#Created by Kbib version 0.6.1 #Last modified: Thu Jun 19 17:24:45 2008 @article{ABEL1966, author = {ABEL, REUBEN}, title = {PRAGMATISM AND THE OUTLOOK OF MODERN SCIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {45-54}, keywords = {empiricism, fact, logic, meaning, pragmatism, reality, science, truth}, abstract = {"I HOPE I HAVE SHOWN THE UNIQUE PERTINENCE OF PRAGMATISM TO THE CHARACTERISTIC OUTLOOK AND PROBLEMS OF THE WORLD OF MODERN SCIENCE. IN ITS THEORY OF REALITY AS CONSTITUTED BY THE INTERACTION OF MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT, AND IN ITS VIEW OF TRUTH AS ENTAILING HUMAN ACTIVITY AND INQUIRY, PRAGMATISM PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPTS, CONSTRUCTS, FACTS, THEORIES, AND LAWS OF SCIENCE; FOR COMPREHENDING THE STATUS OF GEOMETRY AND LOGIC; FOR DEALING WITH DETERMINISM, INDUCTION, PROBABILITY, AND RATIONALITY; FOR A THEORY OF MEANING; AND FOR AN ATTITUDE OF EMPIRICIST OPEN-MINDEDNESS...."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ABEL1972, author = {ABEL, REUBEN}, title = {ON "FORM" IN ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {371-376}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, form}, abstract = {'FORM' IN A WORK OF ART IS ANALYSED NOT AS A NOUN BUT AS A VERB. THE MATERIALS OF A WORK OF ART ARE FORMED (COMPOSED, ARRANGED, ETC.) INTENTIONALLY, BY A PERSON, WHO DOES SO FOR THE SAKE OF DOING SO (REGARDLESS OF OTHER MOTIVES), AND WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF EVOKING A RESPONSE FROM SOME OTHER PERSON TO HIM. THIS EXPLAINS OUR ATTITUDE TO FORGERIES, COPIES, COMPUTER PRODUCTS, NATURAL OBJECTS, ETC. IT ALSO CLARIFIES WHAT MAKES US UNEASY ABOUT SO MUCH RECENT ART: THE WIDESPREAD MINIMISATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF FORM. THE PASSIONATE INTEREST IN FORM IS SUGGESTED AS A DIFFERENTIA OF HOMO SAPIENS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ABELSON1961, author = {ABELSON, RAZIEL}, title = {IN DEFENSE OF FORMAL LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {333-346}, keywords = {defense, empiricism, formal-logic; logic, rationalism, textual-criticis}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR SUMMARIZES S TOULMIN'S MAIN CRITICISMS OF LOGIC, AND THEN OPPOSES THEM AS BEING TOO EXTREME. TOULMIN'S THESIS IS THAT LOGIC IS NOT A THEORETICAL SCIENCE BUT A GROUP OF PRACTICAL SKILLS AND ITS PRINCIPALS ARE NOT A PRIORI LAWS BUT SPECIFIC AND CONTEXT-BOUND RULES FOR SUCCESSFUL INFERENCES. ABELSON WANTS TO COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE EXTREME EMPIRICISM OF TOULMIN AND THE EXTREME RATIONALISM OF PROFESSIONAL LOGICIANS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ONE MUST FIND A MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN A PURELY FORMAL LOGIC THAT IN ITSELF HAS NO PRACTICAL VALUE, AND A PRACTICAL, CONTEXT-DEPENDENT LOGIC THAT REALLY ISN'T LOGIC AT ALL. SOMEWHERE, PURE LOGIC AND FACTUAL KNOWLEDGE BLEND TOGETHER INTO "PRACTICAL LOGIC" WHICH IS THE PROVINCE OF BOTH LOGIC AND EMPIRICAL INQUIRY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ABELSON1961a, author = {ABELSON, RAZIEL}, title = {A REPLY TO EVANS'S "MEANING AND USE".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {262-263}, keywords = {language, meaning, ontology, sentence, use, word}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Achinstein2001, author = {Achinstein, Peter}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {740-743}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Book of Evidence}, volume = {68(3)}, year = {2001} } @article{ACKERMANN1982, author = {ACKERMANN, ROBERT}, title = {CONTEXT DEPENDENT KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {425-433}, keywords = {context, epistemology, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ACKERMANN1964, author = {ACKERMANN, ROBERT}, title = {NORMATIVE EXPLANATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {522-529}, keywords = {deducibility, ethics, explanation, fact, naturalism, normative-judgment; science}, abstract = {IN THE "LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS", HUSSERL EXPLAINS OUR PERCEPTION OF EXTERNAL REALITY IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: HE CLAIMS THAT WE EXPERIENCE IMMANENT SENSATIONS THAT ARE APPREHENDED OR ANIMATED BY INTENTIONS, WHICH OBJECTIVATE THEM. IN THE LECTURES ON TIME, HUSSERL TRIES TO EXPLAIN HOW BOTH SENSATIONS AND INTENTIONS ARE CONSTITUTED FOR CONSCIOUSNESS. THE CONCEPT OF AN EXTENDED PRESENT INSTANT, INVOLVING BOTH PROTENTION AND RETENTION, IS THE KEY TO HIS EXPLANATION; IT ALLOWS HIM TO SAY THAT WE CAN RETAIN IN OUR PRESENT CONSCIOUSNESS THE ELAPSING SENSATION AND INTENTION, AND THUS BE AWARE OF THEM AS IMMANENT OBJECTS. IN ADDITION, HUSSERL IDENTIFIES IMMANENT TEMPORALITY WITH INTENTIONS AND SENSATIONS. AS A RESULT, HE CAN NO LONGER CLAIM THAT THEY ARE REALLY DISTINCT FROM ONE ANOTHER, FOR BOTH ARE CONSTITUTED OUT OF THE SAME ELEMENT, INNER TIME. THUS THE DISTINCTION THAT SERVES AS THE BASIS FOR HIS ANALYSIS IN THE "INVESTIGATIONS" IS SUPPRESSED BY HIS CONCLUSIONS IN THE LECTURES ON TIME.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADAMS1982, author = {ADAMS, E-M}, title = {PERSONS AND MORALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {384-390}, keywords = {ethics, morality, person}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADAMS1974, author = {ADAMS, E-M}, title = {LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS AND EPISTEMIC ENCOUNTERS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {34}, pages = {404-414}, keywords = {asserting, epistemology, experience, knowing, language, thinking}, abstract = {AN EPISTEMIC ENCOUNTER IS AN ACT OF 'THINKING THAT P' WHICH NOT ONLY INVOLVES BEING CORRECT, HAVING GOOD GROUNDS OR REASONS AND THOSE GROUNDS OR REASONS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR GETTING IT RIGHT, BUT ALSO THE ACT OF 'THINKING THAT P' BEING AT LEAST PARTIALLY SELF-WARRANTING, AND THE MODE OF 'THINKING THAT P' BEING SUCH THAT IT PROVIDES AN ORIGINAL, INDIGENOUS SEMANTIC CONTENT. THE MODES OF EXPERIENCE AND THOUGHT WE TAKE TO PROVIDE EPISTEMIC ENCOUNTERS DETERMINE WHAT AREAS OF DISCOURSE APPEAR PHILOSOPHICALLY OPAQUE AND PROBLEMATIC AND HOW WE SEEK PHILOSOPHICAL CLARITY, FOR IT IS ONLY THROUGH EPISTEMIC ENCOUNTERS WE CAN ESTABLISH SEMANTIC TIES BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND ITEMS AND FEATURES OF THE WORLD.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adams2002, author = {Adams, Robert-M}, title = {Precis of Finite and Infinite Goods}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {439-444}, keywords = {ethics, framework, goods, infinite, metaethics, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adams2002a, author = {Adams, Robert-Merrihew}, title = {Responses}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {475-490}, keywords = {ethics, goods, metaethics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adams2003, author = {Adams, Robert-Merrihew}, title = {Anti-Consequentialism and the Transcendence of the Good}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {114-132}, keywords = {consequentialism, ethics, good, metaethics, transcendence}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adams1997, author = {Adams, Robert-Merrihew}, title = {Things in Themselves}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {801-825}, keywords = {metaphysics, object, reality, thing-in-itsel}, abstract = {The paper is an interpretation and defense of Kant's conception of things in themselves as noumena, along the following lines. Noumena are transempirical realities. As such they have several important roles in Kant's critical philosophy (Section 1). Our theoretical faculties cannot obtain enough content for a conception of noumena that would assure their real possibility as objects, but can establish their merely formal logical possibility (Sections 2-3). Our practical reason, however, grounds belief in the real possibility of some noumena, and even knowledge of the noumenal reality of a free will (Section 4). Section 5 defends Kant's conception of noumena as a good piece of philosophy, particularly with respect to its distinction between logical and real possibility. Are noumena numerically identical with experienced (phenomenal) objects? Kantian principles yield the answers that human selves are, God isn't, and it's harder to say about bodies (Section 6).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adams1994, author = {Adams, Robert-M}, title = {Religious Disagreements and Doxastic Practices}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {885-890}, keywords = {belief, existence, god, perception, religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADAMS1989, author = {ADAMS, ROBERT-MERRIHEW}, title = {REPLY TO KVANVIG: "ADAMS ON ACTUALISM AND PRESENTISM".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {299-301}, keywords = {future, metaphysics, present, proposition}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADDIS1986, author = {ADDIS, LAIRD}, title = {PAINS AND OTHER SECONDARY MENTAL ENTITIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {59-74}, keywords = {intentionality, mental-states; metaphysics, pain}, abstract = {SECONDARY MENTAL ENTITIES INCLUDE SENSATIONS SUCH AS PAIN AND ITCHES, PERCEPTION-RELATED ENTITIES SUCH AS IMAGES AND AFTERIMAGES, AND EMOTIONS. THE THEORY IS ADVANCED, AND DEFENDED AGAINST LIKELY OBJECTIONS, THAT SECONDARY MENTAL ENTITIES EXIST ONLY AS "OBJECTS" OF STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS (THE PRIMARY MENTAL ENTITIES) AND ARE THEREFORE ALWAYS DISTINCT FROM THE AWARENESS OF THEM. PAIN IS USED AS THE MAIN EXAMPLE BECAUSE IT HAS A FEATURE THAT MAKES IT SEEM ESPECIALLY RESISTANT TO THE THEORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADDIS1972, author = {ADDIS, LAIRD}, title = {ARISTOTLE AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF SUBSTANCES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {107-111}, keywords = {attribute, independence, metaphysics, substance, time}, abstract = {AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO EXPLICATE WHAT ARISTOTLE MAY REASONABLY BE TAKEN TO HAVE MEANT IN HOLDING THAT SUBSTANCES ARE 'INDEPENDENT' AND ATTRIBUTES 'DEPENDENT'. THE ACCOUNTS OF BERGMANN, ROSS, AND SELLARS ARE REJECTED EACH ON ITS OWN GROUND AND ALL BECAUSE OF THEIR COMMON FAILURE TO BRING TIME INTO THE EXPLICATION. IT IS SHOWN THAT WHAT IS TAKEN TO BE THE CORRECT EXPLICATION IS CONSISTENT ONLY WITH A REJECTION OF NON-PLATONIC UNIVERSALS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADELMANN1962, author = {ADELMANN, FREDERICK-J}, title = {THE ROOT OF EXISTENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {405-408}, keywords = {causality, epistemology, existence, experience, phenomenology, self-consciousness; sensation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adler2002, author = {Adler, Jonathan-E}, title = {Is the Generality Problem Too General?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {87-97}, keywords = {epistemology, generality, reliabilism}, abstract = {Reliabilism holds that knowledge is true belief reliably caused. Reliabilists should say something about individuating processes; critics deny that the right degree of generality can be specified without arbitrariness. It is argued that this criticism applies as well to processes mentioned in scientific explanations. The gratuitous puzzles created thereby show that the "generality problem" is illusory.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adler1997, author = {Adler, Jonathan-E}, title = {Constrained Belief and the Reactive Attitudes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {891-905}, keywords = {attitude, belief, epistemology, evidentialism}, abstract = {Evidentialism implies that, for epistemic purposes, belief should be responsive only to evidence. Focusing on our reactive attitude such as resentment or indignation, I construct an argument that the beliefs or judgments accompanying those attitudes are constrained in advance by circumstances to be full, rather than being open to the whole range of partial beliefs. These judgments or beliefs imply strong claims to justification. But the circumstances in which those attitudes are formed allow only very limited evidence. Nevertheless, we cannot opt out regularly since the formation of such attitudes is so central a feature of a minimally content human social life.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AIKEN1982, author = {AIKEN, HENRY-DAVID}, title = {THE ORIGINALITY OF HUME'S THEORY OF OBLIGATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {374-383}, keywords = {obligation, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ainslie2001, author = {Ainslie, Donald-C}, title = {Hume's Reflections on the Identity and Simplicity of Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {557-578}, keywords = {identity, metaphysics, mind, simplicity}, abstract = {The belief in the identity and simplicity of the mind as a bundle of perceptions is an abstruse belief, not one held by the "vulgar" who rarely turn their minds on themselves so as to think of their perceptions. The author suggests that it is this philosophical observation of the mind that creates the problems that Hume finally acknowledges in the "Appendix." He is unable to explain why we believe that the perceptions by means of which we observe our minds while philosophizing are themselves part of our minds. This suggestion is then tested against seven criteria that any interpretation of the "Appendix" must meet. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Ainslie1992, author = {Ainslie, George}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {981-983}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Picoeconomics}, volume = {55(4)}, year = {1992} } @article{AIRAKSINEN1987, author = {AIRAKSINEN, TIMO}, title = {BERKELEY AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF BELIEFS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {235-256}, keywords = {belief, body, justification, metaphysics}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ANALYZES BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. IT IS SHOWN THAT OUR KNOWLEDGE OF SPATIO-TEMPORAL BODIES CANNOT BE CERTAIN. CERTAINTY IS RESTRICTED TO THE REALM OF SENSORY IDEAS THEMSELVES. BUT THERE IS HARDLY ANY REASON TO BE INTERESTED IN IDEAS AS SUCH. BERKELEY IS A COMMON SENSE THINKER WHO WANTS TO KNOW THE WORLD AND ITS SCIENTIFIC LAWS. BODIES ARE CONSTRUCTED ON THE BASIS OF BOTH REAL AND IMAGINARY IDEAS. THIS TOPIC IS ANALYZED STARTING FROM PAPPAS'S AND PITCHER'S VIEWS. IT IS SHOWN THAT BODIES ARE COMPLETE COMPLEXES OF IDEAS AND THAT IMAGINATION PLAYS AN ESSENTIAL ROLE HERE. THE CONTINUITY OF BODIES IS DISCUSSED. THE METHODS OF MAKING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAL AND IMAGINARY IDEAS ARE ANALYZED. CONCERNING BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND--IT IS SHOWN THAT ONE CAN REACH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY IN THIS FIELD BUT ONE CANNOT FIND MUCH INFORMATION CONCERNING THE VARIOUS PARTS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MIND. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ACTIVE AND THE PASSIVE MIND IS DISCUSSED. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN IDEAS AND THE MIND IS EXPLORED BRIEFLY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AIRAKSINEN1980, author = {AIRAKSINEN, TIMO}, title = {PROBLEMS IN HEGEL'S DIALECTIC OF FEELING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {1-25}, keywords = {dialectic, feeling, metaphysics, mind, soul, subjective}, abstract = {THIS PAPER SHOWS HOW HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF SUBJECTIVE MIND CAN BE USED TO ELUCIDATE THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF DIALECTICS. A TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF DIALECTICS IS PRESENTED. SEVERAL APPARENT ANOMALIES BOTH IN HEGEL'S PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY ARE ANALYZED AND RESOLVED BY USING THIS NOTION OF DIALECTICS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alanen2003, author = {Alanen, Lilli}, title = {What Are Emotions About?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {311-334}, keywords = {cognitivism, emotion, intentionality, metaphysics, morality, phenomenology}, abstract = {This paper discusses the interrelations between three aspects of human emotions: their intentionality, their expressivity and their moral significance. It distinguishes three kinds of philosophical views of emotions: the cognitivist (classically held by the Stoics), the emotivist which reduces emotions to nonintentional bodily sensations and physiological states, and the moral phenomenologist, the latter being held by Annette Baier, whose work is the focus of the discussion. Her view, which represents an original development of ideas found in Descartes and Hume, avoids the reductionism of cognitivist and emotivist accounts. The paper gives special attention to her notion of 'deep' objects of emotions and to her account of the expressivity of emotions, arguing that while the first is problematic, the second is a significant contribution to our understanding of the role of emotions in our moral lives.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALBERSHEIM1965, author = {ALBERSHEIM, GERHARD}, title = {THE SCALE STEP.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {63-79}, keywords = {aesthetic-experience; aesthetics, dimensionality, movement, music, pitch, space}, abstract = {"TONAL SPACE" IS STRUCTURED BY DIFFERENT SCALE SYSTEMS WHOSE STEPS ARE DEFINED BY THE MEASURING ROD OF THE CONSONANT INTERVALS OCTAVE, FIFTH, AND MAJOR THIRD. THUS, MUSICAL HEARING, CONDITIONED BY AGE-OLD CONVENTIONS, IS PREFORMED BY OUR THINKING IN SCALE STEPS ON WHICH THE COMMUNICABILITY OF MUSICAL MEANING RESTS. BECAUSE OF THEIR DISTINCTIVE MUSICO-CONCEPTUAL CHARACTER WE COMPREHEND STEPS DESPITE THEIR VARYING INTONATION. THE RELATIVE INDEPENDENCE OF OUR CONCEPTION OF SCALE STEPS FROM THEIR ACTUAL PITCH PREVENTS THE CONSIDERABLE DEVIATIONS FROM JUST INTONATION BY PERFORMERS AND BY OUR TEMPERED TUNING SYSTEM FROM INTERFERING WITH OUR MUSICAL UNDERSTANDING. ACCORDINGLY, "ABSOLUTE PITCH" IS NOT A MEMORY FOR PITCH SIMPLY, BUT FOR THE ACCUSTOMED INTONATION OF SCALE STEPS, REFERRED TO BY THE TONE NAMES. LIKEWISE, THE STEP CHARACTER ACCOUNTS FOR WHAT SOME PSYCHOLOGISTS CALL "CHROMA" AND MISTAKE FOR A PROPERTY OF SINGLE TONES LIKE PITCH OR TIMBRE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Albert1992, author = {Albert, David-Z}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {973-975}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Quantum Mechanics and Experience}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1992} } @other{Alcoff1996, author = {Alcoff, Linda-Martin}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {740-743}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory}, volume = {64(3)}, year = {1996} } @article{ALDRICH1971, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-A}, title = {ILLOCUTIONARY SPACE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {15-28}, keywords = {assertion, language}, abstract = {SEARLE DRAWS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TRUTH CONDITIONS AND ASSERTIBILITY CONDITIONS IN THE WRONG WAY. IT SUGGESTS THAT ONE CAN THINK THAT P IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO SAY IT, IN SOME LOGICAL SENSE OF 'CAN'T', STRONGER THAN ANY PROHIBITION OF ETIQUETTE OR SOCIAL MANNERS. THIS IS COUNTER-INTUITIVE. SPEECH-ACTS, LIKE PHYSICAL, CAN BE PERFORMED ONLY WHERE THERE IS ROOM FOR THEM - ILLOCUTIONARY 'SPACE'. THIS IS THE SPACE OF HUMAN ACTION, IN WHICH 'FREEDOM,' 'CONSTRAINT', ETC. MAKES SENSE. 'PHYSICAL SPACE' IS AN ABSTRACTION OUT OF THIS. IN SHORT, 'ILLOCUTIONARY SPACE' IS NOT A METAPHORICAL EXTENSION OF 'PHYSICAL SPACE.' 'THIN' SAYINGS - SAYINGS OF SENTENCES - ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM 'THICK' ONES, IN WHICH SOMETHING IS SAID (DONE) WITH THE SENTENCES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALDRICH1962, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-C}, title = {IMAGE-MONGERING AND IMAGE-MANAGEMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {51-61}, keywords = {contradiction, image, imagination, language, meaning, possibility, situation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALDRICH1981, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-C}, title = {CAN REPRESENTATIONS BE IDENTICAL WITH ANYTHING?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {401-404}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, representation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALDRICH1966, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-C}, title = {AN ASPECT THEORY OF MIND.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {313-326}, keywords = {aspect-theory; body, introspection, knowledge, mental-states; metaphysics, minds}, abstract = {OLDER ASPECT THEORIES OF MIND, SUCH AS THE DOUBLE ASPECT THEORY, ARE BY-PASSED IN FAVOR OF "ASPECT" IN WITTGENSTEIN'S SENSE. WHAT ONE PERCEIVES WHEN ONE PERCEIVES SOMEONE'S "STATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS"--HIS INTENTION, HIS EMOTION, HIS PAIN--IS COMPARABLE TO WHAT ONE PERCEIVES WHEN ONE HAS AN "ASPECT-EXPERIENCE" OF, SAY, THE DUCK-RABBIT PICTURE. THIS CONCEPT OF "PERCEPTION" OF PERSONS BY PERSONS IS EXPLORED HERE, UNCOVERING SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES TO THE PICTURE CASE. SEEING A PERSON AS A PHYSICAL OBJECT IN MOTION--NOT IN "ACTION"--IS FEASIBLE THOUGH DIFFICULT BECAUSE UNNATURAL. THIS KIND OF "ASPECTION" IS CALLED "CATEGORIAL" AND DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER KINDS. EVEN THE HUMAN "BODY" IS NOT NATURALLY SEEN AS A "PHYSICAL OBJECT."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALDRICH1964, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-C}, title = {A POINT ABOUT SPACES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {397-401}, keywords = {aesthetics, description, expression, object, phenomenology, physical, space}, abstract = {IT IS ARGUED THAT MATERIAL THINGS APPEAR AS EITHER PHYSICAL OBJECTS, (INVOLVING THE LOGIC OF DESCRIPTIVE PORTRAYAL) OR AESTHETIC OBJECTS, (INVOLVING THE LOGIC OF EXPRESSIVE PORTRAYAL). A PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPACES IS PRESENTED, SHOWING HOW A THING APPEARS DIFFERENTLY IN PHYSICAL THAN IN AESTHETIC SPACE. IT IS CLAIMED THAT THE PHYSICAL HAS NO ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY OVER, AND IS NOT PRESUPPOSED BY, THE AESTHETIC. THERE IS MUCH DISCUSSION ON WHY ONE DOES NOT "FRAME" A PHYSICAL OBJECT AND CONCLUSIONS ARE DRAWN ABOUT THE FUNCTION OF A FRAME, (NOT TO LOOK BEYOND FOR MEANING AND VALUE). (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALDRICH1979, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-C}, title = {POINT OF VIEW.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {498-510}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, physicalism, point}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALEXANDER1963, author = {ALEXANDER, H-G}, title = {A SUGGESTION CONCERNING EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMAGINATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {427-431}, keywords = {a-priori; abstraction, empiricism, epistemology, experience, imagination, logic, mathematics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALKER1965, author = {ALKER, HENRY-A}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {534-543}, keywords = {concept, mental-health; morality, ontology, psychiatry, science}, abstract = {THE QUESTION IS RAISED, AS TO WHAT STANDARDS SHOULD BE USED IN ANY DECISION ABOUT THE SCIENTIFIC LEGITIMACY OF A GIVEN CONCEPT. THREE STANDARDS ARE PROPOSED: (1) ONTOLOGICAL STANDARD--BASICALLY FREE FROM INNER INCONSISTENCY, (2) TECHNICAL ADEQUACY--A GIVEN CONCEPT IS ONLY AS GOOD AS THE SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATIONS IT PRESUPPOSES, AND (3) THAT OF NONMORALITY. THE ENTIRE DISCUSSION IS DEVOTED TO THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Allen1993, author = {Allen, Barry}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {719-723}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Truth in Philosophy}, volume = {56(3)}, year = {1993} } @article{ALLEN1970, author = {ALLEN, GLEN-O}, title = {FROM THE "NATURALISTIC FALLACY" TO THE IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {533-549}, keywords = {cause, ethics, good, metaethics}, abstract = {G. E. MOORE'S PROOF THAT 'GOOD' CANNOT BE DEFINED IS THE ANALOGUE OF HUME'S PROOF THAT THE IDEA OF CAUSE HAS NO EMPIRICAL CORRELATE. AS A PROOF, IT CANNOT SUSTAIN ETHICAL INTUITIONISM, EMOTIVISM, OR THE VARIOUS MODIFICATIONS OF ETHICAL NATURALISM WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE TO REST UPON IT. HOWEVER, IT DOES SUSTAIN THE THEORY THAT VALUES ARE CAUSES OF HUMAN RESPONSES, AND THAT, UNDER A METHODOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF OBJECTIVITY, VALUES HAVE OBJECTIVE COGNITIVE STATUS AS CAUSES OF RESPONSES IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF A HYPOTHETICAL BEING, AN IDEAL OBSERVER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALLEN1982, author = {ALLEN, JEFFNER}, title = {WHAT IS HUSSERL'S FIRST PHILOSOPHY?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {610-620}, keywords = {first-philosophy; history-of-ideas; metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALLERS1960, author = {ALLERS, RUDOLF}, title = {HEIDEGGER ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {365-373}, keywords = {being, metaphysics, reason, sufficient, textual-criticis}, abstract = {HEIDEGGER'S METHOD IS EXPLORED IN RELATION TO THE "BEING QUESTION," AND THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION OF LANGUAGE, LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS AND ETYMOLOGICAL EXPLANATION IS SHOWN AS HAVING REPLACED PHENOMENOLOGY. HEIDEGGER'S THESIS--THAT THE MODE IN WHICH BEING BECOMES MANIFEST IN DIFFERENT PERIODS OF HISTORY, IS ILLUSTRATED WITH HIS THOUGHTS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON. THAT THIS PRINCIPLE LASTED SO MANY CENTURIES OF INCUBATION UNTIL IT WAS FORMULATED BY LEIBNIZ, IS A SIGNIFICANT FACT IN THE HISTORY OF BEING. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS NO RETURNING TO PARMENIDES AND THE ORIGINAL INTUITION OF BEING; WE MUST ADOPT A NEW APPROACH, IN ORDER TO RENDER MAN AGAIN CONSCIOUS OF THE PRIMORDIAL IMPORT OF BEING; OTHERWISE WE WILL BE SUFFOCATED BY THE ALL-PERVADING TECHNICALIZATION. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Allison1996, author = {Allison, Henry-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {825-829}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy}, volume = {59(3)}, year = {1996} } @article{Almeder1994, author = {Almeder, Robert-F}, title = {Defining Justification and Naturalizing Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {669-681}, keywords = {epistemology, justification, knowledge, natural-sciences; reason}, abstract = {In this paper I examine the claim that no theory of epistemic justification is possible because whatever definition one gives admits of the question "Are you justified in accepting your definition of justification?" which cannot be answered without begging the question in favor of the original definition offered. I examine various replies to the argument and then argue that the question need not be answered.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Almeder1998, author = {Almeder, Robert}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {493-495}, publisher = {Open Court}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy}, volume = {62(2)}, year = {1998} } @other{Almeder1992, author = {Almeder, Robert}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {715-719}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Blind Realism}, volume = {55(3)}, year = {1992} } @article{Almog2005, author = {Almog, Joseph}, title = {Precis of What Am I?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {696-700}, keywords = {body, dualism, essentialism, metaphysics, mind, separability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Almog2005a, author = {Almog, Joseph}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {717-734}, keywords = {dualism, essence, intuition, metaphysics, possibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alspector-Kelly2002, author = {Alspector-Kelly, Marc}, title = {Stroud's Carnap}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {276-302}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, metaphysics, ontology, semantics}, abstract = {In "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" Carnap drew his famous distinction between 'internal' and 'external' questions of existence, pronouncing the former meaningful and the latter meaningless. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud understands Carnap to be applying the verification criterion of meaningfulness in order to refute Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that Stroud misrepresents both Carnap's aim and method. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston1993, author = {Alston, W-P}, title = {Epistemic Desiderata}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {527-551}, keywords = {argument, condition, epistemology, justification, language}, abstract = {There are endless disputes over alleged necessary conditions for epistemic justice, e.g., that the belief is "based on" adequate grounds and that the justifier is accessible on reflection. But perhaps it is a mistake to suppose that there is some unique status, "justification" concerning the necessary conditions for which they are arguing. If we abandon that view we can reconstrue this part of epistemology as a study of epistemic desiderata, their nature, viability, and importance for various interests and purposes.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALSTON1986, author = {ALSTON, WILLIAM-P}, title = {EPISTEMIC CIRCULARITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {1-30}, keywords = {belief, circularity, epistemology, justification}, abstract = {SUPPOSE THAT WE CANNOT PROVIDE ANY OTHERWISE STRONG ARGUMENT FOR THE RELIABILITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION WITHOUT MAKING USE OF WHAT WE TAKE OURSELVES TO HAVE LEARNED FROM SENSE PERCEPTION. WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE US? THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT IT DOES NOT PREVENT US FROM JUSTIFYING, AND BEING JUSTIFIED IN, A BELIEF THAT SENSE PERCEPTION IS RELIABLE; THOUGH IT DOES PREVENT US FROM GIVING AN IDEALLY EXPLICIT AND COMPLETE JUSTIFICATION OF SUCH A BELIEF, OR OF ANY OTHER BELIEF.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALSTON1989, author = {ALSTON, WILLIAM-P}, title = {REPLY TO DANIELS' "EXPERIENCING GOD".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {501-506}, keywords = {belief, christian, epistemology, experience, god, religion}, abstract = {DANIELS HOLDS THAT THE UNDISCERNING IN SECULAR MATTERS HAVE REASONS FOR SUPPOSING THAT OTHERS CAN DISCERN, WHILE THERE ARE NO ANALOGOUS REASONS IN THE RELIGIOUS SPHERE. THOUGH SOME OF HIS CONTRASTS ARE OVERDRAWN, I DON'T REALLY CONTEST THAT. BUT HE ALSO SEEMS TO SUPPOSE THAT THESE DIFFERENCES PROVIDE A STRONG REASON FOR SUPPOSING THAT NO ONE DOES PERCEIVE GOD, AND HERE I OBJECT, ON THE GROUNDS THAT DANIELS UNWARRANTEDLY SUPPOSES THAT ANY VERIDICAL PERCEPTION MUST PROVE ITSELF IN THE SAME WAY AS SENSE PERCEPTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALSTON1990, author = {ALSTON, William-P}, title = {Externalist Theories of Perception.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {causality, doxography, epistemology, externalism, perception}, abstract = {The title refers to theories that require a certain sort of relation between X and an experience of S in order that S perceive X. The relation might be causal, counterfactual, doxastic, or otherwise. It is argued against such theories that there are possible cases in which X stands in the required relation to an experience of S and S does not perceive X and cases in which X is perceived though it does not stand in the required relation.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston2002, author = {Alston, William-P}, title = {Sellars and the "Myth of the Given"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {69-86}, keywords = {empiricism, metaphysics, mind, myth, perception}, abstract = {Sellars is well known for this critique of the "myth of the given" in his Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. That text does not make it unambiguous just how he understands the "myth". Here I take it that whatever else may be involved, his critique is incompatible with the view that there is a nonconceptual mode of "presentation" or "givenness" of particulars that is the heart of sense perception and what is most distinctive of perception as a type of cognition. A critical examination of Sellars's argument, particularly those directed at the 'theory of appearing', results in the conclusion that he has failed to eliminate the above view of perception. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston1994, author = {Alston, William-P}, title = {Precis of "Perceiving God"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {863-868}, keywords = {existence, experience, god, perception, religion, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston1994a, author = {Alston, William-P}, title = {Reply to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {891-899}, keywords = {existence, experience, god, religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston2005, author = {Alston, William}, title = {Perception and Representation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {253-289}, keywords = {epistemology, experience, perception, representation, representationalism}, abstract = {My criticism of the representationalist position is in sections. (1) There is no sufficient reason for positing a representative function for perceptual experience. It doesn't seem on the face of it to be that, and nothing serves in place of such seeming. (2) Even if it did have such a function, it doesn't have the conceptual resources to represent a state of affairs. (3) Even if it did, it is not suited to represent, e.g., a physical property of color. (4) Finally, even if I am wrong about the first three points, it is still impossible for the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience to consist in it's representing what it does. My central argument for this central claim of the paper is that it is metaphysically, de re possible that one have a certain perceptual experience without it's presenting any state of affairs. And since all identities hold necessarily, this identity claim fails. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston2000, author = {Alston, William-P}, title = {Virtue and Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {185-189}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, knowledge, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Alston1996, author = {Alston, William-P}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {231-234}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A Realist Conception of Truth}, volume = {60(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{ALTRICHTER1973, author = {ALTRICHTER, F}, title = {ON WHAT CANNOT HAVE SPATIAL LOCATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {252-256}, keywords = {mentalism, metaphysics, quantity, space}, abstract = {THE AIM OF THIS DISCUSSION PAPER IS TO EXAMINE A WELL-KNOWN ARGUMENT USED AGAINST THE SO-CALLED IDENTITY THEORY. ACCORDING TO THE ARGUMENT, THE IDENTITY THEORY CANNOT BE A MEANINGFUL HYPOTHESIS, SINCE THE LEIBNIZ PRINCIPLE FORMULATED IN RESPECT TO SPACE PREDICATES IS NOT SATISFIED IN THE CASE OF THE ASSUMED IDENTITY OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND BRAIN STATES OR PROCESSES OR PHENOMENA. IN EXAMINING THE ARGUMENT THREE CASES ARE DIFFERENTIATED; FIRST, THE CASE OF THE SUPPOSED IDENTITY OF MENTAL PHENOMENA WITH BRAIN STATES. IT IS ARGUED THAT IN THIS CASE THE LEIBNIZ PRINCIPLE FORMULATED IN RESPECT TO SPACE PREDICATES IS VACUOUSLY SATISFIED, SINCE IT IS MEANINGLESS TO ASCRIBE 'SPATIAL LOCATION' NOT ONLY TO MENTAL PHENOMENA, BUT TO BRAIN STATES AS WELL. NEXT, THE CASE OF SUPPOSED IDENTITY OF MENTAL PHENOMENA WITH BRAIN PROCESSES IS EXAMINED WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT, ALSO IN THIS CASE, THE LEIBNIZ PRINCIPLE IS VACUOUSLY SATISFIED. LAST, THE CASE OF IDENTIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA WITH BRAIN PHENOMENA IS EXAMINED. AND I CONCLUDE THAT SINCE THE WORD 'PHENOMENON' MAY COVER MANY THINGS FALLING UNDER DIFFERENT CATEGORIES, NOTHING DEFINITE CAN BE SAID ABOUT THE VALIDITY OR INVALIDITY OF THE ARGUMENT IN QUESTION. (EDITED).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AMERIKS1985, author = {AMERIKS, KARL}, title = {HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF KANT'S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {1-36}, keywords = {idealism, phenomenology, philosophy, transcendental-deductio}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ANALYZES HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF KANT'S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY IN TERMS OF THREE SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION (CONCERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF THE I, THE NECESSITY OF THE CATEGORIES, AND THE PROBLEM OF A PRELIMINARY EPISTEMOLOGY) AND THREE SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM (CONCERNING THE THING IN ITSELF, THE ANTINOMIES, AND OTHER SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ameriks1992, author = {Ameriks, Karl}, title = {Recent Work on Hegel: The Rehabilitation of an Epistemologist?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {177-202}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {This paper focuses largely on a set of recent books in English that have attempted to defend the theoretical validity of Hegel's system, and in particular its relevance to current discussions in epistemology. T Rockmore, K Westphal, M Forster, R B Pippin, and T Pinkard each fasten on different aspects (respectively: Hegel as pragmatist, coherentist, anti-skeptic, transcendentalist, or category theorist) and periods of Hegel's theoretical philosophy. I argue that their analyses have significantly raised the level of discussion here, but they do not yet establish that Hegel's theoretical philosophy can be saved from the traditional objection of being overly dogmatic.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ameriks2003, author = {Ameriks, Karl}, title = {Problems from Van Cleve's Kant: Experience and Objects}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {196-202}, keywords = {a-priori; experience, metaphysics, object, transcendence}, abstract = {This article is part of a review discussion concerning James Van Cleve's very valuable book, Problems from Kant. Although Van Cleve traces many significant connections between Kant's first Critique and rationalist positions in contemporary analytic metaphysics, he interprets Kant's transcendental deduction in a manner that is more typical of empiricist approaches. He reconstructs--and then sharply criticizes--the deduction in a way that stresses starting from a relatively "thin" rather than "thick" concept of experience. I offer historical and systematic considerations in favor of an opposite approach to the deduction, one that would save it from objections like Van Cleve's.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Ameriks2000, author = {Ameriks, Karl}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {728-741}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical Philosophy}, volume = {69(3)}, year = {2000} } @other{Amico1993, author = {Amico, Robert}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {226-229}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Problem of the Criterion}, volume = {57(1)}, year = {1993} } @other{Anderson1993, author = {Anderson, Elizabeth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {956-959}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Value in Ethics and Economics}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1993} } @article{Anderson2004, author = {Anderson, R-Lanier}, title = {It Adds Up After All: Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic in Light of the Traditional Logic}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {501-540}, keywords = {analyticity, arithmetic, concept, containment, metaphysics, traditional-logi}, abstract = {Officially, for Kant, judgments are analytic iff the predicate is "contained in" the subject. I defend the containment definition against the common charge of obscurity, and argue that arithmetic cannot be analytic, in the resulting sense. My account deploys two traditional logical notions: logical division and concept hierarchies. Division separates a genus concept into exclusive, exhaustive species. Repeated divisions generate a hierarchy, in which lower species are derived from their genus, by adding differentia(e). Hierarchies afford a straightforward sense of containment: genera are contained in the species formed from them. To capture both relations, hierarchies must posit overlaps between concepts that violate the exclusion rule. Thus, such truths are synthetic. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ANGUELOV1972, author = {ANGUELOV, STEFAN}, title = {ETHICS AS A SCIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {207-215}, keywords = {ethics, marxism, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Annas1995, author = {Annas, Julia}, title = {Reply to Cooper}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {599-610}, keywords = {ethics, eudaimonism, happiness}, abstract = {The reply shows that eudaimonist ethical theories need not essentially include claims of a metaphysical sort. Ancient ethical theories debate with one another (as in Cicero) without being trapped in their own larger theories; hence it is legitimate to reconstruct ancient ethical theories from ancient ethical debates.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Annas1995a, author = {Annas, Julia}, title = {Precis of The Morality of Happiness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(4)}, pages = {909-912}, keywords = {ethical-theory; ethics, happiness, morality, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Annas2005, author = {Annas, Julia}, title = {Comments on John Doris's Lack of Character}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {636-642}, keywords = {behavior, character, character-trait; ethics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ANNIS1980, author = {ANNIS, DAVID-B}, title = {MEMORY AND JUSTIFICATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {324-333}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, justification, memory}, abstract = {IN THIS PAPER I DEVELOP AN ANALYSIS OF FACTUAL MEMORY AS THE RETENTION OF KNOWLEDGE AND DISCUSS SOME OF ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AN ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ANTON1974, author = {ANTON, ANATOLE}, title = {COMMODITIES AND EXCHANGE: NOTES FOR AN INTERPRETATION OF MARX.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {34}, pages = {355-385}, keywords = {commodity, economics, exchange, marxism, rule, social-philosophy; value}, abstract = {THE AIM OF THE PAPER IS TO SHOW THAT MAKING THE ASSUMPTION THAT COMMODITIES ARE DEFINED BY CONSTITUTIVE, IF CHANGING, RULES FOR THE PRACTICE OF EXCHANGE IS ILLUMINATING. IT IS ILLUMINATING SINCE IT PROVIDES INSIGHTS INTO MARX'S SAYING THAT HE 'COQUETTED' WITH HEGELIAN TERMINOLOGY; IT FREES MARX FROM SOME CHARGES OF INCONSISTENCY AND OF THE USE OF A PRIORI METAPHYSICS IN SCIENCE; IT HELPS US UNDERSTAND THE RELATION BETWEEN MARX'S METHOD IN "CAPITAL" AND HIS GENERAL EMPHASIS ON HISTORICAL PROCESS; IT HELPS EXPLICATE MARX'S THIRD THESIS ON FEUERBACH, AND, FINALLY, IT SUGGESTS A SHARP CONTRAST BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND MARXIST PHILOSOPHY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ANTON1965, author = {ANTON, JOHN-P}, title = {JOHN DEWEY AND ANCIENT PHILOSOPHIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {477-499}, keywords = {ancient, cognition, context, criticism, dualism, method, problem, relativism, social-philosoph}, abstract = {THREE ASPECTS OF DEWEY'S RELATIONSHIP TO GREEK PHILOSOPHY ARE DISCUSSED: "THE POLEMICAL", WHICH REFERS TO HIS EARLIER REJECTION OF THE CLASSICAL TRADITION AS BEING INCURABLY DUALISTIC; "THE HISTORICO-CRITICAL", WHICH FOCUSES ON HIS CULTURAL RELATIVISM AS THE CONTEXT FOR HIS MORE JUDICIOUS ASSESSMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS; AND "THE CUMULATIVE", WHICH EXAMINES CERTAIN CENTRAL FEATURES DEWEY SHARED WITH PLATO AND ARISTOTLE AND EXTENDED SIGNIFICANTLY. DEWEY'S DEVELOPMENT IN APPROACHING THE GREEKS IS EXAMINED AND HIS OVERSIMPLIFICATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS EXPOSED. DEWEY ACKNOWLEDGED A DEEP AFFINITY TO PLATO WHILE FOR ARISTOTLE HE SHOWED MARKED REPROBATION. THE MAIN REASON FOR DEWEY'S LIMITED INSIGHTS INTO GREEK PHILOSOPHY MUST BE PRIMARILY ATTRIBUTED TO HIS FAILURE TO EXTEND TO HIS HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS THE SAME CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS HE CONSIDERED CENTRAL TO HIS PRAGMATIC METHODOLOGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Antony1997, author = {Antony, Louise-M}, title = {Feeling Fine About the Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {381-387}, keywords = {feeling, feminism, knowledge, mind, social-philosoph}, abstract = {The article presents a critique of John Searle's attack on computationalist theories of mind in his recent book, The Rediscovery of the Mind. Searle is guilty of caricaturing his opponents and of ignoring their arguments. Moreover, his own positive theory of mind, which he claims "takes account of" subjectivity, turns out to offer no discernible advantages over the views he rejects.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AQUILA1989, author = {AQUILA, RICHARD-E}, title = {INTENTIONALITY, CONTENT, AND PRIMITIVE MENTAL DIRECTEDNESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {583-604}, keywords = {content, intentionality, mental-states; metaphysics, quality}, abstract = {A WAY OF LOOKING AT THE OPAQUE INTENTIONALITY OF MENTAL STATES IS PROPOSED. THE PROPOSAL COMBINES A FEATURE OF EACH OF TWO APPROACHES. ONE MAY APPEAL TO THOSE OF A MORE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSUASION, ANALYZING INTENTIONALITY IN TERMS OF DETERMINATE FORMS OF AN IRREDUCIBLE QUALITY OF MENTAL DIRECTEDNESS. THE OTHER REDUCES INTENTIONALITY TO THE IN-PRINCIPLE TRANSLATABILITY OF THE "CONTENTS" OF MENTAL STATES. BOTH APPROACHES MAY ALSO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY MEANS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF NONINTENTIONAL (AND UNTRANSLATABLE) IMPRESSIONS OR "RAW FEELS." THE PROPOSAL AFFORDS A MORE ADEQUATE FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOMMODATING THE ROLE OF BEHAVIORAL, AND OTHER "CONTEXTUAL," MATERIAL IN INTENTION. IN GENERAL, IT PROVIDES FOR A SYNTHESIS OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND AT LEAST BROADLY BEHAVIORISTIC, OR EVEN FUNCTIONALISTIC, INTUITIONS. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AQUILA1977, author = {AQUILA, RICHARD-E}, title = {TWO PROBLEMS OF BEING AND NON-BEING IN SARTRE'S "BEING AND NOTHINGNESS".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {167-186}, keywords = {body, consciousness, factuality, negative-facts; nothingness, person, phenomena, philosophical-anthropolog}, abstract = {SARTRE'S CLAIM THAT "BEING-FOR-ITSELF" IS A KIND OF NON-BEING IS REALLY TWO CLAIMS WHICH DIFFER IN A WAY NOT GENERALLY RECOGNIZED BY COMMENTATORS. THAT THE BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS A KIND OF NON-BEING IS SARTRE'S WAY OF SAYING THAT A STATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS A STATE OF AFFAIRS INVOLVING AN OBJECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND NOTHING ELSE. PUTTING IT THUS MAKES IT CLEARER THAN SARTRE DOES WHAT ONTOLOGICAL ISSUES ARE RAISED BY HIS CLAIM THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS UNIQUE. THE CLAIM THAT THE BEING OF PERSONS IS A KIND OF NON-BEING IS A VERY DIFFERENT SORT OF CLAIM. UNLIKE THE OTHER, IT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE VIEW THAT PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PERSONS, AS DISTINCT FROM CERTAIN PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THOSE PROPOSITIONS, HAVE AN OBJECTIVE TRUTH VALUE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AQUILA1974, author = {AQUILA, RICHARD-E}, title = {BRENTANO, DESCARTES, AND HUME ON AWARENESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {223-239}, keywords = {awareness, epistemology, intentionality}, abstract = {BRENTANO'S CLAIMS ABOUT INTENTIONALITY DO NOT BEAR SOLELY ON A CONCERN WITH THE POSITIVE NATURE OF MENTAL STATES. THEY ALSO HAVE NO BEARING ON THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL/MATERIAL IDENTITY. PART OF THEIR POINT IS JUST TO OPPOSE A CERTAIN VIEW ABOUT THE PROPER OBJECTS OF AWARENESS, NAMELY THAT INSOFAR AS WE ARE AWARE OF OBJECTS THEY HAVE AN EXISTENCE "IN THE MIND." BOTH HUME AND DESCARTES HELD SUCH A VIEW. AN EXAMINATION OF THE NOTIONS OF "IDEA" AND "OBJECTIVE REALITY" SHOWS THE INACCURACY OF REGARDING DESCARTES AS A "REPRESENTATIVE REALIST." WHAT REPRESENTS EXTERNAL NATURES IN THE MIND IS JUST THOSE NATURES THEMSELVES INSOFAR AS THEY EXIST IN THE MIND.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AQVIST1962, author = {AQVIST, LENNART}, title = {SEMANTIC CONCEPTS OF EXPRESSION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {89-100}, keywords = {emotivism, expression, language, meaning, mental-states; persuasive-definition; proposition, semantics, sentence}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARD1983, author = {ARD, DAVID-J}, title = {KNOWING A NAME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {377-388}, keywords = {language, name, proposition}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Arkonovich2001, author = {Arkonovich, Steven}, title = {Defending Desire: Scanlon's Anti-Humeanism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {499-519}, keywords = {desire, ethics, humean, reason}, abstract = {In the opening chapter of What We Owe To Each Other, Tim Scanlon produces a sustained critique of a Humean conception of practical reason. Scanlon claims he will argue that unless having a desire just is to see something as a reason, desires play (almost) no role in the explanation or justification of action. Yet his specific arguments against Humeanism all employ a very austere understanding of desire (which he calls the "standard model"), and attempt to show that desires so understood are not up to any explanatory or justificatory task. Since the standard model represents only one understanding of desire (distinct from the "recognition of reasons") his specific arguments cannot establish his stated general thesis. I show how a more robust conception of desire will leave the Humean account safe from Scanlon's specific arguments.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARMSTRONG1973, author = {ARMSTRONG, A-MAC}, title = {ON METHODOLOGICAL MATERIALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {62-72}, keywords = {historiography, materialism, natural-sciences; science}, abstract = {CONTRASTS THE PRINCIPLES OF HISTORIOGRAPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE, AND CONCLUDES THAT IT IS WAYWARD TO PREDICT THAT THE PHENOMENA OF ALL LIVING ORGANISMS WILL EVENTUALLY BE EXPLAINED SOLELY IN TERMS OF PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY. FOR THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO HISTORY OF NATURAL SCIENCE AND NO SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS, IF THE ASCERTAINMENT OF SCIENTIFIC TRUTH HAD NOT ITSELF BEEN UNDERSTOOD (NOT IN SCIENTIFIC BUT) IN HISTORICAL TERMS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARMSTRONG1963, author = {ARMSTRONG, A-MAC-C}, title = {REPLY TO PROFESSOR ROBINSON'S "MR ARMSTRONG ON PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {437-438}, keywords = {cognition, common-sense; definition, philosophy, scottish}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARMSTRONG1962, author = {ARMSTRONG, A-MAC-C}, title = {PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {354-359}, keywords = {common-sense; error, philosophy, public, relevance, reliability, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Armstrong1993, author = {Armstrong, D-M}, title = {The Identification Problem and the Inference Problem}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {421-422}, keywords = {epistemology, inference, laws, nature, universal}, abstract = {The object is to answer Van Fraassen's criticism, in his "Laws and Symmetry", of the view that laws of nature are relationships of properties. Such a view, Van Fraassen holds, must either fail to make clear what is the law-making relation (the Identity problem) or else fail to tell us about "what happens and what things are like" (the inference problem). The answer proposed begins with the claim that there is direct perception of singular causal connection.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARMSTRONG1970, author = {ARMSTRONG, ROBERT-L}, title = {THE SWITCHES PARADOX.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {421-427}, keywords = {implication, intuition, logic, paradox}, abstract = {"IF YOU CLOSE SWITCH P AND YOU CLOSE SWITCH Q, THEN BELL R WILL RING. THEREFORE, IF YOU CLOSE SWITCH P BELL R WILL RING OR, IF YOU CLOSE SWITCH Q BELL R WILL RING". THIS ARGUMENT IS FORMALLY VALID BUT ORDINARY INTUITION NATURALLY REJECTS IT. IT IS RESOLVED BY OBSERVING THAT THE ORDINARY INTUITION INTERPRETS THE CONCLUSION, (P IMPLIES R) OR (Q IMPLIES R), AS IF IT WERE (P OR Q) IMPLY R. SUGGESTIONS INVOLVING BOTH LANGUAGE USAGE AND FORMAL LOGIC ARE OFFERED FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF THIS PARADOX.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARONOVITCH1979, author = {ARONOVITCH, HILLIARD}, title = {RATIONAL MOTIVATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {173-193}, keywords = {action, justification, metaphysics, motivation, reasons}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Arpaly2005, author = {Arpaly, Nomy}, title = {Comments on Lack of Character by John Doris}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {643-647}, keywords = {behavior, character, empiricism, ethics, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARTHADEVA1961, author = {ARTHADEVA, B-M}, title = {NAIVE REALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF COLOR-SEEING IN DIM LIGHT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {467-478}, keywords = {change, color, epistemology, light, object, perception, realism, seeing}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ASENJO1966, author = {ASENJO, F-G}, title = {ONE AND MANY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {361-370}, keywords = {composition, division, many, metaphysics, one, ontology, part, reality, whole, world}, abstract = {AMONG THE CATEGORIES THAT ARISTOTLE EMPLOYED, EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY, FEW HAVE UNDERGONE LESS CRITICAL ANALYSIS THAN "ONE" AND "MANY." THIS ARTICLE REVERSES THE ATOMISTIC CONCEPTION THAT "MANY" IS A MULTIPLICITY OF "ONES" AND INSTEAD TAKES THE POSITION THAT ONTOGENETICALLY DIVISION OCCURS PRIOR TO COMPOSITION. FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW, ONE AND MANY ARE DEFINED AS CHARACTERISTICS OF REALITY THAT APPEAR WHEN LARGE CONGLOMERATES ARE BEING DIVIDED INTO DISTINGUISHABLE PARTS. THIS DEFINITION IS FOLLOWED BY DESCRIPTIONS OF POSSIBLE WORLDS THAT CAN BE BUILT ON THE BASIS OF THE VARIOUS HIERARCHIC INTERRELATIONS WITH WHICH ONE AND MANY CAN BE INTERPRETED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ATHERTON1983, author = {ATHERTON, MARGARET}, title = {THE COHERENCE OF BERKELEY'S THEORY OF MIND.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {389-400}, keywords = {metaphysics, mind, spiritual-substanc}, abstract = {BERKELEY HAS BEEN NOTORIOUSLY CHARGED WITH INCONSISTENCY BECAUSE HE HELD THAT SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE EXISTS, ALTHOUGH HE ARGUED AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCE. BERKELEY IS ONLY INCONSISTENT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT HIS ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE PARALLELS THE REJECTED ARGUMENT FOR MATERIAL SUBSTANCE. I SHOW THAT BERKELEY IS RELYING ON QUITE A DIFFERENT ARGUMENT, ONE PERFECTLY CONSISTENT WITH HIS THEORY OF IDEAS, BASED ON PRESUPPOSITIONS THE GERMS OF WHICH CAN BE FOUND IN THE THOUGHT OF HIS PREDECESSORS IN THE THEORY OF IDEAS, DESCARTES AND LOCKE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Atherton2003, author = {Atherton, Margaret}, title = {How Berkeley Can Maintain That Snow Is White}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {101-113}, keywords = {color, epistemology, experience, mind}, abstract = {This paper develops an alternative reading of the First Dialogue arguments, in which their project is not to establish the mind-dependence of colors but instead to undermine the position that colors are also mind-independent. Under these circumstances, the coherence of the First and the Third Dialogue arguments is assured, just so long as the Third Dialogue claim to have established that snow is really white is not taken to mean that snow is mind-independently white, but instead, something like that our experiences of snow are stably and regularly white. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ATWELL1966, author = {ATWELL, JOHN-E}, title = {AUSTIN ON INCORRIGIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {261-266}, keywords = {epistemology, incorrigibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AUDI1988, author = {AUDI, ROBERT}, title = {JUSTIFICATION, TRUTH, AND RELIABILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {1-29}, keywords = {epistemology, justification, reliability, truth}, abstract = {THIS PAPER DEVELOPS AN ACCOUNT OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION--TELEOLOGICAL NORMATIVISM--WHICH IS INTERNALIST BUT NOT DEONTOLOGICAL, AND TELEOLOGICAL BUT NOT RELIABILIST. THE ACCOUNT ATTEMPTS TO DO JUSTICE TO BOTH THE NORMATIVE CHARACTER OF JUSTIFICATION AND ITS CONNECTION WITH TRUTH. SPECIAL EMPHASIS IS GIVEN TO DISTINGUISHING THE PROPERTY FROM THE PROCESS OF JUSTIFICATION AND TO EXPLAINING THEIR MUTUAL INTEGRATION. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Audi2003, author = {Audi, Robert}, title = {Precis of The Architecture of Reason}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {177-180}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, person, practical-reason; rationality}, abstract = {This book constructs a comprehensive theory of rationality. Part I addresses theoretical rationality, roughly the territory of epistemology. Part II concerns practical rationality, roughly the territory of rational action, rational desire, and moral conduct. The third, final part addresses global rationality, the overall rationality of persons. Throughout, the role of experience is central: theoretical reason represents, in good part, our cognitive responses to experience, and it yields our map of the world. Practical reason represents, in good part, our conative responses to experience, and, in the light of our beliefs, it yields a kind of itinerary for our lives. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Audi2003a, author = {Audi, Robert}, title = {Experience and Inference in the Grounding of Theoretical and Practical Reasons: Replies to Professors Fumerton, Marras, and Sinnott-Armstrong}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {202-221}, keywords = {epistemology, experience, inference, rationality, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Audi1996, author = {Audi, Robert}, title = {Objectivity and the Internal-External Reasons Controversy: A Study of Paul K. Moser's Philosophy after Objectivity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {395-400}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, objectivity, reason}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Audi1993, author = {Audi, Robert}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {968-970}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Structure of Justification}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1993} } @other{Audi1996a, author = {Audi, Robert and Wolterstorff, Nicholas}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {486-489}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate}, volume = {60(2)}, year = {1996} } @article{Aune1996, author = {Aune, Bruce}, title = {Haack's Evidence and Inquiry}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {627-632}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, evidence, inquiry}, abstract = {The essay is a critical comment on Susan Haack's Evidence and Inquiry; it attempts to show that in this work she does not fully come to terms with a basic problem faced squarely, though not successfully, by the alternative views that she rejects--namely, foundationalism and coherentism. The problem is how epistemically justified empirical propositions can reasonably be supposed to be true, approximately true, or probable. Haack uses two basic arguments to show that foundationalism and coherentism cannot solve this problem; it is argued that the view she favors, foundherentism, does not elude the force, evidently, of these same arguments.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AUNE1963, author = {AUNE, BRUCE}, title = {ABILITIES, MODALITIES, AND FREE WILL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {397-413}, keywords = {ability, action, can, coercion, could-have; determinism, free-will; metaphysics, modality}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE IS TO ESTABLISH THAT "COULD HAVE" STATEMENTS, THOUGH IN NO WAY EQUIVALENT TO A SET OF HYPOTHETICALS, ARE STILL SUFFICIENTLY IFFY TO VINDICATE MOORE'S ANALYSIS OF THE FREE-WILL PROBLEM. THE ARTICLE EXAMINES THE DIFFERENT SENSES OF "COULD," AND CONCLUDES THAT THE "ABILITY" SENSE IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE. THE MOOREAN SOLUTION IS ELABORATED, IN ORDER TO SAVE FREE-WILL IN THE FACE OF DETERMINISM. PEOPLE COULD HAVE DONE OTHER THAN WHAT THEY DID--EVEN THOUGH THE ACTIONS THEY ACTUALLY PERFORMED HAD CAUSAL ANTECEDENTS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AUSTIN1978, author = {AUSTIN, JAMES-W}, title = {RUSSELL'S CRYPTIC RESPONSE TO STRAWSON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {531-537}, keywords = {denoting, description, egocentrism, epistemology, extensionality, particulars, referring, sentence}, abstract = {IN A HASTILY WRITTEN PAPER, "MR. STRAWSON ON REFERRING," BERTRAND RUSSELL DEFENDED HIS THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS FROM THE CRITICISM LEVELED AT IT IN STRAWSON'S "ON REFERRING." RUSSELL'S DEFENSE, HOWEVER, RAMBLES AND APPEARS CURT IN PLACES AND GENERALLY CRYPTIC. CONSEQUENTLY, LITTLE ATTENTION IS PAID TO IT NOWADAYS. I TRY TO SHOW THAT IT DOES CONTAIN A COHERENT THOUGH SKELETAL REBUTTAL. IN SPITE OF THIS FACT, IT MUST BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE THEORY IS VULNERABLE FROM ANOTHER FLANK, VIZ., FROM ITS ORIGINS IN THE THEORY OF PROPER NAMES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AUSTIN1980, author = {AUSTIN, JAMES}, title = {WITTGENSTEIN'S SOLUTIONS TO THE COLOR EXCLUSION PROBLEM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {142-149}, keywords = {color, language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AVERILL1978, author = {AVERILL, EDWARD}, title = {EXPLAINING THE PRIVACY OF AFTERIMAGES AND PAINS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {299-314}, keywords = {after-image; epistemology, object, pain, perception, public, reflection}, abstract = {AN AFTER-IMAGE IS (1) AN EXPERIENCE OF A COLOR SPOT THAT IS CAUSED A CERTAIN WAY AND (2) THE COLOR SPOT IS PRIVATE. CONDITION (1) DOES NOT IMPLY CONDITION (2). IF THE RIGHT CONCEPT WERE INTRODUCED INTO OUR LANGUAGE, EXPERIENCE THAT MEETS CONDITION ONE WOULD BE CONCEIVED OF AS A PERCEPTION OF A PUBLIC OBJECT. SUCH A CONCEPT IS FULLY DEVELOPED. THUS THE PRIVACY ASSOCIATED WITH AFTER-IMAGES IS DUE TO THE HISTORICAL REASONS THAT LED TO THE ADOPTION OF ONE CONCEPT RATHER THAN ANOTHER. A PARALLEL EXPLANATION IS GIVEN FOR THE PRIVACY OF PAIN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AVERILL1982, author = {AVERILL, EDWARD}, title = {ESSENCE AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY IN KRIPKE AND PUTNAM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {253-258}, keywords = {discovery, science}, abstract = {THE CLAIM THAT IF GOLD HAS THE ATOMIC NUMBER 79 THEN GOLD NECESSARILY HAS THE ATOMIC NUMBER 79 IS SHOWN TO BE FALSE. THE KRIPKE-PUTNAM ARGUMENT FOR THIS CLAIM IS REWORKED TO SHOW THIS: IF A PROPERTY OF GOLD (LIKE ATOMIC NUMBER) PLAYS A BASIC ROLE IN A THEORY OF SUBSTANCE, THAT IS BOTH TRUE AND THE BEST MOST COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF SUBSTANCE POSSIBLE, THEN GOLD NECESSARILY HAS THIS PROPERTY. 'BASIC ROLE' IS EXPLAINED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AXINN1964, author = {AXINN, SIDNEY}, title = {AND YET: A KANTIAN ANALYSIS OF AESTHETIC INTEREST.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {108-116}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, contradiction, human-nature; intention, interest, poetry}, abstract = {SUPPOSE THAT, IN ADDITION TO HAVING CONTRADICTORY INTENTIONS AS THEIR ESSENTIAL NATURE, HUMANS KNOW THEMSELVES TO HAVE CONTRADICTORY INTENTIONS. THE SPECTACLE THAT SUCH INDIVIDUALS PRESENT TO THEMSELVES IS THAT OF AN ENTITY THAT TRIES TO MOVE IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS, "AND YET" HAS COHERENCE. FOR KANT, INDIVIDUALS ARE CONTINUALLY TORN BETWEEN THEIR PERSONAL INTEREST IN PLEASURE AND THEIR HUMAN INTEREST IN MANKIND'S RATIONAL PROGRESS. THIS IS THE ONE-MANY PREDICAMENT THAT ART WORKS OBJECTIFY. THE "NATURE" THAT ART IMITATES IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NATURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL. BY GENERALIZING ON THIS FRAMEWORK WE FIND A BASIS FOR THE AESTHETIC INTEREST OF DEVICES SUCH AS "CONTRAPPOSTO", RHYTHM, ALLITERATION, A PLAY WITHIN A PLAY, ETC. THE AESTHETIC MOMENT IS ASSUMED TO BE THE MOMENT IN WHICH ONE BOTH WANTS SOMETHING TO CONTINUE BECAUSE IT GIVES PLEASURE "AND YET" FEELS THAT IT MUST NOT CONTINUE BECAUSE IT IS IRRATIONAL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Aydede2000, author = {Aydede, Murat}, title = {An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Pain}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(3)}, pages = {537-570}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, pain, pleasure}, abstract = {After distinguishing between affective and sensory (informational) components of these experiences, I argue that although pain experiences normally consist of both components proper to them, pleasure, in contradistinction to pain, is only the affective component of a total experience that may involve many sensations proper and cognitions. Moreover, I hold that although the so-called "physical" pleasure is itself not a sensation proper, it is nevertheless an episodic affective reaction (in a primitive sense) to sensations proper. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baber1992, author = {Baber, Harriet-E}, title = {Almost Indiscernible Twins}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {365-382}, keywords = {epistemology, extrinsic, intrinsic, object, temporality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BACH1981, author = {BACH, KENT}, title = {AN ANALYSIS OF SELF-DECEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {351-370}, keywords = {epistemology, rationalization, self-deceptio}, abstract = {PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD, SELF-DECEPTION IS NOT PARADOXICAL. IT DOES NOT INVOLVE EXPLICITLY CONTRADICTORY BELIEFS, INCOHERENT INTENTIONS, OR MULTIPLE SELVES. DISTINGUISH (OCCURRENTLY) THINKING THAT "P" FROM BOTH BELIEVING THAT "P" AND FROM ENTERTAINING THAT "P". THEN DEFINE SELF-DECEPTION AS MOTIVATED (THOUGH NOT INTENTIONAL) AVOIDANCE OF SUSTAINED OR RECURRENT THOUGHT THAT "P" (DESPITE ONE'S BELIEF). THERE ARE THREE WAYS OF DOING IT: "EVASION, JAMMING", AND "RATIONALIZATION", WHICH INVOLVE, RESPECTIVELY, AVOIDING THE NASTY THOUGHT, COVERING IT UP, AND EXPLAINING IT AWAY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BACH1985, author = {BACH, KENT}, title = {MORE ON SELF-DECEPTION: REPLY TO HELLMAN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {611-614}, keywords = {believing, philosophy, self-deceptio}, abstract = {THIS IS A REPLY TO NATHAN HELLMAN'S TWO OBJECTIONS, IN "BACH ON SELF-DECEPTION" (PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 44, SEPTEMBER, 1983), TO "AN ANALYSIS OF SELF-DECEPTION" (PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 41, MARCH, 1981). FOR ME SELF-DECEPTION IS NOT A MATTER OF GETTING ONESELF TO BELIEVE THE OPPOSITE OF A PROPOSITION "P" ONE BELIEVES (OR HAS PATENTLY STRONG EVIDENCE FOR) BUT IS SOMETHING WEAKER THAN THAT: AVOIDING THE THOUGHT THAT "P", AT LEAST ON A SUSTAINED OR RECURRENT BASIS. HELLMAN FINDS IT "PUZZLING THAT ONE COULD THINK THAT NOT-"P" ON A SUSTAINED, RECURRENT BASIS" IF ONE POSSESSED CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE FOR "P". HIS PUZZLE SUFFERS FROM A MISPLACED "NOT": MY ANALYSIS REQUIRES NOT THAT THE SELF-DECEIVER THINK THAT NOT-"P" BUT THAT HE NOT THINK THAT "P" ON A SUSTAINED, RECURRENT BASIS. HELLMAN'S SECOND OBJECTION IS ALSO ANSWERED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BACH1977, author = {BACH, KENT}, title = {WHEN TO ASK, "WHAT IF EVERYONE DID THAT".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {464-481}, keywords = {categorical-imperative; deliberation, ethics, morality, obligation, utilitarianism}, abstract = {WHEN IS IT MORALLY RELEVANT TO ASK THE "EVERYONE ELSE QUESTION" (EEQ) ABOUT A CONTEMPLATED ACTION? NOT IN PRIVATE DELIBERATION, EVEN ABOUT A "CUMULATIVE ACTION." A SOCIAL RULE REQUIRING PEOPLE TO ASK THE EEQ IS JUSTIFIED ONLY IF (1) GENERAL BUT NOT UNIVERSAL PERFORMANCE OF THE ACTION IN QUESTION IS SOCIALLY NECESSARY, (2) PEOPLE'S DECISIONS WHETHER TO DO IT ARE INTERDEPENDENT, AND (3) THERE IS "COGNITIVE SYMMETRY." ASKING THE EEQ ACHIEVES NOT JUSTICE BUT COGNITIVE STABILITY IN SOCIAL EFFORTS. EVERYONE'S ASKING IT AVOIDS THE COGNITIVE ONE-UPMANSHIP OF TOO MANY PEOPLE, EACH THINKING ENOUGH OTHERS WILL DO THEIR PART, MAKING EXCEPTIONS OF THEMSELVES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BACHRACH1971, author = {BACHRACH, JAY-E}, title = {TYPE AND TOKEN AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE WORK OF ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {415-420}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, identity, token, type}, abstract = {SOME PHILOSOPHERS FAVOR A TYPE/TOKEN ANALYSIS FOR IDENTIFYING WORKS OF ART. CERTAIN ARGUMENTS SHOW THAT THIS SCHEME IS MISTAKEN. THE GENERAL QUESTION IS RAISED: WHAT SORTS OF THINGS DO TITLES OF WORKS IDENTIFY? SOMETIMES TITLES DO NOT NAME; BUT INSOFAR AS THE STATEMENTS IN WHICH TITLES OCCUR ARE MEANINGFUL, SUITABLE EQUIVALENCES CAN BE FOUND WHICH DO REFER TO PHYSICAL OBJECTS OR EVENTS. ON OTHER OCCASIONS, TITLES OFTEN REFER TO AESTHETIC OBJECTS. STILL AT OTHER TIMES NONAESTHETIC OBJECTS ARE NAMED. THE LOCATION OF THE WORK OF ART IS THUS DETERMINED BY THE USE OF THE TITLE. IN THE CASE IN WHICH THE TITLE IS NONREFERRING IT IS ERRONEOUS TO SEEK THE AESTHETIC OBJECT. IN THE CASE OF THE TITLE REFERRING TO A PARTICULAR AESTHETIC OBJECT OR EVENT THE WORK CAN BE READILY LOCATED. THE THIRD USE OF THE TITLE AS REFERRING TO NONAESTHETIC OBJECTS IS, OF COURSE, NOT DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO THE QUESTION OF THE LOCATION OF THE WORK.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BADHWAR1987, author = {BADHWAR, NEERA-KAPUR}, title = {FRIENDS AS ENDS IN THEMSELVES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {1-23}, keywords = {ethics, friendship, love}, abstract = {IN END FRIENDSHIPS, FRIENDS LOVE EACH OTHER INTRINSICALLY, NOT INSTRUMENTALLY, AND AS A SOURCE OF PLEASURE, THUS AS A GOOD TO THEMSELVES. BUT IT IS COMMONLY THOUGHT THAT END LOVE IS "UNCONDITIONAL", SELF-BENEFICIAL LOVE "INSTRUMENTAL", AND FRIENDSHIP THEREFORE BOTH UNCONDITIONAL AND INSTRUMENTAL. THIS VIEW, HOWEVER, CONTRADICTS THE IDEA THAT IN END FRIENDSHIP, THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS UNIQUE AND IRREPLACEABLE. IF SOMEONE LOVES YOU UNCONDITIONALLY, HE LOVES YOU REGARDLESS OF YOUR QUALITIES; IF INSTRUMENTALLY, THEN AS REPLACEABLE BY ANYONE WITH YOUR USEFUL QUALITIES. IN NEITHER CASE DOES HE LOVE THE UNIQUE INDIVIDUAL THAT IS "YOU". THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT END LOVE, AND THE PLEASURE THAT PARTLY DEFINES IT, IS CONDITIONAL ON THE FUNDAMENTAL QUALITIES THAT MAKE THE FRIEND THAT PARTICULAR, IRREPLACEABLE PERSON, NOT ON THE FRIEND FULFILLING ONE'S INDEPENDENTLY DEFINED GOALS. THIS ANALYSIS OPENS THE LOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF JUSTIFYING MORALITY AS BOTH AN END IN ITSELF AND A GOOD TO ONESELF.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAHM1961, author = {BAHM, ARCHIE-J}, title = {POLARITY: A DESCRIPTIVE HYPOTHESIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {347-360}, keywords = {category, complementarity, metaphysics, opposition, polarity, tension}, abstract = {IT IS ASKED, WHAT IS POLARITY? BAHM STATES THAT THE CONCEPT INVOLVES AT LEAST THREE CATEGORIES--OPPOSITENESS, COMPLEMENTARITY, AND TENSION. HIS HYPOTHESIS IS THAT ANY TWO CATEGORIES ESSENTIAL TO THE NATURE OF POLARITY MUTUALLY INVOLVE EACH OTHER. OPPOSITENESS HAS TWO POSITIVES, EACH OF WHICH IS OPPOSED TO THE OTHER. COMPLEMENTARITY PRESUPPOSES OPPOSITENESS, AND HAS: SUPPLEMENTARITY, INTERDEPENDENCE, DIMENSION, RECIPROCITY. TENSION IS A STRETCHING OF ANYTHING DUE TO TWO OR MORE DIVERGENT TENDENCIES. HENCE, POLARITY CATEGORICALLY INVOLVES OPPOSITENESS, COMPLEMENTARITY, AND TENSION. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAHM1961a, author = {BAHM, ARCHIE-J}, title = {MEANINGS OF NEGATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {179-184}, keywords = {metaphysics, negation, organicism, relation, theory, type}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAIER1991, author = {BAIER, Annette-C}, title = {MacIntyre on Hume.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {ethics, judgment}, abstract = {MacIntyre's treatment of Hume's ethics, in Whose Justice, Which Rationality? is praised for its rich textual basis, and criticised for its over-emphasis on Hume's endorsement of early capitalist forms of life, what MacIntyre calls his "anglicising subversion" of Scottish culture. Hume was cosmopolitan more than "anglophile," as were many other Scots in the eighteenth century.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAIER1980, author = {BAIER, ANNETTE}, title = {HELPING HUME TO "COMPLEAT THE UNION".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {167-186}, keywords = {associationism, family-resemblance; modern, thought}, abstract = {HUME'S KEY EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONCEPTS, THOSE OF "VIVACIOUS" PERCEPTIONS, DERIVATIVE LESS LIVELY IDEAS, OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN IDEAS, ARE RELATED TO HIS VIEWS ABOUT LIVING PERSONS AND THEIR OFFSPRING, AND THE FORMS OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PERSONS. THE PRIMACY IN HUME'S THOUGHT OF THE NATURAL FAMILY, AND OF ASSOCIATION IN THE FAMILY, IS EXPLORED AND DEVELOPED, AND THE EXTENSION OF ASSOCIATION BEYOND THE FAMILY, BY SOCIAL ARTIFICES, IS RELATED TO THE FICTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING, WHICH EXTEND THE COMBINATORIAL POTENTIAL OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. TO DERIVE MENTAL ASSOCIATION FROM SOCIAL ASSOCIATION IS BOTH TO INTERCONNECT THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL ASSOCIATION, COMPLETE THEIR UNION, AND ALSO TO COMPLETE THE MASTERY OF REASON BY THE SOCIAL PASSIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baier2001, author = {Baier, Kurt-E}, title = {Justified Morality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {427-433}, keywords = {ethics, justification, morality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAILIFF1964, author = {BAILIFF, JOHN-D}, title = {SOME COMMENTS ON THE 'IDEAL OBSERVER'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {423-428}, keywords = {disinterestedness, ethics, ideal-observer; language, meaning, objectivity}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS NOT TO EXAMINE THE CONCEPT OF THE IDEAL OBSERVER AS TO ITS QUALIFICATIONS AS AN ETHICAL THEORY, BUT TO EXPOSE THE IMPLICATIONS IT HAS FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF RATIONALITY IN ETHICAL DISCOURSE. THE "IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY" IS REALLY NOT VALUE-FREE, ACCORDING TO THE AUTHOR. THE MEANING OF SUCH AN OBSERVER IS FULLY EXPLORED, IN TERMS OF BEING "IMPARTIAL," "FULLY INFORMED," "IDEALLY RATIONAL," ETC., AND RATIONALITY IS FINALLY NOTED TO BE NOT A PERFECT UNIFORMITY OF ATTITUDES AMONG IDEAL OBSERVERS BUT THE FREEDOM AND WILLINGNESS TO ASK FOR REASONS, TO ARGUE. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baker2002, author = {Baker, Lynne-Rudder}, title = {The Ontological Status of Persons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {370-388}, keywords = {metaphysics, ontology, person, status}, abstract = {Things of kind K have ontological significance if their persistence conditions are determined by their being members of K. On Chisholm's view, persons have ontological significance, but animals do not. On animalism, animals have ontological significance, but persons do not. After explaining the notion of ontological significance, this article argues that persons do have ontological significance and, hence, that animalism is not true. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baker2002a, author = {Baker, Lynne-Rudder}, title = {Brief Reply to Rosenkrantz's Comments on My "The Ontological Status of Persons"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {394-396}, keywords = {knowledge, metaphysics, ontology, person}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baker2002b, author = {Baker, Lynne-Rudder}, title = {Precis of Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {592-598}, keywords = {body, constitution, human, metaphysics, person}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baker2002c, author = {Baker, Lynne-Rudder}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {623-635}, keywords = {constitution, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baker1999, author = {Baker, Lynne-Rudder}, title = {What Am I?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {151-159}, keywords = {biology, embryo, person, personal-identity; science}, abstract = {Eric T. Olson has argued that any view of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity has a consequence that he considers untenable--namely, that he was never an early-term fetus. I have several replies. First, the psychological-continuity view of personal identity does not entail the putative consequence; the appearance to the contrary depends on not distinguishing between de re and de dicto theses. Second, the putative consequence is not untenable anyway; the appearance to the contrary depends on not taking seriously an idea that underlies a plausible view of persons that I call 'the Constitution View." Finally, Olson's own "Biological View of personal identity" has liabilities of its own.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bakhurst2005, author = {Bakhurst, David}, title = {Wiggins on Persons and Human Nature}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {462-469}, keywords = {human-nature; interpretation, metaphysics, person, social-constructionis}, abstract = {This paper examines the evolution of David Wiggins's view that persons are human animals. Wiggins maintains that person is "akin to" a natural kind concept. Yet he holds that the states and capacities constitutive of personhood are not explicable in natural-scientific terms. His view thus requires a way of acknowledging the intimate connection between our rationality and our animality. I argue that his position would be strengthened by embracing the idea that personhood is acquired as an aspect of our "second nature". If such a view is developed along lines suggested by McDowell and Vygotsky -- rather the social constructionism Wiggins's distains -- the resulting position harmonizes with Wiggins's broadly Aristotelian perspective and intensifies connections between the moral and metaphysical dimensions of his thought.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Balaguer1998, author = {Balaguer, Mark}, title = {Attitudes without Propositions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {805-826}, keywords = {attitude, belief, epistemology, proposition, semantics}, abstract = {This paper develops a novel version of anti-Platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the Platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing 'that'-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the for 'x believes that p' and 'delta means that p'. Briefly, the view is that (a) Platonists are right that 'that'-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions and, hence, (c) 'that'-clause-containing sentences of the above sort are not true--they are useful fiction. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Balaguer1998a, author = {Balaguer, Mark}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {239-242}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics}, volume = {63(1)}, year = {1998} } @article{BALL1991, author = {BALL, Stephen-W}, title = {Linguistic Intuitions and Varieties of Ethical Naturalism.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {ethical-naturalism; ethics, intuition, linguistics}, abstract = {The purpose of this essay is to develop, and defend, a linguistic argument against various forms of ethical naturalism. Contrary to both standard criticisms, the pre-philosophic linguistic intuitions of native speakers can provide helpful evidence against ethical naturalism. Variations on objections are considered, with emphasis on the current emotivist use of the argument. The essay concludes with an analysis of the application and limitations of the argument, as related to other, nonsemantic forms of naturalism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Balog2001, author = {Balog, Katalin}, title = {Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {645-652}, keywords = {conceptual-analysis; epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, physicalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bar-On1993, author = {Bar-On, Dorit}, title = {Indeterminacy of Translation -- Theory and Practice}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {781-810}, keywords = {eliminativism, indeterminacy, language, translation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bar-On2001, author = {Bar-On, Dorit and Long, Douglas-C}, title = {Avowals and First-Person Privilege}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {311-335}, keywords = {avowals, epistemology, first-person; knowledge, language, privilege, truth}, abstract = {When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called "first-person privilege." According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a sociolinguistic convention governing avowals. We reject both approaches. On our proposed account, a full explanation of the privilege must recognize avowals as expressive performances, which can be taken to reveal directly the subject's present mental condition. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BARBER1971, author = {BARBER, KENNETH}, title = {PART II: MEINONG'S ANALYSIS OF RELATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {564-584}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, relation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BARBER1970, author = {BARBER, KENNETH}, title = {MEINONG'S HUME STUDIES PART I: MEINONG'S NOMINALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {550-567}, keywords = {metaphysics, nominalism, realism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Barnes1997, author = {Barnes, Annette}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {242-245}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Seeing through Self-Deception}, volume = {63(1)}, year = {1997} } @article{BARNETTE1978, author = {BARNETTE, R-L}, title = {GROUNDING THE MENTAL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {39}, pages = {92-105}, keywords = {belief, identity-theory; individual, mentalism, metaphysics, physicalism}, abstract = {I EXAMINE CRITICALLY A RULE THAT IS TACITLY INVOKED BY NEARLY ALL PROPONENTS OF PHYSICALISM, WHICH I CALL THE RULE OF "GROUNDING THE MENTAL" (GM). AFTER FIRST CLARIFYING THE RULE, I THEN SHOW PRECISELY HOW STANDARD VERSIONS OF THE IDENTITY THESIS UNCRITICALLY ACCEPT IT (SPECIFICALLY, ARMSTRONG'S CENTRAL STATE MATERIALISM AND PUTNAM'S FUNCTIONALISM), AND SHOW HOW THESE POSITIONS ARE AFFECTED BY SERIOUS LOGICAL DIFFICULTIES. NEXT, I ARGUE THAT THE RULE SHOULD BE ABANDONED AND ALSO SHOW THAT THIS POSITION SHOULD NOT BOTHER A PHYSICALIST, FOR ADHERENCE TO THE GM RULE IS NOT A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR PHYSICALISM. I GO ON TO DEVELOP A DIRECTION FOR A PHYSICALISTIC THEORY WHICH DOES NOT ACCEPT GM, ONE WHICH IS HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY WORK IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND SYSTEMS-THEORY. I CONCLUDE WITH A LIST OF EIGHT AXIOMS WHICH WOULD BE HELPFUL IN ARTICULATING A FORMAL SEMANTICS FOR THE THEORY I OUTLINE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Baron1997, author = {Baron, Marcia-W and Pettit, Philip and Slote, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {721-723}, publisher = {Blackwell}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Three Methods of Ethics}, volume = {62(3)}, year = {1997} } @article{Barrett1999, author = {Barrett, Martin and Eells, Ellery and Fitelson, Branden (and-others)}, title = {Models and Reality--A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {237-241}, keywords = {epistemology, game-theory; model, reality, social-contrac}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Barrett2002, author = {Barrett, Matthew and Godfrey-Smith, Peter}, title = {Group Selection, Pluralism, and the Evolution of Altruism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {685-691}, keywords = {altruism, ethics, evolution, group, pluralism}, abstract = {Sober and Wilson have done evolutionary biologists and philosophers of biology a great service in writing this book. They vigorously defend a "multilevel" view of natural selection, in which group selection can play a significant role, and argue that group selection was involved in the evolution of altruistic behavior in humans. The book is entirely persuasive in its argument that attempts to marginalize group-selectionist ideas in the latter part of the 20th century were mistaken. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BARTKY1970, author = {BARTKY, S-L}, title = {ORIGINATIVE THINKING IN THE LATER PHILOSOPHY OF HEIDEGGER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {368-381}, keywords = {being, historicism, naming, nihilism, thinking}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BARTKY1979, author = {BARTKY, SANDRA-LEE}, title = {HEIDEGGER AND THE MODES OF WORLD-DISCLOSURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {212-236}, keywords = {being, disclosure, language, metaphysics, thinking, world}, abstract = {FOR THE LATER HEIDEGGER, THE BEING-EVENT TAKES TWO FORMS: THE "HORIZONTAL" BEING-EVENT REFERS TO THE WAY IN WHICH BEING HAS GIVEN BIRTH TO THE EPOCHS OF METAPHYSICS, WHILE WHAT I CALL THE "VERTICAL" BEING-EVENT REFERS TO THE MODES OF WORLD-DISCLOSURE "WITHIN" ANY EPOCH. FIVE MODES OF WORLD-DISCLOSURE MENTIONED IN A KEY CITATION FROM "HOLZWEGE" ARE SCRUTINIZED. I CONCLUDE THAT THE FIVE MODES COLLAPSE TO ONLY TWO, DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH FROM ONE ANOTHER AND THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A VERTICAL BEING-EVENT AS A WHOLE IS BEST BY A VARIETY OF CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES HAVING TO DO WITH THE "UNITY" OF THE MODES OF DISCLOSURE AND THE "CRITERIA" BY WHICH WE DISTINGUISH WHAT IS DISCLOSIVE FROM WHAT IS NOT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAUMER1964, author = {BAUMER, WILLIAM-H}, title = {EVIDENCE AND IDEAL EVIDENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {567-572}, keywords = {confirmation, epistemology, evidence, ideal, paradox, probability}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR NOTES THAT VINCENT'S REFUTATION OF POPPER'S CRITICISM OF A SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY FAILS. THERE IS A PARADOX OF IDEAL EVIDENCE; HOWEVER, THE SOURCE OF THIS PARADOX DISAPPEARS WHEN A CERTAIN RELATIONSHIP IS MADE CLEAR. THE FOLLOWING IS PRESENTED: IDEAL EVIDENCE MUST BE TAKEN AS SUPPORTING AN EMPIRICAL STATEMENT (NOT SOME LOGICAL TRUTH). "A, RELATIVE TO SOME EMPIRICAL STATEMENT IS PROBABLE TO THE DEGREE 1/2." (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAUMER1967, author = {BAUMER, WILLIAM-H}, title = {THE ONE SYSTEMATICALLY AMBIGUOUS CONCEPT OF PROBABILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {264-268}, keywords = {logic, probability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAXTER1991, author = {BAXTER, Donald-L-M}, title = {Berkeley, Perception, and Identity.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {identity, metaphysics, perception}, abstract = {Berkeley says both that one 'sometimes' immediately perceives the same thing by sight and touch, and that one 'never' does. To solve the contradiction I recommend and explain a distinction Berkeley himself makes-between two uses of 'same'. This solution unifies two seemingly inconsistent parts of Berkeley's whole project: He argues both that what we see are bits of light and color organized into a language by which God speaks to us about tactile sensations, and yet that we directly see ordinary objects. My solution explains how these can come to the same thing.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baxter1997, author = {Baxter, Donald-L-M}, title = {Abstraction, Inseparability, and Identity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {307-330}, keywords = {abstraction, epistemology, identity}, abstract = {Berkeley and Hume object to Locke's account of abstraction. Abstraction is separating in the mind what cannot be separated in reality. Their objection is that if a is inseparable in reality from b, then the idea of a is inseparable from the idea of b. The former inseparability is the reason for the latter. In most interpretations, however, commentators leave the former unexplained in explaining the latter. This article assumes that Berkeley and Hume present a unified from against Locke. Hume supplements Berkeley's argument just where there are gaps. In particular, Hume makes explicit something Berkeley leaves implicit: The argument against Locke depends on the principle that things are inseparable if and only if they are identical. Abstraction is thinking of one of an inseparable pair while not thinking of the other. But doing so entails thinking of something while not thinking of it. This is the fundamental objection.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baxter2005, author = {Baxter, Donald-L-M}, title = {Altruism, Grief, and Identity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {371-383}, keywords = {altruism, grief, identity, metaphysics}, abstract = {The divide between oneself and others has made altruism seem irrational to some thinkers, as Sidgwick points out. I use characterizations of grief, especially by St. Augustine, to question the divide, and use a composition-as-identity metaphysics of parts and wholes to make literal sense of those characterizations.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAYLIS1963, author = {BAYLIS, CHARLES-A}, title = {A CRITICISM OF LOVEJOY'S CASE FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL DUALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {527-537}, keywords = {critical-realism; dualism, epistemology, memory, monism, object, perception, sense-dat}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bayne2001, author = {Bayne, Tim}, title = {Chalmers on Justification of Phenomenal Judgments}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {407-419}, keywords = {consciousness, judgment, metaphysics, mind, phenomenology}, abstract = {We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind (TCM), David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully-justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PJs are justified, because it alone can underwrite the certainty of our phenomenal judgments. I argue that Chalmers is unable to sustain this claim.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEARD1966, author = {BEARD, ROBERT-W}, title = {ON PROFESSOR WHITE'S PUZZLE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {107-109}, keywords = {identicals, intensional-logic; logic, name, paradox, substitutivity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEARDSLEY1960, author = {BEARDSLEY, ELIZABETH-L}, title = {DETERMINISM AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {1-20}, keywords = {blame, determinism, equality, ethics, moral-judgment; praise, responsibility, worth}, abstract = {THE QUESTION IS POSED: CAN DETERMINISTS FIND A SATISFACTORY RATIONALE FOR MORAL PRAISE AND BLAME? THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT JUDGMENTS OF MORAL PRAISE AND BLAME, AFFIRMATIVE AS WELL AS NEGATIVE, CAN BE MADE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF DETERMINISM, PROVIDED THAT ONE ACCEPTS A MORE COMPLEX ACCOUNT OF THESE JUDGMENTS AND THEIR FOUNDATIONS THAN IS ORDINARILY SUPPLIED OR ASSUMED. SUCH JUDGMENTS ARE MADE FROM SEVERAL DIFFERENT STANDPOINTS, CALLED "MORAL PERSPECTIVES," AND IF THESE ARE UNDERSTOOD, DETERMINISTS NEED NOT FEEL UNEASY WHEN CONFRONTED BY THE CONCEPTS OF MORAL PRAISE AND BLAME. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEARDSLEY1970, author = {BEARDSLEY, ELIZABETH-LANE}, title = {MORAL DISAPPROVAL AND MORAL INDIGNATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {161-176}, keywords = {blame, ethics, illocutionary-act; indignation, moral}, abstract = {THE ILLOCUTIONARY ACT OF BLAMING---IN THE "BEHABITIVE" MODE DISTINGUISHED BY J L AUSTIN FROM THE "VERDICTIVE" AND "EXERCITIVE" MODES---IS BEST ANALYZED AS EXPRESSING MORAL DISAPPROVAL (ON WHICH MORAL INDIGNATION IS BASED). AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIVE CONDITIONS OF BEHABITIVE BLAMING REVEALS THAT VERDICTIVE BLAMING IS PRESUPPOSED BY IT, AND THEREFORE--CONTRARY TO A WIDELY-HELD VIEW---VERDICTIVE BLAMING CANNOT BE ANALYZED IN TERMS OF AN EMOTION OR ATTITUDE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEARDSLEY1965, author = {BEARDSLEY, MONROE-C}, title = {INTRINSIC VALUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {1-17}, keywords = {axiology, consequence, desire, end, intrinsic-value; justification, mean, naturalism}, abstract = {BEARDSLEY, ATTACKS THE PROPOSITION THAT THERE IS SUCH A THING AS INTRINSIC VALUE. SUCH VALUE WOULD HAVE TO BE INDEPENDENT OF ITS RELATION TO ANYTHING ELSE! THE REASONS FOR BELIEVING IN INTRINSIC VALUE ARE GIVEN: ARGUMENTS FROM DEFINITION, FROM A DIALECTICAL DEMONSTRATION, AND AN ATTEMPT AT EMPIRICAL CONFIRMATION. BEARDSLEY CONCLUDES THAT THE CONCEPT OF INTRINSIC VALUE IS INAPPLICABLE. EVEN IF SOMETHING HAS INTRINSIC VALUE WE COULD NOT KNOW IT, AND THEREFORE IT CAN PLAY NO ROLE IN ETHICAL OR AESTHETIC REASONING. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEARDSLEY1962, author = {BEARDSLEY, MONROE-C}, title = {THE METAPHORICAL TWIST.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {293-307}, keywords = {aesthetics, comparison, extension, intension, linguistic-analysis; metaphor, modifier, object, poetry, predicate}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO DISTINGUISH A THING-APPROACH AND A WORD-APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF ANALYZING METAPHOR. BEARDSLEY REJECTS THE OBJECT-COMPARISON THEORY OF METAPHOR IN FAVOR OF THE VERBAL-OPPOSITION THEORY, WHICH HE EXPLAINS AND DEFENDS. HE CONCLUDES THAT THE LATTER EXPLAINS THE ACKNOWLEDGED FEATURES OF METAPHOR AND MAKES NO ASSUMPTIONS THAT A SOUND PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE WOULD BE UNWILLING TO GRANT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Becker1998, author = {Becker, Lawrence-C}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {737-740}, publisher = {Princeton Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A New Stoicism}, volume = {64(3)}, year = {1998} } @article{Bedau1992, author = {Bedau, Mark}, title = {Where's the Good in Teleology?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {781-806}, keywords = {biology, good, science, teleology, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Beebee2000, author = {Beebee, Helen}, title = {The Non-Governing Conception of Laws of Nature}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(3)}, pages = {571-594}, keywords = {epistemology, natural-law; supervenience}, abstract = {Recently several thought experiments have been developed (by John Carroll amongst others) which have been alleged to refute the Ramsey-Lewis view of laws of nature. The paper aims to show that two such thought experiments fail to establish that the Ramsey-Lewis view is false, since they presuppose a conception of laws of nature that is radically at odds with the Humean conception of laws embodied by the Ramsey-Lewis view. In particular, the thought experiments presuppose that laws of nature govern the behavior of objects. The paper argues that the claim that laws govern should not be regarded as a conceptual truth. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEK1978, author = {BEK, KIM-H}, title = {THE LIMITS OF POSSIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {514-523}, keywords = {contradiction, incorrigibility, intuitionism, logic, possibility, proposition}, abstract = {IN HIS BOOK "CATEGORIAL FRAMEWORKS" STEPHAN KORNER ARGUES THAT THERE ARE NO PROPOSITIONS, NOT EVEN THE CLASSICAL LAW OF CONTRADICTION, WHICH ARE EXTERNALLY INCORRIGIBLE, I.E., PRESUPPOSED IN EVERY POSSIBLE THEORY. HIS RELATIVISTIC CONCLUSION RESTS ON AN INTERPRETATION OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC, WHICH IS FIRST CALLED IN QUESTION. IT IS THEN ARGUED THAT, THE QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION APART, IT IS ALL THE SAME NECESSARY TO ASSUME THE ABSOLUTE VALIDITY OF THE CLASSICAL LAW OF CONTRADICTION, BECAUSE IT IS A SUPREME AND INDISPENSABLE CRITERION OF WHAT A LOGICALLY POSSIBLE THEORY MEANS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BELAIEF1975, author = {BELAIEF, LYNNE}, title = {SELF-ESTEEM AND HUMAN EQUALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {25-43}, keywords = {equality, psychology, right, self-esteem; self-identity; social-philosoph}, abstract = {AIMING TO UNDERSTAND THE MEANING OF HUMAN EQUALITY AS IT EFFECTS SELF-ESTEEM, A PRELIMINARY DISTINCTION IS MADE BETWEEN EQUALITY EXPERIENCED AS A SUBJECTIVE (PSYCHOLOGICAL) PHENOMENON AND EQUALITY EXISTING AS AN ELEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE (SOCIAL) PATTERN OF A CULTURE. ATTENTION IS THEN GIVEN TO THE CAUSAL INTERACTION BETWEEN THE TWO LEVELS. THE SUBJECTIVE DIMENSION IS EXTENSIVELY ANALYZED, BOTH PHENOMENOLOGICALLY AND ETHICALLY. THE LATTER ANALYSIS LEADS TO GRIM CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF EQUALITY BEING TRULY UNDERSTOOD OR VALUED BY INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE ACCEPTED THE JUVENILE IDENTITY CONSCIOUSNESS THAT BASES SELF-ESTEEM ON COMPETITIVE SUPERIORITY. CONCRETE SPECULATION IS GIVEN CONCERNING POSSIBLE MEANS FOR ETHICAL CHANGE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bell1996, author = {Bell, David}, title = {The Formation of Concepts and the Structure of Thoughts}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {583-596}, keywords = {epistemology, language, sentence, structure, thought}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BELLIOTTI1987, author = {BELLIOTTI, RAYMOND-A}, title = {IS LAW A SHAM?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {25-44}, keywords = {ideology, jurisprudence, political-philosophy; politics}, abstract = {THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (CLS) IS COMPOSED MOSTLY OF ACADEMIC LAWYERS WHO SHARE A DISSATISFACTION WITH THE CURRENT STATUS OF CENTRIST-LIBERAL LEGAL THEORY, AND WHO ASPIRE TO RECONSTRUCT THE POLITICAL ORDER ALONG MORE EGALITARIAN BASES. THIS PAPER (1) EXPLAINS CLS'S VIEW OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND CLS'S POLITICAL AGENDA; (2) CRITICIZES ASPECTS OF CLS'S ATTACK ON CENTRIST-LIBERAL POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY; AND (3) SHOWS HOW THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN CLS AND CENTRIST-LIBERALS ARE MIRED IN A FAMILIAR DICHOTOMY: OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM, WHICH DICHOTOMY CLS MUST TRANSCEND IF IT IS TO REALIZE ITS RADICAL PROJECT. FINALLY, A NOTION OF THE "SELF" WHICH MAY BE HELPFUL TO CLS IN CONSTRUCTING ITS ALTERNATIVE LEGAL AND POLITICAL VISION IS SUGGESTED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BELNAP1991, author = {BELNAP, Nuel}, title = {Backwards and Forwards in the Modal Logic of Agency.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {action, agency, intensionality, logic, modal-logi}, abstract = {A modal logic is a logic whose grammar includes an intensional construct having sentences as both inputs and outputs. A "modal logic of agency" intends that some such construct express agency (or action), as, for example, the English construct "a sees to it that Q." The paper has four sections: (1) gives a brief retrospective, (2) restates some claims from an earlier work, (3) motivates the desirability of a modal logic of agency, and (4) draws ten pictures illustrating some of the cases in which such a logic can provide clarification.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ben-Ze'ev2004, author = {Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron}, title = {Emotions Are Not Mere Judgments}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {450-457}, keywords = {emotion, ethics, feeding, judgment, motivation}, abstract = {The search for the essence of emotions is a common feature of various views of emotions---many of which attempt to reduce emotions to one central component. Three major views that seek to define emotions via a basic component are: (a) that emotions are essentially a cognitive-evaluative state; (b) that emotions are feelings; (c) that emotions are desires. I believe that all these reductions are inadequate. I focus here on (a) as expressed in Nussbaum's recent view of emotions. I begin, however, by briefly discussing (b) and (c).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENCIVENGA1988, author = {BENCIVENGA, ERMANNO}, title = {THAT OBSCURE OBJECT OF DESIRE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {533-544}, keywords = {desire, metaphysics, object}, abstract = {VERBS OF DESIRE AND SEARCH ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO ACCOUNT FOR THAN (OTHER) INTENTIONAL CONTEXTS BECAUSE, WHEREAS WHAT WE THINK OF MAY WELL BE NONEXISTENT, WHAT WE DESIRE CANNOT BE. THIS DIFFICULTY IS TREATED HERE AS AN ANOMALY FOR THE TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL PARADIGM BASED ON THE CONCEPTUAL PRIORITY OF OBJECTS, AND THE POSSIBILITY IS EXPLORED OF DEALING WITH THE ANOMALY IN A DIFFERENT (KANTIAN) PARADIGM WHICH ATTRIBUTES CONCEPTUAL PRIORITY TO EXPERIENCES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENCIVENGA1987, author = {BENCIVENGA, ERMANNO}, title = {ECONOMY OF EXPRESSION AND AESTHETIC PLEASURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {615-630}, keywords = {aesthetic-judgment; aesthetics, completeness, expression, literature}, abstract = {MANY CRITICS FIND ECONOMICAL WORKS OF ART TO BE AESTHETICALLY MORE VALUABLE, BUT THEY DO NOT SAY WHY. AN EXPLANATION IS PROPOSED HERE IN THREE STEPS. FIRST, IT IS POINTED OUT THAT THE SPECTATOR OR READER GETS INVOLVED IN CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITIES, ANALOGOUS TO THOSE ORIGINALLY PERFORMED BY THE AUTHOR. SECOND, IT IS NOTICED THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE GENERALLY USEFUL FOR PEOPLE'S PRESERVATION AND WELFARE. THIRD, A COMBINED FREUD-LORENZ MODEL IS USED TO EXPLAIN WHY GENERALLY USEFUL ACTIVITIES SHOULD GIVE PLEASURE: PLEASURE IS THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL COUNTERPART OF THE DISCHARGE OF DRIVE ENERGY, WHICH ACCOMPANIES (NOT THE CONSUMMATION OF AN OBJECT, BUT) THE PERFORMING OF SOME MOVES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENDITT1976, author = {BENDITT, T-M}, title = {BENEFIT AND HARM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {116-120}, keywords = {benefit, harm, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENFIELD1971, author = {BENFIELD, DAVID-W}, title = {JOHNSTONE ON THE TRUTH OF PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {96-102}, keywords = {language, philosophy, statement, truth}, abstract = {IN THE THIRD CHAPTER OF "PHILOSOPHY AND ARGUMENT" H.W. JOHNSTONE ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS ARE NOT PROPOSITIONS WHICH ARE TRUE OR FALSE. IN THIS PAPER I ARGUE THAT JOHNSTONE FAILS TO ESTABLISH HIS THESIS. JOHNSTONE'S ARGUMENT DEPENDS ON HIS CLAIM THAT PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS ARE TRUE RELATIVE TO ARGUMENT. THIS CONCEPT OF TRUTH IS HIGHLY PROBLEMATIC, ALLOWING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT A PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENT CAN BE BOTH TRUE AND FALSE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENFIELD1977, author = {BENFIELD, DAVID-W}, title = {THE A PRIORI AND THE SELF-EVIDENT: A REPLY TO MR CASULLO'S "THE DEFINITION OF A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {225-227}, keywords = {a-priori; contingent, epistemology, necessary, proposition, self-eviden}, abstract = {IN AN EARLIER PAPER, "THE A PRIORI A POSTERIORI DISTINCTION," I ARGUED THAT ALL SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITIONS COULD BE KNOWN "A PRIORI". MR. CASULLO DISAGREES CLAIMING THAT IN KNOWING A CONTINGENT SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITION ONE MUST "APPEAL TO, OR TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, HIS PRESENT EXPERIENTIAL STATE...." IN THIS BRIEF REPLY I CONSIDER TWO ARGUMENTS DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE WAY IN WHICH WE KNOW CONTINGENT SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITIONS DIFFERS EPISTEMICALLY FROM THE WAY IN WHICH WE KNOW NECESSARY SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITIONS. I FIND BOTH ARGUMENTS DEFECTIVE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENFIELD1974, author = {BENFIELD, DAVID-W}, title = {THE A PRIORI-A POSTERIORI DISTINCTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {151-166}, keywords = {a-posteriori; a-priori; epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {PHILOSOPHERS FROM KANT TO QUINE HAVE CONFLATED THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE "A PRIORI" AND THE "A POSTERIORI", THE NECESSARY AND THE CONTINGENT, AND THE ANALYTIC AND THE SYNTHETIC. HOWEVER, IF THESE DISTINCTIONS ARE NOT BLURRED AND IF SUFFICIENT ATTENTION IS PAID TO THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF THE "A PRIORI", THEN IT IS CLEAR THAT THE "A PRIORI" SHOULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE NECESSARY. IN THIS PAPER I OFFER A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE "A PRIORI" AND I ARGUE THAT CERTAIN SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITIONS CAN BE KNOWN "A PRIORI" EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE NEITHER NECESSARY NOR ANALYTIC. I ALSO PROVIDE DEFINITIONS OF SEVERAL QUITE ONTOLOGICALLY DIVERSE "A PRIORI" ENTITIES. I CONCLUDE WITH AN EXPLANATION OF WHY THE "A POSTERIORI" IS NOT SIMPLY THE LOGICAL COMPLEMENT OF THE "A PRIORI" AND I OFFER ANALOGOUS DEFINITIONS OF "A POSTERIORI" ENTITIES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bennett1995, author = {Bennett, Jonathan}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {979-983}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Act Itself}, volume = {58(4)}, year = {1995} } @article{Bennett2004, author = {Bennett, Karen}, title = {Global Supervenience and Dependence}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {501-529}, keywords = {dependence, global, metaphysics, possible-world; supervenience, variation}, abstract = {Two versions of global supervenience have recently been distinguished from each other. I introduce a third version, which is more likely what people had in mind all along. However, I argue that one of the three versions is equivalent to strong supervenience in every sense that matters, and that neither of the other two versions counts as a genuine determination relation. I conclude that global supervenience has little metaphysically distinctive value.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENSMAN1968, author = {BENSMAN, JOSEPH and LILIENFELD, ROBERT}, title = {A PHENOMENOLOGICAL MODEL OF THE ARTISTIC AND CRITICAL ATTITUDES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {353-367}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, attitude, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BERGMAN1965, author = {BERGMAN, HUGO}, title = {BRENTANO ON THE HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {94-99}, keywords = {ancient, development, greek, history, laws, philosophy}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES BRENTANO'S GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY, ESPECIALLY AS A SCIENCE. IT ELUCIDATES FOUR PHASES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY, AS WELL AS IN ANY EPOCH; THESE ARE: ASCENDING, POPULARIZING, SKEPTICAL, AND MYSTICAL. THE ARTICLE ENDS BY ATTEMPTING TO SHOW THAT BRENTANO ATTEMPTED TO SEARCH FOR LAWS EVEN IN HISTORY AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, AND ACTUALLY THOUGHT OF PHILOSOPHY AS A LAWFUL DEVELOPMENT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bergmann2004, author = {Bergmann, Michael}, title = {Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {709-727}, keywords = {circularity, epistemology, justification, testimony}, abstract = {If I form a belief in the trustworthiness of one of my belief sources, X, and, in the formation of that belief, I depend upon X, then that belief is infected with epistemic circularity. Many people think that epistemic circularity is a bad thing in the sense that beliefs infected by it cannot be justified. I argue, first, that if justified belief is possible, epistemic circularity needn't be a bad thing. Then I give an account of the difference between malignant and benign epistemic circularity and I provide a Reidian example of benign epistemically circular belief that is justified.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bergmann2004a, author = {Bergmann, Michael}, title = {What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {161-165}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, foundationalism, justification, knowledge}, abstract = {One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially--i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing foundationalist. In this paper, I will explain why his objections to foundationalism fail.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bergmann2000, author = {Bergmann, Michael}, title = {Deontology and Defeat}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {87-102}, keywords = {defeat, deontology, epistemology, internalism, knowledge}, abstract = {I shall argue that no deontological conception of epistemic justification provides a good reason for endorsing internalism. My main contention is that a requirement having to do with epistemic defeat--a requirement that many externalists impose on knowledge--guarantees the only sorts of deontological justification that have a chance at inducing internalism. Given this compatibility of externalism and deontology, we may safely conclude that deontology by itself doesn't lend support to internalism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BERLEANT1966, author = {BERLEANT, ARNOLD}, title = {ON THE CIRCULARITY OF THE COGITO.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {431-433}, keywords = {circularity, cogito, doubt, epistemology, method, scepticism}, abstract = {ON THE BASIS OF THE DUBITO, DESCARTES INFERS THAT HE IS THINKING AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THAT HE EXISTS AS A THINKING BEING. THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO RAISE A LOGICAL ISSUE, NAMELY THAT THE METHOD OF DOUBTING ITSELF CONTAINS THE NECESSITY FOR A DOUBTER. HENCE, DESCARTES' CONCLUSION FOLLOWS, NOT FROM THE USE OF THE METHOD, BUT FROM ITS ADOPTION, SINCE DOUBTING LOGICALLY PRESUPPOSES A DOUBTER AND THUS AN EXISTENT BEING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BERLEANT1969, author = {BERLEANT, ARNOLD}, title = {SURROGATE THEORIES OF ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {163-185}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, communication, emotion, expression, imitation}, abstract = {THE MAJOR THEORIES OF ART--IMITATION, EMOTIONALIST, EXPRESSION, COMMUNICATION, FORMALIST--ALL FAIL TO EXPLAIN WHAT ART IS. THEY COMMIT A COMMON ERROR BY INTERPRETING THE NATURE OF ART IN TERMS OF NON-AESTHETIC MODES OF EXPERIENCE. THESE MODES ARE MORE FAMILIAR BUT SHARPLY DIFFERENT FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF ART AND ACT AS SURROGATES FOR IT, MISLEADING US AND DIRECTING US AWAY FROM ART. A GENUINELY EMPIRICAL AESTHETICS WILL DEAL WITH ART IN THE LIGHT OF ITS OWN DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BERLEANT1964, author = {BERLEANT, ARNOLD}, title = {A NOTE ON THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING 'ART'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {239-241}, keywords = {aesthetic-experience; aesthetic-object; aesthetics, art, concept, definition}, abstract = {THIS PAPER PROPOSES THAT RATHER THAN BEGINNING WITH A DEFINITION OF ART WHICH IS THEN TESTED AGAINST EXAMPLES, WE START WITH THE PHENOMENA OF ART AND THE EXPERIENCES BY WHICH THEY ARE KNOWN. THIS CORRECTS THE TENDENCY TO JUDGE ART BY A CONCEPT RATHER THAN DEVELOPING CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS THAT RESPOND TO THE OPEN AND CHANGING CHARACTER OF ART. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION IS REALLY ONE OF THE DESCRIPTION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE EXPERIENCES OF ART.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bermudez1997, author = {Bermudez, Jose-Luis}, title = {Practical Understanding vs Reflective Understanding}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {635-641}, keywords = {epistemology, past, self, space, understanding}, abstract = {This contribution to a book symposium on John Campbell's Past, Space and Self examines the dualism between two different ways of understanding the world developed in the book. One such mode, the causally indexical mode, is practical and engaged. The other, the causally nonindexical mode, is disengaged and reflective. The tenability of this dualism is explored with reference to theories of nonconceptual content, of the conditions upon content ascription and of tacit knowledge.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bermudez2000, author = {Bermudez, Jose-Luis}, title = {Naturalized Sense Data}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {353-374}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, sense-data; vision}, abstract = {This paper examines and defends the view that the immediate objects of visual perception, or what are often called sense data, are parts of the facing surfaces of physical objects--the naturalized sense data (NSD) theory. Occasionally defended in the literature on the philosophy of perception, most famously by G. E. Moore (1918-1919), it has not proved popular and, indeed, was abandoned by Moore himself. The contemporary situation in the philosophy of perception seems ripe for a revaluation of the NSD theory, however. The NSD theory allows us to accommodate the very real shortcomings in uncritical direct realism without postulating the existence of nonphysical sense data in a way that has seemed to many incompatible with any robust form of philosophical naturalism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bermudez1997a, author = {Bermudez, Jose-Luis}, title = {Scepticism and Science in Descartes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {743-772}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, method, scepticism, science}, abstract = {Recent Descartes scholarship has revised the traditional view of the Cartesian project as one of strictly deductive rationalism. This revision has particularly stressed the role of science in Descartes's thought. The revisionist conception of Descartes also downplays the significance of the sceptical arguments offered in the First Meditation, seeing them as tools for 'turning the mind away from the senses' in the interest of Cartesian science, rather than as reflecting genuinely epistemological concerns. This paper takes issue with this aspect of the revisionist reading of Descartes. It argues that seeing scepticism as critically important for Descartes is independent of interpreting him as a canonical rationalist. In fact, it is precisely Descartes's scientific thought and practice which make scepticism such a problem for him.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bermudez1998, author = {Bermudez, Jose-Luis}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {727-730}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Paradox of Self-Consciousness}, volume = {63(3)}, year = {1998} } @article{BERNDTSON1970, author = {BERNDTSON, ARTHUR}, title = {THE MEANING OF POWER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {73-84}, keywords = {change, metaphysics, novelty, power}, abstract = {POWER IS THE CAUSE OF CHANGE, THE GROUND OF CHANGE, AND IMMANENT IN CHANGE. IT HAS A TENDENCY TOWARD CHANGE: A VECTOR WITHOUT GOAL AND ANTICIPATION WITHOUT IDEA OR POTENTIALITY. THAT WHICH TENDS IS INTENSITY, WHICH IS RADICALLY INDETERMINATE. POWER IS EXPERIENCED IN EMOTION AND VOLITION. IT IS COMPATIBLE WITH UNIFORM OR VARIABLE OPERATION. IT MAY COMPEL, BUT NOT INEVITABLY. IT IS AN UNCAUSED CAUSE. THE PAPER CLAIMS TO ESTABLISH THE MEANING AND APPEARANCE OF POWER. IT DOES NOT CONSIDER REALITY OF POWER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BERNDTSON1960, author = {BERNDTSON, ARTHUR}, title = {BEAUTY, EMBODIMENT, AND ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {50-61}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, beauty, embodiment, emergence, emotion, expression, form}, abstract = {EMBODIMENT IS SEEN AS THE PERCEPTION OF ADEQUATE EMOTION AS FUSED WITH FORM, AND IT OCCURS INSOFAR AS THE PRELIMINARY ACTIVITIES OF CREATION HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. THIS DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE IS CALLED TRANSITIVE EXPRESSION; IT IS THE PASSAGE OF EMOTION FROM A PRIMITIVE TO AN ADEQUATE STATE THROUGH THE MEDIATION OF FORM. TRANSITIVE EXPRESSION IMPLIES EMBODIMENT AS ITS FINAL STATE OR OUTCOME. THE PURPOSE OF THE PAPER IS TO SHOW THAT BEAUTY IS THE EMERGENT QUALITY OF EMBODIMENT. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE UGLY (A FEELING OF LOATHING) IS WHOLLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH EMBODIMENT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bernecker2004, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Memory and Externalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {605-632}, keywords = {content, context, epistemology, externalism, individuation, memory}, abstract = {Content externalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past environment. I defend externalism about memory by arguing neither philosophical nor psychological considerations stand in the way of accepting the context dependency of memory that follows from externalism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bernstein1998, author = {Bernstein, Mark-H}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {730-733}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally Matters}, volume = {63(3)}, year = {1998} } @other{Bernstein1992, author = {Bernstein, Richard-J}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {977-981}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The New Constellation}, volume = {55(4)}, year = {1992} } @article{Berofsky1998, author = {Berofsky, Bernard}, title = {Through Thick and Thin: Mele on Autonomy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {689-697}, keywords = {autonomy, dependence, internalism, metaphysics}, abstract = {Since the structure of preferences of a self-controlled person might result from external control, Mele insists that an autonomous agent's current condition not have arisen through influences that bypassed his control ove