[UPDATE: Here’s the new version of the paper]
“Moral Perception” has just been accepted for publication in the European Journal of Philosophy. As Clayton once so eloquently put it – Huzzah!
I have to make some stylistic changes. When I do that I’ll post a draft of the paper. For now, I’ll give you a draft of the new version of the abstract.
Moral Perception (forthcoming)
Abstract
In this paper, I defend the view that we can have perceptual moral knowledge. First, I motivate the moral perception view by drawing on some examples involving perceptual knowledge of complex non-moral properties. I argue that we have little reason to think that perception of moral properties couldn’t operate in much the same way that our perception of these complex non-moral properties operates. I then defend the moral perception view from two challenging objections that have yet to be adequately addressed. The first objection is that the moral perception view has implausible commitments concerning the morally blind – people who would claim not to perceive wrongness. The second objection is that the moral perception view is not really compatible with a wide range of the main candidate moral theories. I argue that the moral empiricist has plausible responses to both of these objections.
Congratulations!
Congratulations, if the abstract is any indication of the paper’s content, you will have joined a long, noble tradition of youth corruption!
Just kidding, I look forward to reading it. (As Mr. Burns would say, Huzzah!)
Congratulations!
Congrats, Andy. You deserve it. I still recall our time in the dissertations in progress group under Rich’s tutelage when I would give you more grief than you deserved for your views. Of course, I still think you’re wrong. 😉
Congratulations Android!! I’ll also assume you’re wrong. But you’re still so right.