#Created by Kbib version 0.6.1 #Last modified: Thu Jun 19 17:24:45 2008 @article{ABEL1966, author = {ABEL, REUBEN}, title = {PRAGMATISM AND THE OUTLOOK OF MODERN SCIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {45-54}, keywords = {empiricism, fact, logic, meaning, pragmatism, reality, science, truth}, abstract = {"I HOPE I HAVE SHOWN THE UNIQUE PERTINENCE OF PRAGMATISM TO THE CHARACTERISTIC OUTLOOK AND PROBLEMS OF THE WORLD OF MODERN SCIENCE. IN ITS THEORY OF REALITY AS CONSTITUTED BY THE INTERACTION OF MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT, AND IN ITS VIEW OF TRUTH AS ENTAILING HUMAN ACTIVITY AND INQUIRY, PRAGMATISM PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPTS, CONSTRUCTS, FACTS, THEORIES, AND LAWS OF SCIENCE; FOR COMPREHENDING THE STATUS OF GEOMETRY AND LOGIC; FOR DEALING WITH DETERMINISM, INDUCTION, PROBABILITY, AND RATIONALITY; FOR A THEORY OF MEANING; AND FOR AN ATTITUDE OF EMPIRICIST OPEN-MINDEDNESS...."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ABEL1972, author = {ABEL, REUBEN}, title = {ON "FORM" IN ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {371-376}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, form}, abstract = {'FORM' IN A WORK OF ART IS ANALYSED NOT AS A NOUN BUT AS A VERB. THE MATERIALS OF A WORK OF ART ARE FORMED (COMPOSED, ARRANGED, ETC.) INTENTIONALLY, BY A PERSON, WHO DOES SO FOR THE SAKE OF DOING SO (REGARDLESS OF OTHER MOTIVES), AND WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF EVOKING A RESPONSE FROM SOME OTHER PERSON TO HIM. THIS EXPLAINS OUR ATTITUDE TO FORGERIES, COPIES, COMPUTER PRODUCTS, NATURAL OBJECTS, ETC. IT ALSO CLARIFIES WHAT MAKES US UNEASY ABOUT SO MUCH RECENT ART: THE WIDESPREAD MINIMISATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF FORM. THE PASSIONATE INTEREST IN FORM IS SUGGESTED AS A DIFFERENTIA OF HOMO SAPIENS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ABELSON1961, author = {ABELSON, RAZIEL}, title = {IN DEFENSE OF FORMAL LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {333-346}, keywords = {defense, empiricism, formal-logic; logic, rationalism, textual-criticis}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR SUMMARIZES S TOULMIN'S MAIN CRITICISMS OF LOGIC, AND THEN OPPOSES THEM AS BEING TOO EXTREME. TOULMIN'S THESIS IS THAT LOGIC IS NOT A THEORETICAL SCIENCE BUT A GROUP OF PRACTICAL SKILLS AND ITS PRINCIPALS ARE NOT A PRIORI LAWS BUT SPECIFIC AND CONTEXT-BOUND RULES FOR SUCCESSFUL INFERENCES. ABELSON WANTS TO COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE EXTREME EMPIRICISM OF TOULMIN AND THE EXTREME RATIONALISM OF PROFESSIONAL LOGICIANS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ONE MUST FIND A MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN A PURELY FORMAL LOGIC THAT IN ITSELF HAS NO PRACTICAL VALUE, AND A PRACTICAL, CONTEXT-DEPENDENT LOGIC THAT REALLY ISN'T LOGIC AT ALL. SOMEWHERE, PURE LOGIC AND FACTUAL KNOWLEDGE BLEND TOGETHER INTO "PRACTICAL LOGIC" WHICH IS THE PROVINCE OF BOTH LOGIC AND EMPIRICAL INQUIRY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ABELSON1961a, author = {ABELSON, RAZIEL}, title = {A REPLY TO EVANS'S "MEANING AND USE".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {262-263}, keywords = {language, meaning, ontology, sentence, use, word}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Achinstein2001, author = {Achinstein, Peter}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {740-743}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Book of Evidence}, volume = {68(3)}, year = {2001} } @article{ACKERMANN1982, author = {ACKERMANN, ROBERT}, title = {CONTEXT DEPENDENT KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {425-433}, keywords = {context, epistemology, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ACKERMANN1964, author = {ACKERMANN, ROBERT}, title = {NORMATIVE EXPLANATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {522-529}, keywords = {deducibility, ethics, explanation, fact, naturalism, normative-judgment; science}, abstract = {IN THE "LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS", HUSSERL EXPLAINS OUR PERCEPTION OF EXTERNAL REALITY IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: HE CLAIMS THAT WE EXPERIENCE IMMANENT SENSATIONS THAT ARE APPREHENDED OR ANIMATED BY INTENTIONS, WHICH OBJECTIVATE THEM. IN THE LECTURES ON TIME, HUSSERL TRIES TO EXPLAIN HOW BOTH SENSATIONS AND INTENTIONS ARE CONSTITUTED FOR CONSCIOUSNESS. THE CONCEPT OF AN EXTENDED PRESENT INSTANT, INVOLVING BOTH PROTENTION AND RETENTION, IS THE KEY TO HIS EXPLANATION; IT ALLOWS HIM TO SAY THAT WE CAN RETAIN IN OUR PRESENT CONSCIOUSNESS THE ELAPSING SENSATION AND INTENTION, AND THUS BE AWARE OF THEM AS IMMANENT OBJECTS. IN ADDITION, HUSSERL IDENTIFIES IMMANENT TEMPORALITY WITH INTENTIONS AND SENSATIONS. AS A RESULT, HE CAN NO LONGER CLAIM THAT THEY ARE REALLY DISTINCT FROM ONE ANOTHER, FOR BOTH ARE CONSTITUTED OUT OF THE SAME ELEMENT, INNER TIME. THUS THE DISTINCTION THAT SERVES AS THE BASIS FOR HIS ANALYSIS IN THE "INVESTIGATIONS" IS SUPPRESSED BY HIS CONCLUSIONS IN THE LECTURES ON TIME.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADAMS1982, author = {ADAMS, E-M}, title = {PERSONS AND MORALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {384-390}, keywords = {ethics, morality, person}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADAMS1974, author = {ADAMS, E-M}, title = {LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS AND EPISTEMIC ENCOUNTERS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {34}, pages = {404-414}, keywords = {asserting, epistemology, experience, knowing, language, thinking}, abstract = {AN EPISTEMIC ENCOUNTER IS AN ACT OF 'THINKING THAT P' WHICH NOT ONLY INVOLVES BEING CORRECT, HAVING GOOD GROUNDS OR REASONS AND THOSE GROUNDS OR REASONS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR GETTING IT RIGHT, BUT ALSO THE ACT OF 'THINKING THAT P' BEING AT LEAST PARTIALLY SELF-WARRANTING, AND THE MODE OF 'THINKING THAT P' BEING SUCH THAT IT PROVIDES AN ORIGINAL, INDIGENOUS SEMANTIC CONTENT. THE MODES OF EXPERIENCE AND THOUGHT WE TAKE TO PROVIDE EPISTEMIC ENCOUNTERS DETERMINE WHAT AREAS OF DISCOURSE APPEAR PHILOSOPHICALLY OPAQUE AND PROBLEMATIC AND HOW WE SEEK PHILOSOPHICAL CLARITY, FOR IT IS ONLY THROUGH EPISTEMIC ENCOUNTERS WE CAN ESTABLISH SEMANTIC TIES BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND ITEMS AND FEATURES OF THE WORLD.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adams2002, author = {Adams, Robert-M}, title = {Precis of Finite and Infinite Goods}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {439-444}, keywords = {ethics, framework, goods, infinite, metaethics, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adams2002a, author = {Adams, Robert-Merrihew}, title = {Responses}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {475-490}, keywords = {ethics, goods, metaethics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adams2003, author = {Adams, Robert-Merrihew}, title = {Anti-Consequentialism and the Transcendence of the Good}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {114-132}, keywords = {consequentialism, ethics, good, metaethics, transcendence}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adams1997, author = {Adams, Robert-Merrihew}, title = {Things in Themselves}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {801-825}, keywords = {metaphysics, object, reality, thing-in-itsel}, abstract = {The paper is an interpretation and defense of Kant's conception of things in themselves as noumena, along the following lines. Noumena are transempirical realities. As such they have several important roles in Kant's critical philosophy (Section 1). Our theoretical faculties cannot obtain enough content for a conception of noumena that would assure their real possibility as objects, but can establish their merely formal logical possibility (Sections 2-3). Our practical reason, however, grounds belief in the real possibility of some noumena, and even knowledge of the noumenal reality of a free will (Section 4). Section 5 defends Kant's conception of noumena as a good piece of philosophy, particularly with respect to its distinction between logical and real possibility. Are noumena numerically identical with experienced (phenomenal) objects? Kantian principles yield the answers that human selves are, God isn't, and it's harder to say about bodies (Section 6).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adams1994, author = {Adams, Robert-M}, title = {Religious Disagreements and Doxastic Practices}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {885-890}, keywords = {belief, existence, god, perception, religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADAMS1989, author = {ADAMS, ROBERT-MERRIHEW}, title = {REPLY TO KVANVIG: "ADAMS ON ACTUALISM AND PRESENTISM".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {299-301}, keywords = {future, metaphysics, present, proposition}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADDIS1986, author = {ADDIS, LAIRD}, title = {PAINS AND OTHER SECONDARY MENTAL ENTITIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {59-74}, keywords = {intentionality, mental-states; metaphysics, pain}, abstract = {SECONDARY MENTAL ENTITIES INCLUDE SENSATIONS SUCH AS PAIN AND ITCHES, PERCEPTION-RELATED ENTITIES SUCH AS IMAGES AND AFTERIMAGES, AND EMOTIONS. THE THEORY IS ADVANCED, AND DEFENDED AGAINST LIKELY OBJECTIONS, THAT SECONDARY MENTAL ENTITIES EXIST ONLY AS "OBJECTS" OF STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS (THE PRIMARY MENTAL ENTITIES) AND ARE THEREFORE ALWAYS DISTINCT FROM THE AWARENESS OF THEM. PAIN IS USED AS THE MAIN EXAMPLE BECAUSE IT HAS A FEATURE THAT MAKES IT SEEM ESPECIALLY RESISTANT TO THE THEORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADDIS1972, author = {ADDIS, LAIRD}, title = {ARISTOTLE AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF SUBSTANCES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {107-111}, keywords = {attribute, independence, metaphysics, substance, time}, abstract = {AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO EXPLICATE WHAT ARISTOTLE MAY REASONABLY BE TAKEN TO HAVE MEANT IN HOLDING THAT SUBSTANCES ARE 'INDEPENDENT' AND ATTRIBUTES 'DEPENDENT'. THE ACCOUNTS OF BERGMANN, ROSS, AND SELLARS ARE REJECTED EACH ON ITS OWN GROUND AND ALL BECAUSE OF THEIR COMMON FAILURE TO BRING TIME INTO THE EXPLICATION. IT IS SHOWN THAT WHAT IS TAKEN TO BE THE CORRECT EXPLICATION IS CONSISTENT ONLY WITH A REJECTION OF NON-PLATONIC UNIVERSALS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ADELMANN1962, author = {ADELMANN, FREDERICK-J}, title = {THE ROOT OF EXISTENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {405-408}, keywords = {causality, epistemology, existence, experience, phenomenology, self-consciousness; sensation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adler2002, author = {Adler, Jonathan-E}, title = {Is the Generality Problem Too General?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {87-97}, keywords = {epistemology, generality, reliabilism}, abstract = {Reliabilism holds that knowledge is true belief reliably caused. Reliabilists should say something about individuating processes; critics deny that the right degree of generality can be specified without arbitrariness. It is argued that this criticism applies as well to processes mentioned in scientific explanations. The gratuitous puzzles created thereby show that the "generality problem" is illusory.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Adler1997, author = {Adler, Jonathan-E}, title = {Constrained Belief and the Reactive Attitudes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {891-905}, keywords = {attitude, belief, epistemology, evidentialism}, abstract = {Evidentialism implies that, for epistemic purposes, belief should be responsive only to evidence. Focusing on our reactive attitude such as resentment or indignation, I construct an argument that the beliefs or judgments accompanying those attitudes are constrained in advance by circumstances to be full, rather than being open to the whole range of partial beliefs. These judgments or beliefs imply strong claims to justification. But the circumstances in which those attitudes are formed allow only very limited evidence. Nevertheless, we cannot opt out regularly since the formation of such attitudes is so central a feature of a minimally content human social life.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AIKEN1982, author = {AIKEN, HENRY-DAVID}, title = {THE ORIGINALITY OF HUME'S THEORY OF OBLIGATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {374-383}, keywords = {obligation, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ainslie2001, author = {Ainslie, Donald-C}, title = {Hume's Reflections on the Identity and Simplicity of Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {557-578}, keywords = {identity, metaphysics, mind, simplicity}, abstract = {The belief in the identity and simplicity of the mind as a bundle of perceptions is an abstruse belief, not one held by the "vulgar" who rarely turn their minds on themselves so as to think of their perceptions. The author suggests that it is this philosophical observation of the mind that creates the problems that Hume finally acknowledges in the "Appendix." He is unable to explain why we believe that the perceptions by means of which we observe our minds while philosophizing are themselves part of our minds. This suggestion is then tested against seven criteria that any interpretation of the "Appendix" must meet. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Ainslie1992, author = {Ainslie, George}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {981-983}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Picoeconomics}, volume = {55(4)}, year = {1992} } @article{AIRAKSINEN1987, author = {AIRAKSINEN, TIMO}, title = {BERKELEY AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF BELIEFS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {235-256}, keywords = {belief, body, justification, metaphysics}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ANALYZES BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. IT IS SHOWN THAT OUR KNOWLEDGE OF SPATIO-TEMPORAL BODIES CANNOT BE CERTAIN. CERTAINTY IS RESTRICTED TO THE REALM OF SENSORY IDEAS THEMSELVES. BUT THERE IS HARDLY ANY REASON TO BE INTERESTED IN IDEAS AS SUCH. BERKELEY IS A COMMON SENSE THINKER WHO WANTS TO KNOW THE WORLD AND ITS SCIENTIFIC LAWS. BODIES ARE CONSTRUCTED ON THE BASIS OF BOTH REAL AND IMAGINARY IDEAS. THIS TOPIC IS ANALYZED STARTING FROM PAPPAS'S AND PITCHER'S VIEWS. IT IS SHOWN THAT BODIES ARE COMPLETE COMPLEXES OF IDEAS AND THAT IMAGINATION PLAYS AN ESSENTIAL ROLE HERE. THE CONTINUITY OF BODIES IS DISCUSSED. THE METHODS OF MAKING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAL AND IMAGINARY IDEAS ARE ANALYZED. CONCERNING BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND--IT IS SHOWN THAT ONE CAN REACH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY IN THIS FIELD BUT ONE CANNOT FIND MUCH INFORMATION CONCERNING THE VARIOUS PARTS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MIND. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ACTIVE AND THE PASSIVE MIND IS DISCUSSED. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN IDEAS AND THE MIND IS EXPLORED BRIEFLY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AIRAKSINEN1980, author = {AIRAKSINEN, TIMO}, title = {PROBLEMS IN HEGEL'S DIALECTIC OF FEELING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {1-25}, keywords = {dialectic, feeling, metaphysics, mind, soul, subjective}, abstract = {THIS PAPER SHOWS HOW HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF SUBJECTIVE MIND CAN BE USED TO ELUCIDATE THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF DIALECTICS. A TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF DIALECTICS IS PRESENTED. SEVERAL APPARENT ANOMALIES BOTH IN HEGEL'S PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY ARE ANALYZED AND RESOLVED BY USING THIS NOTION OF DIALECTICS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alanen2003, author = {Alanen, Lilli}, title = {What Are Emotions About?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {311-334}, keywords = {cognitivism, emotion, intentionality, metaphysics, morality, phenomenology}, abstract = {This paper discusses the interrelations between three aspects of human emotions: their intentionality, their expressivity and their moral significance. It distinguishes three kinds of philosophical views of emotions: the cognitivist (classically held by the Stoics), the emotivist which reduces emotions to nonintentional bodily sensations and physiological states, and the moral phenomenologist, the latter being held by Annette Baier, whose work is the focus of the discussion. Her view, which represents an original development of ideas found in Descartes and Hume, avoids the reductionism of cognitivist and emotivist accounts. The paper gives special attention to her notion of 'deep' objects of emotions and to her account of the expressivity of emotions, arguing that while the first is problematic, the second is a significant contribution to our understanding of the role of emotions in our moral lives.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALBERSHEIM1965, author = {ALBERSHEIM, GERHARD}, title = {THE SCALE STEP.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {63-79}, keywords = {aesthetic-experience; aesthetics, dimensionality, movement, music, pitch, space}, abstract = {"TONAL SPACE" IS STRUCTURED BY DIFFERENT SCALE SYSTEMS WHOSE STEPS ARE DEFINED BY THE MEASURING ROD OF THE CONSONANT INTERVALS OCTAVE, FIFTH, AND MAJOR THIRD. THUS, MUSICAL HEARING, CONDITIONED BY AGE-OLD CONVENTIONS, IS PREFORMED BY OUR THINKING IN SCALE STEPS ON WHICH THE COMMUNICABILITY OF MUSICAL MEANING RESTS. BECAUSE OF THEIR DISTINCTIVE MUSICO-CONCEPTUAL CHARACTER WE COMPREHEND STEPS DESPITE THEIR VARYING INTONATION. THE RELATIVE INDEPENDENCE OF OUR CONCEPTION OF SCALE STEPS FROM THEIR ACTUAL PITCH PREVENTS THE CONSIDERABLE DEVIATIONS FROM JUST INTONATION BY PERFORMERS AND BY OUR TEMPERED TUNING SYSTEM FROM INTERFERING WITH OUR MUSICAL UNDERSTANDING. ACCORDINGLY, "ABSOLUTE PITCH" IS NOT A MEMORY FOR PITCH SIMPLY, BUT FOR THE ACCUSTOMED INTONATION OF SCALE STEPS, REFERRED TO BY THE TONE NAMES. LIKEWISE, THE STEP CHARACTER ACCOUNTS FOR WHAT SOME PSYCHOLOGISTS CALL "CHROMA" AND MISTAKE FOR A PROPERTY OF SINGLE TONES LIKE PITCH OR TIMBRE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Albert1992, author = {Albert, David-Z}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {973-975}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Quantum Mechanics and Experience}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1992} } @other{Alcoff1996, author = {Alcoff, Linda-Martin}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {740-743}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory}, volume = {64(3)}, year = {1996} } @article{ALDRICH1971, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-A}, title = {ILLOCUTIONARY SPACE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {15-28}, keywords = {assertion, language}, abstract = {SEARLE DRAWS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TRUTH CONDITIONS AND ASSERTIBILITY CONDITIONS IN THE WRONG WAY. IT SUGGESTS THAT ONE CAN THINK THAT P IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO SAY IT, IN SOME LOGICAL SENSE OF 'CAN'T', STRONGER THAN ANY PROHIBITION OF ETIQUETTE OR SOCIAL MANNERS. THIS IS COUNTER-INTUITIVE. SPEECH-ACTS, LIKE PHYSICAL, CAN BE PERFORMED ONLY WHERE THERE IS ROOM FOR THEM - ILLOCUTIONARY 'SPACE'. THIS IS THE SPACE OF HUMAN ACTION, IN WHICH 'FREEDOM,' 'CONSTRAINT', ETC. MAKES SENSE. 'PHYSICAL SPACE' IS AN ABSTRACTION OUT OF THIS. IN SHORT, 'ILLOCUTIONARY SPACE' IS NOT A METAPHORICAL EXTENSION OF 'PHYSICAL SPACE.' 'THIN' SAYINGS - SAYINGS OF SENTENCES - ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM 'THICK' ONES, IN WHICH SOMETHING IS SAID (DONE) WITH THE SENTENCES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALDRICH1962, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-C}, title = {IMAGE-MONGERING AND IMAGE-MANAGEMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {51-61}, keywords = {contradiction, image, imagination, language, meaning, possibility, situation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALDRICH1981, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-C}, title = {CAN REPRESENTATIONS BE IDENTICAL WITH ANYTHING?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {401-404}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, representation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALDRICH1966, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-C}, title = {AN ASPECT THEORY OF MIND.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {313-326}, keywords = {aspect-theory; body, introspection, knowledge, mental-states; metaphysics, minds}, abstract = {OLDER ASPECT THEORIES OF MIND, SUCH AS THE DOUBLE ASPECT THEORY, ARE BY-PASSED IN FAVOR OF "ASPECT" IN WITTGENSTEIN'S SENSE. WHAT ONE PERCEIVES WHEN ONE PERCEIVES SOMEONE'S "STATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS"--HIS INTENTION, HIS EMOTION, HIS PAIN--IS COMPARABLE TO WHAT ONE PERCEIVES WHEN ONE HAS AN "ASPECT-EXPERIENCE" OF, SAY, THE DUCK-RABBIT PICTURE. THIS CONCEPT OF "PERCEPTION" OF PERSONS BY PERSONS IS EXPLORED HERE, UNCOVERING SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES TO THE PICTURE CASE. SEEING A PERSON AS A PHYSICAL OBJECT IN MOTION--NOT IN "ACTION"--IS FEASIBLE THOUGH DIFFICULT BECAUSE UNNATURAL. THIS KIND OF "ASPECTION" IS CALLED "CATEGORIAL" AND DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER KINDS. EVEN THE HUMAN "BODY" IS NOT NATURALLY SEEN AS A "PHYSICAL OBJECT."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALDRICH1964, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-C}, title = {A POINT ABOUT SPACES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {397-401}, keywords = {aesthetics, description, expression, object, phenomenology, physical, space}, abstract = {IT IS ARGUED THAT MATERIAL THINGS APPEAR AS EITHER PHYSICAL OBJECTS, (INVOLVING THE LOGIC OF DESCRIPTIVE PORTRAYAL) OR AESTHETIC OBJECTS, (INVOLVING THE LOGIC OF EXPRESSIVE PORTRAYAL). A PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPACES IS PRESENTED, SHOWING HOW A THING APPEARS DIFFERENTLY IN PHYSICAL THAN IN AESTHETIC SPACE. IT IS CLAIMED THAT THE PHYSICAL HAS NO ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY OVER, AND IS NOT PRESUPPOSED BY, THE AESTHETIC. THERE IS MUCH DISCUSSION ON WHY ONE DOES NOT "FRAME" A PHYSICAL OBJECT AND CONCLUSIONS ARE DRAWN ABOUT THE FUNCTION OF A FRAME, (NOT TO LOOK BEYOND FOR MEANING AND VALUE). (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALDRICH1979, author = {ALDRICH, VIRGIL-C}, title = {POINT OF VIEW.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {498-510}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, physicalism, point}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALEXANDER1963, author = {ALEXANDER, H-G}, title = {A SUGGESTION CONCERNING EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMAGINATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {427-431}, keywords = {a-priori; abstraction, empiricism, epistemology, experience, imagination, logic, mathematics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALKER1965, author = {ALKER, HENRY-A}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {534-543}, keywords = {concept, mental-health; morality, ontology, psychiatry, science}, abstract = {THE QUESTION IS RAISED, AS TO WHAT STANDARDS SHOULD BE USED IN ANY DECISION ABOUT THE SCIENTIFIC LEGITIMACY OF A GIVEN CONCEPT. THREE STANDARDS ARE PROPOSED: (1) ONTOLOGICAL STANDARD--BASICALLY FREE FROM INNER INCONSISTENCY, (2) TECHNICAL ADEQUACY--A GIVEN CONCEPT IS ONLY AS GOOD AS THE SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATIONS IT PRESUPPOSES, AND (3) THAT OF NONMORALITY. THE ENTIRE DISCUSSION IS DEVOTED TO THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Allen1993, author = {Allen, Barry}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {719-723}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Truth in Philosophy}, volume = {56(3)}, year = {1993} } @article{ALLEN1970, author = {ALLEN, GLEN-O}, title = {FROM THE "NATURALISTIC FALLACY" TO THE IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {533-549}, keywords = {cause, ethics, good, metaethics}, abstract = {G. E. MOORE'S PROOF THAT 'GOOD' CANNOT BE DEFINED IS THE ANALOGUE OF HUME'S PROOF THAT THE IDEA OF CAUSE HAS NO EMPIRICAL CORRELATE. AS A PROOF, IT CANNOT SUSTAIN ETHICAL INTUITIONISM, EMOTIVISM, OR THE VARIOUS MODIFICATIONS OF ETHICAL NATURALISM WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE TO REST UPON IT. HOWEVER, IT DOES SUSTAIN THE THEORY THAT VALUES ARE CAUSES OF HUMAN RESPONSES, AND THAT, UNDER A METHODOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF OBJECTIVITY, VALUES HAVE OBJECTIVE COGNITIVE STATUS AS CAUSES OF RESPONSES IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF A HYPOTHETICAL BEING, AN IDEAL OBSERVER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALLEN1982, author = {ALLEN, JEFFNER}, title = {WHAT IS HUSSERL'S FIRST PHILOSOPHY?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {610-620}, keywords = {first-philosophy; history-of-ideas; metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALLERS1960, author = {ALLERS, RUDOLF}, title = {HEIDEGGER ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {365-373}, keywords = {being, metaphysics, reason, sufficient, textual-criticis}, abstract = {HEIDEGGER'S METHOD IS EXPLORED IN RELATION TO THE "BEING QUESTION," AND THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION OF LANGUAGE, LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS AND ETYMOLOGICAL EXPLANATION IS SHOWN AS HAVING REPLACED PHENOMENOLOGY. HEIDEGGER'S THESIS--THAT THE MODE IN WHICH BEING BECOMES MANIFEST IN DIFFERENT PERIODS OF HISTORY, IS ILLUSTRATED WITH HIS THOUGHTS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON. THAT THIS PRINCIPLE LASTED SO MANY CENTURIES OF INCUBATION UNTIL IT WAS FORMULATED BY LEIBNIZ, IS A SIGNIFICANT FACT IN THE HISTORY OF BEING. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS NO RETURNING TO PARMENIDES AND THE ORIGINAL INTUITION OF BEING; WE MUST ADOPT A NEW APPROACH, IN ORDER TO RENDER MAN AGAIN CONSCIOUS OF THE PRIMORDIAL IMPORT OF BEING; OTHERWISE WE WILL BE SUFFOCATED BY THE ALL-PERVADING TECHNICALIZATION. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Allison1996, author = {Allison, Henry-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {825-829}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy}, volume = {59(3)}, year = {1996} } @article{Almeder1994, author = {Almeder, Robert-F}, title = {Defining Justification and Naturalizing Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {669-681}, keywords = {epistemology, justification, knowledge, natural-sciences; reason}, abstract = {In this paper I examine the claim that no theory of epistemic justification is possible because whatever definition one gives admits of the question "Are you justified in accepting your definition of justification?" which cannot be answered without begging the question in favor of the original definition offered. I examine various replies to the argument and then argue that the question need not be answered.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Almeder1998, author = {Almeder, Robert}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {493-495}, publisher = {Open Court}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy}, volume = {62(2)}, year = {1998} } @other{Almeder1992, author = {Almeder, Robert}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {715-719}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Blind Realism}, volume = {55(3)}, year = {1992} } @article{Almog2005, author = {Almog, Joseph}, title = {Precis of What Am I?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {696-700}, keywords = {body, dualism, essentialism, metaphysics, mind, separability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Almog2005a, author = {Almog, Joseph}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {717-734}, keywords = {dualism, essence, intuition, metaphysics, possibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alspector-Kelly2002, author = {Alspector-Kelly, Marc}, title = {Stroud's Carnap}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {276-302}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, metaphysics, ontology, semantics}, abstract = {In "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" Carnap drew his famous distinction between 'internal' and 'external' questions of existence, pronouncing the former meaningful and the latter meaningless. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud understands Carnap to be applying the verification criterion of meaningfulness in order to refute Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that Stroud misrepresents both Carnap's aim and method. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston1993, author = {Alston, W-P}, title = {Epistemic Desiderata}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {527-551}, keywords = {argument, condition, epistemology, justification, language}, abstract = {There are endless disputes over alleged necessary conditions for epistemic justice, e.g., that the belief is "based on" adequate grounds and that the justifier is accessible on reflection. But perhaps it is a mistake to suppose that there is some unique status, "justification" concerning the necessary conditions for which they are arguing. If we abandon that view we can reconstrue this part of epistemology as a study of epistemic desiderata, their nature, viability, and importance for various interests and purposes.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALSTON1986, author = {ALSTON, WILLIAM-P}, title = {EPISTEMIC CIRCULARITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {1-30}, keywords = {belief, circularity, epistemology, justification}, abstract = {SUPPOSE THAT WE CANNOT PROVIDE ANY OTHERWISE STRONG ARGUMENT FOR THE RELIABILITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION WITHOUT MAKING USE OF WHAT WE TAKE OURSELVES TO HAVE LEARNED FROM SENSE PERCEPTION. WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE US? THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT IT DOES NOT PREVENT US FROM JUSTIFYING, AND BEING JUSTIFIED IN, A BELIEF THAT SENSE PERCEPTION IS RELIABLE; THOUGH IT DOES PREVENT US FROM GIVING AN IDEALLY EXPLICIT AND COMPLETE JUSTIFICATION OF SUCH A BELIEF, OR OF ANY OTHER BELIEF.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALSTON1989, author = {ALSTON, WILLIAM-P}, title = {REPLY TO DANIELS' "EXPERIENCING GOD".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {501-506}, keywords = {belief, christian, epistemology, experience, god, religion}, abstract = {DANIELS HOLDS THAT THE UNDISCERNING IN SECULAR MATTERS HAVE REASONS FOR SUPPOSING THAT OTHERS CAN DISCERN, WHILE THERE ARE NO ANALOGOUS REASONS IN THE RELIGIOUS SPHERE. THOUGH SOME OF HIS CONTRASTS ARE OVERDRAWN, I DON'T REALLY CONTEST THAT. BUT HE ALSO SEEMS TO SUPPOSE THAT THESE DIFFERENCES PROVIDE A STRONG REASON FOR SUPPOSING THAT NO ONE DOES PERCEIVE GOD, AND HERE I OBJECT, ON THE GROUNDS THAT DANIELS UNWARRANTEDLY SUPPOSES THAT ANY VERIDICAL PERCEPTION MUST PROVE ITSELF IN THE SAME WAY AS SENSE PERCEPTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ALSTON1990, author = {ALSTON, William-P}, title = {Externalist Theories of Perception.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {causality, doxography, epistemology, externalism, perception}, abstract = {The title refers to theories that require a certain sort of relation between X and an experience of S in order that S perceive X. The relation might be causal, counterfactual, doxastic, or otherwise. It is argued against such theories that there are possible cases in which X stands in the required relation to an experience of S and S does not perceive X and cases in which X is perceived though it does not stand in the required relation.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston2002, author = {Alston, William-P}, title = {Sellars and the "Myth of the Given"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {69-86}, keywords = {empiricism, metaphysics, mind, myth, perception}, abstract = {Sellars is well known for this critique of the "myth of the given" in his Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. That text does not make it unambiguous just how he understands the "myth". Here I take it that whatever else may be involved, his critique is incompatible with the view that there is a nonconceptual mode of "presentation" or "givenness" of particulars that is the heart of sense perception and what is most distinctive of perception as a type of cognition. A critical examination of Sellars's argument, particularly those directed at the 'theory of appearing', results in the conclusion that he has failed to eliminate the above view of perception. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston1994, author = {Alston, William-P}, title = {Precis of "Perceiving God"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {863-868}, keywords = {existence, experience, god, perception, religion, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston1994a, author = {Alston, William-P}, title = {Reply to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {891-899}, keywords = {existence, experience, god, religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston2005, author = {Alston, William}, title = {Perception and Representation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {253-289}, keywords = {epistemology, experience, perception, representation, representationalism}, abstract = {My criticism of the representationalist position is in sections. (1) There is no sufficient reason for positing a representative function for perceptual experience. It doesn't seem on the face of it to be that, and nothing serves in place of such seeming. (2) Even if it did have such a function, it doesn't have the conceptual resources to represent a state of affairs. (3) Even if it did, it is not suited to represent, e.g., a physical property of color. (4) Finally, even if I am wrong about the first three points, it is still impossible for the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience to consist in it's representing what it does. My central argument for this central claim of the paper is that it is metaphysically, de re possible that one have a certain perceptual experience without it's presenting any state of affairs. And since all identities hold necessarily, this identity claim fails. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Alston2000, author = {Alston, William-P}, title = {Virtue and Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {185-189}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, knowledge, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Alston1996, author = {Alston, William-P}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {231-234}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A Realist Conception of Truth}, volume = {60(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{ALTRICHTER1973, author = {ALTRICHTER, F}, title = {ON WHAT CANNOT HAVE SPATIAL LOCATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {252-256}, keywords = {mentalism, metaphysics, quantity, space}, abstract = {THE AIM OF THIS DISCUSSION PAPER IS TO EXAMINE A WELL-KNOWN ARGUMENT USED AGAINST THE SO-CALLED IDENTITY THEORY. ACCORDING TO THE ARGUMENT, THE IDENTITY THEORY CANNOT BE A MEANINGFUL HYPOTHESIS, SINCE THE LEIBNIZ PRINCIPLE FORMULATED IN RESPECT TO SPACE PREDICATES IS NOT SATISFIED IN THE CASE OF THE ASSUMED IDENTITY OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND BRAIN STATES OR PROCESSES OR PHENOMENA. IN EXAMINING THE ARGUMENT THREE CASES ARE DIFFERENTIATED; FIRST, THE CASE OF THE SUPPOSED IDENTITY OF MENTAL PHENOMENA WITH BRAIN STATES. IT IS ARGUED THAT IN THIS CASE THE LEIBNIZ PRINCIPLE FORMULATED IN RESPECT TO SPACE PREDICATES IS VACUOUSLY SATISFIED, SINCE IT IS MEANINGLESS TO ASCRIBE 'SPATIAL LOCATION' NOT ONLY TO MENTAL PHENOMENA, BUT TO BRAIN STATES AS WELL. NEXT, THE CASE OF SUPPOSED IDENTITY OF MENTAL PHENOMENA WITH BRAIN PROCESSES IS EXAMINED WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT, ALSO IN THIS CASE, THE LEIBNIZ PRINCIPLE IS VACUOUSLY SATISFIED. LAST, THE CASE OF IDENTIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA WITH BRAIN PHENOMENA IS EXAMINED. AND I CONCLUDE THAT SINCE THE WORD 'PHENOMENON' MAY COVER MANY THINGS FALLING UNDER DIFFERENT CATEGORIES, NOTHING DEFINITE CAN BE SAID ABOUT THE VALIDITY OR INVALIDITY OF THE ARGUMENT IN QUESTION. (EDITED).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AMERIKS1985, author = {AMERIKS, KARL}, title = {HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF KANT'S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {1-36}, keywords = {idealism, phenomenology, philosophy, transcendental-deductio}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ANALYZES HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF KANT'S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY IN TERMS OF THREE SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION (CONCERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF THE I, THE NECESSITY OF THE CATEGORIES, AND THE PROBLEM OF A PRELIMINARY EPISTEMOLOGY) AND THREE SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM (CONCERNING THE THING IN ITSELF, THE ANTINOMIES, AND OTHER SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ameriks1992, author = {Ameriks, Karl}, title = {Recent Work on Hegel: The Rehabilitation of an Epistemologist?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {177-202}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {This paper focuses largely on a set of recent books in English that have attempted to defend the theoretical validity of Hegel's system, and in particular its relevance to current discussions in epistemology. T Rockmore, K Westphal, M Forster, R B Pippin, and T Pinkard each fasten on different aspects (respectively: Hegel as pragmatist, coherentist, anti-skeptic, transcendentalist, or category theorist) and periods of Hegel's theoretical philosophy. I argue that their analyses have significantly raised the level of discussion here, but they do not yet establish that Hegel's theoretical philosophy can be saved from the traditional objection of being overly dogmatic.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ameriks2003, author = {Ameriks, Karl}, title = {Problems from Van Cleve's Kant: Experience and Objects}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {196-202}, keywords = {a-priori; experience, metaphysics, object, transcendence}, abstract = {This article is part of a review discussion concerning James Van Cleve's very valuable book, Problems from Kant. Although Van Cleve traces many significant connections between Kant's first Critique and rationalist positions in contemporary analytic metaphysics, he interprets Kant's transcendental deduction in a manner that is more typical of empiricist approaches. He reconstructs--and then sharply criticizes--the deduction in a way that stresses starting from a relatively "thin" rather than "thick" concept of experience. I offer historical and systematic considerations in favor of an opposite approach to the deduction, one that would save it from objections like Van Cleve's.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Ameriks2000, author = {Ameriks, Karl}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {728-741}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical Philosophy}, volume = {69(3)}, year = {2000} } @other{Amico1993, author = {Amico, Robert}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {226-229}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Problem of the Criterion}, volume = {57(1)}, year = {1993} } @other{Anderson1993, author = {Anderson, Elizabeth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {956-959}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Value in Ethics and Economics}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1993} } @article{Anderson2004, author = {Anderson, R-Lanier}, title = {It Adds Up After All: Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic in Light of the Traditional Logic}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {501-540}, keywords = {analyticity, arithmetic, concept, containment, metaphysics, traditional-logi}, abstract = {Officially, for Kant, judgments are analytic iff the predicate is "contained in" the subject. I defend the containment definition against the common charge of obscurity, and argue that arithmetic cannot be analytic, in the resulting sense. My account deploys two traditional logical notions: logical division and concept hierarchies. Division separates a genus concept into exclusive, exhaustive species. Repeated divisions generate a hierarchy, in which lower species are derived from their genus, by adding differentia(e). Hierarchies afford a straightforward sense of containment: genera are contained in the species formed from them. To capture both relations, hierarchies must posit overlaps between concepts that violate the exclusion rule. Thus, such truths are synthetic. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ANGUELOV1972, author = {ANGUELOV, STEFAN}, title = {ETHICS AS A SCIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {207-215}, keywords = {ethics, marxism, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Annas1995, author = {Annas, Julia}, title = {Reply to Cooper}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {599-610}, keywords = {ethics, eudaimonism, happiness}, abstract = {The reply shows that eudaimonist ethical theories need not essentially include claims of a metaphysical sort. Ancient ethical theories debate with one another (as in Cicero) without being trapped in their own larger theories; hence it is legitimate to reconstruct ancient ethical theories from ancient ethical debates.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Annas1995a, author = {Annas, Julia}, title = {Precis of The Morality of Happiness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(4)}, pages = {909-912}, keywords = {ethical-theory; ethics, happiness, morality, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Annas2005, author = {Annas, Julia}, title = {Comments on John Doris's Lack of Character}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {636-642}, keywords = {behavior, character, character-trait; ethics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ANNIS1980, author = {ANNIS, DAVID-B}, title = {MEMORY AND JUSTIFICATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {324-333}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, justification, memory}, abstract = {IN THIS PAPER I DEVELOP AN ANALYSIS OF FACTUAL MEMORY AS THE RETENTION OF KNOWLEDGE AND DISCUSS SOME OF ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AN ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ANTON1974, author = {ANTON, ANATOLE}, title = {COMMODITIES AND EXCHANGE: NOTES FOR AN INTERPRETATION OF MARX.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {34}, pages = {355-385}, keywords = {commodity, economics, exchange, marxism, rule, social-philosophy; value}, abstract = {THE AIM OF THE PAPER IS TO SHOW THAT MAKING THE ASSUMPTION THAT COMMODITIES ARE DEFINED BY CONSTITUTIVE, IF CHANGING, RULES FOR THE PRACTICE OF EXCHANGE IS ILLUMINATING. IT IS ILLUMINATING SINCE IT PROVIDES INSIGHTS INTO MARX'S SAYING THAT HE 'COQUETTED' WITH HEGELIAN TERMINOLOGY; IT FREES MARX FROM SOME CHARGES OF INCONSISTENCY AND OF THE USE OF A PRIORI METAPHYSICS IN SCIENCE; IT HELPS US UNDERSTAND THE RELATION BETWEEN MARX'S METHOD IN "CAPITAL" AND HIS GENERAL EMPHASIS ON HISTORICAL PROCESS; IT HELPS EXPLICATE MARX'S THIRD THESIS ON FEUERBACH, AND, FINALLY, IT SUGGESTS A SHARP CONTRAST BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND MARXIST PHILOSOPHY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ANTON1965, author = {ANTON, JOHN-P}, title = {JOHN DEWEY AND ANCIENT PHILOSOPHIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {477-499}, keywords = {ancient, cognition, context, criticism, dualism, method, problem, relativism, social-philosoph}, abstract = {THREE ASPECTS OF DEWEY'S RELATIONSHIP TO GREEK PHILOSOPHY ARE DISCUSSED: "THE POLEMICAL", WHICH REFERS TO HIS EARLIER REJECTION OF THE CLASSICAL TRADITION AS BEING INCURABLY DUALISTIC; "THE HISTORICO-CRITICAL", WHICH FOCUSES ON HIS CULTURAL RELATIVISM AS THE CONTEXT FOR HIS MORE JUDICIOUS ASSESSMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS; AND "THE CUMULATIVE", WHICH EXAMINES CERTAIN CENTRAL FEATURES DEWEY SHARED WITH PLATO AND ARISTOTLE AND EXTENDED SIGNIFICANTLY. DEWEY'S DEVELOPMENT IN APPROACHING THE GREEKS IS EXAMINED AND HIS OVERSIMPLIFICATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS EXPOSED. DEWEY ACKNOWLEDGED A DEEP AFFINITY TO PLATO WHILE FOR ARISTOTLE HE SHOWED MARKED REPROBATION. THE MAIN REASON FOR DEWEY'S LIMITED INSIGHTS INTO GREEK PHILOSOPHY MUST BE PRIMARILY ATTRIBUTED TO HIS FAILURE TO EXTEND TO HIS HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS THE SAME CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS HE CONSIDERED CENTRAL TO HIS PRAGMATIC METHODOLOGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Antony1997, author = {Antony, Louise-M}, title = {Feeling Fine About the Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {381-387}, keywords = {feeling, feminism, knowledge, mind, social-philosoph}, abstract = {The article presents a critique of John Searle's attack on computationalist theories of mind in his recent book, The Rediscovery of the Mind. Searle is guilty of caricaturing his opponents and of ignoring their arguments. Moreover, his own positive theory of mind, which he claims "takes account of" subjectivity, turns out to offer no discernible advantages over the views he rejects.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AQUILA1989, author = {AQUILA, RICHARD-E}, title = {INTENTIONALITY, CONTENT, AND PRIMITIVE MENTAL DIRECTEDNESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {583-604}, keywords = {content, intentionality, mental-states; metaphysics, quality}, abstract = {A WAY OF LOOKING AT THE OPAQUE INTENTIONALITY OF MENTAL STATES IS PROPOSED. THE PROPOSAL COMBINES A FEATURE OF EACH OF TWO APPROACHES. ONE MAY APPEAL TO THOSE OF A MORE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSUASION, ANALYZING INTENTIONALITY IN TERMS OF DETERMINATE FORMS OF AN IRREDUCIBLE QUALITY OF MENTAL DIRECTEDNESS. THE OTHER REDUCES INTENTIONALITY TO THE IN-PRINCIPLE TRANSLATABILITY OF THE "CONTENTS" OF MENTAL STATES. BOTH APPROACHES MAY ALSO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY MEANS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF NONINTENTIONAL (AND UNTRANSLATABLE) IMPRESSIONS OR "RAW FEELS." THE PROPOSAL AFFORDS A MORE ADEQUATE FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOMMODATING THE ROLE OF BEHAVIORAL, AND OTHER "CONTEXTUAL," MATERIAL IN INTENTION. IN GENERAL, IT PROVIDES FOR A SYNTHESIS OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND AT LEAST BROADLY BEHAVIORISTIC, OR EVEN FUNCTIONALISTIC, INTUITIONS. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AQUILA1977, author = {AQUILA, RICHARD-E}, title = {TWO PROBLEMS OF BEING AND NON-BEING IN SARTRE'S "BEING AND NOTHINGNESS".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {167-186}, keywords = {body, consciousness, factuality, negative-facts; nothingness, person, phenomena, philosophical-anthropolog}, abstract = {SARTRE'S CLAIM THAT "BEING-FOR-ITSELF" IS A KIND OF NON-BEING IS REALLY TWO CLAIMS WHICH DIFFER IN A WAY NOT GENERALLY RECOGNIZED BY COMMENTATORS. THAT THE BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS A KIND OF NON-BEING IS SARTRE'S WAY OF SAYING THAT A STATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS A STATE OF AFFAIRS INVOLVING AN OBJECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND NOTHING ELSE. PUTTING IT THUS MAKES IT CLEARER THAN SARTRE DOES WHAT ONTOLOGICAL ISSUES ARE RAISED BY HIS CLAIM THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS UNIQUE. THE CLAIM THAT THE BEING OF PERSONS IS A KIND OF NON-BEING IS A VERY DIFFERENT SORT OF CLAIM. UNLIKE THE OTHER, IT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE VIEW THAT PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PERSONS, AS DISTINCT FROM CERTAIN PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THOSE PROPOSITIONS, HAVE AN OBJECTIVE TRUTH VALUE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AQUILA1974, author = {AQUILA, RICHARD-E}, title = {BRENTANO, DESCARTES, AND HUME ON AWARENESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {223-239}, keywords = {awareness, epistemology, intentionality}, abstract = {BRENTANO'S CLAIMS ABOUT INTENTIONALITY DO NOT BEAR SOLELY ON A CONCERN WITH THE POSITIVE NATURE OF MENTAL STATES. THEY ALSO HAVE NO BEARING ON THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL/MATERIAL IDENTITY. PART OF THEIR POINT IS JUST TO OPPOSE A CERTAIN VIEW ABOUT THE PROPER OBJECTS OF AWARENESS, NAMELY THAT INSOFAR AS WE ARE AWARE OF OBJECTS THEY HAVE AN EXISTENCE "IN THE MIND." BOTH HUME AND DESCARTES HELD SUCH A VIEW. AN EXAMINATION OF THE NOTIONS OF "IDEA" AND "OBJECTIVE REALITY" SHOWS THE INACCURACY OF REGARDING DESCARTES AS A "REPRESENTATIVE REALIST." WHAT REPRESENTS EXTERNAL NATURES IN THE MIND IS JUST THOSE NATURES THEMSELVES INSOFAR AS THEY EXIST IN THE MIND.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AQVIST1962, author = {AQVIST, LENNART}, title = {SEMANTIC CONCEPTS OF EXPRESSION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {89-100}, keywords = {emotivism, expression, language, meaning, mental-states; persuasive-definition; proposition, semantics, sentence}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARD1983, author = {ARD, DAVID-J}, title = {KNOWING A NAME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {377-388}, keywords = {language, name, proposition}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Arkonovich2001, author = {Arkonovich, Steven}, title = {Defending Desire: Scanlon's Anti-Humeanism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {499-519}, keywords = {desire, ethics, humean, reason}, abstract = {In the opening chapter of What We Owe To Each Other, Tim Scanlon produces a sustained critique of a Humean conception of practical reason. Scanlon claims he will argue that unless having a desire just is to see something as a reason, desires play (almost) no role in the explanation or justification of action. Yet his specific arguments against Humeanism all employ a very austere understanding of desire (which he calls the "standard model"), and attempt to show that desires so understood are not up to any explanatory or justificatory task. Since the standard model represents only one understanding of desire (distinct from the "recognition of reasons") his specific arguments cannot establish his stated general thesis. I show how a more robust conception of desire will leave the Humean account safe from Scanlon's specific arguments.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARMSTRONG1973, author = {ARMSTRONG, A-MAC}, title = {ON METHODOLOGICAL MATERIALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {62-72}, keywords = {historiography, materialism, natural-sciences; science}, abstract = {CONTRASTS THE PRINCIPLES OF HISTORIOGRAPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE, AND CONCLUDES THAT IT IS WAYWARD TO PREDICT THAT THE PHENOMENA OF ALL LIVING ORGANISMS WILL EVENTUALLY BE EXPLAINED SOLELY IN TERMS OF PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY. FOR THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO HISTORY OF NATURAL SCIENCE AND NO SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS, IF THE ASCERTAINMENT OF SCIENTIFIC TRUTH HAD NOT ITSELF BEEN UNDERSTOOD (NOT IN SCIENTIFIC BUT) IN HISTORICAL TERMS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARMSTRONG1963, author = {ARMSTRONG, A-MAC-C}, title = {REPLY TO PROFESSOR ROBINSON'S "MR ARMSTRONG ON PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {437-438}, keywords = {cognition, common-sense; definition, philosophy, scottish}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARMSTRONG1962, author = {ARMSTRONG, A-MAC-C}, title = {PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {354-359}, keywords = {common-sense; error, philosophy, public, relevance, reliability, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Armstrong1993, author = {Armstrong, D-M}, title = {The Identification Problem and the Inference Problem}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {421-422}, keywords = {epistemology, inference, laws, nature, universal}, abstract = {The object is to answer Van Fraassen's criticism, in his "Laws and Symmetry", of the view that laws of nature are relationships of properties. Such a view, Van Fraassen holds, must either fail to make clear what is the law-making relation (the Identity problem) or else fail to tell us about "what happens and what things are like" (the inference problem). The answer proposed begins with the claim that there is direct perception of singular causal connection.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARMSTRONG1970, author = {ARMSTRONG, ROBERT-L}, title = {THE SWITCHES PARADOX.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {421-427}, keywords = {implication, intuition, logic, paradox}, abstract = {"IF YOU CLOSE SWITCH P AND YOU CLOSE SWITCH Q, THEN BELL R WILL RING. THEREFORE, IF YOU CLOSE SWITCH P BELL R WILL RING OR, IF YOU CLOSE SWITCH Q BELL R WILL RING". THIS ARGUMENT IS FORMALLY VALID BUT ORDINARY INTUITION NATURALLY REJECTS IT. IT IS RESOLVED BY OBSERVING THAT THE ORDINARY INTUITION INTERPRETS THE CONCLUSION, (P IMPLIES R) OR (Q IMPLIES R), AS IF IT WERE (P OR Q) IMPLY R. SUGGESTIONS INVOLVING BOTH LANGUAGE USAGE AND FORMAL LOGIC ARE OFFERED FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF THIS PARADOX.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARONOVITCH1979, author = {ARONOVITCH, HILLIARD}, title = {RATIONAL MOTIVATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {173-193}, keywords = {action, justification, metaphysics, motivation, reasons}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Arpaly2005, author = {Arpaly, Nomy}, title = {Comments on Lack of Character by John Doris}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {643-647}, keywords = {behavior, character, empiricism, ethics, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ARTHADEVA1961, author = {ARTHADEVA, B-M}, title = {NAIVE REALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF COLOR-SEEING IN DIM LIGHT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {467-478}, keywords = {change, color, epistemology, light, object, perception, realism, seeing}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ASENJO1966, author = {ASENJO, F-G}, title = {ONE AND MANY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {361-370}, keywords = {composition, division, many, metaphysics, one, ontology, part, reality, whole, world}, abstract = {AMONG THE CATEGORIES THAT ARISTOTLE EMPLOYED, EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY, FEW HAVE UNDERGONE LESS CRITICAL ANALYSIS THAN "ONE" AND "MANY." THIS ARTICLE REVERSES THE ATOMISTIC CONCEPTION THAT "MANY" IS A MULTIPLICITY OF "ONES" AND INSTEAD TAKES THE POSITION THAT ONTOGENETICALLY DIVISION OCCURS PRIOR TO COMPOSITION. FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW, ONE AND MANY ARE DEFINED AS CHARACTERISTICS OF REALITY THAT APPEAR WHEN LARGE CONGLOMERATES ARE BEING DIVIDED INTO DISTINGUISHABLE PARTS. THIS DEFINITION IS FOLLOWED BY DESCRIPTIONS OF POSSIBLE WORLDS THAT CAN BE BUILT ON THE BASIS OF THE VARIOUS HIERARCHIC INTERRELATIONS WITH WHICH ONE AND MANY CAN BE INTERPRETED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ATHERTON1983, author = {ATHERTON, MARGARET}, title = {THE COHERENCE OF BERKELEY'S THEORY OF MIND.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {389-400}, keywords = {metaphysics, mind, spiritual-substanc}, abstract = {BERKELEY HAS BEEN NOTORIOUSLY CHARGED WITH INCONSISTENCY BECAUSE HE HELD THAT SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE EXISTS, ALTHOUGH HE ARGUED AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCE. BERKELEY IS ONLY INCONSISTENT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT HIS ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE PARALLELS THE REJECTED ARGUMENT FOR MATERIAL SUBSTANCE. I SHOW THAT BERKELEY IS RELYING ON QUITE A DIFFERENT ARGUMENT, ONE PERFECTLY CONSISTENT WITH HIS THEORY OF IDEAS, BASED ON PRESUPPOSITIONS THE GERMS OF WHICH CAN BE FOUND IN THE THOUGHT OF HIS PREDECESSORS IN THE THEORY OF IDEAS, DESCARTES AND LOCKE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Atherton2003, author = {Atherton, Margaret}, title = {How Berkeley Can Maintain That Snow Is White}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {101-113}, keywords = {color, epistemology, experience, mind}, abstract = {This paper develops an alternative reading of the First Dialogue arguments, in which their project is not to establish the mind-dependence of colors but instead to undermine the position that colors are also mind-independent. Under these circumstances, the coherence of the First and the Third Dialogue arguments is assured, just so long as the Third Dialogue claim to have established that snow is really white is not taken to mean that snow is mind-independently white, but instead, something like that our experiences of snow are stably and regularly white. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ATWELL1966, author = {ATWELL, JOHN-E}, title = {AUSTIN ON INCORRIGIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {261-266}, keywords = {epistemology, incorrigibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AUDI1988, author = {AUDI, ROBERT}, title = {JUSTIFICATION, TRUTH, AND RELIABILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {1-29}, keywords = {epistemology, justification, reliability, truth}, abstract = {THIS PAPER DEVELOPS AN ACCOUNT OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION--TELEOLOGICAL NORMATIVISM--WHICH IS INTERNALIST BUT NOT DEONTOLOGICAL, AND TELEOLOGICAL BUT NOT RELIABILIST. THE ACCOUNT ATTEMPTS TO DO JUSTICE TO BOTH THE NORMATIVE CHARACTER OF JUSTIFICATION AND ITS CONNECTION WITH TRUTH. SPECIAL EMPHASIS IS GIVEN TO DISTINGUISHING THE PROPERTY FROM THE PROCESS OF JUSTIFICATION AND TO EXPLAINING THEIR MUTUAL INTEGRATION. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Audi2003, author = {Audi, Robert}, title = {Precis of The Architecture of Reason}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {177-180}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, person, practical-reason; rationality}, abstract = {This book constructs a comprehensive theory of rationality. Part I addresses theoretical rationality, roughly the territory of epistemology. Part II concerns practical rationality, roughly the territory of rational action, rational desire, and moral conduct. The third, final part addresses global rationality, the overall rationality of persons. Throughout, the role of experience is central: theoretical reason represents, in good part, our cognitive responses to experience, and it yields our map of the world. Practical reason represents, in good part, our conative responses to experience, and, in the light of our beliefs, it yields a kind of itinerary for our lives. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Audi2003a, author = {Audi, Robert}, title = {Experience and Inference in the Grounding of Theoretical and Practical Reasons: Replies to Professors Fumerton, Marras, and Sinnott-Armstrong}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {202-221}, keywords = {epistemology, experience, inference, rationality, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Audi1996, author = {Audi, Robert}, title = {Objectivity and the Internal-External Reasons Controversy: A Study of Paul K. Moser's Philosophy after Objectivity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {395-400}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, objectivity, reason}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Audi1993, author = {Audi, Robert}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {968-970}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Structure of Justification}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1993} } @other{Audi1996a, author = {Audi, Robert and Wolterstorff, Nicholas}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {486-489}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate}, volume = {60(2)}, year = {1996} } @article{Aune1996, author = {Aune, Bruce}, title = {Haack's Evidence and Inquiry}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {627-632}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, evidence, inquiry}, abstract = {The essay is a critical comment on Susan Haack's Evidence and Inquiry; it attempts to show that in this work she does not fully come to terms with a basic problem faced squarely, though not successfully, by the alternative views that she rejects--namely, foundationalism and coherentism. The problem is how epistemically justified empirical propositions can reasonably be supposed to be true, approximately true, or probable. Haack uses two basic arguments to show that foundationalism and coherentism cannot solve this problem; it is argued that the view she favors, foundherentism, does not elude the force, evidently, of these same arguments.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AUNE1963, author = {AUNE, BRUCE}, title = {ABILITIES, MODALITIES, AND FREE WILL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {397-413}, keywords = {ability, action, can, coercion, could-have; determinism, free-will; metaphysics, modality}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE IS TO ESTABLISH THAT "COULD HAVE" STATEMENTS, THOUGH IN NO WAY EQUIVALENT TO A SET OF HYPOTHETICALS, ARE STILL SUFFICIENTLY IFFY TO VINDICATE MOORE'S ANALYSIS OF THE FREE-WILL PROBLEM. THE ARTICLE EXAMINES THE DIFFERENT SENSES OF "COULD," AND CONCLUDES THAT THE "ABILITY" SENSE IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE. THE MOOREAN SOLUTION IS ELABORATED, IN ORDER TO SAVE FREE-WILL IN THE FACE OF DETERMINISM. PEOPLE COULD HAVE DONE OTHER THAN WHAT THEY DID--EVEN THOUGH THE ACTIONS THEY ACTUALLY PERFORMED HAD CAUSAL ANTECEDENTS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AUSTIN1978, author = {AUSTIN, JAMES-W}, title = {RUSSELL'S CRYPTIC RESPONSE TO STRAWSON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {531-537}, keywords = {denoting, description, egocentrism, epistemology, extensionality, particulars, referring, sentence}, abstract = {IN A HASTILY WRITTEN PAPER, "MR. STRAWSON ON REFERRING," BERTRAND RUSSELL DEFENDED HIS THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS FROM THE CRITICISM LEVELED AT IT IN STRAWSON'S "ON REFERRING." RUSSELL'S DEFENSE, HOWEVER, RAMBLES AND APPEARS CURT IN PLACES AND GENERALLY CRYPTIC. CONSEQUENTLY, LITTLE ATTENTION IS PAID TO IT NOWADAYS. I TRY TO SHOW THAT IT DOES CONTAIN A COHERENT THOUGH SKELETAL REBUTTAL. IN SPITE OF THIS FACT, IT MUST BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE THEORY IS VULNERABLE FROM ANOTHER FLANK, VIZ., FROM ITS ORIGINS IN THE THEORY OF PROPER NAMES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AUSTIN1980, author = {AUSTIN, JAMES}, title = {WITTGENSTEIN'S SOLUTIONS TO THE COLOR EXCLUSION PROBLEM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {142-149}, keywords = {color, language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AVERILL1978, author = {AVERILL, EDWARD}, title = {EXPLAINING THE PRIVACY OF AFTERIMAGES AND PAINS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {299-314}, keywords = {after-image; epistemology, object, pain, perception, public, reflection}, abstract = {AN AFTER-IMAGE IS (1) AN EXPERIENCE OF A COLOR SPOT THAT IS CAUSED A CERTAIN WAY AND (2) THE COLOR SPOT IS PRIVATE. CONDITION (1) DOES NOT IMPLY CONDITION (2). IF THE RIGHT CONCEPT WERE INTRODUCED INTO OUR LANGUAGE, EXPERIENCE THAT MEETS CONDITION ONE WOULD BE CONCEIVED OF AS A PERCEPTION OF A PUBLIC OBJECT. SUCH A CONCEPT IS FULLY DEVELOPED. THUS THE PRIVACY ASSOCIATED WITH AFTER-IMAGES IS DUE TO THE HISTORICAL REASONS THAT LED TO THE ADOPTION OF ONE CONCEPT RATHER THAN ANOTHER. A PARALLEL EXPLANATION IS GIVEN FOR THE PRIVACY OF PAIN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AVERILL1982, author = {AVERILL, EDWARD}, title = {ESSENCE AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY IN KRIPKE AND PUTNAM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {253-258}, keywords = {discovery, science}, abstract = {THE CLAIM THAT IF GOLD HAS THE ATOMIC NUMBER 79 THEN GOLD NECESSARILY HAS THE ATOMIC NUMBER 79 IS SHOWN TO BE FALSE. THE KRIPKE-PUTNAM ARGUMENT FOR THIS CLAIM IS REWORKED TO SHOW THIS: IF A PROPERTY OF GOLD (LIKE ATOMIC NUMBER) PLAYS A BASIC ROLE IN A THEORY OF SUBSTANCE, THAT IS BOTH TRUE AND THE BEST MOST COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF SUBSTANCE POSSIBLE, THEN GOLD NECESSARILY HAS THIS PROPERTY. 'BASIC ROLE' IS EXPLAINED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{AXINN1964, author = {AXINN, SIDNEY}, title = {AND YET: A KANTIAN ANALYSIS OF AESTHETIC INTEREST.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {108-116}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, contradiction, human-nature; intention, interest, poetry}, abstract = {SUPPOSE THAT, IN ADDITION TO HAVING CONTRADICTORY INTENTIONS AS THEIR ESSENTIAL NATURE, HUMANS KNOW THEMSELVES TO HAVE CONTRADICTORY INTENTIONS. THE SPECTACLE THAT SUCH INDIVIDUALS PRESENT TO THEMSELVES IS THAT OF AN ENTITY THAT TRIES TO MOVE IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS, "AND YET" HAS COHERENCE. FOR KANT, INDIVIDUALS ARE CONTINUALLY TORN BETWEEN THEIR PERSONAL INTEREST IN PLEASURE AND THEIR HUMAN INTEREST IN MANKIND'S RATIONAL PROGRESS. THIS IS THE ONE-MANY PREDICAMENT THAT ART WORKS OBJECTIFY. THE "NATURE" THAT ART IMITATES IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NATURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL. BY GENERALIZING ON THIS FRAMEWORK WE FIND A BASIS FOR THE AESTHETIC INTEREST OF DEVICES SUCH AS "CONTRAPPOSTO", RHYTHM, ALLITERATION, A PLAY WITHIN A PLAY, ETC. THE AESTHETIC MOMENT IS ASSUMED TO BE THE MOMENT IN WHICH ONE BOTH WANTS SOMETHING TO CONTINUE BECAUSE IT GIVES PLEASURE "AND YET" FEELS THAT IT MUST NOT CONTINUE BECAUSE IT IS IRRATIONAL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Aydede2000, author = {Aydede, Murat}, title = {An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Pain}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(3)}, pages = {537-570}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, pain, pleasure}, abstract = {After distinguishing between affective and sensory (informational) components of these experiences, I argue that although pain experiences normally consist of both components proper to them, pleasure, in contradistinction to pain, is only the affective component of a total experience that may involve many sensations proper and cognitions. Moreover, I hold that although the so-called "physical" pleasure is itself not a sensation proper, it is nevertheless an episodic affective reaction (in a primitive sense) to sensations proper. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baber1992, author = {Baber, Harriet-E}, title = {Almost Indiscernible Twins}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {365-382}, keywords = {epistemology, extrinsic, intrinsic, object, temporality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BACH1981, author = {BACH, KENT}, title = {AN ANALYSIS OF SELF-DECEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {351-370}, keywords = {epistemology, rationalization, self-deceptio}, abstract = {PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD, SELF-DECEPTION IS NOT PARADOXICAL. IT DOES NOT INVOLVE EXPLICITLY CONTRADICTORY BELIEFS, INCOHERENT INTENTIONS, OR MULTIPLE SELVES. DISTINGUISH (OCCURRENTLY) THINKING THAT "P" FROM BOTH BELIEVING THAT "P" AND FROM ENTERTAINING THAT "P". THEN DEFINE SELF-DECEPTION AS MOTIVATED (THOUGH NOT INTENTIONAL) AVOIDANCE OF SUSTAINED OR RECURRENT THOUGHT THAT "P" (DESPITE ONE'S BELIEF). THERE ARE THREE WAYS OF DOING IT: "EVASION, JAMMING", AND "RATIONALIZATION", WHICH INVOLVE, RESPECTIVELY, AVOIDING THE NASTY THOUGHT, COVERING IT UP, AND EXPLAINING IT AWAY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BACH1985, author = {BACH, KENT}, title = {MORE ON SELF-DECEPTION: REPLY TO HELLMAN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {611-614}, keywords = {believing, philosophy, self-deceptio}, abstract = {THIS IS A REPLY TO NATHAN HELLMAN'S TWO OBJECTIONS, IN "BACH ON SELF-DECEPTION" (PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 44, SEPTEMBER, 1983), TO "AN ANALYSIS OF SELF-DECEPTION" (PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 41, MARCH, 1981). FOR ME SELF-DECEPTION IS NOT A MATTER OF GETTING ONESELF TO BELIEVE THE OPPOSITE OF A PROPOSITION "P" ONE BELIEVES (OR HAS PATENTLY STRONG EVIDENCE FOR) BUT IS SOMETHING WEAKER THAN THAT: AVOIDING THE THOUGHT THAT "P", AT LEAST ON A SUSTAINED OR RECURRENT BASIS. HELLMAN FINDS IT "PUZZLING THAT ONE COULD THINK THAT NOT-"P" ON A SUSTAINED, RECURRENT BASIS" IF ONE POSSESSED CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE FOR "P". HIS PUZZLE SUFFERS FROM A MISPLACED "NOT": MY ANALYSIS REQUIRES NOT THAT THE SELF-DECEIVER THINK THAT NOT-"P" BUT THAT HE NOT THINK THAT "P" ON A SUSTAINED, RECURRENT BASIS. HELLMAN'S SECOND OBJECTION IS ALSO ANSWERED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BACH1977, author = {BACH, KENT}, title = {WHEN TO ASK, "WHAT IF EVERYONE DID THAT".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {464-481}, keywords = {categorical-imperative; deliberation, ethics, morality, obligation, utilitarianism}, abstract = {WHEN IS IT MORALLY RELEVANT TO ASK THE "EVERYONE ELSE QUESTION" (EEQ) ABOUT A CONTEMPLATED ACTION? NOT IN PRIVATE DELIBERATION, EVEN ABOUT A "CUMULATIVE ACTION." A SOCIAL RULE REQUIRING PEOPLE TO ASK THE EEQ IS JUSTIFIED ONLY IF (1) GENERAL BUT NOT UNIVERSAL PERFORMANCE OF THE ACTION IN QUESTION IS SOCIALLY NECESSARY, (2) PEOPLE'S DECISIONS WHETHER TO DO IT ARE INTERDEPENDENT, AND (3) THERE IS "COGNITIVE SYMMETRY." ASKING THE EEQ ACHIEVES NOT JUSTICE BUT COGNITIVE STABILITY IN SOCIAL EFFORTS. EVERYONE'S ASKING IT AVOIDS THE COGNITIVE ONE-UPMANSHIP OF TOO MANY PEOPLE, EACH THINKING ENOUGH OTHERS WILL DO THEIR PART, MAKING EXCEPTIONS OF THEMSELVES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BACHRACH1971, author = {BACHRACH, JAY-E}, title = {TYPE AND TOKEN AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE WORK OF ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {415-420}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, identity, token, type}, abstract = {SOME PHILOSOPHERS FAVOR A TYPE/TOKEN ANALYSIS FOR IDENTIFYING WORKS OF ART. CERTAIN ARGUMENTS SHOW THAT THIS SCHEME IS MISTAKEN. THE GENERAL QUESTION IS RAISED: WHAT SORTS OF THINGS DO TITLES OF WORKS IDENTIFY? SOMETIMES TITLES DO NOT NAME; BUT INSOFAR AS THE STATEMENTS IN WHICH TITLES OCCUR ARE MEANINGFUL, SUITABLE EQUIVALENCES CAN BE FOUND WHICH DO REFER TO PHYSICAL OBJECTS OR EVENTS. ON OTHER OCCASIONS, TITLES OFTEN REFER TO AESTHETIC OBJECTS. STILL AT OTHER TIMES NONAESTHETIC OBJECTS ARE NAMED. THE LOCATION OF THE WORK OF ART IS THUS DETERMINED BY THE USE OF THE TITLE. IN THE CASE IN WHICH THE TITLE IS NONREFERRING IT IS ERRONEOUS TO SEEK THE AESTHETIC OBJECT. IN THE CASE OF THE TITLE REFERRING TO A PARTICULAR AESTHETIC OBJECT OR EVENT THE WORK CAN BE READILY LOCATED. THE THIRD USE OF THE TITLE AS REFERRING TO NONAESTHETIC OBJECTS IS, OF COURSE, NOT DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO THE QUESTION OF THE LOCATION OF THE WORK.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BADHWAR1987, author = {BADHWAR, NEERA-KAPUR}, title = {FRIENDS AS ENDS IN THEMSELVES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {1-23}, keywords = {ethics, friendship, love}, abstract = {IN END FRIENDSHIPS, FRIENDS LOVE EACH OTHER INTRINSICALLY, NOT INSTRUMENTALLY, AND AS A SOURCE OF PLEASURE, THUS AS A GOOD TO THEMSELVES. BUT IT IS COMMONLY THOUGHT THAT END LOVE IS "UNCONDITIONAL", SELF-BENEFICIAL LOVE "INSTRUMENTAL", AND FRIENDSHIP THEREFORE BOTH UNCONDITIONAL AND INSTRUMENTAL. THIS VIEW, HOWEVER, CONTRADICTS THE IDEA THAT IN END FRIENDSHIP, THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS UNIQUE AND IRREPLACEABLE. IF SOMEONE LOVES YOU UNCONDITIONALLY, HE LOVES YOU REGARDLESS OF YOUR QUALITIES; IF INSTRUMENTALLY, THEN AS REPLACEABLE BY ANYONE WITH YOUR USEFUL QUALITIES. IN NEITHER CASE DOES HE LOVE THE UNIQUE INDIVIDUAL THAT IS "YOU". THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT END LOVE, AND THE PLEASURE THAT PARTLY DEFINES IT, IS CONDITIONAL ON THE FUNDAMENTAL QUALITIES THAT MAKE THE FRIEND THAT PARTICULAR, IRREPLACEABLE PERSON, NOT ON THE FRIEND FULFILLING ONE'S INDEPENDENTLY DEFINED GOALS. THIS ANALYSIS OPENS THE LOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF JUSTIFYING MORALITY AS BOTH AN END IN ITSELF AND A GOOD TO ONESELF.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAHM1961, author = {BAHM, ARCHIE-J}, title = {POLARITY: A DESCRIPTIVE HYPOTHESIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {347-360}, keywords = {category, complementarity, metaphysics, opposition, polarity, tension}, abstract = {IT IS ASKED, WHAT IS POLARITY? BAHM STATES THAT THE CONCEPT INVOLVES AT LEAST THREE CATEGORIES--OPPOSITENESS, COMPLEMENTARITY, AND TENSION. HIS HYPOTHESIS IS THAT ANY TWO CATEGORIES ESSENTIAL TO THE NATURE OF POLARITY MUTUALLY INVOLVE EACH OTHER. OPPOSITENESS HAS TWO POSITIVES, EACH OF WHICH IS OPPOSED TO THE OTHER. COMPLEMENTARITY PRESUPPOSES OPPOSITENESS, AND HAS: SUPPLEMENTARITY, INTERDEPENDENCE, DIMENSION, RECIPROCITY. TENSION IS A STRETCHING OF ANYTHING DUE TO TWO OR MORE DIVERGENT TENDENCIES. HENCE, POLARITY CATEGORICALLY INVOLVES OPPOSITENESS, COMPLEMENTARITY, AND TENSION. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAHM1961a, author = {BAHM, ARCHIE-J}, title = {MEANINGS OF NEGATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {179-184}, keywords = {metaphysics, negation, organicism, relation, theory, type}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAIER1991, author = {BAIER, Annette-C}, title = {MacIntyre on Hume.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {ethics, judgment}, abstract = {MacIntyre's treatment of Hume's ethics, in Whose Justice, Which Rationality? is praised for its rich textual basis, and criticised for its over-emphasis on Hume's endorsement of early capitalist forms of life, what MacIntyre calls his "anglicising subversion" of Scottish culture. Hume was cosmopolitan more than "anglophile," as were many other Scots in the eighteenth century.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAIER1980, author = {BAIER, ANNETTE}, title = {HELPING HUME TO "COMPLEAT THE UNION".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {167-186}, keywords = {associationism, family-resemblance; modern, thought}, abstract = {HUME'S KEY EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONCEPTS, THOSE OF "VIVACIOUS" PERCEPTIONS, DERIVATIVE LESS LIVELY IDEAS, OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN IDEAS, ARE RELATED TO HIS VIEWS ABOUT LIVING PERSONS AND THEIR OFFSPRING, AND THE FORMS OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PERSONS. THE PRIMACY IN HUME'S THOUGHT OF THE NATURAL FAMILY, AND OF ASSOCIATION IN THE FAMILY, IS EXPLORED AND DEVELOPED, AND THE EXTENSION OF ASSOCIATION BEYOND THE FAMILY, BY SOCIAL ARTIFICES, IS RELATED TO THE FICTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING, WHICH EXTEND THE COMBINATORIAL POTENTIAL OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. TO DERIVE MENTAL ASSOCIATION FROM SOCIAL ASSOCIATION IS BOTH TO INTERCONNECT THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL ASSOCIATION, COMPLETE THEIR UNION, AND ALSO TO COMPLETE THE MASTERY OF REASON BY THE SOCIAL PASSIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baier2001, author = {Baier, Kurt-E}, title = {Justified Morality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {427-433}, keywords = {ethics, justification, morality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAILIFF1964, author = {BAILIFF, JOHN-D}, title = {SOME COMMENTS ON THE 'IDEAL OBSERVER'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {423-428}, keywords = {disinterestedness, ethics, ideal-observer; language, meaning, objectivity}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS NOT TO EXAMINE THE CONCEPT OF THE IDEAL OBSERVER AS TO ITS QUALIFICATIONS AS AN ETHICAL THEORY, BUT TO EXPOSE THE IMPLICATIONS IT HAS FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF RATIONALITY IN ETHICAL DISCOURSE. THE "IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY" IS REALLY NOT VALUE-FREE, ACCORDING TO THE AUTHOR. THE MEANING OF SUCH AN OBSERVER IS FULLY EXPLORED, IN TERMS OF BEING "IMPARTIAL," "FULLY INFORMED," "IDEALLY RATIONAL," ETC., AND RATIONALITY IS FINALLY NOTED TO BE NOT A PERFECT UNIFORMITY OF ATTITUDES AMONG IDEAL OBSERVERS BUT THE FREEDOM AND WILLINGNESS TO ASK FOR REASONS, TO ARGUE. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baker2002, author = {Baker, Lynne-Rudder}, title = {The Ontological Status of Persons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {370-388}, keywords = {metaphysics, ontology, person, status}, abstract = {Things of kind K have ontological significance if their persistence conditions are determined by their being members of K. On Chisholm's view, persons have ontological significance, but animals do not. On animalism, animals have ontological significance, but persons do not. After explaining the notion of ontological significance, this article argues that persons do have ontological significance and, hence, that animalism is not true. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baker2002a, author = {Baker, Lynne-Rudder}, title = {Brief Reply to Rosenkrantz's Comments on My "The Ontological Status of Persons"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {394-396}, keywords = {knowledge, metaphysics, ontology, person}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baker2002b, author = {Baker, Lynne-Rudder}, title = {Precis of Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {592-598}, keywords = {body, constitution, human, metaphysics, person}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baker2002c, author = {Baker, Lynne-Rudder}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {623-635}, keywords = {constitution, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baker1999, author = {Baker, Lynne-Rudder}, title = {What Am I?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {151-159}, keywords = {biology, embryo, person, personal-identity; science}, abstract = {Eric T. Olson has argued that any view of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity has a consequence that he considers untenable--namely, that he was never an early-term fetus. I have several replies. First, the psychological-continuity view of personal identity does not entail the putative consequence; the appearance to the contrary depends on not distinguishing between de re and de dicto theses. Second, the putative consequence is not untenable anyway; the appearance to the contrary depends on not taking seriously an idea that underlies a plausible view of persons that I call 'the Constitution View." Finally, Olson's own "Biological View of personal identity" has liabilities of its own.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bakhurst2005, author = {Bakhurst, David}, title = {Wiggins on Persons and Human Nature}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {462-469}, keywords = {human-nature; interpretation, metaphysics, person, social-constructionis}, abstract = {This paper examines the evolution of David Wiggins's view that persons are human animals. Wiggins maintains that person is "akin to" a natural kind concept. Yet he holds that the states and capacities constitutive of personhood are not explicable in natural-scientific terms. His view thus requires a way of acknowledging the intimate connection between our rationality and our animality. I argue that his position would be strengthened by embracing the idea that personhood is acquired as an aspect of our "second nature". If such a view is developed along lines suggested by McDowell and Vygotsky -- rather the social constructionism Wiggins's distains -- the resulting position harmonizes with Wiggins's broadly Aristotelian perspective and intensifies connections between the moral and metaphysical dimensions of his thought.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Balaguer1998, author = {Balaguer, Mark}, title = {Attitudes without Propositions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {805-826}, keywords = {attitude, belief, epistemology, proposition, semantics}, abstract = {This paper develops a novel version of anti-Platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the Platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing 'that'-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the for 'x believes that p' and 'delta means that p'. Briefly, the view is that (a) Platonists are right that 'that'-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions and, hence, (c) 'that'-clause-containing sentences of the above sort are not true--they are useful fiction. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Balaguer1998a, author = {Balaguer, Mark}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {239-242}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics}, volume = {63(1)}, year = {1998} } @article{BALL1991, author = {BALL, Stephen-W}, title = {Linguistic Intuitions and Varieties of Ethical Naturalism.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {ethical-naturalism; ethics, intuition, linguistics}, abstract = {The purpose of this essay is to develop, and defend, a linguistic argument against various forms of ethical naturalism. Contrary to both standard criticisms, the pre-philosophic linguistic intuitions of native speakers can provide helpful evidence against ethical naturalism. Variations on objections are considered, with emphasis on the current emotivist use of the argument. The essay concludes with an analysis of the application and limitations of the argument, as related to other, nonsemantic forms of naturalism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Balog2001, author = {Balog, Katalin}, title = {Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {645-652}, keywords = {conceptual-analysis; epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, physicalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bar-On1993, author = {Bar-On, Dorit}, title = {Indeterminacy of Translation -- Theory and Practice}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {781-810}, keywords = {eliminativism, indeterminacy, language, translation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bar-On2001, author = {Bar-On, Dorit and Long, Douglas-C}, title = {Avowals and First-Person Privilege}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {311-335}, keywords = {avowals, epistemology, first-person; knowledge, language, privilege, truth}, abstract = {When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called "first-person privilege." According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a sociolinguistic convention governing avowals. We reject both approaches. On our proposed account, a full explanation of the privilege must recognize avowals as expressive performances, which can be taken to reveal directly the subject's present mental condition. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BARBER1971, author = {BARBER, KENNETH}, title = {PART II: MEINONG'S ANALYSIS OF RELATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {564-584}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, relation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BARBER1970, author = {BARBER, KENNETH}, title = {MEINONG'S HUME STUDIES PART I: MEINONG'S NOMINALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {550-567}, keywords = {metaphysics, nominalism, realism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Barnes1997, author = {Barnes, Annette}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {242-245}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Seeing through Self-Deception}, volume = {63(1)}, year = {1997} } @article{BARNETTE1978, author = {BARNETTE, R-L}, title = {GROUNDING THE MENTAL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {39}, pages = {92-105}, keywords = {belief, identity-theory; individual, mentalism, metaphysics, physicalism}, abstract = {I EXAMINE CRITICALLY A RULE THAT IS TACITLY INVOKED BY NEARLY ALL PROPONENTS OF PHYSICALISM, WHICH I CALL THE RULE OF "GROUNDING THE MENTAL" (GM). AFTER FIRST CLARIFYING THE RULE, I THEN SHOW PRECISELY HOW STANDARD VERSIONS OF THE IDENTITY THESIS UNCRITICALLY ACCEPT IT (SPECIFICALLY, ARMSTRONG'S CENTRAL STATE MATERIALISM AND PUTNAM'S FUNCTIONALISM), AND SHOW HOW THESE POSITIONS ARE AFFECTED BY SERIOUS LOGICAL DIFFICULTIES. NEXT, I ARGUE THAT THE RULE SHOULD BE ABANDONED AND ALSO SHOW THAT THIS POSITION SHOULD NOT BOTHER A PHYSICALIST, FOR ADHERENCE TO THE GM RULE IS NOT A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR PHYSICALISM. I GO ON TO DEVELOP A DIRECTION FOR A PHYSICALISTIC THEORY WHICH DOES NOT ACCEPT GM, ONE WHICH IS HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY WORK IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND SYSTEMS-THEORY. I CONCLUDE WITH A LIST OF EIGHT AXIOMS WHICH WOULD BE HELPFUL IN ARTICULATING A FORMAL SEMANTICS FOR THE THEORY I OUTLINE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Baron1997, author = {Baron, Marcia-W and Pettit, Philip and Slote, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {721-723}, publisher = {Blackwell}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Three Methods of Ethics}, volume = {62(3)}, year = {1997} } @article{Barrett1999, author = {Barrett, Martin and Eells, Ellery and Fitelson, Branden (and-others)}, title = {Models and Reality--A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {237-241}, keywords = {epistemology, game-theory; model, reality, social-contrac}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Barrett2002, author = {Barrett, Matthew and Godfrey-Smith, Peter}, title = {Group Selection, Pluralism, and the Evolution of Altruism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {685-691}, keywords = {altruism, ethics, evolution, group, pluralism}, abstract = {Sober and Wilson have done evolutionary biologists and philosophers of biology a great service in writing this book. They vigorously defend a "multilevel" view of natural selection, in which group selection can play a significant role, and argue that group selection was involved in the evolution of altruistic behavior in humans. The book is entirely persuasive in its argument that attempts to marginalize group-selectionist ideas in the latter part of the 20th century were mistaken. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BARTKY1970, author = {BARTKY, S-L}, title = {ORIGINATIVE THINKING IN THE LATER PHILOSOPHY OF HEIDEGGER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {368-381}, keywords = {being, historicism, naming, nihilism, thinking}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BARTKY1979, author = {BARTKY, SANDRA-LEE}, title = {HEIDEGGER AND THE MODES OF WORLD-DISCLOSURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {212-236}, keywords = {being, disclosure, language, metaphysics, thinking, world}, abstract = {FOR THE LATER HEIDEGGER, THE BEING-EVENT TAKES TWO FORMS: THE "HORIZONTAL" BEING-EVENT REFERS TO THE WAY IN WHICH BEING HAS GIVEN BIRTH TO THE EPOCHS OF METAPHYSICS, WHILE WHAT I CALL THE "VERTICAL" BEING-EVENT REFERS TO THE MODES OF WORLD-DISCLOSURE "WITHIN" ANY EPOCH. FIVE MODES OF WORLD-DISCLOSURE MENTIONED IN A KEY CITATION FROM "HOLZWEGE" ARE SCRUTINIZED. I CONCLUDE THAT THE FIVE MODES COLLAPSE TO ONLY TWO, DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH FROM ONE ANOTHER AND THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A VERTICAL BEING-EVENT AS A WHOLE IS BEST BY A VARIETY OF CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES HAVING TO DO WITH THE "UNITY" OF THE MODES OF DISCLOSURE AND THE "CRITERIA" BY WHICH WE DISTINGUISH WHAT IS DISCLOSIVE FROM WHAT IS NOT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAUMER1964, author = {BAUMER, WILLIAM-H}, title = {EVIDENCE AND IDEAL EVIDENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {567-572}, keywords = {confirmation, epistemology, evidence, ideal, paradox, probability}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR NOTES THAT VINCENT'S REFUTATION OF POPPER'S CRITICISM OF A SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY FAILS. THERE IS A PARADOX OF IDEAL EVIDENCE; HOWEVER, THE SOURCE OF THIS PARADOX DISAPPEARS WHEN A CERTAIN RELATIONSHIP IS MADE CLEAR. THE FOLLOWING IS PRESENTED: IDEAL EVIDENCE MUST BE TAKEN AS SUPPORTING AN EMPIRICAL STATEMENT (NOT SOME LOGICAL TRUTH). "A, RELATIVE TO SOME EMPIRICAL STATEMENT IS PROBABLE TO THE DEGREE 1/2." (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAUMER1967, author = {BAUMER, WILLIAM-H}, title = {THE ONE SYSTEMATICALLY AMBIGUOUS CONCEPT OF PROBABILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {264-268}, keywords = {logic, probability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAXTER1991, author = {BAXTER, Donald-L-M}, title = {Berkeley, Perception, and Identity.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {identity, metaphysics, perception}, abstract = {Berkeley says both that one 'sometimes' immediately perceives the same thing by sight and touch, and that one 'never' does. To solve the contradiction I recommend and explain a distinction Berkeley himself makes-between two uses of 'same'. This solution unifies two seemingly inconsistent parts of Berkeley's whole project: He argues both that what we see are bits of light and color organized into a language by which God speaks to us about tactile sensations, and yet that we directly see ordinary objects. My solution explains how these can come to the same thing.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baxter1997, author = {Baxter, Donald-L-M}, title = {Abstraction, Inseparability, and Identity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {307-330}, keywords = {abstraction, epistemology, identity}, abstract = {Berkeley and Hume object to Locke's account of abstraction. Abstraction is separating in the mind what cannot be separated in reality. Their objection is that if a is inseparable in reality from b, then the idea of a is inseparable from the idea of b. The former inseparability is the reason for the latter. In most interpretations, however, commentators leave the former unexplained in explaining the latter. This article assumes that Berkeley and Hume present a unified from against Locke. Hume supplements Berkeley's argument just where there are gaps. In particular, Hume makes explicit something Berkeley leaves implicit: The argument against Locke depends on the principle that things are inseparable if and only if they are identical. Abstraction is thinking of one of an inseparable pair while not thinking of the other. But doing so entails thinking of something while not thinking of it. This is the fundamental objection.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Baxter2005, author = {Baxter, Donald-L-M}, title = {Altruism, Grief, and Identity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {371-383}, keywords = {altruism, grief, identity, metaphysics}, abstract = {The divide between oneself and others has made altruism seem irrational to some thinkers, as Sidgwick points out. I use characterizations of grief, especially by St. Augustine, to question the divide, and use a composition-as-identity metaphysics of parts and wholes to make literal sense of those characterizations.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BAYLIS1963, author = {BAYLIS, CHARLES-A}, title = {A CRITICISM OF LOVEJOY'S CASE FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL DUALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {527-537}, keywords = {critical-realism; dualism, epistemology, memory, monism, object, perception, sense-dat}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bayne2001, author = {Bayne, Tim}, title = {Chalmers on Justification of Phenomenal Judgments}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {407-419}, keywords = {consciousness, judgment, metaphysics, mind, phenomenology}, abstract = {We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind (TCM), David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully-justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PJs are justified, because it alone can underwrite the certainty of our phenomenal judgments. I argue that Chalmers is unable to sustain this claim.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEARD1966, author = {BEARD, ROBERT-W}, title = {ON PROFESSOR WHITE'S PUZZLE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {107-109}, keywords = {identicals, intensional-logic; logic, name, paradox, substitutivity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEARDSLEY1960, author = {BEARDSLEY, ELIZABETH-L}, title = {DETERMINISM AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {1-20}, keywords = {blame, determinism, equality, ethics, moral-judgment; praise, responsibility, worth}, abstract = {THE QUESTION IS POSED: CAN DETERMINISTS FIND A SATISFACTORY RATIONALE FOR MORAL PRAISE AND BLAME? THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT JUDGMENTS OF MORAL PRAISE AND BLAME, AFFIRMATIVE AS WELL AS NEGATIVE, CAN BE MADE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF DETERMINISM, PROVIDED THAT ONE ACCEPTS A MORE COMPLEX ACCOUNT OF THESE JUDGMENTS AND THEIR FOUNDATIONS THAN IS ORDINARILY SUPPLIED OR ASSUMED. SUCH JUDGMENTS ARE MADE FROM SEVERAL DIFFERENT STANDPOINTS, CALLED "MORAL PERSPECTIVES," AND IF THESE ARE UNDERSTOOD, DETERMINISTS NEED NOT FEEL UNEASY WHEN CONFRONTED BY THE CONCEPTS OF MORAL PRAISE AND BLAME. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEARDSLEY1970, author = {BEARDSLEY, ELIZABETH-LANE}, title = {MORAL DISAPPROVAL AND MORAL INDIGNATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {161-176}, keywords = {blame, ethics, illocutionary-act; indignation, moral}, abstract = {THE ILLOCUTIONARY ACT OF BLAMING---IN THE "BEHABITIVE" MODE DISTINGUISHED BY J L AUSTIN FROM THE "VERDICTIVE" AND "EXERCITIVE" MODES---IS BEST ANALYZED AS EXPRESSING MORAL DISAPPROVAL (ON WHICH MORAL INDIGNATION IS BASED). AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIVE CONDITIONS OF BEHABITIVE BLAMING REVEALS THAT VERDICTIVE BLAMING IS PRESUPPOSED BY IT, AND THEREFORE--CONTRARY TO A WIDELY-HELD VIEW---VERDICTIVE BLAMING CANNOT BE ANALYZED IN TERMS OF AN EMOTION OR ATTITUDE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEARDSLEY1965, author = {BEARDSLEY, MONROE-C}, title = {INTRINSIC VALUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {1-17}, keywords = {axiology, consequence, desire, end, intrinsic-value; justification, mean, naturalism}, abstract = {BEARDSLEY, ATTACKS THE PROPOSITION THAT THERE IS SUCH A THING AS INTRINSIC VALUE. SUCH VALUE WOULD HAVE TO BE INDEPENDENT OF ITS RELATION TO ANYTHING ELSE! THE REASONS FOR BELIEVING IN INTRINSIC VALUE ARE GIVEN: ARGUMENTS FROM DEFINITION, FROM A DIALECTICAL DEMONSTRATION, AND AN ATTEMPT AT EMPIRICAL CONFIRMATION. BEARDSLEY CONCLUDES THAT THE CONCEPT OF INTRINSIC VALUE IS INAPPLICABLE. EVEN IF SOMETHING HAS INTRINSIC VALUE WE COULD NOT KNOW IT, AND THEREFORE IT CAN PLAY NO ROLE IN ETHICAL OR AESTHETIC REASONING. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEARDSLEY1962, author = {BEARDSLEY, MONROE-C}, title = {THE METAPHORICAL TWIST.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {293-307}, keywords = {aesthetics, comparison, extension, intension, linguistic-analysis; metaphor, modifier, object, poetry, predicate}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO DISTINGUISH A THING-APPROACH AND A WORD-APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF ANALYZING METAPHOR. BEARDSLEY REJECTS THE OBJECT-COMPARISON THEORY OF METAPHOR IN FAVOR OF THE VERBAL-OPPOSITION THEORY, WHICH HE EXPLAINS AND DEFENDS. HE CONCLUDES THAT THE LATTER EXPLAINS THE ACKNOWLEDGED FEATURES OF METAPHOR AND MAKES NO ASSUMPTIONS THAT A SOUND PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE WOULD BE UNWILLING TO GRANT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Becker1998, author = {Becker, Lawrence-C}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {737-740}, publisher = {Princeton Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A New Stoicism}, volume = {64(3)}, year = {1998} } @article{Bedau1992, author = {Bedau, Mark}, title = {Where's the Good in Teleology?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {781-806}, keywords = {biology, good, science, teleology, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Beebee2000, author = {Beebee, Helen}, title = {The Non-Governing Conception of Laws of Nature}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(3)}, pages = {571-594}, keywords = {epistemology, natural-law; supervenience}, abstract = {Recently several thought experiments have been developed (by John Carroll amongst others) which have been alleged to refute the Ramsey-Lewis view of laws of nature. The paper aims to show that two such thought experiments fail to establish that the Ramsey-Lewis view is false, since they presuppose a conception of laws of nature that is radically at odds with the Humean conception of laws embodied by the Ramsey-Lewis view. In particular, the thought experiments presuppose that laws of nature govern the behavior of objects. The paper argues that the claim that laws govern should not be regarded as a conceptual truth. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BEK1978, author = {BEK, KIM-H}, title = {THE LIMITS OF POSSIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {514-523}, keywords = {contradiction, incorrigibility, intuitionism, logic, possibility, proposition}, abstract = {IN HIS BOOK "CATEGORIAL FRAMEWORKS" STEPHAN KORNER ARGUES THAT THERE ARE NO PROPOSITIONS, NOT EVEN THE CLASSICAL LAW OF CONTRADICTION, WHICH ARE EXTERNALLY INCORRIGIBLE, I.E., PRESUPPOSED IN EVERY POSSIBLE THEORY. HIS RELATIVISTIC CONCLUSION RESTS ON AN INTERPRETATION OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC, WHICH IS FIRST CALLED IN QUESTION. IT IS THEN ARGUED THAT, THE QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION APART, IT IS ALL THE SAME NECESSARY TO ASSUME THE ABSOLUTE VALIDITY OF THE CLASSICAL LAW OF CONTRADICTION, BECAUSE IT IS A SUPREME AND INDISPENSABLE CRITERION OF WHAT A LOGICALLY POSSIBLE THEORY MEANS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BELAIEF1975, author = {BELAIEF, LYNNE}, title = {SELF-ESTEEM AND HUMAN EQUALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {25-43}, keywords = {equality, psychology, right, self-esteem; self-identity; social-philosoph}, abstract = {AIMING TO UNDERSTAND THE MEANING OF HUMAN EQUALITY AS IT EFFECTS SELF-ESTEEM, A PRELIMINARY DISTINCTION IS MADE BETWEEN EQUALITY EXPERIENCED AS A SUBJECTIVE (PSYCHOLOGICAL) PHENOMENON AND EQUALITY EXISTING AS AN ELEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE (SOCIAL) PATTERN OF A CULTURE. ATTENTION IS THEN GIVEN TO THE CAUSAL INTERACTION BETWEEN THE TWO LEVELS. THE SUBJECTIVE DIMENSION IS EXTENSIVELY ANALYZED, BOTH PHENOMENOLOGICALLY AND ETHICALLY. THE LATTER ANALYSIS LEADS TO GRIM CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF EQUALITY BEING TRULY UNDERSTOOD OR VALUED BY INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE ACCEPTED THE JUVENILE IDENTITY CONSCIOUSNESS THAT BASES SELF-ESTEEM ON COMPETITIVE SUPERIORITY. CONCRETE SPECULATION IS GIVEN CONCERNING POSSIBLE MEANS FOR ETHICAL CHANGE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bell1996, author = {Bell, David}, title = {The Formation of Concepts and the Structure of Thoughts}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {583-596}, keywords = {epistemology, language, sentence, structure, thought}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BELLIOTTI1987, author = {BELLIOTTI, RAYMOND-A}, title = {IS LAW A SHAM?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {25-44}, keywords = {ideology, jurisprudence, political-philosophy; politics}, abstract = {THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (CLS) IS COMPOSED MOSTLY OF ACADEMIC LAWYERS WHO SHARE A DISSATISFACTION WITH THE CURRENT STATUS OF CENTRIST-LIBERAL LEGAL THEORY, AND WHO ASPIRE TO RECONSTRUCT THE POLITICAL ORDER ALONG MORE EGALITARIAN BASES. THIS PAPER (1) EXPLAINS CLS'S VIEW OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND CLS'S POLITICAL AGENDA; (2) CRITICIZES ASPECTS OF CLS'S ATTACK ON CENTRIST-LIBERAL POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY; AND (3) SHOWS HOW THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN CLS AND CENTRIST-LIBERALS ARE MIRED IN A FAMILIAR DICHOTOMY: OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM, WHICH DICHOTOMY CLS MUST TRANSCEND IF IT IS TO REALIZE ITS RADICAL PROJECT. FINALLY, A NOTION OF THE "SELF" WHICH MAY BE HELPFUL TO CLS IN CONSTRUCTING ITS ALTERNATIVE LEGAL AND POLITICAL VISION IS SUGGESTED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BELNAP1991, author = {BELNAP, Nuel}, title = {Backwards and Forwards in the Modal Logic of Agency.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {action, agency, intensionality, logic, modal-logi}, abstract = {A modal logic is a logic whose grammar includes an intensional construct having sentences as both inputs and outputs. A "modal logic of agency" intends that some such construct express agency (or action), as, for example, the English construct "a sees to it that Q." The paper has four sections: (1) gives a brief retrospective, (2) restates some claims from an earlier work, (3) motivates the desirability of a modal logic of agency, and (4) draws ten pictures illustrating some of the cases in which such a logic can provide clarification.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ben-Ze'ev2004, author = {Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron}, title = {Emotions Are Not Mere Judgments}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {450-457}, keywords = {emotion, ethics, feeding, judgment, motivation}, abstract = {The search for the essence of emotions is a common feature of various views of emotions---many of which attempt to reduce emotions to one central component. Three major views that seek to define emotions via a basic component are: (a) that emotions are essentially a cognitive-evaluative state; (b) that emotions are feelings; (c) that emotions are desires. I believe that all these reductions are inadequate. I focus here on (a) as expressed in Nussbaum's recent view of emotions. I begin, however, by briefly discussing (b) and (c).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENCIVENGA1988, author = {BENCIVENGA, ERMANNO}, title = {THAT OBSCURE OBJECT OF DESIRE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {533-544}, keywords = {desire, metaphysics, object}, abstract = {VERBS OF DESIRE AND SEARCH ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO ACCOUNT FOR THAN (OTHER) INTENTIONAL CONTEXTS BECAUSE, WHEREAS WHAT WE THINK OF MAY WELL BE NONEXISTENT, WHAT WE DESIRE CANNOT BE. THIS DIFFICULTY IS TREATED HERE AS AN ANOMALY FOR THE TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL PARADIGM BASED ON THE CONCEPTUAL PRIORITY OF OBJECTS, AND THE POSSIBILITY IS EXPLORED OF DEALING WITH THE ANOMALY IN A DIFFERENT (KANTIAN) PARADIGM WHICH ATTRIBUTES CONCEPTUAL PRIORITY TO EXPERIENCES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENCIVENGA1987, author = {BENCIVENGA, ERMANNO}, title = {ECONOMY OF EXPRESSION AND AESTHETIC PLEASURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {615-630}, keywords = {aesthetic-judgment; aesthetics, completeness, expression, literature}, abstract = {MANY CRITICS FIND ECONOMICAL WORKS OF ART TO BE AESTHETICALLY MORE VALUABLE, BUT THEY DO NOT SAY WHY. AN EXPLANATION IS PROPOSED HERE IN THREE STEPS. FIRST, IT IS POINTED OUT THAT THE SPECTATOR OR READER GETS INVOLVED IN CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITIES, ANALOGOUS TO THOSE ORIGINALLY PERFORMED BY THE AUTHOR. SECOND, IT IS NOTICED THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE GENERALLY USEFUL FOR PEOPLE'S PRESERVATION AND WELFARE. THIRD, A COMBINED FREUD-LORENZ MODEL IS USED TO EXPLAIN WHY GENERALLY USEFUL ACTIVITIES SHOULD GIVE PLEASURE: PLEASURE IS THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL COUNTERPART OF THE DISCHARGE OF DRIVE ENERGY, WHICH ACCOMPANIES (NOT THE CONSUMMATION OF AN OBJECT, BUT) THE PERFORMING OF SOME MOVES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENDITT1976, author = {BENDITT, T-M}, title = {BENEFIT AND HARM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {116-120}, keywords = {benefit, harm, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENFIELD1971, author = {BENFIELD, DAVID-W}, title = {JOHNSTONE ON THE TRUTH OF PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {96-102}, keywords = {language, philosophy, statement, truth}, abstract = {IN THE THIRD CHAPTER OF "PHILOSOPHY AND ARGUMENT" H.W. JOHNSTONE ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS ARE NOT PROPOSITIONS WHICH ARE TRUE OR FALSE. IN THIS PAPER I ARGUE THAT JOHNSTONE FAILS TO ESTABLISH HIS THESIS. JOHNSTONE'S ARGUMENT DEPENDS ON HIS CLAIM THAT PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS ARE TRUE RELATIVE TO ARGUMENT. THIS CONCEPT OF TRUTH IS HIGHLY PROBLEMATIC, ALLOWING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT A PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENT CAN BE BOTH TRUE AND FALSE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENFIELD1977, author = {BENFIELD, DAVID-W}, title = {THE A PRIORI AND THE SELF-EVIDENT: A REPLY TO MR CASULLO'S "THE DEFINITION OF A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {225-227}, keywords = {a-priori; contingent, epistemology, necessary, proposition, self-eviden}, abstract = {IN AN EARLIER PAPER, "THE A PRIORI A POSTERIORI DISTINCTION," I ARGUED THAT ALL SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITIONS COULD BE KNOWN "A PRIORI". MR. CASULLO DISAGREES CLAIMING THAT IN KNOWING A CONTINGENT SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITION ONE MUST "APPEAL TO, OR TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, HIS PRESENT EXPERIENTIAL STATE...." IN THIS BRIEF REPLY I CONSIDER TWO ARGUMENTS DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE WAY IN WHICH WE KNOW CONTINGENT SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITIONS DIFFERS EPISTEMICALLY FROM THE WAY IN WHICH WE KNOW NECESSARY SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITIONS. I FIND BOTH ARGUMENTS DEFECTIVE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENFIELD1974, author = {BENFIELD, DAVID-W}, title = {THE A PRIORI-A POSTERIORI DISTINCTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {151-166}, keywords = {a-posteriori; a-priori; epistemology, knowledge}, abstract = {PHILOSOPHERS FROM KANT TO QUINE HAVE CONFLATED THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE "A PRIORI" AND THE "A POSTERIORI", THE NECESSARY AND THE CONTINGENT, AND THE ANALYTIC AND THE SYNTHETIC. HOWEVER, IF THESE DISTINCTIONS ARE NOT BLURRED AND IF SUFFICIENT ATTENTION IS PAID TO THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF THE "A PRIORI", THEN IT IS CLEAR THAT THE "A PRIORI" SHOULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE NECESSARY. IN THIS PAPER I OFFER A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE "A PRIORI" AND I ARGUE THAT CERTAIN SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITIONS CAN BE KNOWN "A PRIORI" EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE NEITHER NECESSARY NOR ANALYTIC. I ALSO PROVIDE DEFINITIONS OF SEVERAL QUITE ONTOLOGICALLY DIVERSE "A PRIORI" ENTITIES. I CONCLUDE WITH AN EXPLANATION OF WHY THE "A POSTERIORI" IS NOT SIMPLY THE LOGICAL COMPLEMENT OF THE "A PRIORI" AND I OFFER ANALOGOUS DEFINITIONS OF "A POSTERIORI" ENTITIES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bennett1995, author = {Bennett, Jonathan}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {979-983}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Act Itself}, volume = {58(4)}, year = {1995} } @article{Bennett2004, author = {Bennett, Karen}, title = {Global Supervenience and Dependence}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {501-529}, keywords = {dependence, global, metaphysics, possible-world; supervenience, variation}, abstract = {Two versions of global supervenience have recently been distinguished from each other. I introduce a third version, which is more likely what people had in mind all along. However, I argue that one of the three versions is equivalent to strong supervenience in every sense that matters, and that neither of the other two versions counts as a genuine determination relation. I conclude that global supervenience has little metaphysically distinctive value.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BENSMAN1968, author = {BENSMAN, JOSEPH and LILIENFELD, ROBERT}, title = {A PHENOMENOLOGICAL MODEL OF THE ARTISTIC AND CRITICAL ATTITUDES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {353-367}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, attitude, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BERGMAN1965, author = {BERGMAN, HUGO}, title = {BRENTANO ON THE HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {94-99}, keywords = {ancient, development, greek, history, laws, philosophy}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES BRENTANO'S GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY, ESPECIALLY AS A SCIENCE. IT ELUCIDATES FOUR PHASES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY, AS WELL AS IN ANY EPOCH; THESE ARE: ASCENDING, POPULARIZING, SKEPTICAL, AND MYSTICAL. THE ARTICLE ENDS BY ATTEMPTING TO SHOW THAT BRENTANO ATTEMPTED TO SEARCH FOR LAWS EVEN IN HISTORY AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, AND ACTUALLY THOUGHT OF PHILOSOPHY AS A LAWFUL DEVELOPMENT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bergmann2004, author = {Bergmann, Michael}, title = {Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {709-727}, keywords = {circularity, epistemology, justification, testimony}, abstract = {If I form a belief in the trustworthiness of one of my belief sources, X, and, in the formation of that belief, I depend upon X, then that belief is infected with epistemic circularity. Many people think that epistemic circularity is a bad thing in the sense that beliefs infected by it cannot be justified. I argue, first, that if justified belief is possible, epistemic circularity needn't be a bad thing. Then I give an account of the difference between malignant and benign epistemic circularity and I provide a Reidian example of benign epistemically circular belief that is justified.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bergmann2004a, author = {Bergmann, Michael}, title = {What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {161-165}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, foundationalism, justification, knowledge}, abstract = {One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially--i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing foundationalist. In this paper, I will explain why his objections to foundationalism fail.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bergmann2000, author = {Bergmann, Michael}, title = {Deontology and Defeat}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {87-102}, keywords = {defeat, deontology, epistemology, internalism, knowledge}, abstract = {I shall argue that no deontological conception of epistemic justification provides a good reason for endorsing internalism. My main contention is that a requirement having to do with epistemic defeat--a requirement that many externalists impose on knowledge--guarantees the only sorts of deontological justification that have a chance at inducing internalism. Given this compatibility of externalism and deontology, we may safely conclude that deontology by itself doesn't lend support to internalism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BERLEANT1966, author = {BERLEANT, ARNOLD}, title = {ON THE CIRCULARITY OF THE COGITO.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {431-433}, keywords = {circularity, cogito, doubt, epistemology, method, scepticism}, abstract = {ON THE BASIS OF THE DUBITO, DESCARTES INFERS THAT HE IS THINKING AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THAT HE EXISTS AS A THINKING BEING. THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO RAISE A LOGICAL ISSUE, NAMELY THAT THE METHOD OF DOUBTING ITSELF CONTAINS THE NECESSITY FOR A DOUBTER. HENCE, DESCARTES' CONCLUSION FOLLOWS, NOT FROM THE USE OF THE METHOD, BUT FROM ITS ADOPTION, SINCE DOUBTING LOGICALLY PRESUPPOSES A DOUBTER AND THUS AN EXISTENT BEING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BERLEANT1969, author = {BERLEANT, ARNOLD}, title = {SURROGATE THEORIES OF ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {163-185}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, communication, emotion, expression, imitation}, abstract = {THE MAJOR THEORIES OF ART--IMITATION, EMOTIONALIST, EXPRESSION, COMMUNICATION, FORMALIST--ALL FAIL TO EXPLAIN WHAT ART IS. THEY COMMIT A COMMON ERROR BY INTERPRETING THE NATURE OF ART IN TERMS OF NON-AESTHETIC MODES OF EXPERIENCE. THESE MODES ARE MORE FAMILIAR BUT SHARPLY DIFFERENT FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF ART AND ACT AS SURROGATES FOR IT, MISLEADING US AND DIRECTING US AWAY FROM ART. A GENUINELY EMPIRICAL AESTHETICS WILL DEAL WITH ART IN THE LIGHT OF ITS OWN DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BERLEANT1964, author = {BERLEANT, ARNOLD}, title = {A NOTE ON THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING 'ART'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {239-241}, keywords = {aesthetic-experience; aesthetic-object; aesthetics, art, concept, definition}, abstract = {THIS PAPER PROPOSES THAT RATHER THAN BEGINNING WITH A DEFINITION OF ART WHICH IS THEN TESTED AGAINST EXAMPLES, WE START WITH THE PHENOMENA OF ART AND THE EXPERIENCES BY WHICH THEY ARE KNOWN. THIS CORRECTS THE TENDENCY TO JUDGE ART BY A CONCEPT RATHER THAN DEVELOPING CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS THAT RESPOND TO THE OPEN AND CHANGING CHARACTER OF ART. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION IS REALLY ONE OF THE DESCRIPTION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE EXPERIENCES OF ART.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bermudez1997, author = {Bermudez, Jose-Luis}, title = {Practical Understanding vs Reflective Understanding}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {635-641}, keywords = {epistemology, past, self, space, understanding}, abstract = {This contribution to a book symposium on John Campbell's Past, Space and Self examines the dualism between two different ways of understanding the world developed in the book. One such mode, the causally indexical mode, is practical and engaged. The other, the causally nonindexical mode, is disengaged and reflective. The tenability of this dualism is explored with reference to theories of nonconceptual content, of the conditions upon content ascription and of tacit knowledge.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bermudez2000, author = {Bermudez, Jose-Luis}, title = {Naturalized Sense Data}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {353-374}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, sense-data; vision}, abstract = {This paper examines and defends the view that the immediate objects of visual perception, or what are often called sense data, are parts of the facing surfaces of physical objects--the naturalized sense data (NSD) theory. Occasionally defended in the literature on the philosophy of perception, most famously by G. E. Moore (1918-1919), it has not proved popular and, indeed, was abandoned by Moore himself. The contemporary situation in the philosophy of perception seems ripe for a revaluation of the NSD theory, however. The NSD theory allows us to accommodate the very real shortcomings in uncritical direct realism without postulating the existence of nonphysical sense data in a way that has seemed to many incompatible with any robust form of philosophical naturalism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bermudez1997a, author = {Bermudez, Jose-Luis}, title = {Scepticism and Science in Descartes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {743-772}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, method, scepticism, science}, abstract = {Recent Descartes scholarship has revised the traditional view of the Cartesian project as one of strictly deductive rationalism. This revision has particularly stressed the role of science in Descartes's thought. The revisionist conception of Descartes also downplays the significance of the sceptical arguments offered in the First Meditation, seeing them as tools for 'turning the mind away from the senses' in the interest of Cartesian science, rather than as reflecting genuinely epistemological concerns. This paper takes issue with this aspect of the revisionist reading of Descartes. It argues that seeing scepticism as critically important for Descartes is independent of interpreting him as a canonical rationalist. In fact, it is precisely Descartes's scientific thought and practice which make scepticism such a problem for him.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bermudez1998, author = {Bermudez, Jose-Luis}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {727-730}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Paradox of Self-Consciousness}, volume = {63(3)}, year = {1998} } @article{BERNDTSON1970, author = {BERNDTSON, ARTHUR}, title = {THE MEANING OF POWER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {73-84}, keywords = {change, metaphysics, novelty, power}, abstract = {POWER IS THE CAUSE OF CHANGE, THE GROUND OF CHANGE, AND IMMANENT IN CHANGE. IT HAS A TENDENCY TOWARD CHANGE: A VECTOR WITHOUT GOAL AND ANTICIPATION WITHOUT IDEA OR POTENTIALITY. THAT WHICH TENDS IS INTENSITY, WHICH IS RADICALLY INDETERMINATE. POWER IS EXPERIENCED IN EMOTION AND VOLITION. IT IS COMPATIBLE WITH UNIFORM OR VARIABLE OPERATION. IT MAY COMPEL, BUT NOT INEVITABLY. IT IS AN UNCAUSED CAUSE. THE PAPER CLAIMS TO ESTABLISH THE MEANING AND APPEARANCE OF POWER. IT DOES NOT CONSIDER REALITY OF POWER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BERNDTSON1960, author = {BERNDTSON, ARTHUR}, title = {BEAUTY, EMBODIMENT, AND ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {50-61}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, beauty, embodiment, emergence, emotion, expression, form}, abstract = {EMBODIMENT IS SEEN AS THE PERCEPTION OF ADEQUATE EMOTION AS FUSED WITH FORM, AND IT OCCURS INSOFAR AS THE PRELIMINARY ACTIVITIES OF CREATION HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. THIS DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE IS CALLED TRANSITIVE EXPRESSION; IT IS THE PASSAGE OF EMOTION FROM A PRIMITIVE TO AN ADEQUATE STATE THROUGH THE MEDIATION OF FORM. TRANSITIVE EXPRESSION IMPLIES EMBODIMENT AS ITS FINAL STATE OR OUTCOME. THE PURPOSE OF THE PAPER IS TO SHOW THAT BEAUTY IS THE EMERGENT QUALITY OF EMBODIMENT. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE UGLY (A FEELING OF LOATHING) IS WHOLLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH EMBODIMENT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bernecker2004, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Memory and Externalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {605-632}, keywords = {content, context, epistemology, externalism, individuation, memory}, abstract = {Content externalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past environment. I defend externalism about memory by arguing neither philosophical nor psychological considerations stand in the way of accepting the context dependency of memory that follows from externalism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bernstein1998, author = {Bernstein, Mark-H}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {730-733}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally Matters}, volume = {63(3)}, year = {1998} } @other{Bernstein1992, author = {Bernstein, Richard-J}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {977-981}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The New Constellation}, volume = {55(4)}, year = {1992} } @article{Berofsky1998, author = {Berofsky, Bernard}, title = {Through Thick and Thin: Mele on Autonomy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {689-697}, keywords = {autonomy, dependence, internalism, metaphysics}, abstract = {Since the structure of preferences of a self-controlled person might result from external control, Mele insists that an autonomous agent's current condition not have arisen through influences that bypassed his control over his mental life. This requirement is deemed too weak; the agent must not be in the grip of forces inhibiting a proper cognitive, conative, and affective connection to the world. As neutral on the free-will question, Mele perhaps establishes the possibility of libertarianism; but his more ambitious project to show how indetermination can contribute to freedom fails. Mele argues convincingly that autonomy depends in part upon causal history. This book makes a very important contribution to the literature.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Berofsky2000, author = {Berofsky, Bernard}, title = {Ultimate Responsibility in a Deterministic World}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {135-140}, keywords = {determinism, metaphysics, responsibility, world}, abstract = {Robert Kane's The Significance of Free Will is evaluated. Kane insists that the compatibilist cannot account for Ultimate Responsibility since determinism would preclude responsibility for any sufficient reason for our wills. But he concedes that there is no incompatibilist case for the denial of "personal responsibility" in a deterministic world, where personal responsibility includes the capacity to act otherwise along with all the other compatibilist freedoms, such as the absence of either coercion or noncoercive control, knowledge, critical competence, higher-order reflectiveness, and mental health. It is argued that indetermination does not provide any additional element relevant to moral responsibility.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Berofsky1996, author = {Berofsky, Bernard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {995-996}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Liberation from Self: A Theory of Personal Autonomy}, volume = {58(4)}, year = {1996} } @article{Bezuidenhout1996, author = {Bezuidenhout, Anne}, title = {Resisting the Step Toward Naturalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {743-770}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, naturalism, psychologism}, abstract = {Some epistemologists believe that epistemology is a branch of empirical psychology. Others, while not willing to equate epistemology with (any part of) psychology, believe nevertheless that there is an intimate connection between the two. This naturalistic attitude is bolstered by a belief in psychologism, which is defined as the view that epistemic properties of beliefs depend on properties of the psychological processes responsible for those beliefs. Several arguments meant to establish a link between psychologism and naturalism are discussed and shown wanting. Finally, an alternative framework for epistemological investigation is sketched, which endorses psychologism, but is nonnaturalist, in that it relies on the use of a priori methods.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BHARADWAJA1981, author = {BHARADWAJA, V-K}, title = {A THEORY OF TARKA SENTENCES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {532-546}, keywords = {language, nyaya, sentence}, abstract = {THE AUTHOR ANALYZES "TARKA" SENTENCES OF THE FORM 'IF "X" WERE THE CASE, THEN "Y" WOULD HAVE BEEN THE CASE' AS CONTRAFACTUAL CONDITIONALS IN THE CONTEXT OF SUPPORT FOR "VYAPTIS" (EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATIONS). HIS ANALYSIS GIVES AN ADEQUATE CRITERION FOR DIFFERENTIATING "TARKA" FROM "VYAPTI" SENTENCES AND IT SHOWS HOW "VYAPTIS" MUST SUPPORT BUT THEMSELVES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY "TARKA" SENTENCES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BHATT1976, author = {BHATT, S-R}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF MIKSA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {564-570}, keywords = {hinduism, religion, self-realizatio}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bicchieri1999, author = {Bicchieri, Cristina}, title = {Local Fairness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {229-236}, keywords = {epistemology, fairness, game-theory; psychology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bickle1996, author = {Bickle, John}, title = {New Wave Psychophysical Reductionism and the Methodological Caveats}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {57-78}, keywords = {methodology, mind, psychology, reductionism, science}, abstract = {A new brand of psychology-to-neuroscience reductionism has emerged over the past fifteen years, grounded on a novel account of theory reduction in science. In this paper, I continue defending this new wave reductionism by addressing three "methodological caveats." Each is so-called because it warns of dire consequences for theory construction and development in special sciences should we impose reductionism. But each rests on a mistake about the methodological implications of new wave reductionism; and what the latter does imply (or suggest) about methodology for targeted reduced theories is reasonable.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIDERMAN1984, author = {BIDERMAN, SHLOMO and KASHER, ASA}, title = {RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS OF PUNISHMENT AND REWARD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {433-452}, keywords = {punishment, religion, reward, symmetry}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIEN1981, author = {BIEN, JOSEPH}, title = {POLITICS OF THE PRESENT: MACHIAVELLIAN HUMANISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {197-204}, keywords = {humanism, individual, political-action; political-philosophy; virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIERMAN1962, author = {BIERMAN, ARTHUR-K}, title = {THAT THERE ARE NO ICONIC SIGNS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {243-249}, keywords = {connotation, conventionality, denotation, iconic, language, semiotics, sign, signification}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIGELOW1990, author = {BIGELOW, JOHN and PARGETTER, ROBERT}, title = {From Extroverted Realism to Correspondence: A Modest Proposal.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(3)}, pages = {435-460}, keywords = {correspondence, epistemology, metaphysics, realism, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIGELOW1990a, author = {BIGELOW, JOHN and PARGETTER, ROBERT}, title = {From Extroverted Realism to Correspondence: A Modest Proposal.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(3)}, pages = {435-460}, keywords = {correspondence, epistemology, metaphysics, realism, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIGELOW1986, author = {BIGELOW, PATRICK}, title = {THE INDETERMINABILITY OF TIME IN "SEIN UND ZEIT".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {357-379}, keywords = {extension, metaphysics, ontological-proof; presence, time}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bilgrami1998, author = {Bilgrami, Akeel}, title = {Precis of Belief and Meaning}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {595-605}, keywords = {belief, meaning, metaphysics}, abstract = {This essay provided a summary of my book, Belief and Meaning, showing how I thought that it was possible to combine a view of intentional content that was externalist as well as one which keeps faith with Frege's constraint raised by his puzzle about identity and Kripke's puzzle about belief. The account criticizes current externalist accounts owing to Putnam, Burge, McDowell and Davidson. A great deal turns on meaning and intentional content being contextual in a way that the book elaborates.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bilgrami1998a, author = {Bilgrami, Akeel}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {635-647}, keywords = {belief, meaning, metaphysics}, abstract = {This essay replies to four commentators and critics of my book, Belief and Meaning, ranging on a wide variety of themes including: Frege's and Kripke's puzzles about identity and belief, the normativity of meaning, the nature of concepts, the nature of intentionality, externalism versus internalism, the role of reference in intentional content, self-knowledge, etc.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BINKLEY1971, author = {BINKLEY, TIMOTHY}, title = {ON READING INVESTIGATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {429-432}, keywords = {language, meaning}, abstract = {REMARK 43 OF THE INVESTIGATIONS IS OFTEN READ AS WITTGENSTEIN'S DEFINITION OR THEORY OF MEANING. HOWEVER, SUCH AN INTERPRETATION IS DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE WITH WITTGENSTEIN'S REPEATED INSISTENCE THAT HIS INVESTIGATION IS DESCRIPTIVE. IN THIS PAPER IT IS ARGUED THAT REMARK 43 IS BEST UNDERSTOOD AS A DESCRIPTION OF HOW ONE MIGHT DEFINE OR EXPLAIN 'MEANING', AND SOME ATTEMPT IS MADE TO SHOW HOW SUCH AN INTERPRETATION CAN BE CARRIED OUT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIRCHALL1982, author = {BIRCHALL, B-C}, title = {FREGE'S 'OBJECTS' AND 'CONCEPTS': REVOLUTIONARY OR REACTIONARY?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {343-358}, keywords = {concept, epistemology, object, predicate}, abstract = {FAR FROM BEING A "GREAT PHILOSOPHICAL ACHIEVEMENT," FREGE'S DIVISION BETWEEN "OBJECTS" AND "CONCEPTS," IN BEING A RECRUDESCENCE OF THE DIVISION BETWEEN THE "PURE PARTICULAR" AND THE "PURE UNIVERSAL," IS, IT IS ARGUED, REACTIONARY. FREGE'S MISTAKE WAS THAT OF CONFUSING BETWEEN "A TERM" AND ITS "FUNCTION" IN THE PROPOSITION. THE SUBJECT-FUNCTION OF THE PROPOSITION IS TRANSFORMED INTO AN "OBJECT" OR "ENTITY WHOSE NATURE IT IS TO BE DESIGNATED" WHILST THE PREDICATE-FUNCTION OF THE PROPOSITION IS TRANSFORMED INTO A "CONCEPT" OR "ENTITY WHOSE NATURE IT IS TO CHARACTERIZE."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIRCHALL1981, author = {BIRCHALL, B-C}, title = {THE INTENTIONAL PROJECT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {147-159}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionalism, knowing, mental-act; object}, abstract = {THE CLASSICAL DILEMMA IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT FOR A MENTAL ACT TO "HAVE AN OBJECT," THE MENTAL ACT MUST BE RELATED, IN SOME WAY, TO THAT OBJECT. BUT ONCE "HAVING AN OBJECT" IS UNDERSTOOD AS A RELATION HOLDING BETWEEN A MENTAL ACT AND ITS OBJECT, THE POSTULATION OF "PECULIAR ENTITIES," AT LEAST IN THE CASE OF FALSE BELIEF, SEEMS UNAVOIDABLE. TO REJECT A RELATIONAL INTERPRETATION OF "HAVING AN OBJECT" SEEMS TO HAVE EQUALLY UNACCEPTABLE IMPLICATIONS. AS GROSSMANN PUTS IT: "IF ACTS ARE NOT RELATIONS NO CONNECTION IS LEFT BETWEEN A SELF AND THE REST OF THE WORLD." SO THE CLASSICAL DILEMMA FORCES A CHOICE BETWEEN BEING RELATED TO AN OBJECT AND NOT BEING RELATED TO AN OBJECT. THIS PAPER IS AN ATTEMPT TO ARGUE THAT THE CLASSICAL DILEMMA CAN BE OVERCOME AND THAT THE RELATIONAL AND NON-RELATIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF "HAVING AN OBJECT" CAN BE RECONCILED IN A "CONATIONALIST" ACCOUNT OF MENTAL ACTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BIRO1982, author = {BIRO, J-I}, title = {INTENTION, DEMONSTRATION, AND REFERENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {35-41}, keywords = {demonstration, intention, metaphysics, reference}, abstract = {D KAPLAN'S HINT THAT IN A CASE OF OSTENSION THE OBJECT INTENDED TO BE DEMONSTRATED AND THE OBJECT ACTUALLY DEMONSTRATED MAY FAIL TO COINCIDE IS ELABORATED AN DEFENDED AGAINST AN OBJECTION BROUGHT BY R BERTOLET. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE PHENOMENON IN QUESTION IS BY NO MEANS ISOLATED OR EXOTIC, BUT ONE THAT ILLUSTRATES A GENERAL FEATURE OF ALL REFERENCE AND MEANING, NAMELY, THAT CONTEXT IS AN INDEPENDENT FACTOR IN DETERMINING THE CONTENT OF UTTERANCES, A FACTOR SOMETIMES MORE POWERFUL THAN THE UTTERER'S OWN INTENTIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bishop2003, author = {Bishop, John}, title = {Prospects for a Naturalist Libertarianism: O'Connor's Persons and Causes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(1)}, pages = {228-243}, keywords = {causation, libertarianism, metaphysics, naturalism, person}, abstract = {What commitments are needed for a 'reconciliatory naturalist' understanding of agency that meets our ethical presuppositions while regarding action as belonging wholly to the natural order? In Persons and Causes (OUP, 2000), Timothy O'Connor argues that reconciliatory naturalists should affirm metaphysical libertarianism, 'agency theory' (free action requires ontologically irreducible agent-causation), and emergentism (agency introduces a qualitatively new macrofeature that exerts an ontologically basic "downward" causal influence on microstructural events). Through examining O'Connor's arguments, this paper presents the case for the contrary view that reconciliatory naturalists should reject emergentism and ontological agent-causationism and accept a broadly compatibilist account of free action.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bittner2001, author = {Bittner, Rudiger}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {495-497}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Doing Things for Reasons}, volume = {69(2)}, year = {2001} } @article{Blackburn1998, author = {Blackburn, Simon-W}, title = {Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {195-198}, keywords = {ethics, moral-theory; objectivity, relativism}, abstract = {This paper is a brief reaction to the contributions by Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson to their joint volume, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. I describe Harman's relativism and Thomson's objectivism. I argue that the latter, by making moral qualities epiphenomenal, cuts itself off from any satisfactory explanation of why we should be interested in them. The former, I argue, needs to explain what is 'salient' about the 'moral framework' to which judgments are relativized: eventually, this needs explaining in terms of its being the one we hold, and this in turn needs explaining in terms Harman does not allow himself, such as mine.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLACKBURN1990, author = {BLACKBURN, Simon}, title = {Hume and Thick Connexions.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {causation, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Blackburn2002, author = {Blackburn, Simon}, title = {Precis of Ruling Passions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {122-135}, keywords = {desire, ethics, greek, human-nature; passion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Blackburn2002a, author = {Blackburn, Simon}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {164-176}, keywords = {ethics, passion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Blackburn1992, author = {Blackburn, Simon-W}, title = {Gibbard on Normative Logic}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {947-952}, keywords = {ethics, normative}, abstract = {The point of this paper is to compare and evaluate the different approaches to normative logic revealed in the work of Allan Gibbard, and in my own apparently different approach to the issue. I argue that although in Chapter 5 of his "Wise Choices, Apt Feelings" Gibbard may seem to make use of illegitimate resources, bringing in extra materials (some of which are in other chapters) keeps the theory afloat, and brings the two theories substantially into line.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Blackburn1993, author = {Blackburn, Simon}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {965-968}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Essays in Quasi-Realism}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1993} } @article{BLACKBURN1988, author = {BLACKBURN, THOMAS-S}, title = {ON THE VERY IDEA OF A FORMATIVE EXPERIENCE: DEPAUL'S CHALLENGE TO COHERENCE THEORIES IN ETHICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {139-144}, keywords = {coherence, ethics, moral-judgmen}, abstract = {IN SEVERAL RECENT ARTICLES, MICHAEL DEPAUL HAS ARGUED THAT THE EPISTEMIC CONDITIONS TO BE SATISFIED BY ANY COMPETENT MORAL JUDGE MAY INCLUDE THE UNDERGOING OF CERTAIN "FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES," THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF WHICH HAVE BEEN NEGLECTED IN USUAL APPEALS TO "REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM." DEPAUL FAILS TO MAKE CLEAR, HOWEVER, HOW THE LACK OF SUCH EXPERIENCES CAN BE UNDERSTOOD AS A MERELY "EPISTEMIC" FAILING, RATHER THAN AS A FAILURE TO HAVE ACHIEVED A CERTAIN MORAL INSIGHT OR MATURITY. THERE IS, I ARGUE, NO WAY TO INCORPORATE THIS ELEMENT INTO A THEORY OF MORAL COMPETENCE WHILE ALSO PRESERVING NEUTRALITY TOWARD COMPETING MORAL VIEWPOINTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Blackson2004, author = {Blackson, Thomas-A}, title = {An Invalid Argument for Contextualism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {344-345}, keywords = {assertion, contextualism, epistemology, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLANSHARD1968, author = {BLANSHARD, BRAND}, title = {REJOINDER TO MR KEARNS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {116-118}, keywords = {epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLANSHARD1967, author = {BLANSHARD, BRAND and SKINNER, B-F}, title = {THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS - A DEBATE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {317-337}, keywords = {behaviorism, consciousness, epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Blattner1996, author = {Blattner, William-D}, title = {Existence and Self-Understanding in Being and Time}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {97-110}, keywords = {being, existence, metaphysics, self, time, understanding}, abstract = {Heidegger's existentialism in Being and Time may be captured in the thesis that Dasein is what it understands itself to be. To defend this thesis, we need two further claims: First, Dasein's characteristics are all abilities, rather than properties. Second, Heidegger embraces a dualism between self-interpretive characteristics and factual ones, and Dasein possesses exclusively the former. Furthermore, an analysis of Heidegger's account of self-understanding and projection implies that one cannot ever acquire any settled characteristic that continues to apply to one, simply in virtue of having already attained it. This makes possible what Heidegger calls "death."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLOCK1960, author = {BLOCK, IRVING}, title = {ARISTOTLE AND THE PHYSICAL OBJECT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {93-101}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, object, perception, physical, sense}, abstract = {HOW WE BECOME AWARE OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS OVER AND ABOVE THE PERCEPTUAL ACTS OF SEEING COLOR, SHAPES AND HEARING SOUNDS, ETC., IS A QUESTION THAT HAS OCCUPIED MANY CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. DID ARISTOTLE EVER FACE THIS PROBLEM, AND IF HE DID, HOW DID HE DEAL WITH IT? THIS ARTICLE DISCUSSES THIS QUESTION AND CONCLUDES THAT THE ANSWER TO IT CAN BE FOUND "DE INSOMNIAS" IN ARISTOTLE'S DISCUSSION OF DREAMS AND ILLUSIONS. THERE IS AN ACT AFFIRMATION ("PHESIN") CARRIED OUT BY THE CONTROLLING AND DISCRIMINATING SENSE ("TO KURION KAI TO EPIKRINON") WHICH DOES THIS. "FOR, SPEAKING GENERALLY, THE CONTROLLING POWER ("ERXE") AFFIRMS ("PHESIN") THE REPORT GIVEN BY EACH SENSE UNLESS SOME MORE AUTHORITATIVE POWER CONTRADICTS IT."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Block1998, author = {Block, Ned}, title = {Is Experiencing Just Representing?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {663-670}, keywords = {earth, experience, metaphysics, representation}, abstract = {My inverted earth argument purports to describe a situation in which intentional content changes whereas phenomenal character remains constant. Tye says intentional contents don't shift-crossed wires in the visual system introduce a malfunction. I say there is nothing more defective about crossed wires than about straight wires. Tye also says that if intentional contents do shift, so do phenomenal characters. I argue that he requires an unacceptable notion of phenomenal character in which it can be logically impossible for the subject to notice a change in phenomenal character.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Block2003, author = {Block, Ned}, title = {Do Causal Powers Drain Away?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {133-150}, keywords = {causation, exclusion, metaphysics, physicalism}, abstract = {This paper discusses the main argument of Mind in a Physical World (Kim, 1998), the 'causal exclusion argument'. The paper raises the question of whether it is a consequence of the causal exclusion argument that all macro level causation (that is, causation above the level of fundamental physics) is an illusion, with all of the apparent causal powers of mental and other macro properties draining into the bottom level of physics. The paper argues that such a consequence would give us reason to reject the causal exclusion argument. The paper also considers a stronger challenge, the charge that, as Kim says, if there is no bottom level of physics, the causal exclusion argument has the consequence that "causal powers would drain away into a bottomless pit and there wouldn't be any causation anywhere." It is argued that the causal exclusion argument is incompatible with our explanatory practice.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLOCKER1969, author = {BLOCKER, H-GENE}, title = {PHYSIOGNOMIC PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {377-390}, keywords = {epistemology, perception}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE IS A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE THEORY OF WERNER AND OTHERS THAT THERE ARE TWO BASIC TYPES OF PERCEPTION, "GEOMETRIC-TECHNICAL", CHARACTERIZING MORE "SOPHISTICATED" CULTURES, IN WHICH PRIMARY AND POSSIBLY SECONDARY QUALITIES PREDOMINATE, AND "PHYSIOGNOMIC", CHARACTERIZING MORE "PRIMITIVE" CULTURES, IN WHICH TERTIARY (EXPRESSIVE) QUALITIES PREDOMINATE. THE DISTINCTION IS BASED ON (A) THE RELATIVITY OF WHAT IS SEEN TO THE PERCIPIENT'S POINT OF VIEW AND (B) THE FACT THAT IN "SOPHISTICATED" TECHNOLOGICAL CULTURES, THE PERCEPTUAL POINT OF VIEW IS THE SELF-ALIENATING EGO-OBJECT POLARIZATION IN WHICH TERTIARY QUALITIES ARE INTERNALIZED AND REGARDED AS SUBJECTIVE, WHILE IN MORE "PRIMITIVE" CULTURES IT IS CHARACTERIZED BY EGO-OBJECT INTEGRATION IN WHICH TERTIARY FEATURES ARE UNDIFFERENTIATED FROM OBJECTIVE FEATURES OF A PUBLIC ENVIRONMENT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bloomfield2000, author = {Bloomfield, Paul}, title = {Virtue Epistemology and the Epistemology of Virtue}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {23-43}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, knowledge, skill, virtue}, abstract = {The ancient Greeks almost universally accepted the thesis that virtues are skills. Skills have an underlying intellectual structure (logos), and having a particular skill entails understanding the relevant logos, possessing a general ability to diagnose and solve problems (phronesis), as well as having appropriate experience. Two implications of accepting this thesis for moral epistemology and epistemology in general are considered. Thinking of virtues as skills yields a viable virtue epistemology in which moral knowledge is a species of a general kind of knowledge that is not philosophically suspect. Also, the debate between internalists and externalists in epistemology is subversively resolved. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLOSE1981, author = {BLOSE, B-L}, title = {MATERIALISM AND DISEMBODIED MINDS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {59-74}, keywords = {behaviorism, disembodiment, materialism, metaphysics, minds}, abstract = {A BELIEF ALMOST UNIVERSALLY HELD BY PHILOSOPHERS--THAT THE PHILOSOPHICAL BEHAVIORIST CANNOT UNDERSTAND, CANNOT ALLOW FOR THE LOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF, DISEMBODIED EXISTENCE--IS TAKEN TO TASK. THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT IN THE LAST ANALYSIS THE BEHAVIORIST HAS BETTER RESOURCES THAN EITHER THE NONMATERIALIST PHILOSOPHER OF MIND OR THE CENTRAL-STATE OR IDENTITY-THEORY MATERIALIST FOR PROVIDING AN ADEQUATE CONCEPTION OF DISEMBODIED EXISTENCE, AND HE PRESENTS TWO SORTS OF DISEMBODIED EXISTENCE THAT THE BEHAVIORIST CAN UNDERSTAND--ONE THAT INVOLVES THE POWER OF ACTING ON THE BODILY WORLD OR OF BEING RE-EMBODIED OR REALIZED IN IT, AND THE OTHER, SATISFYINGLY LESS FULL-BLOODED, THAT IS UNDERSTOOD IN TERMS MERELY OF THE LOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF ACQUIRING THIS POWER.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLOSSER1987, author = {BLOSSER, PHILIP}, title = {MORAL AND NONMORAL VALUES: A PROBLEM IN SCHELER'S ETHICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {139-143}, keywords = {ethics, moral, nonmoral, phenomenology}, abstract = {IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A TELEOLOGICAL ETHICS THAT AVOIDS THE PROBLEMS CRITICIZED BY KANT IN CONSEQUENTIALIST THEORIES, SCHELER TRIES TO SHOW THAT THE MORAL VALUE OF AN ACTION LIES IN ITS REALIZATION OF OTHER, NONMORAL VALUES, WHICH ARE "POSITIVE" "A PRIORI" IN THEIR RELATION TO THOSE LEFT UNREALIZED. THE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IS THAT ONE CAN IDENTIFY NUMEROUS NONMORAL VALUES (ECONOMIC, AESTHETIC, LINGUISTIC, LOGICAL, ETC.) WHOSE "REALIZATION" ONE WOULD HESITATE TO CALL "MORALLY" "GOOD" OR "EVIL." WE SAY THAT OUR SPEECH "OUGHT" TO EXHIBIT GOOD GRAMMAR AND OUR REASONING, GOOD LOGIC; BUT WE WOULD BE HARD PRESSED, I THINK, TO CALL THESE "MORAL" OBLIGATIONS. HENCE, NOT ONLY "MORAL" "GOOD," BUT LINGUISTIC, LOGICAL, AESTHETIC, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND MANY OTHER KINDS OF "GOOD" APPEAR IN THE REALIZATION OF VALUES. THIS MEANS, IN TURN, THAT NOT ONLY "NON"-MORAL, BUT "MORAL" VALUES THEMSELVES (SUCH AS "FIDELITY," "FORGIVENESS," "HONESTY," AND THE LIKE) ARE CANDIDATES FOR REALIZATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Blum1994, author = {Blum, Lawrence-A}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {477-479}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Moral Perception and Particularity}, volume = {57(2)}, year = {1994} } @article{BLUM1985, author = {BLUM, ROLAND-PAUL}, title = {DECONSTRUCTION AND CREATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {293-306}, keywords = {creation, metaphysics, self}, abstract = {EMMANUEL LEVINAS, IN "OTHERWISE THAN BEING OR BEYOND ESSENCE", ATTEMPTS TO SHOW, BY USING DECONSTRUCTIONIST TECHNIQUES, THAT A SELF WHOSE ESSENCE IS TEMPORALITY IS NECESSARILY "OTHER" THAN ITSELF. THIS OTHERNESS IS "AUTRUI," THE OTHER PERSON. HOWEVER, LEVINAS ONLY DECONSTRUCTS THE SELF, NOT THE OTHER, A CONCEPT WHICH PRESUPPOSES RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS INCOMPATIBLE WITH A CONSISTENT PROJECT OF DECONSTRUCTION. THUS, LEVINAS' RECENT WORK IS MORE AKIN TO THE THEORIES OF "TOTALITY AND INFINITY" THAN WOULD INITIALLY APPEAR.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLUM1983, author = {BLUM, ROLAND-P}, title = {EMMANUEL LEVINAS' THEORY OF COMMITMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {145-168}, keywords = {ethics, intersubjectivity, phenomenology}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE ATTEMPTS TO CLARIFY LEVINAS' COMPLICATED AND ELUSIVE IDEAS CONCERNING THE RELATION BETWEEN SELF AND OTHER BY A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE CARTESIAN, KIERKEGAARDIAN AND HUSSERLIAN INFLUENCES UPON THEM. IT CONCLUDES THAT, DESPITE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH THE THEORY THAT THE OTHER PERSON IS BOTH INFINITELY SEPARATE FROM THE SELF AND YET PLACES AN ABSOLUTE DEMAND UPON IT, LEVINAS HAS MADE A VALUABLE ATTEMPT TO AVOID THE EXTREMES OF HOBBESIAN INDIVIDUALISM AND HEGELIAN CONTEXTUALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLUMBERG1977, author = {BLUMBERG, DAVID}, title = {ANTINATURALISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF MORALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {498-515}, keywords = {autonomy, ethics, freedom, judgment, morality, naturalism, relativity, standard}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLUMENFELD1988, author = {BLUMENFELD, DAVID}, title = {FREEDOM, CONTINGENCY, AND THINGS POSSIBLE IN THEMSELVES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {81-101}, keywords = {contingency, freedom, metaphysics}, abstract = {THIS ESSAY IS A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF ONE OF LEIBNIZ'S PRINCIPAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM AND CONTINGENCY IN HIS SYSTEM, VIZ., HIS THEORY OF THINGS POSSIBLE IN THEMSELVES. SECTION I SETS UP THE PROBLEM BY CONSTRUCTING TWO ARGUMENTS: A GENERAL ONE PURPORTING TO SHOW THAT NEITHER GOD NOR MAN CAN ACT FREELY AND A MORE RESTRICTED ONE DIRECTED ONLY AGAINST HUMAN FREEDOM. SECTION II DEVELOPS THE THEORY OF POSSIBILITY IN ITSELF. SECTIONS III AND IV, RESPECTIVELY, DISCUSS THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE TO THE TWO ARGUMENTS AGAINST FREEDOM, AND THE PROBLEMS THAT LEIBNIZ ENCOUNTERS IN MAKING HIS VIEWS STICK.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLUMENFELD1985, author = {BLUMENFELD, DAVID}, title = {LEIBNIZ ON CONTINGENCY AND INFINITE ANALYSIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {483-514}, keywords = {analysis, contingency, necessity, philosophy}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Blumenfeld1993, author = {Blumenfeld, David-C}, title = {Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence by R C Sleigh, Jr}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {933-943}, keywords = {correspondence, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLUMENFELD1980, author = {BLUMENFELD, JEAN-BEER}, title = {ACTING INTENTIONALLY AND ACTING VOLUNTARILY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {228-231}, keywords = {ethics, intending, wanting}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BLUMENFELD1961, author = {BLUMENFELD, WALTER}, title = {VALUE AND VALUATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {314-332}, keywords = {aesthetics, awareness, axiology, ethics, logic, objectivism, religion, valuation, value}, abstract = {IT IS MAINTAINED HERE THAT VALUES ARE NOT SUBSTANCE LIKE THINGS IN THEMSELVES, AS AUTONOMOUS ENTITIES OR PRINCIPLES. THE AUTHOR OPPOSES OBJECTIVISM AND IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHIES. IT IS NOT MERELY THAT THE SUBJECT PRODUCES VALUES AND LENDS THEM TO OBJECTS; AND IT IS NOT THAT VALUES PERTAIN DIRECTLY TO OBJECTS. BLUMENFELD ASKS PHENOMENOLOGICALLY, WHAT HAPPENS WHEN A SUBJECT ESTIMATES CERTAIN THINGS AS VALUABLE, AND DIFFERENTIATES BETWEEN SUCH VALUE QUALITIES AS: HEALTHY, AGREEABLE, INTERESTING, TRUE, JUST, MORALLY GOOD, SYMPATHETIC, AESTHETICALLY SATISFACTORY, AND HOLY, WITH THEIR CORRESPONDING OPPOSITES. IN EACH OF THE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF VALUATION THERE IS A SPECIFIC CORRELATION BETWEEN THE OBJECT, THE SUBJECT, THE PARTICULAR SITUATION, AND THE SOCIETY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bogdan1993, author = {Bogdan, Radu-J}, title = {The Pragmatic Psyche}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(1)}, pages = {157-158}, keywords = {cognition, epistemology, intentionality, pragmatism, psyche}, abstract = {In a recent article ("Semantics and the Psyche", "Phil Phenomenol Res", 52, 1992, 395-399), Dascal and Horowitz criticize two claims I made in "Does Semantics Run the Psyche?" ("Phil and Phenomenol Res", 49, 1989, 687-700) about Fodor's psychosemantic project. One claim was that the semantics does not run the psyche, the other that Fodor's naturalization of content assumes rather than explains intentionality. I show, first, that my claims survive their criticisms, and second, that that it is because intentionality is left unexplained that the semantics appears to run the psyche.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BOGDAN1989, author = {BOGDAN, RADU-J}, title = {DOES SEMANTICS RUN THE PSYCHE?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {687-700}, keywords = {metaphysics, mind, psyche, semantics}, abstract = {THE PAPER DISCUSSES AND CRITICIZES THE VIEW THAT IT IS THE SEMANTIC PROPERTIES OF COGNITION THAT HAVE CAUSAL EFFICACY. THIS IS THE VIEW DEFENDED BY JERRY FODOR IN HIS LATEST BOOK, "PSYCHOSEMANTICS" (1987). I ARGUE THAT THE INFORMATION CAUSALLY EFFICACIOUS IN CENTRAL COGNITION IS TYPICALLY PRAGMATIC (BECAUSE SENSITIVE NOT ONLY TO FACTS OF REFERENCE BUT ALSO TO RELATIONS TO MEMORY, PLANNING AND ACTION) AND CAUSAL IN VIRTUE OF ITS PRAGMATIC PROPERTIES. I ALSO SHOW THAT FODOR'S ANALYSIS OF SEMANTIC ABOUTNESS AS A RELIABLE MIND-WORLD COVARIATION EXPLAINS THE SEMANTIC SUCCESS BUT NOT THE SEMANTIC NATURE OF OUR COGNITIVE STATES. FODOR'S NATURALIZATION HANDLES THE SEMANTIC, NOT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PART OF PSYCHOSEMANTICS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bogdan1997, author = {Bogdan, Radu-J}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {737-739}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Interpreting Minds: The Evolution of a Practice}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1997} } @article{Boghossian2001, author = {Boghossian, Paul-Artin}, title = {Inference and Insight}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {633-640}, keywords = {epistemology, inference, knowledge, reason}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Boghossian1994, author = {Boghossian, Paul-A}, title = {Sense, Reference and Rule-Following}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {139-144}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, language, rule}, abstract = {This is a critical discussion of Jerrold Katz's "The Metaphysics of Meaning". The essay raises some questions about exactly how Katz's new intensionalism' is to be understood, and about its plausibility. It also questions the views ability to solve the outstanding problems in the philosophy of mind and language.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bok2002, author = {Bok, Hilary}, title = {Wallace's 'Normative Approach' to Moral Responsibility}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {682-686}, keywords = {ethics, moral-sentiment; morality, responsibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BOLER1968, author = {BOLER, JOHN-F}, title = {AGENCY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {165-181}, keywords = {agency, epistemology, explanation}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE SKETCHES AN ARISTOTELIAN SCHEMA FOR AGENCY AS A DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF OUR NON-TECHNICAL CONCEPT OF ACTION, EMPHASIZING ITS DISTINCTION FROM DEEPER EXPLANATIONS AND ALTERNATE DESCRIPTIVE SCHEMES. THE METHOD IS DESCRIPTIVE RATHER THAN ARGUMENTATIVE, THOUGH IT IS MORE PROBLEMATIC THAN HISTORICAL. ONLY VAGUE REFERENCES ARE MADE TO ARISTOTLE. SOME FOOTNOTES ALLUDE TO WORK BY DONALD DAVIDSON.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bond2005, author = {Bond, E-J}, title = {Does the Subject of Experience Exist in the World?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {124-133}, keywords = {experience, metaphysics, mind, subject, time}, abstract = {In this paper I attempt to show, by considering a number of sources, including Wittgenstein, Sartre, Thomas Nagel and Spinoza, but also adding something crucial of my own, that it is impossible to construe the subject of experience as an object among other objects in the world. My own added argument is the following. The subject of experience cannot move in time along with material events and processes or it could not be aware of the passage of time, hence, neither of change nor of motion. The subject cannot therefore be identified with any neural process, function, or location since whatever goes on in the CNS is necessarily objective and part of the temporal flux. However, this does not imply any form of dualism for experiences exist only for the subject whose experiences they are and, hence, they have no objective reality.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bonevac2002, author = {Bonevac, Daniel}, title = {Sellars vs. the Given}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {1-30}, keywords = {atomism, epistemology, foundationalism, given, immediacy, indistinguishable, justification, knowledge}, abstract = {John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars's arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the 'given' is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars's arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument--the "inconsistent triad" argument--addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there are several ways of escaping its conclusion. Invocations of Sellars's refutation of the Myth of the Given are empty.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BonJour2004, author = {BonJour, Laurence}, title = {In Search of Direct Realism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {349-367}, keywords = {direct-realism; epistemology, knowledge, perception, representationalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BonJour2001, author = {BonJour, Laurence}, title = {Precis of In Defense of Pure Reason}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {625-631}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology, justification, knowledge, pure-reaso}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BonJour2001a, author = {BonJour, Laurence}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {673-698}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BONJOUR1990, author = {BONJOUR, LAURENCE}, title = {Reply to Solomon's "Apriority and Metajustification in BonJour's 'Structure of Empirical Knowledge'".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {779-782}, keywords = {empirical-knowledge; epistemology, justification}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BOONIN1966, author = {BOONIN, LEONARD-G}, title = {CONCERNING THE DEFEASIBILITY OF LEGAL RULES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {371-378}, keywords = {decision, defeasibility, law, legal, reasoning, rule, social-philosoph}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF DEFEASIBILITY AS IT APPLIES TO THE ANALYSIS OF LEGAL CONCEPTS AND THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL DECISIONS. AN EXAMINATION IS MADE OF H L A HART'S USE OF DEFEASIBILITY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT. A DISTINCTION IS DRAWN BETWEEN TWO CONCEPTS OF DEFEASIBILITY AND A COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPT OF "EXTENDABILITY" IS INTRODUCED. A FURTHER DISTINCTION IS MADE BETWEEN THE DEFEASIBILITY OF LEGAL RULES AND THE OPEN TEXTURE OF LEGAL FACTS. IT IS ARGUED THAT DEFEASIBILITY IS A FRUITFUL CONCEPT IN LEGAL ANALYSIS, AND THAT PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE DEFEASIBILITY OF LEGAL RULES, THE TRADITIONAL LEGAL THEORY WHICH TREATED LEGAL DECISIONS AS LOGICAL DEDUCTIONS FROM LEGAL RULES IS INADEQUATE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BOSSERT1974, author = {BOSSERT, PHILIP-J}, title = {A COMMON MISUNDERSTANDING CONCERNING HUSSERL'S 'CRISIS' TEXT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {20-33}, keywords = {crisis, twentieth}, abstract = {IN THE ARTICLE, I ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT IT IS A MISCONCEPTION THAT PART III OF EDMUND HUSSERL'S "CRISIS" TEXT IS INCOMPLETE, A CLAIM OFTEN MADE BY HUSSERL COMMENTATORS. THE EVIDENCE FOR THIS VIEW IS PRESENTED IN THREE PARTS: 1) A HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE EVENTS BETWEEN 1928 AND 1938 RELEVANT TO HUSSERL'S WRITING OF THE "CRISIS;" 2) A TEXT-CRITICAL STUDY OF PART III OF THE "CRISIS" IN LIGHT OF EUGENE FINK'S 1936 OUTLINE FOR THE COMPLETE TEXT; AND 3) A BRIEF LITERARY ANALYSIS OF PARTS IIIA AND IIIB. THE REASON FOR ATTEMPTING TO SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT PART III OF THE "CRISIS" IS COMPLETE IS THAT MANY OF THE IMPORTANT STATEMENTS IN THIS PART ARE OFTEN REJECTED BY HUSSERL COMMENTATORS BECAUSE IT WAS LEFT 'UNFINISHED' BY HUSSERL. I BELIEVE THE "CRISIS" DESERVES EQUAL WEIGHT WITH HUSSERL'S OTHER 'FINISHED' PUBLICATIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bovens1999, author = {Bovens, Luc}, title = {The Value of Hope}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {667-681}, keywords = {epistemology, hope, rationality}, abstract = {Hope obeys Aristotle's doctrine of the mean: one should neither hope too much, not too little. But what determines what constitutes too much and what constitutes too little for a particular person at a particular time? The sceptic presents an argument to the effect that it is never rational to hope. An attempt to answer the sceptic leads us in different directions. Decision-theoretic and preference-theoretic arguments support the instrumental value of hope. An investigation into the nature of hope permits us to assess the intrinsic value of hope. However, it must be granted to the sceptic that there is a tension between hope and epistemic rationality. I conclude with some reflections about the relationship between hope and character features that are constitutive of inner strength.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bovens1995, author = {Bovens, Luc}, title = {The Intentional Acquisition of Mental States}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(4)}, pages = {821-840}, keywords = {action, epistemology, intentionality, mental-states; morality}, abstract = {A common strategy to bring about a change in one's own beliefs, moral judgments or desires is to act as if one already had the projected beliefs, moral judgments or desires. There is a curious asymmetry between intentionally changing one's beliefs and moral judgments on the one hand and intentionally changing one's desires on the other hand in that the former phenomenon typically meets with qualms while the latter does not. I provide an explanation of this asymmetry by laying out the different role that as if actions play within the respective phenomena and by appealing to Carnap's requirement of total evidence.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Boyd2003, author = {Boyd, Richard}, title = {Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part II}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(1)}, pages = {24-47}, keywords = {consequentialism, ethics, metaphysics, naturalism, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Boyd2003a, author = {Boyd, Richard}, title = {Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part I}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(3)}, pages = {505-553}, keywords = {consequentialism, ethics, finite, metaphysics, naturalism, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Braddon-Mitchell2001, author = {Braddon-Mitchell, David and West, Caroline}, title = {Temporal Phase Pluralism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {59-83}, keywords = {metaphysics, modality, personal-identity; pluralism, temporality}, abstract = {Some theories of personal identity allow some variation in what it takes for a person to survive from context to context; and sometimes this is determined by the desires of person-stages or the practices of communities. This leads to problems for decision making in contexts where what is chosen will affect personal identity. 'Temporal Phase Pluralism' solves such problems by allowing that there can be a plurality of persons constituted by a sequence of person stages. This illuminates difficult decision making problems when persons have to choose between different life-altering choices.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BRADY1973, author = {BRADY, JAMES-B}, title = {STATUS RESPONSIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {408-411}, keywords = {ethics, responsibility}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE CRITICIZES JOHN SILBER'S VIEW THAT A PERSON MAY BE BLAMEWORTHY IN SOME DEGREE EVEN THOUGH HIS CONDUCT IS NEITHER INTENTIONAL, RECKLESS NOR NEGLIGENT. TWO POSSIBLE CRITERIA FOR 'STATUS' RESPONSIBILITY, THAT THE PERSON MAY EXPERIENCE REGRET AND THAT ONE MAY BE BLAMEWORTHY FOR TAKING NONRECKLESS OR NON-NEGLIGENT RISKS ARE DISCUSSED AND REJECTED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BRAND1975, author = {BRAND, MYLES}, title = {ON PHILOSOPHICAL DEFINITIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {151-172}, keywords = {definition, language, location}, abstract = {IN THIS PAPER, THE LEGITIMACY OF NONREDUCTIVE DEFINITIONS OR ANALYSES IS DEFENDED. IN THE FIRST SECTION, THE ISSUES ARE ILLUSTRATED USING QUINE'S ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH THE ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC QUESTION. THE NEXT SECTION CLARIFIES THE NOTIONS OF NONREDUCTIVE AND REDUCTIVE DEFINITIONS, OR BETTER, "SYSTEMIC" AND "EXTRASYSTEMIC" DEFINITIONS. IN ORDER TO MAKE THESE NOTIONS CLEAR, IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER AN ILLUSTRATION IN SOME DEPTH; HENCE, IN THE FINAL SECTION, AN ARGUMENT IS MADE TO SHOW THAT A SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF CAUSATION IS REQUIRED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br1997, author = {Brandl, Johannes}, title = {Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {697-702}, keywords = {austrian, german, history, philosophy}, abstract = {This review essay critically examines the claim made by Barry Smith in his book on The Legacy of Franz Brentano (Open Court 1994), namely that there is a specific unity in Austrian philosophy which connects the members of the Brentano-School with other Austrian philosophers, especially with the logical empiricist. It is argued that this claim can neither be supported by the rising political liberalism in Austria at the time, nor by generalizing the Aristotelianism characteristic of Brentano, nor by tracing back the antimetaphysical attitude characteristic of the Vienna Circle. Despite its questionable historic perspective, however, Smith's book can be recommended as a competent introduction to the philosophy of Brentano and his followers, notably Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, Kasimir Twardowski, Tadeusz Kotarbinski and Christian Ehrenfels.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br1993, author = {Brandom, Robert}, title = {The Social Anatomy of Inference}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {661-666}, keywords = {inference, language, linguistics, semantics, social}, abstract = {In response to Fodor and Lepore's arguments against holism, it is argued that there are good reasons to demarcate specifically "conceptual" contentfulness by its "inferential" articulation. If that is right, possession of such content must be anatomic' in their sense. It is claimed further that conceiving conceptual contents in terms of inferential roles does not by itself commit one to a two-factor' approach, in which truth and reference are added on as independent elements. Nor does such an approach preclude meaningful talk of shared conceptual contents.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br2001, author = {Brandom, Robert-B}, title = {Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {587-609}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, modality, normativity, teleology}, abstract = {I argue that just as it is legitimate, where helpful, to use modal vocabulary in explaining various features of intentionality, so it is in principle legitimate to appeal to normative vocabulary to do so. It is not circular or otherwise objectionable to appeal to nonextensional modal concepts to make sense of the kind of intensionality peculiar to intentional phenomena. And for the same reasons that justify appeals to counterfactuals and dispositions in naturalistic programs in semantics, it is not circular or otherwise objectionable to appeal to normative concepts to make sense of the specifically conceptual normativity distinctive of intentional phenomena.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br1997a, author = {Brandom, Robert-B}, title = {Precis of Making It Explicit}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {153-156}, keywords = {expression, language, linguistics, meaning}, abstract = {The book is an attempt to explain the meanings of linguistic expressions in terms of their use. The explanatory strategy is to begin with an account of social practices, to identify the particular structure they must exhibit in order to qualify as specifically linguistic practices, and then to consider what different sorts of semantic contents those practices can confer on states, performances, and expressions caught up in them in suitable ways. The result is a kind of conceptual role semantics that is at once firmly rooted in actual practices of producing and consuming speech acts, and sufficiently finely articulated to make clear how those practices are capable of conferring a rich variety of kinds of content.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br1997b, author = {Brandom, Robert-B}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {189-204}, keywords = {epistemology, language, linguistics, meaning}, abstract = {Four replies to comments on Making It Explicit. The reply to John McDowell concerns the semantic privileging of inference over representation. The reply to Gideon Rosen concerns the role of discursive norms, specifically the relations between normative statuses and normative attitudes. The reply to Richard Rorty concerns relativism and the identification of facts with true claims (in the sense of what is claimed or claimable, rather than on claimings). The reply to Jay Rosenberg concerns objectivity and the differences between various sorts of facts (for instance, between natural facts and normative facts).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br1998, author = {Brandom, Robert-B}, title = {Perception and Rational Constraint}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {369-374}, keywords = {empiricism, metaphysics, mind, perception, world}, abstract = {McDowell understands the requirement that the world have a rational and not merely a causal bearing on perceptual judgment as the requirement that experience have a rational and not merely a causal bearing on perceptual judgments. This is why he sees the rational constraint as requiring a notion of conceptually articulated but prejudgmental perceptual experiences. There are alternatives he overlooks. The problem is traced to a residual individualism in McDowell's thinking about reasoning--a systematic underestimation of the significance of the fact that talk of the space of reasons is an abstraction from concrete, essentially social practices of giving and asking for reasons.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br1995, author = {Brandom, Robert-B}, title = {Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(4)}, pages = {895-908}, keywords = {epistemology, external, internal, knowledge, reason}, abstract = {A critical discussion of McDowell's epistemology. He sees both skepticism and dogmatism as running together the truth and justification conditions on knowledge, and both extreme and hybrid externalism as incorrectly divorcing them. He diagnoses their mistakes as stemming from a common presupposition: internalizing the space of reasons. I argue that, like these positions, McDowell individualizes the space of reasons, and that factives and warrantives can be properly understood as standings in the space of reasons once we appreciate the social articulation of the practices of giving and asking for reasons that are made explicit in assessments and attributions of knowledge.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Br1994, author = {Brandom, Robert}, title = {Expressing and Attributing Beliefs}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {905-912}, keywords = {belief, cartesianism, experience, metaphysics, mind}, abstract = {This piece is a contribution to a symposium on Arthur Collins' book "The Nature of Mental Things". Collins' argument from the observation that there is no state of belief that the subject might report without asserting that "p"' to the conclusion that beliefs are not inner states is expounded and critically assessed.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BRANDT1989, author = {BRANDT, R-B}, title = {PRACTICAL RATIONALITY: A RESPONSE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {125-130}, keywords = {choice, metaphysics, practical-reason; rationality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BRANDT1991, author = {BRANDT, R-B}, title = {Roderick Firth's Contribution to Ethics.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {attitude, epistemology, ethics}, abstract = {Firth rejected both noncognitive and self-evidence theories of ethical statements. He offered an account of the actual meaning of ethical language, following his "radical empiricist" theory of meaning that the meaning of any statement can be expressed by a conjunction of statements which refer only to observable events, as Berkeley and Lewis held for "That daffodil if yellow." So he explained "That was morally wrong" as "If a person were factually omniscient, vividly imaginative, were devoid of interest and emotions concerned with particular persons/places, but were otherwise a normal human being, he would experience disapproval toward that act." People learn this meaning by correction of using "is wrong" to mean only "I disfavor/disapprove that." The article summarizes various criticisms made of this view.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bransen2000, author = {Bransen, Jan}, title = {Alternatives of Oneself: Recasting Some of Our Practical Problems}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {381-400}, keywords = {choice, ethics, morality, rationality, self}, abstract = {This paper argues that there are practical problems of such a kind that neither impartial morality nor rational choice theory can provide us with comfort and guidance in our attempt to make the right choice if confronted with such a problem. It argues that both morality and rational choice theory are bound to misconstrue problems of this kind. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bratman1998, author = {Bratman, Michael-E}, title = {The Sources of Normativity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {699-709}, keywords = {belief, intention, metaphysics, normativity}, abstract = {This is a review essay discussing Christine M. Korsgaard's 1996 book, The Sources of Normativity. Korsgaard argues that a rational, reflective human agent is committed to valuing reflectiveness (and so "humanity") in her own person and in the person of others. I present this argument and discuss problems about a threatened regress, and problems about the supposed connection between agency and the endorsement of universal principles. I point to the possibility of a theory of agency and will in the territory between a Humean view and the sort of Kantian view for which Korsgaard argues.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bratman2000, author = {Bratman, Michael-E}, title = {Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility and History}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {453-458}, keywords = {ethics, history, morality, responsibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BRATMAN1990, author = {BRATMAN, MICHAEL-E}, title = {Dretske's Desires.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {795-800}, keywords = {action, behavior, desire, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bratman1999, author = {Bratman, Michael-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {238-241}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency}, volume = {65(1)}, year = {1999} } @article{Braun2004, author = {Braun, David-M}, title = {Consciousness and Cognition}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {484-491}, keywords = {cognition, consciousness, metaphysics}, abstract = {This paper is an extended critical review of Michael Thau's book Consciousness and Cognition.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BREITHAUPT1978, author = {BREITHAUPT, ERWIN and GOTESKY, RUBIN}, title = {CREATIVITY: A METASOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {39}, pages = {23-41}, keywords = {activity, creativity, person, process, product, social-philosophy; standard}, abstract = {SOCIOLOGY, IT IS SUGGESTED, PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF THE ART-INSTITUTION, IS THE BEST APPROACH FOR UNDERSTANDING CREATIVITY IN THE ARTS. THE ART-INSTITUTION IS TAKEN AS THE MATRIX WITHIN WHICH ART-STANDARDS ARE PRODUCED AND IN TERMS OF WHICH CREATIVITY IS UNDERSTOOD AND DISTINGUISHED FROM THE NON-CREATIVE. ART-STANDARDS ARE DISTINGUISHED INTO THREE MAIN CATEGORIES: ACCEPT, REJECT AND MOOT. ACCEPT-STANDARDS ARE FURTHER DISTINGUISHED INTO APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL STANDARDS. CREATIVITY, IT IS FURTHER SUGGESTED, IS BEST UNDERSTOOD IN TERMS OF MOOT-STANDARDS WHICH ARE STANDARDS NOT YET ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNING ART-ELITE AS DESERVING OF INCORPORATION IN THE CORPUS OF ART-STANDARDS. WHEN MOOT-STANDARDS ARE APPROVED AS ACCEPT-STANDARDS, IT IS THEN THAT ART-PRODUCTS PRODUCED IN TERMS OF THE MOOT-STANDARDS ARE "RETROSPECTIVELY" CALLED "CREATIVE." THE CEASELESS STRUGGLE BETWEEN ART-GROUPS OVER ART-PRODUCTS AND ART-STANDARDS OFTEN RESULTS IN THE FORMULATION OF CREATIVITY-STANDARDS USED TO JUDGE THE ACCEPTABILITY OF MOOT-STANDARDS AND THE REJECTABILITY OF LONG-ESTABLISHED ACCEPT-STANDARDS. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brewer2001, author = {Brewer, Bill}, title = {Precis of Perception and Reason}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {405-416}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, knowledge, perception, reason}, abstract = {The main arguments of my book, Perception and Reason, are outlined. Part I argues that perceptual experiences provide reasons for empirical beliefs. For such beliefs depend for their contents upon their relations with experiences, and only reason-giving relations may play this crucial content-determining role. Part II argues that reasons require conceptual contents, and explains in detail how perceptual experiences provide such reasons for empirical beliefs. Connections are drawn with traditional foundationalism, coherentism, skepticism, externalism and a priori knowledge.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brewer2001a, author = {Brewer, Bill}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {449-464}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, openness, perception}, abstract = {The arguments and views of my book, Perception and Reason, are developed and defended in response to critical commentaries by Richard Fumerton, Susan Hurley, Naomi Eilan and Michael Martin. The key issues discussed are: whether perceptual experiences have conceptual contents; the bearing of traditional arguments from hallucination; context-dependent reasons for action in minimally rational infants and animals; whether I succeed in capturing the intuitively explanatory role of perceptual experience in connection with the possibility of demonstrative thought; whether it is correct to regard the reason-giving role of perceptual experiences as a product purely of their content.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brewer2004, author = {Brewer, Bill}, title = {Stroud's Quest for Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {408-414}, keywords = {belief, color, metaphysics, reality, sensation}, abstract = {The discussion focuses mainly on Stroud's central argument against the likelihood of any successful unmasking explanation in connection with colour. The suggestion is that his final position is unstable. Either his conclusion that the unmasker's overall strategy is self-defeating is stronger than is warranted, or his insistence that no conclusive result is established in connection with the fundamental quest for reality is unduly cautious, depending on how precisely the dependence, which he rightly insists upon, of the identification of perceptions of colour upon some identification of colour properties themselves, is to be taken.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brewer2003, author = {Brewer, Talbot}, title = {Two Kinds of Commitments (and Two Kinds of Social Groups)}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(3)}, pages = {554-583}, keywords = {commitment, group, metaphysics, promise, social}, abstract = {I argue that theories which seek to model all commitments on promises, or to ground them all on voluntary consent, can account only for one sort of obligation and not for the other. Since social groups are most perspicuously categorized in terms of the sorts of commitments that bind their members together, this puts me in a position to distinguish two importantly different kinds of social groups, which I call aggregations and associations. I try to show that this position can account for features of the normative structure of social groups that are overlooked by those theorists (e.g., Margaret Gilbert) who have attempted to offer a unitary, voluntarist account of the phenomena under investigation. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Bringsjord1999, author = {Bringsjord, Selmer}, title = {The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {41-69}, keywords = {computation, metaphysics, mind, zombie}, abstract = {It is true that if zombies--creatures who are behaviorally indistinguishable from us, but no more conscious than a rock--are logically possible, the computational conception of mind is false? Are zombies logically possible? Are they physically possible? This paper is a careful, sustained argument for affirmative answers to these three questions.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Brittain2001, author = {Brittain, Charles}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {738-740}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics}, volume = {68(3)}, year = {2001} } @article{Broackes2004, author = {Broackes, Justin}, title = {Realism, Scepticism and the Lament for an Archimedean Point: Stroud and the Quest for Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {415-422}, keywords = {color, metaphysics, phenomenalism, realism, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Broadie1991, author = {Broadie, Sarah}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {728-731}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Ethics With Aristotle}, volume = {55(3)}, year = {1991} } @article{Brock2001, author = {Brock, Dan-W}, title = {Gert on the Limits of Morality's Requirements}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {435-440}, keywords = {ethics, good, limits, morality, nature}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brock1998, author = {Brock, Dan-W}, title = {Aggregating Costs and Benefits}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {963-967}, keywords = {ethics, morality, mortality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BROCKHAUS1991, author = {BROCKHAUS, Richard-R}, title = {Realism and Psychologism in 19th Century Logic.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {logic, nineteenth, psychologism, realism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brooks1994, author = {Brooks, D-H-M}, title = {How to Perform a Reduction}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {803-814}, keywords = {biology, knowledge, physics, reductionism, science}, abstract = {The reductionist wishes to show that everything ontologically "is" physical, everything is ultimately determined by the physical and finally that everything is ultimately explicable in terms of physics. The Nagel model of reduction was based on the classical positivist hypothetico-deductive model of explanation. This model does not extend to biology, because of the crucial notion of a biological function. I wish to argue that those who argue for the irreducibility of biology and psychology are basing their arguments on an outmoded model of reduction.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Broome1998, author = {Broome, John}, title = {Kamm on Fairness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {955-961}, keywords = {ethics, fairness, morality, mortality}, abstract = {When you have a choice between saving five people and saving one, what is a fair way to choose? In her Morality, Mortality, Frances Kamm describes three procedures for choosing, each of which she considers fair. This paper examines her arguments for all three and rejects them. It argues that the only fair procedure is one Kamm does not recommend: to decide by tossing a coin. Nevertheless, despite the fairness of tossing a coin, you should simply save the five directly, without tossing a coin, because the greater good of saving the five is enough to override fairness.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BROWN1967, author = {BROWN, CLIFFORD}, title = {LEIBNIZ AND AESTHETICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {70-80}, keywords = {aesthetics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brown1992, author = {Brown, Curtis}, title = {Direct and Indirect Belief}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {289-316}, keywords = {being, belief, consciousness, mental-states; metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brown2001, author = {Brown, Charlotte}, title = {Is the General Point of View the Moral Point of View?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {197-203}, keywords = {commitment, metaphysics, morality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brown1992a, author = {Brown, Harold-I}, title = {Direct Realism, Indirect Realism, and Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {341-363}, keywords = {mental-states; metaphysics, object, perception, realism}, abstract = {I argue that direct realism does not leave us in a better situation than indirect realism for learning the nature of the physical world. In either case, claims about physical objects must be justified by the hypothetico-deductive procedures that provide the basis for all justifications of scientific theories. The main metaphysical thesis of direct realism is accepted in this paper and the heart of the paper consists of a reconstruction of two traditional arguments against direct realism--the arguments from illusion and from causality--as arguments for an epistemological, rather than a metaphysical, conclusion.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brown2000, author = {Brown, Jessica}, title = {Critical Reasoning, Understanding and Self-Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(3)}, pages = {659-676}, keywords = {epistemology, reasoning, self-knowledge; understanding}, abstract = {The paper extends Burge's own work on critical reasoning. He argued that critical reasoning imposes a limit on the extent to which we can be mistaken about what thoughts we are having; in general, we can know nonempirically what we are thinking (Burge, "Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society XCVI, 1996). He does not explicitly consider whether critical reasoning also imposes a limit on incomplete understanding of thoughts. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BROWN1971, author = {BROWN, PATTERSON}, title = {STACE'S REFUTATION OF REALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {426-428}, keywords = {metaphysics, realism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BROWNING1988, author = {BROWNING, DOUGLAS}, title = {SAMENESS THROUGH CHANGE AND THE COINCIDENCE OF PROPERTIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {103-121}, keywords = {change, identity, metaphysics}, abstract = {ANY ATTEMPT TO ASSIMILATE THE RELATION OF NUMERICAL SAMENESS IN CASES OF SAMENESS THROUGH CHANGE TO THE RELATION OF IDENTITY AS SPECIFIED BY LEIBNIZ'S LAW FAILS. THIS ARTICLE TRIES TO SHOW WHY THIS IS SO. IT ARGUES, FIRST, THAT THE STANDARDLY ACCEPTED VIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF LEIBNIZ'S LAW TO SUCH CASES, THOUGH QUITE PROPER, DOES NOT REST UPON NOR PRESUPPOSE SUCH AN ASSIMILATION. IT THEN ARGUES THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO ENSURE THE COINCIDENCE OF PROPERTIES IN SUCH CASES BY LIMITING THE SCOPE OF LEIBNIZ'S LAW TO "GENUINE PROPERTIES" HAS THE RESULT OF MARKING OUT WHAT SHALL COUNT AS SUCH PROPERTIES IN A MANNER WHICH IS EITHER PROMISCUOUS OR ALTOGETHER ARBITRARY, AND IN ANY CASE VACUOUS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BROWNING1968, author = {BROWNING, DOUGLAS}, title = {CREATIVITY, CORRESPONDENCE, AND STATEMENTS ABOUT THE FUTURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {514-536}, keywords = {correspondence, creativity, epistemology, future, statement, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BROWNING1973, author = {BROWNING, DOUGLAS}, title = {THE CANON OF SUBJECTABLES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {171-186}, keywords = {language, logic, predicate-logic; predication, singulars}, abstract = {IT IS ARGUED THAT THE CANON OF SUBJECTABLES, NAMELY, THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO REFER TO ANY SINGULAR BY MEANS OF A SUBJECTING-EXPRESSION, IS QUESTIONABLE. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THERE MAY BE REFERENTS OF CERTAIN SENTENCES OR CERTAIN PREDICATE-EXPRESSIONS WHICH CAN ONLY MISLEADINGLY BE SUBJECTED TO PREDICATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brueckner1993, author = {Brueckner, Anthony}, title = {One More Failed Transcendental Argument}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {633-636}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, scepticism, self, transcendentalism}, abstract = {This paper is a critical discussion of an argument (by Douglas C Long) to show that if one knows that one is the subject of various mental states, then one has knowledge that this subject is a material thing.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brueckner1994, author = {Brueckner, Anthony}, title = {The Shifting Content of Knowledge Attributions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(1)}, pages = {123-126}, keywords = {context, epistemology, knowledge, language, truth}, abstract = {Does the content of a knowledge-attributing sentence depend only upon features of the context of utterance? Or do features of the knower's own context affect such content?}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brueckner1998, author = {Brueckner, Anthony}, title = {Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {361-364}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, paradox, self-knowledg}, abstract = {In a number of papers, Sydney Shoemaker has argued that first-order belief plus rationality implies second-order belief. This paper is a critical discussion of Shoemaker's argument.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BRUECKNER1986, author = {BRUECKNER, ANTHONY-L}, title = {HUMEAN FICTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {655-664}, keywords = {metaphysics, personal-identity; scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brueckner1994a, author = {Brueckner, Anthony}, title = {The Structure of the Skeptical Argument}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {827-835}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, language, scepticism}, abstract = {A "closure principle" for knowledge is thought to be required by a now standard formulation of the Cartesian skeptic's argument to show that one lacks knowledge about the external world. It is argued that another epistemic principle is also required, an "underdetermination principle" that renders closure superfluous.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brueckner2005, author = {Brueckner, Anthony}, title = {Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {436-443}, keywords = {epistemology, evidence, knowledge, scepticism}, abstract = {This is a critical discussion of Williamson's claims that (1) e is evidence iff e is known, and (2) skepticism about knowledge of the external world can be blocked by denying that one's evidence is the same in a normal situation and in a skeptical brain-in-a-vat situation.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Brueckner2005a, author = {Brueckner, Anthony}, title = {Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {384-391}, keywords = {epistemology, fallibilism, knowledge, scepticism, underdetermination}, abstract = {Fallibilism about knowledge and justification is a widely held view in epistemology. In this paper, I will try to arrive at a proper formulation of fallibilism. Fallibilists often hold that Cartesian skepticism is a view that deserves to be taken seriously and dealt with somehow. I argue that it turns out that a canonical form of skeptical argument depends upon the denial of fallibilism. I conclude by considering a response on behalf of the skeptic.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BRUNIUS1970, author = {BRUNIUS, TEDDY}, title = {THE AESTHETICS OF ROMAN INGARDEN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {590-595}, keywords = {aesthetics, art-object; phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BUCHANAN1976, author = {BUCHANAN, ALLEN}, title = {BASIC KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {37}, pages = {101-108}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, proposition}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BUCHDAHL1961, author = {BUCHDAHL, G}, title = {THE PROBLEM OF NEGATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {163-178}, keywords = {dialogue, epistemology, evidence, meaning, negation, perception, reality, relation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BUNGE1968, author = {BUNGE, MARIO}, title = {THEORY OF PARTIAL TRUTH, NOT PROVED INCONSISTENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {297-298}, keywords = {epistemology, truth}, abstract = {R. ACKERMANN'S CHARGE THAT THE AUTHOR'S AXIOM SYSTEM FOR PARTIAL TRUTH IS INCONSISTENT, IS SHOWN TO BE UNJUSTIFIED AND TO REST ON THE CRITIC'S NEGLECT OF THE CLAUSES OF CERTAIN THEOREMS IN THE THEORY. THE LATTER OCCURS IN THE AUTHOR'S "THE MYTH OF SIMPLICITY", (ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, N.J.: PRENTICE-HALL, 1963).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BUNGE1961, author = {BUNGE, MARIO}, title = {ETHICS AS A SCIENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {139-152}, keywords = {ethics, fact, goodness, justification, linguistic-analysis; moral-judgment; norm, science, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Bunzl1997, author = {Bunzl, Martin}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {490-493}, publisher = {Routledge}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Real History: Reflections on Historical Practice}, volume = {62(2)}, year = {1997} } @article{BURBIDGE1981, author = {BURBIDGE, JOHN}, title = {MAN, GOD, AND DEATH IN HEGEL'S "PHENOMENOLOGY".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {183-196}, keywords = {death, god, man, negativity, philosophical-anthropolog}, abstract = {RELYING SOLELY ON MASTER/SLAVE AND THE PREFACE, KOJEVE HAS CONTRASTED THE DEATH AND NEGATIVITY OF MODERN MAN WITH THE POSITIVITY OF GOD. THIS PAPER TRACES THE THEME OF DEATH THROUGHOUT THE "PHENOMENOLOGY": THE LIFE-AND-DEATH STRUGGLE, MASTER/SLAVE, UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS, ANTIGONE, CULTURE AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT, THE REIGN OF TERROR, AND REVEALED RELIGION. IT CONCLUDES NOT ONLY THAT DIVINITY FOR HEGEL IS DEFINED BY NEGATIVITY AND DEATH, BUT THAT MODERN MAN'S NEGATIVITY, FAR FROM OPPOSING HIM TO THE DIVINE, RECONCILES HIM WITH GOD. A FINAL COMMENT RELATES THE THREE TYPES OF NEGATIVITY IN DEATH TO SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT HEGEL'S LOGICAL METHOD.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Burge2003, author = {Burge, Tyler}, title = {Perceptual Entitlement}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {503-548}, keywords = {belief, entitlement, epistemology, individualism, perception}, abstract = {The paper develops a conception of epistemic warrant as applied to perceptual belief, called "entitlement", that does not require the warranted individual to be capable of understanding the warrant. It characterizes entitlement as fulfillment of an epistemic norm that is a priori associated with a certain representational function that can be known a priori to be a function of perception. The paper connects anti-individualism, a thesis about the nature of mental states, and perceptual entitlement. It presents an argument that explains the objectivity and validity of perceptual entitlement partly in terms of the nature of perceptual states--hence the nature of perceptual beliefs, which are constitutively associated with perceptual states. The paper discusses ways that an individual can be entitled to perceptual belief through its connection to perception, and ways that entitlement to perceptual belief can be undermined. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Burge2003a, author = {Burge, Tyler}, title = {Social Anti-Individualism, Objective Reference}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {682-690}, keywords = {inference, language, objectivity, reference}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Burgess1997, author = {Burgess, John-P and Rosen, Gideon}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {723-727}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics}, volume = {62(3)}, year = {1997} } @article{Burke1994, author = {Burke, Michael}, title = {Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Among Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {591-624}, keywords = {epistemology, matter, metaphysics, object, sortal, substance}, abstract = {This article presents a novel account of the relations among objects, sorts, sortals, and persistence conditions. Among its advantages over the standard account is its compatibility with the commonsense principle of one material object to a place. The account enables us to dispose of the full range of putative counterexamples to that principle, including, notably, that of persons and their bodies. And it enables us to do so without resorting to anti- essentialism, temporal parts, sortal relativism, temporal relativism, mereological essentialism, or other theories that conflict with our ordinary ways of thinking about the world.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BURKE1962, author = {BURKE, RICHARD}, title = {G H MEAD AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {81-88}, keywords = {empiricism, experience, metaphysics, methodology, science, speculation}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE IS A SUMMARY OF THE "EMPIRICIST METAPHYSICS" OF GEORGE HERBERT MEAD. AGAINST THE COMMON INTERPRETATION (OF M NATANSON, A E MURPHY, P PFUETZE AND OTHERS) THAT MEAD BEGAN AS A TOUGH-MINDED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGIST AND ENDED AS A METAPHYSICIAN LIKE WHITEHEAD AND BERGSON, I ARGUE THAT (1) HE HELD A CONSISTENTLY POSITIVIST OR ANTI-METAPHYSICAL POSITION THROUGHOUT HIS LIFE; AND (2) HIS ATTEMPT TO INCORPORATE "SUBJECTIVE" AND "PHENOMENOLOGICAL" DATA INTO THE METHOD OF SCIENCE DESERVES SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BURKE1967, author = {BURKE, RICHARD-J}, title = {ARISTOTLE ON THE LIMITS OF ARGUMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {386-400}, keywords = {argument, logic}, abstract = {"IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO EXAMINE EVERY PROBLEM AND EVERY THESIS, BUT ONLY THOSE ABOUT WHICH DOUBT MIGHT BE FELT BY THE KIND OF PERSON WHO NEEDS ARGUMENT RATHER THAN PUNISHMENT OR PERCEPTION. FOR THOSE WHO DOUBT WHETHER OR NOT THE GODS OUGHT TO BE HONORED AND PARENTS LOVED NEED PUNISHMENT, WHILE THOSE WHO DOUBT WHETHER OR NOT SNOW IS WHITE NEED PERCEPTION" ("TOPICS" I, 11, 105A3-8). SUCH PASSAGES APPEAR FREQUENTLY IN ARISTOTLE, AND AT CRUCIAL POINTS. THE MODERN READER IS LIKELY TO CONCLUDE (AND GOOD STUDENTS DO CONCLUDE) THAT ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE, IN CONTRAST TO PARTICULAR IDEAS AND ARGUMENTS, IS FLAGRANTLY DOGMATIC; FOR JUST SUCH QUESTIONS HAD BEEN LIVE ISSUES TO PLATO AND THE SOPHISTS. A MORE PLAUSIBLE APPROACH IS TO CREDIT THE INVENTOR OF FORMAL LOGIC WITH MORE PERSPICACITY THAN THE AVERAGE LOGICIAN RATHER THAN LESS. AN EXAMINATION OF HIS ACTUAL PROCEDURE, WHICH IS ALMOST ALWAYS "DIALECTICAL" RATHER THAN "DEMONSTRATIVE" ("TOPICS" I, 1), REVEALS A SOPHISTICATED THEORY: THAT "PROOF" IN PHILOSOPHY IS ALWAYS RELATIVE TO THE CONDITIONS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF INQUIRY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Burns1991, author = {Burns, Linda-Claire}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {483-486}, publisher = {Kluwer}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Vagueness}, volume = {54(2)}, year = {1991} } @article{BURTON1976, author = {BURTON, ROBERT-G}, title = {THE HUMAN AWARENESS OF TIME: AN ANALYSIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {303-318}, keywords = {anticipation, future, memory, metaphysics, past, time}, abstract = {THIS ANALYSIS OF MEMORY, ANTICIPATION, AND AUDITORY EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT IN MEMORY WE HAVE DIRECT AWARENESS OF THE PAST AS FULLY DETERMINATE, WHEREAS ANTICIPATION IS DIRECTED TOWARD A FUTURE THAT IS DETERMINATE ONLY IN ITS GENERAL CHARACTER BUT NEVER IN ITS ACTUAL DETAILS. WE EXPERIENCE THE PRESENT IN A CONTEXT THAT INCLUDES BOTH THE BACKGROUND OF THE IMMEDIATE PAST AND THE HORIZON OF THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THE NOVELTY OF EACH EXPERIENCE CAN BE APPREHENDED ONLY AGAINST THE CONTRASTING BACKGROUND OF ITS IMMEDIATE PAST. THE AWARENESS OF CONTINUING PROCESS REFLECTS A COORDINATE ANTICIPATION OF THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BURTON1982, author = {BURTON, ROBERT-G}, title = {CHOICE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {581-586}, keywords = {choice, free-will; metaphysics}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO CAPTURE KEY FEATURES IN OUR EXPERIENCE OF CHOICE. THE INITIAL FORMULA, "I CHOOSE X," UNDERGOES TRANSFORMATIONS EVENTUATING IN THE FORMULA, "I CHOOSE TO DO X RATHER THAN Y BECAUSE...." MOST OF THE ELEMENTS THAT EMERGE ARE IMPLICIT IN THE DICTIONARY DEFINITION OF 'CHOICE' AS "THE VOLUNTARY ACT OF SELECTING OR SEPARATING FROM TWO OR MORE THINGS THAT WHICH IS PREFERRED." FINALLY, THE PROBLEM OF "CHOICE WITHOUT PREFERENCE" IS RESOLVED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BUTCHVAROV1960, author = {BUTCHVAROV, PANAYOT}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF POSSIBILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {318-337}, keywords = {actuality, fact, metaphysics, noncontradiction, nonexistence, possibility, thing, thought}, abstract = {THREE GENERAL THEORIES ARE DISTINGUISHED: (1) A POSSIBLE THING IS ONLY IN AND FOR THOUGHT; (2) WHAT IS POSSIBLE IS MERELY WHAT IS NOT SELF-CONTRADICTORY; (3) POSSIBLES ARE ACTUAL IN THEMSELVES BUT THEY ARE NOT IN THE WORLD. NEITHER OF THESE THEORIES SEEM TO BE WHOLLY SATISFACTORY TO THE AUTHOR. A SUBSTITUTE THEORY IS GIVEN, WHERE POSSIBILITY IS DEFINED AS "BEING-THOUGHT-ABOUT." HOWEVER, THIS APPEARS TO CONFLICT WITH THE ORDINARY MEANING OF THE TERM, IN REFERENCE TO ACTUALITY. IT IS THEN ARGUED THAT THE TRADITIONAL MEANING OF POSSIBILITY IN TERMS OF ACTUALITY IS ITSELF CONTRADICTORY. SO, THE NEW THEORY STANDS, PROVIDES SATISFACTORY CRITERIA OF THE POSSIBLE, SOLVES CERTAIN PUZZLES, AND IMPROVES ON THE TRADITIONAL MEANING OF THE TERM. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BUTLER1976, author = {BUTLER, CLARK}, title = {HEGEL AND FREUD: A COMPARISON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {506-522}, keywords = {consciousness, philosophical-anthropology; self-consciousnes}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE POINTS TO CONSIDERABLE CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THE FREUDIAN THEORY OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND THE DIALECTIC OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN HEGEL'S "PHENOMENOLOGY", BETWEEN THE FREUDIAN THEORY OF PSYCHO-SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, AND BETWEEN THE FREUDIAN AND HEGELIAN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHIES. BOTH MEN TAKE THE "DIALECTIC OF REVOLUTION AND RESTORATION" TO BE AN ESSENTIAL KEY TO BOTH INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE HISTORY. IT IS ARGUED THAT FREUD IS, THOUGH UNWITTINGLY, A DIALECTICIAN, AND THAT PSYCHOANALYSIS LENDS ITSELF TO EXPRESSION IN THE LANGUAGE OF HEGELIAN DIALECTICS BETTER THAN IN THE MECHANISTIC-PHYSIOLOGICAL LANGUAGE FREUD IN FACT USED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BUTLER1988, author = {BUTLER, DOUGLAS}, title = {CHARACTER TRAITS IN EXPLANATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {215-238}, keywords = {behavior, character-trait; explanation, metaphysics}, abstract = {IT WOULD BE LUNACY OUTSIDE OF METAETHICS TO DENY ALL INFERENCES FROM FACTS ABOUT TRAITS OF CHARACTER TO THE ASCRIPTIONS OF VIRTUES OR VICES. IN ORDER TO EVALUATE SUCH INFERENCES THIS PAPER EXTENSIVELY EXPLORES THE NATURE OF CHARACTER TRAITS AS DEVICES FOR ENRICHING COMMON SENSE EXPLANATIONS OF BEHAVIOUR. TRAITS ARE NOT INSTRUMENTALLY STRUCTURED BUNDLES OF BELIEFS AND DESIRES. THEY ARE COMPLEXES INVOLVING DISPOSITIONS TO FORM CERTAIN REPRESENTATIONS AND TO ATTACH PRACTICAL SALIENCE TO THEM; IN MANY CASES THEY ALSO INVOLVE CONDITIONAL DESIRES. IF WE UNDERSTAND TRAITS THIS WAY WE CAN COMPLETE SOME MORAL INFERENCES THAT WE CANNOT COMPLETE IF WE ASCRIBE ONLY INSTRUMENTAL MOTIVES. BUT THIS CHARACTER TRAIT STRUCTURE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO GET FACT-TO-VALUE INFERENCES OFF THE GROUND FROM SCRATCH, IF WE DISREGARD OUR EVERYDAY MORAL EVALUATIONS OF THE DESIRES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS THAT WE USE TO FILL OUT THE STRUCTURE OF SPECIFIC TRAITS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Butler1997, author = {Butler, Keith}, title = {Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {773-800}, keywords = {content, epistemology, externalism, internalism, knowledge}, abstract = {Externalism holds, and internalism denies, that the individuation of many of an individual's mental states (e.g., thoughts about the physical world) depends necessarily on relations that individual bears to the physical and/or social environment. Many philosophers, externalists and internalists alike, believe that introspection yields knowledge of the contents of our thoughts that is direct and authoritative. It is not obvious, however, that the metaphysical claims of externalism are compatible with this epistemological thesis. Some have sought to dispel the worry that there is a conflict, though they admit that if such a conflict exists, it spells trouble for externalism. Boghossian has argued that there is indeed a conflict between externalism and introspective knowledge of content. Surprisingly, however, he also argues that there is a conflict between internalism and introspective knowledge of content. I will defend Boghossian's claim that there is a conflict between externalism and knowledge of content, but criticize his claim that there is a conflict between internalism and knowledge of content.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BYKHOVSKII1973, author = {BYKHOVSKII, BERNARD}, title = {A PHILOSOPHY OF DESPAIR.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {187-200}, keywords = {existentialism, idealism, nineteenth, science}, abstract = {THE PHILOSOPHY OF EXISTENTIALISM IS BASED ON THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN EGOCENTRIC VOLUNTARISM AND OBJECTIVE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. A CONVERSION OF ITS THEORY INTO GOAL-DIRECTED, PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IS OPPOSED BY ITS PERSPECTIVELESS, PATHETIC-IRRATIONAL DISORIENTATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY GIVES NO ALTERNATIVES TO FEAR AND DESPAIR AND STIFLES EFFORTS TO REBUILD THE WORLD ON A RATIONAL FOUNDATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{BYKHOVSKII1969, author = {BYKHOVSKII, B}, title = {MARCUSISM AGAINST MARXISM: A CRITIQUE OF UNCRITICAL CRITICISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {203-218}, keywords = {dialectic, marxism, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Byrne2002, author = {Byrne, Alex}, title = {Semantic Values?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {201-207}, keywords = {language, meaning, normativity, semantics}, abstract = {This is a commentary on Lance and Hawthorne's The Grammar of Meaning and focuses on their view that meaning is normative.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Byrne1996, author = {Byrne, Alex}, title = {On Misinterpreting Kripke's Wittgenstein}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(2)}, pages = {339-343}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, private-languag}, abstract = {I argue that Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language has been widely misinterpreted. According to the prevailing interpretation, Kripke's Wittgenstein says that, contrary to appearances, attributions of meaning are not factual claims at all. They look like statements of alleged fact, but really they have some entirely different role. On my reading Kripke's Wittgenstein claims that no reductive account of meaning facts is possible, and that the demand for such an account is motivated by misleading philosophical pictures of what it is to mean something by a word.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Byrne2003, author = {Byrne, Alex}, title = {Color and Similarity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(3)}, pages = {641-665}, keywords = {color, epistemology, perception, similarity}, abstract = {Similarity claims about the colors, for instance that blue is more similar to purple than to yellow, are sometimes held to pose a serious problem for physicalism about color: the view that colors are physical properties of some kind. I examine various responses to this problem, find them wanting, and give my own solution, which appeals to the way colors are visually represented. Finally, I argue that the proposed account removes the principal motivation for Lewis's and Walker's response to Kripke's Wittgenstein, in terms of "natural" properties.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CAHN1977, author = {CAHN, STEVEN-M}, title = {RANDOM CHOICES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {549-551}, keywords = {choice, free-will; metaphysics, randomness}, abstract = {THE CLAIM THAT THE DOCTRINE OF FREE WILL CAN BE TRUE ONLY IF THE DOCTRINE OF DETERMINISM IS FALSE HAS OFTEN BEEN ATTACKED ON THE GROUNDS THAT WHAT IS RANDOM IS NO MORE FREE THAN WHAT IS CAUSED. I CALL ATTENTION TO A COMMON PHENOMENON THAT SUGGESTS THAT A RANDOM ACT, THOUGH PERHAPS UNCAUSED, NEED BE NEITHER ACCIDENTAL NOR IRRESPONSIBLE. DISCUSSION CENTERS ON AN EXAMPLE SUCH AS CHOOSING A NUMBER FROM 1 TO 10.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CAM1987, author = {CAM, PHILIP}, title = {PROPOSITIONS ABOUT IMAGES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {335-338}, keywords = {image, mental, metaphysics, proposition}, abstract = {THE PAPER CRITICIZES A LINE OF ARGUMENT WITH WHICH DANIEL DENNETT DEFENDS A PROPOSITIONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MENTAL IMAGERY. IT ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT DENNETT'S PROPOSITIONAL RECONSTRUCTIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH A DEPICTIVE REPRESENTATIONAL FORMAT FOR IMAGERY, WHILE THEY FAIL TO FULLY CAPTURE ITS PHENOMENOLOGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CAM1984, author = {CAM, PHILIP}, title = {DENNETT ON INTELLIGENT STORAGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {247-262}, keywords = {artificial-intelligence; brain-processes; metaphysics}, abstract = {ACCORDING TO DENNETT, THERE ARE ONLY TWO SORTS OF ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION HOW THE BRAIN STORES AND USES INFORMATION IN SATISFYING THE ORGANISM'S NEEDS. FIRST, THERE ARE FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNTS OF THE KIND SKETCHED BY DENNETT IN "CONTENT AND CONSCIOUSNESS" AND, SECONDLY, THERE IS THE "BRAIN-WRITING" HYPOTHESIS THAT THE BRAIN EMPLOYS ITS OWN LANGUAGE. I ATTEMPT BOTH TO BRING OUT THE INADEQUACY OF DENNETT'S APPROACH AND TO SHOW THAT THE "BRAIN-WRITING" HYPOTHESIS IS NOT UNDERMINED BY HIS CRITICISMS. IF, AS DENNETT SAYS, THIS HYPOTHESIS FORMS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO HIS OWN ACCOUNT, THEN THE FACT THAT DENNETT'S STORY MUST BE REJECTED SHOWS THAT SOME SUCH ALTERNATIVE IS CORRECT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Campbell1997, author = {Campbell, John}, title = {Precis of Past, Space and Self}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {633-634}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, past, self, space}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Campbell1997a, author = {Campbell, John}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {655-670}, keywords = {epistemology, metaphysics, past, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Campos2003, author = {Campos, Manuel}, title = {Analyticity and Incorrigibility}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(3)}, pages = {689-708}, keywords = {analyticity, epistemology, incorrigibility, meaning, necessity}, abstract = {The traditional point of view on analyticity implies that truth in virtue only of meaning entails a priori acceptability and vice versa. The argument for this claim is based on the idea that meaning as it concerns truth and meaning as it concerns competence are one and the same thing. In this paper I argue that the extensions of these notions do not coincide. I hold that truth in virtue of meaning--truth for semantic reasons--doesn't imply a priori acceptability, and that a priori reflection based only on knowledge of meaning--in the sense of competence--doesn't necessitate true conclusions. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Care2000, author = {Care, Norman-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {738-740}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Decent People}, volume = {66(3)}, year = {2000} } @other{Care1998, author = {Care, Norman-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {1090-1093}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Living with One's Past: Personal Fates and Moral Pain}, volume = {49(4)}, year = {1998} } @article{Cargile1996, author = {Cargile, James}, title = {Evidence and Inquiry by Susan Haack}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {621-625}, keywords = {belief, coherentism, epistemology, evidence}, abstract = {This is a discussion of some points from Susan Haack's Evidence and Inquiry. One point is the definition of terms such as "basic belief" and "one-directional justification." Another is the claim that "assuming A's evidence held constant, the less strongly A believes that p, the more justified he is in this (weak) belief." Another is the criticism of C.I. Lewis's famous saying that "If anything is to be probable, something must be certain."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cargile2000, author = {Cargile, James}, title = {Skepticism and Possibilities}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {157-171}, keywords = {epistemology, possibility, scepticism, truth}, abstract = {One skeptical strategy against A's claim to know that P is to hold that it is logically possible for someone to have the same "base" (a term needing explaining) for P as A does in spite of its not being true that P. Philosophical replies have focused on showing that these are not genuine possibilities. Whether they are can be an interesting question of metaphysics, but it is argued in this paper that this metaphysical discussion is not the proper focus for an assessment of skepticism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carlson2003, author = {Carlson, Erik}, title = {Counterexamples to Principle Beta: A Response to Crisp and Warfield}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(3)}, pages = {730-737}, keywords = {consequence, determinism, freedom, metaphysics}, abstract = {The well-known "consequence argument" for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism relies on a certain rule of inference; "principle beta". Thomas Crisp and Ted Warfield have recently argued that all hitherto suggested counterexamples to beta can be easily circumvented by proponents of the consequence argument. I present a new counterexample which, I argue, is free from the flaws Crisp and Warfield detect in earlier examples.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carman2001, author = {Carman, Taylor}, title = {On Making Sense (and Nonsense) of Heidegger}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {561-572}, keywords = {being, metaphysics}, abstract = {Herman Philipse's Heidegger's Philosophy of Being is an attempt to interpret, analyze, and ultimately discredit the whole of Heidegger's thought. But Philipse's reading of the texts is uncharitable, and the ideas he presents and criticizes often bear little resemblance to Heidegger's views. Philipse relies on a crude distinction between "theoretical" and "applicative" interpretations in arguing that Heidegger's conception of interpretation as a kind of projection (Entwurf) is, like the liar's paradox, formally self-defeating. But even granting the distinction, the charge of reflective incoherence is fallacious and question-begging. Finally, Philipse advances the astonishing "interpretive hypothesis" that the seemingly morbid existential themes in Being and Time were part of a deliberate "Pascalian strategy" to win converts to Heidegger's own idiosyncratic "postmonotheist worship of Being." (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARMICHAEL1969, author = {CARMICHAEL, PETER-A}, title = {"BASED ON".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {113-115}, keywords = {epistemology, induction}, abstract = {ARE GENERAL STATEMENTS BASED ON PARTICULARS? NO. VICE VERSA. SO FAR AS THEY HAVE A BASE, IT IS SPECULATION OR HYPOTHESIS, OF WHICH THE DATA OF EXPERIENCE, OR PROPOSITIONS REPRESENTING THEM, ARE CONFIRMATORY INSTANCES. IF A GENERAL STATEMENT DERIVED FROM THE DATA, IT COULD NOT BE DENIED SO LONG AS THE DATA WERE ADMITTED. INDUCTION IS NOT FROM THE DATA, THOUGH IT MAY BE INSPIRED BY THEM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARMICHAEL1966, author = {CARMICHAEL, PETER-A}, title = {THE RHETORICAL CONCEPTION OF TRUTH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {104-106}, keywords = {language, metalanguage, rhetoric, semantics, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARMICHAEL1974, author = {CARMICHAEL, PETER-A}, title = {MILL AND 'DESIRABLE'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {34}, pages = {435-436}, keywords = {desire, ethics, linguistic-analysi}, abstract = {MILL'S CONTENTION ("UTILITARIANISM," CHAPTER 4) THAT THE TERM 'DESIRABLE' SIGNIFIES A DESIRING, NOT JUST A CAPACITY OR DUTY OF DESIRING, IS JUSTIFIED BY THE FACT THAT WITHOUT DESIRE 'DESIRABLE' WOULD BE VACUOUS. THE DESIRABLE IS ANYTHING REGARDED DESIRINGLY, AS MILL CONTENDED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARMICHAEL1973, author = {CARMICHAEL, PETER-A}, title = {KANT AND JESUS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {412-416}, keywords = {categorical-imperative; christ, ethics}, abstract = {A REJOINDER TO AN ARGUMENT BY S K THOMAS IN "MIND" THAT THE 'CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE' AND THE 'GOLDEN RULE' ARE SIDES OF THE SAME COIN, THIS ARTICLE HOLDS THAT, RATHER, THERE IS AN ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THEM, THE 'GOLDEN RULE' ENJOINING EGOISM, TACITLY EXTENDED UNIVERSALLY, AND THE 'CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE' A SELFLESS UNIVERSALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARMICHAEL1977, author = {CARMICHAEL, PETER-A}, title = {THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AT WORK IN RELIGION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {247-250}, keywords = {belief, ontological-proof; religion}, abstract = {THE CREEDS OF RELIGION, NOT BEING OPEN TO OBJECTIVE REVIEW AND CONFIRMATION, ARE SUBJECTIVE ONLY. THEY PRESUME THAT THE IDEA INTERNALLY RAISES THE OBJECT. THIS IS THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT EXTENDED. IT REMAINS INTERNAL, OF NO EXTERNAL IMPORT, AND ISSUES IN SOLIPSISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARNES1964, author = {CARNES, ROBERT-D}, title = {DESCARTES AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {502-511}, keywords = {attribute, circularity, concept, existence, god, necessary, ontological-proof; property, religion}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO PINPOINT EXPLICITLY THE VICIOUS CIRCULARITY IN PROPOSITION I OF DESCARTES' "GEOMETRICAL DEMONSTRATIONS" OF GOD'S EXISTENCE. THE ARGUMENT IS TREATED BOTH DISCURSIVELY AND SYMBOLICALLY. SINCE THE PHRASE "NATURE OR CONCEPT" OCCURS CRUCIALLY, THE TERM "CONCEPT" IS EXAMINED RELEVANT TO THE FOLLOWING DISTINCTIONS: (I) PROPERTY CONCEPTS--GENERAL AND INDIVIDUAL (ENUMERATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVELY UNIQUE) (II) PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS--DEPENDING ON HOW ONE INTERPRETS "CONCEPT," THE ARGUMENT DIFFERS IN FORM AND CONCLUSION. WHEN "CONCEPT" IS TAKEN IN THE SENSE OF: GENERAL PROPERTY CONCEPTS AND DESCRIPTIVELY UNIQUE, INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY CONCEPTS--ONLY A HYPOTHETICAL CONCLUSION IS DERIVABLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARNEY1962, author = {CARNEY, JAMES-D}, title = {WAS MOORE TALKING NONSENSE IN 1918?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {521-527}, keywords = {after-image; appearance, epistemology, object, perception, reality, seeing, sense-dat}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carney1993, author = {Carney, James-D}, title = {Representation and Style}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {811-828}, keywords = {metaphysics, phenomenology, representation, style, visual-ar}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARR1973, author = {CARR, DAVID}, title = {THE "FIFTH MEDITATION" AND HUSSERL'S CARTESIANISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {14-35}, keywords = {cartesianism, epistemology, experience, phenomenology, solipsism}, abstract = {THIS PAPER IS A STUDY OF HUSSERL'S FIFTH CARTESIAN MEDITATION IN RELATION TO THE FIRST FOUR. IT ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT THIS SECTION OF HUSSERL'S WORK EXHIBITS A PROFOUND DEPARTURE FROM THE PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES OF CARTESIAN PHILOSOPHY, IN SPITE OF THE WORK'S TITLE. IN PARTICULAR, IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO ADDRESS THE TRADITIONAL PROBLEM OF SOLIPSISM, A TYPICALLY CARTESIAN PROBLEM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carrier1993, author = {Carrier, L-S}, title = {The Impossibility of Massive Error}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {405-409}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology, scepticism, semantics}, abstract = {Kirk Ludwig thinks that Davidson's anti-skeptical argument is designed to show the "logical" impossibility of massive error, which begs the question against the skeptic. Ludwig's criticism can be overcome by interpreting Davidson as arguing, instead, for its "epistemic" impossibility: massive error is inconsistent with many things that we know, including our knowledge of language, its intertranslatability, and its being learned in the presence of that which our words describe. If the skeptic responds that we lack knowledge of these things, Davidson's position is best defended by denying that the only good reasons for believing factual claims are experiential reasons.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carroll2005, author = {Carroll, John-W}, title = {Natural Laws in Scientific Practice}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {240-245}, keywords = {induction, natural-law; science}, abstract = {This is a review of Marc Lange's Natural Laws in Scientific Practice.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Carroll1994, author = {Carroll, John-W}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {971-973}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Laws of Nature}, volume = {57(4)}, year = {1994} } @other{Carroll1998, author = {Carroll, Noel}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {481-485}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A Philosophy of Mass Art}, volume = {61(2)}, year = {1998} } @article{Carruthers2004, author = {Carruthers, Peter}, title = {Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {316-336}, keywords = {concept, consciousness, experience, metaphysics, phenomena}, abstract = {Relying on a range of now-familiar thought-experiments, it has seemed to many philosophers that phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of reductive explanation. This paper is concerned to explain, and then to meet, the challenge of showing how purely recognitional concepts are possible if there are no such things as qualia--in the strong sense of intrinsic (nonrelational, nonintentional) properties of experience. It argues that an appeal to higher-order experiences is necessary to meet this challenges, and then deploys a novel form of higher-order thought theory to explain how such experiences are generated. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Carruthers1996, author = {Carruthers, Peter}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {553-555}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Language, Thought, and Consciousness: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {59(2)}, year = {1996} } @article{CARSON1989, author = {CARSON, THOMAS-L}, title = {COULD IDEAL OBSERVERS DISAGREE: A REPLY TO TALIAFERRO.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {115-124}, keywords = {disagreement, ethics, ideal-observer; impartiality, moral-judgmen}, abstract = {IN "THE STATUS OF MORALITY" I ARGUE THAT FIRTH'S VERSION OF THE IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY COMMITS HIM TO AN EXTREME VERSION OF MORAL RELATIVISM. FIRTHIAN IDEAL OBSERVERS COULD DISAGREE IN THEIR ATTITUDES ABOUT ALL POSSIBLE MORAL QUESTIONS. I ALSO PROPOSE AN ALTERNATIVE VERSION OF THE IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY WHICH I BELIEVE COMMITS US TO A MODERATE VERSION OF MORAL RELATIVISM. IN "RELATIVIZING THE IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY" CHARLES TALIAFERRO DEFENDS FIRTH'S FORMULATION OF THE IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY. HE ALSO REJECTS MY CLAIM THAT FIRTH IS COMMITTED TO RELATIVISM. IN THIS PAPER I DEFEND MY VIEWS AGAINST TALIAFERRO'S CRITICISMS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carson2001, author = {Carson, Thomas-L}, title = {Gert on Rationality, Intrinsic Value, and the Overridingness of Morality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {441-446}, keywords = {ethics, intrinsic-value; morality, rationality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carson1992, author = {Carson, Thomas}, title = {Gibbard's Conceptual Scheme for Moral Philosophy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {953-956}, keywords = {ethics, morality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CARTER1968, author = {CARTER, ROBERT-EDGAR}, title = {THE IMPORTANCE OF INTRINSIC VALUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {567-577}, keywords = {axiology, ethics, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carter2004, author = {Carter, W-R}, title = {'Partist' Resistance to the Many}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {713-723}, keywords = {identity, location, materialism, metaphysics, particulars, perdurance, person}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carter1999, author = {Carter, William-R}, title = {Will I Be a Dead Person?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {167-171}, keywords = {embryo, fetus, person, personal-identity; science}, abstract = {Eric Olsen argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the standard view of personal identity is mistaken. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olsen's favored biological view of personal identity.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Carter1997, author = {Carter, W-R}, title = {Dion's Left Foot (and the Price of Burkean Economy)}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {371-379}, keywords = {economy, epistemology, object, violence}, abstract = {Two recent papers by Michael Burke bearing upon the persistence of people and commonplace things illustrate the fact that the quest for synchronic ontological economy is likely to encourage a disturbing diachronic proliferation of entities. This discussion argues that Burke's promise of ontological economy is seriously compromised by the fact that his proposed metaphysic does violence to standard intuitions concerning the persistence of people and commonplace things. In effect, Burke would have us achieve synchronic economy (rejection of coincident entities) by postulating strongly counterintuitive transtemporal claims of numerical diversity. The argument is made that the price of Burkean economy is too high.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cartwright1995, author = {Cartwright, Nancy}, title = {"Precis of" Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {153-155}, keywords = {causality, epistemology, measurement, nature}, abstract = {Three levels of causal claims are pointed out: singular claims, causal laws, and ascriptions of capacities. Singular causal facts are primary. The relation between probabilities and causal laws cannot be characterized correctly without referring to such facts. Causal laws describe what causal relations obtain in specified situations. However generic causal claims are best thought of as ascriptions of capacities. Capacities describe what kinds of causal laws can obtain across different kinds of situations. If laws are mere regularities then all laws are "ceteris paribus" laws, hence causal law do not have the same fundamental status as ascriptions of capacities, since in order to get a regularity we must first have an arrangement with an appropriate capacity.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cartwright1995a, author = {Cartwright, Nancy}, title = {Reply to Eells, Humphreys and Morrison}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {177-187}, keywords = {experiment, gravity, nature, science, universal}, abstract = {Humphreys points out that only some theoretical activities within modern science are committed to abstraction and concretization and not science as a whole. Cartwright does not claim the contrary: The model of explanation by concretization can argue in favor of an ontology of tendencies only in domains that use its analytic method. Contrary to Morrison's concerns, capacity claims can be tested by looking for their characteristic contributions in well- understood settings. Furthermore, ascriptions of capacities need not be universal; they may hold across restricted domains. Eell's proposal of counterfactually- defined properties serves as well as singular causes in treating the probabilistic relation between a cause and its effect when intermediate factors appear. However this approach doesn't seem to work for the problem of mixed capacities.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cartwright1993, author = {Cartwright, Nancy}, title = {In Defence of This Worldly' Causality: Comments on Van Fraassen's "Laws and Symmetry"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {423-429}, keywords = {causality, epistemology, laws, nature}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Cartwright1999, author = {Cartwright, Nancy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {244-247}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science}, volume = {66(1)}, year = {1999} } @other{Casebier1991, author = {Casebier, Allan}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {486-488}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Film and Phenomenology}, volume = {54(2)}, year = {1991} } @article{CASEY1971, author = {CASEY, EDWARD-S}, title = {IMAGINATION: IMAGINING AND THE IMAGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {475-490}, keywords = {epistemology, image, imagination}, abstract = {IMAGINATION IS EXAMINED IN TWO OF ITS ESSENTIAL ASPECTS THROUGH A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS. IMAGINING IS DESCRIBED AS THE CONSCIOUS PROJECTION AND CONTEMPLATION OF OBJECTS POSITED AS PURE POSSIBILITIES. THE IMAGE IS THEN SEEN AS THE INDETERMINATE PRESENTATION OF AN IMAGINED OBJECT TO CONSCIOUSNESS. IMAGINED OBJECTS ARE SHOWN TO BE INDEPENDENT OF PERCEPTION. THESE OBJECTS, TOGETHER WITH THE IMAGE, FORM THE TOTAL INTENTIONAL CORRELATE OF THE ACT OF IMAGINING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cassam1997, author = {Cassam, Quassim}, title = {Subjects and Objects}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {643-648}, keywords = {consciousness, epistemology, kantianism, object, subject}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Cassam1997a, author = {Cassam, Quassim}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {711-714}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Self and World}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1997} } @article{CASTANEDA1985, author = {CASTANEDA, HECTOR-NERI}, title = {THE SEMANTICS AND THE CAUSAL ROLES OF PROPER NAMES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {91-114}, keywords = {language, meaning, phenomenology, proper-name; semantics}, abstract = {HERE IS A SOMEWHAT COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT OF PROPER NAMES AS THEY FUNCTION IN ORDINARY EXPERIENCE. IT IS THE "RESTRICTED-VARIABLE/RETRIEVAL VIEW OF PROPER NAMES". SINCE THE WAY ANY STANDARD PIECE OF LANGUAGE FUNCTIONS IN EXPERIENCE HINGES ON THE MEANING OF THAT PIECE OF LANGUAGE, WE ARE HERE CONCERNED BOTH WITH THE MAIN PRAGMATIC ROLES OF PROPER NAMES AND WITH THEIR FUNDAMENTAL SEMANTIC PROPERTIES. BECAUSE WE AIM AT COMPREHENSIVENESS, AS WELL AS CORRECTNESS, WE COLLECT RICH AND DIVERSIFIED DATA, CAPABLE OF EXHIBITING SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTUAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PATTERNS OF OUR USES OF PROPER NAMES; WE ALSO COLLECT RICH AND CAREFUL EXEGESIS SO AS TO DISTILL CRITERIA OF ADEQUACY THAT CAN GUIDE US IN DEVELOPING A GOOD ACCOUNT OF SUCH PATTERNS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASTANEDA1960, author = {CASTANEDA, HECTOR-NERI}, title = {IMPERATIVE REASONINGS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {21-49}, keywords = {end, imperatives, inference, logic, means, ought, truth-value; value}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE IS TO RE-EXAMINE "THE LOGIC OF IMPERATIVES," AND DISCUSS IN WHAT SENSE THERE ARE IMPERATIVE INFERENCES. CASTANEDA AGREES WITH R HARE, THAT THERE ARE LEGITIMATE IMPERATIVE INFERENCES. HE TRIES TO FORMULATE THE IMPERATIVE ANALOGUES OF TRUTH-VALUES, WHICH ARE INVOLVED IN THE VALIDITY OF IMPERATIVE INFERENCES. THE AUTHOR SUGGESTS AN INTIMATE CONNECTION BETWEEN IMPERATIVES AND (OUGHT) SENTENCES, AND FINALLY SHOWS THE LOGICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN IMPERATIVES, INDICATIVES AND (OUGHT) SENTENCES. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASTANEDA1962, author = {CASTANEDA, HECTOR-NERI}, title = {BAIER'S JUSTIFICATION OF THE RULES OF REASON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {366-373}, keywords = {ethics, justification, morality, reason, rule, satisfaction, self-interes}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASTANEDA1978, author = {CASTANEDA, HECTOR-NERI}, title = {CONFLICTS OF COMMITMENTS AND MORALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {564-574}, keywords = {act, commitment, conflict, decision, ethics, morality, motivation}, abstract = {THIS PAPER EXPLAINS THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF MORALITY, ESTABLISHING HOW SERIOUS THE STANDARD ERROR IS OF THINKING THAT THERE IS A UNIVOCAL ANSWER TO THE QUESTION: "WHAT OUGHT I MORALLY TO DO HERE NOW?" THE FACT IS THAT THERE ARE, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE, THREE DIFFERENT ANSWERS THAT THIS QUESTION CAN RECEIVE. MORALITY IS A COMPLEX SYSTEM OF THREE NORMATIVE SUB-SYSTEMS, INTERRELATED IN VERY INTRICATE WAYS, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT ONE MAY ENGAGE IN CHANGING ONE'S MORAL CODE. (THIS BUILT-IN DEMAND OF PROGRESS IS CHARACTERISTICALLY LEFT OUT OF MANY THEORIES OF MORALITY.) THAT COMPLEX STRUCTURE OF MORALITY IS EXPLAINED IN FULL IN CASTANEDA'S "THE STRUCTURE OF MORALITY". THE ARTICLE DEFENDS THE BOOK FROM TWO INTERESTING ATTACKS LAUNCHED BY A A COX IN HER "CASTANEDA'S THEORY OF MORALITY". COX'S CRITICISMS FORMULATE TWO EXCELLENT TESTS FOR ANY THEORY OF MORALITY, AND CASTANEDA'S THEORY PASSES THOSE TESTS WITH FLYING COLORS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASTANEDA1960a, author = {CASTANEDA, HECTOR-NERI}, title = {"7 + 5 = 12" AS A SYNTHETIC PROPOSITION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {141-158}, keywords = {arithmetic, logic, number, object, part, proposition, relation, synthetic}, abstract = {THE STUDY HERE DISCUSSES KANT'S CLAIM THAT (MOST) ARITHMETICAL PROPOSITIONS ARE SYNTHETIC, AND ELUCIDATES ITS TRUTH TOGETHER WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS VIEW THAT NUMBERS ARE RELATIONS OF OBJECTS TO THEIR PARTS. THIS UNFASHIONABLE VIEW AND KANT'S INSIGHTS ARE DEVELOPED MORE COMPLETELY. THE AUTHOR FORMULATES KANT'S IDEA OF A SYNTHETIC PROPOSITION, PROVIDES A TEST FOR DECIDING WHETHER A PROPOSITION IS SYNTHETIC OR NOT, AND ARGUES FOR THE PLAUSIBILITY OF KANT'S VIEWS OF ORDINARY ARITHMETIC PROPOSITIONS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASTELL1972, author = {CASTELL, ALBUREY}, title = {THE STATUS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL CAUSATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {403-407}, keywords = {causation, metaphysics, presupposition}, abstract = {THE STATEMENT THAT EVERY EVENT HAS A CAUSE, IS AN ABSOLUTE PRESUPPOSITION. IT IS A MARK OF ABSOLUTE PRESUPPOSITIONS THAT THEY ARE NOT TESTABLE, NOT FALSIFIABLE, NOT CONTROVERTIBLE, NOT DISCOVERABLE. YOU CAN, OF COURSE, DISCOVER THAT YOU PRESUPPOSE THEM ABSOLUTELY. SO LONG AS THEY ARE PRESUPPOSED, THEY PROVIDE A LAUNCHING PAD FOR QUESTION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Caston1998, author = {Caston, Victor}, title = {Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {249-298}, keywords = {existence, intentionality, metaphysics}, abstract = {Aristotle not only formulates the problem of intentionality explicitly, he makes a solution to it a requirement for any adequate theory of mind. His own solution, however, is not to be found in his theory of sensation, as Brentano and others have thought. In fact, it is precisely because Aristotle regards this theory as inadequate that he goes on to argue for a distinct new ability he calls "phantasia." The theory of content he develops on this basis (unlike Brentano's) is profoundly naturalistic: it is a representational theory, formulated in terms of the causal powers and physical magnitudes of the body.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Casullo1992, author = {Casullo, Albert}, title = {Causality, Reliabilism, and Mathematical Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {557-584}, keywords = {causality, logic, mathematics, reliabilism}, abstract = {Paul Benacerraf has argued that plausible causal constraints on knowledge preclude the possibility of knowledge of statements whose truth conditions involve abstract entities. There are two prevalent replies for this charge. The first is to maintain that if the causal constraints are correctly understood they do not preclude knowledge of abstract entities. The second is to maintain that an adequate account of knowledge does not involve the problematic causal constraints. The primary purpose of this paper is to argue that neither reply succeeds.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASULLO1989, author = {CASULLO, ALBERT}, title = {PERCEPTUAL SPACE IS MONADIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {131-134}, keywords = {metaphysics, monadic, perception, space, visualization}, abstract = {IN A RECENT PAPER, I DEFENDED THE "MONADIC THEORY" OF PERCEPTUAL SPACE: (MT) OBJECTS IN THE VISUAL FIELD HAVE THEIR LOCATION BY VIRTUE OF MONADIC POSITIONAL PROPERTIES. THE DEFENSE INVOLVED (A) RESPONDING TO SOME OBJECTIONS; AND (B) OFFERING AN INDEPENDENT ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE THEORY. LORNE FALKENSTEIN OFFERS TWO OBJECTIONS TO MY DEFENSE OF (MT). HE MAINTAINS THAT A PURELY RELATIONAL ACCOUNT OF LOCATIONS IN VISUAL SPACE IS POSSIBLE AND THAT MY ACCOUNT INVOLVES A TACIT RELIANCE ON SPATIAL RELATIONS. IN THIS PAPER I ARGUE THAT THESE OBJECTIONS ARE NOT CONVINCING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASULLO1987, author = {CASULLO, ALBERT}, title = {A DEFENSE OF SENSE-DATA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {45-61}, keywords = {event, metaphysics, sense-dat}, abstract = {IN RECENT YEARS, THE SENSE-DATUM ACCOUNT OF VISUAL EXPERIENCE HAS FALLEN INTO DISFAVOR. THE PRIMARY REASON FOR ITS DEMISE IS THE WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT THE ADVERBIAL APPROACH PROVIDES AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY WHICH ACCOMMODATES THE DATA OF VISUAL EXPERIENCE AS WELL AS THE SENSE-DATUM THEORY BUT HAS THE ADVANTAGES OF BEING A SIMPLER THEORY AND ONE WHICH AVOIDS SOME PUZZLING PROBLEMS FACED BY ITS COMPETITOR. HOWEVER, THE VERSIONS OF THE ADVERBIAL THEORY DEVELOPED BY ITS TWO LEADING PROPONENTS, R M CHISHOLM AND WILFRID SELLARS, FACE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. CONSEQUENTLY, MICHAEL TYE HAS RECENTLY ATTEMPTED TO DEVELOP A NEW VERSION OF THE THEORY WHICH AVOIDS THESE DIFFICULTIES. THE PRIMARY GOAL OF THIS PAPER IS TO SHOW THAT THE SENSE-DATUM THEORY IS SUPERIOR TO THIS LATEST VERSION OF THE ADVERBIAL THEORY IN A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT WAYS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Casullo2001, author = {Casullo, Albert}, title = {Experiment and A Priori Justification}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(3)}, pages = {665-671}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology, justification, reason}, abstract = {Laurence BonJour's In Defense of Pure Reason is rich and challenging. It offers a tightly integrated attack on empiricism and defense of rationalism. The tight texture of argument makes it difficult to isolate and assess specific aspects of the book in a brief discussion. My goal is to examine the role of experience in BonJour's conception of a priori justification.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASULLO1986, author = {CASULLO, ALBERT}, title = {THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF PERCEPTUAL SPACE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {665-671}, keywords = {epistemology, individuation, monads, perception, space}, abstract = {IT IS GENERALLY TAKEN FOR GRANTED THAT THE STRUCTURE OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE IS RELATIONAL IN CHARACTER. THIS VIEW IS USUALLY CONTRASTED WITH SUBSTANTIVAL THEORIES WHICH VIEW SPACE AS A KIND OF SUBSTANCE WHOSE EXISTENCE IS IN NO WAY DEPENDENT ON THE OBJECTS WHICH OCCUPY IT AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME. GIVEN THE PREVALENCE OF THE RELATIONAL VIEW OF PHYSICAL SPACE, IT IS NATURAL TO SUPPOSE THAT PERCEPTUAL SPACE HAS A SIMILAR STRUCTURE. BERTRAND RUSSELL AND NELSON GOODMAN HAVE ARGUED THAT THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF THE VISUAL FIELD IS NOT RELATIONAL IN CHARACTER. WHAT IS PARTICULARLY STRIKING ABOUT THEIR VIEW IS THAT THEY DO NOT ADOPT A SUBSTANTIVAL VIEW OF PERCEPTUAL SPACE BUT HOLD, INSTEAD, THAT OBJECTS IN THE VISUAL FIELD HAVE THEIR LOCATION BY VIRTUE OF "MONADIC POSITIONAL PROPERTIES". THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO DEFEND THE MONADIC THEORY OF PERCEPTUAL SPACE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASULLO1988, author = {CASULLO, ALBERT}, title = {REVISABILITY, RELIABILISM, AND A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {187-213}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology, reliability, revision}, abstract = {A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN UNDERSTOOD AS KNOWLEDGE WHICH IS INDEPENDENT OF EXPERIENTIAL EVIDENCE. MANY PHILOSOPHERS REJECT THE CLAIM THAT THERE IS SUCH KNOWLEDGE. ONE PROMINENT LINE OF ATTACK HAS BEEN FORCEFULLY DEVELOPED BY HILARY PUTNAM. IT BEGINS BY ANALYZING THE NOTION OF A STATEMENT KNOWN A PRIORI AS ONE WHICH IS RATIONALLY UNREVISABLE. PEIRCE'S CELEBRATED DOCTRINE OF FALLIBILISM IS THEN INVOKED IN SUPPORT OF THE CLAIM THAT NO STATEMENTS ARE RATIONALLY UNREVISABLE. THIS LINE OF ATTACK RAISES A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE. IS THERE ANY GOOD REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE ENTAILS RATIONAL UNREVISABILITY? THIS PAPER DISTINGUISHES TWO VERSIONS OF THIS THESIS AND ARGUES THAT BOTH SHOULD BE REJECTED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CASULLO1977, author = {CASULLO, ALBERT}, title = {THE DEFINITION OF A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {220-224}, keywords = {a-priori; epistemology, intuition, knowledge, proposition, self-eviden}, abstract = {IN HIS PAPER "THE A PRIORI--A POSTERIORI DISTINCTION," DAVID W BENFIELD OFFERS A DEFINITION OF A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE WHICH HAS THE CONSEQUENCE THAT "ALL" NONINFERENTIAL KNOWLEDGE IS A PRIORI. I ARGUE THAT BENFIELD'S DEFENSE OF THIS POSITION DEPENDS ON HIS FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITIONS AS OPPOSED TO PROPOSITIONS WHICH ARE BELIEVED ON THE BASIS OF NO EVIDENCE. I ALSO OFFER AN ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION OF A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE WHICH IS BOTH FAITHFUL TO THE TRADITIONAL MEANING OF THIS TERM AND DOES NOT HAVE THE CONSEQUENCE THAT ALL NONINFERENTIAL KNOWLEDGE IS A PRIORI.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CATALANO1990, author = {CATALANO, JOSEPH-S}, title = {Successfully Lying to Oneself: A Sartrean Perspective.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {673-693}, keywords = {bad-faith; lying, self-deception; twentieth}, abstract = {The crux of the argument is a distinction between a thetic and nonthetic consciousness. The point is that, for Sartre, translucency does not imply a thetic, or delineated, conceptual awareness. It is thus possible to be nonthetically aware of one's behavior, and still misrepresent this awareness conceptually to oneself. Beyond this, it is also possible to frame one's conceptual misrepresentations so that one eventually believes in them. Tension, of course, exists, but it is conceived by the individual to be the "normal" tension experienced by everyone.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CAWS1962, author = {CAWS, PETER}, title = {THE PARADOX OF INDUCTION AND THE INDUCTIVE WAGER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {512-520}, keywords = {future, induction, inference, justification, logic, paradox, self-referenc}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CERF1962, author = {CERF, WALTER}, title = {STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {537-558}, keywords = {dreaming, mental-act; mind, motivation, perception, philosophical-anthropology; psychology, social-sciences; text}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CERF1963, author = {CERF, WALTER}, title = {'IN A STATE'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {174-194}, keywords = {actuality, language, linguistic-analysis; mood, potentiality, state, statement}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chakrabarti1992, author = {Chakrabarti, Arindam}, title = {I Touch What I Saw}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(1)}, pages = {103-116}, keywords = {metaphysics, nyaya, object, realism, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chakrabarti1994, author = {Chakrabarti, Arindam}, title = {Testimony: A Philosophical Study}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {965-972}, keywords = {god, history, knowledge, language, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHAKRABARTI1976, author = {CHAKRABARTI, KISOR-KUMAR}, title = {SOME COMPARISONS BETWEEN FREGE'S LOGIC AND NAVYA-NYAYA LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {554-563}, keywords = {indian, logic, reference, sense}, abstract = {THE PAPER HAS THREE PARTS. THE FIRST PART DEALS WITH FREGE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENSE AND REFERENCE OF PROPER NAMES AND A SIMILAR DISTINCTION IN NAVYA-NYAYA LOGIC. IN THE SECOND PART WE HAVE COMPARED FREGE'S DEFINITION OF NUMBER TO THE NAVYA-NYAYA DEFINITION OF NUMBER. IN THE THIRD PART WE HAVE SHOWN HOW THE 'RUSSELL PARADOX' WHICH EXPOSED A CONTRADICTION IN FREGE'S NAIVE SET THEORY COULD BE AVOIDED IF AN INJUNCTION OF NAVYA-NYAYA LOGIC WERE FOLLOWED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chalmers1999, author = {Chalmers, David-J}, title = {Precis of The Conscious Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {435-438}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, mind, psychology, world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chalmers1999a, author = {Chalmers, David-J}, title = {Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {473-496}, keywords = {epistemology, materialism, metaphysics, modality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chalmers2004, author = {Chalmers, David-J}, title = {Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {182-190}, keywords = {imagination, indexicality, intension, metaphysics, zombie}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHANDRA1981, author = {CHANDRA, SURESH}, title = {WITTGENSTEIN AND STRAWSON ON THE ASCRIPTION OF EXPERIENCES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {280-298}, keywords = {ascription, experience, metaphysics, person}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chang2001, author = {Chang, Ruth}, title = {Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {447-453}, keywords = {action, ethics, morality, reasons}, abstract = {On a 'comparative' conception of practical reasons, reasons are like 'weights' that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a 'toggle' conception of practical reasons; something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert's conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception--his central claim that actions can be rational without there being reasons for them--does not require adoption of the toggle conception. The more intuitive comparative conception of reasons for action can accommodate the insight.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHARLESWORTH1970, author = {CHARLESWORTH, JAMES-H}, title = {REFLECTIONS ON MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF "WORD".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {609-613}, keywords = {language, meaning, phenomenology, word}, abstract = {THE DISCUSSION IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS: THE FIRST IS A DIALOGUE WITH MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING WORDS, AND THE SECOND CONTAINS A FEW OF CHARLESWORTH'S OWN REFLECTIONS ON THE SUBJECT. CHARLESWORTH AGREES WITH MERLEAU-PONTY THAT 'THOUGHT' AND 'WORD' ARE INSEPARABLE, THAT LANGUAGE IS THE SPEAKER TAKING A POSITION IN THE WORLD OF MEANINGS, AND THAT WORDS HAVE A PHYSIOGNOMY. IN THE SECOND SECTION CHARLESWORTH SUGGESTS THAT WORDS ARE LIVING ORGANISMS, HAVE HOOKS, APPEAR AND ARE NOT CHOSEN, ARE SEEN FROM A LIMITED PERSPECTIVE, LINKED THROUGH THOUGHT WITH THE PRECEDING AND SUCCEEDING WORD, AND ARE BOTH MEANS AND ENDS. FINALLY, IT IS STATED THAT "WE ARE WORDS" IN THE SENSE THAT WHEN WE SPEAK ORIGINALLY WE DO NOT CHOOSE WORDS; THEY SHOW THEMSELVES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHARLSON1964, author = {CHARLSON, PRICE}, title = {THE BEHAVIOR OF QUALITIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {233-238}, keywords = {aesthetics, art-object; expressiveness, quality, taste}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chase2004, author = {Chase, James}, title = {Indicator Reliabilism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(1)}, pages = {115-137}, keywords = {consequentialism, epistemology, reliabilism, rule}, abstract = {In "Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology" Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of epistemic access, and use this to present an analysis of justification as an indicator concept we use to track how well the evaluated agent is doing with respect to the primary epistemic norm of believing truths and not falsehoods. A theory of justification along these lines is then given, and its prospects of handling the evil demon objection to reliabilism are assessed.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHATTERJEE1969, author = {CHATTERJEE, MARGARET}, title = {LANGUAGE AS PHENOMENON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {116-121}, keywords = {language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHATTOPADHYAYA1971, author = {CHATTOPADHYAYA, D-P}, title = {COPERNICUS BETRAYED.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {57-63}, keywords = {modern}, abstract = {KANT THOUGHT THAT THE BEST WAY TO JUSTIFY NEWTONIAN PHYSICS IS TO SHOW (HUMAN) UNDERSTANDING MAKES NATURE POSSIBLE AND THAT OBJECTIVITY OF SCIENTIFIC OBJECTS CAN BE SAFELY SECURED IF ITS ORIGIN CAN BE STRESSED TO UNIVERSAL (INTER-SUBJECTIVE) MIND. A CRITIC OF CLASSICAL RATIONALISM AND THE EXPONENT OF CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY, KANT IN HIS BID TO DEFEND SCIENCE OVER DID HIS WORK. HE CREDITS HUMAN UNDERSTANDING WITH AN INFALLIBLE (I.E. UNIVERSAL AND NECESSARY) AUTHORSHIP OF NATURE, WHILE THE HISTORY OF NATURAL SCIENCE SPEAKS OF A DIFFERENT STORY, - STORY OF GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. HUMAN MIND MAY PROPOSE A PRIORI WHAT NATURE IS LIKE, BUT IT IS ALWAYS LIABLE TO BE DISPOSED OF BY WHAT NATURE IN ITSELF IS. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE MAY BE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI BUT NOT NECESSARILY VALID.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHAUDHURY1962, author = {CHAUDHURY, PRAVAS-JIVAN}, title = {NEWTON AND HYPOTHESIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {344-353}, keywords = {explanation, hypothesis, phenomena, physical-sciences; science, scientific-method; system}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE HERE IS A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF NEWTON'S VIEW OF THE ROLE OF HYPOTHESES IN PHYSICAL SCIENCE. IT IS MAINTAINED THAT AN HYPOTHESIS SUPPOSES SOME PHYSICAL ENTITY OR MECHANISM BEHIND SOME PHENOMENON TO EXPLAIN THE LATTER; THESE CAUSAL AGENCIES BEHIND THE PHENOMENA ARE THE CRUX OF SERIOUS HYPOTHESES IN THE PRACTICED METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE. HOWEVER, NEWTON AS A PERSON WAS AFRAID OF CONTROVERSY AND EXPOSURE, AND BECAUSE OF HIS ABNORMAL MENTAL COMPLEXES AND PERSONALITY, WHAT HE TALKED ABOUT WAS REALLY DESCRIPTION (QUANTITATIVE LAWS OF OBSERVED EVENTS); THIS WAS SAFER. SO, AS THE SCIENTIST, HE WORKED NORMALLY, BUT AS THE MAN, WRITING ABOUT HIS WORK (MOSTLY IN CONTROVERSY WITH CRITICS) HE DEVIATED FROM A CORRECT GRASP AND EXPRESSION OF WHAT HE WAS DOING--THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHENG1968, author = {CHENG, CHUNG-YING}, title = {REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VALIDITY OF INDUCTION: AN EXAMINATION OF CHARLES PEIRCE'S THEORY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {392-402}, keywords = {induction, logic}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHERRY1986, author = {CHERRY, CHRISTOPHER}, title = {MINE AND MATTERING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {297-304}, keywords = {mental-states; metaphysics, personal-identit}, abstract = {MANY HAVE SUPPOSED THAT FOR EACH AND EVERY PERSON, HIS "OWN" STATES (PAIN, PLEASURE, ETC.) MUST MATTER MORE THAN THOSE OF ANY OTHER. THIS SUPPOSITION, WHICH IS AT BEST OBSCURE AND AT WORST FALSE, UNDERLIES MUCH WRITING ON EGOISM AND ALTRUISM. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN EPISTEMOLOGICAL CLAIMS TO THE EFFECT THAT PERSONS HAVE 'SPECIAL ACCESS' TO THEIR OWN, AND ONLY THEIR OWN, STATES, AND BROADLY "ETHICAL" CLAIMS ABOUT THE ROLE SUCH STATES MUST OR MAY HAVE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE MORAL LIVES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHERRY1980, author = {CHERRY, CHRISTOPHER}, title = {HOW DIFFERENCES MAKE A DIFFERENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {41}, pages = {64-92}, keywords = {activity, difference, equality, social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cheyne1997, author = {Cheyne, Colin}, title = {Getting in Touch with Numbers: Intuition and Mathematical Platonism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {111-125}, keywords = {intuition, logic, mathematics, number, platonism}, abstract = {Mathematics is about numbers, sets, functions, etc. and according to one prominent view, these are abstract entities lacking causal powers and spatio-temporal location. If this is so, then it is a puzzle how we come to have knowledge of such remote entities. One suggestion is intuition. But 'intuition' covers a range of notions. This paper identifies and examines those varieties of intuition which are most likely to play a role in the acquisition of our mathematical knowledge, and argues that none of them, singly or in combination, can plausibly account for knowledge of abstract entities.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Chihara1998, author = {Chihara, Charles-S}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {483-486}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Worlds of Possibility: Modal Realism and the Semantics of Modal Logic}, volume = {63(2)}, year = {1998} } @other{Child1994, author = {Child, William}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {711-715}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Causality, Interpretation and the Mind}, volume = {58(3)}, year = {1994} } @article{CHIPMAN1973, author = {CHIPMAN, LAUCHLAN}, title = {THINGS IN THEMSELVES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {489-502}, keywords = {appearance, modern, noumena}, abstract = {AN ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE AN ELUCIDATION AND QUALIFIED DEFENCE OF KANT'S NOTION OF A THING IN ITSELF, AS IT FIGURES IN HIS "CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON AND THE PROLEGOMENA". IT IS ARGUED THAT A THING IN ITSELF IS A THING INSOFAR AS IT IS NOT EXHAUSTED BY ITS ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL APPEARINGS. SO UNDERSTOOD, IT IS A NOTION WHICH HAS A PLACE IN OUR ORDINARY CONCEPTUAL SCHEME. FURTHERMORE IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAKE SENSE OF KANT'S CLAIM THAT THE CATEGORIES DO NOT APPLY TO THINGS IN THEMSELVES: FOR SOME OF THE CATEGORIES KANT'S CLAIM IS TRUE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chisholm1994, author = {Chisholm, Roderick-M}, title = {Ontologically Dependent Entities}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {499-507}, keywords = {epistemology, ontology, space}, abstract = {A discussion of the distinction between ontologically dependent and ontologically non- dependent entities presupposes a general theory of categories. I assume that there are four basic types of entity: states; contingent individuals; "abstracta"; and necessary substance. A theory of categories may be formulated by making use of the following undefined philosophical locations: 1) x "exemplifies" y; 2) x is "necessarily" such that it is F; 3) x is a "constituent" of y; 4) x is a "state" of y; and 5) the intentional concept of "believing".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHISHOLM1969, author = {CHISHOLM, RODERICK-M}, title = {ON THE OBSERVABILITY OF THE SELF.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {7-21}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, self}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHISHOLM1991, author = {CHISHOLM, Roderick-M}, title = {Firth and the Ethics of Belief.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, ethics, normative}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHISHOLM1969a, author = {CHISHOLM, RODERICK-M}, title = {ON A PRINCIPLE OF EPISTEMIC PREFERABILITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {294-301}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, logic, preference}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHISHOLM1964, author = {CHISHOLM, RODERICK-M}, title = {BELIEVING AND INTENTIONALITY: A REPLY TO MR LUCE AND MR SLEIGH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {266-269}, keywords = {believing, existence, inference, intentionality, logic, mental}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHISHOLM1963, author = {CHISHOLM, RODERICK-M}, title = {NOTES ON THE LOGIC OF BELIEVING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {195-201}, keywords = {believing, error, intentionality, logic, modal-logic; psychology, statement}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CHO1990, author = {CHO, Kah-Kyung}, title = {Phenomenology as Cooperative Task: Husserl-Farber Correspondence during 1936-37.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {metaphysics, phenomenology}, abstract = {Both Farber's straightforward questions and Husserl's unusually detailed answers documented in this article deserve their place in the annals of phenomenology. Husserl denies a critic's charge that he "borrowed" Brentano's ideas, and he gives a standard phenomenologist answer to the questions of historical materialism and "evolutionary" philosophy. We also learn why instead of a translation of Logical Investigations, as Husserl wished, its commentary version, The Foundations of Phenomenology, came into our hands. While Husserl exhorts his American followers to cooperate under the aspect of eternity, he also reveals his worries, as "a nationally ostracized man," and as a father.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Chomsky1998, author = {Chomsky, Noam}, title = {Comments: Galen Strawson, Mental Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {437-441}, keywords = {mental, metaphysics, reality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Christensen1997, author = {Christensen, Carleton-B}, title = {Meaning Things and Meaning Others}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {495-522}, keywords = {meaning, metaphysics, ontology, phenomenology}, abstract = {At least phenomenologically the way communicative acts reveal intentions is different from the way noncommunicative acts do this: the former have an "addressed" character which the latter do not. The paper argues that this difference is a real one, reflecting the irreducibly "conventional" character of human communication. It attempts to show this through a critical analysis of the Gricean program and its methodologically individualist attempt to explain the "conventional" as derivative from the "nonconventional." It is shown how in order to eliminate certain counterexamples the Gricean analysis of utterer's meaning must be made self-referential. It is then shown how this in turn admits an "ontological difference" which undercuts all methodological individualism: meaning something by an utterance must then have a certain intrinsic, irreducible "conventionality" and "intersubjectivity."(edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Christensen1993, author = {Christensen, Carleton-B}, title = {Sense, Subject and Horizon}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {749-779}, keywords = {horizon, intentionality, metaphysics, phenomenology, sense, subject}, abstract = {Husserl's concept of (inner) horizon is interpreted as containing an intriguing conception of perceptual experience in which "concepts", abilities to act and capacities of imagination mesh with one another. As thus interpreted, the concept insinuates a non- Cartesian picture of the subject, object and act of perceptual experience. Husserl's conception of phenomenology, transcendental reduction and intentionality are sketched. Objections to the interpretation are dealt with by rejecting the overly Cartesian picture of transcendental reduction underlying them. The paper concludes by indicating a criticism Husserl can rightly make of Frege.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Christensen1993a, author = {Christensen, David}, title = {Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {301-321}, keywords = {epistemology, language, scepticism, semantics}, abstract = {Semantical answers to the skeptic have attracted much attention recently. They strike many as suspect, roughly because they seem to use purely linguistic considerations to answer substantive questions about the extralinguistic world. I defend the legitimacy of this anti-skeptical strategy, showing that the worries that have been expressed about it in the literature are without foundation. I then argue that precisely this sort of anti-skeptical argument must play a crucial role in epistemology. It provides our only defense against a very simple form of skeptical challenge which would, if unchecked, undermine our knowledge in virtually every area.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Christensen1998, author = {Christensen, Wayne and Hooker, Cliff-A}, title = {Churchland Symposium}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {871-878}, keywords = {ethics, metaphysics, mind, morality}, abstract = {Churchland holds that, instead of being a serial symbol-processing computational system, the mind is a vector-transforming parallel neural net (nnet) operating nonformally, subconceptually and subpersonally. While sympathetic to his general thrust, we argue that Churchland has not paid sufficient attention to what constitutes a dynamical account of mind: he has a crucially ambiguous notion of computation; treats nnets as computational modules, separable from perception-action-environment interaction cycles; treats nnets as associationist blocks without the directive, regulatory organization crucial to life and intelligence; and provides no account of functional, especially cognitive, normativity, nor of its roots in the management of interaction.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Christiano2005, author = {Christiano, Thomas}, title = {Democracy and Bureaucracy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {211-217}, keywords = {autonomy, democracy, policy, political-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Churchl1999, author = {Churchland, Paul-M}, title = {Densmore and Dennett on Virtual Machines and Consciousness}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {763-767}, keywords = {consciousness, epistemology, machine}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Churchl1993, author = {Churchland, Paul-M}, title = {State-Space Semantics and Meaning Holism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {667-672}, keywords = {holism, language, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Churchl1992, author = {Churchland, Paul-M}, title = {Activation Vectors versus Propositional Attitudes: How the Brain Represents Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {419-424}, keywords = {attitude, brain, epistemology, reality, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Churchl2004, author = {Churchland, Paul-M}, title = {Philosophy of Mind Meets Logical Theory: Perry on Neo-Dualism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {199-206}, keywords = {knowledge, materialism, metaphysics, modality, zombie}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Churchl1998, author = {Churchland, Paul-M}, title = {Precis of The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {859-863}, keywords = {brain, consciousness, metaphysics, soul}, abstract = {This book aims to make the current elements of empirical neuroscience and the current techniques of artificial neural network modelling available to a wide academic and popular audience. Its second aim is to draw out the consequences of these developments for a variety of familiar philosophical issues, and for a variety of social, moral, legal, and technological issues. In particular, it proposes to sketch a positive account of the many dimensions of consciousness--such as qualia, attention, imagination, and dreaming--in neurocomputational terms. I have tried to write the most accessible and pictorial introduction to connectionism possible.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Churchl1998a, author = {Churchland, Paul-M}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {893-904}, keywords = {ethics, metaphysics, virtue}, abstract = {To MacIntyre (on Virtues and Rules), I reply that behavior-guiding rules are neither necessary nor effective in explaining the moral competence of normal humans. Slowly-acquired perceptual and social skills provide a better explanation. To Christensen & Hooker (on Regulatory Systems and the Dynamics of Science), I concede that regulatory mechanisms at the social level are integral to a proper account of scientific cognition. To Shapere (on Creativity in Science), I insist that the novel redeployment of existing explanatory prototypes can indeed account for all historical cases of scientific creativity. And to Philipse (on Theory Ladenness and Folk Psychology), I defend an updated (connectionist) holism on meaning and content, which leads us straight back to the theory-laden character of commonsense knowledge, and the replaceability of folk psychology.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Cioffi1998, author = {Cioffi, Frank}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {730-732}, publisher = {Open Court}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience}, volume = {62(3)}, year = {1998} } @article{CLACK1973, author = {CLACK, R-JEROLD}, title = {CHISHOLM AND HUME ON OBSERVING THE SELF.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {33}, pages = {338-348}, keywords = {metaphysics, self}, abstract = {CHISHOLM HAS RECENTLY ATTACKED HUME'S VIEW THAT THE SELF IS UNOBSERVABLE. I ARGUE, CONTRA CHISHOLM, (1) THAT HUME DID NOT MAKE A CONCEPTUAL ERROR IN HIS NOTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES THE IDEA OF THE SELF, (2) THAT HUME DID NOT CONTRADICT HIMSELF IN ASSERTING THAT HE (A SELF) CANNOT LOCATE HIS SELF WITHIN EXPERIENCE, AND (3) THAT AWARENESS OF PARTICULAR MENTAL DATA DOES NOT ENTAIL SELF-AWARENESS. I CONCLUDE THAT NEITHER CHISHOLM NOR HUME EXHIBITS AWARENESS OF THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF SELF-OBSERVATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Clark1993, author = {Clark, Austen}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {245-246}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Sensory Qualities}, volume = {56(1)}, year = {1993} } @other{Clark1990, author = {Clark, Maudemarie}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {229-233}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy}, volume = {54(1)}, year = {1990} } @article{Clark2000, author = {Clark, Philip}, title = {What Goes without Saying in Metaethics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {357-379}, keywords = {belief, ethics, explanation, metaethics}, abstract = {Reflection on the nature of practical thought has led some philosophers to hold that some beliefs have a necessary influence on the will. Reflection on the nature of motivational explanation has led other philosophers to say that no belief can motivate without the assistance of a background desire. This way of thinking, I argue, is directly responsible for the deadlock between Humeans like Donald Davidson and Michael Smith, and anti-Humeans like Thomas Nagel and John McDowell. But there is an antidote. The traditional Greek conception of practical reason gives us an attractive way of holding both that all beliefs require assistance and that certain beliefs entail a disposition of the will. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Clark2004, author = {Clark, Philip}, title = {Kantian Morals and Humean Motives}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {109-126}, keywords = {amoralism, ethics, moral-imperative; moral-judgment; motivation}, abstract = {The idea that moral imperatives are categorical is commonly used to support internalist claims about moral judgment. I argue that the categorical quality of moral requirements shows at most that moral motivation need not flow from a background desire to be moral. It does not show that moral judgments can motivate by themselves, or that amoralism is impossible.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CLEMENTS1979, author = {CLEMENTS, COLLEEN}, title = {DEATH AND PHILOSOPHICAL DIVERSIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {524-536}, keywords = {death, personal-identity; philosophical-anthropolog}, abstract = {THREE AREAS ARE DEALT WITH: (1) THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF 'DEATH' INVOLVING MAJOR PHILOSOPHIC ISSUES, E.G., THE IDENTITY PROBLEM; (2) THE STATEMENT OF THE ACTUAL VITAL PROBLEMS MASKED BY CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS BUT WELL-UNDERSTOOD BY THE HUMAN POPULATION, BORROWING FROM NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER AND SARTRE; (3) ONE ALTERNATIVE FOR COPING WITH THE EMPIRICAL DATA OF DEATH, USING A SYSTEMS THEORY MODEL. A SYSTEMS CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL AND MODERN THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DEFENSES AGAINST FACING THIS REALITY IS GIVEN. THE DISCUSSION IS A VARIATION ON THE OLD THEME OF CHANGE OPPOSED TO PERMANENCE, CHAOS (POSITIVE ENTROPY) OPPOSED TO STABLE FORM (NEGATIVE ENTROPY), CONTINGENCY OPPOSED TO NECESSITY, FRAMED IN HUMAN TERMS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cling2003, author = {Cling, Andrew-D}, title = {Self-Supporting Arguments}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {279-303}, keywords = {inductive-logic; justification, language, logic, scepticism}, abstract = {Deductive and inductive logic confront this skeptical challenge: we can justify any logical principle only by means of an argument but we can acquire justification by means of an argument only if we are already justified in believing some logical principle. We could solve this problem if probative arguments do not require justified belief in their corresponding conditionals. For if not, then inferential justification would not require justified belief in any logical principle. So even arguments whose corresponding conditionals are epistemically dependent upon their conclusions--epistemically self-supporting arguments--need not be viciously circular. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Cockburn1997, author = {Cockburn, David}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {485-488}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future}, volume = {61(2)}, year = {1997} } @article{CODE1984, author = {CODE, LORRAINE}, title = {TOWARD A 'RESPONSIBILIST' EPISTEMOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {29-50}, keywords = {epistemology, foundationalism, intellectual-virtue; responsibility}, abstract = {IN THIS PAPER I PROPOSE THAT ONE WAY OF CIRCUMNAVIGATING THE CURRENT IMPASSE IN EPISTEMOLOGY, WHERE NEITHER FOUNDATIONALISM NOR COHERENTISM SEEMS TO BE ABLE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE, IS TO CONSTRUCT A THEORY IN WHICH THE EPISTEMIC CHARACTER OF WOULD-BE KNOWERS ACQUIRES GREATLY INCREASED EPISTEMOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE. IN EFFECT, THIS WOULD BE AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE, WHOSE MODES OF REASONING WOULD BE ANALOGOUS TO, THOUGH NOT DERIVATIVE FROM, AN ETHICS OF MORAL VIRTUE. GRANTING SUCH SIGNIFICANCE TO THE CHARACTER OF KNOWING SUBJECTS IS NOT A MATTER OF PROVIDING ALTERNATIVE FOUNDATIONS TO THOSE WHICH HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES TO BE EITHER ELUSIVE OR INADEQUATE, OR BOTH. THIS, RATHER, IS A PROPOSAL FOR AN ALTERNATIVE, BUT COMPLEMENTARY, ROUTE TO THE EVALUATION OF KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS. HERE I ELABORATE THE GENERAL FEATURES OF SUCH A POSITION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Code1991, author = {Code, Lorraine}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {495-496}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {What Can She Know?}, volume = {54(2)}, year = {1991} } @article{COHEN1984, author = {COHEN, ELLIOT-D}, title = {REASON AND EXPERIENCE IN LOCKE'S EPISTEMOLOGY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {71-86}, keywords = {epistemology, experience, reason}, abstract = {LOCKE IS FREQUENTLY CALLED AN EMPIRICIST. HOWEVER, THE ROLES OF REASON AND EXPERIENCE IN LOCKE'S EPISTEMOLOGY HAVE, THEREBY, BEEN OBSCURED. IN THIS PAPER, DIFFERENT SENSES OF "EMPIRICISM" AND "RATIONALISM" ARE DISTINGUISHED, AND RELEVANT PASSAGES FROM LOCKE'S WRITINGS ARE SCRUTINIZED FOR PURPOSES OF EXPLICATING HIS EPISTEMOLOGY. THROUGH THIS EXAMINATION, IT IS SEEN THAT LOCKE, LIKE KANT, SEEKS A "REASON-EXPERIENCE SYNTHESIS" AND THAT THE BLANKET LABEL "EMPIRICIST," AS APPLIED TO LOCKE, IS MOST UNFORTUNATE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cohen2000, author = {Cohen, Jonathan}, title = {Analyticity and Katz's New Intensionalism: Or, If You Sever Sense from Reference, Analyticity Is Cheap but Useless}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {115-135}, keywords = {analyticity, epistemology, intensionalism, reference}, abstract = {This paper argues that Katz's program cannot succeed. Because he rejects the Fregean thesis, Katz ends up with an impoverished account of analyticity incapable of doing the work Katz (or anyone else) requires of it. If this is right, then we have no reason to endorse Katz's idiosyncratic notions of sense and analyticity over their traditional competitors. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COHEN1991, author = {COHEN, L-Jonathan}, title = {Stephen P. Stich, "The Fragmentation of Reason".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {cognitive, epistemology, process, rationality}, abstract = {Stich objects to founding any rule of inference on an appeal to reflective equilibrium. But Stich fails to see that, if we think that someone has a really absurd and unacceptable rule of inference, it cannot have properly passed his reflective equilibrium test, because we always suppose that he has principles by reference to which we can teach him his error. Nor can we accept Stich's own attempt to found rules of inference on considerations of utility it is possible for a cognitive principle to be an intellectual error even if a pragmatically useful one.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cohen2002, author = {Cohen, Stewart}, title = {Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {309-329}, keywords = {epistemology, evidence, knowledge, reliability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cohen1998, author = {Cohen, Stewart}, title = {Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {143-159}, keywords = {argument, epistemology, knowledge, premise, scepticism}, abstract = {This paper compares two kinds of epistemic principles--an underdetermination principle and a deductive closure principle. It argues that each principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical argument. It examines the logical relations between the premises of the two kinds of skeptical argument and concludes that the deductive closure argument cannot be refuted without refuting the underdetermination argument. The underdetermination argument, however, can be refuted without refuting the deductive closure argument. In this respect, the deductive closure argument is the stronger of the two.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cohen2003, author = {Cohen, Stewart}, title = {Greco's Agent Reliabilism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {437-443}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, reliabilism, scepticism, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cohen1999, author = {Cohen, Stewart}, title = {Lehrer on Coherence and Self-Trust}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {1043-1048}, keywords = {epistemology, ethics, self, trust}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cohen1998a, author = {Cohen, Stewart}, title = {Fumerton on Metaepistemology and Skepticism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {913-918}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, metatheory, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COHEN1977, author = {COHEN, STEPHEN}, title = {DISTINCTIONS AMONG BLAME CONCEPTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {149-166}, keywords = {act, attitude, belief, blame, ethics, judgment, speech-ac}, abstract = {THIS PAPER DISCUSSES A METAETHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NOTION OF MORAL BLAMING. DISTINCT FROM BLAMING "PER SE" ARE THE ACT OF BLAMING AND THE JUDGMENT OF BLAMEWORTHINESS. CONSTITUTIVE CONDITIONS ARE SUGGESTED FOR EACH OF THESE NOTIONS. THE BASIC NOTION IS THE JUDGMENT OF BLAMEWORTHINESS; BLAMING IS DERIVED FROM IT BY SUPPLEMENTING ITS CONSTITUTIVE CONDITIONS, REQUIRING THE PRESENCE OF AN AFFECTIVE ELEMENT. BLAMING IS NOT A DISTINCTIVELY MORAL NOTION; THAT WHICH MAKES FOR BLAMING MORALLY ARE THE REASONS IN VIRTUE OF WHICH ONE BLAMES, NOT A SPECIFIC KIND OF BLAMING ONE ENGAGES IN OR A SPECIFIC KIND OF ATTITUDE THAT ONE HAS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cohen2005, author = {Cohen, Stewart}, title = {Why Basic Knowledge Is Easy Knowledge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {417-430}, keywords = {closure, deduction, epistemology, knowledge, probability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Cohen1996, author = {Cohen, Sheldon-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {244-246}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Aristotle on Nature and Incomplete Substance}, volume = {60(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{Cohon1997, author = {Cohon, Rachel}, title = {The Common Point of View in Hume's Ethics}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {827-850}, keywords = {ethics, judgment, moral-theor}, abstract = {I argue that every time we reflect upon someone's character from the common point of view, we feel an actual sentiment of approbation or disapprobation, which may alter and merge with the situated sentiment or may fail to do so, leaving two different feelings about the same character. Furthermore, whenever we make moral evaluations we also simultaneously make objective, causal judgments about the love and hatred, pride and humility that the trait will produce. We routinely take up the common point of view in order to achieve truth and consistency in our causal judgments, to avoid grave practical problems. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Collins1998, author = {Collins, Arthur-W}, title = {Beastly Experience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {375-380}, keywords = {experience, metaphysics, perception, world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Collins1994, author = {Collins, Arthur-W}, title = {Precis of "The Nature of Mental Things"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {901-903}, keywords = {causation, dualism, mental, metaphysics, phenomena}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Collins1994a, author = {Collins, Arthur-W}, title = {Reply to Commentators}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {929-945}, keywords = {belief, mental, metaphysics, mind}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Collins1995, author = {Collins, H-M and Kusch, M}, title = {Two Kinds of Actions: A Phenomenological Study}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(4)}, pages = {799-819}, keywords = {action, epistemology, model, phenomenology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Collins2002, author = {Collins, John}, title = {Truth or Meaning? A Question of Priority}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {497-536}, keywords = {deflationism, epistemology, meaning, truth}, abstract = {There is an incompatibility between the deflationist approach to truth, which makes truth transparent on the basis of an antecedent grasp of meaning, and the traditional endeavor, exemplified by Davidson, to explicate meaning through of truth. I suggest that both parties are in the explanatory red: deflationist lack a non-truth-involving theory of meaning and Davidsonians lack a nondeflationary account of truth. My focus is on the attempts of the latter party to resolve their problem. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Comesana2005, author = {Comesana, Juan}, title = {Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {367-383}, keywords = {belief, disjunctivism, epistemology, justification, warrant}, abstract = {In this paper I argue that McDowell's brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill-motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a "highest common factor" between veridical and nonveridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant (where "warrant" is understood as whatever has to be added to true belief to yield knowledge).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COMMENO1962, author = {COMMENO, CONSTANTINO-LASCARIS}, title = {THE PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT OF ABELARDO BONILLA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {119-124}, keywords = {aesthetics, history, humanism, latin-american; law, twentieth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Conee1992, author = {Conee, Earl}, title = {The Truth Connection}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {657-669}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, truth}, abstract = {A particular conception of the justification condition on knowledge is defended. It is argued that this sort of justification has a certain special bearing on truth.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Conee2002, author = {Conee, Earl}, title = {Innocuous Infallibility}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {406-408}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, infallibility, justification, truth}, abstract = {Alan Sidelle has offered an argument to show that internalism about justification implies us to have a certain sort of infallibility concerning some internal facts. This is true but harmless to internalism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CONEE1985, author = {CONEE, EARL}, title = {DISCUSSION: ON SEEKING A RATIONALE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {601-610}, keywords = {consequentialism, distributive-justice; ethics, rationale}, abstract = {IN SAMUEL SCHEFFLER'S BOOK, "THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM", A CERTAIN SORT OF DEFENSE--A "RATIONALE"--IS SOUGHT ON BEHALF OF VARIOUS MORAL THESES. THE PRESENT PAPER ARGUES AGAINST THE PHILOSOPHICAL VALUE OF THIS PROJECT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Conee1998, author = {Conee, Earl}, title = {Seeing the Truth}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {847-857}, keywords = {epistemology, mental, phenomenon, proposition, truth}, abstract = {Some propositions are obvious in their own right. We can 'just see' that they are true. So there is some such epistemic phenomenon as seeing the truth of a proposition. This paper investigates the nature of this phenomenon. The aptness of the visual metaphor is explained. Accounts of the phenomenon requiring qualia by which the truth is apprehended are disputed. A limited theory is developed and applied.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Conee1994, author = {Conee, Earl}, title = {The Nature and the Impossibility of Moral Perfection}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {815-825}, keywords = {conduct, ethics, morality, nature, perfection}, abstract = {It is argued that a morally perfect agent is one who is ideal in every morally relevant respect. On the basis of this conception it is argued that morally perfect agency is impossible.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Conee2005, author = {Conee, Earl}, title = {The Comforts of Home}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {444-451}, keywords = {condition, epistemology, home, luminosity}, abstract = {A "luminous" condition is one that we are in a position to know that we are in, whenever we are in it. Timothy Williamson argued that there are no significant luminous conditions. Williamson's argument is faulted. A different argument is offered for the same conclusion. The epistemic importance of the conclusion is discussed.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CONLY1975, author = {CONLY, CRAIG-A}, title = {THE BASIS OF TIME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {82-93}, keywords = {change, continuity, force, measurement, metaphysics, motion, perception, time}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COOK1982, author = {COOK, DANIEL-J}, title = {MARX'S CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL LANGUAGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {530-554}, keywords = {ideology, language, praxis, social-consciousnes}, abstract = {THOUGH MARX NEVER SYSTEMATICALLY DEVELOPED A THEORY OF LANGUAGE, HE OFTEN COMMENTED IN HIS PRE-1848 WRITINGS ON THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHIES AND IDEOLOGIES. IN THIS PAPER, I EXAMINE MARX'S CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE. THE FIRST PART IS DEVOTED TO SKETCHING THE ORIGINS OF MARX'S IDEAS ON LANGUAGE. THE SECOND PART ANALYZES THE STRATEGIES MARX USED IN HIS EARLIEST CRITICAL WRITINGS TO CRITICIZE THE 'LANGUAGES' OF PHILOSOPHY AND IDEOLOGY. THE THIRD PART EXAMINES MARX'S (AND NOW ENGEL'S) COMMENTS IN "THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY" ON THE ROLE AND USE OF LANGUAGE IN FURTHERING THE IDEOLOGICAL PURPOSES OF THE RULING CLASS. THE FINAL PART OF THE PAPER EXTRAPOLATES MARX'S OWN POSITION ON THE NATURE OF THE PROPER LANGUAGE FOR PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Cooper2002, author = {Cooper, David-E}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {497-499}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Measure of Things: Humanism, Humility, and Mystery}, volume = {71(2)}, year = {2002} } @article{Cooper1995, author = {Cooper, John-M}, title = {Eudaimonism and the Appeal to Nature in the Morality of Happiness: Comments on Julia Annas, "The Morality of Happiness"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {587-598}, keywords = {ethics, eudaimonism, happiness, morality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COOPER1977, author = {COOPER, WESLEY-E}, title = {THE PERFECTLY JUST SOCIETY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {38}, pages = {46-58}, keywords = {justice, political-philosophy; society}, abstract = {IF WE TAKE SERIOUSLY RAWLS' CONCEPTION OF IDEAL THEORY, WE FIND THAT HIS ALLEGEDLY PERFECTLY JUST SOCIETY IS CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN PERFECTLY JUST. ITS IMPERFECTIONS CAN BE TRACED TO A FAULT IN HIS DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY GOODS, AND THIS FAULT IN TURN IS DUE TO HIS FAILING TO DRAW SOME CRUCIAL DISTINCTIONS. I FIRST CHARACTERIZE IDEAL THEORY AND RAWLS' NOTION OF A PERFECTLY JUST SOCIETY; WITH IDEAL THEORY PROVIDING THE FRAME OF REFERENCE, I INTRODUCE AND DISCUSS SOME DISTINCTIONS WHICH UNDERMINE THE AFOREMENTIONED NOTION; I THEN APPLY THIS DISCUSSION IN A CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY GOODS; FINALLY, USING A REVISED DOCTRINE, I ADUMBRATE A MORE ADEQUATE IDEA OF A PERFECTLY JUST SOCIETY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COPELAND1971, author = {COPELAND, JOHN-W}, title = {B F SKINNER'S SKEPTICISM ABOUT CHOICES AND FUTURE CONSEQUENCES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {31}, pages = {540-545}, keywords = {choice, consequence, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Copp2001, author = {Copp, David}, title = {Against Internalism about Reasons--Gert's Rational Options}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(2)}, pages = {455-461}, keywords = {choice, ethics, internalism, morality, motivation, reasons}, abstract = {There are at least two familiar "internalist" strategies for explaining the "normativity" or "prescriptivity" of reasons. According to one, which is defended by Williams, motivation is entailed by reasons. According to another, which is defended by Korsgaard, Scanlon, and Smith, motivation by reasons follows from rationality. Bernard Gert argues that both views conflict with the intuitive observation that there are "rational options." His theory of rationality is not internalist. I agree that there are rational options, but I argue that Gert's theory conflicts with another internalist doctrine, one that any plausible theory must accept.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Copp2002, author = {Copp, David}, title = {Goldman on the Goals of Democracy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(1)}, pages = {207-214}, keywords = {democracy, epistemology, goals, knowledge, social}, abstract = {In Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman argues that the success of democracy depends on its producing outcomes preferred by a majority of voters. He argues that its success in this requires voters to have a certain kind of knowledge. Goldman's argument depends on mistaken views about the goals of democracy. The essentials of democracy are found in a political system that aims to equalize political power and authority. A system of this kind would select the candidate voted for by most, but it would not be flawed as a democracy if it failed to secure their preferred outcomes.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Copp1995, author = {Copp, David}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {986-989}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Morality, Normativity, and Society}, volume = {58(4)}, year = {1995} } @article{CORBETT1988, author = {CORBETT, S-M}, title = {ZENO'S 'ACHILLES': A REPLY TO JOHN MCKIE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {325-331}, keywords = {metaphysics, motion, paradox}, abstract = {FROM ARISTOTLE TO JOHN MCKIE THE 'ACHILLES' HAS BEEN REGARDED AS A VARIATION OF ANOTHER OF ZENO'S ARGUMENTS, THE 'DICHOTOMY'. THERE IS, HOWEVER, AN ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO ARGUMENTS. WHILE THE INFINITE SERIES IN THE 'DICHOTOMY' IS GENERATED BY A PROCESS OF DIVISION, IN THE 'ACHILLES' THE INFINITE SERIES IS DERIVED BY MEANS OF A PROCESS OF "ADDITION". INDEED, IT IS ONLY BY MAKING THE ILLEGITIMATE ASSUMPTION THAT ACHILLES WILL OVERTAKE THE TORTOISE THAT THE 'ACHILLES' CAN BE TRANSFORMED INTO A VARIATION OF THE 'DICHOTOMY'. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO ARGUMENTS EFFECTIVELY BLOCKS SOLUTIONS LIKE THAT PROPOSED BY MCKIE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CORCORAN1972, author = {CORCORAN, JOHN}, title = {CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF CLASSICAL LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {33}, pages = {25-47}, keywords = {argumentation, demonstration, implication, inference, logic, validity}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE DEVELOPS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF CLASSICAL LOGIC, PARTICULARLY FOR THAT PART OF CLASSICAL LOGIC CONCERNED WITH CORRECTNESS OF ARGUMENTS. THE VALIDITY OF THE FRAMEWORK IS SUPPORTED BY EXAMPLES OF ITS APPLICABILITY IN HISTORICALLY GIVEN SITUATIONS. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK TWO KINDS OF REDUCTIONISM ARE SEEN TO BE GROUNDLESS. FINALLY, THE CURRENTLY ACCEPTED EXPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE IS SUBJECTED TO CRITICAL REEVALUATION WHICH SHOWS THAT CONTINUED ACCEPTANCE IS NOT JUSTIFIED WITHOUT FURTHER RESEARCH.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CORCORAN1973, author = {CORCORAN, JOHN and WOOD, SUSAN}, title = {THE SWITCHES "PARADOX" AND THE LIMITS OF PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1973}, volume = {34}, pages = {102-108}, keywords = {logic, paradox, propositional-logic; sentential-calculu}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE IS A DISCUSSION OF THE DATA, PURPOSES, RESULTS, APPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF LOGICAL THEORY. CONCRETE CONTENT IS PROVIDED BY MEANS OF AN EXAMPLE, 'THE SWITCHES PARADOX', WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED IN THIS JOURNAL. BECAUSE OF ITS ELEMENTARY LEVEL, THIS ARTICLE MIGHT BE FOUND SUITABLE FOR UNDERGRADUATE COURSES IN LOGICAL THEORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CORRADO1975, author = {CORRADO, MICHAEL}, title = {ON BELIEVING INSCRIPTIONS TO BE TRUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {59-73}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, inscription, language, logic, proposition}, abstract = {I SCHEFFLER, IN "ANATOMY OF INQUIRY", ACCEPTS AN ARGUMENT THAT SHOWS THAT THE OBJECTS OF BELIEF, DESIRE, AND SO ON, MUST EXIST. THE ARGUMENT DEPENDS UPON THE NECESSITY OF APPEALING TO GENERALIZED PSYCHOLOGICAL STATEMENTS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION. TO AVOID COMMITMENT TO PROPOSITIONS HE PROPOSES INSCRIPTIONALISM AND TAKES THE OBJECTS OF BELIEF AND SO ON TO BE CONCRETE INDIVIDUAL INSCRIPTION.. BUT THERE ARE SOME TYPES OF BELIEF-STATEMENT--ESSENTIAL TO PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION--FOR WHICH INSCRIPTIONALISM WILL NOT WORK. THESE ARE BELIEF-STATEMENTS WHICH MUST BE UNDERSTOOD "DE RE". BUT WILL AN INSCRIPTIONAL TRANSLATION WORK FOR THE OTHERS, THOSE THAT ARE "DE DICTO"? I ARGUE THAT BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF BELIEF-STATEMENTS IN WHICH THE "DE RE" AND "DE DICTO" ARE MIXED, THOSE THAT ARE PURELY "DE DICTO" CANNOT BE GIVEN AN INSCRIPTIONAL ANALYSIS. THAT ARGUMENT IS INDEPENDENT OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE "DE RE".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COVAL1964, author = {COVAL, S-C}, title = {PERSONS AND CRITERIA IN STRAWSON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {406-409}, keywords = {criteria, meaning, metaphysics, person, predicate, scepticism, textual-criticis}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COWAN1969, author = {COWAN, JOSEPH-L}, title = {THE GAMBLER'S FALLACY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {238-251}, keywords = {argumentation, fallacy, logic, probability}, abstract = {"GAMBLER'S FALLACY" EXAMINED FOR INTRINSIC INTEREST AND LIGHT ON ROLE OF LOGICIAN AS CRITIC OF ORDINARY DISCOURSE. VARIETY OF "ANALYSES" BY LOGICIANS SINCE THEY MUST CONSTRUCT RATHER THAN SIMPLY DISCOVER CONNECTIONS BETWEEN PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS. ONE CONSTRUAL OF GAMBLER'S ARGUMENT AS VALID PRESENTED. THIS EMPLOYED WHEN REQUIRED PREMISES ARE FALSE BECAUSE "ARGUMENT" ITSELF IS INVENTION OF LOGICIAN, AND "GAMBLER'S ARGUMENT" MIGHT BE BETTER UNDERSTOOD AS NOT ARGUMENT MERELY BUT AS DRAMA.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{COX1978, author = {COX, A-A and AL-HIBRI, A}, title = {CASTANEDA'S THEORY OF MORALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {38}, pages = {557-563}, keywords = {deontology, duty, ethics, hierarchy, intuition, normative-ethics; obligation}, abstract = {CASTANEDA DEFENDS THE VIEW THAT OBLIGATIONS DO NOT CONFLICT BY INTRODUCING A HIERARCHY OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES. CONFLICTS ARE RESOLVED BY OPTING FOR THE OBLIGATION RESTING ON THE HIGHEST PRINCIPLE. SUCH A METHOD IS GENERALLY INADEQUATE FOR THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS. SPECIFICALLY, CASTANEDA'S SYSTEM IS COUNTER-INTUITIVE BECAUSE (I) AN ETHICAL HIERARCHY IS MUCH MORE COMPLEX THAN ENVISIONED BY CASTANEDA, (II) CASTANEDA'S METHOD FOR CALCULATING THE COMPARATIVE MORAL VALUE OF ACTIONS AS THE BASIS OF THE HIERARCHY IS ALSO INADEQUATE; AND (III) IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ABSTRACT EXCESSIVELY FROM THE SPECIFICITY OF A MORAL SITUATION WITHOUT GENERATING PROBLEMS. ALL THIS IS SHOWN BY CONSTRUCTING AND EVALUATING THE RELEVANT MORAL SITUATION IN EACH CASE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Craig2000, author = {Craig, Edward}, title = {Response to Lehrer}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {655-665}, keywords = {discourse, epistemology, knowledge, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Craig2001, author = {Craig, William-Lane}, title = {Wishing It Were Now Some Other Time}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {159-166}, keywords = {epistemology, meaning, time, truth}, abstract = {One of the most serious obstacles to accepting a tenseless view of time is the challenge posed by our experience of tense. A particularly striking example of such experience, pointed out by Schlesinger but largely overlooked in the literature, is the wish felt by probably all of us at some time or other that it were now some other time. Such a wish seems evidently rational to hold, and yet on a tenseless theory of time such a wish must be regarded as irrational, since it is logically impossible for the now to be located at some other time, there being no such thing as an objective now or present. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Craig1994, author = {Craig, William-Lane}, title = {Robert Adams's New Anti-Molinist Argument}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {857-861}, keywords = {argument, existence, knowledge, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Craig1993, author = {Craig, William-Lane and Smith, Quentin}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {733-737}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Theism, Atheism and Big Bang Cosmology}, volume = {56(3)}, year = {1993} } @article{Crane2005, author = {Crane, Tim}, title = {Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {155-162}, keywords = {consciousness, metaphysics, phenomenology, physicalism}, abstract = {Central to Papineau's defence of physicalism is the claim that phenomenal concepts resemble their referents. I dispute that there any such concepts.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CRAWFORD1974, author = {CRAWFORD, DAN-D}, title = {PROPOSITIONAL AND NONPROPOSITIONAL PERCEIVING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {201-210}, keywords = {epistemology, perceiving, proposition}, abstract = {I DISCUSS THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS THAT EXIST BETWEEN PROPOSITIONAL AND NONPROPOSITIONAL USES OF PERCEPTUAL VERBS, E.G., 'S SEES THAT SOMETHING IS A DOOR', AND 'S SEES A DOOR'. I FOCUS ON CHISHOLM'S DEFINITION OF ONE PROPOSITIONAL USE AND SHOW THAT IT IS INADEQUATE AS IT STANDS, IN THAT IT APPLIES TO CASES IN WHICH ONE TAKES SOMETHING TO HAVE SOME CHARACTERISTIC BUT IS NOT PERCEIVING IT TO HAVE THAT CHARACTERISTIC. WE MUST ADD THE UNDEFINED EXPRESSION 'PERCEPTUALLY TAKES' TO THE DEFINITION. I THEN ARGUE FOR THE GENERAL THESIS THAT THE CONCEPT OF PERCEIVING IN BOTH OF ITS MOST IMPORTANT PROPOSITIONAL AND NONPROPOSITIONAL SENSES HAS A DUAL FUNCTION IN THAT IT REFERS TO CAUSAL, PSYCHO-PHYSICAL FACTS, AS WELL AS CONCEPTUAL FACTS, I.E., TAKINGS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CRAWFORD1964, author = {CRAWFORD, PATRICIA-A}, title = {A SURVEY OF RECENT RELIGIOUS LITERATURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {429-441}, keywords = {being, epistemology, faith, indian, judaism, knowledge, religion, text}, abstract = {THIS ARTICLE IS A CRITICAL REVIEW AND SURVEY OF 28 BOOKS IN THE FIELD OF RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. THE MAJOR PART OF THE ARTICLE IS GIVEN TO REVIEWS OF THE FOLLOWING BOOKS: JOHN HICK'S "FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE", PAUL SCHMIDT'S "RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE", W T STACE'S "MYSTICISM AND PHILOSOPHY", HENRY NELSON WIEMAN'S "INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATION OF FAITH", A C DAS'S "A MODERN INCARNATION OF GOD: A COMMENTARY ON THE LIFE AND TEACHING OF SRI RAMAKRISHNA", HERMAN DOOYEWEERD'S "IN THE TWILIGHT OF WESTERN THOUGHT", AND HANS FREUND'S "THE BALANCED LIFE".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CRAWFORD1979, author = {CRAWFORD, T-D}, title = {ON THE USES OF 'IS' AND 'OUGHT'.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {592-594}, keywords = {ethics, is, ought}, abstract = {SEARLE'S ATTEMPT TO BRIDGE THE "IS"-"OUGHT" GAP IS DISCUSSED FROM A LINGUISTIC POINT OF VIEW. "IS" IS NOT CONFINED TO FACTUAL STATEMENTS, NOR IS "OUGHT" CONFINED TO EVALUATIVE STATEMENTS. SEARLE'S STATEMENTS 3, 4 AND 5 CONTAIN AMBIGUOUS EXPRESSIONS BASED ON THE WORDS "IS" AND "OUGHT"; HIS ARGUMENT IS VALID ONLY IF THE EXPRESSIONS ARE READ AS FACTUAL, NOT EVALUATIVE. THUS THE "IS"-"OUGHT" GAP IS BRIDGED, BUT NOT THE FACT-VALUE GAP.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Creath1992, author = {Creath, Richard}, title = {Induction and the Gettier Problem}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {401-404}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, induction, knowledge, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CREEGAN1962, author = {CREEGAN, ROBERT-F}, title = {THE REFERENTIAL CONTINUUM, PART II.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {581-582}, keywords = {behavior, communication, language, meaning, perception, reference}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CREEGAN1960, author = {CREEGAN, ROBERT-F}, title = {THE REFERENTIAL CONTINUUM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {547-549}, keywords = {communication, expression, language, meaning, reference}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Cresswell1994, author = {Cresswell, Max-J}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {241-244}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Language in the World: A Philosophical Enquiry}, volume = {58(1)}, year = {1994} } @article{Crisp2005, author = {Crisp, Thomas-M and Smith, Donald-P}, title = {'Wholly Present' Defined}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {318-344}, keywords = {dimension, endurance, eternal, metaphysics, present, time}, abstract = {Three-dimensionalists, sometimes referred to an endurantists, think that objects persist through time by being "wholly present" at every time they exist. But what is it for something to be wholly present at a time? It is surprisingly difficult to say. The three-dimensionalist is free, of course, to take 'is wholly present at' as one of her theory's primitives, but this is problematic for at least one reason: some philosophers claim not to understand her primitive. Clearly the three-dimensionalist would be better off if she could state her theory in terms accessible to all. We think she can. What is needed is a definition of 'is wholly present at' that all can understand. In this paper, we offer one.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Crisp2000, author = {Crisp, Thomas-M and Warfield, Ted-A}, title = {The Irrelevance of Indeterministic Counterexamples to Principle Beta}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {173-184}, keywords = {consequence, counterexample, free-will; indeterminism, metaphysics}, abstract = {Incompatibilism about freedom and causal determinism is commonly supported by appeal to versions of the well-known consequence argument. Critics of the consequence argument have presented counterexamples to the consequence argument's central inference principle. The thesis of this article is that proponents of the consequence argument can easily bypass even the best of the counterexamples.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CRITTENDEN1970, author = {CRITTENDEN, CHARLES}, title = {ONTOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {85-96}, keywords = {description, existence, fiction, language, logic, ontology, quantification}, abstract = {THE THEORY CONSTRUES ALL STATEMENTS ABOUT FICTION AS FALSE; IT CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH COMMON PRACTICE. FOR IT ASSUMES THAT ONLY EXISTENT OBJECTS CAN BE VALUES OF VARIABLES. BUT BEING AN OBJECT IS DISTINCT FROM EXISTING; QUANTIFIERS SHOULD BE TAKEN AS INDICATING WHAT OBJECTS A SENTENCE PRESUPPOSES BUT NOT AS A CRITERION FOR WHAT EXISTENT ENTITIES IT ASSUMES. COLLAPSING THIS DISTINCTION IS REASONABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF A CONSTRUCTED SCIENTIFIC FRAMEWORK, BUT IN GENERAL LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY ARE SEPARATE CONCERNS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Crittenden1991, author = {Crittenden, Charles}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {225-229}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Unreality}, volume = {54(1)}, year = {1991} } @article{CROCKER1980, author = {CROCKER, LAWRENCE}, title = {MARX'S USE OF CONTRADICTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1980}, volume = {40}, pages = {558-563}, keywords = {contradiction, dialectic, formal-logic; social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CROWELL1990, author = {CROWELL, STEVEN-GALT}, title = {Husserl, Heidegger, and Transcendental Philosophy: Another Look at the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(3)}, pages = {501-518}, keywords = {metaphysics, phenomenology, transcendental}, abstract = {This essay interprets Husserl's first draft of his Encyclopaedia Britannica article and Heidegger's suggestions for revision, outlining a new way of reading the Husserl/Heidegger relationship. It is argued that these sources do not show Heidegger rejecting Husserl's transcendental phenomenology but rather, in specific disagreement over the phenomenological status of the "ego" and the "world," reinterpreting transcendental phenomenology as an ontological achievement, in a sense of "ontology" which itself derives in important ways from Husserl's transcendental reflection on the constitution of meaning. The essay argues that there is a significant sense in which Heidegger accepts the transcendental-phenomenological reduction.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Crowell2000, author = {Crowell, Steven-Galt}, title = {Metaphysics, Metontology, and the End of Being and Time}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {307-331}, keywords = {meaning, metaphysics, metontology, ontology}, abstract = {In 1928 Heidegger argued that the transcendental philosophy he had pursued in Being and Time needed to be completed by what he called "metontology." This paper analyzes what this notion amounts to. Far from being merely a curiosity of Heidegger scholarship, the place occupied by "metontology" opens onto a general issue concerning the relation between transcendental philosophy and metaphysics, and also between both of these and naturalistic empiricism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CROWTHER1983, author = {CROWTHER, PAUL}, title = {EXPERIENCE OF ART: SOME PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES OF HERMENEUTICAL ANALYSIS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {347-362}, keywords = {aesthetic-experience; aesthetics, art}, abstract = {PART ONE OF THIS PAPER CONCENTRATES ON GADAMER'S CRITIQUE OF AESTHETIC FORMALISM. IT IS ARGUED THAT WHILST GADAMER FAILS TO REFUTE THE FORMALIST APPROACH, HE DOES AT LEAST ESTABLISH IT AS ONLY ONE LIMITED ASPECT TO OUR BROAD EXPERIENCE OF ART. IN PART TWO, SOME IDEAS FROM HEGEL, HEIDEGGER, AND MERLEAU-PONTY ARE BROACHED, IN ORDER TO ARTICULATE TWO OTHER PHENOMENOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF ARTISTIC EXPERIENCE--THE 'ALETHIC' AND THE 'NUMINOUS'.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CUA1970, author = {CUA, ANTONIO-S}, title = {MORAL JUDGMENT AND UNDERSTANDING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {614-616}, keywords = {ethics, moral-judgmen}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CUA1967, author = {CUA, A-S}, title = {TOWARD AN ETHICS OF MORAL AGENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {163-174}, keywords = {ethics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cullity2004, author = {Cullity, Garrett}, title = {Sympathy, Discernment, and Reasons}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(1)}, pages = {37-62}, keywords = {discernment, ethics, reasons, rightness, sympathy}, abstract = {According to "the argument from discernment", sympathetic motivation is morally faulty, because it is morally undiscriminating. Sympathy can incline you to do the right thing, but it can also incline you to do the wrong thing. And if so, it is no better as a reason for doing something than any other morally arbitrary consideration. The only truly morally good form of motivation--because the only morally nonarbitrary one--involves treating and action's rightness as your reason for performing it. This paper attacks the argument from discernment and argues against its conclusion.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CUMMINS1990, author = {CUMMINS, PHILLIP-D}, title = {Pappas on the Role of Sensations in Reid's Theory of Perception.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {755-762}, keywords = {epistemology, perception, sensation}, abstract = {I challenge George Pappas's contention that there are both philosophical and textual grounds for holding that for Reid sensations are constituents of rather than merely concomitants of perceptions. The philosophical ground is that the latter option generates an inconsistency for Reid in cases in which sensations are perceived. I question the inconsistency by arguing that generating it requires a very implausible thesis about joint effects of a single cause. I also question Pappas's textual evidence that for Reid sensations are sometimes perceived.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CUMMINS1963, author = {CUMMINS, PHILLIP}, title = {PERCEPTUAL RELATIVITY AND IDEAS IN THE MIND.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {202-214}, keywords = {epistemology, idea, immaterialism, minds, perception, primary-quality; relativity, scepticism, secondary-qualit}, abstract = {THE MOST IMPORTANT LINK BETWEEN BERKELEY AND THE CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHERS IS EXAMINED, "VIZ.", THE ARGUMENT FROM PERCEPTUAL RELATIVITY, WHICH BERKELEY USED TO DESTROY THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES DISTINCTION. BERKELEY REFUTED BAYLES' SKEPTICISM AND IN SO DOING, STATED DOCTRINES SIMILAR TO THOSE OF MALEBRANCHE. THE ABOVE ARGUMENT IS BASICALLY THAT SECONDARY QUALITIES AS PERCEIVED ARE INCONSTANT AND RELATIVE, AND HENCE MUST BE SENSATIONS IN THE PERCEIVING MIND. IT IS ASSUMED THAT SENSED QUALITIES MUST BE PROPERTIES OF MINDS, (WHICH CANNOT BE PROPERTIES OF NON-MINDS). BERKELEY'S ARGUMENT PROVES THE DEPENDENCE OF ALL SENSIBLE QUALITIES UPON THE MIND. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cummins2000, author = {Cummins, Robert}, title = {Reply to Millikan}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {113-127}, keywords = {attitude, epistemology, representation}, abstract = {This is a response to Ruth Millikan's critical review of my Representations, Targets and Attitudes (MIT, 1996). My "Reply" focuses mainly on the charge that my equation of representation with isomorphism makes representation promiscuous and, hence, trivializes the concept. The main new point of interest in the discussion is that the content of a mental representation must be fixed independently of what its consumers can actually exploit in order to make room for the fact that it is possible to learn to exploit previously inaccessible content.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Cuneo1999, author = {Cuneo, Terence-D}, title = {An Externalist Solution to the "Moral Problem"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {359-380}, keywords = {ethics, externalism, moral-theory; motivation}, abstract = {In his recent book, The Moral Problem, Michael Smith presents a number of arguments designed to expose the difficulties with so-called 'externalist' theories of motivation. This essay endeavors to defend externalism from Smith's attacks. I attempt three tasks in the essay. First, I try to clarify and reformulate Smith's distinction between internalism and externalism. Second, I formulate two of Smith's arguments--what I call the 'reliability argument' and 'the rationalist argument'--and attempt to show that these arguments fail to damage externalism. Third, I undertake to expose and question some of the motivations that drive internalism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CUNNINGHAM1983, author = {CUNNINGHAM, SUZANNE}, title = {HUSSERL AND PRIVATE LANGUAGES: A RESPONSE TO HUTCHESON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {103-112}, keywords = {language, phenomenology, private-languag}, abstract = {IN "CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS" EDMUND HUSSERL DESCRIBES HIS PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION AS LEAVING ONE WITHOUT "OTHER EGOS" AND WITHOUT "ALL THE FORMATIONS PERTAINING TO SOCIALITY AND CULTURE" (P. 19). I ARGUED IN MY BOOK, "LANGUAGE AND THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTIONS OF EDMUND HUSSERL", THAT THIS ACCOUNT OF THE REDUCTION LEAVES US WITH SOME VERSION OF A PRIVATE LANGUAGE AND THEREFORE OFFERS AN UNACCEPTABLE METHOD FOR ACHIEVING HUSSERL'S GOAL, I.E., ESTABLISHING ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN FOUNDATIONS FOR SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS. PETER HUTCHESON, IN HIS PAPER, "HUSSERL AND PRIVATE LANGUAGES," (PPR, SEPT. '81) TAKES ISSUE WITH MY CLAIMS. HIS CENTRAL OBJECTIONS RELATE TO MY CHARACTERIZATION OF PRIVATE LANGUAGES AND TO MY INTERPRETATION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION. IN THIS PAPER, I RESPOND TO HIS OBJECTIONS AND ARGUE THAT MY THESIS REGARDING HUSSERL'S METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO BE FALSE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{CUNNINGHAM1985, author = {CUNNINGHAM, SUZANNE}, title = {PERCEPTUAL MEANING AND HUSSERL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {553-566}, keywords = {judgment, metaphysics, perception, phenomenology}, abstract = {THIS PAPER TAKES ISSUE WITH TWO OF THE MORE RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF HUSSERL'S NOTION OF "NOEMA" (ROUGHLY, 'MEANING'). THE FIRST, BY DAGFINN FOLLESDAL, ARGUES THAT THE "NOEMA" SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD ON ANALOGY WITH FREGEAN "SINN" AS AN ABSTRACT, TIMELESS ENTITY. THE SECOND, BY ROBERT SOLOMON, ARGUES THAT THIS IS NOT ADEQUATE FOR "NOEMATA"/MEANINGS IN PERCEPTION; THEY MUST BE PERCEIVED. I ARGUE AGAINST BOTH THAT PERCEPTUAL MEANING IS NEITHER AN ABSTRACT ENTITY OR A PERCEIVED ENTITY. IT IS A HIGHLY PARTICULARIZED, TIME-BOUND ENTITY UNCOVERED ONLY IN REFLECTION ON PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{D'AMICO1981, author = {D'AMICO, ROBERT}, title = {HUSSERL ON THE FOUNDATIONAL STRUCTURES OF NATURAL AND CULTURAL SCIENCES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {5-22}, keywords = {culture, human-sciences; metaphysics, natural-sciences; objectivism, phenomenology, scientific-metho}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE CONCERNS HUSSERL'S LATER WRITINGS ON SCIENCE AND ATTEMPTS TO GIVE A FOUNDATION FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. I TRY TO EMPHASIZE HUSSERL'S STRESS IN HIS "ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY" ON THE COMMUNICATIVE AND CULTURAL DIMENSION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH. HOWEVER, I ARGUE THAT CONTRARY TO COMMON OPINION, HUSSERL'S VIEWS ARE REMARKABLY SIMILAR TO TRADITIONAL AND POSITIVIST PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. SPECIFICALLY HUSSERL ACCEPTS THE ACCUMULATION MODEL OF PROGRESS AND THE EFFECT TO CONNECT SCIENTIFIC ABSTRACTIONS WITH SOME SECURE, REPEATABLE ACTS OF OBSERVATION. IN CONCLUSION, HUSSERL'S VIEWS ARE CONTRASTED WITH COMMENTS FROM HABERMAN, FOUCAULT AND KUHN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{D'Arms2000, author = {D'Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel}, title = {The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(1)}, pages = {65-90}, keywords = {appropriateness, emotion, ethics, fallacy, moral-theor}, abstract = {Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is wrong to be envious. These two senses of 'appropriate' have much less in common than philosophers have supposed. Indeed, the distinction between propriety and correctness is crucial to understanding the distinctive role of the emotions in ethics. We argue here that an emotion can be fitting despite being wrong to feel, and that various philosophical arguments are guilty of a systematic error which we term the moralistic fallacy. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DA-COSTA1989, author = {DA-COSTA, NEWTON-C-A and FRENCH, STEVEN}, title = {ON THE LOGIC OF BELIEF.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {431-446}, keywords = {belief, doxography, epistemic-logic; epistemology, paraconsistent-logic}, abstract = {THREE SYSTEMS OF DOXASTIC LOGIC ARE PRESENTED AND DISCUSSED. IT IS ARGUED THAT OUR ACTUAL BODIES OF BELIEF OFTEN INCORPORATE PRIMA FACIE CONTRADICTIONS AND THAT A LOGIC OF BELIEF APPROPRIATE FOR MODELLING SUCH BELIEF SYSTEMS SHOULD THEREFORE BE PARA-CONSISTENT. IT IS ALSO NOTED THAT THIS IDEA SHEDS NEW LIGHT ON MOORE'S PARADOX AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-DECEPTION, FOR EXAMPLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DACEY1975, author = {DACEY, RAYMOND}, title = {THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC THEORY IN SUPPORTING COUNTERFACTUAL ARGUMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {402-410}, keywords = {counterfactual, economics, logic}, abstract = {ECONOMIC HISTORY EMPLOYS COUNTERFACTUAL ARGUMENTS, I.E., ARGUMENTS BASED UPON A FALSE FACTUAL PREMISE, TO DISPEL MYTHS. SUCH ARGUMENTS HAVE AS CONCLUSIONS COUNTERFACTUAL STATEMENTS. THE QUESTION ADDRESSED IS WHAT IS THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC THEORY IN SUPPORTING COUNTERFACTUAL ARGUMENTS? TRADITIONAL ANALYSES OF COUNTERFACTUAL STATEMENTS REQUIRE TOO MUCH OF ECONOMIC THEORY, I.E., MODAL "IF..., THEN..." CONNECTIVES. AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS BASED UPON FINCH'S PAPER "AN EXPLICATION OF COUNTERFACTUALS BY PROBABILITY THEORY" ("PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH", VOL. 18, 1958) PROVIDES THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS: IN ORDER FOR AN ECONOMIC MODEL (OR THEORY) M TO SUPPORT A COUNTERFACTUAL ARGUMENT WITH FALSE PREMISE C AND CONSEQUENT E ONLY THREE REQUIREMENTS NEED BE MET. THEY ARE: 1) THE MODEL M MUST BE CONFIRMED TO AT LEAST THE (PROBABILITY) LEVEL 1/2; 2) THE MODEL M MUST BE NECESSARY TO DEDUCE E FROM C; AND 3) C MUST BE FACTUALLY AND NOT LOGICALLY FALSE. THESE CONDITIONS ARE STRIKINGLY SIMPLE AND AVOID THE NEEDLESS INTRUSION OF NOTIONS OF CAUSALITY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC HISTORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DAHL1991, author = {DAHL, Norman}, title = {Justice and Aristotelian Practical Reason.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {aristotelianism, justice, practical-reason; social-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DAHL1991a, author = {DAHL, Norman-O}, title = {Plato's Defense of Justice.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {action, agent, ethics, justice, soul}, abstract = {This paper argues that Plato has a response to two familiar criticisms of his defense of justice in the Republic--that it commits a fallacy of irrelevance, and it provides people with the wrong reason for being just. The response commits Plato to a view much like the forms of intuitionism held in the early part of this century. This latter has two important consequences. It makes it doubtful that Plato held an'Iagent-centered' as opposed to an 'act-centered' theory of justice. And it leaves him to face criticisms analogous to those that have been raised against these forms of intuitionism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dancy2003, author = {Dancy, Jonathan}, title = {Precis of Practical Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {423-428}, keywords = {ethics, normative, practical, reality, reasons}, abstract = {This is a precis of my Practical Reality (OUP, 2000).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dancy2003a, author = {Dancy, Jonathan}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {468-490}, keywords = {axiology, belief, desire, motivation, normative}, abstract = {This is a series of replies to the criticisms of my Practical Reality (OUP, 2000) offered by Wayne Davis, Stephen Darwall, Christian Piller, Michael Smith and R. Jay Wallace.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DANIELS1989, author = {DANIELS, CHARLES-B}, title = {EXPERIENCING GOD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {487-499}, keywords = {belief, christian, epistemology, experience, god, religion}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ADDRESSES ITSELF TO ISSUES RAISED BY WILLIAM P ALSTON'S "RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF." IN SECTION 1, I BEGIN WITH A FEW WORDS OF DIRECT CRITICISM OF ALSTON'S VIEWS. IN SECTION 2, I PRESENT FOUR REASONS THE BLIND OR UNDISCERNING HAVE TO THINK THAT, DESPITE THE FACT THEY DO NOT EXPERIENCE CERTAIN FEATURES OF THE WORLD, THOSE FEATURES ARE THERE TO BE EXPERIENCED AND OTHERS HAVE THE ABILITY TO EXPERIENCE THEM. FINALLY, IN SECTION 3, I ARGUE THAT NONE OF THESE REASONS GIVES THE NONRELIGIOUS GROUNDS TO THINK A RELIGIOUS SIDE OF REALITY IS THERE TO BE EXPERIENCED AND THE RELIGIOUS AT TIMES EXPERIENCE IT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DANIELS1990, author = {DANIELS, Norman}, title = {Equality of What: Welfare, Resources, or Capabilities?.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {resource, social-philosophy; welfare}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Daniels1998, author = {Daniels, Norman}, title = {Kamm's Moral Methods}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {947-954}, keywords = {ethics, morality, mortality}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DANTO1982, author = {DANTO, ARTHUR-C}, title = {DEPICTION AND DESCRIPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {1-19}, keywords = {depicting, description, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DANTO1969, author = {DANTO, ARTHUR-C}, title = {COMPLEX EVENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {66-77}, keywords = {action, event, man, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Darby2004, author = {Darby, Derrick}, title = {Rights Externalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {620-634}, keywords = {externalism, metaphysics, recognition, rights, social}, abstract = {Rights externalism is the thesis that a subject's status as a rightholder is secured not on account of it having a certain nature, but on account of it being afforded a certain sort of social recognition. I believe that rights externalism has been given short shrift, largely because a certain objection is widely taken to be a compelling reason for rejecting it. This objection goes roughly as follows. Both in theory and in practice we commonly appeal to the fact that subjects possess certain nonconventional rights to criticize immoral social practices, arrangements, and institutions. Although this objection is taken by some rights internalists to justify favoring rights internalism over rights externalism, I argue that it does not. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dardis1993, author = {Dardis, Anthony-B}, title = {Sunburn: Independence Conditions on Causal Relevance}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {577-598}, keywords = {causation, epistemology, natural-la}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Darwall1994, author = {Darwall, Stephen-L}, title = {From Morality to Virtue and Back?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {695-701}, keywords = {common-sense; ethics, morality, virtue}, abstract = {A critical discussion of Michael Slote's "From Morality to Virtue" in which worries are raised about abandoning moral for aretaic notions. Two examples: contemporary conceptions of the virtues assume morality in the background and aretaic notions fail to provide the idea of accountability central to morality --an idea we shouldn't give up.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Darwall2003, author = {Darwall, Stephen}, title = {Desires, Reasons, and Causes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {436-443}, keywords = {axiology, cause, desire, motivation, reasons}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Darwall1998, author = {Darwall, Stephen}, title = {Expressivist Relativism?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(1)}, pages = {183-188}, keywords = {ethics, moral-theory; objectivity, relativism, scepticism}, abstract = {This is part of a symposium on Harman and Thomson's Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Blackwell, 1996). I argue that Harman's acceptance of a quasi-absolutist semantics of fundamental normative claims blurs issues with at least some traditional critics of relativism, e.g., noncognitivists. I also raise some questions concerning the relation between quasi-absolutism and the idea that moral conventions derive from bargaining.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Darwall1995, author = {Darwall, Stephen}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {992-995}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought": 1640-1740}, volume = {58(4)}, year = {1995} } @article{Dascal1992, author = {Dascal, Marcelo and Horowitz, Amir}, title = {Semantics and the Psyche}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(2)}, pages = {395-399}, keywords = {epistemology, meaning, psyche, reality, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DAUENHAUER1981, author = {DAUENHAUER, BERNARD-P}, title = {SCHURMANN ON POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {130-132}, keywords = {coercion, political-philosoph}, abstract = {REINER SCHURMANN, BUILDING ON HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT, HAS PROPOSED A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY WHICH EXPLICITLY DISPENSES WITH QUESTIONS CONCERNING POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. IN THIS DISCUSSION, I POINT TO THE APPARENT PRACTICAL NECESSITY FOR RESTRICTED POLITICAL COERCION. THIS APPARENT NECESSITY, I ARGUE, MUST EITHER BE SHOWN TO BE ILLUSORY OR MUST BE TAKEN TO REQUIRE QUESTIONS CONCERNING POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. SINCE SCHURMAN HAS NOT AS YET DONE EITHER OF THESE, THEN HIS ARGUMENT REMAINS INCOMPLETE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{David1996, author = {David, Marian}, title = {Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {943-952}, keywords = {egocentrism, epistemology, judgment, knowledge}, abstract = {This fine book offers a wealth of illuminating and subtle discussions on a wide range of topics unified by the theme of rationality. At its heart lies Foley's proposal of a general framework for the theory of rationality: all rationality judgments are perspective-relative evaluations of how effective a person appears to be in satisfying her goals. Foley's main concern lies with a boldly subjective brand of epistemic rationality: it is egocentrically rational for S to believe p iff, reflecting on her own deepest standards, S would think that believing p furthers her purely epistemic goal of now having an accurate and comprehensive set of beliefs.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DAVID1991, author = {DAVID, Marian}, title = {Neither Mentioning 'Brains in a Vat' nor Mentioning Brains in a Vat Will Prove that We Are Not Brains in a Vat.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {brain, epistemology, externalism, scepticism}, abstract = {The paper considers some reconstructions of Putnam's anti-skeptical argument to the effect that we are not brains in a vat. The standard reconstructions of the argument are rejected because they employ a metalinguistic premise concerning the meaning of the sentence I am a brain in a vat' which makes them susceptible to skepticism about meaning. An invitingly simple object-language version of the argument is suggested. It, too, is rejected because the premise that we can think that we are brains in a vat remains open to skeptical doubt.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{David2006, author = {David, Marian}, title = {A Substitutional Theory of Truth?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {72(1)}, pages = {182-189}, keywords = {epistemology, metalinguistic, quantification, substitution, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Davidson2003, author = {Davidson, Donald}, title = {Responses to Barry Stroud, John McDowell, and Tyler Burge}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {691-699}, keywords = {language, meaning, representation, use}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DAVIES1983, author = {DAVIES, KIM}, title = {EMPIRICISM AND THE BOUNDS OF SENSE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {43}, pages = {401-406}, keywords = {empiricism, epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Davies1991, author = {Davies, Stephen}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {492-494}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Definitions of Art}, volume = {54(2)}, year = {1991} } @article{Davis1998, author = {Davis, Lawrence-H}, title = {Functionalism and Personal Identity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(4)}, pages = {781-804}, keywords = {epistemology, functionalism, metaphysics, personal-identit}, abstract = {Sydney Shoemaker has claimed that functionalism, a theory about mental states, implies a certain theory about the identity over time of persons, the entities that have mental states. He also claims that persons can survive a "Brain-State-Transfer" procedure. My examination of these claims includes description and analysis of imaginary cases, but--notably--not appeals to our "intuitions" concerning them. It turns out that Shoemaker's basic insight is correct. But there is no implication that it is necessary. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DAVIS1982, author = {DAVIS, WAYNE-A}, title = {MILLER ON WANTING, INTENDING, AND BEING WILLING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {107-110}, keywords = {intention, metaphysics, wanting, willing}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Davis2003, author = {Davis, Wayne-A}, title = {Psychologism and Humeanism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(2)}, pages = {452-459}, keywords = {axiology, explanation, humeanism, psychologism, reasons}, abstract = {Dancy argues that reasons are not psychological states, but perceived facts about the world, and shows that the reasons themselves are not causes. Dancy concludes that actions are not explained by beliefs and desires, and that reason explanations are not causal. I show that these further conclusions are unwarranted by sketching an alternative theory according to which what it is for an action to be done for a reason is for certain beliefs and desires to cause it. Our reasons are the contents of those beliefs and desires. This theory is compatible with Dancy's facts, and explains more.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Davis2005, author = {Davis, Wayne-A}, title = {Concepts and Epistemic Individuation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {290-325}, keywords = {concept, epistemology, individuation, integration}, abstract = {Peacocke (1999, 2001) defines what he calls the "integration challenge." The challenge is to integrate our metaphysics with our epistemology by showing that they are mutually acceptable. Peacocke's key conclusion is that the integration challenge can be met for "epistemically individuated concepts." A good theory of content, he believes, will close the apparent gap between an account of truth for any given subject matter and an overall account of knowledge. I shall argue that there are no epistemically individuated concepts, and shall critically analyze Peacocke's arguments for their existence. I will suggest more generally that the possession conditions of concepts and their principles of individuation shed little light on the epistemology or metaphysics of things other than concepts. My broader goal is to shed light on what concepts are by showing that they are more fundamental than the sorts of cognitive and epistemic factors a leading theory uses to define them. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Davis2003a, author = {Davis, Wayne-A}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {744-747}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Meaning, Expression, and Thought}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2003} } @other{Davis1998a, author = {Davis, Wayne-A}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {241-244}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory}, volume = {65(1)}, year = {1998} } @article{De-Almeida2001, author = {De-Almeida, Claudio}, title = {What Moore's Paradox Is About}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {33-58}, keywords = {argument, belief, language, paradox}, abstract = {On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore's paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which the believer can have no nonoverridden evidence. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DE-BELLIS1991, author = {DE-BELLIS, Mark}, title = {The Representational Content of Musical Experience.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {metaphysics, music, representation, sensation}, abstract = {In Sense and Content, Christopher Peacocke draws a distinction between sensational and representational properties of experience, illustrating it with ambiguous figures and their musical analogue, the tritone. The present paper, invoking music-theoretical accounts of musical listening, argues that musical experience has a representational content sufficiently rich to render Peacocke's postulation of sensational qualities unnecessary. (Content must be understood here on a fine grained conception, rather than, say as a set of possible worlds.)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DE-MONTPENSIER1972, author = {DE-MONTPENSIER, ROY-STONE}, title = {THE LOGIC OF ETHICAL STATEMENTS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {297-321}, keywords = {ethics, laws, morality, scepticism, statement}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DE-PAUL1988, author = {DE-PAUL, MICHAEL-R}, title = {NAIVETE AND CORRUPTION IN MORAL INQUIRY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {619-635}, keywords = {coherence, corruption, ethics, experience, moral-developmen}, abstract = {CONTEMPORARY MORAL THEORISTS HAVE FOCUSED THEIR ATTENTION ON REASONING TYPES OF EXPERIENCE TO THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER TYPES OF EXPERIENCE THAT CAN CAUSE US TO ALTER OUR MORAL JUDGMENTS. AS A RESULT COHERENCE APPROACHES TO MORAL INQUIRY, E.G., RAWLSIAN WIDE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM, CONTAIN NO ELEMENT WHICH WOULD DRIVE NAIVE PERSONS TO ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL LIFE EXPERIENCE AS AN ELEMENT IN MORAL INQUIRY. THIS DEFICIENCY IS NOT EASY TO CORRECT. THERE ARE TWO PROMISING APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM, BUT NEITHER IS OBVIOUSLY SATISFACTORY. ONE OF THESE APPROACHES ACCEPTS THE BROAD COHERENTIST CONCEPTION, BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT IT IMPOSES A SUFFICIENTLY STRONG OBLIGATION TO SEEK OUT FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES. THE OTHER SOLUTION IS ARISTOTELIAN AND IS OPPOSED TO COHERENTISM. THE ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH REJECTS THE IDEAL OF A METHOD THAT IS NEUTRAL BETWEEN SUBSTANTIVE MORAL THEORIES, AND THEREFORE, IT IS OPPOSED TO THE WHOLE DIRECTION OF MODERN THINKING ABOUT MORAL INQUIRY. THIS DISCUSSION AIMS AT BRINGING ONE TO SEE THAT A FUNDAMENTAL CHOICE BETWEEN THESE APPROACHES MUST BE MADE AND TO APPRECIATE THE COST OF EACH CHOICE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{De-Pierris2002, author = {De-Pierris, Graciela}, title = {Causation As a Philosophical Relation in Hume}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(3)}, pages = {499-545}, keywords = {causation, epistemology, metaphysics, naturalism, phenomenology, scepticism}, abstract = {By giving the proper emphasis to both radical skepticism and naturalism as two independent standpoints in Hume, I wish to propose a more satisfactory account of some of the more puzzling Humean claims on causation. I place these claims alternatively in either the philosophical standpoint of the radical skeptic or in the standpoint of everyday and scientific beliefs. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{De-Rosa2004, author = {De-Rosa, Raffaella}, title = {Locke's Essay Book I: The Question-Begging Status of the Anti-Nativist Arguments}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(1)}, pages = {37-64}, keywords = {empiricism, metaphysics, nativism, question-beggin}, abstract = {In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I of Locke's Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) "the awareness principle", viz., the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn't currently aware or hasn't been aware in the past. I then argue that the arguments' dependence on this principle is question begging on two counts. Unless this principle is defended, Locke's arguments beg the question against Descartes and Leibniz because their nativism implies the denial of the awareness principle. And even when Locke defended the principle, his arguments remain question begging because they presuppose the empiricism they aim to prove. The disclosure of the question-begging status of these arguments debunks a seemingly powerful way of attacking nativism.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DE-VRIES1983, author = {DE-VRIES, WILLEM}, title = {PROBLEMS IN AIRAKSINEN'S DIALECTIC OF FEELING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1983}, volume = {44}, pages = {85-94}, keywords = {dialectic, feeling, metaphysics}, abstract = {ACCORDING TO T AIRAKSINEN, THE RECURRENCE OF THE NOTION OF "FEELING" AT SEVERAL DIFFERENT STAGES OF HEGEL'S DIALECTIC IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT POSES DIFFICULT PROBLEMS FOR THE INTERPRETER. HE PROPOSES TO RESOLVE THEM BY DEVELOPING A DOUBLE ASPECT THEORY OF DIALECTIC. READING THE DIALECTIC FORWARDS, WE SEE THE "ONTOLOGICAL" ASPECT AND ENCOUNTER DIFFERENT THINGS AT EACH LEVEL. READING THE DIALECTIC BACKWARDS WE SEE THE "METHODICAL" ASPECT, AND CAN LUMP THINGS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS INTO GROUPS OF COMMON KINDS. THE AUTHOR ARGUES AGAINST AIRAKSINEN'S POSITION, FIRST BY CLAIMING THAT HE HAS MISCONSTRUED THE NOTION OF FEELING BY OVERLOOKING SEVERAL IMPORTANT HEGELIAN DISTINCTIONS, VIZ., BETWEEN SENSATION AND FEELING, AND BETWEEN INNER AND OUTER FEELINGS. THE AUTHOR THEN ARGUES THAT WITH A PROPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE FORM/CONTENT DISTINCTION THE RECURRENCE OF FEELING AT DIFFERENT POINTS IN THE DIALECTIC IS PERFECTLY INTELLIGIBLE WITHOUT A DOUBLE ASPECT INTERPRETATION OF THE DIALECTIC.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Debellis1996, author = {Debellis, M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {732-735}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Music and Conceptualization}, volume = {58(3)}, year = {1996} } @article{Dees1996, author = {Dees, Richard-H}, title = {Moral Conversations}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {531-550}, keywords = {conversation, conviction, ethics, morality, self}, abstract = {By considering their experiences when people undergo a change in their moral perspective, I argue that we can best explain and justify conversions by reference to the internal and contextual features of the convert herself. Conversions occur in three ways: by a gradual evolution in the convert's values, by the discovery of facts that alters her view of the world, and by a radical transformation that changes her whole life. Only in the last of these cases does a contextual view seem inadequate and then we are left with nothing meaningful to say except what will make sense to her.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Deigh2004, author = {Deigh, John}, title = {Nussbaum's Account of Compassion}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {465-472}, keywords = {compassion, emotion, ethics, eudaimonia, stoicism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Delaney1994, author = {Delaney, C-F}, title = {The Goal of Science and the Nature of Reality: Rescher's Pragmatic Idealism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(2)}, pages = {395-402}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, pragmatism, reality, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Della-Rocca2005, author = {Della-Rocca, Michael}, title = {Descartes, the Cartesian Circle, and Epistemology without God}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(1)}, pages = {1-33}, keywords = {doubt, epistemology, externalism, god, idea}, abstract = {This paper defends an interpretation of Descartes according to which he sees us as having normative (and not merely psychological) certainty of all clear and distinct ideas during the period in which they are apprehended clearly and distinctly. However, on this view, a retrospective doubt about clear and distinct ideas is possible. This interpretation allows Descartes to avoid the Cartesian circle in an effective way and also shows that Descartes is surprisingly, in some respects, an epistemological externalist. The paper goes on to defend this interpretation against some powerful philosophical objections by Margaret Wilson and others by showing how Descartes's doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths can be brought in to support his epistemology. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Della-Rocca2005a, author = {Della-Rocca, Michael}, title = {Descartes-Inseparability-Almog}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {701-708}, keywords = {dualism, essentialism, metaphysics, mind, separability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DEMOS1961, author = {DEMOS, RAPHAEL}, title = {SOME REMARKS ON ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL REASON.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {153-162}, keywords = {attitude, cognition, emotion, ethics, imperatives, meaning, moral-judgment; practical-reaso}, abstract = {PRACTICAL WISDOM "PHRONESIS" INVOLVES SOMETHING MORE THAN COGNITIVE MEANING. THIS ARTICLE ATTEMPTS TO FIND OUT, WHAT, ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE, DIFFERENTIATES PRACTICAL WISDOM FROM OTHER COGNITIVE ATTITUDES. IT IS CLAIMED THAT ARISTOTLE VIEWS MORAL UTTERANCES AS HAVING BOTH AN EMOTIVE AND AN IMPERATIVE MEANING. HENCE, HIS VIEWS ON ETHICAL SENTENCES ANTICIPATED THOSE OF STEVENSON AND AYER. YET TODAY, EMOTIVE MEANING IS VIEWED AS EXCLUDING COGNITIVE-DESCRIPTIVE MEANING; HOWEVER, FOR ARISTOTLE THESE WERE NOT CONTRARIES. AN EMOTIVE--IMPERATIVE MEANING ALSO IS TRUE OR FALSE, ALSO IS BELIEVED. THUS ARISTOTLE IS BETTER COMPARED WITH KANT. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES WITH A DISCUSSION OF MAN'S BASIC DUTY--TO TRY TO FIND WHAT HIS DUTY IS. THIS, HIS META-DUTY, IS PROBLEMATIC; IS IT BY NATURE OR NOT? (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DEMPSTER1989, author = {DEMPSTER, DOUGLAS-J}, title = {EXEMPLIFICATION AND THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF ART.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {393-412}, keywords = {art, cognitive, exemplification, symbol, twentieth, valuation}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE BEGINS BY ARGUING THAT NELSON GOODMAN'S ACCOUNT OF EXEMPLIFICATION IS CENTRAL NOT ONLY TO HIS THEORY OF ARTISTIC EXPRESSION AND HIS AMBITIOUS ASSIMILATION OF THE ARTS AND SCIENCES UNDER A THEORY OF SYMBOL SYSTEMS AND COGNITIVE VALUES, BUT THAT IT IS CENTRAL ALSO TO THE NOTORIETY OF SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF FICTIONAL DISCOURSE AND FICTIVE PICTORIAL REPRESENTATION. THE PAPER ARGUES AGAINST THE NECESSITY AND SUFFICIENCY OF GOODMAN'S ACCOUNT OF EXEMPLIFICATION, AND CONCLUDES THAT A SEMANTIC ACCOUNT OF EXEMPLIFICATION CANNOT BE CONSTRUCTED WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF NOMINALISM. IT CLOSES WITH SOME TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS TOWARD A NONSEMANTIC ACCOUNT OF EXEMPLIFICATION THAT WOULD STILL SUPPORT GOODMAN'S CLAIMS ABOUT THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF ART.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Denis2001, author = {Denis, Lara}, title = {From Friendship to Marriage: Revising Kant}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(1)}, pages = {1-28}, keywords = {ethics, friendship, marriage, moral-theor}, abstract = {This paper examines Kant's accounts of friendship and marriage, and argues for what can be called an ideal of "moral marriage" based on Kant's notion of moral friendship. After explaining why Kant values friendship so highly, it gives an account of the ways in which marriage falls far short, according to Kant, of what friendship has to offer. The paper then argues that many of Kant's reasons for finding marriage morally impoverished compared with friendship are wrong-headed. The paper further argues that a few of Kant's views about friendship are false. The main point is that, when we slightly revise Kant's account of friendship and jettison Kant's misguided notions about marriage, we see that marriages can aspire to much of the same moral richness as friendships. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Denkel1997, author = {Denkel, Arda}, title = {On the Compresence of Tropes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {599-606}, keywords = {cohesion, epistemology, internal, trope}, abstract = {Once we assume that objects are bundles of tropes, we want to know how that latter cohere. Are they held together by a substratum, are they linked by external relations or do they cling to one another by internal relations? This paper begins by exploring the reasons for eliminating the first two suggestions. Defending that the third option can be made plausible, it advances the following thesis: Maintaining that tropes are held in a compresence by appropriately qualified internal relations avoids the consequence that such properties will be essential to the object. The specific targets of the second part of the paper include, first, a more precise description of the notion of a cohesive internal relation, and second, an explanation of how alteration is possible in an object the particular properties of which hold together by qualified internal relations.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Denkel1992, author = {Denkel, Arda}, title = {Substance Without Substratum}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(3)}, pages = {705-711}, keywords = {epistemology, substance, truth}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Denkel2000, author = {Denkel, Arda}, title = {The Refutation of Substrata}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {431-439}, keywords = {epistemology, individuation, sameness, substratum}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Denkel1995, author = {Denkel, Arda}, title = {Artifacts and Constituents}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(2)}, pages = {311-322}, keywords = {aesthetics, art, artifact, essentialism, object}, abstract = {Is this paper the author argues that a restricted form of artifact-essentialism is tenable. The essence of an artifact is the structure that gives it the same function in every possible world nomologically equivalent to the actual. The author refutes the claim that the reasons for regarding an artifact and the piece of stuff constituting it as nonidentical entities are inadequate, and demonstrates that an ontology intermediate between artifact-essentialism and its antithesis cannot be consistent. Failing to be an essentialist commits one to a full-fledged anti-essentialism in the same respect.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Denkel1996, author = {Denkel, Arda}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {238-240}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Object and Property}, volume = {62(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{Dennett2004, author = {Dennett, Daniel-C}, title = {Commentary on John Dupre's Human Nature and the Limits of Science}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {473-483}, keywords = {evolution, human-nature; limits, metaphysics, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dennett2002, author = {Dennett, Daniel-C}, title = {Commentary on Sober and Wilson, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {692-696}, keywords = {altruism, ethics, evolution, psychology, unselfishness}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DENNETT1990, author = {DENNETT, Daniel-C}, title = {The Interpretation of Texts, People and Other Artifacts.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, keywords = {artifact, interpretation, language, people, text}, abstract = {The interpretation of texts (hermeneutics), people (intentional psychology), artifacts, and evolutionary design processes (adaptationism) are shown to be practices governed by the same principles, subject to the same problems and controversies, and limited by the same ultimate indeterminacies. In every exercise of interpretation, the intentions of the "author" (if any) are only defeasible indicators of meaning or function, and beyond an assessment of current or future functional prowess, there are no deeper facts to ground an original or fundamental attribution of meaning.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dennett1993, author = {Dennett, Daniel-C}, title = {Precis of Consciousness Explained}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {889-892}, keywords = {cognitive-science; consciousness, metaphysics, mind, phenomena}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dennett1993a, author = {Dennett, Daniel-C}, title = {The Message Is: There Is No Medium}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(4)}, pages = {919-931}, keywords = {cartesianism, consciousness, metaphysics, mind}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DENNETT1987, author = {DENNETT, DANIEL-C}, title = {COMMENTARY ON CAM'S "PROPOSITIONS ABOUT IMAGES".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {339-341}, keywords = {image, metaphysics, minds, proposition}, abstract = {IN "PROPOSITIONS ABOUT IMAGES" CAM CORRECTLY ANALYZES AND CRITICIZES THE GROUNDS I GAVE, IN THE WORKS HE CITES, FOR MY DENIAL THAT WE HAVE PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO ANYTHING DESERVING TO BE CALLED A MENTAL IMAGE. CAM CLAIMS, MOREOVER, THAT THERE IS NO WAY FOR ME TO CASH MY "PROMISSARY NOTES" ABOUT DESCRIPTIVE PROPOSITIONS. HE IS RIGHT, BUT I WAS WRONG TO THINK I NEEDED SUCH AN ESCAPE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DENNETT1968, author = {DENNETT, D-C}, title = {FEATURES OF INTENTIONAL ACTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {232-244}, keywords = {action, epistemology, intention}, abstract = {IN "INTENTION" (BLACKWELL'S 1957, SECOND EDITION 1963), G.E.M. ANSCOMBE OFFERS AN ARGUMENT TO SHOW THAT "AN ACTION IS NOT CALLED 'INTENTIONAL' IN VIRTUE OF ANY EXTRA FEATURE WHICH EXISTS WHEN IT IS PERFORMED"; ON THE MOST INTERESTING AND USEFUL INTERPRETATION THIS CONCLUSION IS UNTENABLE. SINCE ANSCOMBE'S ARGUMENT IS ABOUT WHAT COULD SERVE AS CRITERION FOR INTENTIONAL ACTION, THE NOTION OF A CRITERION FOR USE OF A WORD IS EXAMINED. IT IS THEN ARGUED THAT ANSCOMBE'S ARGUMENT DEPENDS ON A CLAIM THAT IS UNSUPPORTED AND IMPLAUSIBLE, AND WHICH, MOREOVER, ENTAILS PHYSICAL INDETERMINISM AT THE MACROSCOPIC LEVEL. A WEAKER, INDEED LARGELY TRIVIAL, VERSION OF THE ARGUMENT IS SEEN TO BE TENABLE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Densmore1999, author = {Densmore, Shannon and Dennett, Daniel-C}, title = {The Virtues of Virtual Machines}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {747-761}, keywords = {epistemology, machine, virtual, virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DePaul2002, author = {DePaul, Michael-R}, title = {A Half Dozen Puzzles Regarding Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {629-635}, keywords = {attitude, axiology, hedonism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{DePaul1993, author = {DePaul, Michael-R}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {959-962}, publisher = {Routledge}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Balance and Refinement}, volume = {56(4)}, year = {1993} } @article{DeRose1996, author = {DeRose, Keith}, title = {Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {193-197}, keywords = {content, contextualism, epistemology, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DeRose2004, author = {DeRose, Keith}, title = {The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {346-350}, keywords = {contextualism, epistemology, knowledge, standard}, abstract = {A new form of invariantism in epistemology, the 'subject-sensitive invariantism' of John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley, now stalks contextualism, threatening both to provide a rival account of the linguistic phenomena contextualism seeks to explain within an invariantist semantics, and also, as Thomas Blackson points out, to undermine an argument for contextualism in DeRose's earlier "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context." The current paper attacks 'subject-sensitive invariantism' by showing how it mishandles certain third-person attributions of knowledge.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DeRose1992, author = {DeRose, Keith}, title = {Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {913-929}, keywords = {attribution, contextualism, epistemology, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DeRose2000, author = {DeRose, Keith}, title = {Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {697-706}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, evidence, knowledge}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DERRIDA1969, author = {DERRIDA, JACQUES}, title = {THE ENDS OF MAN.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {31-57}, keywords = {french, man, metaphysics}, abstract = {CETTE COMMUNICATION PROPOSEE A UN COLLOQUE FRANCO-AMERICAIN EST L'ANALYSE DE LA SITUATION PHILOSOPHIQUE FRANCAISE ACTUELLE. APRES QUELQUES CONSIDERATIONS SUR LA SIGNIFICATION POLITIQUE ET HISTORIQUE D'UN COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL DE PHILOSOPHIE, L'AUTEUR POSE LA QUESTION DE L'HOMME ET DE SES FINS (AU SENS A BIGU DE MORT ET DE FINALITE), TELLE QU'ELLE FASCINE LA PHILOSOPHIE FRANCAISE AUJOURD'HUI. POUR COMPRENDRE EN QUELS TERMES SE POSE AUJOURD'HUI CETTE QUESTION EN FRANCE, IL FAUT TENIR COMPTE DE LA LECTURE QUI A ETE FAITE PAR LES DEUX DERNIERES GENERATIONS DE KANT, HEGEL, HUSSERL ET HEIDEGGER. A UN PREMIER NIVEAU, CETTE LECTURE A MECONNU, DE MANIERE TRES SIGNIFICATIVE, LA CRITIQUE DE L'ANTHROPOLOGISME, SINON DE L'HUMANISME, QUI EST A L'OEUVRE CHEZ CES QUATRE PHILOSOPHES. LES PRINCIPAUX ARGUMENTS DE CETTE CRITIQUE SONT RECONSTITUES AU COURS D'UNE PREMIERE ETAPE. MAIS A UN DEUXIEME NIVEAU, IL APPARAIT QU'UN HUMANISME PROFOND SOUTIENT CETTE CRITIQUE. DEMONSTRATION EN EST FAITE, AVEC UNE ATTENTION PARTICULIERE EN CE QUI CONCERNE HEIDEGGER, DONT LA SITUATION EST PLUS DIFFICILE ET PLUS DECISIVE. C'EST CETTE DERMIERE ANALYSE QUI EST PRESUPPOSEE PAR TOUTE LA CRITIQUE DE L'HUMANISME QUI DOMINE AUJOURD'HUI EN FRANCE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DEVINE1987, author = {DEVINE, PHILIP-E}, title = {RELATIVISM, ABORTION, AND TOLERANCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {48}, pages = {131-138}, keywords = {abortion, ethics, relativism, taoism, tolerance}, abstract = {THIS PAPER REPLIES TO DAVID WONG'S CONTENTION, IN "MORAL RELATIVITY", THAT A PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL TOLERANCE CAN BE BUILT ON RELATIVIST PREMISES. TOLERANCE, IT IS ARGUED, CANNOT BE A SUPRA-SYSTEMIC PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE RELATIONS AMONG MORALITIES; RATHER, ITS MEANING WILL DEPEND ON THE PARTICULAR MORALITY IN WHICH IT IS EMBEDDED. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE ESSAY, SIMON BLACKBURN'S SIMILAR ARGUMENT IN "SPREADING THE WORD" IS BRIEFLY CONSIDERED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Devitt1993, author = {Devitt, Michael}, title = {Localism and Analyticity}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {641-646}, keywords = {analysis, epistemology, logic, meaning}, abstract = {In their discussion of semantic holism, Fodor and Lepore claim that Quine showed that any inferential properties constituting a meaning cannot be distinguished on epistemic grounds like apriority. But they often write as if Quine showed that such properties cannot be distinguished at all. The paper argues that Quine did not show the latter. It goes on to propose a criterion for distinguishing the constitutive properties: they are the ones that determine reference. Fodor is not in a position to reject this criterion since he already uses an analogous one in his own theory.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Devitt2002, author = {Devitt, Michael}, title = {Meaning and Use}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {106-121}, keywords = {language, meaning, semantics, thought, use}, abstract = {Part I argues that the use theory in Horwich's Meaning does not give sufficient attention to the relation between language and thought. A development of the theory is proposed that gives explanatory priority to the mental. Part II argues that Horwich greatly overstates the case for his use theory; that the arguments from ignorance and error against description theories of reference can be adapted against the use theory; and that a tempting development of the use theory would risk both the collapse of the theory into truth referentialism and the difficulties that have plagued truth referentialism. Finally, a consideration of our ordinary thought ascriptions provides evidence against any use theory. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Devitt1996, author = {Devitt, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {489-492}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism}, volume = {60(2)}, year = {1996} } @other{Dicker1993, author = {Dicker, Georges}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {723-726}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction}, volume = {56(3)}, year = {1993} } @article{DICKIE1961, author = {DICKIE, GEORGE}, title = {BULLOUGH AND THE CONCEPT OF PSYCHICAL DISTANCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {233-238}, keywords = {aesthetics, attitude, inhibition, practical, principle, psychical-distanc}, abstract = {DICKIE DISCUSSES SOME MISINTERPRETATIONS AND INADEQUACIES OF BULLOUGH'S VIEW OF PSYCHICAL DISTANCE. THIS IS A PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTITUDE A SPECTATOR TAKES TOWARD SOME OBJECT, YET PSYCHICAL DISTANCE IS NOT THE WHOLE OF THE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE. IT IS A NECESSARY AND SUSTAINING, BUT NOT A SUFFICIENT CONDITION OF THE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THINKING OF ACTUAL SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL DISTANCE AS A SPECIES OF THE GENERAL TYPE PSYCHICAL DISTANCE IS INCORRECT. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED. PHYSICAL DISTANCE MAY HELP CAUSE, DESTROY, OR INHIBIT (DEPENDING ON THE DEGREE) PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE, BUT THESE TWO CANNOT BE THOUGHT OF AS THINGS OF THE SAME TYPE, DIFFERING ONLY IN GENERALITY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DIETL1968, author = {DIETL, PAUL}, title = {HUME ON THE PASSIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {554-566}, keywords = {ethics, passion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DIGBY1981, author = {DIGBY, TOM-F}, title = {KESARCODI-WATSON ON ATMA-VIDYA AND "EGO".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {123-124}, keywords = {atman, metaphysics, objectivism, self-knowledg}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dillard1996, author = {Dillard, Peter-S}, title = {Radical Anti-Deflationism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {173-182}, keywords = {deflation, epistemology, radicalism, truth}, abstract = {Paul Boghossian argues that deflationism about truth is incompatible with any demarcation between factual and nonfactual statements, and indeed presupposes a metaphysically loaded concept of truth. Both objections fail. I show that there is a coherent formulation of deflationism in terms Boghossian accepts, and I show that Boghossian takes as primitive a vague notion of "Correspondence between Language and Reality" that the deflationist is not committed and should reject.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Divers2004, author = {Divers, John}, title = {Agnosticism about Other Worlds: A New Antirealist Programme in Modality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(3)}, pages = {660-685}, keywords = {agnosticism, antirealism, metaphysics, modality, possible-worl}, abstract = {The modal antirealist, as presented here, aims to secure at least some of the benefits associated with talking in genuine modal realist terms while avoiding commitment to a plurality of Lewisian (or ersatz) worlds. The antirealist stance of agnosticism about other worlds combines acceptance of Lewis's account of what world-talk means with refusal to assert, or believe in, the existence of other worlds. Agnosticism about other worlds does not entail a comprehensive agnosticism about modality, but where such agnosticism about modality is enforced, the aim of the agnostic programme is to show that it is not detrimental to our modal practices. The agnostic programme consists in an attempt to demonstrate the rational dispensability of that disputed class of modal beliefs which the agnostic eschews, but which are held by the realist and the folk. Here I attempt to motivate, describe, and illustrate such an agnostic antirealist programme in modal philosophy.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DOAN1960, author = {DOAN, FRANK-M}, title = {ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASE OF LANGUAGE WITH "SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MATHEMATICAL" MODELS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {239-247}, keywords = {ideal-language; intelligibility, language, mathematics, metaphysics, model, structure, symbolism}, abstract = {IS THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASE OF LANGUAGE ULTIMATELY AN EXTRA LINGUISTIC ONE? THE AUTHOR THINKS THAT LANGUAGE MUST HAVE AN INTRINSIC VALUE; CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURES ARE NOT MERELY AN EXPRESSION OF THE INTEGRATION OF PERSONALITY. SYMBOLS MUST BE ALLOWED TO SATISFY THE CONDITIONS FOR DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION. THE BASE OF AN IDEAL LANGUAGE REMAINS AT THE LEVEL OF ITS SYMBOLS. THE COGNITIVE POWER RESIDES IN THE SYMBOLS AND NOT IN AN EXTRALINGUISTIC PRINCIPLE. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DOBSEVAGE1963, author = {DOBSEVAGE, A-P}, title = {EXISTENTIAL VALUES ARE HUMANISTIC, AND MORAL TOO.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {610-615}, keywords = {axiology, choice, existentialism, freedom, morality, value}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Doepke1996, author = {Doepke, Frederick-C}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {240-243}, publisher = {Open Court}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument}, volume = {62(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{DOMMEYER1961, author = {DOMMEYER, FREDERICK-C}, title = {A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF C J DUCASSE'S METAPHILOSOPHY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {439-455}, keywords = {appraisal, ethics, knowledge, metaphilosophy, metaphysics, methodology, norm, philosophy, science}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DORE1984, author = {DORE, CLEMENT}, title = {DOES SUFFERING SERVE VALUABLE ENDS?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {103-110}, keywords = {god, religion, suffering}, abstract = {IN "DOES SUFFERING SERVE VALUABLE ENDS?" I FIRST CONSIDER A NUMBER OF ARGUMENTS FOR A NEGATIVE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. ONE ARGUMENT IS THAT, JUST AS WE KNOW THAT, SAY, WHISTLING DOESN'T ALWAYS CAUSE VALUABLE STATES OF AFFAIRS AND HEATING WATER TO THE BOILING POINT DOESN'T CAUSE TORNADOES, SO, TOO, WE HAVE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AGAINST THE THESIS THAT SUFFERING ALWAYS SERVES VALUABLE ENDS. ANOTHER ARGUMENT IS THAT EVEN THE THEIST DOESN'T ALWAYS THINK OTHERWISE, SINCE HE BELIEVES THAT THERE ARE SOME CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH HE IS OBLIGED TO ABOLISH SUFFERING.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Doris2005, author = {Doris, John-M}, title = {Precis of Lack of Character}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {632-635}, keywords = {character, ethics, practical-reason; virtue}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Doris2005a, author = {Doris, John-M}, title = {Replies: Evidence and Sensibility}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {656-677}, keywords = {adequacy, content, ethics, virtue-ethic}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Doris2002, author = {Doris, John-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {632-635}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2002} } @other{Doris2002a, author = {Doris, John-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {636-642}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2002} } @other{Doris2002b, author = {Doris, John-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {643-647}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2002} } @other{Doris2002c, author = {Doris, John-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {648-655}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2002} } @other{Doris2002d, author = {Doris, John-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {656-677}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior}, volume = {71(3)}, year = {2002} } @article{Dorr2003, author = {Dorr, Cian}, title = {Merricks on the Existence of Human Organisms}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {67(3)}, pages = {711-718}, keywords = {existence, human, metaphysics, organism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DOSS1970, author = {DOSS, SEALE-R}, title = {COPERNICUS REVISITED: TIME VERSUS "TIME" VERSUS TIME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {31}, pages = {193-211}, keywords = {epistemology, time}, abstract = {WITTGENSTEIN'S REMARKS ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF TIME ARE ONLY HINTS AS TO ITS CHARACTER. PURSUED IN DETAIL, THESE HINTS LEAD TO THREE CONCLUSIONS: 1) THE WORD 'TIME' MAY BE USED IN MANY DIFFERENT WAYS, BUT NOT IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE QUESTION "WHAT IS TIME?" MAY BE ANSWERED; 2) OUR KNOWLEDGE OF TIME IS BASED UPON THE WAYS IN WHICH THE WORD 'TIME' MAY BE USED MEANINGFULLY; 3) OUR KNOWLEDGE OF TIME IS LIMITED BY THE WAYS IN WHICH THE WORD 'TIME' MAY BE USED MEANINGFULLY. THESE CONCLUSIONS SUGGEST A 'COPERNICAN REVOLUTION' REMINISCENT OF KANT, EXCEPT THAT WITTGENSTEIN'S POSITION (WHICH MAY BE CHARACTERIZED AS 'LINGUISTIC IDEALISM' AS OPPOSED TO 'TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM') REQUIRES NO NOUMENAL SUPPOSITIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DOSTAL1982, author = {DOSTAL, ROBERT-J}, title = {THE PROBLEM OF "INDIFFERENZ" IN SEIN UND ZEIT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {43}, pages = {43-58}, keywords = {dasein, indifference, metaphysics}, abstract = {THE PAPER DISCUSSES THE TECHNICAL TERM "INDIFFERENZ" AS IT OCCURS IN "SEIN UND ZEIT". THROUGH THIS ONE CONFRONTS THE PROBLEM OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MODALITY OF "DASSEIN". HEIDEGGER AMBIVALENTLY ASSIGNS SOMETIMES A THREEFOLD MODALITY OF AUTHENTICITY, INAUTHENTICITY, AND INDIFFERENCE AND SOMETIMES A TWOFOLD MODALITY OF AUTHENTICITY AND INAUTHENTICITY. IT IS ARGUED THAT THE AMBIVALENCE IS SIGNIFICANT OF THE METHODOLOGICAL AMBIVALENCE OF HEIDEGGER TOWARD TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY. FINALLY THE MODALITY IS TWOFOLD WHICH UNDERMINES THE INDIFFERENT METHOD AND VOICE OF THE TEXT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DOSTAL1987, author = {DOSTAL, ROBERT-J}, title = {THE WORLD NEVER LOST: THE HERMENEUTICS OF TRUST.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {413-434}, keywords = {hermeneutics, language, text}, abstract = {THIS ESSAY EXAMINES GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS OF TRUST AND DEFENDS IT AGAINST THE CRITICISMS RAISED BY RORTY AND DERRIDA, AMONG OTHERS, WHO URGE A 'STRONG TEXTUALISM' AND A HERMENEUTICS OF SUSPICION. THE NOTIONS OF 'THE WORLD', 'THE MATTER AT HAND' ("SACHE SELBST"), AND 'TRUTH' ARE SEEN AS PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE HERMENEUTICS OF TRUST. IT IS ALSO ARGUED THAT GADAMER HAS NOT PROVIDED AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Double2004, author = {Double, Richard}, title = {The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {411-422}, keywords = {ethics, free-will; freedom, morality, subjectivism}, abstract = {Adopting metalevel free-will subjectivism is one among several ways to maintain that persons never experience moral freedom in their choices. The other ways of arguing against moral freedom I consider are presented by Saul Smilansky, Ted Honderich, Bruce Waller, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom. In this paper, without arguing for the acceptance of free-will subjectivism, I argue that subjectivism has some moral and theoretical advantages over its kindred theories.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DOUBLE1985, author = {DOUBLE, RICHARD}, title = {PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {383-392}, keywords = {dualism, materialism, metaphysics, phenomena, property}, abstract = {MANY FRIENDS AND FOES OF MATERIALISM BELIEVE THAT PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES (PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROPERTIES, QUALIA, THE SUBJECTIVE FEATURES OF EXPERIENCE) POSE SEVERE DIFFICULTIES FOR MATERIALISM AND REQUIRE MATERIALISTS TO DENY THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH PROPERTIES. THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT THIS BELIEF IS UNWARRANTED BECAUSE: (1) THERE IS NO ONTOLOGICAL GROUND BETWEEN MATERIALISM AND SUBSTANCE DUALISM, AND (2) PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES PROVIDE NO REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR SUBSTANCE DUALISM. MATERIALISTS SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF THE PHENOMENAL (SOMETHING MANY DO NOT), WHILE ANTI-MATERIALISTS CANNOT USE THE PHENOMENAL CHARACTER OF THE MENTAL TO DISCREDIT MATERIALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Double1996, author = {Double, Richard}, title = {Honderich on the Consequences of Determinism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(4)}, pages = {847-854}, keywords = {determinism, epistemology, mind, neuroscience}, abstract = {In How Free Are You? Ted Honderich presents his idea of how we should view human freedom and responsibility if we believe that all human actions are determined. In this paper I endorse Honderich's analysis of the attitudinal nature of the free will issue, but argue that on Honderich's conception of attitudes a better conclusion would be that determinism can have no consequences for our attitudes about persons. To show this I develop an analogy between metaethics and normative ethics to show that on the premise that attitudes are neither true nor false, metaphysical claims have no consequences for our lower-level theorizing, whether in normative ethics or in free will.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Double1996a, author = {Double, Richard}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {1082-1086}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Metaphilosophy and Free Will}, volume = {49(4)}, year = {1996} } @article{DOUBROVSKY1960, author = {DOUBROVSKY, J-S}, title = {EXISTENCE AND SYMBOL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {229-238}, keywords = {existence, existentialism, man, metaphysics, psychoanalysis, quality, symbol, world}, abstract = {THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ON THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF SYMBOLS IS DISCUSSED. IT IS SHOWN HOW THE OBJECTIVE VALUE OF QUALITIES IS EXPLAINED AWAY BY THE THEORY OF EMOTIONAL PROJECTION OF THE EGO INTO THINGS. THE PRESUPPOSITION HERE IS THAT SYMBOLS ARE REALLY NEGATED AND DISCARDED, SINCE THEY STAND IN THE WAY OF KNOWLEDGE. THE AUTHOR FEELS THAT SYMBOLS HAVE TO BE UNDERSTOOD IN THEIR OWN WORLD, NOT THE WORLD OF SCIENCE, BUT THAT OF EXISTENCE. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT SARTRE RESTORED SYMBOLISM TO ITS ORIGINARY PRELOGICAL LEVEL; A SYMBOL HERE IS REVELATORY OF EXISTENCE OR MAN'S BEING IN THE WORLD. OUR SYMBOLIC WORLD IS THE REAL WORLD; SCIENCE IS BUILT ON THIS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT CERTAIN SYMBOLIC THEMES OR PATTERNS THROUGHOUT HUMAN HISTORY SHOW THE HUMAN CONDITION, WHICH DETERMINES SOME FUNDAMENTAL SITUATIONS (COMMON TO ALL MAN), WHICH ARE TRANSHISTORICAL. ONE CANNOT DO AWAY WITH SYMBOLS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Dowe2000, author = {Dowe, Phil}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {244-248}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Physical Causation}, volume = {67(1)}, year = {2000} } @article{DOWNES1965, author = {DOWNES, CHAUNCEY}, title = {HUSSERL AND THE COHERENCE OF THE OTHER MINDS PROBLEM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {253-259}, keywords = {epistemology, intentionality, naturalism, other-minds; person, phenomenology}, abstract = {IN STATING THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS IT IS ASSUMED THAT SELF-KNOWLEDGE IS POSSIBLE BUT THE EXISTENCE OF OTHERS IS DUBIOUS. STATING THE PROBLEM IS INCOHERENT BECAUSE A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IS ACCEPTED IN TERMS OF WHICH THE PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED. "STARTING FROM ONE'S OWN CASE," IN THE CARTESIAN TRADITION, CREATES A PSEUDO-PROBLEM. HUSSERL ATTACKS THIS TRADITION, BUT BY INVESTIGATING THE STRUCTURE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO, SEEMS TO BE IN THE TRADITION. DOWNES ARGUES THAT THIS IS NOT SO, AND THAT HUSSERL'S CAREFUL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE NATURALISTIC AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL ENABLES HIM TO AVOID INCOHERENCE IN HIS TREATMENT OF OTHER MINDS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE PROBLEM IS A SIGN OF THEORETICAL CONFUSION AT THE FOUNDATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PERSON, AND CAN ONLY BE CORRECTED BY AN EMPHASIS ON INTENTIONALITY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DOWNIE1963, author = {DOWNIE, R-S}, title = {HOPE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {248-251}, keywords = {belief, desire, hope, intention, mind, philosophical-anthropology; probability}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Doyle2000, author = {Doyle, James}, title = {Moral Rationalism and Moral Commitment}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {1-22}, keywords = {commitment, ethics, morality, rationality}, abstract = {I argue that the moral rationalist is not in fact committed to the possibility of egoist-conversion, and that an explanation of its impossibility can be given which is compatible with rationalism; so this impossibility counts neither against rationalism nor for the want-belief model. I consider a number of apparent objections to my position and rebut them. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DRANGE1969, author = {DRANGE, THEODORE}, title = {REPLY TO MARTIN ON TYPE CROSSINGS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {30}, pages = {136-139}, keywords = {language, sentence, type}, abstract = {THIS IS A DEFENSE OF DRANGE'S BOOK "TYPE CROSSINGS" (MOUTON, 1966) AGAINST OBJECTIONS RAISED BY ROBERT MARTIN IN HIS DISCUSSION ARTICLE "DRANGE ON TYPE CROSSINGS" (SAME ISSUE). DRANGE DEFENDS HIS ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT TYPE CROSSINGS (E.G., THE SENTENCE "VIRTUE IS BLUE") ARE BOTH (NECESSARILY) FALSE AND (CONCEPTUALLY) MEANINGLESS. HE ALSO DEFENDS THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD IN THE BOOK WHICH AIM AT REFUTING THE VIEW THAT THERE ARE TYPE=RULES IN EFFECT IN ORDINARY LANGUAGE. FOR THE MOST PART, MARTIN'S OBJECTIONS ARE SHOWN TO STEM FROM CERTAIN MISUNDERSTANDINGS, AND AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO CORRECT THESE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Draper2004, author = {Draper, Kai}, title = {Epicurean Equanimity Towards Death}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(1)}, pages = {92-114}, keywords = {death, equanimity, ethics, life}, abstract = {This paper assesses two reformulations of Epicurus's argument that "death...is nothing to us, since while we exist, death is not present; and whenever death is present, we do not exist." The first resembles many contemporary reformulations in that it attempts to reach the conclusion that death is not to the disadvantage of its subject. I argue that this rather anachronistic sort of reformulation cannot succeed. The second reformulation stays closer to the spirit of Epicurus's actual position on death by attempting to reach the conclusion that it is inappropriate to fear or dread or have any other negative affective response towards death. I raise a plausible objection to this argument, suggesting that dissatisfaction is sometimes an appropriate response to the approach of death. I then go on to consider the possibility that Epicurus was partly right in that it may always be inappropriate to dread death.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dreier2000, author = {Dreier, James}, title = {Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(3)}, pages = {619-638}, keywords = {ethics, externalism, model, morality, motivation}, abstract = {The disagreement between internalists and externalists runs deep, and it lingers even in the face of clever intuition pumps. An argument in Michael Smith's The Moral Problem seeks some leverage against externalism from a point within normative theory. Smith argues by dilemma: Externalists either fail to explain why motivation tracks moral judgment in a good moral agents. I argue that there are alternative models of moral motivation available to externalists, in particular a model according to which a good moral agent is one who is effectively regulated by a second order desire to desire to do what is right. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dreier2002, author = {Dreier, James}, title = {The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative Judgment}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {136-143}, keywords = {ethics, expression, judgment, normative, passion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dretske2000, author = {Dretske, Fred}, title = {Reply to Lopes}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(2)}, pages = {455-459}, keywords = {metaphysics, mind, psychology, representation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dretske1997, author = {Dretske, Fred}, title = {So Do We Know or Don't We?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(2)}, pages = {407-409}, keywords = {epistemology, knowing, knowledge, scepticism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DRETSKE1990, author = {DRETSKE, FRED}, title = {Reply to Reviewers of "Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(4)}, pages = {819-839}, keywords = {behavior, indicator, intention, metaphysics}, abstract = {Professors Stich and Millikan question my use of indication (or information) as a basis on which to build a semantics of thought. They also ask about my use of teleological concepts (indicator functions) in my analysis of mental representation. Professor Stampe argues that I fail to capture the rationalizing aspect of desire and Bratman that I have two theories about the intentional content of desire. Tuomela challenges my idea that explanations in terms of reasons always provide structuring causes of action. While conceding some points and clarifying others, the general theory about the way reasons explain behavior is amplified and defended.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dretske2000a, author = {Dretske, Fred}, title = {Entitlement: Epistemic Rights without Epistemic Duties?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {591-606}, keywords = {belief, duty, entitlement, epistemology, ethics, rights}, abstract = {If an epistemic entitlement is a right to believe P, and use P in further cognitive inquiry, without a justification for thinking P true, externalists (about knowledge) are those who think we enjoy such entitlements. What is the source of these entitlements? It cannot be reliability since this would (contrary to most intuitions) deny entitlement to someone like a brain in a vat (not reliably hooked up to the environment he has beliefs about) who has the same reasons for believing as we do. It is argued that entitlements derive, ultimately, from the unavoidability of a belief: if an epistemically responsible agent cannot help believing P, then he has the right to believe P.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Dretske1995, author = {Dretske, Fred}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {459-468}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Naturalizing the Mind}, volume = {57(2)}, year = {1995} } @article{DREYFUS1962, author = {DREYFUS, H-L and TODES, S-J}, title = {THE THREE WORLDS OF MERLEAU-PONTY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {559-565}, keywords = {description, epistemology, life-world; objectivity, perception, phenomenology, world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Driver1997, author = {Driver, Julia}, title = {The Ethics of Intervention}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(4)}, pages = {851-870}, keywords = {agent, ethics, intervention, literature, obligation}, abstract = {This essay explores the obligations that may arise from benevolently intended interventions that go awry. The author argues that even when the intervening agent has acted with good intentions and in a non-negligent manner, she may be required to continue aid in cases where her initial intervention failed. This is surprising because it means that persons who perform supererogatory acts run the risk of incurring additional heavy obligations through no fault of their own. The author also considers deflationary accounts that run counter to her own analysis.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Driver2001, author = {Driver, Julia}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {238-240}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)}, volume = {69(1)}, year = {2001} } @article{DROST1990, author = {DROST, MARK-P}, title = {The Primacy of Perception in Husserl's Theory of Imagining.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50(3)}, pages = {569-582}, keywords = {consciousness, imagining, metaphysics, perception}, abstract = {In the Logical Investigations Husserl outlines two distinct situations in which one speaks of an image: (a) there is the imaginal act in which one perceived physical object is an image of another perceivable object, and (b) there is the imaginal act in which a mental content is an intermediate in the intention of an object. In each case Husserl shows that the interpretation of anything as an image presupposes an object intentionally given to consciousness. Of the two imaginal acts, I argue that the first is logically dependent on a perceptual intention, and that the second is explicable in terms of a perceptual intention rather than in terms of pictorial representation. I conclude that nonmental images cannot be a paradigm for understanding the situation in which an image is a mental event, that images cannot be the basis for perceptual acts, and that Husserl is not committed to a picture theory of mental images.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DRUMMON1979, author = {DRUMMON, JOHN-J}, title = {ON SEEING "A" MATERIAL THING "IN" SPACE: THE ROLE OF KINAESTHESIS IN VISUAL PERCEPTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {40}, pages = {19-32}, keywords = {kinesthetic-experience; matter, metaphysics, perception, space, visual}, abstract = {THIS PAPER ANALYZES HUSSERL'S SOLUTION TO A PROBLEM ABOUT HOW WE DISTINGUISH ONE PERCEPTION FROM ANOTHER IN THE COURSE OF A CONTINUOUS PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE. HUSSERL'S POSITION IS THAT AGREEMENT OF SENSE OR QUALITY IN THE FLOW OF APPEARANCES IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THE PERCEPTION OF AN IDENTICAL OBJECT AND THAT A FURTHER APPEAL MUST BE MADE TO A CERTAIN BODILY ACTIVITIES WHICH MOTIVATE CHANGES IN THE APPEARANCE OF THE OBJECT. THESE CHANGES, IN TURN, INDICATE THE OBJECT'S FIXED POSITION IN SPACE AND ITS BODILY ENCLOSEDNESS. THUS IS THE SPATIAL IDENTITY OF THE OBJECT CONSTITUTED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1962, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {CONCERNING THE LOGICAL STATUS OF CRITERIA MORALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {127-130}, keywords = {criteria, ethics, morality, norm, principle}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1961, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {CONCERNING THE UNIFORMITY OF CAUSALITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {97-101}, keywords = {causality, event, metaphysics, necessity, uniformity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1968, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {INTRINSIC VALUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {410-412}, keywords = {axiology, value}, abstract = {IN "INTRINSIC VALUE" BEARDSLEY PROPOSED THAT THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS INTRINSIC VALUE, BUT ARGUED ONLY THAT NOTHING HAS IT, WITHOUT SAYING WHAT IT IS. POSITIVE INTRINSIC VALUE IS PLEASURE; NEGATIVE INTRINSIC VALUE IS DISPLEASURE. WERE ALL VALUES INSTRUMENTAL, ANY REASON GIVEN FOR AN ACT WOULD LEAD ON TO ANOTHER WITHOUT END; AND NO REASON COULD BE THE ENJOYMENT DOING IT. WERE THERE ONLY INSTRUMENTAL VALUES, LOSS OF THE CAPACITY TO EXPERIENCE INTRINSIC VALUES WOULD LEAVE ALL LATER ACTS OF AGENTS THE SAME AS IF THE LOSS HAD NOT OCCURRED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1964, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {BROAD'S LECTURES ON PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {561-566}, keywords = {disposition, methodology, personality, psychicalism, science, textual-criticis}, abstract = {PARANORMAL PHENOMENA ARE DEFINED AS CONFLICTING WITH ONE OR MORE OF THE "BASIC LIMITING PRINCIPLES" WHICH ARE TAKEN FOR GRANTED. EXAMPLES ARE GIVEN: THOUGHTS (MENTAL EVENTS) OCCURRING IN A PERSON B CAN BE KNOWN BY ANOTHER PERSON A ONLY THROUGH PHYSICAL SIGNS OF THEM; HOWEVER, TELEPATHY IS AN EXCEPTION. AN EVENT WHICH AT A GIVEN TIME HAS NOT OCCURRED CANNOT BE PERCEIVED AT THAT TIME; HOWEVER, PRE-COGNITION IS AN EXCEPTION, THEN SEVERAL THEORIES OF PERCEPTION ARE EXAMINED AND A REPRESENTATIVE THEORY IS FAVORED OVER A PHENOMENALISTIC ONE. THE NATURE OF HUMAN PERSONALITY IS EXAMINED AND NO DEFINITE CONCLUSION IS REACHED REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE HUMAN PERSONALITY SURVIVING BODILY DEATH. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1961a, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {SOME COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR DOMMEYER'S CRITICISMS IN "A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF C J DUCASSE'S METAPHILOSOPHY".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {552-555}, keywords = {appraisal, ethics, norm, principle, science, theory}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1961b, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {THE SOURCES OF THE EMOTIONAL IMPORT OF AN AESTHETIC OBJECT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, pages = {556-557}, keywords = {aesthetic-object; aesthetics, emotion, expression, form, material}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1967, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {HOW LITERALLY CAUSATION IS PERCEIVABLE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {271-273}, keywords = {causation, epistemology, perception}, abstract = {CAUSATION BETWEEN CHANGES IS PERCEIVABLE AS AND ONLY AS LITERALLY AS PERCEIVING PHYSICAL OBJECTS OR RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM IS. PERCEIVING INVOLVES, BESIDES SENSATIONS, INTERPRETATION OF THEM LIKE JUDGING THAT, E.G., A BIRD EXISTS. SO PERCEIVING CAUSATION IS A CASE OF PROBABLE INFERENCE LIKE PERCEPTUAL JUDGMENTS OF EXISTENCE. IT IS NOT ARGUED THAT CAUSATION BETWEEN INHERENTLY UNPERCEIVABLE CHANGES, E.G., OF THEORETICAL ENTITIES OF PHYSICS, IS PERCEIVABLE, FOR THEIR EPISTEMIC STATUS IS POSTULATIONAL.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUCASSE1965, author = {DUCASSE, C-J}, title = {CAUSATION: PERCEIVABLE: OR ONLY INFERRED?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {173-179}, keywords = {causation, change, experiment, inference, perception, physics, science}, abstract = {In theoretical physics causation is the relation between any total state A of an isolated theoretical system S at a time T 'subscript 1' and its total state B at any later time T 'subscript 2'; S being such as to make equally possible inference of B from A, and of A from B. Since concepts are not perceivable, there is no causality among matters of fact. The physicist's definition of cause and effect is inapplicable to mental events. In the common verbs of causation, to bend, to remind, etc., causation is the triadic relation between a state of affairs S and only two changes in it: one, C, at a time T 'subscript 1'; the other, E, at a time T 'subscript 2'. This relation between perceivable events C and E is itself perceivable. It obtains in any "experiment" whether by man or by nature.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUERLINGER1982, author = {DUERLINGER, JAMES}, title = {UNSPOKEN CONNECTIONS IN THE DESIGN ARGUMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {42}, pages = {519-529}, keywords = {analogical-argument; design-argument; epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUFRENNE1965, author = {DUFRENNE, MIKEL}, title = {EXISTENTIALISM AND EXISTENTIALISMS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {26}, pages = {51-62}, keywords = {body, existence, existentialism, man, marxism, ontology, phenomenology, philosophical-anthropology; subjectivity, world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUFRENNE1969, author = {DUFRENNE, MIKEL}, title = {COMMENT ON WILFRID SELLARS' PAPER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {528-535}, keywords = {communication, language, thought}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Dummett1991, author = {Dummett, Michael}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {961-963}, publisher = {Harvard Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics}, volume = {53(4)}, year = {1991} } @article{DUNCAN1966, author = {DUNCAN, ELMER-H}, title = {RULES AND EXCEPTIONS IN ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {27}, pages = {267-273}, keywords = {aesthetics, ethics, rule}, abstract = {SOME OF THE MORE INFLUENTIAL WORK IN RECENT AESTHETICS IS A RESULT OF CARRYING OVER WORK DONE IN OTHER AREAS OF PHILOSOPHY. THE PRESENT PAPER IS AN ATTEMPT TO APPLY AN ETHICAL INSIGHT TO AESTHETICS. IT HAS BEEN CLAIMED THAT SUCH MORAL RULES AS "LYING IS WRONG" ARE ANALYTIC. THIS VIEW IS SUPPORTED BY ORDINARY LANGUAGE, SINCE TO CALL SOMEONE A LIAR OR A THIEF IS ALWAYS TO INSULT HIM. ORDINARY LANGUAGE ALSO SUPPORTS THE VIEW THAT SUCH RULES OF CRITICISM AS, "DISORGANIZATION IS AESTHETICALLY BAD," ARE ANALYTIC. READERS WHO HAVE QUALMS ABOUT THE ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION MAY RECAST THE ENTIRE ARGUMENT IN TERMS TAKEN FROM ROSS' DISCUSSION OR PRIMA FACIE DUTIES. THAT IS, JUST AS LYING IS PRIMA FACIE MORALLY WRONG, DISORGANIZATION IS PRIMA FACIE AESTHETICALLY BAD, THOUGH BOTH CLAIMS MAY BE OVERRIDDEN BY OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Dupre2005, author = {Dupre, John}, title = {You Must Have Thought This Book Was about You: Reply to Daniel Dennett}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(3)}, pages = {691-695}, keywords = {explanation, free-will; human, nature, science}, abstract = {In a recent discussion in this journal, Daniel Dennett claims to be unable to find any arguments for my rejection of the version of human evolutionary psychology that he naively embraces. In this comment I summarize the main strand of argument that he missed and sketch the reasons why the views of both genetics and evolution that Dennett assumes have become obsolete. I also summarize part of the reason for my rejection of the compatibilist account of free will that Dennett endorses.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Dupre2001, author = {Dupre, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {473-483}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Human Nature and the Limits of Science}, volume = {69(2)}, year = {2001} } @article{DUPRE1964, author = {DUPRE, LOUIS}, title = {THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN HUSSERL'S "LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {345-354}, keywords = {consciousness, epistemology, evidence, intuitionism, logic, logicism, psychologism, textual-criticism; truth}, abstract = {IT IS STATED THAT HUSSERL'S THEORY OF TRUTH IS AMBIGUOUS. WHEN HUSSERL ATTACKED PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF TRUTH, A LOGICISM SEEMED TO BE PREDOMINANT; LATER HE INCLINED TOWARD INTUITIONISM, WHERE TRUTH IS CONSTITUTED BY THE REAL PRESENCE OF THE OBJECT. PURELY LOGICAL RELATIONS IN AN ETERNAL ORDER OF TRUTH, INDEPENDENT OF THINGS, SEEMS TO CONFLICT WITH THE IDEA OF EVIDENCE, WHICH IS A PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT TRUTH IS THE RESULT OF AN INTUITION IN WHICH THE THING ITSELF IS GIVEN. FINALLY, PARALLELS ARE DRAWN BETWEEN HUSSERL'S DOUBLE TRUTH AND LEIBNIZ'S TRUTHS OF REASON AND TRUTHS OF FACT. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUPRE1968, author = {DUPRE, LOUIS-K}, title = {HUSSERL'S THOUGHT ON GOD AND FAITH.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {29}, pages = {201-215}, keywords = {faith, god, religion}, abstract = {A STUDY OF HUSSERL'S UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS LED TO THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS. THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENCE ARISES OUT OF THE FACT THAT THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD IS NOT FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR BY THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF REALITY, THEREFORE, REQUIRES ANOTHER BEING THAN THE BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS. NOR DOES CONSCIOUSNESS PROVIDE ITS OWN FOUNDATION. HERE ALSO AN ABSOLUTE BEYOND THE ABSOLUTE BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS NEEDED. UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF FICHTE, HUSSERL GRADUALLY ADOPTED THE IDEA OF A TRANSCENDENT, INFINITE "TELOS." YET, HE NEVER REACHED MORE THAN A RELATIVE TRANSCENDENCE AND CONSIDERED THE EXISTENCE OF A PERSONAL, TRANSCENDENT BEING A MATTER OF "FAITH", TO WHICH THEORETICAL REASON HAS NO ACCESS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DURFEE1968, author = {DURFEE, HAROLD-A}, title = {THE REFORMULATION OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1968}, volume = {28}, pages = {385-391}, keywords = {god, religion, theology}, abstract = {THE ESSAY REFORMULATES THE DEBATE BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY THEISM AND NEO-NATURALISM. ASSUMING TILLICH'S ANALYSIS OF GOD AS THAT WHICH IS OF 'ULTIMATE CONCERN,' IT EMPHASIZES THE DENIAL BY RANDALL AND HOOK AS NEO-NATURALISTS, OF ANYTHING AS OF 'ULTIMATE CONCERN,' AND THUS THE DENIAL OF GOD'S EXISTENCE IN THE ONLY SENSE TILLICH WOULD ALLOW. THIS REFORMULATES THE QUESTION OF GOD'S EXISTENCE AS CENTERED AROUND THE QUESTION AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF 'ULTIMATE CONCERNS.' THIS DENIAL WOULD ELIMINATE THE GROUND FOR TILLICH'S PROTESTANT PRINCIPLE. PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IS NOW CALLED UPON TO REWORK PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY, DEBATING WHETHER OR NOT MAN HAS 'ULTIMATE CONCERNS,' HOW THEIR PRESENCE OR ABSENCE IS TO BE ESTABLISHED, WHAT THEIR UNIQUE CHARACTER WOULD BE, AND HOW UNIVERSAL THEY ARE IF PRESENT. SUCH A DEBATE WOULD REFORMULATE THE STRUCTURE OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION. THIS IS THE APPROPRIATE LOCUS OF THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE BETWEEN THEISM AND NEO-NATURALISM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DURFEE1975, author = {DURFEE, HAROLD-A}, title = {WAR, POLITICS, AND RADICAL PLURALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {549-558}, keywords = {pluralism, political-philosophy; politics, war}, abstract = {AN ANALYSIS OF THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF WAR AND POLITICS IN THE RADICALLY PLURALISTIC SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS. LEVINAS PROPOSES A COMPLETE SEPARATION OF SELVES BRIDGED ONLY BY LANGUAGE, THUS CONTINUING RECENT ONTOLOGIES OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY, AND DEVELOPING A UNIQUE ETHICS OF LANGUAGE. THE POLITICAL IS THE EXPRESSION OF TOTALIZATION AND RATIONALISM, THE NEGATION OF INTERIORITY, AND OPPOSED TO MORALITY. POLITICAL AND RATIONAL TOTALIZATION IS WAR. THE ONTOLOGY OF PEACE LIES RATHER IN THE INTERSUBJECTIVITY OF FACE TO FACE DIALOGUE. GENUINE SPEECH LIES IN THE WORDS OF APOLOGY AND JUSTIFICATION. WAR IS NOT TO CONVERSE WHILE PEACE IS GENUINE CONVERSATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DUTTON1974, author = {DUTTON, DENIS}, title = {TO UNDERSTAND IT ON ITS OWN TERMS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1974}, volume = {35}, pages = {246-256}, keywords = {epistemology, understanding}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DWORKIN1966, author = {DWORKIN, GERALD}, title = {MARX AND MILL: A DIALOGUE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {403-414}, keywords = {alienation, dialogue, freedom, human-nature; ideology, nineteenth, oppression, political-philosoph}, abstract = {THIS ESSAY EXPLORES, IN DIALOGUE FORM, THE SIMILARITIES AND CONTRASTS IN THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF KARL MARX AND JOHN STUART MILL. THEIR VIEWS ON THE DETERMINING FORCES OF HISTORY, THE IDEAL CHARACTER-TYPE, FREEDOM, AND PHILOSOPHY ARE DISCUSSED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{DWYER1989, author = {DWYER, PHILIP}, title = {FREEDOM AND RULE-FOLLOWING IN WITTGENSTEIN AND SARTRE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {49-68}, keywords = {freedom, meaning, metaphysics, rule}, abstract = {WHAT SARTRE MEANS BY 'EXISTENCE PRECEDES ESSENCE' IS SKETCHED, AND HOW THIS NOTION CAPTURES THE GIST OF WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER CRITIQUE OF HIS EARLY CONCEPTION OF LANGUAGE IS SHOWN. A DETAILED COMPARISON OF SARTRE AND WITTGENSTEIN REVOLVES AROUND WITTGENSTEIN'S ACCOUNT OF RULE FOLLOWING. HIS ARGUMENTS AGAINST MEANING AS SOMETHING WHICH TRANSCENDS AND DETERMINES THE "USE" OF WORDS DUPLICATES SARTRE'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANY NOTION OF A HUMAN ESSENCE DETERMINING HUMAN ACTION IN GENERAL. IN DEBUNKING THE ILLUSION OF A METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF EITHER LANGUAGE OR HUMAN EXISTENCE, BOTH ANALYSES PUT FREEDOM AT THE CENTRE OF THE LANGUAGE-GAME AND OF HUMAN LIFE GENERALLY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EAMES1986, author = {EAMES, ELIZABETH-R}, title = {RUSSELL AND THE EXPERIENCE OF TIME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {681-682}, keywords = {experience, metaphysics, time}, abstract = {IN RESPONSE TO ROBERTS' "ON RUSSELL'S PERCEPTION OF AKOLUTHIC SENSATIONS," I ARGUE THAT THIS VIEW OF TIME IS CLOSE TO JAMES, RATHER THAN TO BRENTANO, AND SKETCH THE COMPLEX ROLE OF PRESENT EXPERIENCE (THE "SPECIOUS PRESENT") IN RUSSELL'S EPISTEMOLOGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EAMES1967, author = {EAMES, ELIZABETH-R}, title = {THE CONSISTENCY OF RUSSELL'S REALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {27}, pages = {502-511}, keywords = {epistemology, realism}, abstract = {THE COMMON VIEWS OF RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHY, THAT IT SHIFTED FROM REALISM TO PHENOMENALISM, AND THAT LOGICAL ATOMISM OF 1920 WAS THE APEX OF ITS DEVELOPMENT, ARE HERE CRITICIZED IN THE CONTEXT OF THREE PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION OF HIS PHILOSOPHY: THAT OF THE STATUS OF UNIVERSALS, THAT OF 'NEUTRAL MONISM,' AND THAT OF THE ESCAPE FROM SOLIPSISM. A MODIFIED REALISM IS SHOWN TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE DIRECTION OF RUSSELL'S THOUGHT WHEN THESE PROBLEMS ARE UNRAVELLED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EAMES1961, author = {EAMES, S-MORRIS}, title = {EXPERIENCE, LANGUAGE, AND KNOWLEDGE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {102-105}, keywords = {being, existence, experience, inquiry, knowledge, language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EAMES1964, author = {EAMES, S-MORRIS}, title = {VALUING, OBLIGATION, AND EVALUATION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {318-328}, keywords = {cognition, desire, ethics, evaluation, moral-judgment; naturalism, obligation, valuation}, abstract = {CONTEMPORARY NATURALISTIC THEORY (DEWEY) HAS BEEN CRITICIZED AS HAVING A MORAL PRINCIPLE OF MERE EXPEDIENCY, AND FOR A FAILURE TO DEVELOP A THEORY OF MORAL OBLIGATION. THE AUTHOR ATTEMPTS TO ANSWER THESE CRITICISMS AND TO EXTEND NATURALISTIC THEORY BEYOND WHAT HAS BEEN GENERALLY REGARDED AS THE GROUND OF GOOD AND RIGHT. THE AUTHOR IS SYMPATHETIC TO ARISTOTLE AND MILL, WHEN HE DEFINES INTEREST AS LONG-TERM DESIRE. IN GENERAL A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO VALUING IS TAKEN. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EARLE1960, author = {EARLE, WILLIAM}, title = {HEGEL AND SOME CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {20}, pages = {352-364}, keywords = {existentialism, irrationalism, positivism, rationalism, reality, twentieth}, abstract = {EARLE ARGUES AGAINST TWO CONTEMPORARY ALTERNATIVES--POSITIVISM AND EXISTENTIALISM. IT IS CLAIMED THAT THESE ARE FORMS OF IRRATIONALISM; FOR THESE TWO MOVEMENTS, RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY HAS SHRUNK TO NOTHING AND HAS NO REAL CONTENT OF ITS OWN. HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD IS VINDICATED; THE "REAL IS THE RATIONAL, AND THE RATIONAL IS THE REAL" IS JUSTIFIED. THIS PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN ABANDONED BY THE ABOVE TWO MOVEMENTS WITHOUT DUE CAUSE, A RE-EXAMINATION OF HEGEL SHOWS WHY. UNFORTUNATELY, EXISTENTIALISM ENDS WITH LIFE AND POSITIVISM ENDS WITH CALCULUS, AND NEITHER HAVE REAL PHILOSOPHY. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EARLE1975, author = {EARLE, WILLIAM-JAMES}, title = {DO FEELINGS CAUSE ACTIONS?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {540-548}, keywords = {action, agency, ethics, feeling}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Earman1993, author = {Earman, John}, title = {In Defense of Laws: Reflections on Bas Van Fraassen's "Laws and Symmetry"}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {413-419}, keywords = {epistemology, laws, nature}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Earman2005, author = {Earman, John}, title = {Contact with the Nomic: A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature Part I: Humean Supervenience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {1-22}, keywords = {metaphysics, natural-law; nature, supervenience}, abstract = {This is the first part of a two-part article in which we defend the thesis of Humean supervenience about laws of nature (HS). According to this thesis, two possible worlds cannot differ on what is a law of nature unless they also differ on the Humean base. The Humean base is easy to characterize intuitively, but there is no consensus on how, precisely, it should be defined. Here in part I, we present and motivate a characterization of the Humean base that, we argue, enables HS to capture what is really stake in the debate, without taking on extraneous commitments.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Earman2000, author = {Earman, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {487-494}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Hume's Abject Failure: The Argument against Miracles}, volume = {68(2)}, year = {2000} } @other{Earman1992, author = {Earman, John}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {707-711}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1992} } @article{Earman2005a, author = {Earman, John and Roberts, John-T}, title = {Contact with the Nomic: A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature Part II: The Epistemological Argument for Humean Supervenience}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(2)}, pages = {253-286}, keywords = {epistemology, natural-law; realism, science, supervenience}, abstract = {In part I, we presented and motivated a new formulation of Humean supervenience about laws of nature (HS). Here in part II, we present an epistemological argument in defense of HS, thus formulated. Our contention is that one can combine a modest realism about laws of nature with a proper recognition of the importance of empirical testability in the epistemology of science only if one accepts HS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EASTON1961, author = {EASTON, LOYD-D}, title = {ALIENATION AND HISTORY IN THE EARLY MARX.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {193-205}, keywords = {alienation, communism, community, dialectic, history, immediacy, individual, social-philosophy; subjectivity}, abstract = {USES OF THE CONCEPT OF "ALIENATION" IN CURRENT SOCIAL CRITICISM WIDELY REFER TO MARX'S EARLY VIEW THAT MAN'S OWN DEED IN GOVERNMENT, WEALTH, AND CULTURE "BECOMES TO HIM AN ALIEN POWER, STANDING OVER AGAINST HIM INSTEAD OF BEING RULED BY HIM" SO THAT HE IS NOT "AT HOME" OR WHOLE IN HIS SOCIAL LIFE. MY PRIMARY CONCERN IS NOT SO MUCH CURRENT USES OF "ALIENATION" AS ITS PLACE IN MARX'S THOUGHT, WITH EMPHASIS ON SEVERAL POINTS--HIS PARTICULAR APPROPRIATIONS FROM HEGEL AND FEUERBACH, HIS HELLENIC IMAGE OF COMMUNITY, IMPLICATIONS OF HIS AMBIVALENCE TOWARD HISTORY--WHICH ARE THEMSELVES GENERALLY ALIEN TO THE EXTENSIVE LITERATURE ON THE SUBJECT. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ebbs1998, author = {Ebbs, Gary}, title = {Bilgrami's Theory of Belief and Meaning}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58(3)}, pages = {613-620}, keywords = {belief, meaning, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ebbs1996, author = {Ebbs, Gary}, title = {Can We Take Our Words at Face Value?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {499-530}, keywords = {content, epistemology, individualism, knowledge, language}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EDDINS1966, author = {EDDINS, BERKLEY-B}, title = {HISTORICAL DATA AND POLICY-DECISIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1966}, volume = {26}, pages = {427-430}, keywords = {criteria, decision, history, intelligibility, objectivity, public-policy; speculation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EDGAR1971, author = {EDGAR, WILLIAM-J}, title = {PROFESSOR GOTESKY AND THE LAW OF NON-CONTRADICTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1971}, volume = {32}, pages = {259-263}, keywords = {contradiction, inconsistency, metaphysics}, abstract = {In his article, 'the uses of inconsistency' (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 6/68), Rubin Gotesky tries to show (1) that the law of non-contradiction as an ontological principle, on the evidence, involves its denial, and (2) that relative to communication and social action (a) the law is rejected in all cases of lying and deception, and (b) that there are situations of unavoidable contradiction. Gotesky does not explicitly claim that the law is false; he asserts that all attempts, thus far, to establish it as a general truth have resulted in contradiction. Nor does he explicitly claim that contradictions exist in nature, although this is a possibility for him. I contend that Gotesky has not established (1), and that his discussion of (2) trades on senses of 'inconsistent' not relevant to the law of non-contradiction. in (1) Gotesky confuses finding a limiting condition on thought with thinking what cannot be thought. support for (2) rests largely on modal confusions, such as noting that what a man says may 'contradict' what he does. (edited).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Edgington2005, author = {Edgington, Dorothy}, title = {The Mystery of the Missing Boundary}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {704-711}, keywords = {certainty, epistemology, sorites, truth, vagueness}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EDIDIN1985, author = {EDIDIN, ARON}, title = {PHILOSOPHY: JUST LIKE SCIENCE ONLY DIFFERENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {537-552}, keywords = {intuition, methodology, philosophy, scientific-metho}, abstract = {A VIEW OF THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY IS DEVELOPED WHICH HOLDS THAT IT IS LIKE EMPIRICAL SCIENCE IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ITS THEORIES AND THE DATA WHICH CAN SUPPORT THEM, BUT UNLIKE SCIENCE IN THE NATURE OF THE DATA. AN ACCOUNT OF PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITION AS THE SOURCE OF DATA FOR PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY IS PROPOSED. SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE VIEW ARE CONSIDERED AND JUDGED INDECISIVE, BUT NO FINAL VERDICT ON THE VIEW'S ADEQUACY IS PROPOSED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EDIE1964, author = {EDIE, JAMES-M}, title = {TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND EXISTENTIALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {52-63}, keywords = {existentialism, intentionality, life-world; perception, phenomenology, philosophy, transcendental}, abstract = {THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO ATTEMPT TO DEFINE WHAT IS MEANT BY A TRANSCENDENTAL STRUCTURE IN TERMS OF THE SENSE IT HAS BEEN GIVEN BY THE DEVELOPING PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRADITION FROM HUSSERL TO THE PRESENT TIME. AFTER DISTINGUISHING THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL SENSE OF TRANSCENDENTAL FROM THE "OBJECTIVE" TRANSCENDENTALISM OF GREEK AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND FROM THE "SUBJECTIVE" TRANSCENDENTALISM OF KANTIANISM, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO GIVE THE TRANSCENDENTAL AN ONTOLOGICAL, I.E., "EXISTENTIAL," MEANING. IT IS THIS NEW DEFINITION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL WHICH IS THE UNIFYING ELEMENT IN THE EXTREMELY DIVERSIFIED STUDIES OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXISTENTIALISTS AND THE BASIS OF A NEW ONTOLOGY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EDIE1963, author = {EDIE, JAMES-M}, title = {EXPRESSION AND METAPHOR.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {538-561}, keywords = {consciousness, experience, expression, intentionality, language, meaning, metaphor, phenomenology, philosophy}, abstract = {THE PURPOSE IS TO EXAMINE METAPHORICAL EXPRESSION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF AN INTENTIONAL THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND TO SUGGEST THAT THE NECESSITY OF SPEAKING (AND THINKING) IN METAPHORS IS NOT AN ACCIDENTAL WEAKNESS OF HUMAN THOUGHT BUT AN EXISTENTIAL NECESSITY THAT PERVADES ALL THE "SUB-UNIVERSES" OF MEANING. SOME OF THE FUNDAMENTAL METAPHORS IN PHILOSOPHICAL LANGUAGE ARE ANALYZED AND A GENERAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF METAPHOR IS SUGGESTED. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Eells1995, author = {Eells, Ellery}, title = {Cartwright on Probabilistic Causality: Types, Tokens, and Capacities}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(1)}, pages = {169-175}, keywords = {causality, empiricism, experiment, gravity, science}, abstract = {As part of a book symposium on Nancy Cartwright's "Nature's Capacities and their Measurement" (Oxford, 1989), the issues addressed have to do with generic and singular probabilistic causation, and with the relationship between theories at the two levels. In her book, Cartwright argues that singular causation is basic -- that the theory of generic probabilistic causation depends on the idea of singular causation. Although we have come to agree about many fine points involved in theories and examples, I argue that she has not established the direction of dependence, and I allude to arguments of my own that the direction is opposite.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Egan2006, author = {Egan, Andy}, title = {Secondary Qualities and Self-Location}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {72(1)}, pages = {97-119}, keywords = {color, epistemology, location, primary-quality; quality, secondary-quality; shape}, abstract = {There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer-independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less-than-fully-real, subjective, observer-dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically interesting because it is (a) often quite attractive to draw such a distinction, and (b) incredibly hard to spell it out in any kind of satisfying and sensible way. I attempt such a spelling-out after first trying to pin down in more detail what we want from the primary/secondary quality distinction, and saying a bit about why that is such a hard thing to get.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EHMAN1970, author = {EHMAN, ROBERT-R}, title = {REPLY TO MR CUA.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {617-618}, keywords = {ethics, moral-judgmen}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EHMAN1967, author = {EHMAN, ROBERT-R}, title = {MORAL OBJECTIVITY.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1967}, volume = {28}, pages = {175-187}, keywords = {ethics, objectivity}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EHMAN1964, author = {EHMAN, ROBERT-R}, title = {MORAL JUDGMENT AND ULTIMATE ENDS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {25}, pages = {253-258}, keywords = {action, end, ethics, justification, moral-judgment; ultimate}, abstract = {IN SURVEYING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN JUDGMENTS AND ACTION, IT IS MAINTAINED THAT A MAN'S MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE MORE ESPECIALLY RELEVANT TO HIS ACTION THAN HIS ORDINARY FACTUAL JUDGMENTS. THE AUTHOR UPHOLDS THAT THE MORAL END IS ULTIMATE AND THAT MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE STATEMENTS OF OUR ULTIMATE ENDS OR MEANS TO THOSE ENDS. A JUSTIFICATION OF MORAL JUDGMENTS IS SHOWING THAT THEY STATE OUR OWN ULTIMATE END OR A MEANS TO OUR ULTIMATE END. THERE ARE TWO SORTS OF INQUIRY: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS OF POSSIBLE ULTIMATE ENDS AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE MEANS TO THESE ENDS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EHRIND1985, author = {EHRIND, DOUGLAS}, title = {"NORMAL" INTENTIONAL ACTION.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {46}, pages = {155-158}, keywords = {action-theory; intentional, metaphysics, phenomenology}, abstract = {CAUSAL ACCOUNTS OF INTENTIONAL ACTION HOLD THAT S DOES B INTENTIONALLY IF AND ONLY IF S DESIRES G, S BELIEVES THAT B WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRODUCTION OF G, AND THIS DESIRE-BELIEF COMPLEX CAUSES B. COUNTEREXAMPLES INVOLVING UNUSUAL CAUSAL ROUTES FROM COMPLEX TO ACTION HAVE SHOWN THIS ACCOUNT NOT TO PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT CONDITION. ON A MODIFIED VERSION OF THIS VIEW, RESTRICTION IS MADE TO "NORMAL" CAUSAL PATHS. I ARGUE THAT THIS MODIFIED ACCOUNT IS UNSATISFACTORY.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EHRING1986, author = {EHRING, DOUGLAS}, title = {TELEOLOGY AND IMPOSSIBLE GOALS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {47}, pages = {127-132}, keywords = {goals, impossibility, metaphysics, teleology}, abstract = {ACCORDING TO LARRY WRIGHT, TELEOLOGICAL BEHAVIOR IS BEHAVIOR WITH A "CONSEQUENCE-ETIOLOGY," I.E., BEHAVIOR WHICH OCCURS BECAUSE OF WHAT THE BEHAVIOR BRINGS ABOUT. IN THIS PAPER I ARGUE THAT WRIGHT'S ANALYSIS CANNOT HANDLE CASES INVOLVING PHYSICALLY OR LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE GOALS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Ehring1997, author = {Ehring, Douglas}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {483-486}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Causation and Persistence: A Theory of Causation}, volume = {60(2)}, year = {1997} } @article{Eilan2001, author = {Eilan, Naomi}, title = {Consciousness, Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {433-440}, keywords = {acquaintance, consciousness, epistemology, reason}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Eklund2002, author = {Eklund, Matti}, title = {Inconsistent Languages}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64(2)}, pages = {251-275}, keywords = {inconsistency, language, logic, paradox, semantics, sorites}, abstract = {The main thesis of this paper is that we sometimes are disposed to accept false and even jointly inconsistent claims by virtue of our semantic competence, and that this comes to light in the sorties and liar paradoxes. Among the subsidiary theses are that this is an important source of indeterminacy in truth conditions, that we must revise basic assumptions about semantic competence, and that classical logic and bivalence can be upheld in the face of the sorties paradox.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Eklund2005, author = {Eklund, Matti}, title = {Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {557-579}, keywords = {assumption, fiction, fictionalism, indifference, language, ontology, utterance}, abstract = {In this paper I outline an alternative to hermeneutic fictionalism, an alternative I call indifferentism, with the same advantages as hermeneutic fictionalism with respect to ontological issues but avoiding some of the problems that face fictionalism. The difference between indifferentism and fictionalism is this. The fictionalist about ordinary utterances of a sentence S holds, with more orthodox views, that the speaker in some sense commits herself to the truth of S. It is only that for the fictionalist this is truth in the relevant fiction. According to the indifferentist, by contrast, we are simply noncommittal -- or indifferent -- with respect to some aspects of what is literally said in our assertive utterances (specifically, with respect to the ontologically committing aspects).}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ekstrom1993, author = {Ekstrom, Laura-Waddell}, title = {A Coherence Theory of Autonomy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(3)}, pages = {599-616}, keywords = {action, autonomy, belief, desire, freedom, social-philosoph}, abstract = {This paper presents a conception of the self partially in terms of a particular notion of preference. It develops a coherentist account of when one's preferences are "authorized", or sanctioned as one's own, and presents a coherence theory of autonomous action. The view presented solves certain problems with hierarchical accounts of freedom, such as Harry Frankfurt's.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ekstrom1999, author = {Ekstrom, Laura-Waddell}, title = {Keystone Preferences and Autonomy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {49(4)}, pages = {1057-1063}, keywords = {autonomy, ethics, preference, trust}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elder1994, author = {Elder, Crawford-L}, title = {Laws, Natures, and Contingent Necessities}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(3)}, pages = {649-667}, keywords = {epistemology, identity, judgment, laws, nature}, abstract = {Many regard the empirical uniformities which science calls lawlike as more than brute regularities, but less than "full strength" necessities: they are ways the world is bound to go, but the world could have gone differently. This paper questions that position. Most illustrations of ways the laws of nature "might have failed to obtain" in effect deny that the laws are laws in the first place. Given genuine natural necessity, the substances which figure in the actual laws could not behave differently, or be differently composed from how science says they necessarily are, without ceasing to be themselves.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elder1996, author = {Elder, Crawford-L}, title = {Realism and Determinable Properties}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(1)}, pages = {149-159}, keywords = {epistemology, property, realism, universal, vagueness}, abstract = {Realists about properties typically see dangers in maintaining that, corresponding to determinable predicates, there exist determinable properties; they typically deny there are any determinable properties. Thus the only real properties are precisely delineated ones, which ordinary language rarely equips us to pick out individually. This paper argues property realists need not take so extreme a position. The dangers infect only one form of "determinable property"--those which, if real, would lack contrary opposites (e.g., being colored, having mass). There are also "determinable properties" which do have contrary opposites--e.g., being blue, being painful--and these property realists should recognize as real.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elder1998, author = {Elder, Crawford-L}, title = {Essential Properties and Coinciding Objects}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {317-331}, keywords = {existence, metaphysics, modality, object}, abstract = {How can a parcel of matter, or collection of particles, simultaneously compose three different objects, characterized by different modal properties? If the statue is gouged it still exists, but not exactly that piece of gold which originally occupied the statue's borders, and the (mass of) gold within that piece can survive dispersal, while the piece cannot. The solution to this "problem of coinciding objects", this paper argues, is that there is, in that space, only the statue. The properties which the piece and the mass supposedly must have, to go on being, are not properties which anything can have necessarily or essentially. Not even having that origin can be essential. There is no object of which the statue is composed, though there are objects (viz., gold atoms) and a kind of stuff (viz., gold) of which it is composed.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elder2001, author = {Elder, Crawford-L}, title = {Mental Causation Versus Physical Causation: No Contest}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(1)}, pages = {111-127}, keywords = {causation, epistemology, mental, physical}, abstract = {Common sense supposes thoughts can cause bodily movements and thereby bring about changes in where the agent is or how his surroundings are. Many philosophers suppose that any such outcome is realized in a complex state of affairs involving only microparticles; that previous microphysical developments were sufficient to cause that state of affairs; hence that, barring overdetermination, causation by the mental is excluded. This paper argues that the microphysical swarm that realizes the outcome is an accident (Aristotle) or a coincidence (David Owens) and has no cause, though each component movement in it has one. Mental causation faces no competition "from below".}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ELDRIDGE1986, author = {ELDRIDGE, RICHARD}, title = {THE NORMAL AND THE NORMATIVE: WITTGENSTEIN'S LEGACY, KRIPKE, AND CAVELL.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {46}, pages = {555-575}, keywords = {knowledge, language, normal, normative}, abstract = {IF WITTGENSTEIN IS RIGHT THAT OUR PRACTICES REST ONLY ON NORMAL PROJECTIONS OF RULES, THEN HOW CAN PRACTICES BE CRITICIZED? KRIPKE'S ASSERTIBILITY-CONDITIONS ACCOUNT OF LICIT RULE-PROJECTIONS IS CRITICIZED FOR ITS UNCRITICAL CONVENTIONALISM. WITTGENSTEIN'S SO-CALLED PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT IS EXAMINED AS A PARADIGM SET OF NON-DEMONSTRATIVE FIRST-PERSON REFLECTIONS ON WHAT WE NORMALLY DO THAT HAVE CRITICAL FORCE. THIS CRITICAL FORCE IS THEN EXPLICATED THROUGH A CONSIDERATION OF CAVELL'S NOTION OF A "CLAIM OF REASON."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ELEY1972, author = {ELEY, LOTHAR}, title = {LIFE-WORLD CONSTITUTION OF PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC AND ELEMENTARY PREDICATE LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {322-340}, keywords = {logic, metalogic, phenomenology, propositional-logi}, abstract = {THE ARTICLE IS AN INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOGIC AS A POSITIVE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. THE METHOD IS THAT OF A METACRITIQUE, I.E. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE PARTICULAR TYPE OF CONSCIOUSNESS FOR WHICH POSITIVE LOGIC CONSTITUTES THE MEASURE OF TRUTH. AS A METACRITIQUE IT IS TRANSCENDENTAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL. AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO SHOW THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION IS, AS HUSSERL WOULD SAY, ONE OF INTERSUBJECTIVE GENESIS. FOR THE PURPOSES OF DEMONSTRATION THE EXAMPLES OF PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC AND ELEMENTARY PREDICATE LOGIC ARE USED. HUSSERL'S POSITION, TAKEN AS THE POINT OF DEPARTURE, IS DEVELOPED, USING IN PART THE WORK OF HEGEL, FREGE AND P. LORENZEN.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elga2004, author = {Elga, Adam}, title = {Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {69(2)}, pages = {383-396}, keywords = {belief, duplicate, epistemology, indifference, principle, scepticism}, abstract = {Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate of Dr. Evil has been created. Upon learning this, how seriously should he take the hypothesis that he himself is that duplicate? I answer: very seriously. I defend a principle of indifference for self-locating belief which entails that after Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate has been created, he ought to have exactly the same degree of belief that he is Dr. Evil as that he is the duplicate. More generally, the principle shows that there is a sharp distinction between ordinary skeptical hypotheses, and self-locating skeptical hypotheses.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elgin2002, author = {Elgin, Catherine-Z}, title = {Take It from Me: The Epistemological Status of Testimony}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(2)}, pages = {291-308}, keywords = {argument, epistemology, knowledge, testimony}, abstract = {C. J. A. Coady argues, on Davidsonian grounds, that (1) most testimony is true, hence, (2) most testimony supplies warrant sufficient for knowledge. I appeal to Grice's maxims to undermine Coady's argument and to show that the matter is more complicated and context-sensitive than is standardly recognized. Informative exchanges take place within networks of shared, tacit assumptions that affect the scope and strength of our claims, and the level of warrant required for their responsible assertion. The maxims explains why different levels of warrant are transferred in different contexts. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elgin2004, author = {Elgin, Catherine-Z}, title = {Richard Foley's Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(3)}, pages = {724-734}, keywords = {authority, belief, epistemology, reliability, trust}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elgin2001, author = {Elgin, Catherine-Z}, title = {The Legacy of Nelson Goodman}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62(3)}, pages = {679-690}, keywords = {aesthetics, appearance, art, epistemology, language}, abstract = {Nelson Goodman was one of the foremost philosophers of the twentieth century. His work radically reshaped the subject, forcing fundamental reconceptions of philosophy's problems, ends and means. Goodman not only contributed to diverse fields, from philosophy of language to aesthetics, from philosophy of science to mereology, his works cut across these and other fields, revealing shared features and connecting links that more narrowly focused philosophers overlook. This paper begins to assess Goodman's legacy by reviewing his major accomplishments and identifying a cluster of metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological commitments that run through his works.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ELGIN1987, author = {ELGIN, CATHERINE-Z}, title = {THE COST OF CORRESPONDENCE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {47}, pages = {475-480}, keywords = {correspondence, metaphysics, realism}, abstract = {IN "CONCEPTS AND CORRESPONDENCE," SCOTT SHALKOWSKI MAINTAINS THAT GOODMAN DOES NOT REFUTE REALISM. HE'S RIGHT. BUT I ARGUE THAT THE PRICE THAT SHALKOWSKI PAYS TO PRESERVE REALISM IS EXCESSIVE. HE IS READY TO REJECT BIVALENCE OR THE GRAMMATICAL CRITERION FOR SENTENCEHOOD, AND TO CONCEDE THAT WE CAN'T TELL WHETHER TO BE REALISTS ABOUT 'GREEN' OR 'GRUE'. I SUGGEST THAT WITHOUT REFUTING REALISM GOODMAN PROVIDES POWERFUL REASONS FOR REJECTING IT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Elgin1996, author = {Elgin, Catherine-Z}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {724-726}, publisher = {Princeton Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Considered Judgment}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1996} } @article{Ellis1992, author = {Ellis, Anthony}, title = {Deontology, Incommensurability and the Arbitrary}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {855-875}, keywords = {arbitrariness, deontology, ethics, incommensurability}, abstract = {Non-absolutist deontology holds that certain acts are prohibited unless the consequences of not performing them are sufficiently bad. I argue that we cannot give an account of what sufficiently' means in this formulation, and that this destroys such a theory. The problem is that of specifying cutoff points'. I argue that such a theory cannot specify such cutoff points without arbitrariness. Nor will it solve the problem to hold that there "is" no cutoff point, or only a vague one. I then gesture towards one moral theory which responds to at least some of the motivations behind non-absolutist deontology but which does not encounter this problem.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Ellis2000, author = {Ellis, Brian}, title = {Causal Laws and Singular Causation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {329-351}, keywords = {causation, disposition, epistemology, metaphysics, object}, abstract = {In this paper it will be argued that causal laws describe the actions of causal powers. The process which results from such an action is one which belongs to a natural kind, the essence of which is that it is a display of this causal power. Therefore, if anything has a given causal power necessarily, it must be naturally disposed to act in the manner prescribed by the causal law describing the action of this causal power. In the formal expressions of causal laws, the necessity operators occur within the scopes of the universal quantifiers. Hence, the necessities must hold of each instance. The causal laws may, thus, be shown to be concerned with necessary connections between events or circumstances of precisely the sort required for a decent account of singular causation.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Ellis1990, author = {Ellis, Brian}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {968-970}, publisher = {Blackwell}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Truth and Objectivity}, volume = {53(4)}, year = {1990} } @article{ELUGARDO1975, author = {ELUGARDO, REINALDO}, title = {LANDESMAN ON ABSTRACT PARTICULARS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {411-414}, keywords = {metaphysics, particulars, predication}, abstract = {PROFESSOR CHARLES LANDESMAN HAS RECENTLY PRESENTED SEVERAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE THESIS OF ABSTRACT PARTICULARS. ONE OF HIS ARGUMENTS IS THAT POSITIONAL DIFFERENCE AMONG QUALIFIED OBJECTS DOES NOT YIELD NUMERICAL DIFFERENCE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE NONRELATIONAL QUALITIES. IN THE PRESENT PAPER, I OFFER A CRITICISM OF LANDESMAN'S ARGUMENT. MY CRITICISM IS THAT HIS ARGUMENT RESTS ON AN ASSUMPTION WHICH SUPPORTS THE THESIS OF ABSTRACT PARTICULARS: OBJECTS AND THEIR QUALITIES OCCUPY THE SAME SPATIAL REGION AT THE SAME TIME. I TRY TO SHOW HOW THIS ASSUMPTION UNDERCUTS THE FORCE OF LANDESMAN'S ARGUMENT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elugardo1999, author = {Elugardo, Reinaldo}, title = {Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(2)}, pages = {513-523}, keywords = {attitude, metaphysics, mind}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Elugardo1993, author = {Elugardo, Reinaldo}, title = {Burge on Content}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53(2)}, pages = {367-384}, keywords = {cognition, empiricism, epistemology, externalism, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EMAD1972, author = {EMAD, PARVIS}, title = {MAX SCHELER'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SHAME.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1972}, volume = {32}, pages = {361-370}, keywords = {epistemology, phenomenology, sex, shame}, abstract = {THIS PAPER IS AN ATTEMPT TO GIVE A BRIEF BUT THOROUGH GOING EXPOSITION OF M. SCHELER'S WAY OF COGNIZING, DESCRIBING AND EVALUATING THE PHENOMENON OF SHAME. THE FIRST PART OF THE PAPER IS GIVEN TO THE TASK OF DIFFERENTIATING SHAME FROM RELATED FEELINGS THUS DETERMINING ITS ESSENTIAL STRUCTURE. IN THE SECOND PART, BASIC FORMS OF SHAME ARE DISCUSSED AND MISCONCEPTIONS GIVEN IN THE EDUCATIONAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL THEORIES OF SHAME ARE DEALT WITH. PART THREE FOCUSES SOLELY ON SHAME AND SEX AND REVIEWS SCHELER'S CRITICISM OF FREUD. FINALLY THE METAPHYSICAL IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO SHAME BY SCHELER IS ELABORATED UPON, AND MENTION IS MADE OF THE ATTENTION PAID BY GERMAN PHILOSOPHERS TO THIS FEELING. THIS PAPER CONSIDERS THE SCHELERIAN VERSION OF PHENOMENOLOGY TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS INDISPENSIBLE FOR AN EXPOSITION OF HIS THOUGHT ON SHAME. TO CONTRIBUTE, HOWEVER, TO SCHELER-RESEARCH, THE UNITY AND ENTIRETY OF HIS THOUGHT AS SHOWN IN HIS PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF SHAME, IS EXPLICITLY EMPHASIZED.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EMBREE1979, author = {EMBREE, LESTER}, title = {A NOTE ON 'IS' AND 'OUGHT' IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {595-597}, keywords = {is, language, ought}, abstract = {ATTENTION IS CALLED TO THE IS/OUGHT DISTINCTION AS MADE BY HUSSERL IN THE "PROLEGOMENA TO PURE LOGIC" AND ITS BEARING IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY. "OUGHTS" ARE INTERPRETED BY HUSSERL AS VALUE JUDGMENTS INCORPORATING THEORETICAL JUDGMENTS (OR "ISES") AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A FORMAL LOGIC OF SUCH VALUE JUDGMENTS IS SHOWN. CLARIFICATION OF THE DISTINCTION IS ALLEGED BY THE AUTHOR TO BE PRIOR TO THE QUESTION OF THE DERIVABILITY OR NON-DERIVABILITY OF OUGHTS FROM ISES OR VICE VERSA.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EMMANUEL1991, author = {EMMANUEL, Steven-M}, title = {Kierkegaard's Pragmatist Faith.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1991}, keywords = {christianity, faith, pragmatism, religion}, abstract = {The aim of this paper is to show that the Kierkegaardian conception of faith can be defended along traditional pragmatist lines. I interpret the Absolute Paradox as a conceptual expression for the total incommensurability between an infinite God and a finite human intellect. As such, the paradox clears logical space for faith by showing that theoretical reason is incapable of deciding the question of whether Christianity is true. However, where theoretical reason cannot decide the option between belief and unbelief, and where the attainment of an eternal happiness is effectively precluded by the failure to believe, the venture to become Christian may be validated on practical grounds.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Emmanuel1996, author = {Emmanuel, Steven-M}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {974-976}, publisher = {SUNY Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation}, volume = {57(4)}, year = {1996} } @article{ENGEL1963, author = {ENGEL, S-MORRIS}, title = {KANT'S 'REFUTATION' OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {20-35}, keywords = {existence, god, language, necessity, ontological-proof; predicate, religion, textual-criticis}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ENGEL1965, author = {ENGEL, S-MORRIS}, title = {REPLY TO DR SCHWARZ'S "PROFESSOR ENGEL ON KANT".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {412-413}, keywords = {existence, god, ontological-proof; predicate, religion}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{ENGEL1970, author = {ENGEL, S-MORRIS}, title = {WITTGENSTEIN AND KANT.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1970}, volume = {30}, pages = {403-414}, keywords = {modern}, abstract = {ALTHOUGH WITTGENSTEIN'S DEBT TO KANT HAS NOT FAILED TO CATCH THE EYE OF SOME OF HIS READERS, ITS TRUE DEPTH AND EXTENT HAS STILL TO BE RECORDED. NOR IS THE EXISTING LITERATURE ON THIS POINT VERY ILLUMINATING. ON THE CONTRARY, CONSIDERING THE ALREADY VAST SCOPE OF THIS LITERATURE, THE REFERENCES TO KANT ARE NOT ONLY OFTEN LACKING IN INTEREST BUT ARE IN THE MAJORITY OF CASES SIMPLY NOT THERE AT ALL. IN THE PRESENT PAPER AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO REDRESS THIS BALANCE BY DESCRIBING IN MORE DETAIL THAN HAS YET BEEN ATTEMPTED THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THIS RELATION AND WHAT IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING AND ILLUMINATING ABOUT IT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Engstrom1988, author = {Engstrom, Stephen}, title = {Conditioned Autonomy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {48}, pages = {435-453}, keywords = {autonomy, ethics, morality, rigorism}, abstract = {My aim is to show that although there are passages in Kant's writings that suggest the presence in his moral theory of a rigoristic distinction between good and evil and an unacceptable associated view that all human agents are, without distinction, evil, there is nothing in his basic conception of morality as grounded in the autonomy of practical reason that commits him to rigorism or to the unacceptable associated view. In the first part of the paper, I make some preliminary remarks about the idea of autonomy and furnish a setting for it by outlining Kant's view of the practical context of deliberation and choice. In the second part I examine Kant's descriptions of two conditions of human character, namely, frailty and impurity, as a means of dissociating the idea of autonomy from the rigoristic distinction. In the third part I go on to develop a notion of conditioned autonomy that does not involve rigorism and so allows us to draw moral distinctions between human agents. I conclude by indicating some close connections between the idea of conditioned autonomy and Kant's notions of virtue and impurity.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Engstrom1992, author = {Engstrom, Stephen}, title = {The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant's Moral Theory}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52(4)}, pages = {747-780}, keywords = {ethics, good, happiness, virtue}, abstract = {Kant claims that the concept of the highest good, the idea of happiness in proportion to virtue, is grounded in the moral law. But this claim has often been challenged. How can Kant justify including happiness in the highest good? Why should only the virtuous be worth of happiness? This paper argues that when the moral law is interpreted as the criterion for valid application of the concept of the good, the concept of the highest good does indeed follow from the moral law. It also argues that the duty to promote the highest good harmonizes with other duties.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Erwin1997, author = {Erwin, Edward}, title = {Psychoanalysis: Past, Present, and Future}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(3)}, pages = {671-696}, keywords = {past, present, psychoanalysis, science}, abstract = {This article discusses recent philosophic works on psychoanalysis by Patricia Kitcher, Adolf Grunbaum, Donald Levy, and Richard Wollheim. One issue that is addressed concerns the extent to which Freudian hypotheses once received support from discoveries in biology and the social sciences. A second issue concerns the current empirical status of Freud's views. A third issue concerns the future of psychoanalysis if Freudian theory is supplanted by either object relations theory or self psychology.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Erwin1996, author = {Erwin, Edward}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {268-271}, publisher = {MIT Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {A Final Accounting: Philosophical and Empirical Issues in Freudian Psychology}, volume = {59(1)}, year = {1996} } @article{Estlund2005, author = {Estlund, David}, title = {What's So Rickety? Richardson's Non-Epistemic Democracy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(1)}, pages = {204-210}, keywords = {autonomy, democracy, policy, political-philosoph}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EVANS1962, author = {EVANS, D-LUTHER}, title = {THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GETTING TRUTH AND GETTING WISE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, pages = {360-365}, keywords = {interpretation, knowledge, methodology, objectivity, philosophy, subjectivity, truth, wisdom}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{EVANS1961, author = {EVANS, J-L}, title = {MEANING AND USE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {22}, pages = {251-261}, keywords = {expression, language, meaning, ontology, reality, relation, rule, sentence, use, word}, abstract = {EVANS JUSTIFIES HIS CONCEPT OF MEANING IN LIGHT OF ABELSON'S CRITICISMS, WHICH ARISE FROM A PREJUDICE IN FAVOR OF CERTAIN LOGICAL CATEGORIES (SUBSTANCE, ATTRIBUTE AND RELATION), REPRESENTING A DESCENDING ORDER OF RESPECTABILITY. THE AUTHOR HOLDS THAT THIS INVOLVES THINKING THAT THE STATUS OF A CONCEPT WOULD BE ENHANCED IF IT COULD BE REGARDED AS SOME SORT OF OBJECTIVE ENTITY, SUCH AS A PLATONIC FORM, AND IF THIS SHOULD PROVE IMPOSSIBLE, THEN THE CONCEPT MUST BE EITHER ATTRIBUTIVE OR RELATIONAL. THERE IS A DISAPPOINTMENT AT SEEING THE DISPLACEMENT OF MEANING FROM THE CATEGORY OF SUBSTANCE BY THE "USE" THEORY OF MEANING. THE MAIN MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF THE PHRASE "RULES OF USE" ARE EXAMINED, AND THE ARTICLE ENDS BY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN USING AND MISUSING WORDS. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Evans1991, author = {Evans, J-Claude}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {966-968}, publisher = {Univ of Minn Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Strategies of Deconstruction}, volume = {53(4)}, year = {1991} } @article{FACIONE1976, author = {FACIONE, PETER-A}, title = {COUNTEREXAMPLES AND WHERE THEY LEAD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {523-530}, keywords = {argumentation, counterfactual, logic, refutation}, abstract = {THE USE OF COUNTER-EXAMPLES IN PHILOSOPHY IS A FAMILIAR PRACTICE WHICH MAY LEAD A PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE THROUGH FOUR LEVELS OF SOPHISTICATION. LEVEL ONE TRANSACTIONS INCLUDE FRAMING THE ORIGINAL PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLICATION AND PROPOSING THE FIRST COUNTER-EXAMPLES. LEVEL TWO IS THE LEVEL OF REVISION AMENDMENT, NEW COUNTER-EXAMPLES AND NEW AMENDMENTS. WHEN IMAGINATION AND PATIENCE WITH THE WORK ON LEVEL TWO NEAR AN END, THE DEBATE CAN ADVANCE TO LEVEL THREE. HERE ATTACKS ARE MOUNTED WHICH QUESTION, IN FUNDAMENTAL WAYS, THE WHOLE ENTERPRISE THAT, ON LEVEL ONE, LEAD TO THE ORIGINAL EXPLICATION. IF THE ATTACKS ARE MET SUCCESSFULLY, THEN THE DEBATE MAY MOVE TO LEVEL FOUR. THE SIGN OF THIS TRANSITION IS THE COUNTER-ATTACK THAT THE "PURPORTED" COUNTER-EXAMPLES ARE NOT "GENUINE." ON LEVEL FOUR THERE EMERGES A BASIC CONFLICT OF PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS WHICH IS POTENTIALLY IRRECONCILABLE. (EDITED)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FAIR1976, author = {FAIR, FRANK-K}, title = {TWO PROBLEMS WITH RODERICK CHISHOLM'S PERCEIVING.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {547-550}, keywords = {epistemology, language, perceiving}, abstract = {THE FIRST PROBLEM IS THAT RICHARD SEVERENS HAS PRODUCED A FAMILY OF COUNTEREXAMPLES TO CHISHOLM'S DEFINITION OF "THERE IS SOMETHING WHICH S PERCEIVES TO BE F." I THINK THAT THE COUNTEREXAMPLES WORK, BUT THAT CHISHOLM'S DEFINITION CAN BE EASILY AMENDED TO COPE WITH THEM. THE SECOND PROBLEM IS THAT CHISHOLM (AND FRED DRETSKE IN HIS 1969 BOOK ON SEEING AND KNOWING) ACCEPTS AS VALID AN ARGUMENT AGAINST CAUSAL THEORIES OF PERCEPTION WHICH IS ACTUALLY FALLACIOUS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fales2004, author = {Fales, Evan}, title = {Proper Basicality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {373-383}, keywords = {epistemology, externalism, foundationalism}, abstract = {Foundationalist epistemologies, whether internalist or externalist, ground noetic structures in beliefs that are said to be foundational, or properly basic. It is essential to such epistemologies that they provide clear criteria for proper basicality. This proves, I argue, to be a thorny task, at least insofar as the goal is to provide a psychologically realistic reconstruction of our actual doxastic practices. I examine some of the difficulties, and suggest some implications, in particular for the externalist epistemology of Alvin Plantinga.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FALES1984, author = {FALES, EVAN}, title = {DAVIDSON'S COMPATIBILISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {227-246}, keywords = {compatibilism, freedom, libertarianism, metaphysics}, abstract = {DONALD DAVIDSON ADVOCATES A VERSION OF COMPATIBILISM MOTIVATED BY HIS NON-REDUCTIVE MATERIALISM. WHILE THIS POSITION HAS A NUMBER OF ADVANTAGES OVER MORE CLASSICAL FORMS OF COMPATIBILISM, AN EXAMINATION OF DAVIDSON'S VIEWS ON CAUSATION AND EVENT-IDENTITY (UPON WHICH THE ARGUMENT DEPENDS) REVEALS A CHARACTERIZATION OF THE FORMER WHICH RENDERS THE LATTER UNINTELLIGIBLE. FINALLY A LIBERTARIAN VIEW IS SKETCHED WHICH IS GROUNDED IN A DISTINCTION BETWEEN CAUSAL RELATIONS AND THE CONNECTION BETWEEN REASONS AND ACTIONS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Falkenstein2000, author = {Falkenstein, Lorne}, title = {Reid's Account of Localization}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {305-328}, keywords = {color, epistemology, intuition, sensation, space}, abstract = {This paper contrasts three different positions taken by 18th century British scholars on how sensations, particularly sensations of color and touch, come to be localized in space: Berkeley's view (initiated, though not fully executed) that we learn to localize ideas of color by associating certain purely qualitative features of those ideas with ideas of touch and motion, Hume's view that visual and tangible impressions are originally disposed in space, and Reid's view (inspired by Porterfield) that we are innately disposed to refer appearances of color to the end of a line passing through the centre of the eye and originating from the spot on the back of the retina where the material impression causing that appearance was received. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FALKENSTEIN1989, author = {FALKENSTEIN, LORNE}, title = {IS PERCEPTUAL SPACE MONADIC?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {709-713}, keywords = {metaphysics, monadology, perception, space}, abstract = {AGAINST THE CLAIMS OF RUSSELL, GOODMAN, AND ALBERT CASULLO, THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT THE LOCATION OF PHENOMENA IN VISUAL SPACE CANNOT BE DETERMINED THROUGH REFERENCE TO MONADIC LOCAL PROPERTIES OF THE VISUAL FIELD.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FARBER1963, author = {FARBER, MARVIN}, title = {FIRST PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE WORLD.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {315-334}, keywords = {experience, idealism, metaphysics, phenomenology, transcendence, transcendental-reduction; world}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FARBER1969, author = {FARBER, MARVIN}, title = {THE IDEA OF A NATURALISTIC LOGIC.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1969}, volume = {29}, pages = {598-601}, keywords = {logic, naturalism}, abstract = {THE IDEA OF A NATURALISTIC LOGIC AS CONCEIVED BY DEWEY IS COMPARED WITH THE IDEA OF A PURE LOGIC AS ADVANCED BY HUSSERL. DEFENDING THE NATURALISTIC AFFIRMATION OF INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE, THE WRITER REGARDS THE "LIFE-WORLD" OF PHENOMENOLOGY AS EVIDENCE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF SUBJECTIVISM. THE RADICALLY REFLECTIVE PROCEDURE OF PHENOMENOLOGY IS VIEWED AS A LEGITIMATE EXTENSION OF A NATURALISTIC LOGIC. THE CONCEPTS AND STRUCTURES DESCRIBED IN THE REFLECTIVE EXAMINATION OF EXPERIENCE MERELY ADD ANOTHER DIMENSION FOR INQUIRY, WITHOUT REMOVING MAN FROM NATURE IN ANY REAL SENSE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FARBER1965, author = {FARBER, MARVIN}, title = {PERVASIVE SUBJECTIVISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {527-533}, keywords = {epistemology, idealism, knowing, metaphysics, methodology, phenomenology, philosophy, reality, subjectivism}, abstract = {THE VARIOUS FORMS OF SUBJECTIVISM PROCEED FROM THE "COGITO" OR ACKNOWLEDGE ITS PRIMACY. THAT ALLOWS FOR CONSIDERABLE INGENUITY OF OPERATIONS WHILE INSURING A BASIC RELATEDNESS IN THE OUTCOME. THE NEED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE WORLD ON THAT BASIS PRESENTS THE MOST SERIOUS DIFFICULTY TO PURE SUBJECTIVISM. COVERT OR MIXED FORMS OF THAT PHILOSOPHY FACE THE SAME DIFFICULTY INSOFAR AS THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBJECTIVITY IS ASSUMED. MERLEAU-PONTY IS OF INTEREST IN THIS CONNECTION. THE CRITICAL REACTION THAT HAS DEVELOPED HAS BEEN DUE TO THE UNRESOLVED DIFFICULTIES, AS ILLUSTRATED BY FINK; BUT ALSO TO THE MANY FUNCTIONS PHILOSOPHY MUST PERFORM.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FARBER1964, author = {FARBER, MARVIN}, title = {THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEW OF VALUES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1964}, volume = {24}, pages = {552-560}, keywords = {axiology, ethics, experience, individual, phenomenology, society, valuation, value}, abstract = {THERE IS AN EMPHASIS HERE ON THE WAY VALUES APPEAR IN EXPERIENCE AND ON THE CONCRETE EVENTS WHICH MANIFEST THEMSELVES IN THE PROCESS OF EXPERIENCE. IT IS ARGUED THAT VALUATION IS GROUNDED IN REASON; THE RATIONAL SUBJECT IS THE SUBJECT ESTABLISHING THE ETHICAL WORLD. A RATIONALLY GROUNDED AGREEMENT CONCERNING VALUATION AND WILLING IS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR A HARMONIOUS SOCIAL LIFE, ACCORDING TO HUSSERL. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FARBER1960, author = {FARBER, MARVIN}, title = {WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1960}, volume = {21}, pages = {255-259}, keywords = {being, existence, greek, methodology, ontology, philosophizing, philosophy, textual-criticis}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FAUVEL1975, author = {FAUVEL, J-G}, title = {TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL MATHEMATICS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {16-24}, keywords = {information-theory; logic, mathematics, phenomenology, set-theory; structure}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FEIBLEMAN1962, author = {FEIBLEMAN, JAMES-K}, title = {FORMAL MATERIALISM RECONFIRMED.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1962}, volume = {23}, pages = {62-70}, keywords = {energy, formal, materialism, matter, metaphysics, mind, physical-sciences; property, substance}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FEIBLEMAN1965, author = {FEIBLEMAN, JAMES-K}, title = {ARTIFACTUALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1965}, volume = {25}, pages = {544-559}, keywords = {adaptation, artifact, culture, evolution, man, material, object, philosophical-anthropology; tool}, abstract = {THE TWO FACTORS WHICH PLAYED THE LARGEST ROLE IN HUMAN EVOLUTION WERE LANGUAGES AND MATERIAL TOOLS. THE PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF LANGUAGES HAS BEEN VIGOROUSLY PURSUED BY WITTGENSTEIN AND HIS FOLLOWERS, BUT THE EQUALLY IMPORTANT PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF MATERIAL TOOLS HAS BEEN NEGLECTED. CIVILIZED MAN LIVES IN A WORLD LARGELY COMPOSED OF MATERIAL TOOLS. HE HAS ALTERED EVERYTHING IN HIS IMMEDIATE ENVIRONMENT. HE HAS BROUGHT THIS DEVELOPMENT TO THE POINT WHERE HE IS NOW A VICTIM OF IT, FOR HE RESPONDS TO THE STIMULI OF THE ARTIFACTS WITH CHAIN-LEARNED BEHAVIOR. THE PROCESS OF EVOLUTION SHOULD BE ACCELERATED RATHER THAN STOPPED BY THIS DEVELOPMENT, BUT WE DO NOT YET KNOW WHERE IT WILL TAKE US. WE SHALL NOT BE ON TOP OF THE PROBLEM UNTIL WE HAVE ACQUIRED THE ABILITY TO PLAN TOOLS IN TERMS OF THE ANTICIPATED CONDITIONING TO WHICH THEY WILL SUBJECT US.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feit2003, author = {Feit, Neil}, title = {Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {66(2)}, pages = {304-327}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, infallibilism, knowledge, warrant}, abstract = {Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier problem that is compatible with fallibilism. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feit2001, author = {Feit, Neil}, title = {Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(1)}, pages = {29-55}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, rationality}, abstract = {The author presents and defends a general view about belief, and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke's puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke's original puzzle, which have to do with belief attributions containing empty names and kind terms.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feldman1995, author = {Feldman, Fred}, title = {Adjusting Utility for Justice: A Consequentialist Reply to the Objection from Justice}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {55(3)}, pages = {567-585}, keywords = {consequentialism, epistemology, ethics, justice}, abstract = {Traditional forms of consequentialism are open to objections based on considerations of justice. Classic cases such as the Small Southern Town, the Organ Harvest, the Colosseum, etc. show that such forms of consequentialism, focussing exclusively on the total value of available outcomes, are insensitive to questions about the manner in which that value is distributed among the various recipients in the outcome. As a result, such theories sometimes permit serious injustices. In this paper, I formulate an axiology that is sensitive to justice, and combine it with a consequentialist normative theory. I try to show that the resulting view generates correct results in cases involving justice.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feldman2002, author = {Feldman, Fred}, title = {Comments on Two of DePaul's Puzzles}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {636-639}, keywords = {epistemology, hedonism, logic, pain, sensation}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feldman2002a, author = {Feldman, Fred}, title = {The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(3)}, pages = {604-628}, keywords = {axiology, good-life; hedonism, pleasure, value}, abstract = {It is important to keep in mind that hedonism is a theory about the value of a person's life for the person who lives it, and not for the world or for others. It is also important to distinguish between sensory hedonism and attitudinal hedonism. "Desert Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism" appears to be immune to objections (a) and (b). A variant appears to be immune to all of them. Perhaps it is the answer to the question about the value of a life. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feldman1999, author = {Feldman, Fred}, title = {Comments on Living High and Letting Die}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(1)}, pages = {195-201}, keywords = {caring, choice, ethics}, abstract = {In Living High and Letting Die, Peter Unger asserts that "well-to-do folks like us" have a moral obligation to give most of our wealth to organizations that will use the money to help prevent premature death among distant third-world "tykes." I wonder why it is wrong to devote our wealth to other projects, such as saving the lives of nearby children, or teenagers, or making the world better in other ways. Unger's suggestion is that his doctrine follows from his moral theory, "Liberationism." I make the following claims: (1) Although Unger never clearly states the normative component of liberationism, he does state a smattering of principles that might be parts of it. (2) None of these principles implies that anyone has an all-in obligation to give anything to prevent premature deaths among tykes in distant lands. (3) We can formulate principles that have the desired implications. (4) Such principles are wholly implausible.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FELDMAN1989, author = {FELDMAN, FRED}, title = {ON DYING AS A PROCESS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {375-390}, keywords = {death, dying, metaphysics, process}, abstract = {TO SAY THAT A THING IS DYING, IN THE PROCESS SENSE, IT TO SAY (ROUGHLY) THAT IT IS IN A "TERMINAL DECLINE," THAT IT IS "HEADING TOWARD DEATH." AFTER EXAMINING AND REJECTING SEVERAL PROPOSED ANALYSES OF THE CONCEPT OF DYING AS A PROCESS, I PRESENT MY OWN. WHEN AN ORGANISM IS DYING, IT IS ENGAGED IN A PROCESS CONSISTING OF THE SEQUENTIAL DECREASE OF THE THING'S VITAL PROPERTIES; A PROCESS WHICH, IF ALLOWED TO REACH ITS CONCLUSION WITHOUT INTERFERENCE, WILL TERMINATE WITH THE DEATH OF THE ORGANISM. I DISCUSS THE VIRTUES OF THIS ANALYSIS, AND ITS WEAKNESSES.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Feldman1997, author = {Feldman, Fred}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {734-736}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy}, volume = {60(3)}, year = {1997} } @other{Feldman1992, author = {Feldman, Fred}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {233-237}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Confrontations with the Reaper}, volume = {55(1)}, year = {1992} } @article{Feldman1997a, author = {Feldman, Richard}, title = {Essay: Human Knowledge and Human Nature: A New Introduction to an Ancient Debate by Peter Carruthers and Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis by Edward Craig}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1997}, volume = {57(1)}, pages = {205-221}, keywords = {epistemology, knowledge, nature}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feldman2000, author = {Feldman, Richard}, title = {The Ethics of Belief}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(3)}, pages = {667-695}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, ethics, knowledge}, abstract = {In this paper I first argue that we do have a form of voluntary control over a substantial number of beliefs, but this fact is of no great significance for epistemology since epistemic evaluations do not depend upon whether we have or exercise voluntary control over beliefs. Next, I argue that what we epistemically ought to do is to have the beliefs supported by the evidence we actually have. Finally, I express skepticism about the meaningfulness of questions about how to weigh epistemological considerations against moral or prudential considerations in figuring out what we ought to do all things considered.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Feldman2002b, author = {Feldman, Richard and Conee, Earl}, title = {Typing Problems}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {65(1)}, pages = {98-105}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, generality, knowledge, reliabilism, type}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FEREJOHN1984, author = {FEREJOHN, MICHAEL-T}, title = {SOCRATIC VIRTUE AS THE PARTS OF ITSELF.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {44}, pages = {377-388}, keywords = {epistemology, logic, virtue, whole}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fern2005, author = {Fernandez, Jordi}, title = {Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {71(3)}, pages = {533-556}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, justification, moore's-paradox; paradox, perception, rationality, self-knowledg}, abstract = {I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore's paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the model in question can account for both versions of Moore's paradox. Moore's paradox, I conclude, tells us something about our conceptions of rationality and self-knowledge. For it teaches us that we take it to be constitutive of being rational that one can have privileged access to one's own mind and it reveals that having privileged access to one's own mind is a matter of forming first-order beliefs and corresponding second-order beliefs on the same basis.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FERRATER-MORA1977, author = {FERRATER-MORA, J}, title = {FICTIONS, UNIVERSALS, AND ABSTRACT ENTITIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {37}, pages = {353-367}, keywords = {abstract-entity; fiction, metaphysics, objectification, phenomenology, universal}, abstract = {FICTIONS, UNIVERSALS, AND ABSTRACTS ENTITIES ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS "OBJECTIFICATIONS" OF HUMAN SUBJECTS (OR ANY SUBJECTS HAVING A NEURAL ORGANIZATION SIMILAR TO, OR FUNCTIONING AS, MAN'S). UNIVERSALS ARE FOUNDED UPON LINGUISTIC ACTIVITY. ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE MORE RESILIENT TO THE ABOVE APPROACH, BUT ARE IN NO CASE ONTOLOGICALLY "INDEPENDENT."}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Ferreira1991, author = {Ferreira, M-Jamie}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {734-737}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Transforming Vision}, volume = {54(3)}, year = {1991} } @article{FETHE1976, author = {FETHE, CHARLES}, title = {MIRACLES AND ACTION EXPLANATIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {36}, pages = {415-422}, keywords = {action, explanation, miracle, religion}, abstract = {TO DEFEND THE CONCEPT OF MIRACLES FROM ATTACKS SUCH AS THOSE RAISED BY NOWELL-SMITH, CERTAIN PHILOSOPHERS HAVE APPEALED TO ACTION THEORY AND ARGUED THAT THE THEIST'S EXPLANATION OF MIRACLES IS LIKE THE EXPLANATION OF AN ACTION AND NOT LIKE THE EXPLANATION OF A CAUSED EVENT. THIS ARTICLE SHOWS THAT NOWELL-SMITH'S OBJECTIONS CANNOT BE AVOIDED IN THIS WAY AND THAT BELIEF IN MIRACLES ONLY ACCENTS THE THEIST'S PROBLEM OF EXPLAINING GOD'S RELATION TO THE WORLD.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FEUER1963, author = {FEUER, LEWIS-S}, title = {THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD OF ARTHUR O LOVEJOY: CRITICAL REALISM AND PSYCHOANALYTICAL REALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {23}, pages = {493-510}, keywords = {behaviorism, critical-realism; criticism, epistemology, irrationality, methodology, motive, philosophy, pragmatism, psychoanalysis}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FIESER1989, author = {FIESER, JAMES}, title = {IS HUME A MORAL SKEPTIC?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {89-105}, keywords = {descriptive-ethics; ethics, metaethics, moral, scepticism}, abstract = {USING J L MACKIE'S ANALYSIS OF MORAL SKEPTICISM AS A POINT OF REFERENCE, I ARGUE THAT, AS A NORMATIVE THEORY, HUME'S ACCOUNT OF MORALITY IS NOT SKEPTICAL SINCE HE IS OFFERING A RELATIVELY OPTIMISTIC CONSEQUENTIALIST THEORY OF RIGHT AND WRONG ACTION. AS A METAETHICAL THEORY, HOWEVER, I ARGUE THAT HUME IS A WEAK METAETHICAL SKEPTIC INSOFAR AS HE DENIES THAT MORALITY IS INDEPENDENT OF THE EXISTENCE AND CHARACTER OF HUMAN BEINGS. HE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A THOROUGH OR STRONG METAETHICAL SKEPTIC, THOUGH, SINCE HE ADVANCES A MORAL THEORY WHICH IS FIRMLY GROUNDED IN HUMAN INSTINCT.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Fine1993, author = {Fine, Gail}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {489-491}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {On Ideas--Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms}, volume = {56(2)}, year = {1993} } @other{Fine2002, author = {Fine, Kit}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {223-232}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Limits of Abstraction}, volume = {72(1)}, year = {2002} } @article{FIRTH1978, author = {FIRTH, RODERICK}, title = {COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR POSTOW'S PAPER: "ETHICAL RELATIVISM AND THE IDEAL OBSERVER".}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1978}, volume = {39}, pages = {122-123}, keywords = {conflict, ethics, objectivism, obligation, observer}, abstract = {POSTOW HAS ARGUED THAT MY ANALYSIS OF ETHICAL TERMS IN "ETHICAL ABSOLUTISM AND THE IDEAL OBSERVER" LEAVES OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT AN IDEAL OBSERVER COULD REACT FAVORABLY TOWARD TWO INCOMPATIBLE ACTS. I REPLY THAT THIS RAISES NO DIFFICULTY FOR AN ANALYSIS OF 'RIGHT'. BUT FOR "EXCLUSIVE" TERMS LIKE 'DUTY' AND 'OBLIGATORY' THE ANALYSIS REQUIRES AN ADDITIONAL CLAUSE.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fischer1999, author = {Fischer, John-Martin}, title = {Contribution on Martha Nussbaum's The Therapy of Desire}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {59(3)}, pages = {787-792}, keywords = {desire, epistemology, hellenism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fischer2000, author = {Fischer, John-Martin}, title = {The Significance of Free Will by Robert Kane}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {60(1)}, pages = {141-148}, keywords = {determinism, free-will; metaphysics, significance}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fischer2000a, author = {Fischer, John-Martin and Ravizza, Mark}, title = {Precis of Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {441-445}, keywords = {control, ethics, moral-responsibilit}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fischer2000b, author = {Fischer, John-Martin and Ravizza, Mark}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2000}, volume = {61(2)}, pages = {467-480}, keywords = {control, ethics, responsibility}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FISHER1975, author = {FISHER, JOHN}, title = {FALLIBILITY AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE FUTURE.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1975}, volume = {36}, pages = {44-58}, keywords = {epistemology, future, knowledge, prediction, scepticism, verification}, abstract = {I DEFEND A POSITION THAT COMBINES KNOWLEDGE OF THE FUTURE WITH A ROBUST SENSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EVENTS SURPRISING OUR BEST JUSTIFIED EXPECTATIONS. THE SCEPTICAL ARGUMENT ALLUDES TO FUTURE POSSIBILITIES REFUTING OUR KNOWLEDGE; I ATTACK SEVERAL POPULAR BUT PERNICIOUS ANTISCEPTICAL RESPONSES. I ARGUE AGAINST THE CLAIM THAT IT MAKES NO SENSE TO ENTERTAIN THE SCEPTIC'S POSSIBILITIES. IN ANALYZING AUSTIN'S ACCOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE, I ARGUE THAT HIS PERFORMATIVE ANALYSIS WRONGLY MAKES KNOWLEDGE COMPATIBLE WITH ACTUALLY BEING WRONG, WHEREAS THE CORRECT RESPONSE TO THE SCEPTIC IS THAT KNOWLEDGE IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING WRONG.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FISHER1963, author = {FISHER, MARK}, title = {CATEGORY-ABSURDITIES.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1963}, volume = {24}, pages = {260-267}, keywords = {absurdity, category, grammar, language, metaphor, modality, necessity, rule}, abstract = {IT IS MAINTAINED THAT TO SHOW A STATEMENT TO BE ABSURD, ONE SHOWS THAT IT CAN'T BE TRUE, THAT IT IS NECESSARILY FALSE, FOR A PARTICULAR KIND OF REASON. SOMETIMES CATEGORY-ABSURDITIES ARISE BECAUSE LINGUISTIC RULES ARE BROKEN. THE AUTHOR HOLDS THAT ONE CAN SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF WHAT MAKES CATEGORY-MISTAKES MISTAKES WITHOUT MENTIONING MEANING AT ALL. THEN ONE CAN GO ON TO DISCUSS THE DIFFERENT KIND OF ERROR THAT ARISES WHEN MEANING RULES ARE IGNORED. (STAFF)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fitch1996, author = {Fitch, G-W}, title = {Representing Beliefs}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {597-609}, keywords = {action, argument, belief, epistemology}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FITCH1984, author = {FITCH, G-W}, title = {TWO ASPECTS OF BELIEF.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1984}, volume = {45}, pages = {87-102}, keywords = {belief, epistemology, indexical}, abstract = {THE ANALYSIS OF PROPER NAMES IN BELIEF CONTEXTS HAS BEEN A CONSTANT SOURCE OF DIFFICULTY FOR THOSE WHO HAVE ADOPTED THE DIRECT REFERENCE THEORY FOR NAMES. IT IS ARGUED THAT THE PROBLEM DOES NOT REST UPON THE DIRECT REFERENCE THEORY, BUT RATHER LIES WITH THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF BELIEF. AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF BELIEVING MOTIVATED IN PART BY RECENT WORK ON BELIEF AND INDEXICALS IS OFFERED THAT SOLVES THE PROBLEMS FOR NAMES IN BELIEF CONTEXTS.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FLAGE1985, author = {FLAGE, DANIEL-E}, title = {BERKELEY'S NOTIONS.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {407-426}, keywords = {causality, metaphysics, notion, perception, relation}, abstract = {THE PAPER EXAMINES THE EPISTEMIC FUNCTION OF BERKELEIAN NOTIONS. BEGINNING WITH AN ELUCIDATION OF BERKELEY'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN POSITIVE AND RELATIVE NOTIONS, IT IS ARGUED THAT RELATIVE NOTIONS FUNCTION IN THE COGNITIVE REALM IN A MANNER ANALOGOUS TO DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS. IT IS SHOWN THAT THIS MODEL OF RELATIVE NOTIONS IS CONSISTENT WITH BERKELEY'S ACCOUNTS OF ONE'S NOTIONS OF SUBSTANCE AND OF RELATIONS AMONG IDEAS, PROVIDED ONE ALLOWS THAT ONE HAS POSITIVE NOTIONS OF THE RELATIONS OF PERCEPTION AND CAUSATION.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Fleishacker1994, author = {Fleishacker, Samuel}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {233-235}, publisher = {Cornell Univ Pr}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {The Ethics of Culture}, volume = {57(1)}, year = {1994} } @article{Floridi1996, author = {Floridi, Luciano}, title = {Followers of French Fashions: Neo-Cartesianism and Analytic Epistemology}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56(3)}, pages = {633-639}, keywords = {analytic, cartesianism, epistemology, french}, abstract = {This is a discussion of Susan Haack's epistemology, as it is outlined in her book Evidence and Inquiry. Haack explicitly characterises her foundherentism as a moderate form of Cartesianism in which rationalist or a priori solutions of the sceptical challenge are declined. The question then becomes whether a purely empirical, neo-Cartesian approach to epistemology (the withdrawal from the a priori) may be successfully antisceptical. As a theory of epistemic justification, foundherentism faces the fundamental thread of vicious circularity. In two occasions Haack argues that foundherentism can solve the metaepistemological problem of its own justification. In this article I explain why we should be rather more pessimistic.}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Floridi2005, author = {Floridi, Luciano}, title = {Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70(2)}, pages = {351-370}, keywords = {data, information, language, meaning, semantics}, abstract = {There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticizing and revising the standard definition of semantic information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favor of the Dretske-Grice approach: meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticized for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information, and misinformation (that is, false semantic information) is not a type of semantic information, but pseudoinformation, that is not semantic information at all. This is shown by arguing that none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing, whilst there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudoinformation. As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth-condition. (edited)}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @other{Floridi1996a, author = {Floridi, Luciano}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, owner = {andrew}, pages = {711-714}, publisher = {E J Brill}, timestamp = {2008.06.19}, title = {Scepticism and the Foundation of Epistemology: A Study in the Metalogical Fallacies}, volume = {61(3)}, year = {1996} } @article{Fodor2001, author = {Fodor, Jerry-A}, title = {Brandom's Burdens: Compositionality and Inferentialism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {63(2)}, pages = {465-481}, keywords = {composition, inference, language, pragmatism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FODOR1989, author = {FODOR, JERRY}, title = {"REMNANTS OF MEANING" BY STEPHEN SCHIFFER.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {50}, pages = {409-423}, keywords = {intention, language, meaning, semantics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{FODOR1981, author = {FODOR, JERRY-A}, title = {REPLY TO PROFESSOR ZAITCHIK ON PHYSICALISM.}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {292-293}, keywords = {intensionalism, metaphysics, representationalism}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fodor1994, author = {Fodor, Jerry-A and Lepore, Ernie}, title = {What "Is" The Connection Principle?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {54(4)}, pages = {837-845}, keywords = {connectionism, consciousness, intentionality, language, linguistics, metaphysics}, owner = {andrew}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @article{Fogelin2004, author = {Fogelin, Robert-J}, title = {Stroud's Quest for Reality}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {68(2)}, pages = {401-407}, key