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[podcast]http://www.sympoze.com/podcast/episode4.mp3[/podcast]

Articles Discussed

• The Externalist’s Demon
  from Canadian Journal of Philosophy by Clayton Littlejohn
• ALTERNATIVE QUESTIONS AND KNOWLEDGE ATTRIBUTIONS
  from The Philosophical Quarterly by Egre, Paul
• THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND THE DEVIL
  from The Philosophical Quarterly by Nagasawa, Yujin
• SSI DISINTERRED
  from The Philosophical Quarterly by Brueckner, Anthony
• DEFINING ULTIMATE ONTOLOGICAL BASIS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL LAYER
  from The Philosophical Quarterly by Paseau, Alexander
• THERE ARE BRUTE NECESSITIES
  from The Philosophical Quarterly by Whittle, Bruno
• Racism as Disrespect
  from Ethics by Joshua Glasgow
• Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology
  from Ethics by Alison Hills
• Precis of My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility
  from Philosophy and Phenomenological Research by JOHN MARTIN FISCHER
• Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription
  from Philosophy and Phenomenological Research by STEPHAN TORRE
• Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument
  from Philosophy and Phenomenological Research by GUY KAHANE
• Analysis (tons of interesting stuff)

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4 Responses to “Wide Scope Philosopy Podcast – Episode 4”

1. 

   Clayton

   January 9, 2010 at 3:11 pm

   Andrew,

   Thanks for the inclusion. I know that some authors distinguish doxastic justification from propositional justification, and I think you can draw this distinction, but I think there’s a further distinction between _personal_ and doxastic justification. On Kvanvig’s view, doxastic justification is (roughly) propositional justification + basing and personal justification = doxastic justification. If that view is right, externalists cannot accommodate the intuition that gives rise to the new evil demon problem. I think that personal justification does not entail doxastic justification (and doesn’t entail propositional justification, either) and so externalism about doxastic j and propositional j doesn’t support externalism about personal j.

   Reply
2. 

   Andrew Cullison

   January 13, 2010 at 6:14 pm

   Clayton,

   Got it.

   I think I construed your notion of justification as being the propositional/doxastic distinction because one of your notions seemed to be a relation between a person and a proposition and the other seemed to be a property of a mental state.

   I agree with Kvanvig, in that I think that doxastic justification = propositional justification + basing…but I supposed one could disagree.

   I think the fundamental distinction between propositional justification and doxastic justification is that the former is a relational property between a person and a proposition. The latter is a property of a doxastic mental state. One could have a view of those two kinds of properties that doesn’t connect them in the ways that Kvanvig does.

   Given the more neutral characterization of the two notions…they looked a little like your two notions in the abstract.

   Haven’t read your paper yet, but I’m looking forward to it.

   Reply
3. 

   Clayton

   January 15, 2010 at 12:31 pm

   Hey Andy,

   If you get a chance to take a look and have any qualms or objections, do let me know. I’d love to chat about this stuff sometime. It’s been a while since I’ve thought about the issues covered in the paper. (CJP had a bit of a backlog so this was, I think, the first paper I had accepted and maybe the last one to find its way into the public space.)

   Any chance you’ll be at any conferences in the upcoming conference season? One of these days it would be nice to run into you and have a drink.

   Reply
4. 

   Andrew Cullison

   January 21, 2010 at 8:37 pm

   Cool. I’ll get in touch. I’d love to talk about this stuff too.

   I don’t have any plans to attend Central or Pacific. I’ll let you know if that changes.

   Reply