Knowledge Has to Include Justification?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {41-69}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00059.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00059.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00059.x} } @article{BRENNAN2007, author = {BRENNAN,JASON}, title = {Modesty without Illusion}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {111-128}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00062.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00062.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00062.x} } @article{FELDMAN2007, author = {FELDMAN,RICHARD}, title = {Knowledge and Lotteries*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {211-226}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00072.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00072.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00072.x} } @article{NETA2007a, author = {NETA,RAM}, title = {Anti-intellectualism and the Knowledge-Action Principle}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {180-187}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00069.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00069.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00069.x} } @article{MILLGRAM2007, author = {MILLGRAM,ELIJAH}, title = {Who Was Nietzsche's Genealogist?*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {92-110}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00061.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00061.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00061.x} } @article{HARMAN2007, author = {HARMAN,GILBERT}, title = {Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Primary Speaker Meaning1}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {173-179}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00068.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00068.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00068.x} } @article{STANLEY2007, author = {STANLEY,JASON}, title = {Replies to Gilbert Harman, Ram Neta, and Stephen Schiffer}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {196-210}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00071.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00071.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00071.x} } @article{KENT2007, author = {KENT,BONNIE}, title = {Aquinas and Weakness of Will}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {70-91}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00060.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00060.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00060.x} } @article{QIZILBASH2007, author = {QIZILBASH,MOZAFFAR}, title = {The Mere Addition Paradox, Parity and Vagueness*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {129-151}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00063.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00063.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00063.x} } @article{STANLEY2007a, author = {STANLEY,JASON}, title = {Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {168-172}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00067.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00067.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00067.x} } @article{ROBERTS2007, author = {ROBERTS,JOHN T.}, title = {Reply to Skow}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {163-167}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00066.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00066.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00066.x} } @article{SKOW2007, author = {SKOW,BRADFORD}, title = {Earman and Roberts on Empiricism about Laws}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {158-162}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00065.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00065.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00065.x} } @article{REGINSTER2007, author = {REGINSTER,BERNARD}, title = {Nietzsche’s New Darwinism.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {227-230}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00074.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00074.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00074.x} } @article{PLANTINGA2007, author = {PLANTINGA,ALVIN}, title = {On "Proper Basicality"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {612-621}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00095.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00095.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00095.x} } @article{LOUDEN2007, author = {LOUDEN,ROBERT B.}, title = {Kantian Moral Humility: Between Aristotle and Paul}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {632-639}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00098.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00098.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00098.x} } @article{MILLIKAN2007, author = {MILLIKAN,RUTH GARRETT}, title = {Précis of Varieties of Meaning*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {655-662}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00100.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00100.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00100.x} } @article{KNOBE2007, author = {KNOBE,JOSHUA}, title = {Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {727-729}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00110.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00110.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00110.x} } @article{MILLIKAN2007a, author = {MILLIKAN,RUTH GARRETT}, title = {Reply to Recanati}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {682-691}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00104.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00104.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00104.x} } @article{FAULKNER2007, author = {FAULKNER,PAUL}, title = {What Is Wrong with Lying?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {535-557}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00092.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00092.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00092.x} } @article{FRIERSON2007, author = {FRIERSON,PATRICK}, title = {Corruption, Non-ideal Theory, and Grace: A Response to Kant and the Ethics of Humility}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {624-631}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00097.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00097.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00097.x} } @article{GRENBERG2007, author = {GRENBERG,JEANINE M.}, title = {Précis of Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {622-623}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00096.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00096.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00096.x} } @article{FANTL2007, author = {FANTL,JEREMY and MCGRATH,MATTHEW}, title = {On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {558-589}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00093.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00093.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00093.x} } @article{MILLIKAN2007b, author = {MILLIKAN,RUTH GARRETT}, title = {Reply to Bermúdez}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {670-673}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00102.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00102.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00102.x} } @article{MILLIKAN2007c, author = {MILLIKAN,RUTH GARRETT}, title = {Reply to Taylor}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {710-715}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00108.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00108.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00108.x} } @article{ROSENBERG2007, author = {ROSENBERG,JAY F.}, title = {Comments on Ruth Garrett Millikan’s Varieties of Meaning}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {692-700}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00105.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00105.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00105.x} } @article{TAYLOR2007, author = {TAYLOR,KENNETH A.}, title = {Sign, Sign, Everywhere a Sign!}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {703-709}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00107.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00107.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00107.x} } @article{MILLIKAN2007d, author = {MILLIKAN,RUTH GARRETT}, title = {Reply to Rosenberg}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {701-702}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00106.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00106.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00106.x} } @article{BERMUDEZ2007, author = {BERMUDEZ,JOSE LUIS}, title = {Negation, Contrariety, and Practical Reasoning: Comments on Millikan’s Varieties of Meaning}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {663-669}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00101.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00101.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00101.x} } @article{KAUFMAN2007, author = {KAUFMAN,DAN}, title = {Locke on Individuation and the Corpuscular Basis of Kinds1}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {499-534}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00091.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00091.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00091.x} } @article{GRENBERG2007a, author = {GRENBERG,JEANINE M.}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {640-654}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00099.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00099.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00099.x} } @article{RECANATI2007, author = {RECANATI,FRANCOIS}, title = {Millikan’s Theory of Signs}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {674-681}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00103.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00103.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00103.x} } @article{SCHROEDER2007, author = {SCHROEDER,TIMOTHY and CAPLAN,BEN}, title = {On the Content of Experience*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {590-611}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00094.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00094.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00094.x} } @article{MACINTYRE2007, author = {MACINTYRE,ALASDAIR}, title = {Review Essay on Moral Animals: Ideals and Constraints in Moral Theory}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {716-726}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00109.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00109.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00109.x} } @article{JOHNSTON2007, author = {JOHNSTON,MARK}, title = {Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our Minds}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {233-268}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00075.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00075.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00075.x} } @article{LIN2007, author = {LIN,MARTIN}, title = {Spinoza’s Arguments for the Existence of God*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {269-297}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00076.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00076.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00076.x} } @article{KENNEDY2007, author = {KENNEDY,MATTHEW J.}, title = {Visual Awareness of Properties}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {298-325}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00077.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00077.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00077.x} } @article{SHEMMER2007, author = {SHEMMER,YONATAN}, title = {Desires as Reasons1}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {326-348}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00078.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00078.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00078.x} } @article{CARSON2007, author = {CARSON,THOMAS L.}, title = {Axiology, Realism, and the Problem of Evil*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {349-368}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00079.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00079.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00079.x} } @article{FORBER2007, author = {FORBER,PATRICK}, title = {Nietzsche Was No Darwinian}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {369-382}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00080.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00080.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00080.x} } @article{SCHAFFER2007, author = {SCHAFFER,JONATHAN}, title = {Knowing the Answer}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {383-403}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00081.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00081.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00081.x} } @article{SHEA2007, author = {SHEA,NICHOLAS}, title = {Consumers Need Information: Supplementing Teleosemantics with an Input Condition}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {404-435}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00082.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00082.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00082.x} } @article{MILLIKAN2007e, author = {MILLIKAN,RUTH GARRETT}, title = {An Input Condition for Teleosemantics? Reply to Shea (and Godfrey-Smith)1}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {436-455}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00083.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00083.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00083.x} } @article{LEITE2007, author = {LEITE,ADAM}, title = {Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief: A Reply to Tom Kelly’s "Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {456-464}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00084.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00084.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00084.x} } @article{KELLY2007, author = {KELLY,THOMAS}, title = {Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {465-474}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00085.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00085.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00085.x} } @article{SINGER2007, author = {SINGER,PETER}, title = {Review Essay on The Moral Demands of Affluence*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {475-483}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00086.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00086.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00086.x} } @article{LOPES2007, author = {LOPES,DOMINIC MCIVER}, title = {The Aesthetic Function of Art.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {484-487}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00087.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00087.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00087.x} } @article{BACH2007, author = {BACH,KENT}, title = {Literal Meaning.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {487-492}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00088.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00088.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00088.x} } @article{BISHOP2007, author = {BISHOP,MICHAEL}, title = {Reconstructing Reason and Representation.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {492-495}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00089.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00089.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00089.x} } @article{GOLDBERG2008, author = {GOLDBERG,SANFORD C.}, title = {Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited1}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {1-36}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00113.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00113.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00113.x} } @article{CLARK2008, author = {CLARK,ANDY}, title = {Pressing the Flesh: A Tension in the Study of the Embodied, Embedded Mind?*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {37-59}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00114.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00114.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00114.x} } @article{ONOF2008, author = {ONOF,CHRISTIAN}, title = {Property Dualism, Epistemic Normativity and the Limits of Naturalism*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {60-85}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00115.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00115.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00115.x} } @article{SCHROEDER2008, author = {SCHROEDER,MARK}, title = {Expression for Expressivists}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {86-116}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00116.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00116.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00116.x} } @article{DENIS2008, author = {DENIS,LARA}, title = {Animality and Agency: A Kantian Approach to Abortion}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {117-137}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00117.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00117.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00117.x} } @article{SWAIN2008, author = {SWAIN,STACEY and ALEXANDER,JOSHUA and WEINBERG,JONATHAN M.}, title = {The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {138-155}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00118.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00118.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00118.x} } @article{NATHAN OAKLANDER2008, author = {NATHAN OAKLANDER,L.}, title = {Be Careful What You Wish For: A Reply to Craig}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {156-163}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00119.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00119.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00119.x} } @article{BERNECKER2008, author = {BERNECKER,SVEN}, title = {Agent Reliabilism and the Problem of Clairvoyance}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {164-172}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00120.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00120.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00120.x} } @article{BREYER2008, author = {BREYER,DANIEL and GRECO,JOHN}, title = {Cognitive Integration and the Ownership of Belief: Response to Bernecker}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {173-184}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00121.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00121.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00121.x} } @article{PRIEST2008, author = {PRIEST,GRAHAM}, title = {Précis of Towards Non-Being}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {185-190}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00122.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00122.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00122.x} } @article{NOLAN2008, author = {NOLAN,DANIEL}, title = {Properties and Paradox in Graham Priest’s Towards Non-Being}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {191-198}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00123.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00123.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00123.x} } @article{KROON2008, author = {KROON,FREDERICK}, title = {Much Ado About Nothing: Priest and the Reinvention of Noneism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {199-207}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00124.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00124.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00124.x} } @article{PRIEST2008a, author = {PRIEST,GRAHAM}, title = {Replies to Nolan and Kroon}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {208-214}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00125.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00125.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00125.x} } @article{GIBSON2008, author = {GIBSON,MARTHA I.}, title = {Truth and Predication}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {215-219}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00126.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00126.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00126.x} } @article{GOMEZ-TORRENTE2008, author = {GOMEZ-TORRENTE,MARIO}, title = {Kripke. Names, Necessity, and Identity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {219-222}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00127.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00127.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00127.x} } @article{DAVIES2008, author = {DAVIES,STEPHEN}, title = {Introduction to a Philosophy of Music}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {222-224}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00128.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00128.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00128.x} } @article{MCCALL2008, author = {MCCALL,STORRS}, title = {The Ontology of Time}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {225-228}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00129.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00129.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00129.x} } @article{FANTL2008, author = {FANTL,JEREMY}, title = {Thinking About Knowing}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {228-231}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00130.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00130.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00130.x} } @article{SCHMITT2008, author = {SCHMITT,FREDERICK F.}, title = {Veritas: The Correspondence Theory and Its Critics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {1}, pages = {232-234}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00131.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00131.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00131.x} } @article{NOE2008, author = {NOE,ALVA}, title = {Précis of Action In Perception: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {660-665}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00161.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00161.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00161.x} } @article{D’ARMS2008, author = {D’ARMS,JUSTIN}, title = {Prinz’s Theory of Emotion1}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {712-719}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00167.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00167.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00167.x} } @article{HILLS2008, author = {HILLS,DAVID}, title = {Response to Gut Reactions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {720-728}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00168.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00168.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00168.x} } @article{NOE2008a, author = {NOE,ALVA}, title = {Reply to Campbell, Martin, and Kelly}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {691-706}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00165.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00165.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00165.x} } @article{ALLISON2008, author = {ALLISON,HENRY E.}, title = {"Whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence": Hume’s Analysis and Kant’s Response}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {525-546}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00156.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00156.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00156.x} } @article{PRINZ2008, author = {PRINZ,JESSE}, title = {Response to D’Arms and Hills}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {729-732}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00169.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00169.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00169.x} } @article{PRINZ2008a, author = {PRINZ,JESSE}, title = {Précis of Gut Reactions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {707-711}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00166.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00166.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00166.x} } @article{BURAS2008, author = {BURAS,TODD}, title = {Three Grades of Immediate Perception: Thomas Reid’s Distinctions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {603-632}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00159.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00159.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00159.x} } @article{OLSSON2008, author = {OLSSON,ERIK J.}, title = {Klein on the Unity of Cartesian and Contemporary Skepticism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {511-524}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00155.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00155.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00155.x} } @article{CAMPBELL2008, author = {CAMPBELL,JOHN}, title = {Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {666-673}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00162.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00162.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00162.x} } @article{MARTIN2008, author = {MARTIN,M.G.F.}, title = {Commentary on Action in Perception}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {674-681}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00163.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00163.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00163.x} } @article{KELLY2008, author = {KELLY,SEAN DORRANCE}, title = {Content and Constancy: phenomenology, psychology, and the content of perception}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {682-690}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00164.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00164.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00164.x} } @article{ROSKIES2008, author = {ROSKIES,ADINA L.}, title = {A New Argument for Nonconceptual Content}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {633-659}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00160.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00160.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00160.x} } @article{BAUMANN2008, author = {BAUMANN,PETER}, title = {Contextualism and the Factivity Problem}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {580-602}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00158.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00158.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00158.x} } @article{ENOCH2008, author = {ENOCH,DAVID and SCHECHTER,JOSHUA}, title = {How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {547-579}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00157.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00157.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00157.x} } @article{GINET2008, author = {GINET,CARL}, title = {Teleological Realism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {736-740}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00171.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00171.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00171.x} } @article{DICKER2008, author = {DICKER,GEORGES}, title = {Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {740-745}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00172.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00172.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00172.x} } @article{BRUECKNER2008, author = {BRUECKNER,ANTHONY}, title = {Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {3}, pages = {733-736}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00170.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00170.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00170.x} } @article{HUDSON2008, author = {HUDSON,HUD}, title = {Précis of The Metaphysics of Hyperspace}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {422-426}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00142.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00142.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00142.x} } @article{EGAN2008, author = {EGAN,FRANCES}, title = {The Content of Color Experience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {407-414}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00140.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00140.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00140.x} } @article{REA2008, author = {REA,MICHAEL C.}, title = {Hyperspace and The Best World Problem: A Reply To Hud Hudson}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {444-451}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00145.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00145.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00145.x} } @article{HELLER2008, author = {HELLER,MARK}, title = {Hudson Fine Tunes His Way to Hyperspace}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {436-443}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00144.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00144.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00144.x} } @article{MATTHEN2008, author = {MATTHEN,MOHAN}, title = {Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Précis}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {392-399}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00138.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00138.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00138.x} } @article{MATTHEN2008a, author = {MATTHEN,MOHAN}, title = {Reply to Egan and Clark}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {415-421}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00141.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00141.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00141.x} } @article{GLASGOW2008, author = {GLASGOW,JOSHUA}, title = {On the Methodology of the Race Debate: Conceptual Analysis and Racial Discourse}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {333-358}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00135.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00135.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00135.x} } @article{CLARK2008a, author = {CLARK,AUSTEN}, title = {Classes of Sensory Classification: A Commentary on Mohan Matthen, Seeing, Doing, and Knowing}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {400-406}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00139.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00139.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00139.x} } @article{HUDSON2008a, author = {HUDSON,HUD}, title = {Reply to Parsons, Reply to Heller, and Reply to Rea}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {452-470}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00146.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00146.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00146.x} } @article{PARSONS2008, author = {PARSONS,JOSH}, title = {Hudson on Location}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {427-435}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00143.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00143.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00143.x} } @article{POLLOCK2008, author = {POLLOCK,JOHN L.}, title = {What Am I? Virtual Machines and the Mind/Body Problem}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {237-309}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00133.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00133.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00133.x} } @article{BESSER-JONES2008, author = {BESSER-JONES,LORRAINE}, title = {Social Psychology, Moral Character, and Moral Fallibility*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {310-332}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00134.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00134.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00134.x} } @article{BRUECKNER2008a, author = {BRUECKNER,ANTHONY}, title = {Wright on the McKinsey Problem}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {385-391}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00137.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00137.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00137.x} } @article{LEVIN2008, author = {LEVIN,JANET}, title = {Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {359-384}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00136.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00136.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00136.x} } @article{MORTON2008, author = {MORTON,ADAM}, title = {The Roots of Evil}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {495-496}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00149.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00149.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00149.x} } @article{BETT2008, author = {BETT,RICHARD}, title = {The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {504-506}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00152.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00152.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00152.x} } @article{STECKER2008, author = {STECKER,ROBERT}, title = {Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {501-503}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00151.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00151.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00151.x} } @article{POLI2008, author = {POLI,ROBERTO}, title = {The Order of Evils: Toward an Ontology of Morals}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {497-501}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00150.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00150.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00150.x} } @article{MENDOLA2008, author = {MENDOLA,JOSEPH}, title = {Review Essay on Value, Reality, and Desire}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {484-494}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00148.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00148.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00148.x} } @article{SORENSEN2008, author = {SORENSEN,ROY}, title = {Semivaluationism: Putting Vagueness in Context in Context*}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, number = {2}, pages = {471-483}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00147.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00147.x}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00147.x} }